WEBVTT 00:00.880 --> 00:04.650 PROFESSOR: So the topic of today's lecture, as you can 00:04.650 --> 00:08.000 see from the title, is liberty. 00:08.000 --> 00:12.530 And the best way to get a sense of the project in which 00:12.530 --> 00:17.010 we will find ourselves engaged today is to contrast the 00:17.010 --> 00:22.330 opening pages of Rawls' Theory of Justice with the opening 00:22.330 --> 00:26.830 pages of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 00:26.830 --> 00:32.170 So you'll recall that when we were reading the Rawls-- 00:32.170 --> 00:36.580 for some reason the remote is not working, that's a pity but 00:36.580 --> 00:37.430 there we go-- 00:37.430 --> 00:41.510 you'll recall that when we were reading the Rawls, Rawls 00:41.510 --> 00:47.720 began his text by speaking of justice as the first virtue of 00:47.720 --> 00:49.300 social institutions. 00:49.300 --> 00:53.120 It plays the role with regard to the legitimacy of an 00:53.120 --> 00:57.500 institution that truth plays with regard to the legitimacy 00:57.500 --> 00:59.670 of a system of thought. 00:59.670 --> 01:04.420 Each person, says Rawls, "possesses an inviolability 01:04.420 --> 01:07.960 founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a 01:07.960 --> 01:12.640 whole cannot override." For this reason, says Rawls 01:12.640 --> 01:16.530 famously in these opening pages, "justice denies that 01:16.530 --> 01:21.930 the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater 01:21.930 --> 01:24.340 good shared by others" 01:24.340 --> 01:31.270 So Rawls is concerned with and inviolability of humanity 01:31.270 --> 01:36.240 based on a notion of justice. 01:36.240 --> 01:42.650 Nozick is also concerned with a kind of inviolability. 01:42.650 --> 01:47.200 But rather than seeing the core of that inviolability as 01:47.200 --> 01:53.850 lying in some notion of justice he sees it as lying in 01:53.850 --> 01:56.210 a notion of rights. 01:56.210 --> 02:00.270 So he says in the opening of the preface, the first 02:00.270 --> 02:02.350 sentence which you read for today. 02:02.350 --> 02:05.950 "Individuals have rights and there are things that no 02:05.950 --> 02:12.080 person or group may do to them without violating those 02:12.080 --> 02:18.280 rights." And he goes on to say that "the minimal state 02:18.280 --> 02:21.340 limited to the narrow functions of protection 02:21.340 --> 02:26.050 against force, theft, fraud, the enforcement of contracts 02:26.050 --> 02:28.570 and so on is the most extensive 02:28.570 --> 02:30.480 state that can be justified. 02:30.480 --> 02:35.740 Any state more extensive than the minimal state violates 02:35.740 --> 02:37.810 people's rights." 02:37.810 --> 02:40.640 So there's something extraordinarily interesting 02:40.640 --> 02:44.530 going on in this pair of works. 02:44.530 --> 02:48.630 Both of them are concerned with the fundamental question 02:48.630 --> 02:53.060 which we first encountered in the context of Hobbes: how 02:53.060 --> 02:58.060 could it be that it's legitimate to have a state? 02:58.060 --> 03:02.860 Both of them are concerned with structuring the state in 03:02.860 --> 03:07.500 such a way that it doesn't violate that which is 03:07.500 --> 03:12.890 perceived as being on their picture as inviolable. 03:12.890 --> 03:18.820 But they differ profoundly in what sort of state they end up 03:18.820 --> 03:21.030 calling legitimate. 03:21.030 --> 03:25.660 Perhaps because at the core of Rawls's picture lies the 03:25.660 --> 03:30.370 notion of justice, whereas at the core of Nozick's picture 03:30.370 --> 03:33.700 lies the notion of rights. 03:33.700 --> 03:38.940 So what I want to do in today's lecture is to contrast 03:38.940 --> 03:43.650 some of the themes, which we encountered last lecture in 03:43.650 --> 03:49.160 the context of Rawls' Theory of Justice by looking at a 03:49.160 --> 03:55.810 particular famous chapter of his colleague Robert Nozick's 03:55.810 --> 03:57.060 work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 04:00.130 --> 04:04.230 Even from the brief selections that you read from these two 04:04.230 --> 04:08.590 works, the differences between them should have 04:08.590 --> 04:10.890 been evident to you. 04:10.890 --> 04:14.430 They were written a mere three years apart. 04:14.430 --> 04:18.210 Rawls' Theory of Justice was published in 1971. 04:18.210 --> 04:20.430 Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia three 04:20.430 --> 04:23.770 years later in 1974. 04:23.770 --> 04:28.240 Rawls and Nozick at the time had offices down the hall from 04:28.240 --> 04:29.790 one another. 04:29.790 --> 04:37.030 But Rawls' work, as you will feel, is part of a major 04:37.030 --> 04:39.130 philosophical project. 04:39.130 --> 04:41.680 It's extraordinarily self reflective. 04:41.680 --> 04:46.050 Rawls is in his middle age when he writes it. 04:46.050 --> 04:51.360 And he's been thinking about these questions for decades. 04:51.360 --> 04:55.950 Nozick's book is an extraordinarily insightful 04:55.950 --> 05:00.890 response to Rawls, as well as being a positive 05:00.890 --> 05:03.650 formulation of a view. 05:03.650 --> 05:09.050 But it's not a work with the gravitas of Theory of Justice. 05:09.050 --> 05:11.910 It was written when Nozick was quite young. 05:11.910 --> 05:13.980 He was in his early 30s. 05:13.980 --> 05:17.520 And it's important to know that although these works are 05:17.520 --> 05:21.130 typically paired in philosophy courses-- (If you took-- or 05:21.125 --> 05:21.825 are taking-- 05:21.830 --> 05:25.290 Moral Foundations of Politics or an introductory political 05:25.290 --> 05:28.930 theory course, you will get these two books paired 05:28.930 --> 05:30.170 together.),-- 05:30.170 --> 05:35.890 Theory of Justice is, if you look at its citation index, 05:35.890 --> 05:39.940 more than three times more influential, if that's the 05:39.940 --> 05:42.940 measure, than Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 05:42.940 --> 05:47.030 So Theory of Justice Google Scholar citation is roughly 05:47.030 --> 05:52.610 30,000 whereas Anarchy, State, and Utopia is roughly 10,000. 