WEBVTT 00:01.600 --> 00:03.300 Professor Steven Smith: Okay, where are we? 00:03.300 --> 00:07.760 Today, we're going to study--I'm going to talk about 00:07.755 --> 00:13.165 Aristotle's--you might call it Aristotle's comparative politics 00:13.173 --> 00:16.933 and focusing on the idea of the regime. 00:16.930 --> 00:22.270 This is the theme that you remember in the opening day I 00:22.271 --> 00:28.001 said was really the central concept or the leading thread of 00:28.002 --> 00:33.642 this course and it's in books III through VI of Aristotle's 00:33.635 --> 00:39.265 Politics that he develops his idea of the regime and 00:39.268 --> 00:43.888 regime politics. Book I, that we spoke about 00:43.885 --> 00:48.875 last time, really in a way tells us something about the--you 00:48.880 --> 00:53.960 might say almost the metaphysics of Aristotle's politics. 00:53.960 --> 01:01.560 Today Aristotle speaks more empirically, more politically 01:01.558 --> 01:04.948 about what a regime is. 01:04.950 --> 01:07.560 His idea of regime politea, 01:07.564 --> 01:11.684 again, the same word, the same word that was used for 01:11.683 --> 01:15.013 the title of Plato's Republic is the 01:15.010 --> 01:19.130 centerpiece of Aristotle's politics literally. 01:19.129 --> 01:23.289 It occupies the theme of the middle three books, 01:23.292 --> 01:25.332 books III through VI. 01:25.330 --> 01:28.680 These books are difficult in many ways; 01:28.680 --> 01:29.760 they're complicated. 01:29.760 --> 01:33.100 They're not everybody's favorite part of the book, 01:33.096 --> 01:36.706 but they are my favorite part because it tells us more 01:36.706 --> 01:41.056 precisely than anywhere else how Aristotle understands the nature 01:41.064 --> 01:45.154 of politics and that after all is what we are most interested 01:45.150 --> 01:48.190 in. A regime refers to both the 01:48.187 --> 01:53.267 formal enumeration of rights and duties within a community, 01:53.269 --> 01:58.879 but it also addresses something closer to what we would call the 01:58.879 --> 02:02.529 way of life or the culture of a people. 02:02.530 --> 02:06.180 Their distinctive customs, manners, laws, 02:06.177 --> 02:10.187 habits, moral dispositions and sentiments, 02:10.189 --> 02:15.579 and Aristotle's constitutional theorizing begins by asking a 02:15.576 --> 02:19.036 simple question. What is the identity of a city? 02:19.039 --> 02:24.459 What gives it its identity and enduring existence over time? 02:24.460 --> 02:29.330 His answer is the regime; the regime is what gives a 02:29.327 --> 02:31.807 people and a city its identity. 02:31.810 --> 02:36.250 02:36.250 --> 02:43.330 Aristotle distinguishes between what he calls the matter and the 02:43.330 --> 02:45.690 form of the regime. 02:45.690 --> 02:48.420 Let me examine both of these in turn. 02:48.419 --> 02:53.989 The matter, the substance, the material basis of a regime 02:53.986 --> 02:56.766 concerns its citizen body. 02:56.770 --> 03:01.970 That is to say the character of those who constitute a city and 03:01.971 --> 03:06.001 here he rejects a number of alternatives for what 03:05.999 --> 03:08.599 constitutes a citizen body. 03:08.599 --> 03:12.869 He rejects the idea that the city is defined simply by a 03:12.874 --> 03:16.454 group of people who inhabit a common territory, 03:16.448 --> 03:18.778 the same space as it were. 03:18.780 --> 03:23.160 The identity of a polis he writes is not constituted by 03:23.158 --> 03:25.268 its walls. That is to say, 03:25.273 --> 03:28.623 it is not constituted by geography alone, 03:28.616 --> 03:31.956 and similarly, he rejects the idea that a 03:31.960 --> 03:36.560 regime can be understood as a defensive alliance against 03:36.556 --> 03:38.726 invasion by others. 03:38.729 --> 03:40.909 In our terms, for example, 03:40.914 --> 03:45.894 NATO would not be a regime, a purely military or defensive 03:45.894 --> 03:48.634 alliance. Finally, he denies the 03:48.627 --> 03:53.267 possibility that a regime exists that whenever a number of people 03:53.273 --> 03:57.273 come together to establish commercial relations with one 03:57.266 --> 04:00.776 another, organizations like NAFTA, 04:00.783 --> 04:06.453 or the WTO, the World Trade Organization do not a regime 04:06.446 --> 04:10.486 make. A regime cannot be understood 04:10.492 --> 04:14.162 simply as a commercial alliance. 04:14.160 --> 04:15.080 What is a regime then? 04:15.080 --> 04:18.390 It is evident Aristotle said, is that a city is not a 04:18.391 --> 04:22.081 partnership in a location or for the sake of not committing 04:22.084 --> 04:27.784 injustice against one another, or for transacting business, 04:27.778 --> 04:31.178 so what is a citizen body? 04:31.180 --> 04:35.940 The citizens who constitute a regime, he tells us, 04:35.941 --> 04:41.871 do more than occupy the common space but are held together, 04:41.870 --> 04:48.200 according to Aristotle, by bonds of common affection. 04:48.199 --> 04:52.619 It is affection, loyalty and friendship that 04:52.624 --> 04:54.584 make up a regime. 04:54.579 --> 04:58.949 This sort of thing he says, this political partnership is 04:58.950 --> 05:02.700 the work of affection, philia is his word, 05:02.696 --> 05:04.956 is the work of affection. 05:04.959 --> 05:09.339 "Affection is the intentional choice of living together." 05:09.340 --> 05:13.060 1280a, if anyone's interested. 05:13.060 --> 05:15.700 "It is the intentional choice of living together." 05:15.699 --> 05:19.349 Friendship, he writes, "is the greatest of good things 05:19.345 --> 05:23.535 for cities, for when people feel affection for each other they 05:23.542 --> 05:26.502 are less likely to fall into conflict." 05:26.500 --> 05:30.630 But what kind of friendship is he talking about? 05:30.629 --> 05:35.669 Is it the kind of friendship that you feel for your best 05:35.665 --> 05:39.505 friend, or for your parents or siblings? 05:39.509 --> 05:43.509 What kind of a friendship are these bonds of affection, 05:43.509 --> 05:47.439 that he says hold the city together and that make it a 05:47.435 --> 05:48.245 regime? 05:48.250 --> 05:53.450 05:53.449 --> 05:56.309 Political friendships, he tells us, 05:56.308 --> 06:01.188 are not the kind of thing that require us to forego our own 06:01.185 --> 06:05.555 individual identities in a way that one might find in 06:05.557 --> 06:10.697 passionate relations of love, right? 