WEBVTT 00:01.690 --> 00:04.650 Prof: Okay, this morning we're going to 00:04.654 --> 00:07.954 carry on talking about Jeremy Bentham and classical 00:07.948 --> 00:09.198 utilitarianism. 00:09.200 --> 00:14.020 And I'm going to begin by making a few points about the 00:14.019 --> 00:18.739 measurement of utility, which we bumped into in a 00:18.736 --> 00:23.746 glancing kind of way last time, but we're going to dig into it 00:23.747 --> 00:24.607 a little bit. 00:24.610 --> 00:29.540 And then we're going to move from that into talking about 00:29.539 --> 00:34.379 utility and distribution in classical utilitarianism; 00:34.380 --> 00:38.700 how we should think about the measurement of utility across 00:38.697 --> 00:42.937 the whole society and what implications Bentham's argument 00:42.940 --> 00:46.760 has for that, and I think you'll start to see 00:46.764 --> 00:51.254 why classical utilitarianism became such an ideologically 00:51.251 --> 00:55.181 powerful doctrine in the eighteenth and nineteenth 00:55.178 --> 00:56.378 centuries. 00:56.380 --> 01:01.180 So just briefly to recap, we talked last time about 01:01.182 --> 01:04.932 Bentham's principle being maximized, 01:04.930 --> 01:07.310 "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." 01:07.310 --> 01:09.630 The idea being that if you think of, 01:09.629 --> 01:12.189 in this case, a very simple two-person 01:12.188 --> 01:15.728 society, and you think of that as the 01:15.729 --> 01:18.979 status quo, A has that much utility, 01:18.979 --> 01:21.019 B has that much utility. 01:21.019 --> 01:25.639 Anything on this side of the status quo would be an 01:25.638 --> 01:28.038 improvement for society. 01:28.040 --> 01:32.770 The greatest happiness of the greatest number will have been 01:32.768 --> 01:33.728 increased. 01:33.730 --> 01:39.510 Now, that's all very abstract, and by way of trying to make it 01:39.507 --> 01:44.337 somewhat more concrete, let's notice two features of 01:44.337 --> 01:46.607 utility measurement. 01:46.610 --> 01:51.410 The first, as I said to you last time, as far as Bentham is 01:51.409 --> 01:56.869 concerned, this is a doctrine of what I called objective egoism; 01:56.870 --> 02:01.350 that people are self-interested and behave self-interestedly, 02:01.349 --> 02:05.719 but that we can figure out what's likely to motive them 02:05.716 --> 02:10.086 regardless of their own interpretation of their actions 02:10.085 --> 02:11.375 or behavior. 02:11.379 --> 02:15.229 We have our interpretation; remember, Bentham says the rare 02:15.230 --> 02:18.090 case-- as with the physiology of the 02:18.086 --> 02:20.426 human body, so with the anatomy and 02:20.425 --> 02:25.395 physiology of the human mind, it's the rare case that you get 02:25.397 --> 02:28.007 it right about yourself. 02:28.008 --> 02:32.298 And it's the objective scientific calculus that's going 02:32.301 --> 02:35.881 to tell us what maximizes people's utility. 02:35.878 --> 02:38.938 Now, you might say, "Well, how is that 02:38.940 --> 02:41.200 actually going to work?" 02:41.199 --> 02:45.479 So there are two steps here. 02:45.479 --> 02:49.639 The first one is that he thinks all utility is quantifiable. 02:49.639 --> 02:54.089 I went through that last time, but the piece I didn't mention 02:54.091 --> 02:58.391 is that it follows from that that utility is reducible to a 02:58.394 --> 03:02.304 single index, and in this case Bentham's 03:02.300 --> 03:04.180 thinking of money. 03:04.180 --> 03:08.220 Money is going to be the measure of utility in his 03:08.216 --> 03:11.416 scheme, and that means that we could 03:11.419 --> 03:16.259 think of these units of utility as having a kind of dollar 03:16.264 --> 03:17.034 value. 03:17.030 --> 03:21.670 So anytime you think this doctrine is crude or extreme, 03:21.674 --> 03:27.014 remember my point that this is a guy who takes every thought to 03:27.006 --> 03:29.066 the logical extreme. 03:29.068 --> 03:34.338 But if so you get one, let's just for simplicity say, 03:34.339 --> 03:39.709 say one Standard International Util costs a dollar. 03:39.710 --> 03:44.380 And let's suppose you experience two Standard 03:44.383 --> 03:49.803 International Utils of pain from coming to class. 03:49.800 --> 03:53.840 Then I could make you indifferent between coming to 03:53.841 --> 03:58.531 class and not coming to class by paying you two dollars. 03:58.530 --> 04:02.130 It could get you to come to class if I paid three dollars, 04:02.126 --> 04:05.846 and I would not get you to come to class if I paid a dollar, 04:05.848 --> 04:06.478 right? 04:06.479 --> 04:08.159 And so that's the second point. 04:08.158 --> 04:13.988 In the first instance we say that utility is quantifiable and 04:13.991 --> 04:18.541 expressible through money, but then related to that, 04:18.536 --> 04:21.986 and as indicated in the example I just gave you, 04:21.990 --> 04:24.990 we can work with a doctrine of revealed preference. 04:24.990 --> 04:29.910 We can vary the price that we charge admission for the course. 04:29.910 --> 04:35.350 So let's say we charge--let's imagine there are three of you 04:35.348 --> 04:40.688 and one of you experiences two utils of pain from coming to 04:40.694 --> 04:44.284 class, one experiences three utils of 04:44.279 --> 04:47.749 pain, and one experiences two utils 04:47.745 --> 04:49.025 of pleasure. 04:49.029 --> 04:52.699 There's one perverse student in the audience who actually likes 04:52.704 --> 04:54.014 coming to the class. 04:54.009 --> 04:58.789 So then we would find that if we paid a dollar, 04:58.786 --> 05:01.276 one of you would come. 05:01.278 --> 05:06.288 If we increase it to two-fifty, two of you would come, 05:06.288 --> 05:11.868 and so we could vary the price to get information about your 05:11.865 --> 05:12.995 utility. 05:13.000 --> 05:15.990 And we could even influence your behavior without actually 05:15.994 --> 05:18.784 changing your preferences, and that's a very important 05:18.778 --> 05:20.038 distinction to make. 05:20.040 --> 05:27.110 Your enjoyment from coming or not coming to class wouldn't 05:27.105 --> 05:35.035 change, but your behavior would change if we varied the price; 05:35.040 --> 05:39.670 so that we can influence your behavior by manipulating the 05:39.666 --> 05:44.536 incentives without regard to what your underlying preferences 05:44.538 --> 05:47.448 are, and we could allow them 05:47.449 --> 05:50.009 actually to stay the same. 05:50.009 --> 05:56.039 You'd rather be at home asleep, but if the price is high enough 05:56.038 --> 05:58.078 you'll come anyway. 