WEBVTT 00:00.280 --> 00:06.040 PROFESSOR: OK, so as you know, we've moved in our discussion 00:06.040 --> 00:11.990 to the question of what sort of social structures are 00:11.990 --> 00:18.070 either legitimate or contributory to the well being 00:18.070 --> 00:22.730 of humans, given our nature. 00:22.730 --> 00:29.550 And we ended last lecture by having a game theoretic 00:29.550 --> 00:33.670 representation of what I called the cooperation 00:33.670 --> 00:38.620 dividend, which you'll recall involves the case of two 00:38.620 --> 00:45.870 individuals who, fearful that the other will attack their 00:45.870 --> 00:52.260 resources, expend a certain amount of energy walling off 00:52.260 --> 00:54.260 their goods. 00:54.260 --> 00:59.780 Where if they were somehow to find themselves in a situation 00:59.780 --> 01:04.270 where they could cooperate and trust themselves to cooperate, 01:04.270 --> 01:08.840 their energy could be devoted, instead of to the protection 01:08.840 --> 01:11.810 of their goods, to the production of 01:11.810 --> 01:13.390 other sorts of goods. 01:13.390 --> 01:16.540 Those required, as Hobbes says, "for commodious living" 01:16.540 --> 01:18.600 and for things like navigation. 01:18.600 --> 01:23.680 Goods that would allow both of them to be better off. 01:23.680 --> 01:28.760 And in the last two lectures we looked at the writings of 01:28.760 --> 01:34.520 Thomas Hobbes in the context of his work, Leviathan which 01:34.520 --> 01:39.460 explored both why it is that the cooperation dividend is 01:39.460 --> 01:45.100 expected to be to the advantage of all and also why 01:45.100 --> 01:50.380 it is that in order to hold cooperation in place, certain 01:50.380 --> 01:53.930 sorts of external enforcement mechanisms-- 01:53.930 --> 02:00.010 in Hobbes's mind, a Leviathan, a monarch or leader who has 02:00.010 --> 02:01.720 absolute power-- 02:01.720 --> 02:07.160 is required to hold this sort of cooperation in place. 02:07.160 --> 02:12.480 What we're going to turn to in the lectures today and 02:12.480 --> 02:19.670 Thursday is a contemporary version of this question, 02:19.670 --> 02:22.820 which asks us to think about-- 02:22.820 --> 02:26.480 if we are considering not merely the cooperation or lack 02:26.480 --> 02:30.020 of cooperation between two people, but rather the 02:30.020 --> 02:35.320 distribution of goods and responsibilities across a 02:35.320 --> 02:37.610 larger community-- 02:37.610 --> 02:43.950 how it is that such a society should be structured if we 02:43.950 --> 02:49.660 take as our basic picture something similar to Hobbes. 02:49.660 --> 02:55.050 Namely the idea that cooperation is beneficial to 02:55.050 --> 02:59.950 all in a way that competition isn't, but that stably 02:59.950 --> 03:04.950 promoting cooperation requires certain sorts of 03:04.950 --> 03:06.350 incentivizing. 03:06.350 --> 03:11.790 And so what we'll look in particular today is discussion 03:11.790 --> 03:16.170 by the 20th-century philosopher John Rawls who 03:16.170 --> 03:22.300 lived from 1921 to 2002 and who taught at Harvard 03:22.300 --> 03:24.210 throughout his career. 03:24.210 --> 03:29.280 We encountered Rawls writings already in a very early paper, 03:29.280 --> 03:33.180 the 1955 paper on punishment that we looked at where he 03:33.180 --> 03:36.370 introduced the idea of a two-level justification of 03:36.370 --> 03:37.450 punishment. 03:37.450 --> 03:41.120 And what we'll be looking at in today's lecture is Rawls' 03:41.120 --> 03:47.030 discussion in his enormously influential 1971 book, A 03:47.030 --> 03:49.630 Theory of Justice. 03:49.630 --> 03:54.870 So Rawls' Theory of Justice, which in many ways brought 03:54.870 --> 03:59.250 back into contemporary philosophical discussion 03:59.250 --> 04:04.250 consideration of a set of questions which we traced all 04:04.250 --> 04:06.190 the way back to Plato's Republic -- 04:06.190 --> 04:10.710 why is it in people's self interest to participate in a 04:10.710 --> 04:12.330 societal structure -- 04:12.330 --> 04:14.820 and brought it back in a way that 04:14.820 --> 04:17.110 entered the public discourse. 04:17.110 --> 04:20.010 A Theory of Justice is the kind of book that you'll see 04:20.010 --> 04:22.750 cited in legal cases. 04:22.750 --> 04:26.460 You'll see it discussed not merely in academic journals, 04:26.460 --> 04:30.500 but also in intellectually grounded conversations about 04:30.500 --> 04:34.090 the legitimacy of the society. 04:34.090 --> 04:38.410 And A Theory of Justice begins with these famous words. 04:38.410 --> 04:42.020 Rawls says, after saying what he hopes to do in the book, 04:42.020 --> 04:48.230 that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions 04:48.230 --> 04:57.140 as truth is of systems of thought." He says, "Just as a 04:57.140 --> 05:01.650 theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected 05:01.650 --> 05:07.710 or revised if it's untrue, so, too laws and institutions, no 05:07.710 --> 05:14.050 matter how efficient or well arranged, must be reformed or 05:14.050 --> 05:17.510 abolished if they are unjust." 05:17.510 --> 05:24.040 This is an articulation of what Rawls sees as the central 05:24.040 --> 05:29.710 commitment of a certain outlook of the legitimacy of 05:29.710 --> 05:30.880 government. 05:30.880 --> 05:35.190 A Western picture-- and perhaps more general picture-- 05:35.190 --> 05:40.820 according to which, a social structure, an arrangement of 05:40.820 --> 05:45.650 fundamental institutions by which lives are governed, is 05:45.650 --> 05:53.430 legitimate if and only if the institutions which it supports 05:53.430 --> 05:55.590 are just. 05:55.590 --> 06:01.850 So just as a theory which is extraordinarily elegant but 06:01.850 --> 06:07.480 false should be rejected on the grounds that it's untrue, 06:07.480 --> 06:13.160 so too, says Rawls, should a societal structure which is 06:13.160 --> 06:19.070 elegant but unjust be rejected. 