WEBVTT 00:01.930 --> 00:05.910 Prof: So today we're going to start talking about 00:05.912 --> 00:10.412 classical utilitarianism, and we're going to use as our 00:10.411 --> 00:13.481 point of departure Jeremy Bentham, 00:13.480 --> 00:20.800 who lived between 1748 and 1832 and came up with the canonical 00:20.800 --> 00:26.320 statement of the doctrine of utilitarianism. 00:26.320 --> 00:30.400 It's a doctrine which is still very much alive and kicking in 00:30.403 --> 00:34.013 the contemporary West despite all of its problems, 00:34.010 --> 00:37.180 and we'll have things to say about why that is. 00:37.180 --> 00:42.430 But I wanted to make a couple of prefatory remarks first about 00:42.430 --> 00:43.980 Bentham himself. 00:43.980 --> 00:50.190 There are some thinkers in the Western tradition, 00:50.190 --> 00:54.160 I guess in any tradition, who have a particular 00:54.158 --> 00:58.038 characteristic that Bentham certainly has, 00:58.040 --> 01:02.300 and I think of the folks we're going to read Karl Marx had and 01:02.301 --> 01:03.701 Robert Nozick had. 01:03.700 --> 01:08.710 And the thing I'm thinking of here is they are the kind of 01:08.706 --> 01:13.356 person who takes one idea to the most extreme possible 01:13.364 --> 01:14.774 formulation. 01:14.769 --> 01:19.439 They ask themselves a question, "How would the world be if 01:19.436 --> 01:23.496 this idea that I have is the only important idea," 01:23.501 --> 01:26.891 and they take it to its logical extreme, 01:26.890 --> 01:29.470 to an excessive kind of formulation. 01:29.470 --> 01:35.050 And they will go places with their idea that nobody else will 01:35.047 --> 01:39.507 go, and so that makes them a little bit crazy. 01:39.510 --> 01:47.000 They're monomaniacal, obsessively consumed with their 01:47.001 --> 01:48.011 idea. 01:48.010 --> 01:51.030 In the case of Bentham it's the idea of utility, 01:51.028 --> 01:54.558 which we're going to unpack a little bit in a moment. 01:54.560 --> 02:00.110 But what's always interesting about people like this is that 02:00.114 --> 02:05.014 they play out an idea to its logical extreme and that 02:05.010 --> 02:10.470 exhibits both its strengths and its limitation just because 02:10.469 --> 02:15.459 they're willing to go when others will not go, 02:15.460 --> 02:20.080 think the unthinkable, think politically incorrect 02:20.080 --> 02:25.930 things for their time in pursuit of really pushing this idea to 02:25.925 --> 02:27.995 the absolute hilt. 02:28.000 --> 02:31.230 And so Bentham is the kind of thinker who I suspect, 02:31.226 --> 02:34.506 at the end of the day, nobody will be fully convinced 02:34.514 --> 02:36.354 by, but he's very useful. 02:36.348 --> 02:39.358 He's a very useful diagnostician of what it is 02:39.361 --> 02:43.311 about utilitarianism that's going to be appealing to you and 02:43.312 --> 02:47.402 where eventually you're going to want to put some limits on it 02:47.396 --> 02:50.406 just because he goes beyond the limits. 02:50.410 --> 02:56.370 And so you can see what happens if you push it all the way to 02:56.366 --> 02:57.456 the hilt. 02:57.460 --> 03:04.150 Secondly, I want to just say that Bentham is important as a 03:04.146 --> 03:08.756 fountain of more than utilitarianism, 03:08.758 --> 03:14.438 but also of modern conceptions of value more generally 03:14.444 --> 03:15.844 considered. 03:15.840 --> 03:21.330 You'll see that there were rumblings of the kinds of things 03:21.325 --> 03:26.525 he had to say about value in the seventeenth century. 03:26.530 --> 03:29.610 Hobbes, for example, who I mentioned last time, 03:29.610 --> 03:33.300 criticized Aristotle for not seeing that what is good for 03:33.303 --> 03:36.473 some people may not be good for other people, 03:36.470 --> 03:42.340 and Bentham builds on that idea. 03:42.340 --> 03:47.830 You'll see Bentham will start to link the good to what it is 03:47.827 --> 03:49.777 that people desire. 03:49.780 --> 03:53.590 There were also rumblings of Bentham's methods in 03:53.593 --> 03:58.283 particularly his aspirations to found politics on scientific 03:58.282 --> 04:01.622 principles in the seventeenth century. 04:01.620 --> 04:05.110 We already saw last time the Hobbesian and Lockean 04:05.111 --> 04:08.821 creationist theories of science, but they were really 04:08.818 --> 04:10.598 transitional figures. 04:10.598 --> 04:14.728 They also gave theological justifications for their 04:14.729 --> 04:18.699 arguments as I explained at some length in Locke, 04:18.696 --> 04:21.006 in the context of Locke. 04:21.009 --> 04:22.369 I didn't have time to do it with Hobbes, 04:22.370 --> 04:26.260 but many of you will know that if you read the second 04:26.262 --> 04:30.012 two-thirds of Hobbes' Leviathan, it's almost 04:30.005 --> 04:33.595 all about interpretation of the scriptures, 04:33.600 --> 04:38.620 showing that his scientifically derived principles are also 04:38.624 --> 04:41.054 consistent with the Bible. 04:41.050 --> 04:42.830 Bentham sheds all of this. 04:42.829 --> 04:48.149 For Bentham he's not interested in appeals to tradition. 04:48.149 --> 04:50.719 He's not interested in appeals to religion. 04:50.720 --> 04:54.640 He's not interested in appeals to natural law. 04:54.639 --> 05:00.039 He dismisses the natural law tradition as dangerous nonsense, 05:00.040 --> 05:03.010 "nonsense on stilts." 05:03.009 --> 05:09.469 He's only interested in a scientific set of principles for 05:09.473 --> 05:11.973 organizing politics. 05:11.970 --> 05:14.590 And one of the nice things about Bentham, 05:14.588 --> 05:17.298 at least from your point of view, is-- 05:17.300 --> 05:22.250 and we'll see that utilitarianism values efficiency 05:22.245 --> 05:25.625 in many ways, but one of the interesting 05:25.629 --> 05:29.779 things or the helpful things about Bentham is that he reduces 05:29.783 --> 05:32.903 his whole doctrine to a single paragraph, 05:32.899 --> 05:36.119 and he puts that paragraph right at the front of his 05:36.124 --> 05:39.484 Introduction to The Principles of Morals and 05:39.475 --> 05:40.735 Legislation. 05:40.740 --> 05:44.890 So here you have the kind of Cliffs Notes formulation of 05:44.886 --> 05:46.466 Bentham's argument. 