05:58.079 --> 06:03.629 Okay, so that's all well and good at the level of thinking 06:03.630 --> 06:10.410 about one individual's behavior, but what about thinking about 06:10.408 --> 06:14.008 society in more general terms? 06:14.009 --> 06:18.719 When we talk about utilitarianism in Bentham's 06:18.721 --> 06:22.051 system, classical utilitarianism, 06:22.050 --> 06:27.160 we see that he operates with these numbers that attach to 06:27.163 --> 06:32.643 specific actions or policies and that we can make comparisons 06:32.639 --> 06:34.829 across individuals. 06:34.829 --> 06:39.839 So to put this in the jargon of economists, Bentham allows 06:39.841 --> 06:43.271 interpersonal comparisons of utility. 06:43.269 --> 06:47.209 Bentham allows interpersonal comparisons of utility. 06:47.209 --> 06:52.979 We can say that if you take one unit of utility from one person 06:52.976 --> 06:58.646 and give it to another person their utility will go up and the 06:58.649 --> 07:03.019 first person's utility is going to go down. 07:03.019 --> 07:10.629 Okay, so it's a doctrine of interpersonal comparisons of 07:10.625 --> 07:12.005 utility. 07:12.009 --> 07:14.479 And for those of you who are mathematicians here it might 07:14.478 --> 07:16.898 also be worth noting that Bentham operates with cardinal 07:16.903 --> 07:17.393 scales. 07:17.389 --> 07:18.989 These are additive things. 07:18.990 --> 07:23.910 You can actually think about these as sort of lumps of 07:23.910 --> 07:29.670 pleasure or pain experience that are moved around across people 07:29.666 --> 07:33.006 and can be added and subtracted. 07:33.009 --> 07:36.399 And so I put up just here to sort of--so you can think your 07:36.401 --> 07:38.041 way through this doctrine. 07:38.040 --> 07:42.620 If you imagine a status quo, a perfectly egalitarian world 07:42.615 --> 07:46.545 in which each person has six units of utility, 07:46.550 --> 07:48.930 you can start asking yourself, "Well, 07:48.930 --> 07:52.000 let's imagine if we could redistribute things." 07:52.000 --> 07:56.870 What would that mean as far as Bentham's doctrine is concerned? 07:56.870 --> 08:01.720 What I've given in this first column as a potential departure 08:01.721 --> 08:05.931 from the status quo is the utility monster example we 08:05.925 --> 08:08.105 talked about last time. 08:08.110 --> 08:13.280 If it turns out Leonid has a vastly superior capacity to 08:13.276 --> 08:17.126 experience pleasure than anybody else, 08:17.129 --> 08:24.789 then we could get a huge increase in total utility by 08:24.790 --> 08:32.600 taking a lot from B and C and giving it to Leonid, 08:32.600 --> 08:36.910 so that we would say "allow," 08:36.912 --> 08:37.822 right? 08:37.820 --> 08:42.880 Or we could think of this change from the status quo-- 08:42.879 --> 08:48.029 we go to a more inegalitarian society and, 08:48.029 --> 08:50.019 again, the greatest happiness of the greatest number has 08:50.024 --> 08:50.464 increased. 08:50.460 --> 08:54.410 We have a world here where there are eighteen utils and a 08:54.413 --> 08:57.523 world here where there are nineteen utils. 08:57.519 --> 09:01.649 Or think about this case, we might think of this as a 09:01.649 --> 09:05.539 kind of schematization of the Eichmann problem. 09:05.538 --> 09:12.058 If the utility that the Aryans gain from practicing genocide 09:12.062 --> 09:18.922 and ethnic cleansing against the Jews exceed the utilities that 09:18.918 --> 09:23.798 the Jews lose, there would be no reason under 09:23.799 --> 09:26.859 Bentham's doctrine not to do it. 09:26.860 --> 09:34.010 Okay, now there's a certain ambiguity in the phrase, 09:34.009 --> 09:37.019 "Maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest 09:37.020 --> 09:39.340 number," which Bentham never finally 09:39.336 --> 09:40.086 resolves. 09:40.090 --> 09:43.850 The ambiguity is whether he's saying just maximize the total, 09:43.850 --> 09:46.350 so here the total's bigger than eighteen, 09:46.350 --> 09:48.370 here the total's bigger than eighteen, 09:48.370 --> 09:50.420 here the total's bigger than eighteen, 09:50.418 --> 09:53.848 so it's obviously the case that it's preferable, 09:53.850 --> 09:56.880 on Bentham's scheme, to the status quo. 09:56.879 --> 10:02.179 Or is he perhaps saying maximize the utility of the 10:02.177 --> 10:05.307 majority, the greatest happiness of the 10:05.307 --> 10:08.107 greatest number, the greatest number simply 10:08.105 --> 10:09.495 meaning the majority? 10:09.500 --> 10:13.750 But in that second interpretation you could still 10:13.753 --> 10:18.183 get highly inegalitarian distributions being judged 10:18.183 --> 10:22.813 superior to the status quo, because if you imagine going 10:22.807 --> 10:26.317 from here to here we've got a majority here experiencing 10:26.317 --> 10:32.427 twelve utils of pleasure, and here we have a majority of 10:32.433 --> 10:40.683 two experiencing seventeen potentially utils of pleasure. 10:40.678 --> 10:45.598 So there is some ambiguity there as to just what Bentham 10:45.595 --> 10:48.695 meant, but most of the time he is 10:48.697 --> 10:53.027 taken as having meant just the crude statement, 10:53.029 --> 10:58.009 "Maximize the total amount of utility in the society." 10:58.009 --> 11:01.619 And so that nuance between whether we're saying the 11:01.615 --> 11:06.155 greatest number means a majority or just the total amount is not 11:06.160 --> 11:09.480 something that will detain us any further. 11:09.480 --> 11:16.030 Now, you could say, "Okay, so far so good, 11:16.032 --> 11:24.012 but isn't all of this a little counterintuitive?" 11:24.009 --> 11:29.189 After all, if you compare--let's focus on the 11:29.188 --> 11:36.368 difference between the status quo and distribution IV here. 11:36.370 --> 11:40.900 These people might be on the verge of starvation. 11:40.899 --> 11:48.089 Surely giving them a unit of utility is going to be much more 11:48.085 --> 11:55.625 enhancing to their happiness than giving A a unit of utility. 