06:19.070 --> 06:25.390 He goes on to identify what he sees as some fundamental 06:25.390 --> 06:29.850 commitments of this sort of picture. 06:29.850 --> 06:35.480 He writes, for example, that "each person possesses an 06:35.480 --> 06:41.000 inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare 06:41.000 --> 06:45.200 of society as a whole cannot override. 06:45.200 --> 06:50.880 For this reason, justice denies that the loss of 06:50.880 --> 06:57.800 freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by 06:57.800 --> 06:59.320 others." 06:59.320 --> 07:02.280 Now we thought about this question-- 07:02.280 --> 07:08.050 the question of the trade-off of goods across individuals-- 07:08.050 --> 07:12.780 in the context of our discussion of consequentialism 07:12.780 --> 07:18.550 on the one hand and other moral theories, deontology and 07:18.550 --> 07:21.770 virtue theory on the other. 07:21.770 --> 07:24.270 What Rawls gives voice to-- 07:24.270 --> 07:29.250 both here and in sections 5 and 26 of Theory of Justice, 07:29.250 --> 07:30.930 which I had you read -- 07:30.930 --> 07:36.700 is another reason related to the reason that we read about 07:36.700 --> 07:40.170 in Bernard Williams, this idea of dignity. 07:40.170 --> 07:46.120 Another reason for rejecting as a fundamental way of making 07:46.120 --> 07:51.700 sense of human responsibility, consequentialism as its 07:51.700 --> 07:54.200 grounding basis. 07:54.200 --> 07:59.370 But what might not have been apparent to you when we were 07:59.370 --> 08:04.440 reading things like The Trolley Problem, was the 08:04.440 --> 08:07.740 connection of the outlook-- 08:07.740 --> 08:11.010 this idea that "each person possesses an inviolability 08:11.010 --> 08:14.130 founded on justice that even the welfare society as a whole 08:14.130 --> 08:16.920 cannot override," -- 08:16.919 --> 08:24.079 and one of the foundational documents of this nation. 08:24.080 --> 08:30.530 So among the truths that Thomas Jefferson thought we 08:30.530 --> 08:37.950 hold "to be self evident," is that "all men are created 08:37.950 --> 08:42.690 equal and that they are endowed by their creator with 08:42.690 --> 08:46.100 certain inalienable rights. 08:46.100 --> 08:48.680 And that among these," -- 08:48.680 --> 08:53.500 these rights such that even the utility of society as a 08:53.500 --> 08:57.090 whole is not sufficient to override them-- 08:57.090 --> 09:02.230 "are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 09:02.230 --> 09:06.980 Moreover, you'll see in this founding document-- 09:06.980 --> 09:10.550 this is of course the Declaration of Independence-- 09:10.550 --> 09:16.590 that there is voice given to exactly the contract-carrying 09:16.590 --> 09:23.080 picture that we first recognize in its inchoate form 09:23.080 --> 09:26.280 in Glaucon's discussion of the role of justice in Plato's 09:26.280 --> 09:33.110 Republic and much more clearly in the work of Hobbes. 09:33.110 --> 09:37.110 So listen to what comes next. 09:37.110 --> 09:43.020 "That to secure these rights, governments are instituted 09:43.020 --> 09:50.320 among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the 09:50.320 --> 09:55.490 governed." The idea that entering into a social 09:55.490 --> 09:57.900 contract with one another -- 09:57.900 --> 10:04.340 whereby as a way securing the rights to life, liberty and 10:04.340 --> 10:09.570 the pursuit of happiness, we subject ourselves to a rule of 10:09.570 --> 10:13.490 law, which we thereby take to be legitimate -- 10:13.490 --> 10:18.180 is central, both to the social contract tradition as 10:18.180 --> 10:22.270 articulated in Hobbes and his successors, Locke and Rousseau 10:22.265 --> 10:29.235 and Kant, and to this document, which all of us have 10:29.240 --> 10:33.260 presumably encountered previously. 10:33.260 --> 10:39.270 Moreover, continues this document, "whenever any form 10:39.270 --> 10:44.800 of government becomes destructive of these ends, it 10:44.800 --> 10:49.840 is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to 10:49.840 --> 10:53.860 institute a new government." What kind of new government? 10:53.860 --> 10:55.990 What's Jefferson's answer? 10:55.990 --> 11:00.160 A new government, where "laying its foundation on such 11:00.160 --> 11:05.430 principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them 11:05.430 --> 11:10.060 shall seem most likely to affect their safety and 11:10.060 --> 11:11.640 happiness." 11:11.640 --> 11:18.030 So the idea that we set out to create a government that gains 11:18.025 --> 11:23.035 its legitimacy through our recognition that thereby our 11:23.040 --> 11:30.560 self-interest is advanced is a central notion to the American 11:30.560 --> 11:33.110 political tradition. 11:33.110 --> 11:38.800 So how does it manifest itself in the particular text that 11:38.800 --> 11:40.580 we're thinking about today? 11:40.580 --> 11:48.090 How does John Rawls, in this book from the 1970s, attempt 11:48.090 --> 11:53.410 to give contemporary voice to this set of concerns that 200 11:53.410 --> 11:57.790 years prior to him were given voice to by Thomas Jefferson 11:57.790 --> 12:02.830 and 150 years prior to that were given voice 12:02.830 --> 12:05.920 to by Thomas Hobbes? 