WEBVTT

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Prof: So today we're
going to start talking about

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classical utilitarianism,
and we're going to use as our

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point of departure Jeremy
Bentham,

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who lived between 1748 and 1832
and came up with the canonical

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statement of the doctrine of
utilitarianism.

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It's a doctrine which is still
very much alive and kicking in

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the contemporary West despite
all of its problems,

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and we'll have things to say
about why that is.

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But I wanted to make a couple
of prefatory remarks first about

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Bentham himself.

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There are some thinkers in the
Western tradition,

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I guess in any tradition,
who have a particular

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characteristic that Bentham
certainly has,

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and I think of the folks we're
going to read Karl Marx had and

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Robert Nozick had.

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And the thing I'm thinking of
here is they are the kind of

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person who takes one idea to the
most extreme possible

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formulation.

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They ask themselves a question,
"How would the world be if

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this idea that I have is the
only important idea,"

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and they take it to its logical
extreme,

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to an excessive kind of
formulation.

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And they will go places with
their idea that nobody else will

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go, and so that makes them a
little bit crazy.

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They're monomaniacal,
obsessively consumed with their

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idea.

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In the case of Bentham it's the
idea of utility,

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which we're going to unpack a
little bit in a moment.

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But what's always interesting
about people like this is that

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they play out an idea to its
logical extreme and that

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exhibits both its strengths and
its limitation just because

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they're willing to go when
others will not go,

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think the unthinkable,
think politically incorrect

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things for their time in pursuit
of really pushing this idea to

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the absolute hilt.

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And so Bentham is the kind of
thinker who I suspect,

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at the end of the day,
nobody will be fully convinced

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by, but he's very useful.

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He's a very useful
diagnostician of what it is

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about utilitarianism that's
going to be appealing to you and

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where eventually you're going to
want to put some limits on it

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just because he goes beyond the
limits.

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And so you can see what happens
if you push it all the way to

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the hilt.

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Secondly, I want to just say
that Bentham is important as a

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fountain of more than
utilitarianism,

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but also of modern conceptions
of value more generally

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considered.

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You'll see that there were
rumblings of the kinds of things

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he had to say about value in the
seventeenth century.

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Hobbes, for example,
who I mentioned last time,

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criticized Aristotle for not
seeing that what is good for

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some people may not be good for
other people,

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and Bentham builds on that idea.

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You'll see Bentham will start
to link the good to what it is

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that people desire.

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There were also rumblings of
Bentham's methods in

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particularly his aspirations to
found politics on scientific

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principles in the seventeenth
century.

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We already saw last time the
Hobbesian and Lockean

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creationist theories of science,
but they were really

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transitional figures.

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They also gave theological
justifications for their

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arguments as I explained at some
length in Locke,

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in the context of Locke.

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I didn't have time to do it
with Hobbes,

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but many of you will know that
if you read the second

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two-thirds of Hobbes'
Leviathan, it's almost

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all about interpretation of the
scriptures,

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showing that his scientifically
derived principles are also

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consistent with the Bible.

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Bentham sheds all of this.

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For Bentham he's not interested
in appeals to tradition.

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He's not interested in appeals
to religion.

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He's not interested in appeals
to natural law.

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He dismisses the natural law
tradition as dangerous nonsense,

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"nonsense on stilts."

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He's only interested in a
scientific set of principles for

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organizing politics.

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And one of the nice things
about Bentham,

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at least from your point of
view, is--

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and we'll see that
utilitarianism values efficiency

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in many ways,
but one of the interesting

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things or the helpful things
about Bentham is that he reduces

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his whole doctrine to a single
paragraph,

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and he puts that paragraph
right at the front of his

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Introduction to The
Principles of Morals and

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Legislation.

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So here you have the kind of
Cliffs Notes formulation of

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Bentham's argument.

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He says that,
"Nature has placed mankind

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under the governance of two
sovereign masters,

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pain and pleasure.

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It is for them alone to point
out what we ought to do,

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as well as to determine what we
shall do."

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So this is going to be about
describing human behavior and

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about what ought to be the case,
right?

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What we shall do.

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...[T]o point out what we ought
to do as well as to determine

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what we shall do.

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On the one hand the standard of
right and wrong,

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on the other the chain of
causes and effects,

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are fastened to their throne.

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(That's the throne of pain and
pleasure.)

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They govern us in all we do,
in all we say,

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and in all we think:
every effort we can make to

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throw off our subjection (that's
our subjection to

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pleasure-seeking and
pain-avoiding) will serve but to

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demonstrate and confirm it (to
confirm that subjection).

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In words a man may pretend to
abjure their empire (that's the

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empire of pain and pleasure):
but in reality he will remain

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subject to it all the while.

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The principle of utility
recognizes this subjection,

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and assumes it for the
foundation of that system,

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the object of which is to rear
the fabric of felicity by the

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hands of reason and law.

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Systems which attempt to
question it deal in sounds

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instead of sense,
in caprice instead of reason,

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and in darkness instead of
light.

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That is, in a nutshell,
Bentham's theory;

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very bold unequivocal statement.

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He's saying if you want to
understand human beings in a

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causal explanatory sense all you
have to know about them is that

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they're going to seek pleasure
and avoid pain.

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And if you want to think about
what ought to happen in the

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design of institutions they
should be designed around that

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fact, to accommodate that fact.

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And he's going to develop a
system of laws,

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a system of government that
takes into account and is built

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upon this assumption about human
nature,

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as he would have called it;
human psychology,

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as we would call it today.

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Now, I'm going to make five
points about Bentham's system to

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give you some sense of the full
dimensions of it,

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before we start dissecting it
and subjecting it to critical

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scrutiny.

