WEBVTT

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Prof: So this morning
we're going to start talking

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about Edmund Burke and the
anti-Enlightenment.

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And one prefatory note is that
when thinking about political

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theory as opposed to everyday
political argument I think it's

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very important not to get hung
up on labels such as left wing,

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or right wing,
or liberal, or conservative.

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And I think the occasion of
beginning to speak about Burke

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is a good moment to make this
point.

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After all, I think it'd be fair
to say that before you walked

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into this course if you had
looked down the syllabus and

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somebody had said,
"Who is the most radical

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thinker on this syllabus?"

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most of you would have picked
out Marx.

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But as we've seen,
Marx is actually a footnote to

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the Enlightenment.

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Marx is not,
he's not somebody who engages

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in a radical departure from the
ideas that were developed by

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Locke and the other thinkers
that shaped the main ideas of

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the Enlightenment.

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Burke, on the other hand,
is generally thought of as a

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conservative politically,
and indeed he was a

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conservative politically,
but philosophically he's a much

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more radical thinker than Marx
was.

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He is somebody who really goes
to the root of accepted

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assumptions in his critical
questioning.

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Burke completely rejects the
Enlightenment project as I have

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described it to you today.

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Let me say a little bit about
who he was.

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He was born in 1829,
so that makes him,

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I mean 1729,
sorry.

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I gave him a hundred years
there.

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He was born in 1729,
a quarter of a century after

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Locke died,
and the main work for which he

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is most known,
his Reflections on the

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Revolution in France,
was published in 1790 almost

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exactly a century after,
actually more like 110 years

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after Locke's Second
Treatise.

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Well, I should say it was
published a hundred years after,

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but it was written a 110 years
after because we now know that

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Locke wrote The Second
Treatise in the early 1680s.

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But what motivated Burke to
write his reflections on the

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French Revolution was the
appalling carnage that

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eventually resulted from the
French Revolution.

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The French Revolution was not
planned as a revolution.

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It was really street riots that
escalated in Paris,

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but escalated to the point of
the complete destruction of the

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whole society,
the inauguration of a massive

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terror,
which appalled Burke.

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And so he wrote this,
what started out as a pamphlet,

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but became this very famous
book on the Reflections on

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the Revolution in France
, and that becomes a

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basis of Burke's outlook.

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He wasn't a professional
scholar or academic.

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He was actually a public person.

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He would eventually become a
Member of Parliament and has

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some things to say about
democratic representation that I

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will come back to when we get to
the theory of democracy.

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But at the time he wrote the
Reflections on the Revolution

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in France,
which is what I had you read

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excerpts from today,
he was mainly preoccupied with

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what had happened,
what had transpired across the

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Channel in 1789.

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And he was, in particular,
concerned to establish against

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people like Richard Price,
who's one of the people who he

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engages there,
that 1789 was in any sense a

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logical follow-on of 1688 in
England;

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1688, of course,
when we had the revolution in

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England,
the glorious revolution of 1688

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when William was put on the
throne,

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which Locke defended,
but from Burke's point of view

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that was a minor palace affair
not a fundamental or radical

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revolution.

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And in this sense Locke's
view--I'm sorry,

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Burke's view of the English
Revolution,

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for those of you who are
historians here you might be

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interested to know,
is very much at odds with the

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big new book called 1688
just recently published by

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Professor Pincus in the history
department here,

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a very interesting book which
argues that 1688 was a much more

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radical break with the past than
people thought at the time,

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and certainly than Burke
thought because Burke thought

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that 1688 was not a radical
break with the past whereas 1789

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in France was a radical break
with the past.

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And I think that another thing
to say before we get into the

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particulars of Burke's view is
that,

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unlike everybody else you've
read in this course,

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Burke really does not have a
theory of politics.

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He does not have a set of
premises that you can lay out,

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conclusions to which he wants
to get and then change of

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reasoning that get him from A to
B from the premises to the

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conclusion.

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There is no theory of politics
in Burke.

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With Kant we talk about
universalizability.

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Locke we talk about this
commitment to principles of

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scientific certainty.

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Burke has, rather than a
theory, he has an attitude or a

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disposition,
an outlook, and that outlook is

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informed first and foremost by
extreme distrust not only of

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science,
but of anybody who claims to

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have scientific knowledge.

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He thinks that human society is
way too complicated for us ever

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to get completely to the bottom
of it.

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That we are kind of carried
along on a wave of very

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complicated history that we
understand only dimly,

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if at all, and that that's not
going to change.

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The human condition is a
condition first and foremost,

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of fumbling in the dark.

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He says, just to give you a
flavor of this),

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"The science of
constituting a commonwealth,

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or renovating it,
or reforming it,

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is,
like every other experimental

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science,
not to be taught a priori."

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So here you can see a complete
resistance to the logical

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reasoning that drove Hobbes and
Locke in thinking about the

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structure of mathematics and a
system of axioms of the sort

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Bentham tried to come up with.

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"No,"
says Burke, "Nor is it a

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short experience that can
instruct us in that practical

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science;
because the real effects of

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moral causes are not always
immediate,

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but that which in the first
instance is prejudicial may be

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excellent in its remoter
operation;

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(so when we think we see
something bad it might be having

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a good effect) and its
excellence may arise even from

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the ill effects it produces in
the beginning.

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The reverse also happens;
and very plausible schemes,

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with very pleasing
commencements,

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have often shameful and
lamentable conclusions.

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In states there are often some
obscure and almost latent

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causes,
things which appear at first

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view of little moment,
on which a very great part of

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its prosperity or adversity may
most essentially depend."

