WEBVTT 00:01.240 --> 00:04.190 Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time we turned to questions 00:04.192 --> 00:06.672 about the morality of suicide, and I started with two 00:06.668 --> 00:09.238 arguments that I called quick and dirty arguments. 00:09.240 --> 00:11.420 I suppose it would have been fairer to say that they were 00:11.422 --> 00:15.952 really theological arguments, or they were moral arguments 00:15.950 --> 00:20.930 that used, in part, theological premises. 00:20.930 --> 00:24.090 I suggested that, at least if we look at them in 00:24.090 --> 00:27.520 their quick and dirty versions, they were inadequate, 00:27.523 --> 00:30.933 and if we're going to make a more careful argument about the 00:30.931 --> 00:34.421 morality of suicide, we need to turn to a more 00:34.420 --> 00:38.570 systematic view about the contents of morality. 00:38.570 --> 00:41.770 We need to look at suicide in terms of the basic moral 00:41.774 --> 00:44.424 principles. Now, that's not something we've 00:44.420 --> 00:48.140 got the chance to do in detail, but I think we can at least say 00:48.140 --> 00:51.680 enough about a couple of basic approaches to the contents of 00:51.680 --> 00:53.860 morality, or the basic moral rules, 00:53.864 --> 00:56.774 to get the beginnings of an understanding of what might 00:56.768 --> 00:59.828 emerge about the morality of suicide if we were to do that 00:59.834 --> 01:03.044 more carefully. So, holding off on suicide for 01:03.036 --> 01:07.496 the moment, let's ask ourselves, what is it that makes an action 01:07.502 --> 01:10.552 morally acceptable or morally forbidden? 01:10.549 --> 01:13.399 This is, unsurprisingly, something that different moral 01:13.398 --> 01:14.768 theories disagree about. 01:14.769 --> 01:18.839 But there's at least one factor or one feature that all, 01:18.842 --> 01:22.102 or almost all, moral theories agree about. 01:22.099 --> 01:26.019 And that is that the consequences of your action 01:26.019 --> 01:28.319 matter. That is, we might or might not 01:28.316 --> 01:31.306 think that consequences are the only things that are 01:31.305 --> 01:34.185 morally relevant when we think about the morality of your 01:34.191 --> 01:36.571 action, but surely it is one 01:36.572 --> 01:39.312 thing that's morally relevant--what are the 01:39.313 --> 01:42.123 consequences of your action going to be. 01:42.120 --> 01:46.800 So, let's think about the morality of suicide with an eye 01:46.798 --> 01:50.108 towards consequences, bearing in mind that since 01:50.114 --> 01:53.124 we're talking about a moral point of view we need to take 01:53.118 --> 01:56.228 into account the consequences as they affect everybody. 01:56.230 --> 01:59.800 Now, the person who, of course, is most affected by 01:59.802 --> 02:03.162 suicide is, of course, the person who is killing 02:03.161 --> 02:05.791 themself. And at first glance it might 02:05.791 --> 02:09.261 seem pretty clear that the consequences of suicide are bad 02:09.255 --> 02:12.625 for that person. After all, the person was alive 02:12.626 --> 02:15.986 and now they're dead, and we normally would take 02:15.987 --> 02:17.987 death to be a bad result. 02:17.990 --> 02:21.180 If I were to tell you, "Oh, here's a switch on the 02:21.183 --> 02:23.343 wall. If you were to flip the switch, 02:23.335 --> 02:26.505 a thousand people who would otherwise be alive would end up 02:26.507 --> 02:28.747 dead," you would normally take that to 02:28.745 --> 02:32.175 be a pretty compelling argument against flipping the switch. 02:32.180 --> 02:33.960 Why? Because the result would be 02:33.956 --> 02:34.566 bad. Why? 02:34.572 --> 02:37.642 Because a thousand people would end up dead. 02:37.639 --> 02:41.589 Well, one person ending up dead isn't as bad as a thousand 02:41.590 --> 02:45.130 people ending up dead, but for all that shouldn't we 02:45.125 --> 02:47.685 still say it's a bad consequence? 