06:10.699 --> 06:13.869 Rather, they presuppose relations, that is to say 06:13.866 --> 06:17.226 political relations, not between lovers or even best 06:17.230 --> 06:21.440 friends of some kind, but between civic partners who 06:21.443 --> 06:26.063 may in fact be intensely rivalrous and competitive with 06:26.058 --> 06:31.098 one another for positions of political office and honor. 06:31.100 --> 06:34.630 Civic friendship, civic philia is in other 06:34.626 --> 06:38.886 words not without a strong element of what might be thought 06:38.888 --> 06:43.218 of as sibling rivalry in which each citizen strives to outdo 06:43.223 --> 06:46.753 the others for the sake of the civic good. 06:46.750 --> 06:51.490 Many of you have siblings and know a little bit about what 06:51.488 --> 06:53.648 sibling rivalry is like. 06:53.649 --> 06:57.529 Siblings, as everyone knows, may be the best of friends, 06:57.528 --> 07:01.688 but this does not exclude strong elements of competition, 07:01.689 --> 07:07.809 rivalry, and even conflict for the attention of the parents, 07:07.808 --> 07:10.928 and fellow citizens, for Aristotle, 07:10.930 --> 07:13.870 are like siblings, each competing with one another 07:13.870 --> 07:16.150 for the esteem, the affection, 07:16.154 --> 07:21.404 and the recognition of the city that serves for them as a kind 07:21.401 --> 07:23.381 of surrogate parent. 07:23.379 --> 07:27.129 That is the way that Aristotle understands a civic body, 07:27.130 --> 07:30.470 a citizen body. So that when he says that 07:30.472 --> 07:35.362 citizens are held together by ties of common affection he 07:35.359 --> 07:38.239 means something very specific. 07:38.240 --> 07:43.450 The civic bond is more than an aggregate of mere self-interest 07:43.445 --> 07:48.645 or rational calculation as was going to be defended by someone 07:48.651 --> 07:53.861 like Thomas Hobbes or by most of today's modern economists who 07:53.857 --> 07:58.887 believe that society can be understood simply as a series of 07:58.892 --> 08:04.012 rational transactions between buyers and sellers of different 08:04.012 --> 08:08.452 goods and that can be modeled along some kind of game 08:08.450 --> 08:12.160 theoretic lines. Aristotle denies this, 08:12.155 --> 08:13.585 explicitly denies this. 08:13.589 --> 08:17.469 He seems to have known something about the modern 08:17.472 --> 08:22.572 economic theory of society long before modern economics was even 08:22.567 --> 08:25.657 developed. But again, when Aristotle 08:25.662 --> 08:30.062 speaks of the kinds of affection that hold a citizen body 08:30.058 --> 08:33.358 together, he does not mean anything like 08:33.360 --> 08:37.690 the bonds of personal intimacy that characterize private 08:37.689 --> 08:40.079 friendships. What he means, 08:40.075 --> 08:44.545 when speaking about civic affection, is more like the 08:44.552 --> 08:48.602 bonds of loyalty, camaraderie that hold together 08:48.598 --> 08:51.438 members of a team or a club. 08:51.440 --> 08:55.360 These are more than, again, ties of mutual 08:55.361 --> 08:58.651 convenience. They require loyalty, 08:58.650 --> 09:03.850 trust, what social scientists today sometimes call social 09:03.853 --> 09:08.313 capital, that successful societies require social 09:08.312 --> 09:11.512 capital. A distinguished political 09:11.514 --> 09:16.224 scientist at another university, I will not mention its name 09:16.221 --> 09:18.761 here, at another university, 09:18.758 --> 09:24.108 has spoken about the importance of social capital or trust as a 09:24.106 --> 09:28.876 sort of basic relation, the basic component of a 09:28.883 --> 09:30.893 healthy democracy. 09:30.889 --> 09:34.829 Aristotle knew that, he didn't use a kind of ugly 09:34.828 --> 09:38.518 social scientific word like social capital; 09:38.519 --> 09:42.899 rather he spoke about civic friendship and philia. 09:42.899 --> 09:47.409 The political partnership he says must therefore be regarded 09:47.412 --> 09:51.852 as being for the sake of noble actions and not just for the 09:51.848 --> 09:53.988 sake of living together. 09:53.990 --> 09:59.250 The city, as he likes to say or the regime exists not merely for 09:59.252 --> 10:04.852 the sake of life but for what he understands to be the good life, 10:04.850 --> 10:09.100 the life of friendship, the life of again, 10:09.103 --> 10:15.123 competitive relations for positions of honor and office. 10:15.120 --> 10:19.000 So we can say that a regime is in the first instance 10:19.001 --> 10:21.591 constituted by its citizen body. 10:21.590 --> 10:24.830 Citizens are those who share a common way of life. 10:24.830 --> 10:29.550 The citizen in an unqualified sense, Aristotle writes, 10:29.553 --> 10:35.083 is defined by no other thing so much as sharing in decision and 10:35.079 --> 10:38.219 office. Or, as he puts it a little bit 10:38.220 --> 10:42.040 later, whoever is entitled to participate in an office 10:42.038 --> 10:46.068 involving deliberation or decision-making is a citizen of 10:46.071 --> 10:49.031 the city. Listen to the words he uses 10:49.025 --> 10:51.255 there in describing a citizen. 10:51.259 --> 10:56.249 A citizen is one who takes sharing in decision and office, 10:56.252 --> 10:59.322 who participates in deliberation and 10:59.318 --> 11:03.188 decision-making. A citizen is one therefore who 11:03.189 --> 11:07.359 not only enjoys the protection of the law, is not merely you 11:07.358 --> 11:11.808 might say a passive beneficiary of the protection of society and 11:11.810 --> 11:15.360 its laws, but is one who takes a share in 11:15.362 --> 11:19.832 shaping the laws and who participates in political rule 11:19.826 --> 11:21.476 and deliberation. 11:21.480 --> 11:24.440 Aristotle even notes, you probably observe, 11:24.441 --> 11:27.051 that his definition of the citizen, 11:27.049 --> 11:31.029 he says, is most appropriate to citizens of democracy, 11:31.030 --> 11:35.610 where in his famous formulation everyone knows how to rule and 11:35.612 --> 11:37.192 be ruled in turn. 11:37.190 --> 11:41.960 It is this reflection and the character of the citizen that 11:41.960 --> 11:47.060 leads him to wonder whether the good citizen and the good human 11:47.060 --> 11:49.610 being are one and the same. 11:49.610 --> 11:53.090 Can a person be both, as it were, a good man, 11:53.091 --> 11:55.861 a good person and a good citizen? 11:55.860 --> 12:00.460 12:00.460 --> 12:04.160 Famous discussion in Aristotle's book; 12:04.159 --> 12:10.799 Aristotle's answer to this is perhaps deliberately obscure. 