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I want to make sure that we
understand exactly what his

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system is.

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And I want to first of all
notice that it is what I'm going

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to call a comprehensive and
deterministic account.

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I call it a comprehensive and
deterministic account in that

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it's an account of all human
behavior.

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He wants to say everything you
do is ultimately determined by

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pleasure-seeking and
pain-avoiding.

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How plausible--who thinks
that's plausible?

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Hands up.

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Plausible?

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Implausible?

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Okay, give us an example,
somebody,

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of something that is not
pleasure-seeking or

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pain-avoiding,
anybody, something that is not

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the result of pleasure-seeking
or pain-avoiding.

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Well, you put your hands up.

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You must have had some thoughts.

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Yeah, okay here.

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Yeah, you take it.

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Student: Running into a fire to
rescue people.

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Prof: Pardon?

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Student:  Running into a
fire to rescue people.

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Prof: Running into a
fire to rescue people.

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Okay, you run into a fire to
rescue people.

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What do you think Bentham would
say about that example?

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Yeah, over here, sir.

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Student:  The pleasure
is actually saving the people,

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so there is,
like, this benefit that you get

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from it, the pleasure.

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Prof: The pleasure you
get from having saved the people

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must outweigh the pain of the
fire or you wouldn't do it.

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Any other example?

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Nobody's got an example?

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Nobody can think of an example?

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No?

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Yes? Yes, sir?

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Student:  Well,
there may be some.

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For example,
saving one's child may be

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purely instinctual rather than
driven by pain or pleasure.

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Prof: So say sacrificing
your life to save your child,

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let's say, to put it in an
extreme case.

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Student:  Yes.

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Prof: What would Bentham
say about that?

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I mean, this seems like a
genuine altruistic action.

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Somebody lays down their life
for their own child.

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How can that be
pleasure-seeking and

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pain-avoiding?

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What would Bentham say?

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Yeah?

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Student:
>

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Prof: Wait,
we need you...

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Student:  I mean,
clearly the pain of,

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like, having lost a child,
like, outweighs whatever

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pleasures.

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Prof: Yeah,
I think that is what he would

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say.

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Think of the counterfactual.

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How could I live with myself
for the rest of my life if I

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didn't do it?

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The pain would be too great.

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And Bentham considers cases
like this sort of thing.

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Apparently altruistic acts
seems ultimately always

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reducible to the pleasure-pain
calculus.

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One example he considers is
people acting from religious

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motivations and he says,
"Ha!

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Just read the Bible.

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Look at the descriptions of
heaven and hell.

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Isn't that a made-to-order
pleasure-seeking and

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pain-avoidance?"

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Hell is described as,
you know, the fires of hell,

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perpetual pain.

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So, the people who constructed
religious doctrines clearly had

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an understanding of human nature
or they wouldn't have described

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hell in a way that they
described it and heaven in the

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way that they describe it.

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So, the first thing he wants to
say is that this is a completely

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comprehensive explanation of
human behavior.

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Can anybody think of any
example that couldn't be

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re-described as fitting this
pleasure-pain calculus?

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Yeah?

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Student:  I think that
if life is all about pain and

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pleasure we would be willing to
replace our life with one with

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only,
I mean, one only with pleasure,

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right?

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But we wouldn't.

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We value our life by ourself.

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There is something
indescribable quality to it.

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I mean, life is the sum of all
experiences rather than just

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pain and pleasure,
so.

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Prof: So you think that
there is more complexity to

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human motivation that's just not
expressible as or reducible to

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pain and pleasure.

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I think that's a very
sophisticated and common

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critique that's been made of
Bentham.

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If you go and read,
indeed if you read the obituary

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of him that was written by
Coleridge, I think it was,

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makes exactly this point.

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There was this sophistication
to human motivation that isn't

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captured in this idea.

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I think that the truth is
Bentham would have acknowledged

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some of that,
but he would have said,

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"At the end of the day
it's not important because the

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pleasure-pain calculus overrides
when the chips are down.

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If we're going to think about
what it is that's going to

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motivate people,
it's pleasure-seeking and

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pain-avoidance."

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Okay, a second thing that you
should notice about this

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doctrine is that I'm going to
call it a naturalistic doctrine.

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In some ways it's astounding
that writing almost half a

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century before Darwin,
Darwin was born in 1809 and

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lived until 1882,
so writing almost half a

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century before Darwin,
Bentham grounds his principle

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in the imperatives for human
survival.

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He thinks that the
pleasure-pain principle has a

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natural biological basis.

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Although there are religious,
moral and political sources and

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sanctions of pain and pleasure,
these are all secondary to the

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physical sources for Bentham.

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"The physical,"
he refers to at one point,

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as "the groundwork"
of the political,

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moral, and religious.

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It is included in each of them.

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At another point he says we are
bound by the principle of

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utility as "the natural
constitution of the human

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frame" often unconsciously
and often when our conscious

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explanations for our actions are
inconsistent with the principle

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of utility.

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I'll come back to that point.

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If we didn't abide by the
principle of utility,

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he says in his little essay,
The Psychology of Economic

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Man,
he says, "The human

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species could not continue in
existence and that in a few

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months,
not to say weeks or days,

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we would be all that would be
needed for its

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annihilation."

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In other words,
the principle of utility

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expresses our objective
interests as living creatures.

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A third point that I'm going to
make about Bentham's doctrine is

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that it's what I will call
egoistic, but not subjectivist.

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Now, that's a lot of babble
terminology, but let me explain

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what it means.

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The reason I'm using those two
words together is that they

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don't normally go together.