02:47.690 --> 02:51.400 And as a result of that, shouldn't we say that however 02:51.395 --> 02:55.725 far appeal to consequences goes in terms of giving us our moral 02:55.730 --> 02:57.900 theory, don't we have to say in terms 02:57.901 --> 03:00.271 of consequences, or with regard to consequences, 03:00.270 --> 03:02.710 suicide is immoral? 03:02.710 --> 03:04.580 But not so quick! 03:04.580 --> 03:08.800 Even though it's true that normally death is a bad thing, 03:08.799 --> 03:11.059 it's not always a bad thing. 03:11.060 --> 03:15.330 This is the sort of thing that we've learned by thinking about 03:15.330 --> 03:18.410 what does the badness of death consist in. 03:18.409 --> 03:23.179 Typical cases are ones in which the person's dying robs them of 03:23.180 --> 03:27.720 a chunk of life that would've been good for them overall, 03:27.720 --> 03:31.140 and because of that dying then is bad for them. 03:31.139 --> 03:34.649 But in the kinds of cases that we're thinking about, 03:34.651 --> 03:38.301 cases where suicide would be rationally acceptable, 03:38.300 --> 03:41.430 and we're now asking whether or not it's morally acceptable--in 03:41.429 --> 03:44.349 those sorts of cases, at least the kind of paradigm 03:44.347 --> 03:47.987 examples that we've been focused on, the person is better off 03:47.985 --> 03:49.945 dead. They're better off dead, 03:49.946 --> 03:53.266 meaning that what life now holds out for them--although 03:53.267 --> 03:57.447 perhaps not negative through and through--is negative on balance. 03:57.450 --> 04:00.960 It's negative on balance; they're not better off 04:00.963 --> 04:02.633 continuing to live. 04:02.630 --> 04:04.830 They're better off dying. 04:04.830 --> 04:07.160 And that means, of course, that dying isn't bad 04:07.163 --> 04:09.043 for them, but rather good for them, 04:09.039 --> 04:13.639 and so their death is not a bad consequence, but rather a good 04:13.635 --> 04:16.665 consequence. Provided that you're prepared 04:16.667 --> 04:20.757 to accept the possibility of cases in which somebody would be 04:20.757 --> 04:24.777 better off if their life ended sooner rather than later, 04:24.779 --> 04:28.809 we're led to the conclusion that--from the moral point of 04:28.811 --> 04:32.271 view as far as focusing on consequences goes--the 04:32.266 --> 04:36.366 consequences might actually be good rather than bad if the 04:36.370 --> 04:38.890 person were to kill themself. 04:38.889 --> 04:42.269 They will free themself, let's suppose, 04:42.269 --> 04:47.249 of the suffering they would otherwise have to undergo. 04:47.250 --> 04:50.410 Well, that's--first glance said, consequences says 04:50.409 --> 04:52.749 suicide's wrong. Second glance says, 04:52.745 --> 04:55.035 consequences says, as least in certain 04:55.035 --> 04:57.135 circumstances, suicide's right. 04:57.139 --> 05:01.489 Of course, third glance suggests, we can't just focus on 05:01.486 --> 05:06.146 consequences for the person who is contemplating suicide. 05:06.149 --> 05:09.349 Because from the point of view of morality we have to look at 05:09.350 --> 05:11.110 the consequences for everybody. 05:11.110 --> 05:17.700 Who else might get affected by the death or suicide of the 05:17.699 --> 05:20.579 person? Well, the most obvious people 05:20.578 --> 05:24.258 for us to think about at that point then are the family and 05:24.255 --> 05:27.995 loved ones--the people who most directly know about and care 05:27.996 --> 05:31.226 about the person who is contemplating suicide. 05:31.230 --> 05:35.560 And again--I'm running out of glances, but at first glance you 05:35.556 --> 05:38.536 might say, well, there the consequences are 05:38.535 --> 05:41.865 clearly bad. When the person kills themself 05:41.865 --> 05:45.595 that causes, typically, a great deal of distress for 05:45.596 --> 05:50.276 the family and friends of the person who has killed themself. 