12:10.799 --> 12:14.739 The good citizen, he tells, us is still relative 12:14.739 --> 12:17.059 to the regime. That is to say, 12:17.060 --> 12:20.590 the good citizen of the democracy would not necessarily 12:20.591 --> 12:23.741 be the same person, or the same kind of person as 12:23.736 --> 12:26.676 the good citizen of a monarchy or an aristocracy. 12:26.679 --> 12:30.349 Citizen virtue is relative, or we might say, 12:30.352 --> 12:33.502 regime relative. Only in the best regime, 12:33.495 --> 12:37.565 he says, will the good citizen and the good human being be the 12:37.574 --> 12:41.014 same. But what is the best regime? 12:41.009 --> 12:45.609 At least at this point he has not told us. 12:45.610 --> 12:49.220 The point he's trying to make is there are several kinds of 12:49.222 --> 12:53.022 regimes and therefore several kinds of citizenship appropriate 12:53.022 --> 12:55.992 to them. Each regime is constituted by 12:55.994 --> 13:00.214 its matter, that is to say, by its citizen body as we've 13:00.212 --> 13:04.312 been talking about, but also now by its form, 13:04.306 --> 13:06.806 by its formal structures. 13:06.809 --> 13:10.879 That is to say every regime will also be a set of 13:10.883 --> 13:15.303 institutions and formal structures that give shape to 13:15.297 --> 13:19.477 its citizens. Regimes or constitutions you 13:19.480 --> 13:24.280 might say are forms, or formalities that determine 13:24.275 --> 13:29.555 how power is shared and distributed among citizens. 13:29.559 --> 13:35.109 Every regime is an answer, consciously or not, 13:35.108 --> 13:39.918 to the oldest political question of all, 13:39.917 --> 13:44.507 who governs? Who should govern? 13:44.509 --> 13:48.949 Every regime is an answer to that question because every 13:48.948 --> 13:52.498 regime sets forward a way of distributing, 13:52.500 --> 13:57.080 formally distributing powers and distributing offices among 13:57.079 --> 13:58.579 its citizen body. 13:58.580 --> 14:01.460 So we move now from the matter of the regime, 14:01.463 --> 14:05.333 as to what constitutes its citizens and its citizen body, 14:05.330 --> 14:09.440 to the question of the form of the regime, its forms, 14:09.436 --> 14:13.146 its formalities, its structures and institutions 14:13.148 --> 14:17.018 you might say. Entirely too much of modern 14:17.017 --> 14:22.727 political science is focused on simply the forms and formalities 14:22.726 --> 14:26.456 of political life, not enough, in my opinion, 14:26.460 --> 14:30.050 with questions of the citizen body and what makes, 14:30.049 --> 14:33.329 what constitutes, the character or the virtue in 14:33.328 --> 14:35.838 Aristotle's terms of its citizens. 14:35.840 --> 14:38.900 But nevertheless, Aristotle gives extraordinary 14:38.895 --> 14:42.945 importance and attention to the forms or formalities that make 14:42.947 --> 14:45.437 up a regime. What does he mean by that? 14:45.440 --> 14:48.620 14:48.620 --> 14:53.200 Aristotle defines the strictly formal criteria of a 14:53.200 --> 14:58.510 politea twice in his politics and I'm sure you noted 14:58.513 --> 15:01.723 both times where they appeared? 15:01.720 --> 15:06.210 Yes. Book III, chapter 6, 15:06.211 --> 15:09.671 famous definition: "The regime," he says, 15:09.674 --> 15:14.874 "is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, 15:14.870 --> 15:19.390 particularly the one who has the authority over all matters. 15:19.389 --> 15:22.669 For what has authority in the city is everywhere that 15:22.673 --> 15:25.453 governing body, and the governing body is the 15:25.452 --> 15:26.212 regime." 15:26.210 --> 15:29.830 15:29.830 --> 15:32.760 The regime is an arrangement of a city, he says, 15:32.756 --> 15:36.676 with respect to its offices and every city will have a governing 15:36.679 --> 15:39.139 body, that governing body being a 15:39.137 --> 15:42.787 regime. The second definition appears 15:42.793 --> 15:47.063 at the beginning of Book IV, chapter 1. 15:47.059 --> 15:50.539 "For a regime," he writes, "is an arrangement in cities 15:50.539 --> 15:53.949 connected with offices, establishing the manner in 15:53.946 --> 15:56.776 which they have been distributed, what the 15:56.778 --> 15:59.678 authoritative element of the regime is, 15:59.679 --> 16:05.069 and what the end of the partnership is in each case, 16:05.070 --> 16:10.360 a similar but slightly different definition of what 16:10.355 --> 16:16.375 constitutes the formal structure of regime politics." 16:16.379 --> 16:21.089 But from these two definitions appearing in book III, 16:21.093 --> 16:25.813 chapter 6 and Book IV, chapter 1 we learn a number of 16:25.806 --> 16:27.706 important things. 16:27.710 --> 16:31.840 First, is to repeat, a regime concerns the manner in 16:31.838 --> 16:36.288 which power is divided or distributed in a community. 16:36.289 --> 16:40.129 This is what Aristotle means when he uses the phrase, 16:40.130 --> 16:44.340 "an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices." 16:44.340 --> 16:47.230 In other words, every regime will be based on 16:47.227 --> 16:51.027 some kind of judgment of how power should be distributed to 16:51.032 --> 16:54.652 the one, to the few or the many to use 16:54.646 --> 17:00.486 the Aristotelian categories of political rule or some mixture 17:00.494 --> 17:05.664 of those three classes that constitute every city. 17:05.660 --> 17:08.740 In every regime one of these groups, he says, 17:08.735 --> 17:12.645 will be the dominant class, will be the dominant body, 17:12.650 --> 17:16.170 the ruling body, as he says, in that definition 17:16.167 --> 17:18.917 and that ruling body will in turn, 17:18.920 --> 17:21.050 he says, define the nature of the regime. 17:21.050 --> 17:27.490 17:27.490 --> 17:30.670 But Aristotle tells us something more than this. 17:30.670 --> 17:34.950 A regime, his regime typology is, to say, his division of 17:34.947 --> 17:39.527 power, his division of regimes and to the rule of the one, 17:39.529 --> 17:46.199 the few and the many is based not only on how powers are 17:46.200 --> 17:50.810 distributed in a purely factual way, 17:50.809 --> 17:55.399 he also distinguishes between regimes that are well ordered, 17:55.396 --> 18:02.646 well governed, and those that are corrupt. 18:02.650 --> 18:06.610 What does he mean in terms of this distinction? 18:06.609 --> 18:10.429 Aristotle's distinction seems to be not only empirical, 18:10.425 --> 18:14.165 again, based on the factual distribution of powers. 