05:46.470 --> 05:51.090 He says that, "Nature has placed mankind 05:51.091 --> 05:55.821 under the governance of two sovereign masters, 05:55.819 --> 05:58.129 pain and pleasure. 05:58.129 --> 06:01.269 It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, 06:01.273 --> 06:04.183 as well as to determine what we shall do." 06:04.180 --> 06:09.090 So this is going to be about describing human behavior and 06:09.093 --> 06:12.633 about what ought to be the case, right? 06:12.629 --> 06:14.379 What we shall do. 06:14.379 --> 06:19.189 ...[T]o point out what we ought to do as well as to determine 06:19.187 --> 06:20.707 what we shall do. 06:20.709 --> 06:24.249 On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, 06:24.250 --> 06:27.560 on the other the chain of causes and effects, 06:27.564 --> 06:30.054 are fastened to their throne. 06:30.050 --> 06:31.630 (That's the throne of pain and pleasure.) 06:31.629 --> 06:34.199 They govern us in all we do, in all we say, 06:34.199 --> 06:37.259 and in all we think: every effort we can make to 06:37.259 --> 06:40.449 throw off our subjection (that's our subjection to 06:40.449 --> 06:43.829 pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding) will serve but to 06:43.834 --> 06:47.874 demonstrate and confirm it (to confirm that subjection). 06:47.870 --> 06:52.370 In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire (that's the 06:52.374 --> 06:56.734 empire of pain and pleasure): but in reality he will remain 06:56.726 --> 06:59.126 subject to it all the while. 06:59.129 --> 07:03.279 The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, 07:03.278 --> 07:06.768 and assumes it for the foundation of that system, 07:06.769 --> 07:11.849 the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the 07:11.850 --> 07:14.090 hands of reason and law. 07:14.088 --> 07:19.018 Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds 07:19.021 --> 07:23.561 instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, 07:23.560 --> 07:27.210 and in darkness instead of light. 07:27.209 --> 07:31.929 That is, in a nutshell, Bentham's theory; 07:31.930 --> 07:37.570 07:37.569 --> 07:41.529 very bold unequivocal statement. 07:41.529 --> 07:45.539 He's saying if you want to understand human beings in a 07:45.536 --> 07:50.206 causal explanatory sense all you have to know about them is that 07:50.209 --> 07:53.919 they're going to seek pleasure and avoid pain. 07:53.920 --> 07:58.680 And if you want to think about what ought to happen in the 07:58.678 --> 08:03.438 design of institutions they should be designed around that 08:03.437 --> 08:06.357 fact, to accommodate that fact. 08:06.360 --> 08:10.000 And he's going to develop a system of laws, 08:10.000 --> 08:15.070 a system of government that takes into account and is built 08:15.069 --> 08:18.829 upon this assumption about human nature, 08:18.829 --> 08:21.769 as he would have called it; human psychology, 08:21.771 --> 08:24.491 as we would call it today. 08:24.490 --> 08:29.880 Now, I'm going to make five points about Bentham's system to 08:29.879 --> 08:34.629 give you some sense of the full dimensions of it, 08:34.629 --> 08:39.299 before we start dissecting it and subjecting it to critical 08:39.303 --> 08:40.193 scrutiny. 08:40.190 --> 08:44.680 I want to make sure that we understand exactly what his 08:44.681 --> 08:45.681 system is. 08:45.678 --> 08:51.728 And I want to first of all notice that it is what I'm going 08:51.726 --> 08:57.146 to call a comprehensive and deterministic account. 08:57.149 --> 09:02.709 I call it a comprehensive and deterministic account in that 09:02.712 --> 09:06.552 it's an account of all human behavior. 09:06.548 --> 09:11.938 He wants to say everything you do is ultimately determined by 09:11.937 --> 09:15.257 pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding. 09:15.259 --> 09:20.309 How plausible--who thinks that's plausible? 09:20.309 --> 09:23.809 09:23.809 --> 09:24.629 Hands up. 09:24.629 --> 09:27.039 Plausible? 09:27.039 --> 09:28.979 Implausible? 09:28.980 --> 09:31.130 Okay, give us an example, somebody, 09:31.129 --> 09:34.489 of something that is not pleasure-seeking or 09:34.490 --> 09:39.360 pain-avoiding, anybody, something that is not 09:39.355 --> 09:45.125 the result of pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding. 09:45.129 --> 09:47.269 Well, you put your hands up. 09:47.269 --> 09:48.559 You must have had some thoughts. 09:48.559 --> 09:51.139 Yeah, okay here. 09:51.139 --> 09:54.819 Yeah, you take it. 09:54.820 --> 09:56.290 Student: Running into a fire to rescue people. 09:56.289 --> 09:57.259 Prof: Pardon? 09:57.259 --> 09:59.369 Student: Running into a fire to rescue people. 09:59.370 --> 10:02.610 Prof: Running into a fire to rescue people. 10:02.610 --> 10:06.000 Okay, you run into a fire to rescue people. 10:06.000 --> 10:09.910 What do you think Bentham would say about that example? 10:09.909 --> 10:12.039 Yeah, over here, sir. 10:12.038 --> 10:14.748 Student: The pleasure is actually saving the people, 10:14.750 --> 10:16.730 so there is, like, this benefit that you get 10:16.725 --> 10:17.915 from it, the pleasure. 10:17.918 --> 10:21.528 Prof: The pleasure you get from having saved the people 10:21.533 --> 10:25.033 must outweigh the pain of the fire or you wouldn't do it. 10:25.029 --> 10:28.299 Any other example? 10:28.299 --> 10:30.799 Nobody's got an example? 10:30.799 --> 10:33.439 Nobody can think of an example? 10:33.440 --> 10:34.860 No? 10:34.860 --> 10:39.030 Yes? Yes, sir? 10:39.029 --> 10:40.469 Student: Well, there may be some. 10:40.470 --> 10:42.870 For example, saving one's child may be 10:42.865 --> 10:46.745 purely instinctual rather than driven by pain or pleasure. 10:46.750 --> 10:48.460 Prof: So say sacrificing your life to save your child, 10:48.455 --> 10:49.645 let's say, to put it in an extreme case. 10:49.649 --> 10:51.249 Student: Yes. 10:51.250 --> 10:52.780 Prof: What would Bentham say about that? 10:52.779 --> 10:59.279 I mean, this seems like a genuine altruistic action. 10:59.279 --> 11:01.589 Somebody lays down their life for their own child. 11:01.590 --> 11:03.690 How can that be pleasure-seeking and 11:03.690 --> 11:04.650 pain-avoiding? 