05:50.279 --> 05:53.359 Even if that's true, we now have to ask, 05:53.358 --> 05:56.198 how do the consequences weigh out? 05:56.199 --> 06:01.049 After all, we live in a world in which no single act typically 06:01.052 --> 06:04.722 has only good consequences, or no single act has bad 06:04.721 --> 06:06.991 consequences and only bad consequences. 06:06.990 --> 06:10.600 Often our choices are mixed packages where we have to ask 06:10.596 --> 06:14.396 whether the good that we can do is greater than the bad that 06:14.396 --> 06:18.386 we'd be doing with this act or that act or some third act. 06:18.389 --> 06:21.109 Even if there are, then, negative consequences in 06:21.106 --> 06:24.506 terms of distress to the family, friends, and loved ones, 06:24.513 --> 06:27.733 of the person who kills themself, that might still be 06:27.727 --> 06:31.557 outweighed by the benefit to the person himself or herself, 06:31.560 --> 06:34.980 if it was really the case that he or she would be better off 06:34.976 --> 06:35.436 dying. 06:35.440 --> 06:39.330 06:39.329 --> 06:43.939 But it's also worth bearing in mind that insofar as we're 06:43.942 --> 06:49.052 thinking about people who love and care about the person who is 06:49.048 --> 06:54.058 considering dying, then they may actually overall, 06:54.061 --> 07:00.261 on balance, be relieved that the suffering of their loved one 07:00.257 --> 07:02.527 has come to an end. 07:02.529 --> 07:07.509 We will, of course, all be horribly distressed that 07:07.513 --> 07:11.603 nature, or the Fates, or what have you, 07:11.600 --> 07:15.620 has brought it about that this person's choices are now reduced 07:15.623 --> 07:18.093 to killing themself on the one hand, 07:18.089 --> 07:22.209 or continuing the terminal stages of some illness where 07:22.211 --> 07:24.961 they're incapacitated and in pain. 07:24.959 --> 07:28.389 We will, of course, wish there was a serious 07:28.390 --> 07:31.820 prospect of a cure, some chance of recovery, 07:31.821 --> 07:35.971 wish they'd never gotten ill in the first place. 07:35.970 --> 07:40.460 But given the limited choices, continued suffering and pain, 07:40.460 --> 07:43.890 on the one hand, or having an end to that 07:43.890 --> 07:47.930 suffering and pain, if the person can rationally 07:47.925 --> 07:52.385 assess their prospects and reasonably come to believe 07:52.390 --> 07:56.930 they're better off dead, then that's a judgment their 07:56.929 --> 07:59.709 loved ones can come to share as well. 07:59.709 --> 08:02.959 They may well regret the fact--more than regret, 08:02.959 --> 08:06.619 curse the fact--that these are the only choices 08:06.623 --> 08:09.583 they've got, but still, given the limited 08:09.579 --> 08:12.749 choices they may agree, they may come to agree, 08:12.750 --> 08:16.090 better to put an end to the suffering. 08:16.089 --> 08:20.089 And so when the person kills themself, they may second that 08:20.089 --> 08:21.889 choice. They may say, 08:21.888 --> 08:26.418 "At least they're not in pain and agony anymore." 08:26.420 --> 08:29.350 So, if we look at it from the point of view of 08:29.354 --> 08:32.554 consequences--in fact, suppose we had a moral view 08:32.548 --> 08:36.458 that said consequences aren't just one thing that was morally 08:36.461 --> 08:40.961 relevant in thinking about what makes an action right or wrong. 08:40.960 --> 08:44.810 Suppose we took the bold claim that consequences are the only 08:44.814 --> 08:46.874 thing that's morally relevant. 08:46.870 --> 08:49.540 There are moral views that take this position. 08:49.539 --> 08:52.839 I suppose the best-known example of this kind of 08:52.838 --> 08:56.908 consequence-only approach to morality is utilitarianism. 