18:14.170 --> 18:17.400 It seems to have a--what we might call today a normative 18:17.401 --> 18:19.931 component to it, it makes a distinction or a 18:19.927 --> 18:22.747 judgment between the well-ordered and the deviant 18:22.747 --> 18:25.477 regimes, the corrupt regimes. 18:25.480 --> 18:27.720 On the one side, he tells us, 18:27.722 --> 18:32.372 the well ordered regimes are monarchy, aristocracy and what 18:32.368 --> 18:35.118 he calls polity, rule of the one, 18:35.119 --> 18:38.569 the few, and the many, and on the corrupt side he 18:38.568 --> 18:41.368 calls, he describes them as tyranny, 18:41.369 --> 18:44.299 oligarchy and democracy also ruled by the one, 18:44.304 --> 18:45.874 the few, and the many. 18:45.869 --> 18:48.659 But what criteria, we want to know, 18:48.655 --> 18:51.925 does he use to distinguish between these, 18:51.932 --> 18:56.112 as it were, six-fold classification of regimes? 18:56.109 --> 19:00.789 How does he distinguish the well-ordered regimes from the 19:00.786 --> 19:04.966 corrupt regimes? Here is where Aristotle's 19:04.966 --> 19:07.856 analysis gets, in some ways, 19:07.856 --> 19:12.456 maddeningly tricky because in many ways, 19:12.460 --> 19:18.130 of his general reluctance, to condemn any regime out of 19:18.125 --> 19:21.485 hand. If you were to read more than I 19:21.494 --> 19:26.854 had assigned for you in class, if you were to read throughout, 19:26.849 --> 19:31.339 through all of Book VI for example, you would find 19:31.342 --> 19:37.212 Aristotle not only giving advice to Democrats and democracies and 19:37.209 --> 19:41.609 other regimes on how to preserve themselves, 19:41.609 --> 19:46.909 you would find a lengthy description of how tyrants 19:46.910 --> 19:51.040 should moderate, or how tyrants learn to 19:51.044 --> 19:55.394 preserve and defend their own regime. 19:55.390 --> 19:58.600 It seems as if, it seems almost as if, 19:58.599 --> 20:03.629 living before the incarnation of pure evil in the twentieth 20:03.631 --> 20:08.231 century with the rise of modern totalitarianisms, 20:08.230 --> 20:12.400 that Aristotle seemed to think that no regime was so bad, 20:12.398 --> 20:16.568 no regime was so devoid of goodness that its preservation 20:16.566 --> 20:19.466 was not worth at least some effort, 20:19.470 --> 20:22.660 think of that. Rather, in many ways, 20:22.661 --> 20:27.921 he provides reasoned arguments for the strengths and weaknesses 20:27.921 --> 20:31.061 of several different regime types. 20:31.059 --> 20:34.179 Let's consider the one that's closest to our own, 20:34.180 --> 20:38.080 democracy, let's consider what Aristotle has to tell us about 20:38.079 --> 20:39.119 that regime. 20:39.120 --> 20:43.660 20:43.660 --> 20:47.910 In fact, it would be an interesting question for people 20:47.913 --> 20:52.803 to consider, to know how would Aristotle confront or what would 20:52.796 --> 20:57.046 his analysis be if a regime like Hitler's Germany, 20:57.049 --> 21:01.729 Stalin's Russia, the Iran of Khomeini, 21:01.725 --> 21:08.415 regimes that are clearly tyrannies but do they even go 21:08.423 --> 21:12.943 beyond in some way, the tyrannies that Aristotle 21:12.942 --> 21:16.222 spoke about and what kind of advice, what would he have to 21:16.223 --> 21:18.493 say about them? Anyway let's think about 21:18.487 --> 21:19.047 democracy. 21:19.050 --> 21:22.180 21:22.180 --> 21:26.180 Interestingly, we find Aristotle defending 21:26.181 --> 21:32.431 democracy on the grounds that it may contain collectively greater 21:32.427 --> 21:37.597 wisdom than a regime ruled by the one or the few. 21:37.599 --> 21:40.469 In Book III, chapter 11, for example, 21:40.470 --> 21:43.740 he writes, "For because they are many," 21:43.740 --> 21:47.000 that is to say the citizen body, the ruling body of the 21:46.999 --> 21:50.679 democracy, "each can have a part of virtue and prudence and on 21:50.680 --> 21:54.280 their uniting together, and on their joining together 21:54.279 --> 21:58.489 he says, "the multitude with its many feet and hands and having 21:58.490 --> 22:02.830 many senses becomes," he writes, "like a single human 22:02.831 --> 22:07.731 being, and so also with respect to character and mind." 22:07.730 --> 22:10.060 Think of that, the people in a democracy he 22:10.057 --> 22:12.437 says, "coming together, uniting together, 22:12.440 --> 22:16.880 become like a single human being with many hands and feet," 22:16.879 --> 22:20.629 and he says, "with greater character and mind." 22:20.630 --> 22:23.820 We even hear more than any single individual, 22:23.823 --> 22:28.033 and then, in the same text, we also hear Aristotle praising 22:28.032 --> 22:32.272 the practice of ostracism, that is to say exiling, 22:32.267 --> 22:37.457 banishing those individuals deemed to be pre-eminent in any 22:37.456 --> 22:40.316 particular virtue or quality. 22:40.319 --> 22:44.719 He makes a similar point in Book III, chapter 15, 22:44.721 --> 22:49.861 in describing the process of democratic deliberation as a 22:49.855 --> 22:53.885 superior means of arriving at decisions. 22:53.890 --> 22:57.160 He compares it to a potluck dinner; 22:57.160 --> 22:59.870 any one of them, he says, that is to say any one 22:59.870 --> 23:02.120 of the citizens, taken singly is perhaps 23:02.120 --> 23:04.370 inferior in comparison to the best. 23:04.369 --> 23:09.129 But the city is made up of many persons, just as a feast to 23:09.131 --> 23:13.831 which many contribute is finer, is better, than a single and 23:13.825 --> 23:18.215 simple one and on this account a crowd also judges many matters 23:18.221 --> 23:20.421 better than a single person. 23:20.420 --> 23:22.340 Furthermore, what is many, 23:22.343 --> 23:26.963 he says, is more incorruptible like a greater amount of water 23:26.959 --> 23:30.729 than many is more incorruptible than the few. 23:30.730 --> 23:34.770 So he gives there a powerful argument in defense of 23:34.771 --> 23:37.601 democracy, like a potluck dinner; 23:37.599 --> 23:42.329 each individual cook may not be as good as the best chef but 23:42.333 --> 23:47.313 many taken together will provide many more dishes and many more 23:47.307 --> 23:50.487 variety, for a variety of tastes than 23:50.492 --> 23:52.082 does a single chef. 23:52.080 --> 23:56.470 23:56.470 --> 23:59.940 He says, furthermore, a crowd, the many, 23:59.938 --> 24:03.228 is more incorruptible than the few. 24:03.230 --> 24:06.580 Less light incorruptible, here, I take it in a kind of 24:06.584 --> 24:10.234 ordinary sense of the term, less susceptible to bribery, 24:10.228 --> 24:14.298 you can't bribe a lot of people in the way that you can a single 24:14.296 --> 24:17.156 individual. Are Aristotle's views on 24:17.157 --> 24:20.417 democracy correct here in his analysis? 