11:55.629 --> 11:58.789 Anyone know what the principle behind that idea is? 11:58.789 --> 12:02.959 12:02.960 --> 12:05.630 Anyone want to take it? 12:05.629 --> 12:12.059 How many of you have done ECON 101, the first econ course? 12:12.058 --> 12:20.928 Yeah, so what is the principle that would tell you if you have 12:20.931 --> 12:27.041 no food and I give you a loaf of bread, 12:27.038 --> 12:30.028 your utility goes up a lot more than if I have ten loaves of 12:30.032 --> 12:32.012 bread and I give you a loaf of bread. 12:32.009 --> 12:33.169 Somebody? 12:33.169 --> 12:37.869 Okay. 12:37.870 --> 12:39.350 Student: Diminishing marginal utility. 12:39.350 --> 12:41.830 Prof: Diminishing marginal utility, 12:41.825 --> 12:45.205 the principle of diminishing marginal utility of all good 12:45.205 --> 12:45.865 things. 12:45.870 --> 12:53.010 And this is the idea just encapsulated, 12:53.009 --> 12:57.429 to make it a little bit more dramatic: if you don't have a 12:57.431 --> 13:01.001 car and somebody gives you a Porsche Turbo, 13:01.000 --> 13:02.980 your utility's going to go up a huge amount, 13:02.980 --> 13:04.940 right? 13:04.940 --> 13:07.680 But if you already have a Porsche Turbo and somebody gives 13:07.677 --> 13:10.957 you a second one, you're going to get less new 13:10.957 --> 13:16.007 utility from the second Porsche than you had from the first. 13:16.009 --> 13:18.979 And if somebody gives you a third one you're going to have 13:18.975 --> 13:21.255 less utility, less new utility from the third 13:21.264 --> 13:23.194 one that you had from the second. 13:23.190 --> 13:25.870 It's not that you won't get any new, but you'll get less. 13:25.870 --> 13:29.170 And the principle of diminishing marginal utility 13:29.173 --> 13:32.553 says that this line will get flatter, and flatter, 13:32.547 --> 13:34.747 and flatter toward infinity. 13:34.750 --> 13:41.940 You'll always get more utility from a new increment of the same 13:41.942 --> 13:45.592 good, but it'll be less new utility 13:45.586 --> 13:51.016 than you got from the previous increment of that same good, 13:51.019 --> 13:51.769 okay? 13:51.769 --> 13:55.389 That's the concept of diminishing marginal utility. 13:55.389 --> 13:59.139 The new utility you get diminishes at the margin. 13:59.139 --> 14:03.149 Each new Porsche is less valuable to you than the 14:03.150 --> 14:04.740 previous Porsche. 14:04.740 --> 14:09.130 Now, is that plausible? 14:09.129 --> 14:16.219 14:16.220 --> 14:22.080 Anyone think there's a problem with that idea? 14:22.080 --> 14:26.700 14:26.700 --> 14:29.050 Yeah? 14:29.048 --> 14:30.978 Student: The idea with shoes. 14:30.980 --> 14:33.990 If you're given one shoe you're going to get absolutely no 14:33.989 --> 14:35.989 utility, but if you're given two shoes, 14:35.986 --> 14:38.136 a right and a left, then maybe you'll get more 14:38.138 --> 14:38.538 utility? 14:38.539 --> 14:40.429 Prof: Okay, so shoes. 14:40.428 --> 14:44.328 If we just kept giving you lots of right shoes, 14:44.330 --> 14:46.280 there'd be a problem. 14:46.279 --> 14:46.669 Student: Right. 14:46.668 --> 14:48.888 Prof: Okay, so I think Bentham would have 14:48.894 --> 14:51.314 to say it would have to be pairs of shoes, right? 14:51.309 --> 14:53.379 Student: Yeah, I guess. 14:53.379 --> 14:56.769 Prof: Okay, but that's a great example to 14:56.769 --> 14:58.429 start us off on this. 14:58.429 --> 15:00.379 What else? 15:00.379 --> 15:04.679 Anything else anyone might find problematic? 15:04.679 --> 15:06.249 Yeah, over here. 15:06.250 --> 15:09.200 Student: Well, it just seems that if we're 15:09.196 --> 15:12.736 going by diminishing margin utility that if you had everyone 15:12.744 --> 15:15.454 literally dirt poor and always starving, 15:15.450 --> 15:17.870 if you give them just a little bit of something their happiness 15:17.870 --> 15:19.940 would increase so much more because they got that much 15:19.941 --> 15:22.021 little, but people would still be 15:22.019 --> 15:23.949 living in misery technically. 15:23.950 --> 15:26.410 Prof: Just explain that a little more. 15:26.408 --> 15:28.918 Student: Well, marginal utility is if you had 15:28.924 --> 15:31.734 a little bit of something for the first time your happiness 15:31.730 --> 15:34.150 increases so much more because the first time. 15:34.149 --> 15:37.769 So if you were to give people very little food, 15:37.769 --> 15:40.269 or anything at all, and then you suddenly gave them 15:40.274 --> 15:42.184 a little bit they would get really, 15:42.179 --> 15:43.339 really happy about it. 15:43.340 --> 15:46.070 But by this then also if they're also very wealthy and 15:46.072 --> 15:48.962 they got something more they wouldn't really be happy. 15:48.960 --> 15:52.290 So it'd be more beneficial to the utility if they only got a 15:52.288 --> 15:54.938 little bit so they would be very, very happy. 15:54.940 --> 15:55.530 Prof: Okay. 15:55.533 --> 15:56.893 That's a very sophisticated observation. 15:56.889 --> 16:00.039 I'm just going to put it one side and come back to it in 16:00.038 --> 16:03.588 about ten minutes when I start talking about redistribution. 16:03.590 --> 16:04.630 Okay. 16:04.629 --> 16:07.999 But anything else about--if we're still focusing on one 16:08.004 --> 16:10.514 individual, anything else that might be 16:10.509 --> 16:14.249 problematic with this notion of diminishing marginal utility? 16:14.250 --> 16:17.400 Over here? 16:17.399 --> 16:19.669 Student: Well, let's say you're C. 16:19.668 --> 16:21.768 Just because you're rich doesn't mean you don't want to 16:21.768 --> 16:23.768 be more rich, and just because you have a 16:23.774 --> 16:26.904 certain amount of money doesn't mean more money isn't going to 16:26.900 --> 16:29.260 make you equally as happy as it did before. 16:29.259 --> 16:32.309 Prof: Okay, that's true, 16:32.306 --> 16:35.146 but why is it problematic? 16:35.149 --> 16:37.689 Student: I don't know. 16:37.690 --> 16:39.350 Prof: Well, I think you hit on something 16:39.346 --> 16:40.026 really important. 16:40.029 --> 16:43.759 There are a lot of people who think that the principle of 16:43.763 --> 16:47.233 diminishing marginal utility means that money is less 16:47.230 --> 16:50.430 important to people as they have more of it. 16:50.428 --> 16:54.028 After we said the principle of diminishing marginal utility of 16:54.033 --> 16:55.513 all good things, right? 