12:05.920 --> 12:10.020 So Rawls begins by saying what it is that he 12:10.020 --> 12:12.920 takes society to be. 12:12.920 --> 12:17.060 Society, that which we're trying to identify a set of 12:17.060 --> 12:20.940 characteristics for, is "a more or less self-sufficient 12:20.940 --> 12:25.930 association of persons, who in their relations to one another 12:25.930 --> 12:31.470 recognize certain rules of conduct as binding" and who, 12:31.470 --> 12:36.480 "for the most part, act in accordance with them." You'll 12:36.480 --> 12:41.140 recall that at the end of the Prisoners' Dilemma lecture 12:41.140 --> 12:46.160 last week and also in our readings for last Thursday, we 12:46.160 --> 12:51.010 looked at mechanisms other than the ones that Hobbes 12:51.010 --> 12:56.350 identified for enforcing social contract. 12:56.350 --> 12:59.540 Hobbes thought the most effective way was the 12:59.540 --> 13:04.280 imposition of a sovereign, whose threat of penalty and 13:04.280 --> 13:08.980 punishment would hold people to behave in certain ways. 13:08.980 --> 13:15.920 But it turns out that in addition to that, the taking 13:15.920 --> 13:21.070 on implicitly through conscience or habit of certain 13:21.070 --> 13:27.760 kinds of norms of interaction ends up playing as great if 13:27.760 --> 13:31.400 not larger a role in allowing 13:31.400 --> 13:33.980 societies to function smoothly. 13:33.980 --> 13:37.690 And in next Tuesday's readings we'll look at some social 13:37.690 --> 13:39.420 psychological work that directly 13:39.420 --> 13:41.580 addresses that question. 13:41.580 --> 13:44.570 So Rawls has told us what it is that he thinks a society is 13:44.570 --> 13:45.840 for the purposes of discussion. 13:45.840 --> 13:48.790 It's "a more or less self-sufficient association of 13:48.790 --> 13:51.270 persons, who in their relations to one another 13:51.270 --> 13:52.680 recognize" something-- 13:52.680 --> 13:56.840 that is "certain rules of conduct-- as binding" and, 13:56.840 --> 13:59.060 "for the most part" -- not always, I know some of you 13:59.060 --> 14:02.000 talk on your cell phone while you drive -- 14:02.000 --> 14:09.590 "act in accordance with them." These rules "specify a system 14:09.585 --> 14:11.725 of cooperation that's designed" to do what? 14:11.730 --> 14:14.970 It's designed to do the thing that Thomas Jefferson was 14:14.970 --> 14:16.760 talking about in the Constitution. 14:16.760 --> 14:20.920 It's designed to do the thing that Thomas Hobbes was talking 14:20.920 --> 14:23.210 about in Leviathan. 14:23.210 --> 14:26.570 It's designed to do the thing that Glaucon was talking about 14:26.570 --> 14:28.660 in his challenge to Socrates. 14:28.660 --> 14:33.580 They specify "a system of cooperation that is designed 14:33.580 --> 14:38.450 to advance the good of those taking part of it." The 14:38.450 --> 14:44.340 legitimacy of government on this picture derives from the 14:44.340 --> 14:49.220 fact that it is to the advantage of those who 14:49.220 --> 14:52.430 participate in it. 14:52.430 --> 14:54.280 However-- 14:54.280 --> 14:58.850 and this is the perplexing feature that makes political 14:58.850 --> 15:03.950 philosophy a discipline of great intellectual interest-- 15:03.950 --> 15:08.990 "although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual 15:08.990 --> 15:16.380 advantage," it is, says Rawls, undeniably typically "marked 15:16.380 --> 15:19.500 by conflict as well as identity of 15:19.500 --> 15:22.320 interests." Why is this? 15:22.320 --> 15:27.610 It's because while there is an identity of interests-- 15:27.610 --> 15:31.030 because social cooperation makes possible a better life 15:31.030 --> 15:35.540 for all than any would have if each were to live solely by 15:35.540 --> 15:36.990 his own efforts. 15:36.990 --> 15:41.600 That is, we get dividends as the result of not having to 15:41.600 --> 15:45.490 expend our energy on protecting ourselves from the 15:45.490 --> 15:47.120 threat of others' harm. 15:47.120 --> 15:50.140 Each of us-- as we know from the last two lectures-- 15:50.140 --> 15:54.850 is better off when we can count on others to be 15:54.850 --> 15:56.350 cooperative. 15:56.350 --> 16:02.270 It is nonetheless the case that there is a conflict of 16:02.270 --> 16:09.820 interest in any society since "persons are not indifferent 16:09.820 --> 16:14.210 as to how the greater benefits of their collaboration are 16:14.210 --> 16:17.370 distributed." 16:17.370 --> 16:25.670 Roughly speaking, each prefers a larger to a lesser share. 16:25.670 --> 16:32.330 If there are cooperation dividends, that is good and 16:32.330 --> 16:35.920 produces a reason for cooperation. 16:35.920 --> 16:40.910 But when there are cooperation dividends, each of us-- 16:40.910 --> 16:42.770 reasonably enough-- 16:42.770 --> 16:48.570 wants as many of the dividends as we can get. 16:48.569 --> 16:53.669 And the consequence of that is that although "society is a 16:53.670 --> 16:57.150 cooperative venture for mutual advantage," it's typically 16:57.150 --> 17:02.080 "marked by conflict as well as identity of interests." 17:02.079 --> 17:08.139 So this gives rise to the next level question. 17:08.140 --> 17:13.580 When we read Hobbes we read only the very beginning of his 17:13.580 --> 17:16.760 discussion of the social contract, just a bit from the 17:16.760 --> 17:19.800 end of book one and the very beginning of book two. 17:19.800 --> 17:24.180 Rawls is now turning to a question beyond that. 17:24.180 --> 17:33.300 Namely, what set of principles ought we to adopt, given the 17:33.300 --> 17:36.010 fact of conflict? 17:36.010 --> 17:40.690 So we're taking it as a given that we want cooperation, we 17:40.690 --> 17:43.690 want some sort of societal structure. 17:43.686 --> 17:47.066 As a result we're going to end up with more stuff than we 17:47.070 --> 17:50.410 would have had if we hadn't been cooperating. 17:50.410 --> 17:56.110 How should that stuff, how should those goods-- 17:56.110 --> 17:59.180 some tangible, some intangible-- 17:59.180 --> 18:01.720 be distributed? 18:01.720 --> 18:06.860 So Rawls points out that a set of principles is required for 18:06.860 --> 18:10.130 choosing among the various social arrangements, which 18:10.130 --> 18:14.910 determine this distribution of advantages. 