05:52.610 --> 05:55.540 These are extraordinarily high numbers in philosophy. 05:55.540 --> 05:57.910 Those of you who have encountered works in other 05:57.910 --> 06:00.560 domains of philosophy, for example Kripke's Naming and 06:00.560 --> 06:03.760 Necessity, written at about this time, its citation 06:03.760 --> 06:07.500 numbers are about half that of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 06:07.500 --> 06:09.260 about 5,000. 06:09.260 --> 06:14.290 So what I want you to take home from this is the idea 06:14.290 --> 06:18.920 that these are enormously influential works with 06:18.920 --> 06:24.060 consequences far beyond academic philosophy, but that 06:24.060 --> 06:28.060 they differ in their tone. 06:28.060 --> 06:33.130 So Anarchy, State, and Utopia is an attempt to defend the 06:33.130 --> 06:38.690 minimal state from two different kinds of objections. 06:38.690 --> 06:45.330 In the first part of the work, Nozick defends the state 06:45.330 --> 06:48.590 against the position of anarchy. 06:48.590 --> 06:53.950 He argues that a minimal state is justified, that it's not 06:53.950 --> 06:58.590 the case that it's a violation of people's rights to have 06:58.590 --> 07:03.310 basic enforcement of laws, police and the sort of 07:03.310 --> 07:06.900 fundamental things that are required for the basic 07:06.900 --> 07:11.030 stability of getting out of Hobbes's state of nature. 07:11.030 --> 07:15.640 The second part of the book, with which our reading was 07:15.640 --> 07:20.380 concerned, defends the minimal state against a more 07:20.380 --> 07:22.530 maximalist picture. 07:22.530 --> 07:28.260 And in that part of the book, Nozick defends the rights of 07:28.260 --> 07:33.040 people to liberty in two kinds of domains. 07:33.040 --> 07:37.690 The first is that he defends people's rights to enter into 07:37.690 --> 07:41.820 almost any sort of contract that they would like. 07:41.820 --> 07:46.270 He defends, for example, the right of people under certain 07:46.270 --> 07:50.930 conditions to contract themselves into slavery. 07:50.930 --> 07:54.310 He defends, in other contexts, the right to have an 07:54.310 --> 07:58.310 enforceable blackmail contract. 07:58.310 --> 08:01.370 That's not the part of the book which we 08:01.370 --> 08:03.500 read excerpts from. 08:03.500 --> 08:06.440 The part of the book that we read excerpts from, and to 08:06.440 --> 08:10.780 which the remainder of lecture will be devoted, is Nozick's 08:10.780 --> 08:16.230 discussion of our relation to property. 08:16.230 --> 08:21.860 So what Nozick tries to do in the famous seventh chapter of 08:21.860 --> 08:27.590 Anarchy, State, and Utopia is to articulate a notion of 08:27.590 --> 08:30.020 justice in holdings-- 08:30.020 --> 08:34.510 that is, justice with respect to property-- 08:34.510 --> 08:39.660 that provides a principled explanation of the relation 08:39.660 --> 08:44.750 among the three different kinds of concerns that one has 08:44.752 --> 08:48.662 in asking about whether it's legitimate for a person to own 08:48.660 --> 08:50.480 a piece of property. 08:50.480 --> 08:55.930 The first is the question of justice in acquisition. 08:55.930 --> 08:57.680 Under what conditions-- 08:57.680 --> 09:00.300 when I initially come to acquire 09:00.300 --> 09:03.560 something, say a tomato-- 09:03.560 --> 09:09.380 is my acquisition of it such that my ownership of the 09:09.380 --> 09:14.770 object is in keeping with the conditions of justice? 09:14.770 --> 09:17.650 And we'll talk about Nozick's views on justice in 09:17.650 --> 09:19.660 acquisition in a minute. 09:19.660 --> 09:22.720 The second question that Nozick is concerned with here 09:22.720 --> 09:27.860 is the question of justice in transfer. 09:27.860 --> 09:33.290 So he's concerned with the question, if I have an object 09:33.290 --> 09:36.980 and I wish to transfer possession of that object to 09:36.980 --> 09:42.670 you, under what conditions is that transfer 09:42.670 --> 09:45.460 justice-preserving? 09:45.460 --> 09:50.240 And finally, Nozick is concerned with the question of 09:50.240 --> 09:53.290 rectification of injustice. 09:53.290 --> 09:58.850 So suppose I own something which you illegitimately take 09:58.850 --> 10:05.740 from me, under what conditions and how do I reclaim 10:05.740 --> 10:09.790 possession of that object? 10:09.790 --> 10:17.530 Nozick's argument is that we can say everything that needs 10:17.530 --> 10:21.460 to be said about justice in holdings -- 10:21.460 --> 10:25.040 everything that needs to be said about the distribution of 10:25.040 --> 10:28.160 property in a society that doesn't violate 10:28.160 --> 10:29.560 people's rights -- 10:29.560 --> 10:34.150 by appeal to an inductive definition 10:34.150 --> 10:37.150 that runs as follows. 10:37.150 --> 10:41.220 He says, "If a person acquires a holding in keeping with the 10:41.220 --> 10:45.690 principle of justice in acquisition, the person, p, is 10:45.690 --> 10:50.020 entitled to the holding." So, if I come to own something in 10:50.020 --> 10:56.730 a way that is legitimate, rule-following, my owning of 10:56.730 --> 11:03.120 that object is in keeping with the rules of justice. 11:03.120 --> 11:06.940 The second clause is an induction clause. 