16:55.509 --> 16:58.709 Money is a way of purchasing good things, 16:58.710 --> 17:02.840 so your example might be thought to suggest that this 17:02.844 --> 17:07.694 implies the more money you have the less important money is to 17:07.693 --> 17:09.783 you, okay? 17:09.778 --> 17:14.368 So you're right, but notice what that means. 17:14.368 --> 17:18.458 Does it mean that rich people will care less about money? 17:18.460 --> 17:24.370 17:24.368 --> 17:28.558 It's a tricky question because the first impulse is to say, 17:28.555 --> 17:31.875 "Yes, they'll care less about money," 17:31.875 --> 17:33.675 but the answer is no. 17:33.680 --> 17:38.050 Why is the answer no? 17:38.049 --> 17:39.039 Yeah? 17:39.038 --> 17:41.138 Student: They just need more money to get the same 17:41.138 --> 17:41.948 amount of happiness. 17:41.950 --> 17:43.220 Prof: Exactly. 17:43.221 --> 17:46.561 They need more money to get the same amount of happiness 17:46.556 --> 17:49.466 precisely because of the principle of diminishing 17:49.465 --> 17:50.795 marginal utility. 17:50.798 --> 17:54.958 So you got it exactly right to see that money creates some 17:54.955 --> 17:58.745 problematic examples for the principle of diminishing 17:58.748 --> 18:00.278 marginal utility. 18:00.278 --> 18:04.208 But the thing that follows from it is that, 18:04.210 --> 18:08.530 for Donald Trump to get more utility, 18:08.528 --> 18:12.818 you have to give him a huge amount of new money just for him 18:12.820 --> 18:17.260 to get the same amount of new utility as somebody who only has 18:17.258 --> 18:20.438 ten thousand dollars, right? 18:20.440 --> 18:24.940 So the way to think about the desire for money it's a bit like 18:24.943 --> 18:27.753 sort of a heroin addict needs more, 18:27.750 --> 18:30.560 and more, and more new heroin to get the same hit, 18:30.559 --> 18:35.009 right? 18:35.009 --> 18:37.749 So the more money you have, actually the more money you 18:37.750 --> 18:40.540 will want in order to get the next marginal increment of 18:40.540 --> 18:41.150 utility. 18:41.150 --> 18:46.560 So we should expect rich people to be greedy by this theory, 18:46.560 --> 18:51.240 not to become more and more indifferent to money. 18:51.240 --> 18:55.540 Very important assumption and a lot of people get that wrong 18:55.538 --> 18:59.108 when they think about the principle of diminishing 18:59.108 --> 19:00.638 marginal utility. 19:00.640 --> 19:05.760 Are there any other examples of this doctrine that might make it 19:05.763 --> 19:07.313 seem problematic? 19:07.309 --> 19:08.779 Yeah, over there. 19:08.778 --> 19:11.938 Student: Well, if I had a second Porsche Turbo 19:11.938 --> 19:15.628 I would be just really reckless with it and I could do whatever 19:15.634 --> 19:16.294 I want. 19:16.288 --> 19:19.158 I wouldn't have to protect the first Porsche Turbo as much. 19:19.160 --> 19:20.910 Prof: Yeah? 19:20.910 --> 19:24.760 Student: I mean it's like there's more you can do 19:24.759 --> 19:25.929 with it, right? 19:25.930 --> 19:27.710 Prof: Yeah, so why is that a problem? 19:27.710 --> 19:30.480 Student: Well, then wouldn't the second car-- 19:30.480 --> 19:33.190 I mean, like, say if you have a little bit 19:33.193 --> 19:36.773 and you're given a little bit your utility goes up, 19:36.769 --> 19:40.049 but you really want to protect that little bit, 19:40.048 --> 19:42.598 but when you get more maybe it encourages you to save money, 19:42.604 --> 19:43.474 to not spend more. 19:43.470 --> 19:44.970 Prof: So you wouldn't want the second one? 19:44.970 --> 19:46.040 Student: What? 19:46.038 --> 19:48.098 Prof: Are you saying you wouldn't want the second one? 19:48.098 --> 19:49.588 Student: Well, why wouldn't I want the second 19:49.587 --> 19:49.757 one? 19:49.759 --> 19:50.909 Prof: If you had one and I said, 19:50.910 --> 19:53.340 "I'll give you my one, it's right out there," 19:53.337 --> 19:54.117 you wouldn't want it? 19:54.118 --> 19:55.688 Student: It's not that I wouldn't want it. 19:55.690 --> 19:58.400 Prof: You wouldn't be like Jay Leno, 19:58.404 --> 20:00.994 who--how many cars does Jay Leno have? 20:00.990 --> 20:01.550 Student: Too many. 20:01.548 --> 20:04.458 It's not that I wouldn't want it, but maybe the utility for 20:04.460 --> 20:07.370 the second one in some cases would be more than the utility 20:07.369 --> 20:10.129 for the first one so the curve would be thrown off. 20:10.130 --> 20:11.980 Prof: Because? 20:11.980 --> 20:15.570 Student: Because you want to protect that first one, 20:15.567 --> 20:18.787 so, I mean, so you don't lose what little you have. 20:18.788 --> 20:21.818 Prof: Okay, so it's a possibility. 20:21.818 --> 20:26.248 Any other examples of where this becomes problematic? 20:26.250 --> 20:31.630 I mean, think about beer. 20:31.630 --> 20:35.660 One beer increases your utility a lot. 20:35.660 --> 20:39.800 The next, and the next, and the fourteenth, 20:39.801 --> 20:45.421 isn't it going to at some--you know, or taking an aspirin, 20:45.423 --> 20:48.583 isn't it going to, you know? 20:48.579 --> 20:49.939 No? 20:49.940 --> 20:53.460 Student: What about other values like integrity? 20:53.460 --> 20:57.190 If you have a little bit of integrity and you get some more, 20:57.189 --> 21:00.669 but if you have a lot of integrity, a little bit more is 21:00.665 --> 21:02.685 still worth an equal amount. 21:02.690 --> 21:07.360 Prof: So integrity is a great example because once you 21:07.355 --> 21:11.005 start putting values like that out there it, 21:11.009 --> 21:13.809 I think, threatens the idea that it's all reducible to a 21:13.814 --> 21:15.944 single index, right? 21:15.940 --> 21:22.320 Because you can't--having a little bit of integrity is sort 21:22.318 --> 21:27.268 of like being a little bit pregnant, right? 21:27.269 --> 21:34.569 Once Eliot Spitzer's integrity is blown it's not like there's 21:34.566 --> 21:37.846 some--it's a binary good. 21:37.848 --> 21:39.868 You either have it or you don't, right? 21:39.868 --> 21:43.048 People either think he's either a hypocrite or he's not, 21:43.054 --> 21:44.274 it' a binary thing. 