18:14.910 --> 18:20.010 These principles "provide a way of assigning rights and 18:20.010 --> 18:24.240 duties in the basic institutions of society." 18:24.240 --> 18:27.610 Things like what the legal system looks like. 18:27.610 --> 18:30.750 Things like what the economic system looks like. 18:30.750 --> 18:33.850 Things like what the fundamental rights and 18:33.850 --> 18:37.310 responsibilities of citizens look like. 18:37.310 --> 18:43.580 And what they do it to define an appropriate distribution of 18:43.580 --> 18:47.570 benefits and burdens of social cooperation. 18:47.570 --> 18:51.250 Because, as we've already noted, social cooperation 18:51.250 --> 18:56.010 brings with it undeniable benefits but it also brings 18:56.010 --> 18:58.850 with it several kinds of burdens. 18:58.850 --> 19:01.960 Your freedom is restricted in certain ways in 19:01.960 --> 19:03.460 a cooperative system. 19:03.460 --> 19:06.480 And it may well be the case that the benefits that accrue 19:06.476 --> 19:11.956 to the social system go to someone else. 19:11.960 --> 19:17.350 So we're now at a point where I will give voice to what 19:17.350 --> 19:22.540 Rawls calls the main idea of the theory of justice. 19:22.540 --> 19:25.600 And then I'm going to explain to you how that fits with his 19:25.600 --> 19:27.940 notion of the veil of ignorance. 19:27.940 --> 19:31.460 And then just as your attention is beginning to 19:31.460 --> 19:34.010 flag, we're going to do some clickers. 19:34.010 --> 19:39.590 So hold up, a little more fact and then some fun. 19:39.590 --> 19:43.130 So the main idea of The Theory of Justice is, as I've pointed 19:43.130 --> 19:46.680 out to you already, something that is part of the social 19:46.680 --> 19:47.720 contract tradition. 19:47.720 --> 19:50.650 Rawls explicitly says in the first footnote of the text 19:50.645 --> 19:54.285 that we read for today that he's working primarily from 19:54.290 --> 19:58.450 the social contact picture as articulated in Locke, Rousseau 19:58.450 --> 20:02.150 and Kant, but that he is harkening back 20:02.150 --> 20:03.320 to Hobbes in it. 20:03.320 --> 20:07.110 And this, as you know, is the following idea, that each of 20:07.110 --> 20:11.360 us recognizes that there's a certain advantage to living in 20:11.360 --> 20:15.020 a society where we're not constantly under threat, that 20:15.020 --> 20:18.390 each recognizes that non-threat can be achieved-- 20:18.390 --> 20:20.830 this idea that you're not constantly at risk in this 20:20.830 --> 20:23.140 cold war of all against all. 20:23.140 --> 20:26.520 But non-threat can be achieved only under general 20:26.520 --> 20:27.790 cooperation. 20:27.790 --> 20:32.020 And that general cooperation can be achieved only under 20:32.020 --> 20:37.580 some sort of implicit or explicit enforcement system. 20:37.580 --> 20:42.850 So Rawls, with that social contract framework in mind, 20:42.850 --> 20:53.040 goes on to ask, what would it take to get a clear picture of 20:53.040 --> 20:58.240 what that enforcement system ought to look like if, as we 20:58.240 --> 21:02.950 recall, it's meant to be something, which is for the 21:02.950 --> 21:06.080 good of each of its participants? 21:06.080 --> 21:08.570 And here is what he says. 21:08.570 --> 21:12.880 He says, "The principles of justice," of the basic 21:12.880 --> 21:20.240 structure of society, "are those that free and rational 21:20.240 --> 21:26.440 person concerned to further their self-interest would 21:26.440 --> 21:32.380 accept in an original position of equality as defining the 21:32.380 --> 21:36.420 fundamental terms of their association" 21:36.420 --> 21:40.640 That is there are four fundamental ideas that 21:40.640 --> 21:43.960 underlie this picture. 21:43.960 --> 21:48.680 The rules that govern your society, the rules that govern 21:48.680 --> 21:54.210 a legitimate society, into which you ought to contract, 21:54.210 --> 21:59.880 are rules that you would accept if you were free, 21:59.880 --> 22:08.580 rational, self-interested and in a position of equality with 22:08.580 --> 22:14.100 respect to all of the other free, rational and 22:14.095 --> 22:19.575 self-interested individuals who are also contracting into 22:19.580 --> 22:22.520 this society. 22:22.520 --> 22:25.940 How can we possibly get there? 22:25.940 --> 22:30.440 How can we possibly determine what free, rational, 22:30.440 --> 22:35.110 self-interested and equal individuals would agree to, 22:35.110 --> 22:36.160 given that-- 22:36.160 --> 22:37.690 as a matter of fact-- 22:37.690 --> 22:39.460 we're not all equal? 22:39.460 --> 22:42.110 Some of us were born into families of wealth and some of 22:42.110 --> 22:44.460 us were born into families of poverty. 22:44.460 --> 22:46.900 Some of us were born with certain sets of natural 22:46.900 --> 22:49.880 talents; others were born with other sets. 22:49.880 --> 22:53.160 Some of us were born with certain sorts of conceptions-- 22:53.160 --> 22:55.070 or some of us were raised to have certain sorts of 22:55.070 --> 22:55.710 conceptions-- 22:55.710 --> 22:56.700 of the good life. 22:56.700 --> 22:59.730 Others of us were raised to have others. 22:59.730 --> 23:07.060 Rawls' idea is this: the principles that articulate the 23:07.060 --> 23:12.480 legitimate structure of society are those to which you 23:12.480 --> 23:20.140 would agree if you did not know which person you were 23:20.140 --> 23:21.930 going to be. 23:21.930 --> 23:27.190 So he asks you to imagine that you sit behind what's he 23:27.190 --> 23:33.270 called a "veil of ignorance," where no one knows his place 23:33.270 --> 23:38.240 in society, his class position, his social status, 23:38.240 --> 23:41.270 his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 23:41.270 --> 23:45.470 and abilities, his intelligence, his strength or 23:45.470 --> 23:49.040 his conception of the good. 23:49.040 --> 23:55.090 From this position, where you don't know which person you 23:55.090 --> 24:00.670 are going to be, you get the fourth of our four 24:00.670 --> 24:02.190 requirements. 