24:20.420 --> 24:26.780 Do in fact many chefs make for a better dinner than a single 24:26.775 --> 24:29.075 chef? Well, I don't know, 24:29.084 --> 24:34.324 would you rather have dinner at the Union League with one chef, 24:34.319 --> 24:38.489 a master chef or would you rather have dinner with a bunch 24:38.493 --> 24:42.743 of your friends each providing some piece of the dinner? 24:42.740 --> 24:46.680 Well, it's an interesting argument; 24:46.680 --> 24:48.680 it's open to debate anyway. 24:48.680 --> 24:53.200 Yet at the same time, is Aristotle seen defending 24:53.200 --> 24:58.660 democracy, providing reason and many sensible arguments for 24:58.663 --> 25:00.833 democratic regimes? 25:00.829 --> 25:03.869 You find him, in the same section of the 25:03.870 --> 25:08.240 book, providing a defense of kingship and the rule of the 25:08.236 --> 25:09.946 one. In Book III, 25:09.954 --> 25:15.434 chapter 16, he considers the case of the king who acts in all 25:15.426 --> 25:18.706 things according to his own will. 25:18.710 --> 25:21.810 Sounds like a kind of absolute monarch of some kind; 25:21.809 --> 25:26.379 this is the part of Aristotle's politics that seems closest in a 25:26.383 --> 25:29.943 way to the idea of a platonic philosopher-king, 25:29.940 --> 25:34.690 a king who rules without law and rules for the good of all, 25:34.686 --> 25:38.366 simply on the basis of his own superiority. 25:38.369 --> 25:42.049 Aristotle coins a term for this kind of king overall, 25:42.050 --> 25:44.670 he calls it the pambasileia, 25:44.670 --> 25:50.260 baseleia being the Greek word for king, 25:50.256 --> 25:56.216 like the name Basil, it's the Greek word for king 25:56.216 --> 26:00.806 and pan meaning universal, 26:00.809 --> 26:03.579 pambasileia, the universal king, 26:03.578 --> 26:07.498 the king of all. Aristotle does not rule out the 26:07.504 --> 26:11.894 possibility of such a person emerging, a person of, 26:11.890 --> 26:17.630 what he calls excessive virtue, almost hyperbolic excellence, 26:17.625 --> 26:23.075 he says, who stands so far above the rest as to deserve to 26:23.075 --> 26:26.225 be the natural ruler overall. 26:26.230 --> 26:29.350 But how, we want to know, does Aristotle reconcile his 26:29.351 --> 26:31.591 account of the term baseleia, 26:31.589 --> 26:34.839 the king of overall, with his earlier emphasis upon 26:34.839 --> 26:37.569 democratic deliberation and shared rule, 26:37.569 --> 26:42.679 the citizen, recall, is one who takes turn 26:42.678 --> 26:46.788 ruling and being ruled in turn. 26:46.789 --> 26:50.289 When readers look at Aristotle's account of kingship 26:50.289 --> 26:54.199 and particularly this notion of the pambasileia, 26:54.200 --> 26:58.500 the king overall, this suggestion must at least 26:58.499 --> 27:04.109 occur that there is a hidden Alexandrian or Macedonian streak 27:04.106 --> 27:09.146 to Aristotle's political thinking that owes more to his 27:09.153 --> 27:13.643 native Macedon than to his adopted Athens, 27:13.640 --> 27:17.400 the idea of universal kingship. 27:17.400 --> 27:20.680 Think of Alexander the Great later on, and in fact, 27:20.684 --> 27:23.644 in one of my favorite passages in the book, 27:23.640 --> 27:29.430 which you will read for next time, I cannot resist quoting 27:29.427 --> 27:34.857 already a passage from Book VII, and near the end of the book, 27:34.855 --> 27:37.915 Book VII, chapter 7, where Aristotle writes as 27:37.920 --> 27:42.100 follows. He writes, "The nations in cold 27:42.099 --> 27:47.519 locations, particularly in Europe, are filled with 27:47.519 --> 27:51.089 spiritedness." There is that platonic word 27:51.087 --> 27:54.147 again, thumos, are filled with thumos, 27:54.150 --> 27:57.440 "but lacking in discursive thought," lacking in the 27:57.438 --> 27:59.708 deliberative element in other words. 27:59.710 --> 28:03.280 Hence, they remain free because they're thumotic, 28:03.278 --> 28:06.028 but they lack political governance. 28:06.029 --> 28:09.469 "Those in Asia, on the other hand," he writes, 28:09.466 --> 28:12.136 thinking probably here of Persia, 28:12.140 --> 28:17.070 places like Egypt and Persia, "have souls endowed with 28:17.070 --> 28:21.070 discursive thought but lack spiritedness, 28:21.069 --> 28:24.719 lack thumos, hence they remain ruled and 28:24.718 --> 28:27.778 enslaved." But then he goes on to say, 28:27.778 --> 28:32.148 "The stock of Greeks share in both, just as it holds," he 28:32.150 --> 28:35.430 says, "the middle in terms of location. 28:35.430 --> 28:38.560 For it," that is to say the Greeks, "are both spirited, 28:38.556 --> 28:41.626 are both thumotic and endowed with deliberative 28:41.625 --> 28:44.445 thought, and hence, remained free and 28:44.452 --> 28:47.272 governed itself in the best manner." 28:47.269 --> 28:51.919 "And," he writes and he concludes, "at the same time is 28:51.917 --> 28:56.907 capable of ruling all should it obtain a single regime." 28:56.910 --> 29:00.490 That these Greeks are capable of ruling all, 29:00.491 --> 29:02.741 he says, all, who is all? 29:02.740 --> 29:04.950 What does he mean by the all here? 29:04.950 --> 29:08.280 The Greeks? The rest of the world? 29:08.279 --> 29:13.619 Should our--are capable of attaining it seems a single 29:13.623 --> 29:17.763 hegemony, a single regime, are if in fact, 29:17.757 --> 29:20.577 circumstances developed. 29:20.579 --> 29:25.079 So here is a passage in which Aristotle clearly seems to be 29:25.080 --> 29:30.050 pointing to the possibility of a kind of universal monarchy under 29:30.046 --> 29:35.456 Greek rule, at least as a possibility. 29:35.460 --> 29:41.480 This passage I read at length, is important for a number of 29:41.483 --> 29:45.433 reasons, let me just try to explain. 29:45.430 --> 29:49.520 29:49.519 --> 29:53.059 In the first place, it provides us with crucial 29:53.057 --> 29:57.667 information about Aristotle's thinking about the relations of 29:57.671 --> 30:01.601 impulse and reason, of thumos and reason, 30:01.601 --> 30:05.461 as you might say the determinants of human behavior 30:05.462 --> 30:09.402 or the crucial pet term in that passage is this, 30:09.400 --> 30:14.140 again this platonic term spiritedness which is both a 30:14.142 --> 30:19.162 cause of the human desire to rule and at the same time a 30:19.158 --> 30:24.538 cause of our desire to resist the domination of others. 