21:44.269 --> 21:47.649 Maybe some people are somewhat hypocritical, 21:47.652 --> 21:51.032 but it seems like there's a threshold there, 21:51.034 --> 21:53.084 one side or the other. 21:53.078 --> 21:58.478 So there might be some goods like integrity that are not 21:58.477 --> 22:02.007 easily capture-able in this logic. 22:02.009 --> 22:08.839 We should put that out there, but yeah, over here? 22:08.838 --> 22:10.508 Student: What about health? 22:10.509 --> 22:14.359 It's not quite binary because you can be in medium health, 22:14.358 --> 22:17.218 but I think it would be pretty useful to be healthy and then 22:17.215 --> 22:21.225 super healthy, ad infinitum. 22:21.230 --> 22:26.120 Professor Ian Shapiro: Health. 22:26.118 --> 22:28.388 The thing about health it's tricky. 22:28.390 --> 22:31.150 Actually less so in our day than Bentham's, 22:31.148 --> 22:34.298 it's tricky to think about redistributing health, 22:34.303 --> 22:34.963 right? 22:34.960 --> 22:41.240 Although you'll see we will come up against some pretty 22:41.239 --> 22:43.099 bizarre cases. 22:43.098 --> 22:46.888 If some people are sighted and some people are blind and you 22:46.894 --> 22:50.494 could do eye transplants, should we be transplanting from 22:50.494 --> 22:52.364 the sighted to the blind? 22:52.358 --> 22:56.508 Arguably the blind person would gain more utility from getting 22:56.513 --> 23:01.013 one eye than the sighted person would lose from losing one eye, 23:01.009 --> 23:02.499 so shouldn't we do that? 23:02.500 --> 23:08.620 So that can also give you some ways of proceeding that would 23:08.616 --> 23:12.656 make you queasy, right, if you allow the 23:12.660 --> 23:17.430 principle of diminishing marginal utility. 23:17.430 --> 23:23.810 What about the examples I threw out there, beer and aspirins? 23:23.808 --> 23:27.558 They're a bit like the sort of left shoe examples, 23:27.557 --> 23:28.167 right? 23:28.170 --> 23:31.110 I don't think those are actually deep problems for 23:31.105 --> 23:34.515 Bentham's theory because I think what he would say is, 23:34.519 --> 23:38.729 "Well, you'd drink beer and at some point you would sell 23:38.731 --> 23:42.731 the beer rather than make yourself paralytically drunk and 23:42.733 --> 23:44.423 feel terrible." 23:44.420 --> 23:48.680 You'd sell the beer and use that to buy some other good that 23:48.675 --> 23:52.205 would give you increasing utility at a diminishing 23:52.211 --> 23:53.511 marginal rate. 23:53.509 --> 24:00.189 So the main thing is that the fungibility of utility and its 24:00.192 --> 24:04.272 expressibility in terms of money, 24:04.269 --> 24:08.289 although as was pointed out here, when we think about the 24:08.288 --> 24:11.588 diminishing marginal utility even of money, 24:11.588 --> 24:14.808 we shouldn't think that that makes you care less about money 24:14.811 --> 24:18.321 the richer you get; rather it will make you care 24:18.318 --> 24:21.858 more about money the richer that you get. 24:21.858 --> 24:27.658 Okay, now, here's a historical statement about the principle of 24:27.660 --> 24:30.560 diminishing marginal utility. 24:30.558 --> 24:35.638 Every serious economist since the eighteenth century has 24:35.637 --> 24:41.177 assumed that the principle of diminishing marginal utility is 24:41.178 --> 24:44.408 true, including Jeremy Bentham. 24:44.410 --> 24:49.650 You can't do economics without assuming that the principle of 24:49.652 --> 24:53.062 diminishing marginal utility is true. 24:53.058 --> 24:57.248 And I think if you threw out some of these problematic 24:57.253 --> 25:03.463 instances like integrity, I think that what Bentham would 25:03.462 --> 25:06.332 have said, or what any economist would 25:06.325 --> 25:08.295 have said, "Well, yes, 25:08.303 --> 25:13.273 there are some things that are not capture-able easily, 25:13.269 --> 25:19.109 or easily captured by this idea, but if you want to get it 25:19.107 --> 25:20.787 right, if you want to see how people 25:20.790 --> 25:22.900 are going to behave, if you want to get it right, 25:22.897 --> 25:26.227 it's a better assumption than any of the competing assumptions 25:26.227 --> 25:27.207 you could make. 25:27.210 --> 25:31.360 It's going to get you closer to the truth more of the time than 25:31.364 --> 25:35.384 not assuming the principle of diminishing marginal utility is 25:35.384 --> 25:36.394 true." 25:36.390 --> 25:40.870 So Bentham would have probably said that, I think, 25:40.873 --> 25:46.093 if questioned or if somebody had probed with some of these 25:46.087 --> 25:48.007 counter examples. 25:48.009 --> 25:53.229 So it's the best assumption you can make given that you've got 25:53.234 --> 25:55.124 to assume something. 25:55.118 --> 26:00.648 But now, and now I want to come back to the sophisticated point 26:00.651 --> 26:05.831 that was made in the middle at the back there a few minutes 26:05.826 --> 26:08.506 ago, when you start to think about 26:08.506 --> 26:12.126 the utility that people at the bottom of the social order 26:12.130 --> 26:16.370 derive from a particular good, versus the utility that the 26:16.365 --> 26:20.355 people at the top of the social order derive from some 26:20.362 --> 26:23.622 particular good, because in Bentham's scheme, 26:23.621 --> 26:27.401 remember, we are allowing comparisons 26:27.400 --> 26:29.690 across individuals. 26:29.690 --> 26:33.460 Let's suppose a two-person society, 26:33.460 --> 26:40.710 again, and let's suppose it consists of Donald Trump-- 26:40.710 --> 26:44.870 well, it can be a multi-person society but we're just going to 26:44.865 --> 26:47.585 focus on two: Donald Trump and a homeless 26:47.592 --> 26:51.482 woman living out of a left luggage locker in Grand Central 26:51.476 --> 26:52.426 Station. 26:52.430 --> 26:59.370 Actually there are no lockers at Grand Central but there are 26:59.367 --> 27:03.247 at Penn, at Penn Station, okay? 27:03.250 --> 27:06.580 And the question is, should we take a dollar from 27:06.580 --> 27:09.080 Trump and give it to the bag lady. 27:09.079 --> 27:11.869 What? Should we? Yes? No? 27:11.869 --> 27:14.399 How many think yes? 27:14.400 --> 27:18.110 Okay, yeah, almost everybody. 