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So the world is fundamentally
mysterious and murky.

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And things that look good might
have bad consequences.

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Things that look bad might have
good consequences.

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The effects of our actions are
going to be realized in the

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distant future in ways that we
can't possibly imagine.

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And so that being the case the
most important characteristic of

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thinking about politics is
caution.

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We should be cautioned.

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"The science of government
being,

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therefore, so practical in
itself, and intended for such

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practical purposes,
a matter which requires

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experience,
and even more experience than

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any person can gain in his whole
life,

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however sagacious and observing
he may be,

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it is with infinite caution
that any man ought to venture

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upon pulling down an edifice
which has answered in any

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tolerable degree for ages the
common purposes of society,

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or on building it up again
without having models and

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patterns of approved utility
before his eyes."

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So what they did in the French
Revolution was the antithesis of

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what Burke recommends,
because they swept everything

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away and decided to build again
tabula rasa.

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Burke is deeply suspicious of
all attempts to do that and he

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thinks they'll end in disaster
because the people who undertake

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them will not know what they're
doing,

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and even more dangerous,
they're not smart enough to

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know how dumb they are.

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They're not smart enough to
realize that they really do not

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know what they're doing.

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They're not smart enough to
understand that they will

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unleash forces which they will
not be able to control.

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So Burke is,
in that sense,

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a conservative who thinks about
social change in a very cautious

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and incremental way.

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He's not a reactionary in the
sense of being someone who's

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opposed to all change.

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He's a conservative.

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I think one of the nice
definitions of conservatism in

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Burke's sense was actually put
forward by Sir Robert Peel in

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the nineteenth century when he
said--

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he defined conservatism as,
"Changing what you have to

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in order to conserve what you
can."

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Changing what you have to in
order to conserve what you can,

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as distinct from a reactionary
view which would be just flat

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resistance to all change.

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Now, of course,
this idea of conservatism as

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valuing tradition is very
different from the libertarian

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conservatism of Robert Nozick
that we looked at earlier in the

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course.

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The libertarian conservatism of
Robert Nozick is anti-statist,

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anti-government,
and resistance to authority

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being imposed on you,
hence the notion of libertarian

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conservatism.

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Burke is a traditionalist
conservative.

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He thinks that tradition is the
core of human experience,

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and he thinks whatever wisdom
we have about politics is

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embedded in the traditions that
we have inherited.

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"They have served us over
centuries,"

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this is his view writing at the
end of the eighteenth century,

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"they have served us for
centuries.

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They have evolved in a glacial
way."

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As I said, people make
accommodations to change,

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but only in order to conserve
the inherited system of norms,

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practices and beliefs in
institutions that we reproduce

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going forward.

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So that's the sense in which
it's a conservative tradition;

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to conserve,
the basic meaning of the word

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conserve, conservative.

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And so science is a really bad
idea when applied to political

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and social arrangements because
there isn't scientific

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knowledge,
and anybody who claims to have

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it is either a charlatan or a
fool,

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perhaps both.

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And so, as I said,
he doesn't have a theory

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because he's skeptical of the
very possibility of having a

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theory.

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He thinks we should,
as Clint Eastwood says--

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I've forgotten in which movie
it is,

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I think A Fistful of
Dollars,

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maybe--"A man's got to
know his limitations.

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Are you feeling lucky?"

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A man's got to know his
limitations, Burke thinks that

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in spades.

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He thinks we have to understand
that our grasp of the human

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condition is very limited and
it's going to stay that way.

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So, on the first of our two
prongs of the Enlightenment

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endeavor he's completely out of
sympathy.

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Now what about the second?

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What about the commitment to
this idea of the importance of

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individual rights?

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We saw how this developed
initially in Locke's formulation

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in a theological way when Locke
argued that God created us with

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the capacity to behave in a God
like fashion in the world.

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Each individual is the bearer
of the capacity to create

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things, and therefore have
rights over his or her own

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creation.

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In Locke's view we're all equal.

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We're equal in God's sight.

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He creates us all equally,
and we're all also equal in the

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sense,
very important for Locke,

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that no earthly power has the
authority to tell us what the

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scripture says.

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Each person must do it for
himself,

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and when they disagree they
have to either find a mechanism

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to manage their disagreement,
or if they can't,

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look for their reward in the
next life.

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But basically each individual
is sovereign over themselves.

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And that's where modern
doctrines of individual rights

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come from.

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We saw how that played out with
the workmanship ideal,

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Mill's harm principle all the
way down through Nozick and

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Rawls.

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Bentham has, I'm sorry;
Burke has a very,

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very different view of the idea
of rights.

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They're first of all,
they are inherited.

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They're not the product of
reason or any contrived

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theoretical formulations.

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They're inherited.

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"You will observe that
from Revolution Society to the

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Magna Carta it has been the
uniform policy of our

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constitution to claim and assert
our liberties as an entailed

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inheritance derived to us from
our forefathers,

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and to be transmitted to
posterity--

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as an estate specially
belonging to the people of this

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kingdom,
without any reference whatever

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to any other more general or
prior right.

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By this means our constitution
preserves a unity in so great a

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diversity of its parts.

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We have an inheritable crown,
an inheritable peerage,

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and a House of Commons and a
people inheriting privileges,

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franchises, and liberties from
a long line of ancestors."

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So what we think of when we
talk about rights for Burke,

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first of all,
they're not human rights or

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natural rights for him,
they are the rights of

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Englishmen.

