PHIL 176 - Lecture 10 - Personal Identity, Part I: Identity Across Space and Time and the Soul Theory

The lecture focuses on the question of the metaphysical key to personal identity. What does it mean for a person that presently exists to be the very same person in the future? The first approach to answering this question is the "soul theory," that is, the key to being the same person is having the same soul. Difficulties with that approach are then discussed, independent of the question whether souls exist or not.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 9 - Plato, Part IV: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul (cont.)

Professor Kagan elaborates on the "argument from simplicity" and discusses in detail Plato's claims that the soul is simple, changeless and therefore indestructible. The final Platonic argument under discussion is the "argument from essential properties" in which the essential properties of the soul are addressed. At the end of the lecture the question of whether one needs to argue for physicalism is posed.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 8 - Plato, Part III: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul (cont.)

The lecture focuses exclusively on one argument for the immortality of the soul from Plato's Phaedo, namely, "the argument from simplicity." Plato suggests that in order for something to be destroyed, it must have parts, that is, it must be possible to "take it apart." Arguing that the soul is simple, that it does not have parts, Plato believes that it would logically follow that the soul is indestructible.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 7 - Plato, Part II: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul

The discussion of Plato's Phaedo continues, presenting more arguments for the existence and immortality of the soul. One such argument is "the argument from the nature of the forms," which states that because the forms are non-physical objects and cannot be grasped by something physical like the body, it follows that they must be grasped by the soul which must be non-physical as well. This argument is followed by the "argument from recycling" and "the argument from recollection."

PHIL 176 - Lecture 6 - Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part IV; Plato, Part I

The lecture begins with a continued discussion of the Cartesian argument and its weaknesses. The lecture then turns to Plato's metaphysical views in the context of his work, Phaedo. The key point in the discussion is the idea that in addition to the ordinary empirical world that we are familiar with, we posit the existence of a second realm in which the Platonic forms exist. These forms are the abstract properties that we attribute to physical objects, such as beauty, justice, goodness and so on.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 5 - Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part III: Free Will and Near-Death Experiences

Professor Kagan discusses in detail the argument of free will as proof for the existence of an immaterial soul. The argument consists of three premises: 1) We have free will. 2) Nothing subject to determinism has free will. 3) All purely physical systems are subject to determinism. The conclusion drawn from this is that humans are not a purely physical system; but Professor Kagan explains why this argument is not truly compelling. In addition, near-death experiences and the Cartesian argument are discussed at length.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 4 - Introduction to Plato's Phaedo; Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part II

After a brief introduction to Plato's Phaedo, more arguments are offered in this lecture in defense of the existence of an immaterial soul. The emphasis here is on the fact that we need to believe in the existence of a soul in order to explain the claim that we possess free will. This is an argument dualists use as an objection to the physicalists: since no merely physical entity could have free will, there must be more to us than just being a physical object.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 2 - The Nature of Persons: Dualism vs. Physicalism

Professor Kagan discusses the two main positions with regard to the question, "What is a person?" On the one hand, there is the dualist view, according to which a person is a body and a soul. On the other hand, the physicalist view argues that a person is just a body. The body, however, has a certain set of abilities and is capable of a large range of activities.

PHIL 176 - Lecture 1 - Course Introduction

Professor Kagan introduces the course and the material that will be covered during the semester. He aims to clarify what the class will focus on in particular and which subjects it will steer away from. The emphasis will be placed on philosophical questions that arise when one contemplates the nature of death. The first half of the course will address metaphysical questions while the second half will focus on value theory.