11:04.649 --> 11:06.319 What would Bentham say? 11:06.320 --> 11:07.720 Yeah? 11:07.720 --> 11:09.370 Student: > 11:09.370 --> 11:10.790 Prof: Wait, we need you... 11:10.788 --> 11:12.678 Student: I mean, clearly the pain of, 11:12.679 --> 11:14.829 like, having lost a child, like, outweighs whatever 11:14.827 --> 11:15.427 pleasures. 11:15.428 --> 11:17.828 Prof: Yeah, I think that is what he would 11:17.832 --> 11:18.142 say. 11:18.139 --> 11:19.589 Think of the counterfactual. 11:19.590 --> 11:23.570 How could I live with myself for the rest of my life if I 11:23.565 --> 11:24.625 didn't do it? 11:24.629 --> 11:26.789 The pain would be too great. 11:26.788 --> 11:31.118 And Bentham considers cases like this sort of thing. 11:31.120 --> 11:35.910 Apparently altruistic acts seems ultimately always 11:35.912 --> 11:40.022 reducible to the pleasure-pain calculus. 11:40.019 --> 11:43.179 One example he considers is people acting from religious 11:43.179 --> 11:45.249 motivations and he says, "Ha! 11:45.250 --> 11:46.660 Just read the Bible. 11:46.658 --> 11:52.108 Look at the descriptions of heaven and hell. 11:52.110 --> 11:55.440 Isn't that a made-to-order pleasure-seeking and 11:55.442 --> 11:57.112 pain-avoidance?" 11:57.110 --> 12:00.780 Hell is described as, you know, the fires of hell, 12:00.783 --> 12:02.063 perpetual pain. 12:02.058 --> 12:06.558 So, the people who constructed religious doctrines clearly had 12:06.562 --> 12:11.212 an understanding of human nature or they wouldn't have described 12:11.214 --> 12:15.134 hell in a way that they described it and heaven in the 12:15.126 --> 12:17.486 way that they describe it. 12:17.490 --> 12:23.100 So, the first thing he wants to say is that this is a completely 12:23.101 --> 12:27.201 comprehensive explanation of human behavior. 12:27.200 --> 12:31.600 Can anybody think of any example that couldn't be 12:31.600 --> 12:36.550 re-described as fitting this pleasure-pain calculus? 12:36.549 --> 12:37.959 Yeah? 12:37.960 --> 12:42.510 12:42.509 --> 12:45.109 Student: I think that if life is all about pain and 12:45.113 --> 12:47.853 pleasure we would be willing to replace our life with one with 12:47.851 --> 12:49.581 only, I mean, one only with pleasure, 12:49.580 --> 12:49.870 right? 12:49.870 --> 12:50.740 But we wouldn't. 12:50.740 --> 12:52.270 We value our life by ourself. 12:52.269 --> 12:54.859 There is something indescribable quality to it. 12:54.860 --> 12:59.370 I mean, life is the sum of all experiences rather than just 12:59.365 --> 13:01.225 pain and pleasure, so. 13:01.230 --> 13:05.600 Prof: So you think that there is more complexity to 13:05.595 --> 13:10.335 human motivation that's just not expressible as or reducible to 13:10.344 --> 13:12.034 pain and pleasure. 13:12.028 --> 13:16.158 I think that's a very sophisticated and common 13:16.164 --> 13:19.754 critique that's been made of Bentham. 13:19.750 --> 13:24.570 If you go and read, indeed if you read the obituary 13:24.566 --> 13:29.576 of him that was written by Coleridge, I think it was, 13:29.576 --> 13:32.366 makes exactly this point. 13:32.370 --> 13:36.810 There was this sophistication to human motivation that isn't 13:36.812 --> 13:38.622 captured in this idea. 13:38.620 --> 13:42.810 I think that the truth is Bentham would have acknowledged 13:42.812 --> 13:44.972 some of that, but he would have said, 13:44.974 --> 13:47.364 "At the end of the day it's not important because the 13:47.364 --> 13:49.884 pleasure-pain calculus overrides when the chips are down. 13:49.879 --> 13:54.289 If we're going to think about what it is that's going to 13:54.293 --> 13:57.583 motivate people, it's pleasure-seeking and 13:57.582 --> 13:59.592 pain-avoidance." 13:59.590 --> 14:03.890 Okay, a second thing that you should notice about this 14:03.888 --> 14:09.078 doctrine is that I'm going to call it a naturalistic doctrine. 14:09.080 --> 14:13.730 In some ways it's astounding that writing almost half a 14:13.734 --> 14:18.544 century before Darwin, Darwin was born in 1809 and 14:18.543 --> 14:22.093 lived until 1882, so writing almost half a 14:22.090 --> 14:27.670 century before Darwin, Bentham grounds his principle 14:27.667 --> 14:32.907 in the imperatives for human survival. 14:32.908 --> 14:36.758 He thinks that the pleasure-pain principle has a 14:36.758 --> 14:38.968 natural biological basis. 14:38.970 --> 14:42.630 Although there are religious, moral and political sources and 14:42.633 --> 14:46.873 sanctions of pain and pleasure, these are all secondary to the 14:46.870 --> 14:49.030 physical sources for Bentham. 14:49.029 --> 14:51.869 "The physical," he refers to at one point, 14:51.870 --> 14:53.780 as "the groundwork" of the political, 14:53.779 --> 14:55.129 moral, and religious. 14:55.129 --> 14:59.209 It is included in each of them. 14:59.210 --> 15:03.090 At another point he says we are bound by the principle of 15:03.091 --> 15:06.761 utility as "the natural constitution of the human 15:06.764 --> 15:10.864 frame" often unconsciously and often when our conscious 15:10.855 --> 15:15.215 explanations for our actions are inconsistent with the principle 15:15.221 --> 15:16.541 of utility. 15:16.539 --> 15:17.759 I'll come back to that point. 15:17.759 --> 15:21.909 If we didn't abide by the principle of utility, 15:21.908 --> 15:25.498 he says in his little essay, The Psychology of Economic 15:25.496 --> 15:27.846 Man, he says, "The human 15:27.851 --> 15:31.731 species could not continue in existence and that in a few 15:31.727 --> 15:34.007 months, not to say weeks or days, 15:34.011 --> 15:36.631 we would be all that would be needed for its 15:36.629 --> 15:37.969 annihilation." 15:37.970 --> 15:41.490 In other words, the principle of utility 15:41.488 --> 15:46.538 expresses our objective interests as living creatures. 15:46.538 --> 15:52.598 A third point that I'm going to make about Bentham's doctrine is 15:52.599 --> 15:58.369 that it's what I will call egoistic, but not subjectivist. 15:58.370 --> 16:03.280 Now, that's a lot of babble terminology, but let me explain 16:03.275 --> 16:04.625 what it means. 