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That is to say egoistic views
are usually subjectivist,

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so I'm pointing out that
they're not.

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And by egoistic I mean it is
just like in all economics

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assumptions, the assumption of
self-interest.

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People are self-interested
seekers after pleasure,

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and self-interested avoiders of
pain in exactly the way you

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learn about them in an economics
101 textbook.

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And we'll have occasion to
examine that self-interested

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premise in some depth later.

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But it's not a subjectivist
doctrine in that Bentham wants

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to say this is true regardless
of what we ourselves say about

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our preferences.

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It's not dependent upon your
acknowledging its truth for its

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being true, okay?

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So you might think you're
motivated by altruism,

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or love of your child,
or your religious faith.

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Bentham says,
"You're just muddled and

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deluded.

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You don't understand.

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Your subjective understanding
is not in accord with the

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science of the matter."

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At one point he says,
"It is with the anatomy of

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the human mind as it is with the
anatomy and physiology of the

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human body.

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The rare case is not of a man's
being unconversant,

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but of his being conversant
with it."

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So just as if you have a pain
in your side and you don't know

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if it's your liver,
or your spleen,

18:00.211 --> 18:03.421
or your lung,
the rare case is you get it

18:03.417 --> 18:04.377
right.

18:04.380 --> 18:09.530
He once says exactly the same
with your motivation.

18:09.528 --> 18:12.698
The fact that you don't
understand, or wouldn't agree

18:12.704 --> 18:15.644
with, or don't acknowledge
what's motivating you,

18:15.636 --> 18:17.466
so much the worse for you.

18:17.470 --> 18:24.180
You just have an inaccurate or
incomplete understanding of your

18:24.182 --> 18:25.592
motivation.

18:25.589 --> 18:28.159
You're just wrong, okay?

18:28.160 --> 18:31.740
So it's in that sense picks up
on the idea this is an

18:31.736 --> 18:33.246
objectivist account.

18:33.250 --> 18:35.650
It is objectively the case.

18:35.650 --> 18:38.800
Whatever people think about it,
whatever people say about it,

18:38.798 --> 18:44.688
it is objectively the case that
they behave self interestedly in

18:44.693 --> 18:49.563
the pursuit of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain.

18:49.558 --> 18:54.268
Fourth, Bentham's is a
radically consequentialist

18:54.269 --> 18:55.349
doctrine.

18:55.348 --> 18:58.638
Anyone know what that might
mean?

18:58.640 --> 19:07.140
Anyone want to tell us what you
think I might mean by calling it

19:07.141 --> 19:11.191
a consequentialist doctrine?

19:11.190 --> 19:20.810
Yeah? Yes, ma'am?

19:20.808 --> 19:24.318
Student:  That in being
motivated by pleasure and pain

19:24.316 --> 19:27.526
we're concerned with the
consequences of our actions.

19:27.528 --> 19:30.898
If we know something is going
to be painful we'll avoid it,

19:30.895 --> 19:33.965
and if it's going to be
pleasurable we'll move towards

19:33.972 --> 19:34.382
it.

19:34.380 --> 19:36.840
Prof: Yeah,
but as I said at the beginning

19:36.843 --> 19:39.203
of the lecture,
Bentham takes everything to the

19:39.203 --> 19:39.823
extreme.

19:39.818 --> 19:44.168
So we are concerned with the
consequences of the action and

19:44.173 --> 19:45.303
nothing else.

19:45.298 --> 19:49.168
It's an extreme
consequentialist doctrine.

19:49.170 --> 19:54.850
He's not interested in our
intentions, right?

19:54.848 --> 19:58.088
The road to hell is paved with
good intentions for Bentham.

19:58.088 --> 20:02.238
Now, it doesn't matter what
people intend it matters what

20:02.240 --> 20:03.500
happens, right?

20:03.500 --> 20:07.160
It's a radically
consequentialist doctrine.

20:07.160 --> 20:11.600
We will see that there's an
alternative tradition of

20:11.599 --> 20:16.389
thinking about ethics and
politics that is deeply rooted

20:16.387 --> 20:21.787
in human intentions when we come
to read Robert Nozick and John

20:21.786 --> 20:25.526
Rawls and people who draw on
Kant's,

20:25.528 --> 20:28.978
Immanuel Kant's ethics,
and that's what gets to you--

20:28.980 --> 20:33.990
to give you all of the jargon
up front that is what will be

20:33.993 --> 20:39.083
called deontological,
sometimes contrasted with

20:39.082 --> 20:40.772
teleological.

20:40.769 --> 20:45.949
Consequentialist is a kind of
teleological doctrine.

20:45.950 --> 20:47.560
What does teleological
mean?

20:47.559 --> 20:47.839
Anybody?

20:47.839 --> 20:54.239


20:54.240 --> 20:58.270
Yeah, at the back.

20:58.269 --> 20:59.709
Teleological system?

20:59.710 --> 21:07.560


21:07.558 --> 21:11.698
Student:  Well,
given that telos in

21:11.699 --> 21:13.509
Greek is the end...

21:13.509 --> 21:15.109
Prof: The end,
the purpose,

21:15.105 --> 21:16.695
the consequence,
exactly right.

21:16.700 --> 21:21.190
So consequentialist doctrines
are teleological doctrines.

21:21.190 --> 21:23.070
They're all about the
consequences,

21:23.068 --> 21:25.278
the purpose,
the ends, the goals,

21:25.275 --> 21:28.035
the results,
whereas what we will talk about

21:28.035 --> 21:30.535
later when we get to
deontological systems,

21:30.538 --> 21:35.138
or the antithesis of that,
they focus on intentions,

21:35.140 --> 21:37.240
on processes,
on procedures,

21:37.240 --> 21:41.650
on how you do things,
not on where you get to, okay?