11:06.940 --> 11:11.300 "If a person acquires a holding, in keeping with the 11:11.300 --> 11:14.780 principle of justice in transfer, from somebody who 11:14.780 --> 11:17.190 was entitled-- 11:17.190 --> 11:20.160 either as a result of a transfer or as the result of 11:20.160 --> 11:21.520 an initial acquisition-- 11:21.522 --> 11:27.972 to hold that object, then the person is entitled to hold 11:27.970 --> 11:29.920 that object." 11:29.920 --> 11:35.120 And finally, Nozick has a closure clause. 11:35.120 --> 11:39.670 "No one is entitled to a holding except by repeated 11:39.670 --> 11:43.580 applications of one and two." 11:43.580 --> 11:47.560 Now those of you who have taken mathematics are familiar 11:47.560 --> 11:50.420 with this sort of definition. 11:50.422 --> 11:53.962 If I wanted to provide an inductive definition of the 11:53.960 --> 12:00.000 natural numbers, I might begin by saying "one is a member the 12:00.000 --> 12:06.170 set of natural numbers." That's my base clause. 12:06.170 --> 12:12.140 I then add, "if anything is a member of the set of natural 12:12.140 --> 12:19.760 numbers, then that plus one is a member of the set of natural 12:19.760 --> 12:25.770 numbers." And then I put in place some sort of closure 12:25.770 --> 12:29.120 condition such that "the natural numbers," for example, 12:29.120 --> 12:32.240 "are all and only those things that satisfy the first and 12:32.240 --> 12:33.990 second clause." 12:33.990 --> 12:39.030 So the picture that Nozick is providing us with here is one 12:39.030 --> 12:43.990 that gives us a certain kind of closed system. 12:43.990 --> 12:49.070 So let's see how it works in a particular case. 12:49.070 --> 12:54.750 Nozick stresses that when you make use of the principles 12:54.750 --> 13:00.910 that he's articulated here, what matters is the process 13:00.910 --> 13:03.230 not the outcome. 13:03.230 --> 13:09.810 So suppose I come to possess a tomato. 13:09.810 --> 13:15.730 It makes all the difference in the world, on Nozick's view 13:15.730 --> 13:19.640 what the actual process by which I came to 13:19.640 --> 13:22.070 possess that object is. 13:22.070 --> 13:26.100 If, for example, there was a garden down the road from me, 13:26.100 --> 13:31.500 which I didn't own, where a beautiful tomato sat, and I 13:31.500 --> 13:38.510 took that tomato without permission, my possession of 13:38.510 --> 13:40.750 that tomato is illegitimate. 13:45.040 --> 13:47.770 Hmm. 13:47.770 --> 13:50.360 Even if there is an alternative process-- 13:50.360 --> 13:52.610 a hypothetical one-- 13:52.610 --> 13:56.590 which I didn't in fact engage in whereby I could have come 13:56.590 --> 14:00.370 to have that tomato legitimately. 14:00.370 --> 14:03.900 If a thief takes your property, says Nozick, it 14:03.900 --> 14:07.720 doesn't make his possession of your property legitimate even 14:07.720 --> 14:12.460 if you could have voluntarily given it to him. 14:12.460 --> 14:16.980 Moreover, says Nozick, if I come to possess something 14:16.980 --> 14:21.140 illegitimately and I transfer it to you-- 14:21.140 --> 14:23.350 even by legitimate means-- 14:23.353 --> 14:29.183 it retains its illegitimate status. 14:29.180 --> 14:33.750 So the picture that Nozick is presenting in his discussion 14:33.752 --> 14:40.552 of holdings is one with the following characteristics. 14:40.550 --> 14:42.840 Justice in holdings-- 14:42.840 --> 14:47.150 and this will be important for his critique of Rawls-- 14:47.150 --> 14:50.890 justice in holdings is historical. 14:50.890 --> 14:55.830 It depends on what actually happened. 14:55.830 --> 15:00.850 In particular, if something is owned as result of an unjust 15:00.850 --> 15:06.010 acquisition, it produces an unjust holding. 15:06.010 --> 15:09.270 If something is owned as a result of an unjust 15:09.270 --> 15:14.090 acquisition plus a just transfer, it still produces an 15:14.090 --> 15:16.210 unjust holding. 15:16.210 --> 15:19.580 If something is owned as the results of a just acquisition 15:19.580 --> 15:24.590 and an unjust transfer, it produces an unjust holding. 15:24.590 --> 15:27.560 And if something is owned as a result of an unjust 15:27.560 --> 15:30.110 acquisition and an unjust transfer, it's not that these 15:30.110 --> 15:33.090 two injustices cancel one another out. 15:33.090 --> 15:37.630 Rather we have, again, an unjust holding. 15:37.630 --> 15:42.230 It's under two conditions that holdings are 15:42.230 --> 15:44.690 just on Nozick's picture. 15:44.690 --> 15:47.830 The first is if it's a straightforward just 15:47.830 --> 15:49.430 acquisition. 15:49.430 --> 15:54.100 And the second is if there's a just acquisition followed by 15:54.100 --> 15:57.760 one or more just transfers. 15:57.764 --> 16:04.264 So far this isn't getting Nozick very far in terms of a 16:04.260 --> 16:06.400 critique of Rawls. 16:06.400 --> 16:12.850 But the next step will allow you to see how this notion of 16:12.850 --> 16:19.680 justice in property does work on the Nozick picture. 16:19.680 --> 16:25.890 What Nozick goes on to say is that the holdings of a person 16:25.890 --> 16:29.730 are just if he's entitled to them by the principles of 16:29.730 --> 16:34.550 justice in acquisition and transfer or in imperfect 16:34.550 --> 16:37.240 situations by the principle of rectification. 16:37.240 --> 16:41.020 That is, it is a necessary condition on justice in 16:41.020 --> 16:44.600 holding that they have been acquired through one 16:44.599 --> 16:47.259 of these two steps. 16:47.260 --> 16:53.660 But it is also a sufficient condition. 16:53.660 --> 17:01.400 If each person's holdings are just then there are no more 17:01.400 --> 17:07.880 questions to be asked about the aggregation of holdings. 