24:02.190 --> 24:04.730 You get equality. 24:04.730 --> 24:09.970 Because nothing in particular about your self-interest will 24:09.970 --> 24:12.360 play a role. 24:12.360 --> 24:18.460 And having put yourself in this imaginary position, where 24:18.460 --> 24:23.910 ignorance brings with it a certain kind of ability to 24:23.910 --> 24:29.430 think clearly about the question, each party then 24:29.430 --> 24:35.440 freely determines on the basis rational self-interest. So 24:35.440 --> 24:39.740 that gives us freedom, rationality and self-interest. 24:39.740 --> 24:45.320 The framework that they think would be best. 24:45.320 --> 24:51.780 So the idea is this: a bunch of people who don't know what 24:51.780 --> 24:57.200 role they will play in society sit behind the veil of 24:57.200 --> 25:02.000 ignorance and think, how would I want society to be 25:02.000 --> 25:06.650 structured if I didn't know whether I was going to end up 25:06.650 --> 25:16.200 as a shepherd or a capitalist or a doctor or a construction 25:16.200 --> 25:23.820 worker or a police officer or someone who has difficulties 25:23.820 --> 25:28.730 with the authority of police officers or somebody who's 25:28.730 --> 25:32.240 differently abled or perhaps even as a 25:32.240 --> 25:34.230 Yale football player? 25:34.226 --> 25:39.166 And from behind this veil of ignorance, recognizing that 25:39.170 --> 25:46.390 any one of these identities could end up being the one 25:46.390 --> 25:52.830 that they would have, these individuals come up with a 25:52.830 --> 25:59.400 framework for how it is that society would be structured. 25:59.400 --> 26:05.280 So recognizing that they might be extraordinarily wealthy, 26:05.280 --> 26:08.240 they may take into consideration what it would 26:08.240 --> 26:11.790 take for society to allow individuals to flourish under 26:11.790 --> 26:13.930 those conditions. 26:13.930 --> 26:17.080 But they might recognize at the same time that they might 26:17.080 --> 26:21.530 end up as one of the construction workers. 26:21.532 --> 26:23.812 Perhaps they would end up as a doctor. 26:23.810 --> 26:27.850 Perhaps the set of abilities that they had would differ 26:27.850 --> 26:32.760 from those of the majority of the society and so on. 26:32.760 --> 26:39.200 So what you have in the articulation of the veil of 26:39.200 --> 26:44.490 ignorance as a way of thinking about this question, is Rawls' 26:44.490 --> 26:50.760 version of a theme that we have seen over and over and 26:50.760 --> 26:54.600 over again in this course. 26:54.600 --> 26:59.750 Hobbes says to you: When you think about political 26:59.750 --> 27:04.060 structures, think about yourself as not being 27:04.060 --> 27:05.830 different from everyone else. 27:05.830 --> 27:10.130 Be willing, he says, "to lay down your rights to the extent 27:10.130 --> 27:12.470 that others are willing to do this the same. 27:12.470 --> 27:17.370 Content yourself with as much liberty against others as 27:17.370 --> 27:21.140 others have against you." 27:21.140 --> 27:26.140 Mill says, "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to 27:26.140 --> 27:29.800 promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 27:29.800 --> 27:31.380 reverse of happiness. 27:31.380 --> 27:36.210 Not the agent's own happiness, but the happiness of all 27:36.210 --> 27:41.230 concerned." And Kant, again giving voice to this idea: -- 27:41.230 --> 27:45.500 When you think from the moral perspective do not think of 27:45.500 --> 27:48.180 yourself as special. -- 27:48.180 --> 27:52.610 writes, "Act only in accordance with that maxim 27:52.610 --> 27:56.810 through which you can at the same time will that it will 27:56.810 --> 27:59.930 become a universal law." 27:59.930 --> 28:05.680 So if you will take out your clickers, we'll do three quick 28:05.680 --> 28:10.250 exercises where we look to see whether 28:10.250 --> 28:13.240 Rawls's strategy works. 28:13.240 --> 28:16.030 So let me explain to you how this goes. 28:16.030 --> 28:23.490 In this case, you are deciding whether to enroll in one of 28:23.490 --> 28:26.910 three sections of a course. 28:26.910 --> 28:30.650 So the lectures of the course will be identical 28:30.650 --> 28:32.860 in all three cases. 28:32.860 --> 28:39.860 But in option number one the course has four excellent 28:39.860 --> 28:42.590 sections, sections that earn a 9/10 on 28:42.590 --> 28:43.480 average student ratings. 28:43.480 --> 28:48.320 So four of the sections are excellent and one of the 28:48.320 --> 28:50.140 sections is terrible. 28:50.140 --> 28:51.550 And you don't know which section you're 28:51.550 --> 28:52.230 going to end up in. 28:52.230 --> 28:55.560 So in the first option you have the choice of going to 28:55.560 --> 28:58.280 the class and then you're going to be randomly assigned 28:58.280 --> 28:59.630 to one of sections. 28:59.630 --> 29:03.930 Four of them are excellent; one of them is terrible. 29:03.930 --> 29:08.330 The second option is that you can take the course and four 29:08.325 --> 29:10.645 of the sections are very good-- 29:10.650 --> 29:14.360 they gave a score of 7/10 on average-- 29:14.355 --> 29:15.975 and one of the sections in terrible. 29:15.980 --> 29:18.200 And you don't know which section you're going to be in. 29:18.200 --> 29:22.360 So if you take that, you have a 4/5 chance of being in a 29:22.360 --> 29:26.050 very good section, but you have a 1/5 chance of being in 29:26.050 --> 29:27.080 a terrible one. 29:27.075 --> 29:31.475 And in the third version of the course, four of the 29:31.480 --> 29:32.940 sections are very good. 29:32.935 --> 29:34.275 They get a 7/10. 