08:56.909 --> 09:00.809 Utilitarianism is the moral doctrine that says right and 09:00.814 --> 09:05.144 wrong is a matter of producing as much happiness for everybody 09:05.144 --> 09:08.434 as possible, counting everybody's happiness 09:08.426 --> 09:10.666 equally. And when you can't produce 09:10.668 --> 09:14.168 happiness, then at least trying to minimize the misery and 09:14.174 --> 09:18.114 suffering, counting everybody's misery and suffering equally. 09:18.110 --> 09:22.570 So, suppose we accept this utilitarian position. 09:22.570 --> 09:27.460 What conclusions would we come to then about the morality of 09:27.461 --> 09:30.811 suicide? I suppose the conclusion would 09:30.805 --> 09:33.065 be a kind of moderate one. 09:33.070 --> 09:36.910 On the one hand, we'd be rejecting the extreme 09:36.911 --> 09:41.011 that says suicide is never morally acceptable, 09:41.009 --> 09:44.529 because to say that, you'd have to be claiming 09:44.530 --> 09:48.130 suicide always has bad consequences overall. 09:48.129 --> 09:50.749 And that strikes me, although it's an empirical 09:50.746 --> 09:54.326 claim, it strikes me as a rather implausible empirical claim. 09:54.330 --> 09:58.180 It's, sadly enough, not too difficult to describe 09:58.183 --> 10:03.163 cases in which the results may actually be better if the person 10:03.161 --> 10:08.221 kills themself rather than having their suffering continue. 10:08.220 --> 10:12.350 It may be better for them and better for their family. 10:12.350 --> 10:15.310 On the other hand, we certainly wouldn't want--if 10:15.308 --> 10:19.068 we were utilitarians--we also wouldn't want to go to the other 10:19.067 --> 10:22.577 extreme and say suicide is always morally acceptable, 10:22.580 --> 10:25.740 because, of course, to say that it's always morally 10:25.735 --> 10:29.515 acceptable is to say that the consequences are never bad when 10:29.521 --> 10:30.911 you kill yourself. 10:30.909 --> 10:34.719 And that's also pretty obviously an implausible thing 10:34.723 --> 10:36.823 to claim. You guys are young, 10:36.816 --> 10:39.726 you're healthy, you've got a great future in 10:39.726 --> 10:42.186 front of you. If you were to kill yourself, 10:42.186 --> 10:43.606 the results wouldn't be good. 10:43.610 --> 10:47.220 The results would be worse overall than if you had 10:47.223 --> 10:49.733 refrained from killing yourself. 10:49.730 --> 10:53.140 So, the utilitarian position is in the middle. 10:53.139 --> 10:56.549 It doesn't say suicide's never acceptable, doesn't say suicide 10:56.545 --> 10:57.825 is always acceptable. 10:57.830 --> 11:00.550 It says, perhaps unsurprisingly, 11:00.551 --> 11:04.581 it's sometimes acceptable; it depends on the facts. 11:04.580 --> 11:06.180 It depends on the results. 11:06.179 --> 11:11.269 It depends on comparing the results of this action, 11:11.273 --> 11:15.763 killing yourself, to the alternatives open to 11:15.755 --> 11:18.225 you. We have to ask, 11:18.232 --> 11:21.892 is your life worse than nothing? 11:21.889 --> 11:26.249 Is there some medical procedure available to you that would cure 11:26.254 --> 11:27.174 you? If there is, 11:27.170 --> 11:28.960 and even if your life is worse than nothing, 11:28.963 --> 11:31.343 that still doesn't make it the best choice in terms of the 11:31.339 --> 11:33.829 consequences. Getting medical help is a 11:33.826 --> 11:37.156 preferable choice in terms of the consequences. 11:37.159 --> 11:41.019 We can even think of cases where your life is worse than 11:41.016 --> 11:43.536 nothing, you'd be better off dead, 11:43.539 --> 11:46.429 and there is no medical alternative of a cure available 11:46.433 --> 11:49.693 to you, but for all that, it still isn't morally 11:49.690 --> 11:53.060 legitimate to kill yourself in terms of the utilitarian 11:53.063 --> 11:54.993 outlook. Because, as always, 11:54.989 --> 11:58.379 we have to think about the consequences for others. 