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They are the rights of
Englishmen;

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they are particular rights.

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They're the result of a
particular tradition.

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The idea that there could be
universal rights doesn't make

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any sense.

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It's not an intelligible
question, as far as Burke is

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concerned,
to assay what Rawls would say,

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what rights would we create for
all people in some abstract

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setting?

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It doesn't make any sense to
him.

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So it's the rights of
Englishmen.

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And indeed, when Burke was
sympathetic to the American

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Revolution,
not the French Revolution,

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it was because he thought that
the rights of the American

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colonists as Englishmen were
being violated by the English

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Crown.

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And he was also sympathetic to
claims for home rule for

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Ireland, again,
on the same sort of basis.

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But it's this entailed
inheritance, what we have been

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born into as a system of rights
and obligations that we

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reproduce into the future.

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And those rights,
above all, are limited.

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Again, just as our knowledge of
the world is limited so our

19:21.636 --> 19:25.216
rights, in the normative sense,
are limited.

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"Government is a
contrivance of human wisdom to

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provide for human wants.

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Men have a right that these
wants should be provided for by

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this wisdom.

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Among these wants is to be
reckoned the want out of civil

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society, of a sufficient
restraint upon their

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passions."

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We have a right to be
restrained, a very different

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notion than a right to create
things over which we have

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authority, a right to be
restrained.

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"Society requires not only
that the passions of individuals

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should be subjected,
but that even in the mass and

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body,
as well as in the individuals,

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the inclinations of men should
frequently be thwarted,

20:13.720 --> 20:19.080
their will controlled,
and their passions brought into

20:19.084 --> 20:20.404
subjection.

20:20.400 --> 20:24.140
This can only be done by a
power out of themselves,

20:24.140 --> 20:27.200
and not, in the exercise of its
function,

20:27.200 --> 20:33.270
subject to that will and to
those passions which it is its

20:33.272 --> 20:36.472
office to bridle and subdue.

20:36.470 --> 20:43.600
In this sense the restraints on
men, as well as their liberties,

20:43.596 --> 20:48.796
are to be reckoned among their
rights."

20:48.798 --> 20:53.008
The restraints on men,
as well as their liberties,

20:53.006 --> 20:56.436
are to be reckoned among their
rights.

20:56.440 --> 21:00.250
"But as the liberties and
the restrictions vary with times

21:00.248 --> 21:03.748
and circumstances and admit to
infinite modifications,

21:03.750 --> 21:08.730
they cannot be settled upon an
abstract rule (take that John

21:08.730 --> 21:12.660
Rawls);
and nothing is so foolish as to

21:12.663 --> 21:16.763
discuss them upon that
principle."

21:16.759 --> 21:20.679
So we have a right to be
restrained.

21:20.680 --> 21:23.280
We have a right,
most importantly,

21:23.278 --> 21:26.698
that others are going to be
restrained,

21:26.700 --> 21:32.480
and that our passion should be
controlled is something that he

21:32.478 --> 21:38.158
insists is an important part of
what we should think of under

21:38.162 --> 21:44.322
the general heading of what it
is that people have rights to.

21:44.318 --> 21:46.818
"One of the first motives
to civil society,

21:46.818 --> 21:49.868
and which becomes one of its
fundamental rules,

21:49.868 --> 21:53.818
is that no man should be the
judge in his own cause.

21:53.818 --> 21:59.038
By this each person has at once
divested himself of the first

21:59.035 --> 22:02.595
fundamental right of
uncovenanted man,

22:02.598 --> 22:06.138
that is, to judge for himself
and to assert his own

22:06.138 --> 22:07.128
cause."

22:07.130 --> 22:10.770
That's not that different from
Locke, that first part.

22:10.769 --> 22:14.129
After all, Locke talks about
the state of nature as being

22:14.134 --> 22:17.804
exactly a state in which we get
to judge in our own cause,

22:17.798 --> 22:21.438
but for Locke we give it up in
a conditional way.

22:21.440 --> 22:25.550
We never lose the right to
revolution if society doesn't

22:25.546 --> 22:30.246
protect us, and that's what he
thought was triggered in 1688.

22:30.250 --> 22:31.560
Burke says no.

22:31.558 --> 22:35.108
"He advocates all right to
be his own governor.

22:35.108 --> 22:37.158
He inclusively,
in a great measure,

22:37.163 --> 22:39.223
abandons the right of
self-defense,

22:39.218 --> 22:40.908
the first law of nature.

22:40.910 --> 22:47.080
Men cannot enjoy the rights of
an uncivil and of a civil state

22:47.077 --> 22:48.187
together.

22:48.190 --> 22:52.760
That he may obtain justice,
he gives up his right of

22:52.760 --> 22:58.230
determining what it is in points
the most essential to him.

22:58.230 --> 23:04.750
That he may secure some liberty;
he makes a surrender in trust

23:04.750 --> 23:08.930
of the whole of it."

23:08.930 --> 23:14.830
This, to some extent,
has a Hobbesian flavor that

23:14.834 --> 23:18.184
Hobbes says,
"If we don't have law

23:18.181 --> 23:21.631
we'll have civil war,
and so we have to give up

23:21.632 --> 23:24.012
freedom to authority."

23:24.009 --> 23:28.259
The difference is even in
Hobbes's formulation there's

23:28.259 --> 23:33.229
ultimately the recognition that
if society does not provide you

23:33.231 --> 23:37.801
with protection you have a
reasonable basis for resistance

23:37.804 --> 23:40.214
and for overthrowing it.