17:07.880 --> 17:13.590 If each person's holdings are just, then the distribution of 17:13.590 --> 17:16.940 holdings is just. 17:16.940 --> 17:23.360 So we'll see when we get to justice in transfer how it is 17:23.360 --> 17:30.030 that this notion, both of taking historical properties 17:30.030 --> 17:33.630 as the relevant ones in determining justice and in 17:33.630 --> 17:38.440 taking the inductive property holding characterization as 17:38.440 --> 17:43.360 necessary and sufficient for justice in holdings, how it is 17:43.360 --> 17:47.880 that those pair of things provides Nozick with the 17:47.880 --> 17:52.970 leverage to criticize the outlook to which all of you 17:52.970 --> 17:56.290 from behind the veil of ignorance last class-- or the 17:56.290 --> 17:58.200 majority of you from behind the veil of 17:58.200 --> 17:59.510 ignorance last class-- 17:59.510 --> 18:03.190 seems to think was what justice mandated. 18:03.190 --> 18:08.550 That is, Nozick takes from this very simple picture an 18:08.550 --> 18:13.660 argument, which from his perspective renders 18:13.660 --> 18:18.110 illegitimate any sort of centralized 18:18.110 --> 18:22.050 redistribution of resources. 18:22.050 --> 18:28.190 So you remember, in order to evaluate Nozick's inductive 18:28.190 --> 18:32.390 definition that we need to know what it is that he thinks 18:32.390 --> 18:35.090 justice in acquisition involves. 18:35.085 --> 18:41.235 And what it is that he thinks justice in transfer involves. 18:41.240 --> 18:46.760 So the discussion of justice in acquisition is a rather 18:46.760 --> 18:51.270 complicated portion of the text that I had you read for 18:51.270 --> 18:53.630 today's class. 18:53.630 --> 19:01.390 What Nozick does is to make appeal to the work of the 17th 19:01.390 --> 19:08.620 century philosopher John Locke, whose Second Treatise 19:08.620 --> 19:14.350 on Government begins its discussion 19:14.350 --> 19:18.210 of property as follows. 19:18.210 --> 19:23.370 Locke writes, "Though the Earth and all inferior 19:23.370 --> 19:28.120 creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 19:28.120 --> 19:31.490 property in his own person. 19:31.490 --> 19:35.450 This nobody has any right to but himself. 19:35.450 --> 19:40.000 The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say 19:40.000 --> 19:42.640 are properly his." 19:42.640 --> 19:45.960 So on Locke's picture of the state of nature there's a 19:45.960 --> 19:50.370 world out there unowned. 19:50.370 --> 19:53.730 We're setting aside a set of concerns about 19:53.730 --> 19:55.540 whether this picture-- 19:55.540 --> 19:59.460 that the Earth and all inferior creatures belong in 19:59.460 --> 20:03.170 any principled sense to human beings-- and rather looking at 20:03.170 --> 20:07.620 what it is that Locke's argument for the justice in 20:07.620 --> 20:09.530 acquisition clause involves. 20:09.530 --> 20:13.370 So Locke says, the world out there of objects doesn't 20:13.370 --> 20:14.830 belong to anybody. 20:14.830 --> 20:19.960 But what each person does have is the rights to his or her 20:19.960 --> 20:25.670 own body and, in particular, possession, ownership rights 20:25.670 --> 20:27.700 over his labor. 20:27.700 --> 20:34.500 So, says Locke, "Whatsoever he removes out of the state that 20:34.500 --> 20:39.520 nature hath provided and left in it he hath mixed his labor 20:39.520 --> 20:44.180 with and joined it to something that is his own and 20:44.180 --> 20:50.050 thereby makes it his property." Concluding, "It 20:50.050 --> 20:54.070 being by him removed from the common state nature placed it 20:54.070 --> 20:58.680 in, it hath by this labor something annexed to it that 20:58.680 --> 21:02.120 excludes the common right of other men. 21:02.120 --> 21:05.400 For this labor being the unquestionable property of the 21:05.400 --> 21:13.290 laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is 21:13.290 --> 21:17.870 once joined to, at least when there is enough, and as good, 21:17.870 --> 21:21.460 left in common for others." 21:21.460 --> 21:24.420 So Nozick takes from this discussion 21:24.420 --> 21:27.720 of Locke two things. 21:27.720 --> 21:32.540 The first thing he takes is the idea that what justice in 21:32.540 --> 21:38.770 acquisition involves is a certain kind of mixing of what 21:38.770 --> 21:43.880 is one's own, one's labor, with something that is 21:43.880 --> 21:45.130 previously unowned -- 21:47.870 --> 21:51.910 potential property in the state of nature. 21:51.910 --> 21:58.120 And although Nozick has all sorts of criticisms about the 21:58.120 --> 22:00.730 unclarity of this characterization. 22:00.730 --> 22:04.680 He says, for example, "If I go to Mars and sweep off a 22:04.680 --> 22:07.070 portion of the planet, have I thereby 22:07.070 --> 22:09.290 claimed just that portion? 22:09.290 --> 22:13.010 Have I claimed the entire planet of Mars? 22:13.010 --> 22:17.910 Have I claimed all of the planets that lie beyond it?" 22:17.906 --> 22:21.456 He also asks why it is that mixing one's labor with 22:21.460 --> 22:25.030 something should lead to possession of the object 22:25.030 --> 22:28.190 rather than the losing of one's labor. 22:28.190 --> 22:32.950 But ultimately he's willing to accept that something like the 22:32.950 --> 22:37.030 Lockean picture is going to underlie justice in 22:37.030 --> 22:38.710 acquisition. 22:38.710 --> 22:43.390 What worries him, and what he devotes the bulk of the 22:43.390 --> 22:49.190 selection that you read for last night to, is this concern 22:49.190 --> 22:55.510 about whether what he calls the Lockean Proviso, the idea 22:55.510 --> 23:00.470 that in order for acquisition to be legitimate there needs 23:00.470 --> 23:06.440 to be enough and as good left in common for others. 23:06.440 --> 23:12.130 Whether Proviso is frequently violated. 