27:18.109 --> 27:19.939 Why? 27:19.940 --> 27:23.310 Because by assumption with the principle of diminishing 27:23.308 --> 27:26.988 marginal utility we take the dollar from Trump up there, 27:26.990 --> 27:31.480 his loss of utility is negligible, but we give it to 27:31.481 --> 27:34.831 the woman who's starving down here, 27:34.828 --> 27:38.918 and her gain in utility is enormous from that dollar, 27:38.920 --> 27:39.980 right? 27:39.980 --> 27:42.980 So we should take the dollar from Trump. 27:42.980 --> 27:45.470 Let's assume there's no dead weight loss to the government 27:45.471 --> 27:46.871 and all of that for right now. 27:46.869 --> 27:49.179 We will just keep it simple. 27:49.180 --> 27:52.480 We should take that dollar from Trump and we should give it to 27:52.482 --> 27:55.022 the bag lady, and the greatest happiness of 27:55.016 --> 27:57.426 the greatest number will have increased, 27:57.430 --> 28:00.090 right? 28:00.088 --> 28:04.218 But then maybe we should take another dollar, 28:04.221 --> 28:05.631 shouldn't we? 28:05.630 --> 28:10.100 I mean it worked the first time, so we should take a second 28:10.096 --> 28:13.556 dollar from Trump and give it to the bag lady, 28:13.560 --> 28:16.950 and a third dollar, and a fourth dollar. 28:16.950 --> 28:22.340 When are we going to stop? 28:22.339 --> 28:26.829 When are we going to stop? 28:26.829 --> 28:28.229 Yeah? 28:28.230 --> 28:30.670 Student: > 28:30.670 --> 28:32.970 Professor Ian Shapiro: Yeah, we're going to stop at 28:32.972 --> 28:34.772 the point of perfect equality, right? 28:34.769 --> 28:37.869 We're going to keep redistributing until they have 28:37.869 --> 28:39.009 the same amount. 28:39.009 --> 28:46.099 So now you should be able to start to see why classical 28:46.102 --> 28:52.802 utilitarianism was a doctrine that was thought to be 28:52.799 --> 28:59.629 profoundly radical and frightening to rich men, 28:59.630 --> 29:04.150 because it has this built-in impetus for downward 29:04.148 --> 29:05.748 redistribution. 29:05.750 --> 29:07.370 You can say well, there'll be cost, 29:07.368 --> 29:09.928 there'll be dead weight loss to the state and so on, 29:09.930 --> 29:14.180 but still the underlying logic says take it from Trump and give 29:14.181 --> 29:17.111 it to the bag lady, right? 29:17.108 --> 29:19.818 At the margin that's what you should do. 29:19.818 --> 29:27.538 And Bentham completely saw that this was an implication of his 29:27.538 --> 29:28.928 doctrine. 29:28.930 --> 29:31.600 Now, Bentham was a fairly radical guy. 29:31.598 --> 29:35.008 He was a supporter of democracy, which was a radical 29:35.007 --> 29:36.407 thing at that time. 29:36.410 --> 29:41.010 But he wasn't as egalitarian as all that, 29:41.009 --> 29:47.659 and he wanted to temper the downward redistribution that 29:47.655 --> 29:54.175 flows from his principle, and so he makes a distinction 29:54.179 --> 29:59.379 between what he refers to as "absolute" 29:59.375 --> 30:03.485 and "practical" equality. 30:03.490 --> 30:05.810 He says, Suppose but a commencement made, 30:05.808 --> 30:08.358 by the power of a government of any kind, 30:08.358 --> 30:11.698 in the design of establishing it (absolute equality, 30:11.700 --> 30:14.600 that's redistributing to equality), 30:14.598 --> 30:17.178 the effect would be--that, instead of every one's having 30:17.180 --> 30:20.090 an equal share in the sum of the objects of general desire-- 30:20.088 --> 30:25.018 and in particular the means of subsistence, 30:25.019 --> 30:27.449 and the matter of abundance, no one would have any share of 30:27.446 --> 30:27.946 it at all. 30:27.950 --> 30:32.070 Before any division of it could be made, the whole would be 30:32.067 --> 30:34.207 destroyed; and destroyed, 30:34.213 --> 30:36.803 along with it, by those whom, 30:36.801 --> 30:42.261 as well as those for the sake of whom, the division had been 30:42.255 --> 30:43.545 ordained. 30:43.548 --> 30:47.788 He's basically saying, if you want to reduce that to a 30:47.788 --> 30:52.968 bumper sticker, he's saying the rich will burn 30:52.972 --> 30:58.592 their crops before giving them to the poor, 30:58.588 --> 31:01.808 and that is a common argument in politics. 31:01.808 --> 31:07.178 It's the sort of reverse of trickle-down, 31:07.183 --> 31:08.263 right? 31:08.259 --> 31:13.309 Trickle-down is the notion that you allow inequality because the 31:13.305 --> 31:17.465 rich will create more wealth for everybody, right? 31:17.470 --> 31:21.910 The pie bigger for everybody, and so the greatest amount of 31:21.913 --> 31:25.443 utility is increased by allowing inequality. 31:25.440 --> 31:28.310 This is the inverse claim. 31:28.308 --> 31:30.038 Bentham's saying, "Well yes, 31:30.038 --> 31:33.548 in principle absolute equality would maximize the greatest 31:33.550 --> 31:35.770 happiness of the greatest number, 31:35.769 --> 31:38.399 but in fact if a government set out to do that, 31:38.400 --> 31:40.470 the rich would rebel." 31:40.470 --> 31:47.230 And this is a claim that is often made in everyday politics. 31:47.230 --> 31:51.990 So you'll destroy incentives to work, 31:51.990 --> 31:56.630 is the claim that you'll hear when we have arguments about 31:56.626 --> 32:00.936 raising taxes in the run up to the fall elections, 32:00.940 --> 32:03.130 right? 32:03.130 --> 32:08.960 In the transition to democracy in South Africa people said the 32:08.961 --> 32:14.891 white farmers will destroy their farms before turning them over 32:14.887 --> 32:16.797 to the majority. 32:16.799 --> 32:20.549 It turned out not to be true. 32:20.548 --> 32:25.688 So those examples put on the table, what sort of force does 32:25.692 --> 32:27.292 this claim have? 32:27.288 --> 32:34.678 It's really an empirical claim, and we don't really know how 32:34.680 --> 32:41.820 much the rich will tolerate before burning their crops. 32:41.818 --> 32:46.928 Presumably they'll allow some redistributive taxation, 32:46.930 --> 32:50.310 but we don't know how much, and a lot of the day-to-day 32:50.310 --> 32:53.130 argument of politics turns around how much. 32:53.130 --> 32:56.900 So Bentham makes a distinction between absolute and practical 32:56.904 --> 32:58.254 equality, and he says, 32:58.252 --> 33:01.522 "We should redistribute to the point of practical equality, 33:01.519 --> 33:06.409 but not to the point of absolute equality because 33:06.413 --> 33:12.233 redistributing beyond practical equality has this perverse 33:12.227 --> 33:17.527 counter-trickle-down logic and that's not going to be 33:17.528 --> 33:22.528 acceptable from the standpoint of the principle of 33:22.526 --> 33:24.766 utility." 