21:41.650 --> 21:44.170
So Bentham is a radical
consequentialist,

21:44.170 --> 21:50.360
and you judge a doctrine simply
by looking,

21:50.358 --> 21:53.368
you judge a possible policy,
an action,

21:53.368 --> 21:57.178
anything you're thinking of
doing or not doing simply by

21:57.176 --> 22:01.466
virtue of what effect it is
likely to have and nothing else.

22:01.470 --> 22:03.780
Nothing else matters.

22:03.779 --> 22:07.599


22:07.598 --> 22:13.828
Finally, Bentham thinks
everything he's doing is

22:13.830 --> 22:15.820
quantifiable.

22:15.818 --> 22:19.548
I gave you just a sliver to
read from his Introduction to

22:19.549 --> 22:23.339
the Principles of Morals and
Legislation just so that you

22:23.343 --> 22:27.203
could get a sense of how this
guy's mind actually worked.

22:27.200 --> 22:31.630
He really thought it was the
case that he could develop a

22:31.632 --> 22:35.352
kind of science of
utilitarianism where he would

22:35.352 --> 22:38.442
figure out exactly how many
utils,

22:38.440 --> 22:39.830
we might call them.

22:39.828 --> 22:43.388
We might call them Standard
International Utils,

22:43.390 --> 22:47.320
"SIUs,"
would attach to a pleasure or

22:47.320 --> 22:52.000
pain any policy or action,
and that eventually you could

22:52.000 --> 22:56.480
figure out exactly what all of
the optimal policies were for

22:56.477 --> 22:58.827
the organization of society.

22:58.829 --> 23:00.939
He thought about utility.

23:00.940 --> 23:03.000
He thought it had really four
dimensions.

23:03.000 --> 23:05.000
How intense is it?

23:05.000 --> 23:07.880
Duration, how long does it last?

23:07.880 --> 23:12.840
Its certainty or uncertainty,
that is, probability that the

23:12.838 --> 23:14.548
result will occur.

23:14.548 --> 23:18.008
And what he called propinquity
or remoteness,

23:18.012 --> 23:22.582
which modern economists would
say we discount pleasure into

23:22.578 --> 23:23.758
the future.

23:23.759 --> 23:28.429
If you say, "I'll give you
a dollar today,

23:28.430 --> 23:30.540
or I'll give you a dollar
tomorrow,"

23:30.538 --> 23:33.808
you'll get more utility from
the dollar that you get today,

23:33.809 --> 23:35.219
okay?

23:35.220 --> 23:38.950
So he thought that these were
all quantifiable dimensions of

23:38.952 --> 23:41.992
utility,
so a little unsure about the

23:41.993 --> 23:44.883
intensity,
but he's sure that everything

23:44.882 --> 23:46.442
else can be quantified.

23:46.440 --> 23:48.690
And he set about quantifying.

23:48.690 --> 23:53.070
He set about trying to figure
out a system of legislation not

23:53.070 --> 23:56.800
only for his society,
by the way, he started writing

23:56.795 --> 23:59.565
constitutions for other
countries.

23:59.568 --> 24:03.358
And when he ran off to Poland
and various places and said,

24:03.358 --> 24:06.738
"Look, here's my
utilitarian constitution for

24:06.736 --> 24:09.966
your country,"
and he was very disappointed

24:09.974 --> 24:14.114
when people didn't rush off and
implement it right away.

24:14.108 --> 24:19.328
So he truly believed that you
could come up with a

24:19.327 --> 24:25.177
scientifically demonstrable
system of organizing society

24:25.183 --> 24:31.363
based on the quantifiable
character of utilitarianism.

24:31.358 --> 24:39.398
So one further feature of this
quantifiable character of

24:39.404 --> 24:46.134
utilitarianism is that he
thought we could make

24:46.132 --> 24:50.522
comparisons across people.

24:50.519 --> 24:53.329
We could do the math across
people.

24:53.328 --> 25:00.468
We could add up how much
utility one person gets from a

25:00.474 --> 25:05.464
possible action,
and how much utility or

25:05.461 --> 25:10.771
disutility another person gets,
and redistribute in order to do

25:10.765 --> 25:16.175
what he thought we should do,
which was to maximize the

25:16.181 --> 25:22.481
greatest happiness of the
greatest number.

25:22.480 --> 25:24.980
He's a complete
consequentialist,

25:24.984 --> 25:29.764
so we would do whatever we have
to do to maximize the greatest

25:29.761 --> 25:32.661
happiness of the greatest
number.

25:32.660 --> 25:36.250
So, for example,
I happen to know that Denise,

25:36.250 --> 25:40.480
who's sitting over there,
has got a great capacity for

25:40.481 --> 25:41.441
utility.

25:41.440 --> 25:42.670
She's easily pleased.

25:42.670 --> 25:48.550
If you give her a book she'll
be just delighted.

25:48.548 --> 25:52.418
But Anthony over there is a
kind of grumpy guy.

25:52.420 --> 25:54.460
If you give him a book he'd
say, "Well,

25:54.464 --> 25:56.134
why didn't you give me two
books?

25:56.130 --> 25:58.610
One measly book."

25:58.608 --> 26:03.428
So, if I have a choice between
giving this book to Denise,

26:03.430 --> 26:07.350
or giving the book to Anthony,
I'm going to give the book to

26:07.346 --> 26:11.326
Denise because she's going to
get more utility than Anthony's

26:11.329 --> 26:13.919
going to get from having this
book.