23:40.210 --> 23:44.930
But in Locke's case,
I mean, in Burke's case he

23:44.926 --> 23:48.616
doesn't want to concede even
that.

23:48.618 --> 23:52.888
Because we cannot,
once we've made the transition

23:52.890 --> 23:56.450
into civil society,
we cannot go back.

23:56.450 --> 23:58.590
There is no turning back.

23:58.588 --> 24:04.258
We are part and parcel of this
system of entailed inheritances

24:04.256 --> 24:09.826
and that is the human condition
all the way to the bottom.

24:09.828 --> 24:15.118
He doesn't reject completely
the metaphor of the social

24:15.122 --> 24:19.142
contract, but he makes it
indissoluble.

24:19.140 --> 24:26.060
He says, "Society is
indeed a contract.

24:26.058 --> 24:29.938
Subordinate contracts for
objects of mere occasional

24:29.939 --> 24:34.499
interest may be dissolved at
pleasure (if I make an agreement

24:34.503 --> 24:38.463
with you to do something we can
agree to dissolve our

24:38.460 --> 24:41.620
agreement)--
but the state ought not to be

24:41.616 --> 24:45.256
considered as nothing better
than a partnership agreement in

24:45.255 --> 24:48.665
a trade of pepper and coffee,
calico or tobacco,

24:48.671 --> 24:53.051
or some other such low concern
to be taken up for a little

24:53.045 --> 24:57.175
temporary interest,
and to be dissolved by the

24:57.176 --> 24:59.176
fancy of the parties.

24:59.180 --> 25:03.050
It is to be looked on with
other reverence (the

25:03.053 --> 25:06.843
"it"
here is the state) - because it

25:06.843 --> 25:11.813
is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross

25:11.810 --> 25:17.030
animal existence of a temporary
and perishable nature - it is a

25:17.031 --> 25:22.121
partnership in all science;
a partnership in all art;

25:22.118 --> 25:27.968
a partnership in every virtue,
and in all perfection."

25:27.970 --> 25:31.650
"As the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained

25:31.645 --> 25:35.395
in many generations,
it becomes a partnership (now

25:35.401 --> 25:39.941
this is the most famous sentence
Burke ever wrote) not only

25:39.943 --> 25:44.483
between those who are living,
but between those who are

25:44.482 --> 25:49.342
living, those who are dead,
and those who are yet to be

25:49.338 --> 25:50.488
born."

25:50.490 --> 25:53.190
A very different idea of the
social contract,

25:53.192 --> 25:56.822
partnership between those who
are living, those who are dead

25:56.817 --> 25:59.087
and those who are yet to be
born.

25:59.088 --> 26:03.488
"Each contract of each
particular state is but a clause

26:03.491 --> 26:07.971
in the general primeval contract
of eternal society."

26:07.970 --> 26:12.870
So, the "law is not
subject to the will of those

26:12.868 --> 26:17.108
(this is a flat rejection of
workmanship),

26:17.108 --> 26:21.298
who by an obligation above
them, and infinitely superior,

26:21.298 --> 26:24.758
are bound to submit their will
to that law.

26:24.759 --> 26:29.569
The municipal corporations of
that universal kingdom are not

26:29.568 --> 26:32.828
morally at liberty at their
pleasure,

26:32.828 --> 26:36.328
and on the speculations of a
contingent improvement,

26:36.328 --> 26:40.218
wholly to separate and set
asunder the bonds of their

26:40.219 --> 26:44.189
subordinate community,
and to dissolve it into an

26:44.191 --> 26:48.631
unsocial,
uncivil, unconnected chaos of

26:48.625 --> 26:52.165
elementary principles."

26:52.170 --> 26:58.080
So one way of just driving home
the radical break here between

26:58.084 --> 27:03.714
his thought and the social
contract theorists is to mention

27:03.707 --> 27:09.037
that one of the standard
criticisms that often gets made

27:09.038 --> 27:14.818
of social contract theory is,
well, even if there was a

27:14.815 --> 27:18.225
social contact,
you know, some people think of

27:18.233 --> 27:21.963
the adoption of the American
Constitution as a kind of social

27:21.963 --> 27:22.713
contract.

27:22.710 --> 27:26.030
After all it was ratified by
the states.

27:26.028 --> 27:30.038
Actually, the Articles of
Confederation had said it had to

27:30.039 --> 27:34.019
be unanimously ratified,
and they couldn't get that,

27:34.021 --> 27:37.261
so they changed it to
three-quarters of the

27:37.261 --> 27:38.961
confederacy states.

27:38.960 --> 27:41.970
Still, there was an agreement
of some sort,

27:41.968 --> 27:46.048
and it was ratified and so on,
but people have often said,

27:46.049 --> 27:47.769
"Well, so what?

27:47.769 --> 27:51.159
So those people in the
eighteenth century made an

27:51.162 --> 27:52.012
agreement.

27:52.009 --> 27:53.409
I didn't.

27:53.410 --> 27:54.910
What has it got to do with me?

27:54.910 --> 27:58.790
Why should it be binding on
subsequent generations?"

27:58.788 --> 28:02.498
And that's often been a
critique of the idea of the

28:02.502 --> 28:03.842
social contract.

28:03.838 --> 28:07.878
Burke turns that reasoning on
its head.

28:07.880 --> 28:12.450
He says, "Once we see that
this social contract is

28:12.454 --> 28:15.764
multi-generational between the
dead,

28:15.759 --> 28:19.329
the living, and those who are
yet to be born,

28:19.328 --> 28:23.178
who are you (any given
individual),

28:23.180 --> 28:27.950
who are you to think that you
can upend it?