33:24.769 --> 33:30.989 Okay, so when you allow both interpersonal comparisons of 33:30.990 --> 33:37.100 utility and you assume diminishing marginal utility, 33:37.098 --> 33:41.598 utilitarianism becomes a very radical doctrine. 33:41.598 --> 33:45.608 You can hedge it in to some extent with claims of this sort, 33:45.608 --> 33:50.668 but they are themselves controversial and you're going 33:50.674 --> 33:56.604 to get into a very messy world of macroeconomic predictions and 33:56.601 --> 34:01.951 counter-predictions about whether and when you reach this 34:01.953 --> 34:08.653 point of practical equality, or when the gains from downward 34:08.652 --> 34:15.572 redistribution are offset by the losses from the shrinking of the 34:15.572 --> 34:16.332 pie. 34:16.329 --> 34:20.659 Now, some of you might have said, "Well, 34:20.659 --> 34:23.449 at the beginning of this course of lectures, 34:23.449 --> 34:28.639 Shapiro said, 'Every Enlightenment thinker is 34:28.635 --> 34:31.695 committed to postulants. 34:31.699 --> 34:35.929 One is that we can have a scientific theory of politics, 34:35.929 --> 34:39.349 and the other is that individual freedom 34:39.351 --> 34:44.351 operationalizes a doctrine of rights is the most important 34:44.351 --> 34:45.231 good.' 34:45.230 --> 34:48.570 Now, having sat through these lectures on Bentham, 34:48.574 --> 34:51.514 I can see what he's saying about science. 34:51.510 --> 34:55.930 Bentham has this monomaniacal view of science. 34:55.929 --> 34:59.649 He's got his objective egoism. 34:59.650 --> 35:03.170 He can figure it all out, what will maximize social 35:03.173 --> 35:05.333 utility, and run around the world 35:05.327 --> 35:07.337 writing constitutions for people, 35:07.340 --> 35:10.730 can devise a whole public policy that's going to 35:10.731 --> 35:14.341 scientifically maximize the utility of society, 35:14.340 --> 35:18.770 but I'm not seeing a whole lot of room for rights in this 35:18.768 --> 35:19.638 doctrine. 35:19.639 --> 35:24.489 It seems to allow ethnic cleansing, even genocide. 35:24.489 --> 35:28.889 It seems to allow redistribution from one person 35:28.887 --> 35:34.777 to another, all justified on the grounds that this is maximizing 35:34.782 --> 35:37.872 the total utility of society. 35:37.869 --> 35:41.859 Well, even if it is, how does this respect 35:41.864 --> 35:44.404 individual rights?" 35:44.400 --> 35:48.650 35:48.650 --> 35:49.970 Am I just wrong? 35:49.965 --> 35:53.995 Is there some elementary thing I've missed here? 35:54.000 --> 36:00.290 There's not much room for rights in Bentham's doctrine. 36:00.289 --> 36:04.589 So I'm just wrong that these Enlightenment thinkers were 36:04.590 --> 36:07.170 committed to individual rights? 36:07.170 --> 36:11.640 It would be a reasonable inference from what I'm said so 36:11.641 --> 36:12.131 far. 36:12.130 --> 36:18.240 But remember, for Bentham when we try to 36:18.239 --> 36:28.579 maximize utility in the society, individual motivation is vital. 36:28.579 --> 36:32.339 This is a passage I read to you last week, 36:32.340 --> 36:35.510 but I'm just repeating it, "The great enemies of 36:35.512 --> 36:38.872 public peace are the selfish and dissocial passions-- 36:38.869 --> 36:43.749 necessary as they are...Society is held together only by the 36:43.750 --> 36:47.720 sacrifices that men can be induced to make of the 36:47.721 --> 36:52.351 gratifications they demand: to obtain these sacrifices is 36:52.353 --> 36:57.433 the great difficulty, the great task of 36:57.427 --> 37:00.347 government." 37:00.349 --> 37:06.249 He's saying you have to work with individual motivations. 37:06.250 --> 37:11.190 You can't ignore them, and I think that is the point 37:11.192 --> 37:16.912 that's behind his distinction between absolute and practical 37:16.909 --> 37:18.169 equality. 37:18.170 --> 37:21.180 The rich will burn their crops before giving them to the poor. 37:21.179 --> 37:22.909 You have to take that into account. 37:22.909 --> 37:31.439 You have to see individuals as the basic generators of utility. 37:31.440 --> 37:34.940 In another piece of Bentham's writing which I didn't have you 37:34.942 --> 37:37.792 read, but I'll just put it out there 37:37.791 --> 37:42.001 because it's where you start to see our old friend the 37:41.998 --> 37:45.648 workmanship ideal creeping by the backdoor into 37:45.652 --> 37:47.242 utilitarianism. 37:47.239 --> 37:50.439 Bentham says, "Law does not say to man, 37:50.440 --> 37:53.610 Work and I will reward you but it says: 37:53.612 --> 37:56.762 Labour, and by stopping the hand that 37:56.760 --> 38:01.040 would take them from you, I will ensure you the fruits of 38:01.036 --> 38:04.366 your labour-- its natural and sufficient 38:04.369 --> 38:08.509 reward, which without me you cannot preserve. 38:08.510 --> 38:12.300 If industry creates, it is law which preserves. 38:12.300 --> 38:16.020 If at the first we owe everything to labour; 38:16.018 --> 38:18.708 at the second, and every succeeding moment, 38:18.708 --> 38:20.818 we owe everything to law." 38:20.820 --> 38:24.130 So another way of thinking about this is, 38:24.130 --> 38:29.180 that Bentham's idea of the state is essentially regulatory. 38:29.179 --> 38:35.139 It stays the hand of somebody else who would steal your goods, 38:35.141 --> 38:40.031 but the government cannot itself create utility. 38:40.030 --> 38:44.720 Labor creates utility, and this is why I say that 38:44.722 --> 38:47.862 workmanship, that idea that we first 38:47.862 --> 38:50.772 confronted when we talked about Locke, 38:50.768 --> 38:55.758 comes into utilitarianism by the backdoor, 38:55.760 --> 39:00.330 because Bentham's going to say, "Unless you respect 39:00.329 --> 39:04.979 individual rights you're not going to be able to maximize 39:04.981 --> 39:08.721 utility for the society as a whole." 39:08.719 --> 39:12.949 So the state is basically a regulative state, 39:12.945 --> 39:18.605 not a state that's actively involved in creating utility for 39:18.612 --> 39:20.152 individuals. 