26:13.920 --> 26:17.470
We don't really care who has
the utility from a social

26:17.471 --> 26:18.411
perspective.

26:18.410 --> 26:23.360
We want to maximize the
greatest happiness of the

26:23.355 --> 26:25.825
greatest number,
okay?

26:25.828 --> 26:29.758
But then what we might discover
is that Leonid over there has an

26:29.756 --> 26:31.996
even greater capacity for
utility.

26:32.000 --> 26:35.120
He is just a utility monster.

26:35.118 --> 26:39.558
He's got such a capacity for
happiness that any little thing

26:39.557 --> 26:44.217
that most of us would think is
neither here nor there is really

26:44.222 --> 26:46.332
going to make him happy.

26:46.328 --> 26:49.308
Well, then we should give
everything to him,

26:49.314 --> 26:49.874
right?

26:49.868 --> 26:54.378
So it's a doctrine that's
completely uninterested in the

26:54.380 --> 26:58.230
distributive side of
utilitarianism except in an

26:58.234 --> 27:02.344
instrumental way,
and we'll come back to that on

27:02.342 --> 27:03.342
next Monday.

27:03.338 --> 27:08.978
All you want to do is maximize
the greatest happiness of the

27:08.977 --> 27:14.707
greatest number in society,
the total amount of happiness.

27:14.710 --> 27:19.600
Now, here's a further feature
of Bentham's doctrine and I

27:19.603 --> 27:24.583
think it follows from the
consequentialism that you should

27:24.584 --> 27:29.024
at least notice,
because I think it bears on our

27:29.021 --> 27:31.541
thinking about,
for instance,

27:31.540 --> 27:33.390
the Eichmann problem.

27:33.390 --> 27:38.350
And this is actually taken from
Robert Nozick's book,

27:38.345 --> 27:42.725
who you're going to read later
in the semester,

27:42.728 --> 27:46.348
in his critique of
utilitarianism.

27:46.348 --> 27:50.598
He says let's consider the
following thought experiment.

27:50.598 --> 27:56.468
Suppose your brain was
connected by electrodes to a

27:56.473 --> 28:03.063
computer and the computer was
programmed to make you have

28:03.055 --> 28:09.745
whatever experiences give you
pleasure and not to have any

28:09.751 --> 28:14.101
experiences that give you pain.

28:14.098 --> 28:17.588
So you would,
in fact, be unconscious,

28:17.588 --> 28:20.098
I think actually in Nozick's
example,

28:20.098 --> 28:24.188
floating in a vat unconscious,
but you would believe you were

28:24.190 --> 28:28.280
doing whatever it is that gives
you the greatest pleasure.

28:28.278 --> 28:31.728
And the question Nozick asked
is, "Would you want to be

28:31.730 --> 28:33.660
connected to the machine?"

28:33.660 --> 28:38.430
Who would want to be connected
to the machine?

28:38.430 --> 28:40.870
Okay, we only have one,
two three, four,

28:40.865 --> 28:42.675
five, six, seven,
eight, nine,

28:42.678 --> 28:43.738
ten, fifteen.

28:43.740 --> 28:47.680
I see about fifteen candidates
for Nozick's pleasure machine.

28:47.680 --> 28:50.950
Who would not want to be
connected to this machine?

28:50.950 --> 28:55.290
Okay, we have probably
two-thirds of you.

28:55.289 --> 28:57.479
Who's not sure?

28:57.480 --> 28:59.540
Okay, some are not sure.

28:59.538 --> 29:03.398
Those who wouldn't want to be
connected, why not?

29:03.400 --> 29:04.990
I mean, this is great, isn't it?

29:04.990 --> 29:06.310
You don't have to work anymore.

29:06.308 --> 29:07.568
You don't have to do
assignments.

29:07.568 --> 29:09.368
You don't have to show up to
class.

29:09.368 --> 29:12.628
You just, you know,
for the rest of your life,

29:12.628 --> 29:16.758
maybe, you're programmed to
have the experiences that give

29:16.757 --> 29:19.217
you the most pleasure in life.

29:19.220 --> 29:21.110
What could be better than that?

29:21.109 --> 29:23.419
Why don't you want to do it?

29:23.420 --> 29:25.760
Yeah, over here?

29:25.759 --> 29:30.759


29:30.759 --> 29:32.859
Student:  Well,
I think the point of life is to

29:32.856 --> 29:34.476
have like a complexity of
experiences,

29:34.480 --> 29:38.870
and without experiencing pain
at some point pleasure wouldn't

29:38.865 --> 29:39.885
be as sweet.

29:39.890 --> 29:42.310
Prof: Okay,
the point of life is to--hold

29:42.307 --> 29:43.127
on to the mic.

29:43.130 --> 29:44.970
I just want to follow this a
little.

29:44.970 --> 29:49.520
The point of life is to have
some contrast effects.

29:49.519 --> 29:53.129
Richard Nixon said,
"Only if you've been in

29:53.130 --> 29:57.430
the deepest valley can you
appreciate the joy of being on

29:57.431 --> 30:01.811
the highest mountain,"
as he was being run out of the

30:01.808 --> 30:03.728
Whitehouse in 1974.

30:03.730 --> 30:07.410
Well, you could say,
okay, well, in that case we'll

30:07.413 --> 30:11.913
program the machine accordingly
so you'll have certain painful

30:11.906 --> 30:16.766
experiences in order to maximize
the net of pleasure and pain.

30:16.769 --> 30:20.449
Every, I don't know,
every fifth minute you'll have

30:20.453 --> 30:24.803
some unpleasant experience just
so that you don't forget how

30:24.801 --> 30:27.751
pleasant the pleasant experience
is.