23:12.130 --> 23:16.520 Because if that Proviso were frequently violated then 23:16.520 --> 23:20.650 justice in acquisitions wouldn't be simple and 23:20.650 --> 23:24.870 straightforward in the way that Nozick wants it to be. 23:24.870 --> 23:28.840 So the basic structure of the argument that you read-- 23:28.840 --> 23:31.260 and I'll run through it in more detail in a minute-- 23:31.260 --> 23:33.550 the basic structure of the argument that you read in the 23:33.550 --> 23:39.330 context of Nozick's discussion of Locke runs as follows. 23:39.330 --> 23:42.710 Locke has a reasonable picture of what acquisition of 23:42.710 --> 23:44.370 property involves. 23:44.370 --> 23:48.010 We need to fuss with it around the edges but I'm not going to 23:48.010 --> 23:50.290 worry about that, says Nozick. 23:50.290 --> 23:54.610 What I am going to worry about is whether this notion of 23:54.610 --> 23:57.900 there being "enough and as good left in common for 23:57.900 --> 24:02.840 others" is going to undercut the whole Lockean picture. 24:02.840 --> 24:05.790 So what's the idea look like? 24:05.790 --> 24:12.300 Suppose that four of us come upon a field of previously 24:12.300 --> 24:14.910 unclaimed cows. 24:14.910 --> 24:24.180 And that one of us claims four of the cows. 24:24.180 --> 24:28.370 And then a second of us claims six of the cows and a third of 24:28.370 --> 24:32.110 us claims the remaining six cows. 24:32.110 --> 24:38.440 Has the Lockean Proviso been violated? 24:38.440 --> 24:44.380 Nozick's first worry, which he calls the unzipping worry, is 24:44.380 --> 24:49.190 that perhaps it's not just the blue character who took the 24:49.190 --> 24:52.740 last six cows who's violated the Lockean Proviso. 24:52.740 --> 24:56.540 Perhaps the yellow character, in limiting the blue 24:56.540 --> 25:00.670 character, has violated it and the red character, in limiting 25:00.670 --> 25:03.700 the yellow character by limiting the blue character, 25:03.700 --> 25:08.350 has somehow violated the Lockean Proviso. 25:08.350 --> 25:11.540 Nozick says no. 25:11.540 --> 25:16.530 The fact that the red character's activities limited 25:16.530 --> 25:19.420 the yellow character's activities, if we took into 25:19.420 --> 25:23.270 consideration the blue character's activities, is not 25:23.270 --> 25:28.260 sufficient to render red or yellow in violation of the 25:28.260 --> 25:29.430 Lockean Proviso. 25:29.430 --> 25:33.570 So that's step one. 25:33.570 --> 25:37.530 But we still might wonder whether the blue character has 25:37.530 --> 25:39.270 violated the Lockean Proviso. 25:39.270 --> 25:45.480 After all, how could he have left as much and as good for 25:45.480 --> 25:47.320 our fourth character-- 25:47.320 --> 25:48.990 pink over here-- 25:48.990 --> 25:54.900 if pink isn't in a position to get any cows? 25:54.900 --> 26:03.590 Nozick's answer is that in taking on ownership of objects 26:03.590 --> 26:08.230 and mixing one's labor with them, typically what the 26:08.230 --> 26:11.770 subject does is to increase the value of 26:11.770 --> 26:14.210 those objects for all. 26:14.210 --> 26:17.460 So red, from his four cows, might produce 26:17.460 --> 26:20.300 one gallon of milk. 26:20.300 --> 26:26.700 And yellow might produce two and blue might produce three. 26:26.696 --> 26:29.066 As a result, pink-- 26:29.070 --> 26:31.790 though he doesn't have access to the cows-- 26:31.790 --> 26:34.030 is better off. 26:34.030 --> 26:40.550 And, says Nozick, the Lockean Proviso has not been violated. 26:40.550 --> 26:45.700 So what Nozick says in particular, is he asks whether 26:45.700 --> 26:49.490 the situation of persons who are unable to appropriate-- 26:49.490 --> 26:53.770 there being no more acceptable and unowned objects-- 26:53.770 --> 26:58.320 is their situation worsened by a system of allowing 26:58.320 --> 27:01.770 appropriation and private property? 27:01.770 --> 27:05.710 And the answer he gives is a resounding no. 27:05.710 --> 27:08.440 For exactly the sort of reasons that we're familiar 27:08.440 --> 27:11.690 with from our Hobbes case -- 27:11.690 --> 27:16.320 the idea that there is a kind of social contract that kicks 27:16.320 --> 27:19.140 in that allows everybody to benefit. 27:19.136 --> 27:23.096 And also because Nozick firmly believes that individual 27:23.100 --> 27:28.310 ownership brings with it a particular kind of efficiency. 27:28.310 --> 27:34.340 So Nozick's worry, which was: is the Lockean Proviso going 27:34.340 --> 27:38.100 to knock my theory out of the water such that I can't get 27:38.100 --> 27:41.470 the base clause of my inductive argument going? 27:41.470 --> 27:45.680 Nozick's conclusion is that appropriation of private 27:45.680 --> 27:50.490 property satisfies the intent behind the "enough and as good 27:50.490 --> 27:53.650 left over" Proviso. 27:53.650 --> 28:00.910 But, he is careful to point out, this is not based on 28:00.910 --> 28:03.740 utilitarian reasoning. 28:03.740 --> 28:07.340 It's not based on a utilitarian 28:07.340 --> 28:10.390 justification of property. 28:10.390 --> 28:11.390 Nozick-- 28:11.390 --> 28:13.040 like Rawls-- 28:13.040 --> 28:18.450 is concerned with articulating a rights based theory. 28:18.450 --> 28:23.750 And so, like Rawls, doesn't allow trade-offs 28:23.750 --> 28:27.200 of rights for utilities. 28:27.200 --> 28:30.970 So the argument about the original acquisition of 28:30.970 --> 28:34.300 property runs as follows. 28:34.300 --> 28:39.540 Nozick says, I have the right to do everything that doesn't 28:39.540 --> 28:43.880 harm others and the right to do only what 28:43.880 --> 28:45.570 doesn't harm others. 28:45.570 --> 28:50.540 My rights begin and end in their restrictions and 28:50.540 --> 28:57.750 permissions with consideration of what brings harm to others. 