30:24.539 --> 30:28.419 It is the unique source of human assertiveness and 30:28.415 --> 30:31.495 aggressiveness, as well as the source of 30:31.499 --> 30:34.899 resistance to the aggression of others. 30:34.900 --> 30:38.040 It's a very important psychological concept in 30:38.043 --> 30:39.793 understanding politics. 30:39.789 --> 30:44.939 And second, the passage tells us something about certain 30:44.942 --> 30:46.912 additional factors. 30:46.910 --> 30:51.800 Extra, in many ways, extra-political factors such as 30:51.804 --> 30:57.184 climate and geography as components in the development of 30:57.178 --> 30:59.288 political society. 30:59.289 --> 31:03.209 Apparently, quality such as thumos and reason, 31:03.205 --> 31:07.875 thumos and deliberation, are not distributed equally and 31:07.875 --> 31:10.825 universally. He says, he distinguishes, 31:10.834 --> 31:14.284 between the people's of the north, he calls them the 31:14.276 --> 31:18.456 Europeans, spirited and war-like but lacking thumos; 31:18.460 --> 31:23.740 those of Persia and Egypt containing highly developed 31:23.738 --> 31:28.758 forms of intellectual knowledge, no doubt thinking about the 31:28.762 --> 31:32.142 development of things like science and mathematics in Egypt 31:32.141 --> 31:35.171 but lacking this quality of thumos which is so 31:35.171 --> 31:38.161 important for self-government, for self-rule. 31:38.160 --> 31:42.360 These are, one might think about this, these things, 31:42.358 --> 31:47.218 he says, are at least in part determined by certain kinds of 31:47.215 --> 31:51.245 natural or geographic and climatic qualities. 31:51.250 --> 31:56.450 A modern reader of this passage that comes to mind is 31:56.450 --> 32:01.230 Montesquieu, in his famous book, the Spirit of the Laws, 32:01.227 --> 32:04.117 with its emphasis upon the way in which geography and climate, 32:04.119 --> 32:09.689 and environment become in part determinants of the kind of 32:09.693 --> 32:15.763 political culture and political behavior exhibited by different 32:15.756 --> 32:18.736 peoples. Finally, this passage tells us 32:18.742 --> 32:20.802 that under the right circumstances, 32:20.796 --> 32:25.406 at least Aristotle suggests, the Greeks could exercise a 32:25.406 --> 32:29.356 kind of universal rule, if they chose. 32:29.359 --> 32:32.489 He does not rule out this possibility. 32:32.490 --> 32:36.950 Perhaps it testifies to his view that there are different 32:36.953 --> 32:41.583 kinds of regimes that may be appropriate to different kinds 32:41.575 --> 32:44.295 of situations, to different situations. 32:44.299 --> 32:49.009 There is no one-size-fits-all model of political life, 32:49.008 --> 32:53.448 but good regimes may come in a variety of forms. 32:53.450 --> 32:57.570 There seems to be at least built in to Aristotle's account 32:57.567 --> 33:00.237 of politics, a certain flexibility, 33:00.240 --> 33:05.810 a certain latitude of discretion that in some passages 33:05.810 --> 33:10.750 even seems to border on a kind of relativism. 33:10.750 --> 33:14.080 But nevertheless, Aristotle understands that a 33:14.079 --> 33:18.369 person, this pambasileia, this person of superlative 33:18.370 --> 33:21.330 virtue is not really to be expected. 33:21.329 --> 33:26.179 Politics is really a matter of dealing with less than best 33:26.179 --> 33:31.279 circumstances which is perhaps one reason why Aristotle gives 33:31.284 --> 33:35.964 relatively little attention to the structure of the best 33:35.963 --> 33:37.963 regime. Such a regime, 33:37.956 --> 33:41.556 which I do want to talk about Wednesday is something to be 33:41.563 --> 33:44.193 wished for, but is not for practical 33:44.194 --> 33:48.634 purposes something to which he devotes a great deal of time. 33:48.630 --> 33:51.530 Most regimes, and for the most part, 33:51.532 --> 33:56.092 will be very imperfect mixtures of the few and the many, 33:56.093 --> 33:58.253 the rich and the poor. 33:58.250 --> 34:00.320 Most regimes, for the most part, 34:00.320 --> 34:04.130 most politics for the most part, will be struggles between 34:04.127 --> 34:07.197 what he calls oligarchies and democracies, 34:07.200 --> 34:12.560 rule by the rich oligarchies, ruled by the poor democracies. 34:12.559 --> 34:15.529 In that respect, Aristotle seems to add an 34:15.533 --> 34:19.383 economic or sociological category to the fundamentally 34:19.376 --> 34:22.346 political categories of few and many. 34:22.349 --> 34:25.999 The few are not simply defined quantitatively but they are 34:25.998 --> 34:28.748 defined, as it were, also sociologically. 34:28.750 --> 34:32.120 The rich, the poor, again defined as, 34:32.119 --> 34:36.049 the many and defined by him as the poor. 34:36.050 --> 34:40.730 It was not, you have to see when you read these passages, 34:40.730 --> 34:45.490 it was not Karl Marx but rather it was Aristotle who first 34:45.493 --> 34:49.843 identified the importance of what we would call class 34:49.839 --> 34:52.179 struggle, in politics. 34:52.179 --> 34:57.849 Every regime is in many ways a competition between classes. 34:57.849 --> 35:02.939 But where he differs from Marx, is not that he believes that 35:02.943 --> 35:07.523 the fundamental form of competition between classes is 35:07.519 --> 35:11.989 not just for resources, it is not a struggle over who 35:11.986 --> 35:15.666 controls what Marx calls the means of production, 35:15.670 --> 35:20.100 it is a struggle over positions of honor, of status and 35:20.101 --> 35:22.811 position, of positions of rule. 35:22.809 --> 35:25.879 Struggle is, in short, political struggle 35:25.878 --> 35:27.718 not economic struggle. 35:27.719 --> 35:29.709 Every regime, he believes, 35:29.710 --> 35:34.250 will be in some ways a site of contestation with competing 35:34.248 --> 35:37.668 claims to justice, with competing claims to 35:37.672 --> 35:40.322 political rule for who ought to rule. 35:40.320 --> 35:44.330 35:44.329 --> 35:48.609 There is, in other words, not only a partisanship between 35:48.612 --> 35:51.902 regimes, but partisanship within regimes, 35:51.900 --> 35:55.720 where citizens are activated, different groups of citizens, 35:55.724 --> 35:59.624 different classes of citizens are activated by rivalrous and 35:59.615 --> 36:03.105 competing understandings of justice and the good. 36:03.110 --> 36:05.430 The democratic faction, he tells us, 36:05.434 --> 36:08.564 believes because all are equal in some respects, 36:08.556 --> 36:11.276 they should be equal in all respects. 