16:04.629 --> 16:08.499 The reason I'm using those two words together is that they 16:08.500 --> 16:10.470 don't normally go together. 16:10.470 --> 16:14.870 That is to say egoistic views are usually subjectivist, 16:14.865 --> 16:18.035 so I'm pointing out that they're not. 16:18.038 --> 16:22.848 And by egoistic I mean it is just like in all economics 16:22.851 --> 16:27.041 assumptions, the assumption of self-interest. 16:27.038 --> 16:30.778 People are self-interested seekers after pleasure, 16:30.778 --> 16:35.638 and self-interested avoiders of pain in exactly the way you 16:35.638 --> 16:39.658 learn about them in an economics 101 textbook. 16:39.658 --> 16:45.758 And we'll have occasion to examine that self-interested 16:45.759 --> 16:49.149 premise in some depth later. 16:49.149 --> 16:53.419 But it's not a subjectivist doctrine in that Bentham wants 16:53.422 --> 16:57.922 to say this is true regardless of what we ourselves say about 16:57.919 --> 16:59.419 our preferences. 16:59.418 --> 17:07.378 It's not dependent upon your acknowledging its truth for its 17:07.384 --> 17:09.954 being true, okay? 17:09.950 --> 17:13.800 So you might think you're motivated by altruism, 17:13.798 --> 17:17.808 or love of your child, or your religious faith. 17:17.808 --> 17:20.678 Bentham says, "You're just muddled and 17:20.684 --> 17:21.374 deluded. 17:21.369 --> 17:22.839 You don't understand. 17:22.838 --> 17:28.088 Your subjective understanding is not in accord with the 17:28.092 --> 17:31.012 science of the matter." 17:31.009 --> 17:36.409 At one point he says, "It is with the anatomy of 17:36.413 --> 17:42.753 the human mind as it is with the anatomy and physiology of the 17:42.750 --> 17:44.310 human body. 17:44.308 --> 17:48.758 The rare case is not of a man's being unconversant, 17:48.761 --> 17:52.681 but of his being conversant with it." 17:52.680 --> 17:57.490 So just as if you have a pain in your side and you don't know 17:57.488 --> 18:00.208 if it's your liver, or your spleen, 18:00.211 --> 18:03.421 or your lung, the rare case is you get it 18:03.417 --> 18:04.377 right. 18:04.380 --> 18:09.530 He once says exactly the same with your motivation. 18:09.528 --> 18:12.698 The fact that you don't understand, or wouldn't agree 18:12.704 --> 18:15.644 with, or don't acknowledge what's motivating you, 18:15.636 --> 18:17.466 so much the worse for you. 18:17.470 --> 18:24.180 You just have an inaccurate or incomplete understanding of your 18:24.182 --> 18:25.592 motivation. 18:25.589 --> 18:28.159 You're just wrong, okay? 18:28.160 --> 18:31.740 So it's in that sense picks up on the idea this is an 18:31.736 --> 18:33.246 objectivist account. 18:33.250 --> 18:35.650 It is objectively the case. 18:35.650 --> 18:38.800 Whatever people think about it, whatever people say about it, 18:38.798 --> 18:44.688 it is objectively the case that they behave self interestedly in 18:44.693 --> 18:49.563 the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 18:49.558 --> 18:54.268 Fourth, Bentham's is a radically consequentialist 18:54.269 --> 18:55.349 doctrine. 18:55.348 --> 18:58.638 Anyone know what that might mean? 18:58.640 --> 19:07.140 Anyone want to tell us what you think I might mean by calling it 19:07.141 --> 19:11.191 a consequentialist doctrine? 19:11.190 --> 19:20.810 Yeah? Yes, ma'am? 19:20.808 --> 19:24.318 Student: That in being motivated by pleasure and pain 19:24.316 --> 19:27.526 we're concerned with the consequences of our actions. 19:27.528 --> 19:30.898 If we know something is going to be painful we'll avoid it, 19:30.895 --> 19:33.965 and if it's going to be pleasurable we'll move towards 19:33.972 --> 19:34.382 it. 19:34.380 --> 19:36.840 Prof: Yeah, but as I said at the beginning 19:36.843 --> 19:39.203 of the lecture, Bentham takes everything to the 19:39.203 --> 19:39.823 extreme. 19:39.818 --> 19:44.168 So we are concerned with the consequences of the action and 19:44.173 --> 19:45.303 nothing else. 19:45.298 --> 19:49.168 It's an extreme consequentialist doctrine. 19:49.170 --> 19:54.850 He's not interested in our intentions, right? 19:54.848 --> 19:58.088 The road to hell is paved with good intentions for Bentham. 19:58.088 --> 20:02.238 Now, it doesn't matter what people intend it matters what 20:02.240 --> 20:03.500 happens, right? 20:03.500 --> 20:07.160 It's a radically consequentialist doctrine. 20:07.160 --> 20:11.600 We will see that there's an alternative tradition of 20:11.599 --> 20:16.389 thinking about ethics and politics that is deeply rooted 20:16.387 --> 20:21.787 in human intentions when we come to read Robert Nozick and John 20:21.786 --> 20:25.526 Rawls and people who draw on Kant's, 20:25.528 --> 20:28.978 Immanuel Kant's ethics, and that's what gets to you-- 20:28.980 --> 20:33.990 to give you all of the jargon up front that is what will be 20:33.993 --> 20:39.083 called deontological, sometimes contrasted with 20:39.082 --> 20:40.772 teleological. 20:40.769 --> 20:45.949 Consequentialist is a kind of teleological doctrine. 20:45.950 --> 20:47.560 What does teleological mean? 20:47.559 --> 20:47.839 Anybody? 20:47.839 --> 20:54.239 20:54.240 --> 20:58.270 Yeah, at the back. 20:58.269 --> 20:59.709 Teleological system? 20:59.710 --> 21:07.560 21:07.558 --> 21:11.698 Student: Well, given that telos in 21:11.699 --> 21:13.509 Greek is the end... 21:13.509 --> 21:15.109 Prof: The end, the purpose, 21:15.105 --> 21:16.695 the consequence, exactly right. 21:16.700 --> 21:21.190 So consequentialist doctrines are teleological doctrines. 21:21.190 --> 21:23.070 They're all about the consequences, 21:23.068 --> 21:25.278 the purpose, the ends, the goals, 21:25.275 --> 21:28.035 the results, whereas what we will talk about 21:28.035 --> 21:30.535 later when we get to deontological systems, 21:30.538 --> 21:35.138 or the antithesis of that, they focus on intentions, 21:35.140 --> 21:37.240 on processes, on procedures, 21:37.240 --> 21:41.650 on how you do things, not on where you get to, okay? 21:41.650 --> 21:44.170 So Bentham is a radical consequentialist, 21:44.170 --> 21:50.360 and you judge a doctrine simply by looking, 21:50.358 --> 21:53.368 you judge a possible policy, an action, 21:53.368 --> 21:57.178 anything you're thinking of doing or not doing simply by 21:57.176 --> 22:01.466 virtue of what effect it is likely to have and nothing else. 22:01.470 --> 22:03.780 Nothing else matters. 