11:58.379 --> 12:03.229 And there may be others who'd be so adversely affected by your 12:03.230 --> 12:07.600 death that the harm to them outweighs the cost to you of 12:07.603 --> 12:09.753 keeping yourself alive. 12:09.750 --> 12:13.950 Suppose, for example, that you're the single parent 12:13.950 --> 12:15.630 of young children. 12:15.629 --> 12:19.929 You've got a kind of moral obligation to look after them. 12:19.929 --> 12:26.779 If you were to die, they'd really have it horribly. 12:26.779 --> 12:29.749 It's conceivable then, in cases like that, 12:29.747 --> 12:34.087 the suffering of your children, were you to kill yourself, 12:34.090 --> 12:38.110 would outweigh the suffering that you'd have to undergo were 12:38.110 --> 12:42.130 you to keep yourself alive for the sake of your children. 12:42.130 --> 12:44.860 So, it all depends on the facts. 12:44.860 --> 12:49.520 Still, if we accept the utilitarian position, 12:49.515 --> 12:53.955 we do end up with a moderate conclusion. 12:53.960 --> 12:58.400 In certain circumstances suicide will be morally 12:58.397 --> 13:03.907 justified--roughly speaking, in those cases where you're 13:03.914 --> 13:10.084 better off dead and the effects on others aren't so great as to 13:10.079 --> 13:13.849 outweigh that. Those will be the paradigm 13:13.851 --> 13:17.941 cases in which suicide makes sense or is legitimate, 13:17.935 --> 13:20.895 morally speaking, from the utilitarian 13:20.898 --> 13:23.118 perspective. But of course, 13:23.119 --> 13:26.309 that doesn't mean that suicide is indeed ever morally 13:26.310 --> 13:29.070 legitimate. Because we don't necessarily 13:29.067 --> 13:32.587 want to embrace the utilitarian theory of morality. 13:32.590 --> 13:36.210 Utilitarianism is what you get, roughly speaking, 13:36.214 --> 13:40.594 when we say consequences matter and they're all that 13:40.593 --> 13:44.603 matters. But most of us are inclined to 13:44.602 --> 13:50.292 think that there's more to morality than consequences. 13:50.289 --> 13:53.849 Most of us are inclined to think that there are cases in 13:53.848 --> 13:56.758 which actions can have bad results--rather, 13:56.759 --> 14:01.139 actions can have good results and yet, for all that, 14:01.143 --> 14:03.123 be morally forbidden. 14:03.120 --> 14:05.580 Or actions could have bad results and yet, 14:05.584 --> 14:08.114 for all that, still be morally required. 14:08.110 --> 14:12.000 That's not to say that consequences don't matter 14:12.001 --> 14:13.751 morally; it's to claim, 14:13.746 --> 14:17.216 rather, that consequences aren't the only thing 14:17.218 --> 14:18.788 that matters morally. 14:18.789 --> 14:22.539 Consequences can be outweighed by other morally relevant 14:22.538 --> 14:26.078 factors. Well, that's the position 14:26.075 --> 14:31.665 that's held by the branch of moral theory known as 14:31.671 --> 14:35.771 deontology. So deontologists say other 14:35.773 --> 14:40.013 things matter morally besides consequences. 14:40.009 --> 14:42.089 In deciding whether your action is right or wrong, 14:42.086 --> 14:44.116 you have to pay attention to the consequences, 14:44.120 --> 14:48.220 but you have to pay attention to other things as well. 14:48.220 --> 14:49.180 What other things? 14:49.179 --> 14:52.999 Well, unsurprisingly, this is an area then in which 14:53.001 --> 14:57.211 different deontologists will disagree one to the next in 14:57.205 --> 15:01.555 terms of what else they want to add to the list of morally 15:01.562 --> 15:03.322 relevant factors. 15:03.320 --> 15:07.500 But there's one kind of additional factor that most of 15:07.500 --> 15:12.390 us in our deontological moods would want to add to the list, 15:12.389 --> 15:14.519 and that's this--so one, at any rate, 15:14.521 --> 15:17.481 that's relevant I think, most directly relevant for 15:17.481 --> 15:19.081 thinking about suicide. 