36:11.280 --> 36:13.020 The oligarchs, he tells us, 36:13.018 --> 36:15.888 because people are unequal in some respects, 36:15.894 --> 36:18.774 they should be unequal in all respects. 36:18.769 --> 36:23.669 For Aristotle the point and purpose of political science is 36:23.665 --> 36:26.615 to mediate the causes of faction, 36:26.619 --> 36:30.819 to help causes of faction that lead to revolution and civil 36:30.824 --> 36:33.094 war. Aristotle's statesman, 36:33.088 --> 36:36.828 Aristotle's statecraft, his political science, 36:36.828 --> 36:39.818 is a form of political mediation, 36:39.820 --> 36:44.340 how to bring peace to conflict ridden situations. 36:44.340 --> 36:48.580 It is always surprising to me that many people think that 36:48.576 --> 36:53.116 Aristotle ignored or has no real theory of political conflict 36:53.115 --> 36:57.725 when it seems to me conflict is built in to the very structure 36:57.729 --> 37:00.679 of his understanding of a regime. 37:00.679 --> 37:04.259 And again, not just conflict between rival regimes but 37:04.255 --> 37:08.295 conflict built into the nature of what we would call domestic 37:08.303 --> 37:11.513 politics, different classes contending 37:11.514 --> 37:15.854 with different conceptions of justice and how can the 37:15.851 --> 37:21.631 political scientist bring peace, bring moderation to these 37:21.632 --> 37:25.642 deeply conflict ridden situations? 37:25.640 --> 37:30.080 37:30.079 --> 37:32.839 Aristotle proposes--how does he propose to do this? 37:32.840 --> 37:36.970 He proposes a couple of remedies to offset the 37:36.965 --> 37:42.095 potentially warlike struggle between various factions. 37:42.099 --> 37:45.669 And the most important of these remedies is the rule of law. 37:45.670 --> 37:52.270 37:52.269 --> 37:55.589 "Law insures," he says, "the equal treatment of all 37:55.586 --> 37:59.566 citizens and prevents arbitrary rule at the hands of the one, 37:59.565 --> 38:01.285 the few, or the many." 38:01.289 --> 38:06.859 Law establishes what he says is a kind of impartiality for law, 38:06.856 --> 38:09.276 he says, is impartiality. 38:09.280 --> 38:13.880 "One who asks the law to rule," he says, in Book III, 38:13.878 --> 38:18.828 chapter 16, "is held to be asking God and intellect alone 38:18.830 --> 38:23.340 to rule while one who asks man, asks the beast. 38:23.340 --> 38:27.530 Desire is a thing of this sort, and spiritedness," he writes 38:27.526 --> 38:31.576 again, "thumos, spiritedness perverts rulers 38:31.582 --> 38:35.532 and the best men, hence law is intellect without 38:35.531 --> 38:38.441 appetite. Even the best men," he says, 38:38.442 --> 38:40.822 "can be perverted by spiritedness. 38:40.820 --> 38:47.660 Law is the best hedge we have against the domination of 38:47.662 --> 38:50.832 partiality and desire." 38:50.829 --> 38:52.649 But this is not the end of the story. 38:52.650 --> 38:55.680 In fact, it is only the beginning. 38:55.679 --> 38:59.479 Aristotle raises the question, a very important question, 38:59.484 --> 39:03.494 whether the rule of law is to be referred to the rule of the 39:03.492 --> 39:05.532 best, the best individual. 39:05.530 --> 39:09.420 Typically again, he seems to answer the question 39:09.417 --> 39:14.127 from two different points of view, giving each perspective 39:14.132 --> 39:16.202 its due, its justice. 39:16.199 --> 39:20.269 He begins in many ways by appearing to defend Plato's view 39:20.266 --> 39:23.116 about the rule of the best individual. 39:23.119 --> 39:28.939 "The best regime," he says, "is not one based on written 39:28.939 --> 39:31.509 law." Law, and his reason seems to be 39:31.508 --> 39:34.038 something like this, law is at best a clumsy 39:34.044 --> 39:37.774 instrument, a clumsy tool because laws only 39:37.769 --> 39:43.009 deal with general matters and cannot deal with particular 39:43.008 --> 39:45.158 concrete situations. 39:45.159 --> 39:48.349 Furthermore, law seems to bind the hands of 39:48.348 --> 39:52.978 the statesmen and legislators who always have to be responding 39:52.979 --> 39:56.699 to new and unforeseen circumstances and yet at the 39:56.699 --> 40:00.419 same time Aristotle makes the case for law. 40:00.420 --> 40:04.460 The judgment of an individual, no matter how wise, 40:04.460 --> 40:09.160 is more corruptible whether due to passion or interest, 40:09.159 --> 40:14.779 or simply the fallibility of human reason than is law. 40:14.780 --> 40:19.040 He notes, as a practical matter, no one individual can 40:19.041 --> 40:20.731 oversee all things. 40:20.730 --> 40:25.780 40:25.780 --> 40:29.700 Only a third party, in this case law, 40:29.699 --> 40:33.509 is capable of judging adequately. 40:33.510 --> 40:37.580 Again, he seems to give reasons and good reasons for both cases. 40:37.579 --> 40:41.509 So he, but he moves to question, should law be changed? 40:41.510 --> 40:42.780 Is law changeable? 40:42.780 --> 40:45.450 If so, how? And once again, 40:45.452 --> 40:48.272 he puts forward different arguments; 40:48.269 --> 40:52.639 in Book II, chapter 8, he compares law to other arts 40:52.642 --> 40:57.622 and sciences and suggests why sciences such as medicine and 40:57.615 --> 41:01.545 has exhibited progress, this should be true for law. 41:01.550 --> 41:07.650 The antiquity of a law alone is no justification for its usage. 41:07.650 --> 41:11.270 Aristotle seems to reject, you might say, 41:11.273 --> 41:15.263 Burkean conservatism long before the time. 41:15.260 --> 41:18.660 Antiquity or tradition alone is no justification, 41:18.658 --> 41:22.688 yet at the same time he seems to recognize that changes in 41:22.693 --> 41:24.923 law, even when the result is 41:24.915 --> 41:26.925 improvement, are dangerous. 41:26.929 --> 41:32.069 He writes, "It is a bad thing to habituate people to reckless 41:32.066 --> 41:33.946 dissolution of laws. 41:33.949 --> 41:38.249 The city will not be benefited as much from changing law as it 41:38.249 --> 41:41.979 will be harmed through being habituated to disobey the 41:41.984 --> 41:44.784 rulers." In other words he's saying, 41:44.776 --> 41:48.306 lawfulness, like every other virtue, is a habit, 41:48.309 --> 41:52.699 it is a habit of behavior, and the habit of destroying, 41:52.700 --> 41:57.250 disobeying even an unjust law will make people altogether 41:57.254 --> 41:58.234 lawless. 41:58.230 --> 42:02.760 42:02.760 --> 42:07.040 This emphasis upon law is a constraint on human behavior. 