22:03.779 --> 22:07.599 22:07.598 --> 22:13.828 Finally, Bentham thinks everything he's doing is 22:13.830 --> 22:15.820 quantifiable. 22:15.818 --> 22:19.548 I gave you just a sliver to read from his Introduction to 22:19.549 --> 22:23.339 the Principles of Morals and Legislation just so that you 22:23.343 --> 22:27.203 could get a sense of how this guy's mind actually worked. 22:27.200 --> 22:31.630 He really thought it was the case that he could develop a 22:31.632 --> 22:35.352 kind of science of utilitarianism where he would 22:35.352 --> 22:38.442 figure out exactly how many utils, 22:38.440 --> 22:39.830 we might call them. 22:39.828 --> 22:43.388 We might call them Standard International Utils, 22:43.390 --> 22:47.320 "SIUs," would attach to a pleasure or 22:47.320 --> 22:52.000 pain any policy or action, and that eventually you could 22:52.000 --> 22:56.480 figure out exactly what all of the optimal policies were for 22:56.477 --> 22:58.827 the organization of society. 22:58.829 --> 23:00.939 He thought about utility. 23:00.940 --> 23:03.000 He thought it had really four dimensions. 23:03.000 --> 23:05.000 How intense is it? 23:05.000 --> 23:07.880 Duration, how long does it last? 23:07.880 --> 23:12.840 Its certainty or uncertainty, that is, probability that the 23:12.838 --> 23:14.548 result will occur. 23:14.548 --> 23:18.008 And what he called propinquity or remoteness, 23:18.012 --> 23:22.582 which modern economists would say we discount pleasure into 23:22.578 --> 23:23.758 the future. 23:23.759 --> 23:28.429 If you say, "I'll give you a dollar today, 23:28.430 --> 23:30.540 or I'll give you a dollar tomorrow," 23:30.538 --> 23:33.808 you'll get more utility from the dollar that you get today, 23:33.809 --> 23:35.219 okay? 23:35.220 --> 23:38.950 So he thought that these were all quantifiable dimensions of 23:38.952 --> 23:41.992 utility, so a little unsure about the 23:41.993 --> 23:44.883 intensity, but he's sure that everything 23:44.882 --> 23:46.442 else can be quantified. 23:46.440 --> 23:48.690 And he set about quantifying. 23:48.690 --> 23:53.070 He set about trying to figure out a system of legislation not 23:53.070 --> 23:56.800 only for his society, by the way, he started writing 23:56.795 --> 23:59.565 constitutions for other countries. 23:59.568 --> 24:03.358 And when he ran off to Poland and various places and said, 24:03.358 --> 24:06.738 "Look, here's my utilitarian constitution for 24:06.736 --> 24:09.966 your country," and he was very disappointed 24:09.974 --> 24:14.114 when people didn't rush off and implement it right away. 24:14.108 --> 24:19.328 So he truly believed that you could come up with a 24:19.327 --> 24:25.177 scientifically demonstrable system of organizing society 24:25.183 --> 24:31.363 based on the quantifiable character of utilitarianism. 24:31.358 --> 24:39.398 So one further feature of this quantifiable character of 24:39.404 --> 24:46.134 utilitarianism is that he thought we could make 24:46.132 --> 24:50.522 comparisons across people. 24:50.519 --> 24:53.329 We could do the math across people. 24:53.328 --> 25:00.468 We could add up how much utility one person gets from a 25:00.474 --> 25:05.464 possible action, and how much utility or 25:05.461 --> 25:10.771 disutility another person gets, and redistribute in order to do 25:10.765 --> 25:16.175 what he thought we should do, which was to maximize the 25:16.181 --> 25:22.481 greatest happiness of the greatest number. 25:22.480 --> 25:24.980 He's a complete consequentialist, 25:24.984 --> 25:29.764 so we would do whatever we have to do to maximize the greatest 25:29.761 --> 25:32.661 happiness of the greatest number. 25:32.660 --> 25:36.250 So, for example, I happen to know that Denise, 25:36.250 --> 25:40.480 who's sitting over there, has got a great capacity for 25:40.481 --> 25:41.441 utility. 25:41.440 --> 25:42.670 She's easily pleased. 25:42.670 --> 25:48.550 If you give her a book she'll be just delighted. 25:48.548 --> 25:52.418 But Anthony over there is a kind of grumpy guy. 25:52.420 --> 25:54.460 If you give him a book he'd say, "Well, 25:54.464 --> 25:56.134 why didn't you give me two books? 25:56.130 --> 25:58.610 One measly book." 25:58.608 --> 26:03.428 So, if I have a choice between giving this book to Denise, 26:03.430 --> 26:07.350 or giving the book to Anthony, I'm going to give the book to 26:07.346 --> 26:11.326 Denise because she's going to get more utility than Anthony's 26:11.329 --> 26:13.919 going to get from having this book. 26:13.920 --> 26:17.470 We don't really care who has the utility from a social 26:17.471 --> 26:18.411 perspective. 26:18.410 --> 26:23.360 We want to maximize the greatest happiness of the 26:23.355 --> 26:25.825 greatest number, okay? 26:25.828 --> 26:29.758 But then what we might discover is that Leonid over there has an 26:29.756 --> 26:31.996 even greater capacity for utility. 26:32.000 --> 26:35.120 He is just a utility monster. 26:35.118 --> 26:39.558 He's got such a capacity for happiness that any little thing 26:39.557 --> 26:44.217 that most of us would think is neither here nor there is really 26:44.222 --> 26:46.332 going to make him happy. 26:46.328 --> 26:49.308 Well, then we should give everything to him, 26:49.314 --> 26:49.874 right? 26:49.868 --> 26:54.378 So it's a doctrine that's completely uninterested in the 26:54.380 --> 26:58.230 distributive side of utilitarianism except in an 26:58.234 --> 27:02.344 instrumental way, and we'll come back to that on 27:02.342 --> 27:03.342 next Monday. 27:03.338 --> 27:08.978 All you want to do is maximize the greatest happiness of the 27:08.977 --> 27:14.707 greatest number in society, the total amount of happiness. 27:14.710 --> 27:19.600 Now, here's a further feature of Bentham's doctrine and I 27:19.603 --> 27:24.583 think it follows from the consequentialism that you should 27:24.584 --> 27:29.024 at least notice, because I think it bears on our 27:29.021 --> 27:31.541 thinking about, for instance, 27:31.540 --> 27:33.390 the Eichmann problem. 