15:19.080 --> 15:24.680 That factor is the factor of not just what was the upshot of 15:24.677 --> 15:29.797 your action but how you produced that upshot; 15:29.799 --> 15:34.699 not just what the results were, but what was your means 15:34.701 --> 15:39.121 of getting those results and more particularly still, 15:39.120 --> 15:44.750 did you have to harm anybody to produce the results? 15:44.750 --> 15:50.400 Most of us are inclined to think it's wrong to harm people, 15:50.398 --> 15:53.318 or at least innocent people. 15:53.320 --> 15:57.060 It's wrong to harm innocent people even if the results of 15:57.057 --> 15:58.857 doing that might be good. 15:58.860 --> 16:01.880 Now, I threw in the qualification about innocent 16:01.883 --> 16:04.783 people because, of course, it's also true that 16:04.779 --> 16:08.509 most of us are inclined to think that self-defense might be 16:08.510 --> 16:10.890 justified. Harming people who are 16:10.894 --> 16:14.834 attacking you or your friends or your fellow countrymen--that may 16:14.833 --> 16:17.963 be legitimate. And so it's not as though we 16:17.958 --> 16:21.818 want to say it's never legitimate to harm somebody. 16:21.820 --> 16:25.020 But those people are guilty; they're aggressors. 16:25.019 --> 16:28.759 What most of us in our deontological moods are inclined 16:28.756 --> 16:31.726 to think is it's never legitimate to harm an 16:31.731 --> 16:33.601 innocent person. 16:33.600 --> 16:39.580 And the crucial point is that's true even if the results would 16:39.583 --> 16:42.913 be better. Look, there's no debate between 16:42.907 --> 16:47.197 deontologists and utilitarians about harming innocent people in 16:47.203 --> 16:49.863 the normal case, because normally of course--you 16:49.864 --> 16:51.864 know, suppose I, to make an example--to end the 16:51.859 --> 16:54.989 class with a nice big bang, right--I brought my Uzi 16:54.988 --> 16:57.758 sub-machine gun. I now take it and go 16:57.758 --> 17:00.168 rat-a-tat-tat, killing 15 of you. 17:00.169 --> 17:04.409 Well, that would not be something that would have good 17:04.410 --> 17:06.630 results. And so, clearly, 17:06.633 --> 17:11.353 the utilitarian is going to reject that as well as the 17:11.346 --> 17:14.236 deontologist. They're in agreement about that. 17:14.240 --> 17:16.870 In the typical case, killing an innocent person has 17:16.865 --> 17:18.225 bad results, harms them. 17:18.230 --> 17:20.390 It's wrong, full stop, we're done. 17:20.390 --> 17:26.960 But what should we say about cases where killing an innocent 17:26.961 --> 17:30.081 person has better results? 17:30.079 --> 17:32.799 In real life, it's hard to think of cases 17:32.799 --> 17:36.879 like that, but we can at least go "science-fictiony" and tell 17:36.880 --> 17:40.540 an example. So, here is one of my favorite 17:40.539 --> 17:43.179 examples in moral philosophy. 17:43.180 --> 17:47.530 Suppose that we have five patients in a hospital who are 17:47.529 --> 17:52.589 going to die because of organ failures of one sort or another. 17:52.589 --> 17:55.739 One of them needs a heart transplant, one of them needs a 17:55.743 --> 17:58.163 kidney transplant, one of them needs a liver 17:58.164 --> 18:00.364 transplant, and so forth and so on. 18:00.359 --> 18:02.579 Unfortunately, because of tissue 18:02.577 --> 18:05.867 incompatibilities, even as they begin to die we 18:05.868 --> 18:10.158 can't use the organs from the ones that have died to save the 18:10.160 --> 18:14.350 others. Meanwhile, here in the hospital 18:14.352 --> 18:17.722 for a routine check-up is John. 18:17.720 --> 18:19.840 John's perfectly healthy. 