42:07.039 --> 42:10.959 In many ways seems to introduce a strong element of 42:10.957 --> 42:14.167 conventionalism in Aristotle's thought. 42:14.170 --> 42:17.430 This is the view that justice is determined by laws, 42:17.430 --> 42:21.140 by customs, by traditions, that it is conventions, 42:21.139 --> 42:25.309 nomos in the broadest sense of the term that 42:25.310 --> 42:27.230 constitutes justice. 42:27.230 --> 42:29.970 As I indicated, there's also seems to be a 42:29.965 --> 42:33.565 certain degree of relativism associated with this since 42:33.567 --> 42:36.567 conventions vary from society to society. 42:36.570 --> 42:39.710 The standards of justice will seem to, again, 42:39.707 --> 42:43.907 be regime dependent and this seems to be entirely consistent 42:43.914 --> 42:46.984 with parts of Aristotle's anthropology. 42:46.980 --> 42:50.580 After all, if we are political animals by nature, 42:50.579 --> 42:54.929 then the standards of justice must derive from politics, 42:54.929 --> 43:00.309 a right that transcends society cannot be a right natural to 43:00.312 --> 43:00.862 man. 43:00.860 --> 43:07.570 43:07.570 --> 43:12.650 Yet Aristotle's conception of our political nature seems to 43:12.652 --> 43:17.652 require standards of justice that are natural or right for 43:17.646 --> 43:20.816 us. Rule of law presupposes that 43:20.818 --> 43:25.478 there is a form of justice or right natural to us. 43:25.480 --> 43:29.500 But what is the Aristotelian standard of natural right or 43:29.498 --> 43:30.788 natural justice? 43:30.790 --> 43:34.080 43:34.079 --> 43:36.879 Aristotle makes a surprising assertion; 43:36.880 --> 43:39.470 unfortunately, it's an assertion in a book 43:39.472 --> 43:40.802 you're not reading. 43:40.800 --> 43:45.230 A book, the Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 43:45.229 --> 43:50.879 chapter 7, he says there that, " all natural right is mutable 43:50.884 --> 43:54.064 or changeable, all standards of natural 43:54.056 --> 43:56.306 justice are changeable." 43:56.309 --> 44:00.369 And by this he means that natural right is revealed not in 44:00.368 --> 44:03.428 general propositions or universal maxims, 44:03.429 --> 44:06.919 as for example, Immanuel Kant would argue later 44:06.924 --> 44:11.034 on, but in the concrete decisions of a community or its 44:11.025 --> 44:14.135 leaders about what is right or wrong. 44:14.139 --> 44:18.099 Natural right is mutable because different circumstances 44:18.101 --> 44:21.271 will require different kinds of decisions. 44:21.269 --> 44:25.709 So does this mean then that for Aristotle there are no 44:25.710 --> 44:29.900 universally valid standards of justice or right? 44:29.900 --> 44:33.130 That all that ends in circumstances that justice, 44:33.127 --> 44:36.957 like the good citizen is, as it were, regime dependent? 44:36.960 --> 44:40.720 Is this not to fall into the boundless field of 44:40.718 --> 44:45.538 Machiavelianism that declares right and wrong to be entirely 44:45.540 --> 44:49.150 relative to circumstance, context dependent, 44:49.152 --> 44:51.502 is that what Aristotle is saying? 44:51.500 --> 44:55.660 Not at all. Aristotle emphasizes the 44:55.657 --> 45:00.067 mutable character of natural right in part to preserve the 45:00.068 --> 45:04.788 latitude, the freedom of action required by the statesmen. 45:04.789 --> 45:09.679 Every statesman must confront new and sometimes extreme 45:09.683 --> 45:14.123 situations that require inventiveness and creative 45:14.123 --> 45:16.793 action. And in such situations where 45:16.789 --> 45:19.889 the very survival of the community may be at stake, 45:19.889 --> 45:24.879 we might call these emergency situations, the conscientious 45:24.879 --> 45:29.179 statesmen must be able to respond appropriately. 45:29.179 --> 45:33.129 Nine-eleven for example, a moral law that refused to 45:33.134 --> 45:37.944 allow the statesmen to protect the community in times of crisis 45:37.942 --> 45:41.512 would not be a principle of natural right, 45:41.510 --> 45:44.160 it would be a suicide note. 45:44.160 --> 45:48.050 45:48.050 --> 45:51.120 To a considerable degree Aristotle, Aristotelian 45:51.120 --> 45:54.260 standards of natural right reside in the specific 45:54.255 --> 45:57.835 decisions, the concrete decisions of the 45:57.839 --> 46:01.299 ablest states; these cannot be determined in 46:01.301 --> 46:05.321 advance but must be allowed to emerge in response to new, 46:05.321 --> 46:08.911 and again, different and unforeseen situations. 46:08.909 --> 46:12.319 What is naturally right, what is right by nature in 46:12.324 --> 46:16.494 peace time, will not be the same as what is naturally right or 46:16.491 --> 46:18.951 right by nature in times of war. 46:18.950 --> 46:21.960 46:21.960 --> 46:24.680 What is right in normal situations will not be the same 46:24.682 --> 46:26.802 as what is right in states of emergency. 46:26.800 --> 46:30.190 The statesmen in the Aristotelian sense is the one 46:30.189 --> 46:34.339 who seeks to return as quickly and efficiently as possible to 46:34.340 --> 46:36.070 the normal situation. 46:36.070 --> 46:40.000 This is what distinguishes Aristotle from Machiavelli, 46:40.000 --> 46:44.150 and all those later thinkers who take their bearings from 46:44.153 --> 46:47.483 Machiavelli. I'm thinking of thinkers like 46:47.478 --> 46:51.608 Hobbes, like Carl Schmitt, and Max Weber in the twentieth 46:51.608 --> 46:54.198 century. All of these thinkers take 46:54.199 --> 46:58.369 their bearings from the extreme situation, situations of civil 46:58.373 --> 47:01.593 war, of social collapse, of national crisis. 47:01.590 --> 47:06.080 47:06.079 --> 47:10.089 The Aristotelian statesman will not be unduly affected by the 47:10.085 --> 47:12.885 occasional need to depart from the norm, 47:12.889 --> 47:16.029 whether this means this is spent in the case, 47:16.025 --> 47:19.515 to take an American case, the suspension of habeas 47:19.516 --> 47:23.086 Corpus, as Abraham Lincoln did in the, 47:23.093 --> 47:27.473 during the Civil War, or the regrettable need to 47:27.470 --> 47:30.450 engage in domestic espionage. 47:30.449 --> 47:34.559 But in any case, the Aristotelian statesman's 47:34.562 --> 47:40.082 goal will be restoration of the conditions of constitutional 47:40.076 --> 47:45.776 government and rule of law as quickly and again as efficiently 47:45.777 --> 47:49.717 as possible. On that grim note, 47:49.718 --> 47:56.998 I think I'll let you go and we will conclude Aristotle next 47:56.996 --> 47:57.996 time.