The electric field is discussed in greater detail and field due an infinite line charge is computed. The concepts of charge density and electric flux are introduced and Gauss’s Law, which relates the two, is derived. It is applied to the study of the electric field generated by a spherical charge distribution.
The electric field is introduced as the mediator of electrostatic interactions: objects generate the field which permeates all of space, and charged objects in the field experience a force with magnitude proportional to their charge. Several instructive examples are given, including the field of an electric dipole and the notion of the electric dipole and dipole moment. The notion of field lines is introduced.
The course begins with a discussion of electricity. The concept of charge is introduced, and the properties of electrical forces are compared with those of other familiar forces, such as gravitation. Coulomb’s Law, along with the principle of superposition, allows for the calculation of electrostatic forces from a given charge distribution.
Professor Shapiro guides the class through some practical applications of his theory of democratic justice. As applied to governing children, a sphere in which power-based hierarchy is inevitable, he circumscribes the role of the state as the fiduciary over children’s basic interests and the role of parents as the fiduciaries over children’s best interests. In other words, the state ensures the provision of the resources necessary for survival while the parents provide the resources to enable children to thrive as well as possible.
Professor Shapiro takes up again Schumpeter’s minimalist conception of democracy. When operationalized as a two turnover test, this conception of democracy proves far from minimalist, yet people often expect other things from democracy, like delivering justice. Although people experiencing injustice under other types of governments often clamor for democracy, they become disillusioned with democracy when a particular regime fails to ensure greater justice for society.
Majority rule and democratic competition serve as the focus of this second lecture on the democratic tradition. What is it about majority rule that confers legitimacy on collective decisions? Is there any validity to a utilitarian justification, that catering to the wishes of the majority maximizes the happiness of the greatest number? Does majority rule reflect what Rousseau called the general will? What is the general will? Does Arrow’s paradox indicate that the results of voting are arbitrary? Is majority rule just an exercise in realpolitik?
Professor Shapiro transitions to the third and final section of the course, an in-depth look at democracy and its institutions. According to him, democracy is the most successful at delivering on the mature Enlightenment’s twin promises to recognize individual rights as the ultimate political good and to base politics on some kind of commitment to objective knowledge. And interestingly, democracy as a tradition was not made famous by its champions, but rather by its critics. Professor Shapiro guides the class through the writings of Plato, Tocqueville, Madison, and Dahl.
In this lecture, Professor Shapiro delves into the nuances of MacIntyre’s argument, focusing specifically on his Aristotelian account of human psychology. It has two features: (1) man’s nature is inherently teleological or purposive, and (2) human behavior is fundamentally other-directed, in that a person’s happiness is conditioned upon the experience of others as it relates to him, particularly on the feeling of being valued by someone he values. MacIntyre’s account of human psychology highlights the malleability and the contingency of human nature.
In addition to the traditionalist-conservative view covered last time, the other anti-Enlightenment school the course explores is contemporary communitarianism. While Burke and Devlin appealed to tradition as the basis for our values, communitarians appeal to the community-accepted values as the basis for what should guide us. Communitarian Richard Rorty criticizes the Enlightenment endeavor of justifying philosophy from the ground up from indubitable premises as a fool’s errand and a dangerous mug’s game.