18:19.839 --> 18:24.989 And as you're doing your exams on him you discover that he's 18:24.988 --> 18:29.878 exactly suitable to be an organ donor for all five of the 18:29.875 --> 18:33.355 patients. And it occurs to you that if 18:33.359 --> 18:38.389 you were to find some way to kill him, but cover up the cause 18:38.393 --> 18:43.263 of death so it looked like he died of some unexpected freak 18:43.259 --> 18:46.699 seizure, you could then use his organs 18:46.700 --> 18:48.160 to save the five. 18:48.160 --> 18:50.970 This one gets the kidney, that one gets the other kidney, 18:50.972 --> 18:53.382 that one gets the heart, that one gets the liver, 18:53.382 --> 18:54.992 and that one gets the lungs. 18:54.990 --> 18:57.950 So your choice, roughly, is this. 18:57.950 --> 19:01.590 Just give John his routine medical exam, 19:01.586 --> 19:05.686 in which case the five other patients die, 19:05.690 --> 19:09.300 or chop up John, kill him and chop him up, 19:09.303 --> 19:13.273 using his organs to save the five patients. 19:13.269 --> 19:18.539 Well, what should we say is the right thing to do the organ 19:18.535 --> 19:22.145 transplant case? In terms of consequences it 19:22.154 --> 19:25.464 looks as though, if we tell the story right at 19:25.461 --> 19:29.651 least, the results would be better if we chop up John. 19:29.650 --> 19:31.850 After all, it's one versus five. 19:31.849 --> 19:34.829 And although the death of John is a horrible bad result, 19:34.827 --> 19:37.477 the death of the five is a horrible bad result. 19:37.480 --> 19:42.010 And so the results would be better if we were to kill 19:42.007 --> 19:44.517 innocent John. Well, if we had more time we 19:44.516 --> 19:46.546 could argue about are the results really going to be 19:46.551 --> 19:48.321 better, is that a realistic story--what 19:48.318 --> 19:50.478 have you--are there other long-term effects on the 19:50.481 --> 19:53.131 healthcare profession that we haven't taken into account? 19:53.130 --> 19:56.800 But we don't have time to really pursue this story in 19:56.804 --> 19:59.634 detail. Let's just suppose we could 19:59.626 --> 20:02.376 eventually get the details right; 20:02.380 --> 20:07.130 the results really would be better if we chopped up John. 20:07.130 --> 20:08.520 Is that the right thing to do? 20:08.519 --> 20:11.489 Well, maybe utilitarianism says it's the right thing to do, 20:11.489 --> 20:14.299 but it's precisely for that reason that most of us would 20:14.304 --> 20:16.614 then say, you know, there's more to 20:16.612 --> 20:19.242 morality than what utilitarianism says. 20:19.240 --> 20:22.990 Now, whether that objection is a good one is a very, 20:22.990 --> 20:26.800 very complicated question, and if you want--if you'd like 20:26.804 --> 20:30.264 to pursue it--if you want to pursue it--then I invite you to 20:30.255 --> 20:33.175 take an introductory class in moral philosophy. 20:33.180 --> 20:36.610 For our purposes, let's just suppose that most of 20:36.606 --> 20:40.246 us are on board with the deontologists when they say 20:40.247 --> 20:44.457 there's more to morality than what the utilitarian has, 20:44.460 --> 20:46.820 and this example brings it out. 20:46.819 --> 20:51.209 It's wrong to kill somebody who is innocent even though by 20:51.208 --> 20:55.748 hypothesis the results would be better--it's five to one. 20:55.750 --> 21:00.740 People have a right to life, a right not to be killed. 21:00.740 --> 21:04.150 And that right weighs in when we're deciding what to do 21:04.148 --> 21:07.998 morally, so that it's wrong to kill an innocent person even if 21:07.998 --> 21:10.458 the results really would be better. 21:10.460 --> 21:14.800 All right, let's suppose we agree with that--accept that. 21:14.799 --> 21:17.969 Again, in a fuller class on moral philosophy we'd have to 21:17.966 --> 21:20.676 ask ourselves what is the basis of that right, 21:20.680 --> 21:23.170 what other deontological rights do people have, 21:23.170 --> 21:25.660 what exactly are the contours of that right? 21:25.660 --> 21:29.000 But here we can just ask, suppose we accept a right like 21:28.999 --> 21:32.519 that, what are the implications of that for the morality of 21:32.521 --> 21:36.101 suicide? And now, it seems what we have 21:36.102 --> 21:38.862 to say is, suicide is wrong. 