28:27.950 --> 28:35.180
What gives you the right to
pull the rug out from under this

28:35.176 --> 28:40.196
centuries-old evolving social
contract?

28:40.200 --> 28:45.000
What gives you the right to
take it away from those who

28:44.998 --> 28:50.328
haven't even been born who are
part of this (he even uses the

28:50.329 --> 28:53.969
word eternal) eternally
reproducing social

28:53.972 --> 28:55.842
contract."

28:55.838 --> 28:59.118
So it's a sort of mirror image
of the critique which says,

28:59.118 --> 29:02.338
"Well, we never made it so
why should we be bound by

29:02.340 --> 29:03.090
it?"

29:03.088 --> 29:07.008
He says, "It preexisted
you,

29:07.009 --> 29:10.569
and you're going to predecease
it, and you don't have the

29:10.567 --> 29:13.767
right,
you don't have the authority to

29:13.769 --> 29:18.609
undermine it because any rights
you think you have are the

29:18.605 --> 29:21.825
product of this evolving
contract,

29:21.828 --> 29:23.978
they're contained within
it."

29:23.980 --> 29:28.050
So society is not subordinate
to the individual,

29:28.045 --> 29:33.055
which is the most rock-bottom
commitment of the workmanship

29:33.060 --> 29:33.840
idea.

29:33.838 --> 29:39.328
On the contrary,
the individual is subordinate

29:39.325 --> 29:40.905
to society.

29:40.910 --> 29:44.180
Obligations come before rights.

29:44.180 --> 29:50.060
We only get rights as a
consequence of the social

29:50.060 --> 29:55.820
arrangements that give us our
duties as well.

29:55.818 --> 30:01.228
So whereas the Enlightenment
tradition makes the individual

30:01.227 --> 30:05.887
agent the sort of moral center
of the universe,

30:05.890 --> 30:13.680
this god-like individual
creating things over which she

30:13.679 --> 30:19.449
or he has absolute sovereign
control,

30:19.450 --> 30:23.900
is replaced by the exact mirror
image of the idea of an

30:23.903 --> 30:28.363
individual as subordinate to
inherited communities,

30:28.358 --> 30:31.988
traditions, social
arrangements,

30:31.990 --> 30:38.790
and political institutions to
which he or she is ultimately

30:38.786 --> 30:40.306
beholden.

30:40.308 --> 30:44.618
If there was a pre-collective
condition it's of no relevance

30:44.623 --> 30:47.843
to us now because we can't go
back to it,

30:47.838 --> 30:52.108
and any attempt to try,
look across the English Channel

30:52.105 --> 30:54.865
and see what you're going to
get.

30:54.868 --> 31:00.008
That is the Burkean outlook in
a nutshell, and it is,

31:00.009 --> 31:05.939
as I said, the most fundamental
critique of the Enlightenment

31:05.940 --> 31:08.510
it's possible to make.

31:08.509 --> 31:13.779
And even though the
Enlightenment tradition,

31:13.778 --> 31:21.348
as we have studied it here,
was unfolding in the

31:21.353 --> 31:25.113
seventeenth,
eighteenth, nineteenth and

31:25.106 --> 31:29.186
twentieth centuries,
this anti-Enlightenment

31:29.189 --> 31:34.319
undertow has always been there
as well.

31:34.318 --> 31:37.068
Not to make the metaphor do too
much work,

31:37.068 --> 31:41.708
but you can really think of
every wave of advancement in

31:41.711 --> 31:46.861
Enlightenment thinking washing
down the beach and producing an

31:46.861 --> 31:51.421
undertow of resistance and
resentment against it,

31:51.420 --> 31:55.440
both philosophically,
and I'm going to start talking

31:55.442 --> 31:58.752
in a minute about
twentieth-century Burkean

31:58.753 --> 32:02.883
figures,
but also politically.

32:02.880 --> 32:07.430
One story about the rise of
fundamentalism,

32:07.430 --> 32:11.790
and jihadism,
and ethnic separatism is this

32:11.785 --> 32:17.585
is all part of the political
undertow against the current

32:17.593 --> 32:23.923
form that the Enlightenment
political project is taking,

32:23.920 --> 32:27.000
which is globalization,
homogenization,

32:27.000 --> 32:30.200
this sort of McDonald's effect
on the world,

32:30.200 --> 32:34.900
produces this backlash against
globalization where people

32:34.898 --> 32:38.338
affirm primordial-looking
attachments,

32:38.338 --> 32:42.788
even though there's probably no
such thing as a genuinely

32:42.788 --> 32:45.368
primordial one,
separatists,

32:45.367 --> 32:49.097
partial affiliations and
allegiances,

32:49.098 --> 32:54.208
connections to doctrines which
deny the scientific and rational

32:54.205 --> 32:56.755
project of the Enlightenment.

32:56.759 --> 33:00.429
And so, just as globalization
has been advancing we've seen a

33:00.426 --> 33:05.056
resurgence of separatists,
religious fundamentalists,

33:05.058 --> 33:08.608
nationalists,
and other kinds of identities.

33:08.608 --> 33:10.788
Quite the opposite,
for example,

33:10.790 --> 33:12.550
of what Marx predicted.

33:12.548 --> 33:20.258
Marx predicted that things like
nationalism, sectarian

33:20.262 --> 33:24.632
identifications,
would go away,

33:24.630 --> 33:27.250
and Lenin too.