29:34.280 --> 29:37.670 And one of the sections is so-so. 29:37.670 --> 29:41.280 So the question is, which course do you take? 29:41.280 --> 29:44.940 Do you sign up for the course that has four excellent and 29:44.940 --> 29:46.510 one terrible section? 29:46.510 --> 29:50.660 Remember you don't know which section you'll be in. 29:50.660 --> 29:53.860 Do you sign up for the course that has four very good and 29:53.860 --> 29:56.190 one terrible section? 29:56.190 --> 29:59.960 Or do you sign up for the course that has four very good 29:59.960 --> 30:02.770 and one so-so section? 30:02.770 --> 30:05.770 So is everybody clear on the structure of the question? 30:05.770 --> 30:07.620 And I'll start the voting. 30:07.620 --> 30:08.220 OK. 30:08.220 --> 30:09.900 All right, so let's go. 30:09.900 --> 30:11.150 Let's see. 30:14.640 --> 30:18.850 All right so, 60% percent of you are with-- wow! 30:18.850 --> 30:20.290 Where are my outliers? 30:20.290 --> 30:20.610 Dudes! 30:20.610 --> 30:21.970 Everybody understood! 30:21.970 --> 30:22.470 Amazing! 30:22.470 --> 30:23.290 We have never-- 30:23.290 --> 30:25.560 for those visitors who are here-- we have never in this 30:25.560 --> 30:28.420 class had 0% percent of people choose my 30:28.420 --> 30:29.990 obviously irrational choice. 30:29.990 --> 30:33.330 So I'm glad to see that showing off for non-Bulldog 30:33.330 --> 30:35.280 days, people are doing a good job. 30:35.280 --> 30:38.120 So roughly 60% of you are risk-takers. 30:38.120 --> 30:40.750 You're willing to take the 1/5 chance of being in the 30:40.750 --> 30:42.250 terrible class. 30:42.250 --> 30:48.700 But 40% of you are risk-averse in this context. 30:48.700 --> 30:50.120 Let's try it again. 30:50.120 --> 30:53.770 Exact same question, different scenario. 30:53.770 --> 30:58.490 So here's the scenario: you are entering a housing lottery 30:58.490 --> 31:02.850 and you can enter lottery one, lottery two or lottery three. 31:02.850 --> 31:07.020 Housing lottery one, there are four excellent and one 31:07.020 --> 31:08.940 terrible room. 31:08.940 --> 31:12.650 Housing lottery two, there are four very good and one 31:12.650 --> 31:14.270 terrible room. 31:14.270 --> 31:18.380 And housing lottery three, there are four very good and 31:18.380 --> 31:20.350 one so-so room. 31:20.350 --> 31:24.330 Again, you don't know where you will end up. 31:24.330 --> 31:27.830 Question, do you enter housing lottery one, housing lottery 31:27.830 --> 31:30.960 two or housing lottery three? 31:30.960 --> 31:33.650 And let's set the timer. 31:33.650 --> 31:39.720 Six, five, four, three, two, one. 31:39.720 --> 31:42.880 And let's see what we get. 31:42.880 --> 31:44.380 So, ha! 31:44.380 --> 31:47.990 You guys don't care about class but you're very risk 31:47.990 --> 31:50.260 averse on housing. 31:50.260 --> 31:57.140 So when it comes to your well-being in terms of the 31:57.140 --> 32:02.970 infrastructure in which you live, 68% of you are willing 32:02.965 --> 32:07.265 to forgo the possibility of an excellent room for the 32:07.270 --> 32:13.780 certainty that you won't end up in a room that is terrible. 32:13.780 --> 32:16.530 So let's try it one more time. 32:16.530 --> 32:19.350 Now you're going to a hospital. 32:19.350 --> 32:21.380 And here's the configuration. 32:21.380 --> 32:24.950 Hospital one: four excellent, one terrible doctor. 32:24.950 --> 32:27.950 Hospital two, four very good, one terrible doctor. 32:27.950 --> 32:31.560 Hospital three, four very good, one so-so doctor. 32:31.560 --> 32:35.350 You're asking the ambulance to take you to the ER. 32:35.350 --> 32:38.700 You don't know which doctor is on duty but you do know 32:38.700 --> 32:41.620 Hospital one has four excellent, one terrible. 32:41.620 --> 32:44.110 Hospital two has four very good, one terrible. 32:44.110 --> 32:47.190 Hospital three has four very good, one so-so. 32:47.190 --> 32:53.910 And let's see how the numbers come out on this. 32:53.910 --> 32:57.540 So, four, three, two, one. 32:57.540 --> 33:00.320 And let's see where you placed yourselves. 33:00.320 --> 33:04.880 So when it comes to high-stakes medical decisions, 33:04.880 --> 33:12.350 you are even more risk averse than you were with housing. 33:12.345 --> 33:18.315 How much more important than any of these local decisions 33:18.320 --> 33:25.430 is the global decision, what sort of societal framework do 33:25.430 --> 33:31.600 you want around you if you don't know what role you will 33:31.600 --> 33:33.240 play in it? 33:33.240 --> 33:39.670 So Rawls's question, which society do you choose, is 33:39.670 --> 33:44.060 meant to be a version of those three questions, which I just 33:44.060 --> 33:46.360 posed to you. 33:46.360 --> 33:51.810 Which medical system do you choose if you don't know what 33:51.810 --> 33:54.590 kind of individual you're going to be? 33:54.590 --> 33:59.560 And the answer was, you chose one that topped out at very 33:59.560 --> 34:03.980 good but bottomed out at so-so. 34:03.980 --> 34:07.270 What housing system so you choose? 34:07.270 --> 34:10.370 What education system do you choose? 34:10.370 --> 34:15.790 Those were special cases of the question Rawls is asking. 34:15.790 --> 34:18.520 What society do you choose from 34:18.520 --> 34:20.400 behind the veil of ignorance? 34:20.400 --> 34:26.160 And Rawls is very clear that the society that you choose 34:26.159 --> 34:30.339 has two basic commitments. 