27:33.390 --> 27:38.350 And this is actually taken from Robert Nozick's book, 27:38.345 --> 27:42.725 who you're going to read later in the semester, 27:42.728 --> 27:46.348 in his critique of utilitarianism. 27:46.348 --> 27:50.598 He says let's consider the following thought experiment. 27:50.598 --> 27:56.468 Suppose your brain was connected by electrodes to a 27:56.473 --> 28:03.063 computer and the computer was programmed to make you have 28:03.055 --> 28:09.745 whatever experiences give you pleasure and not to have any 28:09.751 --> 28:14.101 experiences that give you pain. 28:14.098 --> 28:17.588 So you would, in fact, be unconscious, 28:17.588 --> 28:20.098 I think actually in Nozick's example, 28:20.098 --> 28:24.188 floating in a vat unconscious, but you would believe you were 28:24.190 --> 28:28.280 doing whatever it is that gives you the greatest pleasure. 28:28.278 --> 28:31.728 And the question Nozick asked is, "Would you want to be 28:31.730 --> 28:33.660 connected to the machine?" 28:33.660 --> 28:38.430 Who would want to be connected to the machine? 28:38.430 --> 28:40.870 Okay, we only have one, two three, four, 28:40.865 --> 28:42.675 five, six, seven, eight, nine, 28:42.678 --> 28:43.738 ten, fifteen. 28:43.740 --> 28:47.680 I see about fifteen candidates for Nozick's pleasure machine. 28:47.680 --> 28:50.950 Who would not want to be connected to this machine? 28:50.950 --> 28:55.290 Okay, we have probably two-thirds of you. 28:55.289 --> 28:57.479 Who's not sure? 28:57.480 --> 28:59.540 Okay, some are not sure. 28:59.538 --> 29:03.398 Those who wouldn't want to be connected, why not? 29:03.400 --> 29:04.990 I mean, this is great, isn't it? 29:04.990 --> 29:06.310 You don't have to work anymore. 29:06.308 --> 29:07.568 You don't have to do assignments. 29:07.568 --> 29:09.368 You don't have to show up to class. 29:09.368 --> 29:12.628 You just, you know, for the rest of your life, 29:12.628 --> 29:16.758 maybe, you're programmed to have the experiences that give 29:16.757 --> 29:19.217 you the most pleasure in life. 29:19.220 --> 29:21.110 What could be better than that? 29:21.109 --> 29:23.419 Why don't you want to do it? 29:23.420 --> 29:25.760 Yeah, over here? 29:25.759 --> 29:30.759 29:30.759 --> 29:32.859 Student: Well, I think the point of life is to 29:32.856 --> 29:34.476 have like a complexity of experiences, 29:34.480 --> 29:38.870 and without experiencing pain at some point pleasure wouldn't 29:38.865 --> 29:39.885 be as sweet. 29:39.890 --> 29:42.310 Prof: Okay, the point of life is to--hold 29:42.307 --> 29:43.127 on to the mic. 29:43.130 --> 29:44.970 I just want to follow this a little. 29:44.970 --> 29:49.520 The point of life is to have some contrast effects. 29:49.519 --> 29:53.129 Richard Nixon said, "Only if you've been in 29:53.130 --> 29:57.430 the deepest valley can you appreciate the joy of being on 29:57.431 --> 30:01.811 the highest mountain," as he was being run out of the 30:01.808 --> 30:03.728 Whitehouse in 1974. 30:03.730 --> 30:07.410 Well, you could say, okay, well, in that case we'll 30:07.413 --> 30:11.913 program the machine accordingly so you'll have certain painful 30:11.906 --> 30:16.766 experiences in order to maximize the net of pleasure and pain. 30:16.769 --> 30:20.449 Every, I don't know, every fifth minute you'll have 30:20.453 --> 30:24.803 some unpleasant experience just so that you don't forget how 30:24.801 --> 30:27.751 pleasant the pleasant experience is. 30:27.750 --> 30:30.010 We can do that. 30:30.009 --> 30:31.809 Student: Well, then you wouldn't be, 30:31.808 --> 30:33.858 like, having free will in experiencing the various 30:33.859 --> 30:34.529 experiences. 30:34.529 --> 30:35.809 Prof: Okay, so that's different. 30:35.809 --> 30:36.889 It's not the contrast. 30:36.890 --> 30:40.530 It's not the banality of pleasure, if you like, 30:40.525 --> 30:44.155 it's that the lack of free will or autonomy. 30:44.160 --> 30:48.030 But couldn't we program it to make you think you were acting 30:48.032 --> 30:50.202 freely even though you weren't? 30:50.200 --> 30:53.700 I think--what about that? 30:53.700 --> 30:59.340 Some people say that's true of us all, this idea we have free 30:59.344 --> 31:01.794 will it's a lot of bunk. 31:01.788 --> 31:05.728 We're all really basically just acting out sort of impulses and 31:05.728 --> 31:08.648 instincts, but we believe we have free will. 31:08.650 --> 31:12.400 So you could be made to believe that you're making choices even 31:12.404 --> 31:13.984 if, in fact, you aren't. 31:13.980 --> 31:16.150 Student: Well, wouldn't the, 31:16.151 --> 31:18.691 like, free will be as much a component of, 31:18.693 --> 31:21.613 like, the natural physical nature of man... 31:21.609 --> 31:22.289 Prof: Well now you're... 31:22.288 --> 31:24.718 Student: As well as--I mean, I'm adding more to 31:24.722 --> 31:25.492 Bentham, but... 31:25.490 --> 31:28.170 Prof: Okay, so that would be a different 31:28.170 --> 31:31.550 theory than Bentham's theory, but you can see where this is 31:31.548 --> 31:32.538 going, right? 31:32.538 --> 31:35.398 That I think there are some people in the room, 31:35.400 --> 31:38.660 if we had time to pursue this conversation, 31:38.660 --> 31:42.340 there are some people in the room who no matter what you did 31:42.340 --> 31:45.900 to the programming in the experience machine they wouldn't 31:45.897 --> 31:48.647 like it, and they wouldn't like it for 31:48.654 --> 31:50.804 two principle reasons, I think. 31:50.798 --> 31:55.588 One has just been articulated which is that somehow this seems 31:55.590 --> 31:58.890 like an abdication of your own autonomy. 31:58.890 --> 32:04.150 And when we think back to the Eichmann problem one of the 32:04.152 --> 32:10.262 things that troubled people was his abdication of his autonomy. 32:10.259 --> 32:14.279 He's giving up his free will to say, "Yes or no. 32:14.279 --> 32:15.719 I think this is right or wrong. 32:15.720 --> 32:18.970 I'm going to do it on the basis of my own autonomous 32:18.973 --> 32:20.063 judgment." 32:20.058 --> 32:24.818 The second thing I think that people would worry about is 32:24.818 --> 32:27.368 who's operating the machine. 32:27.369 --> 32:30.079 Who's operating the machine? 