30:27.750 --> 30:30.010
We can do that.

30:30.009 --> 30:31.809
Student:  Well,
then you wouldn't be,

30:31.808 --> 30:33.858
like, having free will in
experiencing the various

30:33.859 --> 30:34.529
experiences.

30:34.529 --> 30:35.809
Prof: Okay,
so that's different.

30:35.809 --> 30:36.889
It's not the contrast.

30:36.890 --> 30:40.530
It's not the banality of
pleasure, if you like,

30:40.525 --> 30:44.155
it's that the lack of free will
or autonomy.

30:44.160 --> 30:48.030
But couldn't we program it to
make you think you were acting

30:48.032 --> 30:50.202
freely even though you weren't?

30:50.200 --> 30:53.700
I think--what about that?

30:53.700 --> 30:59.340
Some people say that's true of
us all, this idea we have free

30:59.344 --> 31:01.794
will it's a lot of bunk.

31:01.788 --> 31:05.728
We're all really basically just
acting out sort of impulses and

31:05.728 --> 31:08.648
instincts, but we believe we
have free will.

31:08.650 --> 31:12.400
So you could be made to believe
that you're making choices even

31:12.404 --> 31:13.984
if, in fact, you aren't.

31:13.980 --> 31:16.150
Student:  Well,
wouldn't the,

31:16.151 --> 31:18.691
like, free will be as much a
component of,

31:18.693 --> 31:21.613
like, the natural physical
nature of man...

31:21.609 --> 31:22.289
Prof: Well now you're...

31:22.288 --> 31:24.718
Student:  As well as--I
mean, I'm adding more to

31:24.722 --> 31:25.492
Bentham, but...

31:25.490 --> 31:28.170
Prof: Okay,
so that would be a different

31:28.170 --> 31:31.550
theory than Bentham's theory,
but you can see where this is

31:31.548 --> 31:32.538
going, right?

31:32.538 --> 31:35.398
That I think there are some
people in the room,

31:35.400 --> 31:38.660
if we had time to pursue this
conversation,

31:38.660 --> 31:42.340
there are some people in the
room who no matter what you did

31:42.340 --> 31:45.900
to the programming in the
experience machine they wouldn't

31:45.897 --> 31:48.647
like it,
and they wouldn't like it for

31:48.654 --> 31:50.804
two principle reasons,
I think.

31:50.798 --> 31:55.588
One has just been articulated
which is that somehow this seems

31:55.590 --> 31:58.890
like an abdication of your own
autonomy.

31:58.890 --> 32:04.150
And when we think back to the
Eichmann problem one of the

32:04.152 --> 32:10.262
things that troubled people was
his abdication of his autonomy.

32:10.259 --> 32:14.279
He's giving up his free will to
say, "Yes or no.

32:14.279 --> 32:15.719
I think this is right or wrong.

32:15.720 --> 32:18.970
I'm going to do it on the basis
of my own autonomous

32:18.973 --> 32:20.063
judgment."

32:20.058 --> 32:24.818
The second thing I think that
people would worry about is

32:24.818 --> 32:27.368
who's operating the machine.

32:27.369 --> 32:30.079
Who's operating the machine?

32:30.078 --> 32:34.848
How do you know that once
they've got you floating in that

32:34.847 --> 32:39.447
vat what you wanted to have done
will in fact happen?

32:39.450 --> 32:44.220
And so there's a basic problem
of agency and accountability

32:44.218 --> 32:46.518
that makes people nervous.

32:46.519 --> 32:52.819
But let's just put those things
to one side for the moment and

32:52.820 --> 32:57.680
focus on the rest of the
exposition of Bentham's

32:57.676 --> 32:59.016
doctrine.

32:59.019 --> 33:00.839
We're going to come back to all
of these issues,

33:00.839 --> 33:01.459
I promise you.

33:01.460 --> 33:04.350
I just want to get everything
out on the table.

33:04.348 --> 33:11.708
What he says is that the role
of government is,

33:11.710 --> 33:16.900
"A measure of government
(which is but a particular kind

33:16.903 --> 33:19.783
of action,
performed by a particular

33:19.778 --> 33:24.118
person or persons) may be said
to be comfortable to or dictated

33:24.115 --> 33:28.235
by the principle of utility when
in like manner the tendency

33:28.243 --> 33:32.163
which it has to augment the
happiness of the community is

33:32.162 --> 33:36.222
greater than any which it has to
diminish it."

33:36.220 --> 33:41.160
So again, the bumper sticker
version of that for Bentham is,

33:41.157 --> 33:45.927
maximize the greatest happiness
of the greatest number.

33:45.930 --> 33:49.750
And for those of you who like
thinking diagrammatically,

33:49.750 --> 33:54.570
and as I noted in my opening
lecture not everybody does,

33:54.568 --> 33:57.478
but if we imagine a two-person
society,

33:57.480 --> 34:01.390
so A has this much utility,
that's the status quo,

34:01.391 --> 34:02.031
right?

34:02.029 --> 34:03.969
A has this much utility.

34:03.970 --> 34:08.070
B has that much utility,
and let's say there's some

34:08.072 --> 34:12.342
outer limit of possible utility,
which we'll call the

34:12.338 --> 34:14.388
possibility frontier.

34:14.389 --> 34:19.239
Bentham would say if you draw
that line there anything that

34:19.239 --> 34:22.339
puts us in this,
whatever it is,

34:22.340 --> 34:27.080
cloudy zone here,
would be a net increase in the

34:27.077 --> 34:31.307
total amount of utility in the
society;

34:31.309 --> 34:34.039
pretty straight-forward claim,
right?