33:27.250 --> 33:31.880
They thought that as the
principles of capitalism defused

33:31.880 --> 33:36.180
themselves throughout the world,
things like national

33:36.179 --> 33:38.659
attachments would go away.

33:38.660 --> 33:42.720
And indeed on the eve of the
First World War there was the

33:42.722 --> 33:46.932
Second Communist International
where they basically came out

33:46.929 --> 33:49.709
and said to the workers of
Europe,

33:49.710 --> 33:53.270
"Don't get involved in
this national war.

33:53.269 --> 33:54.309
It's not in your interest.

33:54.308 --> 33:58.348
You have a common class
interest across nations against

33:58.345 --> 34:01.775
the interest of employers across
nations,"

34:01.782 --> 34:05.672
and of course this fell on
completely deaf ears.

34:05.670 --> 34:09.500
In 1916 the Second
International pretty much

34:09.503 --> 34:10.933
disintegrated.

34:10.929 --> 34:15.229
And, in fact,
one of the big paradoxes of the

34:15.233 --> 34:20.713
twentieth century has been the
persistence of things like

34:20.710 --> 34:26.480
nationalism through the first
two world wars and then in the

34:26.481 --> 34:30.591
last part of the twentieth
century,

34:30.590 --> 34:34.150
this resurgence of religious
and other forms of

34:34.150 --> 34:38.800
traditionalist attachment that
are fundamentally antithetical

34:38.795 --> 34:41.345
to the Enlightenment project.

34:41.349 --> 34:44.779
So the Enlightenment has always
produced reaction,

34:44.780 --> 34:49.260
undertow, rejection,
often from the people who don't

34:49.260 --> 34:52.910
benefit from it,
and it's one of the ways in

34:52.909 --> 34:57.309
which I think the proponents of
the Enlightenment have always

34:57.306 --> 34:59.356
been politically na�ve.

34:59.360 --> 35:03.820
They've always thought that as
modernization and Enlightenment

35:03.824 --> 35:08.224
diffuses itself throughout the
world these kinds of primitive

35:08.215 --> 35:10.115
thinking will go away.

35:10.119 --> 35:12.529
Well, it turns out that they
don't,

35:12.530 --> 35:17.960
and so one of the big tasks of
political science at the present

35:17.958 --> 35:21.198
time is to try and understand
why,

35:21.199 --> 35:26.049
to try and understand what the
dynamics of political

35:26.045 --> 35:30.695
affiliation and identity
attachment really are.

35:30.699 --> 35:36.619
And so that's a Burkean agenda.

35:36.619 --> 35:40.529
Now if you fast-forward from
Burke to the middle of the

35:40.529 --> 35:44.329
twentieth century,
I had you read a short piece,

35:44.333 --> 35:47.013
very famous and important
piece,

35:47.010 --> 35:50.580
by Lord Devlin who was an
English judge.

35:50.579 --> 35:56.569
Like Burke, someone with Irish
origins,

35:56.570 --> 36:00.720
though some certain amount of
ethnic ambiguity in both cases

36:00.719 --> 36:05.009
there about just how much Irish
and just how much English,

36:05.010 --> 36:07.930
but we needn't detain ourselves
with that in this course.

36:07.929 --> 36:14.279
And he was commenting upon
something called the Wolfenden

36:14.284 --> 36:20.244
Report,
which was published in 1959 by

36:20.237 --> 36:30.197
a commission that had been asked
to tell the British Parliament

36:30.195 --> 36:39.505
what it should do about
homosexuality and prostitution.

36:39.510 --> 36:44.070
And the Wolfenden Report had
said, "The laws against

36:44.065 --> 36:46.175
them should be repealed.

36:46.179 --> 36:51.969
They should both be legalized
on the grounds (they didn't use

36:51.965 --> 36:57.265
these terms but this is the
basic thought or the term we

36:57.269 --> 37:02.669
would use today) that both
homosexuality and prostitution

37:02.670 --> 37:05.950
are victimless crimes."

37:05.949 --> 37:12.169
They are, to use the jargon of
our course, Pareto-superior

37:12.170 --> 37:13.480
exchanges.

37:13.480 --> 37:17.330
They're voluntary transactions
among consenting adults that

37:17.331 --> 37:19.061
don't harm anybody else.

37:19.059 --> 37:23.209
And of course this was put in a
different idiom because it was

37:23.211 --> 37:26.481
the 1950s, but that was
essentially the point.

37:26.480 --> 37:30.670
They don't harm anybody,
so it's just traditional

37:30.672 --> 37:36.002
prejudice, bigotry that leads us
to outlaw these things and we

37:36.001 --> 37:37.751
shouldn't do it.

37:37.750 --> 37:41.980
That was what the Wolfenden
Report had said.

37:41.980 --> 37:54.160
And Burkean-to-the-core Lord
Devlin says, "No!"

37:54.159 --> 37:56.679
I don't know how caught up you
are in the reading.

37:56.679 --> 38:04.969
Anyone who has read Burke--I'm
sorry, Devlin,

38:04.972 --> 38:10.442
tell us why he thinks this.

38:10.440 --> 38:11.680
Yeah?

38:11.679 --> 38:13.679
We need to get you the mic.

38:13.679 --> 38:17.819
Why he thinks,
why is it that Lord Devlin

38:17.822 --> 38:24.242
thinks that the mere fact that
there's no harm is not enough of

38:24.242 --> 38:30.252
a basis for legalizing
homosexuality and prostitution.

38:30.250 --> 38:30.950
Yeah?