32:30.078 --> 32:34.848 How do you know that once they've got you floating in that 32:34.847 --> 32:39.447 vat what you wanted to have done will in fact happen? 32:39.450 --> 32:44.220 And so there's a basic problem of agency and accountability 32:44.218 --> 32:46.518 that makes people nervous. 32:46.519 --> 32:52.819 But let's just put those things to one side for the moment and 32:52.820 --> 32:57.680 focus on the rest of the exposition of Bentham's 32:57.676 --> 32:59.016 doctrine. 32:59.019 --> 33:00.839 We're going to come back to all of these issues, 33:00.839 --> 33:01.459 I promise you. 33:01.460 --> 33:04.350 I just want to get everything out on the table. 33:04.348 --> 33:11.708 What he says is that the role of government is, 33:11.710 --> 33:16.900 "A measure of government (which is but a particular kind 33:16.903 --> 33:19.783 of action, performed by a particular 33:19.778 --> 33:24.118 person or persons) may be said to be comfortable to or dictated 33:24.115 --> 33:28.235 by the principle of utility when in like manner the tendency 33:28.243 --> 33:32.163 which it has to augment the happiness of the community is 33:32.162 --> 33:36.222 greater than any which it has to diminish it." 33:36.220 --> 33:41.160 So again, the bumper sticker version of that for Bentham is, 33:41.157 --> 33:45.927 maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 33:45.930 --> 33:49.750 And for those of you who like thinking diagrammatically, 33:49.750 --> 33:54.570 and as I noted in my opening lecture not everybody does, 33:54.568 --> 33:57.478 but if we imagine a two-person society, 33:57.480 --> 34:01.390 so A has this much utility, that's the status quo, 34:01.391 --> 34:02.031 right? 34:02.029 --> 34:03.969 A has this much utility. 34:03.970 --> 34:08.070 B has that much utility, and let's say there's some 34:08.072 --> 34:12.342 outer limit of possible utility, which we'll call the 34:12.338 --> 34:14.388 possibility frontier. 34:14.389 --> 34:19.239 Bentham would say if you draw that line there anything that 34:19.239 --> 34:22.339 puts us in this, whatever it is, 34:22.340 --> 34:27.080 cloudy zone here, would be a net increase in the 34:27.077 --> 34:31.307 total amount of utility in the society; 34:31.309 --> 34:34.039 pretty straight-forward claim, right? 34:34.039 --> 34:35.689 So we went from there to there. 34:35.690 --> 34:39.410 Both would have more utility, but if we went from there, 34:39.409 --> 34:42.919 say, to there A's utility would have gone up and B's would have 34:42.922 --> 34:45.202 gone down, but we don't care, 34:45.197 --> 34:50.407 right, because the total amount of utility in this society has 34:50.409 --> 34:51.349 gone up. 34:51.349 --> 34:56.329 What we wouldn't want to do is come anywhere into this area 34:56.333 --> 35:00.723 because then utility, the total amount of utility in 35:00.715 --> 35:03.975 this society would have decreased. 35:03.980 --> 35:07.650 35:07.650 --> 35:12.060 Okay, so that's basically the story. 35:12.059 --> 35:16.989 Now, you might say, "Well, why do you need 35:16.990 --> 35:22.030 government at all if this is the story?" 35:22.030 --> 35:27.040 Everybody is--whatever they think, whatever they say, 35:27.039 --> 35:30.719 whatever they understand, everybody is a mindless 35:30.719 --> 35:33.479 pleasure-seeker and pain-avoider, 35:33.480 --> 35:37.300 or perhaps mindful pleasure-seeker or pain-avoider, 35:37.300 --> 35:38.580 but they have no control over that. 35:38.579 --> 35:42.449 They're going to just do what they have to do. 35:42.449 --> 35:47.669 Why create government with the principle that it should 35:47.666 --> 35:51.046 maximize utility in this society? 35:51.050 --> 35:53.880 It seems like an odd thing to do. 35:53.880 --> 35:57.430 Why would you do that? 35:57.429 --> 36:06.289 Anyone? Yeah? 36:06.289 --> 36:07.859 Student: So just looking at that last graph, 36:07.862 --> 36:08.112 right? 36:08.110 --> 36:11.480 If each person tried to maximize their utility then 36:11.481 --> 36:15.801 they'd both want to be on the opposite corners of each other, 36:15.800 --> 36:18.820 so then you would get chaos when you extrapolate that to a 36:18.815 --> 36:19.605 larger group. 36:19.610 --> 36:22.880 You need something to kind of manage everybody's pleasure, 36:22.876 --> 36:23.446 I guess. 36:23.449 --> 36:27.259 Prof: So people wouldn't voluntarily do things that 36:27.264 --> 36:31.084 maximize one another's--maximize the total social utility, 36:31.079 --> 36:31.749 right? 36:31.750 --> 36:35.680 If taking something from A and giving it to B would increase 36:35.677 --> 36:39.337 B's utility more than it would diminish A's utility, 36:39.340 --> 36:42.430 well A's not going to go for that voluntarily. 36:42.429 --> 36:46.469 B might go and take it, but he may or may not be strong 36:46.472 --> 36:47.972 enough to take it. 36:47.969 --> 36:49.079 We don't know. 36:49.079 --> 36:53.999 So that's a very shrewd observation in response to that 36:53.998 --> 36:56.998 diagram, and it actually gets to more 36:56.998 --> 37:00.348 sophisticated questions about redistribution and 37:00.353 --> 37:04.213 utilitarianism that I'm going to take up on Monday. 37:04.210 --> 37:06.880 But there's, I think, before we get to those 37:06.882 --> 37:10.902 questions, there's a more fundamental 37:10.896 --> 37:18.296 level at which Bentham thinks utilitarianism creates the need 37:18.295 --> 37:22.755 for government, and that is that there's a 37:22.762 --> 37:27.332 disconnect between what's individually optimal and what's 37:27.333 --> 37:31.913 socially optimal even before we get to the redistributive 37:31.905 --> 37:33.125 questions. 37:33.130 --> 37:38.170 We might call it the market failure theory of government. 37:38.170 --> 37:47.160 Where other eighteenth-century thinkers had taken the view that 37:47.164 --> 37:50.904 when this, you know, Adam Smith's famous 37:50.896 --> 37:54.186 invisible hand, everybody acting selfishly 37:54.190 --> 37:57.590 leads to a collectively optimal result. 37:57.590 --> 38:00.930 Bentham, we'll see, thinks that's true a lot of the 38:00.925 --> 38:02.455 time, but not always. 