34:34.039 --> 34:35.689
So we went from there to there.

34:35.690 --> 34:39.410
Both would have more utility,
but if we went from there,

34:39.409 --> 34:42.919
say, to there A's utility would
have gone up and B's would have

34:42.922 --> 34:45.202
gone down,
but we don't care,

34:45.197 --> 34:50.407
right, because the total amount
of utility in this society has

34:50.409 --> 34:51.349
gone up.

34:51.349 --> 34:56.329
What we wouldn't want to do is
come anywhere into this area

34:56.333 --> 35:00.723
because then utility,
the total amount of utility in

35:00.715 --> 35:03.975
this society would have
decreased.

35:03.980 --> 35:07.650


35:07.650 --> 35:12.060
Okay, so that's basically the
story.

35:12.059 --> 35:16.989
Now, you might say,
"Well, why do you need

35:16.990 --> 35:22.030
government at all if this is the
story?"

35:22.030 --> 35:27.040
Everybody is--whatever they
think, whatever they say,

35:27.039 --> 35:30.719
whatever they understand,
everybody is a mindless

35:30.719 --> 35:33.479
pleasure-seeker and
pain-avoider,

35:33.480 --> 35:37.300
or perhaps mindful
pleasure-seeker or pain-avoider,

35:37.300 --> 35:38.580
but they have no control over
that.

35:38.579 --> 35:42.449
They're going to just do what
they have to do.

35:42.449 --> 35:47.669
Why create government with the
principle that it should

35:47.666 --> 35:51.046
maximize utility in this
society?

35:51.050 --> 35:53.880
It seems like an odd thing to
do.

35:53.880 --> 35:57.430
Why would you do that?

35:57.429 --> 36:06.289
Anyone? Yeah?

36:06.289 --> 36:07.859
Student:  So just
looking at that last graph,

36:07.862 --> 36:08.112
right?

36:08.110 --> 36:11.480
If each person tried to
maximize their utility then

36:11.481 --> 36:15.801
they'd both want to be on the
opposite corners of each other,

36:15.800 --> 36:18.820
so then you would get chaos
when you extrapolate that to a

36:18.815 --> 36:19.605
larger group.

36:19.610 --> 36:22.880
You need something to kind of
manage everybody's pleasure,

36:22.876 --> 36:23.446
I guess.

36:23.449 --> 36:27.259
Prof: So people wouldn't
voluntarily do things that

36:27.264 --> 36:31.084
maximize one another's--maximize
the total social utility,

36:31.079 --> 36:31.749
right?

36:31.750 --> 36:35.680
If taking something from A and
giving it to B would increase

36:35.677 --> 36:39.337
B's utility more than it would
diminish A's utility,

36:39.340 --> 36:42.430
well A's not going to go for
that voluntarily.

36:42.429 --> 36:46.469
B might go and take it,
but he may or may not be strong

36:46.472 --> 36:47.972
enough to take it.

36:47.969 --> 36:49.079
We don't know.

36:49.079 --> 36:53.999
So that's a very shrewd
observation in response to that

36:53.998 --> 36:56.998
diagram,
and it actually gets to more

36:56.998 --> 37:00.348
sophisticated questions about
redistribution and

37:00.353 --> 37:04.213
utilitarianism that I'm going to
take up on Monday.

37:04.210 --> 37:06.880
But there's,
I think, before we get to those

37:06.882 --> 37:10.902
questions,
there's a more fundamental

37:10.896 --> 37:18.296
level at which Bentham thinks
utilitarianism creates the need

37:18.295 --> 37:22.755
for government,
and that is that there's a

37:22.762 --> 37:27.332
disconnect between what's
individually optimal and what's

37:27.333 --> 37:31.913
socially optimal even before we
get to the redistributive

37:31.905 --> 37:33.125
questions.

37:33.130 --> 37:38.170
We might call it the market
failure theory of government.

37:38.170 --> 37:47.160
Where other eighteenth-century
thinkers had taken the view that

37:47.164 --> 37:50.904
when this,
you know, Adam Smith's famous

37:50.896 --> 37:54.186
invisible hand,
everybody acting selfishly

37:54.190 --> 37:57.590
leads to a collectively optimal
result.

37:57.590 --> 38:00.930
Bentham, we'll see,
thinks that's true a lot of the

38:00.925 --> 38:02.455
time, but not always.

38:02.460 --> 38:09.200
There are certain circumstances
in which people are likely not

38:09.197 --> 38:14.497
to act in a way that produces a
common result.

38:14.500 --> 38:21.050
"The great enemies of
public peace are the selfish and

38:21.045 --> 38:25.665
dissocial passions--
necessary as they are...Society

38:25.670 --> 38:29.400
is held together only by the
sacrifices that men can be

38:29.398 --> 38:32.778
induced to make of the
gratifications they demand:

38:32.782 --> 38:36.722
to obtain these sacrifices is
the great difficulty,

38:36.719 --> 38:40.529
the great task of
government."

38:40.530 --> 38:44.930
And he's thinking really of,
and this may be the first

38:44.927 --> 38:50.067
formulation of it that we find,
what we today call free-riding,

38:50.072 --> 38:51.402
freeloading.

38:51.400 --> 38:58.790
He thinks about the provision
of something like national

38:58.789 --> 39:06.179
defense, what we call,
economists call a public good.

39:06.179 --> 39:11.219
You can't be excluded from the
benefits of it,

39:11.217 --> 39:15.807
right, and it must be jointly
supplied.