38:30.949 --> 38:34.179
Student:  He claims that
it's not an attack against the

38:34.181 --> 38:36.301
individual but a harm against
society.

38:36.300 --> 38:38.720
Prof: So what does that
mean, though,

38:38.715 --> 38:41.125
when you say it's a harm
against society?

38:41.130 --> 38:44.540
How do you unpack that in your
own mind?

38:44.539 --> 38:50.219
Student:  I guess it's
maybe an attack against the

38:50.221 --> 38:54.281
morals that society tends to
agree to.

38:54.280 --> 38:55.590
Prof: Yeah, well, agreed.

38:55.590 --> 38:58.080
Let's put brackets around
agreed.

38:58.079 --> 39:02.239
It's not what we mean by it,
but certainly the morals that

39:02.242 --> 39:03.122
are there.

39:03.119 --> 39:06.039
And where do they come from?

39:06.039 --> 39:10.459
Where do those morals,
I mean, so we have a moral code

39:10.460 --> 39:14.630
that says homosexuality and
prostitution are wrong,

39:14.630 --> 39:17.050
but where does that come?

39:17.050 --> 39:18.770
Anyone?

39:18.769 --> 39:20.489
Yeah?

39:20.489 --> 39:23.299
Student:  Well,
he put a lot of weight on the

39:23.300 --> 39:25.780
basis of religion for driving
one's morals.

39:25.780 --> 39:28.250
Prof: Correct,
religion, an interesting--look

39:28.253 --> 39:29.713
what he says about religion.

39:29.710 --> 39:33.970
He says, "Morals and
religions are inextricably

39:33.965 --> 39:36.965
joined--
the moral standards generally

39:36.969 --> 39:41.159
accepted in Western civilization
being those belonging to

39:41.161 --> 39:42.361
Christianity.

39:42.360 --> 39:47.640
Outside Christendom (there's a
1950s word, we don't say

39:47.643 --> 39:50.583
Christendom anymore,
do we?)

39:50.579 --> 39:54.319
other standards derive from
other religions."

39:54.320 --> 39:57.870
Outside Christendom other
standards derived from other

39:57.871 --> 39:58.611
religion.

39:58.610 --> 40:02.360
"In England we believe in
the Christian idea of marriage

40:02.360 --> 40:05.610
and therefore adopt monogamy as
a moral principle.

40:05.610 --> 40:09.370
Consequently the Christian
institution of marriage has

40:09.371 --> 40:13.841
become the basis of family life,
and so part of the structure of

40:13.844 --> 40:14.984
our society.

40:14.980 --> 40:20.420
It is there not because it is
Christian (this comes to the

40:20.422 --> 40:23.862
point about whether we've
agreed).

40:23.860 --> 40:27.640
It has got there because it is
Christian,

40:27.639 --> 40:33.649
but it remains there because it
is built into the house in which

40:33.646 --> 40:39.936
we live and could not be removed
without bringing it down."

40:39.940 --> 40:42.800
It's there not because it's
Christian, it got there because

40:42.804 --> 40:44.934
it's Christian,
it's a matter of history.

40:44.929 --> 40:47.339
It was a Christian civilization.

40:47.340 --> 40:53.330
So we have a Christian
conception of morality,

40:53.329 --> 40:57.589
but he's not saying it's true.

40:57.590 --> 41:02.800
He's not saying that the
Christian set of beliefs about

41:02.797 --> 41:04.627
religion is true.

41:04.630 --> 41:08.490
He has no interest in the
question of whether or not it's

41:08.487 --> 41:08.967
true.

41:08.969 --> 41:13.309
He's saying here,
"A different society might

41:13.313 --> 41:18.923
be glued together by a different
religion which wouldn't create

41:18.922 --> 41:20.102
monogamy.

41:20.099 --> 41:25.079
It might create polygamy,
and that would have its own

41:25.076 --> 41:30.436
history and its own system of
rights and institutions and

41:30.436 --> 41:34.356
everything that goes with
that."

41:34.360 --> 41:39.700
So it's conservative in the
sense of affirming tradition,

41:39.704 --> 41:44.674
but not conservative in the
sense of saying there are

41:44.668 --> 41:47.148
absolute moral values.

41:47.150 --> 41:51.660
Neither Burke nor Devlin
ventures any opinion on that

41:51.661 --> 41:52.531
subject.

41:52.530 --> 41:58.990
They say it's not even really
important.

41:58.989 --> 42:04.419
What's important is that the
people in the society believe in

42:04.422 --> 42:05.782
these values.

42:05.780 --> 42:11.560
And if the people in this
society don't believe in some

42:11.556 --> 42:15.086
system of values as
authoritative,

42:15.085 --> 42:18.505
the society will fall apart.

42:18.510 --> 42:26.400
You can't put together a
society just on the basis of

42:26.400 --> 42:28.070
interest.

42:28.070 --> 42:29.110
It needs more.

42:29.110 --> 42:31.270
It needs moral glue.

42:31.268 --> 42:34.618
So these folks,
you could say when I say they

42:34.623 --> 42:39.123
don't really have a theory in
the sense that we've looked at

42:39.119 --> 42:42.319
theories up until now in this
course,

42:42.320 --> 42:43.870
it's because you could say,
"Well,

42:43.869 --> 42:45.069
they're not political theorists.

42:45.070 --> 42:48.780
They're really sort of
sociologists.

42:48.780 --> 42:54.580
They're really sociologists of
stability because they're saying

42:54.583 --> 42:59.733
that it's necessary for a
society to be stable that it's

42:59.733 --> 43:04.983
held together by this kind of
moral glue of authoritative

43:04.976 --> 43:06.846
opinion."