34:30.340 --> 34:37.050 The first is that when we are contracting into a social 34:37.050 --> 34:43.610 framework that will govern all aspects of our lives, the very 34:43.610 --> 34:50.320 first condition is that within that framework each person is 34:50.320 --> 34:55.810 to have an "equal right to the most extensive total system of 34:55.810 --> 34:59.370 equal basic liberties that is compatible with a similar 34:59.370 --> 35:03.770 system of liberty for all." That is, that each of us is to 35:03.770 --> 35:08.990 have equal rights to vote, rights to hold public office, 35:08.990 --> 35:12.950 freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, liberty of 35:12.950 --> 35:17.200 conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of person, 35:17.200 --> 35:21.660 right to hold property and freedom to be treated equally 35:21.660 --> 35:24.920 with respect to the rule of law. 35:24.920 --> 35:28.840 These, says Rawls, are non-negotiable and they're 35:28.840 --> 35:33.280 non-negotiable in the sense that if we offered you, from 35:33.280 --> 35:38.510 behind the veil of ignorance, the possibility of trading off 35:38.510 --> 35:43.310 some of these goods for the sake of utility, if you did 35:43.310 --> 35:47.310 not know which individual you were going to be in that 35:47.310 --> 35:52.590 society you would not make that trade. 35:52.590 --> 35:57.410 This is the way in which Rawls attempts to derive those 35:57.410 --> 36:01.000 inviolable principles, which we saw at the beginning of The 36:01.000 --> 36:08.920 Declaration of Independence, from the idea that these are 36:08.920 --> 36:13.630 lines in the sand that would be drawn in any social 36:13.630 --> 36:18.850 framework to which free, rational, self-interested, 36:18.850 --> 36:22.150 equal parties would sign on. 36:22.146 --> 36:27.396 So that's Rawls's first answer to the question, which society 36:27.400 --> 36:28.690 do you choose? 36:28.690 --> 36:33.140 You choose one that has a non-negotiable baseline right 36:33.140 --> 36:38.870 at the level of so-so or better, with respect to these 36:38.870 --> 36:40.940 fundamental liberties. 36:40.940 --> 36:46.540 These are things that don't get traded off for anything. 36:46.540 --> 36:48.670 In addition-- 36:48.670 --> 36:50.760 and somewhat more controversially-- 36:50.760 --> 36:57.590 says Rawls, you would, behind the veil of ignorance, 36:57.590 --> 37:03.740 subscribe to a societal structure where the 37:03.740 --> 37:10.000 distribution of social and economic inequalities followed 37:10.000 --> 37:14.060 a certain set of constraints. 37:14.060 --> 37:18.550 The first is, to the extent that social and economic 37:18.550 --> 37:24.660 inequalities arise in that society, they need to be 37:24.660 --> 37:29.660 attached to positions and offices that are open to all 37:29.660 --> 37:34.610 under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 37:34.610 --> 37:40.130 If attending an outstanding educational institution will 37:40.130 --> 37:44.560 increase the likelihood that you can go on to have a job, 37:44.560 --> 37:49.990 whereby you gain fulfillment and earn a disproportionate 37:49.990 --> 37:55.590 share of society's resources, then it needs to be the case, 37:55.590 --> 38:00.550 says Rawls, that those positions, those 38:00.550 --> 38:08.360 opportunities, are open to all regardless of contingencies of 38:08.360 --> 38:11.140 circumstance that are irrelevant to the possibility 38:11.140 --> 38:13.270 of their making use of them. 38:13.270 --> 38:18.990 In particular, your family's financial resources shouldn't 38:18.990 --> 38:26.320 play a role in your ability to access these opportunities. 38:26.320 --> 38:30.680 So fair equality of opportunity is the first 38:30.680 --> 38:36.360 condition that Rawls thinks needs to hold in order for 38:36.360 --> 38:41.660 social and economic inequalities to be acceptable 38:41.660 --> 38:47.220 to you from behind the veil of ignorance when you do not know 38:47.220 --> 38:49.880 who you will be. 38:49.880 --> 38:56.310 In addition, and even more controversially, Rawls thinks 38:56.310 --> 39:01.440 that behind the veil of ignorance it would be agreed 39:01.440 --> 39:09.690 by the parties that social and economic inequalities would be 39:09.690 --> 39:14.240 accepted as legitimate only to the extent that those 39:14.240 --> 39:18.940 inequalities are to the advantage of all. 39:18.940 --> 39:22.940 And, in particular, to the advantage of those who are 39:22.940 --> 39:25.270 least well off. 39:25.270 --> 39:30.940 So Rawls does not deny that a rising tide lifts all boats, 39:30.940 --> 39:35.290 that there may well be cases where allowing discrepancies 39:35.290 --> 39:41.050 in income or resources or educational opportunities or 39:41.050 --> 39:43.740 the quality of health care would-- 39:43.740 --> 39:45.520 as a matter of fact-- 39:45.520 --> 39:48.890 lead everybody to be better off. 39:48.890 --> 39:53.440 Perhaps the fact that there are research hospitals is of 39:53.440 --> 39:57.690 great value, even to those who don't have direct access to 39:57.690 --> 39:59.150 those hospitals. 39:59.150 --> 40:03.570 Nonetheless, it is because, and only because, those 40:03.570 --> 40:08.330 inequalities benefit the least well off that Rawls thinks 40:08.330 --> 40:13.880 they would be agreed to behind the veil of ignorance. 40:13.880 --> 40:18.660 Moreover, Rawls thinks that these principles, which I've 40:18.660 --> 40:19.460 articulated-- 40:19.460 --> 40:22.370 the first principle, the equal liberty principle, and the 40:22.370 --> 40:25.190 second principle, which tells us the conditions under which 40:25.190 --> 40:27.070 inequality is legitimate-- 40:27.070 --> 40:31.130 are what he calls "lexically ordered" so that no 40:31.130 --> 40:34.690 utilitarian trade-offs are permitted. 40:34.690 --> 40:42.690 In particular, there is no trading freedom for utility. 