28:57.750 --> 29:03.190 Violating the Lockean Proviso, if I managed to do that, would 29:03.190 --> 29:06.880 leave others worse off than they would have been otherwise 29:06.880 --> 29:09.250 and consequently would harm them. 29:09.250 --> 29:13.410 As a consequence, says Nozick, I don't have the right to 29:13.410 --> 29:15.400 violate the Lockean Proviso. 29:15.400 --> 29:18.120 If, as a matter of fact, my original acquisition of 29:18.120 --> 29:24.070 property doesn't leave as much and as good for others, then 29:24.070 --> 29:28.410 my original acquisition was not an instance of just 29:28.410 --> 29:30.790 property ownership. 29:30.790 --> 29:36.150 But, says Nozick, except in very rare cases-- 29:36.150 --> 29:40.070 he calls them conditions of catastrophe or desert island 29:40.070 --> 29:41.440 limitations-- 29:41.440 --> 29:45.130 acquiring property doesn't violate the Lockean Proviso or 29:45.130 --> 29:47.050 harm others. 29:47.050 --> 29:52.350 And the argument for this sub-clause, this sub-argument, 29:52.350 --> 29:55.450 is a utility- based argument. 29:55.450 --> 29:59.730 It's on the grounds of utility that I get the premise that 29:59.730 --> 30:03.050 except in rare cases acquiring property doesn't violate the 30:03.050 --> 30:04.890 Lockean Proviso. 30:04.890 --> 30:08.440 But the fundamental argument, I have the right to do all and 30:08.440 --> 30:10.270 only what doesn't harm others. 30:10.270 --> 30:13.540 Except in very rare cases acquiring property does not 30:13.540 --> 30:16.800 violate the Lockean Proviso and harm others. 30:16.800 --> 30:21.850 That one, plus four, is sufficient to give us the 30:21.850 --> 30:28.550 conclusion that except in very rare cases I have the right to 30:28.550 --> 30:30.820 acquire property. 30:30.820 --> 30:35.390 So that is, by way of exposition, of what I 30:35.390 --> 30:40.060 understand to have been a fairly difficult part of the 30:40.060 --> 30:42.270 assigned text. 30:42.270 --> 30:48.160 So let's move now to an easier segment of the text. 30:48.160 --> 30:53.530 So as we noted, Nozick provides his defense of the 30:53.530 --> 30:57.040 base clause by appeal to Locke's notion of original 30:57.040 --> 31:00.990 acquisition of property and defends that against the 31:00.990 --> 31:02.430 potential objection-- 31:02.430 --> 31:04.890 the Lockean Proviso objection-- 31:04.890 --> 31:10.380 in providing a clearer sense of what that amounts to. 31:10.380 --> 31:15.700 In many ways the most famous part of the text comes in 31:15.700 --> 31:20.370 Nozick's defense of the induction clause. 31:20.370 --> 31:24.070 So in defending the induction clause -- which, remember, 31:24.070 --> 31:29.670 says that if P acquires H, in keeping with the principle of 31:29.670 --> 31:32.970 justice in transfer, from somebody already entitled, 31:32.970 --> 31:35.080 that P is entitled to H -- 31:35.080 --> 31:38.170 Nozick is concerned with what justice in 31:38.170 --> 31:41.340 transfer amounts to. 31:41.340 --> 31:44.320 So he begins by distinguishing something that should be 31:44.320 --> 31:49.240 familiar to all of you from your readings of Mill and Kant 31:49.240 --> 31:51.360 earlier this semester. 31:51.360 --> 31:55.070 He distinguishes between principles that are 31:55.070 --> 31:56.430 historical-- 31:56.430 --> 32:00.960 that is that tell us that whether a distribution is just 32:00.960 --> 32:04.100 depends upon how it came about. 32:04.100 --> 32:07.960 That is, what we are concerned with when we are concerned 32:07.960 --> 32:12.220 about justice is a question of process. 32:12.220 --> 32:16.390 And he contrasts those with what he calls end-result 32:16.390 --> 32:21.950 principles where, whether a distribution is just depends 32:21.950 --> 32:26.790 upon how things are distributed. 32:26.790 --> 32:30.720 So you'll remember that when we were reading Kant and 32:30.720 --> 32:37.350 trying to determine whether an action counted as moral or 32:37.350 --> 32:42.250 morally praiseworthy, Kant was concerned about the process by 32:42.250 --> 32:46.180 which that action was carried out. 32:46.180 --> 32:52.620 Mill, by contrast, was concerned with outcome. 32:52.620 --> 32:58.080 Nozick goes on, in the opening parts of chapter seven that we 32:58.080 --> 33:05.220 read, to provide a defense of historical principles and to 33:05.220 --> 33:12.500 argue that one consequence of that will be that we can never 33:12.500 --> 33:19.970 judge the justice of a society by looking at how its goods 33:19.970 --> 33:22.700 are distributed. 33:22.700 --> 33:30.150 So, he points out, it has been typical in the articulation of 33:30.150 --> 33:34.660 theories of justice, to claim that a society is just if 33:34.660 --> 33:37.590 goods are distributed according to some sort of 33:37.590 --> 33:40.250 independently specifiable criterion. 33:40.250 --> 33:44.350 For example, distribute goods according to the moral merit 33:44.350 --> 33:47.620 of those who receive them, or according to the intelligence 33:47.619 --> 33:51.379 of those who receive them or according to the effort that 33:51.380 --> 33:55.980 individuals put in, or according to their need for 33:55.980 --> 33:58.790 the objects that you distribute. 33:58.790 --> 34:03.900 Nozick points out that people want their society to look 34:03.900 --> 34:11.270 just. And they also want their society to be just. But in 34:11.270 --> 34:16.740 asking their society to look just, Nozick thinks they make 34:16.739 --> 34:22.679 a mistake if they take pattern as a way of determining 34:22.679 --> 34:24.679 legitimate outcome. 34:24.679 --> 34:29.369 Must the look of justice, asks Nozick, reside in a resulting 34:29.370 --> 34:34.570 pattern, which we can specify independently and in advance 34:34.570 --> 34:39.860 rather than in the underlying generating principles? 