43:06.849 --> 43:14.169
So when you say to Lord Devlin,
when he's defending the

43:14.168 --> 43:20.538
outlawing of homosexuality and
prostitution,

43:20.539 --> 43:24.969
"Well, that's just your
bigotry,"

43:24.974 --> 43:31.524
his answer wouldn't be to deny
that it's in some absolute sense

43:31.523 --> 43:35.533
an irrational position,
but he would say,

43:35.530 --> 43:37.940
"Every society needs its
bigotry.

43:37.940 --> 43:44.840
Every society needs its
prejudices."

43:44.840 --> 43:50.410
And so he doesn't appeal to
rationality, but he does appeal

43:50.413 --> 43:53.683
to what he calls reasonableness.

43:53.679 --> 43:55.829
And what is reasonableness?

43:55.829 --> 43:59.199
It's basically the system of
beliefs, as he puts it,

43:59.199 --> 44:02.369
"of the man on the Clapham
omnibus."

44:02.369 --> 44:11.679
We might today say the woman on
the A train reading the New York

44:11.684 --> 44:12.724
Post.

44:12.719 --> 44:20.969
The prejudices of the average
person that is the basic

44:20.967 --> 44:27.407
yardstick,
and if the average person is

44:27.414 --> 44:34.204
appalled by some practices,
then they should be illegal.

44:34.199 --> 44:44.989
And that's the beginning and
end of it.

44:44.989 --> 44:51.089
So what about that?

44:51.090 --> 44:55.390
You could fast-forward it since
he talks about homosexuality and

44:55.387 --> 44:57.567
what we call gay rights today.

44:57.570 --> 44:59.940
If you look at the American
trajectory,

44:59.940 --> 45:05.470
in 1986 this came up before the
Supreme Court in a case called

45:05.472 --> 45:11.012
Bowers versus Hardwick,
and they essentially took the

45:11.014 --> 45:13.544
Burke-Devlin position.

45:13.539 --> 45:21.139
That is that states should be
allowed to outlaw homosexuality

45:21.143 --> 45:26.343
because most people find it
deplorable.

45:26.340 --> 45:29.530
A couple of years ago it came
back to the court and they said,

45:29.530 --> 45:34.250
"Well, mores have evolved
enough since 1986 that we're

45:34.251 --> 45:38.001
going to overturn Bowers versus
Hardwick,"

45:37.996 --> 45:39.376
very Burkean.

45:39.380 --> 45:44.810
They're following the man on
the Clapham omnibus.

45:44.809 --> 45:53.139
They're following the woman on
the A train's prejudices,

45:53.139 --> 46:00.559
beliefs and values,
and that's as it should be.

46:00.559 --> 46:03.369
What about that?

46:03.369 --> 46:08.399
How many people find this
appealing?

46:08.400 --> 46:09.350
Only two?

46:09.349 --> 46:13.629
How many people find it
unappealing?

46:13.630 --> 46:19.120
So we still have at least half
undecided.

46:19.119 --> 46:21.459
What's unappealing about it?

46:21.460 --> 46:22.270
Yeah?

46:22.268 --> 46:23.058
Student:
>

46:23.059 --> 46:31.169
Prof: Take the
microphone.

46:31.170 --> 46:33.770
Student:  According to
his perspective we might still

46:33.766 --> 46:35.656
have a system of slavery in this
country.

46:35.659 --> 46:38.339
Prof: According to this
perspective we would still have

46:38.344 --> 46:39.494
slavery in this country.

46:39.489 --> 46:43.789
Well, I think he wouldn't
concede the point that quickly.

46:43.789 --> 46:49.329
He would say what I just said
about Bowers versus Hardwick

46:49.327 --> 46:54.857
that if the views of the man on
the Clapham omnibus evolve

46:54.864 --> 46:59.424
enough,
then we can recognize change.

46:59.420 --> 47:07.610
Now you might want to not
accept that because what if they

47:07.608 --> 47:10.768
happen before--Yeah?

47:10.768 --> 47:13.978
Student:  Yeah,
to refute that I would just say

47:13.978 --> 47:17.548
that our morals and our ideas of
what is right and wrong are

47:17.550 --> 47:21.180
shaped by the systems that we
were born into and consequently

47:21.181 --> 47:24.881
I feel like Burke and Devlin's
system ascribes a great deal of

47:24.875 --> 47:28.565
value to the moral conceptions
at the beginning of society and

47:28.568 --> 47:32.018
that almost leads us to a system
of stasis in terms of our

47:32.018 --> 47:33.288
morality.

47:33.289 --> 47:36.799
There seems to be too much
stasis and no ability to

47:36.798 --> 47:40.448
reevaluate given how our moral
systems are shaped.

47:40.449 --> 47:41.419
Prof: I think that's
right,

47:41.420 --> 47:45.360
and we will pick up with this
on Monday,

47:45.360 --> 47:53.780
but if you think that the basic
society structure is okay you're

47:53.784 --> 47:59.404
likely to find this doctrine
appealing,

47:59.400 --> 48:03.950
but if you think the basic
structure of the society is

48:03.947 --> 48:09.347
deeply unjust then you're likely
to be affronted by this outlook

48:09.353 --> 48:14.423
because one person's reasonable
morality is another person's

48:14.416 --> 48:17.916
hegemony,
and we'll start with that idea

48:17.918 --> 48:18.698
next time.

48:18.699 --> 48:23.999