39:20.150 --> 39:25.780 It will do some redistribution to the point of practical 39:25.780 --> 39:29.580 equality, but the basic idea is that the 39:29.577 --> 39:34.797 state should be hands-off with respect to the utility creation 39:34.798 --> 39:36.338 in the society. 39:36.340 --> 39:39.820 It's industry that creates utility--labor, 39:39.817 --> 39:44.987 work--so incentives are going to be important going forward if 39:44.990 --> 39:48.130 you're going to maximize utility. 39:48.130 --> 39:54.450 So that's the way in which we see that even a classical 39:54.447 --> 40:01.227 utilitarian like Bentham is going to resist dispensing with 40:01.233 --> 40:05.683 the doctrine of individual rights. 40:05.679 --> 40:12.839 Now, there's a problem, though, with his mode of doing 40:12.838 --> 40:17.098 this, and the problem arises because 40:17.096 --> 40:23.236 the claim that the rich will burn their crops before giving 40:23.235 --> 40:27.255 them to the poor might not be true. 40:27.260 --> 40:31.280 And even if we get to less extreme circumstances like South 40:31.284 --> 40:34.204 Africa before and after the transition, 40:34.199 --> 40:39.359 when we look at actual debates in contemporary politics in the 40:39.360 --> 40:43.230 United States, this is what we see. 40:43.230 --> 40:48.510 Ronald Reagan comes in and says, this is in 1980, 40:48.510 --> 40:53.280 "If we cut taxes, the pie will get bigger for all 40:53.284 --> 40:57.074 and they'll be actually more revenue," 40:57.067 --> 41:00.397 and so utilitarianism says do it. 41:00.400 --> 41:03.660 And the Democrats say, "No, they won't," 41:03.661 --> 41:05.861 and it's an empirical argument. 41:05.860 --> 41:11.230 And you will find, if you go back now and look at 41:11.233 --> 41:16.463 what happened during the 1980s, perfectly credible economists 41:16.461 --> 41:19.211 will line up on both sides because they cut the taxes, 41:19.210 --> 41:22.670 but, of course, eight other things happened as 41:22.673 --> 41:25.603 well that affect the macro-economy, 41:25.599 --> 41:27.779 right? 41:27.780 --> 41:32.630 And disentangling how much the tax cuts were responsible for 41:32.630 --> 41:36.110 what happened, versus how much many other 41:36.106 --> 41:39.296 things that happened were responsible, 41:39.300 --> 41:43.830 nobody really knows. 41:43.829 --> 41:47.499 Or if you look at the current debate we watched and are 41:47.496 --> 41:50.616 watching unfold about the economic stimulus. 41:50.619 --> 41:57.639 If the economy turns around between now and November, 41:57.639 --> 42:03.729 the Democrats will probably do a lot better than if it doesn't, 42:03.730 --> 42:07.090 but the Republicans will say, "Well, 42:07.090 --> 42:11.240 it would have turned around faster if we hadn't had all this 42:11.242 --> 42:12.442 taxation." 42:12.440 --> 42:15.370 And Paul Krugman will say, "Well, it would have 42:15.373 --> 42:18.943 turned around even faster if we had had more taxation." 42:18.940 --> 42:24.900 And so a lot of the problem in debating incentives, 42:24.900 --> 42:29.260 once you get into the real world of macroeconomic 42:29.264 --> 42:33.614 policy-making, is that (a) you never have the 42:33.606 --> 42:37.226 counterfactual; you can't go and rerun history 42:37.228 --> 42:40.708 without the stimulus, right, or without the Reagan 42:40.708 --> 42:41.558 tax cuts. 42:41.559 --> 42:46.069 And (b) the sheer complexity; so many other things 42:46.068 --> 42:49.008 happened--the price of oil goes up, 42:49.010 --> 42:52.010 or the commodities collapse, or the dollar, 42:52.010 --> 42:54.480 or this, or that, or the Chinese revalue, 42:54.480 --> 42:57.990 do or don't change the value of their currency. 42:57.989 --> 43:05.629 So that when it gets down to it, you're never going to get a 43:05.632 --> 43:12.502 definitive answer to the question what is the point of 43:12.500 --> 43:15.480 practical equality. 43:15.480 --> 43:20.030 When have we passed the point of practical equality, 43:20.032 --> 43:22.802 to use Bentham's terminology? 43:22.800 --> 43:23.610 Are we close to it? 43:23.610 --> 43:24.440 Have we gone by it? 43:24.440 --> 43:26.150 Are we nowhere near it? 43:26.150 --> 43:31.740 There have been periods in our history when we've had top 43:31.737 --> 43:35.927 marginal tax rates of 90 percent, right? 43:35.929 --> 43:40.199 Reagan thought a top marginal tax rate of 40 percent was 43:40.202 --> 43:43.392 beyond the point of practical equality. 43:43.389 --> 43:47.259 You're never going to get a definitive resolution of those 43:47.255 --> 43:48.065 questions. 43:48.070 --> 43:52.740 But if we think back to what the aspiration of the early 43:52.742 --> 43:55.972 Enlightenment was, it was certainty. 43:55.969 --> 44:00.739 To use the example, remember, I read to you from 44:00.744 --> 44:06.744 Hobbes, from his Epistle Dedicatory to his Six Lessons to 44:06.739 --> 44:10.599 the Professors of Mathematics; 44:10.599 --> 44:14.019 he said, "For the things we don't make, 44:14.023 --> 44:18.323 we can't know we can only guess about the causes," 44:18.322 --> 44:19.122 right? 44:19.119 --> 44:23.449 Well, here we're guessing about the causes. 44:23.449 --> 44:28.819 We don't really know and there will be--the people who want 44:28.815 --> 44:34.365 either policy will be able to find a plausible set of experts 44:34.367 --> 44:36.677 to defend their view. 44:36.679 --> 44:40.819 So you're getting to this very messy world of macroeconomic 44:40.820 --> 44:45.400 prediction, if you want to put some limits 44:45.400 --> 44:51.250 on the radical edge of classical utilitarianism. 44:51.250 --> 44:59.010 And as a matter of history, that's not how it went. 44:59.010 --> 45:03.940 As a matter of history, how it went was to rethink the 45:03.940 --> 45:08.690 analytical structure of utilitarianism in a way that 45:08.686 --> 45:14.456 completely defanged its radical redistributive edge without any 45:14.456 --> 45:20.036 reference to these messy macroeconomic considerations. 45:20.039 --> 45:24.359 And just how that happened in the transition from classical to 45:24.364 --> 45:28.264 what we're going to all neoclassical utilitarianism is a 45:28.264 --> 45:31.744 subject with which I will begin on Wednesday. 45:31.739 --> 45:32.849 See you then. 45:32.849 --> 45:37.999