PHIL 181 - Lecture 26 - Concluding Lecture

In this concluding lecture, Professor Gendler charts four paths through the course. The first path traces how the course’s three main goals were realized: the goals of introducing students to the discipline of Philosophy though a number of central texts; of considering certain central questions raised by those philosophical texts in light of alternative approaches from related disciplines; and of considering more generally the how various disciplines might provide complementary perspectives on important questions.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 25 - Tying up Loose Ends

Professor Gendler begins with brief introductory remarks about the course’s methodology, explaining the approach that was taken to reading and presenting various articles. She continues with a discussion of Cass Sunstein’s work on social norms, looking particularly at his account of the willingness to pay/willingness to accept distinction. The lecture continues with a consideration of how this distinction-–and the heuristic reasoning that gives rise to it–-might be used to explain our responses to the trolley problem.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 24 - Censorship

Professor Gendler explores some aspects of the question of what sorts of non-rational persuasion are legitimate for a government to engage in. She begins with two modern examples that illustrate Plato’s view on state censorship. She next turns to the text itself and outlines in detail Plato’s argument that since we are vulnerable to non-rational persuasion, and since a powerful source of such persuasion is imitative poetry, such poetry must be censored by the state.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 23 - Social Structures

Professor Gendler begins by recapping the topic of state legitimacy and then offers a way of understanding the disagreement between Rawls and Nozick as one over what states ought to do given the phenomena of moral luck. She then turns to a discussion of how social and cultural structures influence both our characters and our perception of the world. She begins by discussing ways in which this theme plays a role in the work of Aristotle and John Stuart Mill.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 22 - Equality II

Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is presented as a counterpoint to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. In contrast to Rawls, who puts justice at the center of his theory, Nozick maintains that the primary notion should be rights or liberties. With that assumption in place, Nozick argues that a minimal state is the only just state, and that any state more extensive violates fundamental liberties.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 21 - Equality

The discussion of the legitimacy of government is continued with an introduction to a major 20th century work of political philosophy, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.  Professor Gendler explores John Rawls’ central claims: that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” and that the just society is that which rational and self-interested individuals would choose for themselves from behind a “veil of ignorance” (that is, not knowing what role in society they would occupy).

PHIL 181 - Lecture 20 - The Prisoner's Dilemma

Two game theoretical problems–the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Problem of the Commons–are explored in detail. Both collective decision-making scenarios are structured such that all parties making rational choices ensures a less desired outcome for each than if each had chosen individually-less-preferred options. To conclude, Professor Gendler discusses various strategies that can be used to address both problems.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 19 - Contract & Commonwealth: Thomas Hobbes

In the opening part of the lecture, Professor Gendler concludes her discussion of punishment by exploring how Alan Kazdin’s research on effective parenting provides insights about techniques for rehabilitating individuals who violate societal norms. She then moves to the third large unit of the course: the question of the legitimacy and structure of the state. One answer to the question of state legitimacy–that of Thomas Hobbes–is presented.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 18 - Punishment II

The lecture begins with a consideration of the traditional consequentialist account of punishment–-that punishment is justified by its deterrent effect on future crimes. Traditional criticisms of the view are presented, and John Rawls’ two-level justification for punishment is offered as one possible way to avoid such criticisms by bringing together consequentialist and deontological justifications of punishment  in a single theory. Next, Professor Gendler reviews some empirical research on punishment intuitions, including data on moral outrage and the “Knobe effect”.

PHIL 181 - Lecture 17 - Punishment I

Professor Gendler begins with a discussion of differing responses to hypothetical and actual examples, and offers an actual example of a Trolley Problem. Then, the central topic of the lecture, punishment, is presented. After offering a characterization of what civil punishment involves, Professor Gendler discusses various justifications that have been offered of the practice. She distinguishes between justifications that are forward-looking and those that are backward-looking, and between justifications that are primarily victim-directed and those that are primarily offender-directed.

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