40:42.690 --> 40:49.330 If it would be advantageous to society as a whole to engage 40:49.330 --> 40:54.230 in a certain sort of racial profiling, for example, to 40:54.230 --> 41:00.230 reduce crime but in so doing the liberties of a certain 41:00.230 --> 41:06.680 group would be impinged upon, that utility consideration is 41:06.680 --> 41:10.360 not sufficient, says Rawls 41:10.360 --> 41:14.630 More over, as I've pointed out, on Rawls's picture, 41:14.630 --> 41:18.950 inequality is permitted only when the advantage goes to the 41:18.950 --> 41:21.000 least well off. 41:21.000 --> 41:24.420 So in the last three, four minutes of class, I want to do 41:24.415 --> 41:26.025 two more polls with you. 41:26.030 --> 41:30.840 So if your clickers are available, I want to see what 41:30.840 --> 41:33.320 your thoughts are on this. 41:33.320 --> 41:35.760 And if your thoughts diverge from Rawls, I'm going to give 41:35.760 --> 41:40.240 you four places to identify the locus of disagreement. 41:40.240 --> 41:42.170 So let's start with this. 41:42.170 --> 41:44.470 You're trying to choose among societies. 41:44.470 --> 41:50.980 Society one has an average income of $100,000 and 85% of 41:50.975 --> 41:54.805 its citizens have the right to vote and have freedom of 41:54.810 --> 41:57.730 conscience and religion and the like. 41:57.730 --> 42:02.540 That is, this is a society in which 15% of people lack basic 42:02.540 --> 42:05.800 civil rights but the average income is $100,000. 42:05.800 --> 42:09.870 Society number two has an average income of $70,000 and 42:09.870 --> 42:13.320 15% of the people lack basic rights. 42:13.320 --> 42:17.980 Society number three has an average income of $70,000 but 42:17.980 --> 42:22.170 100% of the people have basic freedoms. You're behind the 42:22.170 --> 42:23.250 veil of ignorance. 42:23.250 --> 42:28.080 You do not know whether you will be among the 15% in 42:28.080 --> 42:30.030 society one or two. 42:30.030 --> 42:35.170 As a matter of free, equal, self-interested rationality, 42:35.170 --> 42:37.880 which society do you choose? 42:37.880 --> 42:40.190 One, two, or three. 42:40.190 --> 42:42.360 And let's see how these numbers come out. 42:48.140 --> 42:51.520 It looks like the lexical priority of the first 42:51.520 --> 42:55.400 principle over the second is one over which there isn't a 42:55.400 --> 42:57.810 great deal of controversy. 42:57.810 --> 43:01.580 Let's try the difference principle. 43:01.580 --> 43:02.910 Three societies. 43:02.910 --> 43:05.340 You don't know who you will be. 43:05.340 --> 43:07.640 Society one: average income of $100,000. 43:07.640 --> 43:10.440 Lowest income: $10,000. 43:10.440 --> 43:13.330 Society number two: average income $70,000, 43:13.330 --> 43:15.610 lowest income, $10,000. 43:15.610 --> 43:18.940 Society number three: average income is $70,000, lowest 43:18.940 --> 43:20.240 income, $20,000. 43:20.240 --> 43:22.750 You do not know who you will be. 43:22.750 --> 43:25.740 Which society do you choose? 43:25.740 --> 43:28.470 And let's see how the numbers come out on 43:28.465 --> 43:29.715 the difference principle. 43:34.940 --> 43:37.250 OK. 43:37.250 --> 43:39.960 So, still, huh. 43:39.960 --> 43:42.690 Not as much difference as I had expected. 43:42.690 --> 43:47.610 Interesting to see, that most of you-- even here-- 43:47.610 --> 43:50.160 are egalitarian. 43:50.160 --> 43:57.520 Averse to an increase in the average if is at the cost to 43:57.520 --> 43:59.650 the least advantage. 43:59.650 --> 44:04.690 So for those of you who are in the 27% here and for those of 44:04.690 --> 44:07.960 you more generally who aren't accepting the Rawlsian 44:07.960 --> 44:12.060 framework, I want to point out four different places where 44:12.060 --> 44:16.090 you might be stepping away from him. 44:16.090 --> 44:19.640 The first is that you may disagree with him about what 44:19.640 --> 44:21.310 sorts of principles would be chosen 44:21.310 --> 44:23.210 behind the veil of ignorance. 44:23.210 --> 44:25.710 You might think that maximin reasoning-- 44:25.710 --> 44:28.630 remember in section 26 he says, behind the veil of 44:28.630 --> 44:30.480 ignorance, people would be risk-averse. 44:30.480 --> 44:34.520 They would distribute goods in such a way that they benefited 44:34.520 --> 44:35.810 the least well off. 44:35.810 --> 44:38.610 So you might deny that behind the veil of ignorance the 44:38.610 --> 44:40.970 principles that Rawls says would be 44:40.970 --> 44:42.990 chosen would be chosen. 44:42.990 --> 44:46.710 You might deny that it's the choice that one make behind 44:46.710 --> 44:49.520 the veil of ignorance that represents what free, equal, 44:49.520 --> 44:52.640 rational and self-interested persons would accept as 44:52.640 --> 44:54.410 fundamental terms of their association. 44:54.410 --> 44:57.040 That is, you might think the veil of ignorance is not an 44:57.040 --> 45:00.250 effective device of representation for answering 45:00.250 --> 45:03.940 the question which Rawls sets out to answer. 45:03.940 --> 45:08.630 Or you might think that what free, rational, 45:08.630 --> 45:11.660 self-interested equal persons would accept as fundamental 45:11.660 --> 45:16.000 terms of association is what the veil of ignorance gives 45:16.000 --> 45:23.280 you, but that doesn't determine what's just. 45:23.280 --> 45:24.760 Or you might think-- 45:24.760 --> 45:29.830 and we'll consider this answer in our lecture on Thursday-- 45:29.830 --> 45:34.260 that it's not the case that the first virtue of social 45:34.260 --> 45:36.730 institutions is justice. 45:36.730 --> 45:40.340 But rather that there are other values even more 45:40.340 --> 45:44.910 fundamental that lie at the center of political 45:44.910 --> 45:46.210 legitimacy. 45:46.210 --> 45:47.830 And we'll turn to that question in 45:47.830 --> 45:50.870 our lecture on Thursday.