34:39.860 --> 34:44.760 And to think about this, it's helpful to help ourselves to a 34:44.760 --> 34:48.950 three-way distinction that John Rawls makes in the 34:48.950 --> 34:53.670 context of Theory of Justice. 34:53.670 --> 34:58.180 Rawls distinguishes between three kinds of procedural 34:58.180 --> 35:00.400 justice there. 35:00.400 --> 35:03.100 The first is a notion of what he calls 35:03.100 --> 35:05.420 perfect procedural justice. 35:05.420 --> 35:08.470 This is a case where we have an independent criterion for 35:08.470 --> 35:14.050 what the right result of our act will be and a procedure 35:14.050 --> 35:18.140 that is certain to give us that result. 35:18.140 --> 35:25.220 So, for example, if I'm trying to divide a cake, of which all 35:25.220 --> 35:29.430 of us want pieces, there's an independent criterion for the 35:29.430 --> 35:30.500 right result. 35:30.500 --> 35:36.450 Namely each of us gets a piece of exactly the same size. 35:36.450 --> 35:40.030 And there's a sure procedure for arriving at that result. 35:40.030 --> 35:45.730 What I do is I allow one person to slice and that is 35:45.730 --> 35:52.180 the person who chooses his piece last. So long as he's in 35:52.180 --> 35:57.120 a position to make precise cuts, the result of this 35:57.120 --> 36:01.810 procedure will always give us what it is that we 36:01.810 --> 36:05.110 independently specified as the outcome we sought. 36:05.110 --> 36:08.870 We want equal slices, we have an independent criterion for 36:08.870 --> 36:12.540 the right result, and we have a sure procedure. 36:12.540 --> 36:16.660 He who slices chooses last. 36:16.660 --> 36:22.080 By contrast, in most situations, what we find 36:22.080 --> 36:27.030 ourselves in is a condition where our only choice is what 36:27.030 --> 36:30.230 Rawls calls imperfect procedural justice. 36:30.230 --> 36:34.280 Where we have an independent criterion for the right result 36:34.280 --> 36:37.280 but the procedure that we have for achieving 36:37.280 --> 36:39.960 that result is imperfect. 36:39.960 --> 36:44.740 So for example, in the legal system we have a goal of 36:44.740 --> 36:49.800 convicting all and only those who are guilty of a crime. 36:49.800 --> 36:54.570 We have a clear sense of what the right result will be. 36:54.570 --> 36:58.050 But though we have a procedure which presumably does a good 36:58.050 --> 37:04.280 deal better than chance, it is undeniable that on occasion 37:04.280 --> 37:06.470 the guilty go free. 37:06.470 --> 37:10.930 And likewise undeniable that on occasion the 37:10.930 --> 37:15.090 innocent are convicted. 37:15.090 --> 37:20.370 The third kind of procedural justice is what Rawls calls 37:20.370 --> 37:22.850 pure procedural justice. 37:22.850 --> 37:26.230 This is a case where we have no independent way of 37:26.230 --> 37:29.070 specifying the result. 37:29.070 --> 37:35.160 And what we do is we adopt a procedure by which we will 37:35.160 --> 37:40.560 carry out in real time, in actuality, some sort of 37:40.560 --> 37:42.100 distribution. 37:42.100 --> 37:46.440 And as the result of having followed that procedure, 37:46.440 --> 37:51.120 whichever distribution arises is fair. 37:51.120 --> 37:54.210 So gambling has this structure. 37:54.210 --> 37:59.660 There is a rule that we have. We all pays our money and then 37:59.660 --> 38:01.630 we takes our chances. 38:01.630 --> 38:07.200 And whatever distribution of outcomes results from that is 38:07.200 --> 38:08.930 legitimate. 38:08.930 --> 38:16.770 Nozick's claim is that the distribution of property in a 38:16.770 --> 38:23.960 society ought to be understood as subject, not to some sort 38:23.960 --> 38:27.290 of perfect or imperfect procedural justice. 38:27.290 --> 38:30.900 That is, there's no independent criterion for how 38:30.900 --> 38:34.960 it is that goods ought to be distributed across people. 38:34.960 --> 38:40.940 Rather, it's simply a matter of living historically through 38:40.940 --> 38:45.420 a process whereby things are required in just fashion and 38:45.420 --> 38:50.090 transferred in just fashion, and seeing how it is that 38:50.090 --> 38:52.170 things distribute themselves. 38:52.170 --> 38:56.720 So in contrast to some sort of pattern picture, Marx has this 38:56.720 --> 39:01.160 idea, from each according to his ability to each according 39:01.160 --> 39:02.610 to his needs. 39:02.610 --> 39:06.160 That's an idea that there's an independent criterion of how 39:06.160 --> 39:08.300 things should be distributed. 39:08.300 --> 39:12.790 Nozick provides, in contrast, this rather complicated 39:12.790 --> 39:15.810 articulation: "from each according to what he chooses 39:15.810 --> 39:22.400 to do and roughly to each as they are chosen." That is, 39:22.400 --> 39:26.050 however things distribute themselves, as long as the 39:26.050 --> 39:30.840 process is fair, will end up being fair. 39:30.840 --> 39:36.100 And this gives rise to Nozick's famous argument that 39:36.100 --> 39:39.820 liberty upsets patterns. 39:39.820 --> 39:44.150 So Nozick asks us to imagine a world in which all of our 39:44.150 --> 39:48.760 friends from behind the veil of ignorance are given 39:48.760 --> 39:52.860 whatever equal share you give them in your fair 39:52.860 --> 39:54.100 distribution. 39:54.100 --> 39:57.910 So each of them ends up with a piggy bank of 39:57.910 --> 40:00.620 the appropriate size. 40:00.620 --> 40:07.270 But all of them, says Nozick, are basketball fans and they 40:07.270 --> 40:14.440 choose to take a quarter of their own money and to deposit 40:14.440 --> 40:19.890 it in the bank account of Wilt Chamberlain. 