39:15.809 --> 39:17.319
So it says, If,
for example,

39:17.318 --> 39:20.778
the commencement or continuing
of a war being the question upon

39:20.784 --> 39:23.294
the carpet,
if, upon his calculation,

39:23.288 --> 39:26.698
a hundred a-year during the
continuance of the war,

39:26.699 --> 39:29.079
or for ever,
will be the amount of the

39:29.079 --> 39:33.069
contribution which according to
his calculation he will have to

39:33.065 --> 39:33.575
pay.

39:33.579 --> 39:36.309
(You have to pay a hundred
dollars a year in taxes to

39:36.309 --> 39:37.359
finance this war.)

39:37.360 --> 39:42.060
If his expected profit by the
war will be equal to 0,

39:42.059 --> 39:45.349
and no particular gust or
passions intervene to drive him

39:45.351 --> 39:49.061
from the pursuit of what appears
to be his lasting interest upon

39:49.056 --> 39:49.876
the whole.

39:49.880 --> 39:54.190
-- he will be against the war
and what influence it may happen

39:54.192 --> 39:57.442
to him to possess,
will be exerted on the other

39:57.443 --> 39:58.083
side.

39:58.079 --> 40:01.589
Now, why would his benefit be
zero?

40:01.590 --> 40:08.730
This is rather convoluted
prose, but what Bentham's saying

40:08.728 --> 40:11.468
is,
"If the war is going to be

40:11.471 --> 40:15.501
fought anyway,
I get no marginal benefit from

40:15.500 --> 40:17.000
supporting it.

40:17.000 --> 40:21.700
I might as well oppose it,
or I might as well refuse to

40:21.702 --> 40:25.362
pay taxes in support of
it," right?

40:25.360 --> 40:27.750
And that is the nature of
public goods,

40:27.750 --> 40:31.320
that people can free ride on
their provision because an

40:31.317 --> 40:35.347
economist says the two features
of a public good are they must

40:35.347 --> 40:39.237
be jointly supplied,
everybody has to contribute to

40:39.237 --> 40:42.047
them,
and you can't exclude anybody

40:42.047 --> 40:44.177
from the benefits of them.

40:44.179 --> 40:47.939
Like clean air,
if we create clean air for some

40:47.936 --> 40:52.256
people we're going to create
clean air for all people,

40:52.264 --> 40:53.004
okay?

40:53.000 --> 40:55.790
So people are going to have to
be coerced in the provision of

40:55.791 --> 40:56.491
public goods.

40:56.489 --> 41:00.679
People are going to have to be
coerced to pay for the war.

41:00.679 --> 41:03.559
So that's one example.

41:03.559 --> 41:07.989
Another one that comes up is
the so-called tragedy of the

41:07.987 --> 41:09.407
commons problem.

41:09.409 --> 41:13.019
Suppose you have some common
land, and we'll come back to

41:13.016 --> 41:16.876
talking about this in connection
with Locke's social contract

41:16.880 --> 41:17.590
theory.

41:17.590 --> 41:21.610
God gave the world to mankind
in common, on Locke's story,

41:21.608 --> 41:26.048
so long as much and as good is
available to others in common.

41:26.050 --> 41:29.740
So if you have common land
here's the problem.

41:29.739 --> 41:33.499
You're thinking about grazing
your sheep on the common.

41:33.500 --> 41:39.300
If I put my sheep onto that
common land it doesn't do any

41:39.304 --> 41:43.064
lasting damage,
but if everybody grazes their

41:43.063 --> 41:46.983
sheep on the land and none of it
is allowed to lie fallow,

41:46.980 --> 41:50.210
then it destroys the common,
okay?

41:50.210 --> 41:54.120
So there are too many sheep for
everybody to gaze their sheep on

41:54.123 --> 41:57.853
the land, but any individual
person doesn't have a reason not

41:57.851 --> 41:59.281
to graze his sheep.

41:59.280 --> 42:03.930
This was finally formulated in
a rigorous way by a man called

42:03.931 --> 42:05.251
Garrett Hardin.

42:05.250 --> 42:09.070
The tragedy of the commons that
if you have commons they'll be

42:09.074 --> 42:12.654
destroyed because each person
will do something that makes

42:12.646 --> 42:16.656
individual rational sense but
not collective rational sense.

42:16.659 --> 42:20.729
So this is, again,
it's not exactly the same as

42:20.733 --> 42:24.893
the free-riding problem,
but it's related to the

42:24.893 --> 42:27.023
free-riding problem.

42:27.018 --> 42:31.118
I won't see any reason in the
world why I shouldn't graze my

42:31.121 --> 42:35.361
cow or my sheep on the common,
but when everybody does that we

42:35.360 --> 42:36.960
destroy the common.

42:36.960 --> 42:40.470
It's a bit like walking down
the street with a soda can and

42:40.472 --> 42:42.982
you think,
"Should I take the trouble

42:42.981 --> 42:46.541
to cross the street to put it in
a recycling bin or just throw it

42:46.536 --> 42:47.756
in the trash?"

42:47.760 --> 42:50.580
One Coke bottle,
I mean, what difference one

42:50.583 --> 42:54.523
Coke bottle--it's not going to
make--but if everybody doesn't

42:54.523 --> 42:56.763
cross the street,
the same problem,

42:56.757 --> 42:57.477
okay?

42:57.480 --> 43:01.350
So these are the areas where
there's a disconnect.

43:01.349 --> 43:06.249
There's a disconnect between
individual utility and social

43:06.251 --> 43:11.411
utility, and that is what
creates the need for government.

43:11.409 --> 43:16.639
We will pursue these questions
and much else about classical

43:16.639 --> 43:19.209
utilitarianism next Monday.

43:19.210 --> 43:25.000