38:02.460 --> 38:09.200 There are certain circumstances in which people are likely not 38:09.197 --> 38:14.497 to act in a way that produces a common result. 38:14.500 --> 38:21.050 "The great enemies of public peace are the selfish and 38:21.045 --> 38:25.665 dissocial passions-- necessary as they are...Society 38:25.670 --> 38:29.400 is held together only by the sacrifices that men can be 38:29.398 --> 38:32.778 induced to make of the gratifications they demand: 38:32.782 --> 38:36.722 to obtain these sacrifices is the great difficulty, 38:36.719 --> 38:40.529 the great task of government." 38:40.530 --> 38:44.930 And he's thinking really of, and this may be the first 38:44.927 --> 38:50.067 formulation of it that we find, what we today call free-riding, 38:50.072 --> 38:51.402 freeloading. 38:51.400 --> 38:58.790 He thinks about the provision of something like national 38:58.789 --> 39:06.179 defense, what we call, economists call a public good. 39:06.179 --> 39:11.219 You can't be excluded from the benefits of it, 39:11.217 --> 39:15.807 right, and it must be jointly supplied. 39:15.809 --> 39:17.319 So it says, If, for example, 39:17.318 --> 39:20.778 the commencement or continuing of a war being the question upon 39:20.784 --> 39:23.294 the carpet, if, upon his calculation, 39:23.288 --> 39:26.698 a hundred a-year during the continuance of the war, 39:26.699 --> 39:29.079 or for ever, will be the amount of the 39:29.079 --> 39:33.069 contribution which according to his calculation he will have to 39:33.065 --> 39:33.575 pay. 39:33.579 --> 39:36.309 (You have to pay a hundred dollars a year in taxes to 39:36.309 --> 39:37.359 finance this war.) 39:37.360 --> 39:42.060 If his expected profit by the war will be equal to 0, 39:42.059 --> 39:45.349 and no particular gust or passions intervene to drive him 39:45.351 --> 39:49.061 from the pursuit of what appears to be his lasting interest upon 39:49.056 --> 39:49.876 the whole. 39:49.880 --> 39:54.190 -- he will be against the war and what influence it may happen 39:54.192 --> 39:57.442 to him to possess, will be exerted on the other 39:57.443 --> 39:58.083 side. 39:58.079 --> 40:01.589 Now, why would his benefit be zero? 40:01.590 --> 40:08.730 This is rather convoluted prose, but what Bentham's saying 40:08.728 --> 40:11.468 is, "If the war is going to be 40:11.471 --> 40:15.501 fought anyway, I get no marginal benefit from 40:15.500 --> 40:17.000 supporting it. 40:17.000 --> 40:21.700 I might as well oppose it, or I might as well refuse to 40:21.702 --> 40:25.362 pay taxes in support of it," right? 40:25.360 --> 40:27.750 And that is the nature of public goods, 40:27.750 --> 40:31.320 that people can free ride on their provision because an 40:31.317 --> 40:35.347 economist says the two features of a public good are they must 40:35.347 --> 40:39.237 be jointly supplied, everybody has to contribute to 40:39.237 --> 40:42.047 them, and you can't exclude anybody 40:42.047 --> 40:44.177 from the benefits of them. 40:44.179 --> 40:47.939 Like clean air, if we create clean air for some 40:47.936 --> 40:52.256 people we're going to create clean air for all people, 40:52.264 --> 40:53.004 okay? 40:53.000 --> 40:55.790 So people are going to have to be coerced in the provision of 40:55.791 --> 40:56.491 public goods. 40:56.489 --> 41:00.679 People are going to have to be coerced to pay for the war. 41:00.679 --> 41:03.559 So that's one example. 41:03.559 --> 41:07.989 Another one that comes up is the so-called tragedy of the 41:07.987 --> 41:09.407 commons problem. 41:09.409 --> 41:13.019 Suppose you have some common land, and we'll come back to 41:13.016 --> 41:16.876 talking about this in connection with Locke's social contract 41:16.880 --> 41:17.590 theory. 41:17.590 --> 41:21.610 God gave the world to mankind in common, on Locke's story, 41:21.608 --> 41:26.048 so long as much and as good is available to others in common. 41:26.050 --> 41:29.740 So if you have common land here's the problem. 41:29.739 --> 41:33.499 You're thinking about grazing your sheep on the common. 41:33.500 --> 41:39.300 If I put my sheep onto that common land it doesn't do any 41:39.304 --> 41:43.064 lasting damage, but if everybody grazes their 41:43.063 --> 41:46.983 sheep on the land and none of it is allowed to lie fallow, 41:46.980 --> 41:50.210 then it destroys the common, okay? 41:50.210 --> 41:54.120 So there are too many sheep for everybody to gaze their sheep on 41:54.123 --> 41:57.853 the land, but any individual person doesn't have a reason not 41:57.851 --> 41:59.281 to graze his sheep. 41:59.280 --> 42:03.930 This was finally formulated in a rigorous way by a man called 42:03.931 --> 42:05.251 Garrett Hardin. 42:05.250 --> 42:09.070 The tragedy of the commons that if you have commons they'll be 42:09.074 --> 42:12.654 destroyed because each person will do something that makes 42:12.646 --> 42:16.656 individual rational sense but not collective rational sense. 42:16.659 --> 42:20.729 So this is, again, it's not exactly the same as 42:20.733 --> 42:24.893 the free-riding problem, but it's related to the 42:24.893 --> 42:27.023 free-riding problem. 42:27.018 --> 42:31.118 I won't see any reason in the world why I shouldn't graze my 42:31.121 --> 42:35.361 cow or my sheep on the common, but when everybody does that we 42:35.360 --> 42:36.960 destroy the common. 42:36.960 --> 42:40.470 It's a bit like walking down the street with a soda can and 42:40.472 --> 42:42.982 you think, "Should I take the trouble 42:42.981 --> 42:46.541 to cross the street to put it in a recycling bin or just throw it 42:46.536 --> 42:47.756 in the trash?" 42:47.760 --> 42:50.580 One Coke bottle, I mean, what difference one 42:50.583 --> 42:54.523 Coke bottle--it's not going to make--but if everybody doesn't 42:54.523 --> 42:56.763 cross the street, the same problem, 42:56.757 --> 42:57.477 okay? 42:57.480 --> 43:01.350 So these are the areas where there's a disconnect. 43:01.349 --> 43:06.249 There's a disconnect between individual utility and social 43:06.251 --> 43:11.411 utility, and that is what creates the need for government. 43:11.409 --> 43:16.639 We will pursue these questions and much else about classical 43:16.639 --> 43:19.209 utilitarianism next Monday. 43:19.210 --> 43:25.000