40:19.890 --> 40:24.810 And so do their friends and so do their friends and so do 40:24.810 --> 40:31.220 their friends until, as a result of people freely doing 40:31.220 --> 40:35.690 what a legitimate transfer permits, Wilt Chamberlain 40:35.690 --> 40:39.400 comes to have so much money that his piggy bank gets 40:39.400 --> 40:41.610 blurry on the slide. 40:41.610 --> 40:45.760 He's that extraordinarily wealthy. 40:45.760 --> 40:50.600 Now Nozick takes the Wilt Chamberlain example to have 40:50.600 --> 40:52.840 two implications. 40:52.840 --> 40:54.820 The first is a descriptive implication. 40:54.820 --> 40:57.350 The general point, he says, illustrated by the Wilt 40:57.350 --> 41:01.260 Chamberlain example is that no end-state principle or 41:01.260 --> 41:05.010 distribution pattern principle of justice can be continuously 41:05.010 --> 41:07.350 realized without continuous 41:07.350 --> 41:09.950 interference in people's lives. 41:09.950 --> 41:13.980 Any favored pattern will be transformed into an unfavored 41:13.980 --> 41:16.160 pattern by the principle -- 41:16.160 --> 41:20.430 by people exchanging goods and services with other people or 41:20.430 --> 41:23.990 giving things to other people, things that the transferers 41:23.990 --> 41:28.160 are entitled to under the favored distribution pattern. 41:28.160 --> 41:31.790 To maintain a pattern, one must either interfere with the 41:31.790 --> 41:36.850 process of transferring resources, or interfere in 41:36.850 --> 41:40.050 such a way that one takes away from somebody who has 41:40.050 --> 41:44.940 legitimately acquired their pile of quarters and 41:44.940 --> 41:46.280 redistribute that. 41:46.280 --> 41:48.650 To maintain a pattern, says Nozick, one must either 41:48.650 --> 41:51.220 interfere to stop people from transferring resources 41:51.220 --> 41:52.500 as they wish to. 41:52.500 --> 41:57.060 Or interfere to take from them resources that others chose to 41:57.060 --> 41:59.460 transfer to them. 41:59.460 --> 42:02.020 So that's the descriptive implication of the Wilt 42:02.020 --> 42:04.020 Chamberlain example. 42:04.020 --> 42:06.170 There's also a normative implication of the Wilt 42:06.170 --> 42:08.150 Chamberlain example. 42:08.150 --> 42:11.970 Nozick says this, look if D1, the initial distribution where 42:11.970 --> 42:15.080 each of our characters from behind the veil of ignorance 42:15.080 --> 42:18.860 had their piggy bank, D1 was a just distribution. 42:18.860 --> 42:23.230 And people voluntarily moved from D1 to D2, the one where 42:23.230 --> 42:26.830 Wilt Chamberlain ended up with the large amount of quarters. 42:26.830 --> 42:29.460 Transferring parts of their shares that they were given 42:29.460 --> 42:33.180 under D1, isn't D2 also just? 42:33.180 --> 42:36.390 If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to 42:36.390 --> 42:40.100 which they were entitled under D1 one, didn't this include 42:40.100 --> 42:44.000 their being entitled to give to, or exchange it with Wilt 42:44.000 --> 42:45.240 Chamberlain? 42:45.240 --> 42:48.790 Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice? 42:48.790 --> 42:52.030 Each other person, says Nozick, already has his 42:52.030 --> 42:55.850 legitimate share under D1 and after someone transfers 42:55.850 --> 43:01.760 something to Wilt Chamberlain, their shares are not changed. 43:01.760 --> 43:06.300 So the descriptive claim is that liberty will inevitably 43:06.300 --> 43:08.030 upset patterns. 43:08.030 --> 43:14.200 And the normative claim is that in so doing, no injustice 43:14.200 --> 43:16.610 has occurred. 43:16.610 --> 43:20.450 I'm going to close with two reasons that one might think 43:20.450 --> 43:25.010 that this argument doesn't work as cleanly as Nozick 43:25.010 --> 43:26.400 would think. 43:26.400 --> 43:31.610 The first we've encountered already, which is that many 43:31.610 --> 43:36.480 more situations have the structure of the problem of 43:36.480 --> 43:41.240 the commons than one might antecedently realize. 43:41.240 --> 43:45.250 And it's not always the case that individual transactions 43:45.250 --> 43:51.130 between pairs of people don't carry with them third-party 43:51.130 --> 43:53.090 consequences. 43:53.090 --> 43:58.010 The second is that it is sometimes the case that 43:58.010 --> 44:03.120 distributions of resources across individuals in unequal 44:03.120 --> 44:09.860 ways produces violations of the sorts of freedoms that 44:09.860 --> 44:12.670 Nozick wants to defend. 44:12.670 --> 44:16.710 So suppose we start out with two groups of people, each of 44:16.710 --> 44:21.280 whom have roughly similar amounts of money. 44:21.280 --> 44:25.950 And they send their children to school with one another and 44:25.950 --> 44:30.520 share the same set of teachers. 44:30.520 --> 44:34.890 Suppose that one of those groups, through legitimate 44:34.890 --> 44:41.170 transfers from D1 to D2, comes to possess a much larger 44:41.170 --> 44:48.100 amount of money and create another school where they send 44:48.100 --> 44:53.220 their children and where they hire the teachers who were the 44:53.220 --> 44:55.420 most gifted. 44:55.420 --> 45:00.140 It may become the case that simply as the result of people 45:00.140 --> 45:04.950 having engaged in behavior that involved a series of 45:04.950 --> 45:10.610 independently legitimate transfers, the situation that 45:10.610 --> 45:18.870 results may impede the freedom of these children to become 45:18.870 --> 45:22.180 citizens of the sort whose rights 45:22.180 --> 45:25.650 Nozick wishes to defend. 45:25.650 --> 45:28.610 So it's 11:20 now. 45:28.610 --> 45:31.750 And we'll finish up today's lecture here. 45:31.750 --> 45:35.270 And move next lecture to finish up with six discussion 45:35.270 --> 45:38.030 of justice in holdings and to think about that in the 45:38.030 --> 45:41.170 context of some work in social psychology.