21:38.860 --> 21:41.660 Suicide is morally unacceptable. 21:41.660 --> 21:46.370 Because when I kill myself, well, I'm killing somebody. 21:46.369 --> 21:49.699 And didn't we just say as deontologists that killing an 21:49.699 --> 21:53.029 innocent person--and I'm an innocent person--killing an 21:53.028 --> 21:55.308 innocent person is morally wrong? 21:55.310 --> 21:57.040 Well, I'm a person. 21:57.039 --> 21:59.879 So, killing me is morally wrong. 21:59.880 --> 22:03.810 And it's not really any help to come back and say, 22:03.810 --> 22:08.780 but look, we've stipulated that this is a case where the person 22:08.784 --> 22:10.634 is better off dead. 22:10.630 --> 22:14.510 The results will really be better overall if he kills 22:14.513 --> 22:16.563 himself. Yeah, that's right. 22:16.560 --> 22:18.310 Maybe that is right. 22:18.309 --> 22:22.839 It doesn't matter--because as deontologists we said the right 22:22.839 --> 22:26.689 to life is so powerful it outweighs consequences. 22:26.690 --> 22:30.880 Just as it was wrong to chop up John, even though the results 22:30.880 --> 22:34.440 would be better--five versus one--it's wrong to kill 22:34.442 --> 22:37.602 yourself, even if the results would 22:37.601 --> 22:39.571 be better. Even if that's the only way to 22:39.567 --> 22:41.677 put yourself out of pain, and those are good results, 22:41.677 --> 22:42.527 it doesn't matter. 22:42.529 --> 22:46.859 The right to life outweighs the appeal to consequences. 22:46.859 --> 22:52.169 So as deontologists, it seems, we have to say 22:52.173 --> 22:56.283 suicide is forbidden--full stop. 22:56.279 --> 22:59.329 Well, as usual in philosophy, it's not quite as simple as 22:59.328 --> 23:02.558 that. One possible response somebody 23:02.563 --> 23:06.373 might make is, but look, morality is only 23:06.367 --> 23:09.027 about how I treat others. 23:09.029 --> 23:13.039 It's not about how I treat myself. 23:13.039 --> 23:17.629 And if we were to accept that claim, then we could say the 23:17.632 --> 23:21.422 right to life only covers how I treat others. 23:21.420 --> 23:23.710 In particular, it rules out my killing other 23:23.711 --> 23:26.111 people even when the results would be good. 23:26.109 --> 23:29.609 But it doesn't have any implications for how I treat 23:29.612 --> 23:32.232 myself. And in particular then, 23:32.233 --> 23:36.503 if the right to life doesn't exclude self-killing, 23:36.503 --> 23:39.643 well then, suicide is acceptable. 23:39.640 --> 23:44.230 That's a possible moral view, but I find it rather 23:44.228 --> 23:48.058 implausible. If we were to start to explain 23:48.060 --> 23:53.270 what it is about you that explains why it's wrong for me 23:53.269 --> 23:55.979 to kill you, we'd start saying things about 23:55.980 --> 23:58.880 how, well, you're a person and, as such, you've got all these 23:58.882 --> 24:00.432 plans and so forth and so on. 24:00.430 --> 24:03.730 And as a person, you've got certain rights, 24:03.728 --> 24:07.418 certain things that shouldn't be done to you. 24:07.420 --> 24:09.920 You're not just, --This is the thought that lies 24:09.924 --> 24:12.274 behind much deontological thinking, right? 24:12.270 --> 24:13.890 People aren't objects. 24:13.890 --> 24:18.010 We can't just destroy them for the sake of better results. 24:18.010 --> 24:20.480 Well, that's right; people aren't objects. 24:20.480 --> 24:24.500 But of course, I'm a person too. 24:24.500 --> 24:28.150 And so when I contemplate killing myself, 24:28.154 --> 24:31.814 I'm contemplating destroying a person. 24:31.809 --> 24:37.289 So, it's at least difficult to see why we would accept the 24:37.285 --> 24:43.045 claim that morality only governs how I treat other people. 24:43.049 --> 24:46.799 It seems--although the issue is a complicated one, 24:46.802 --> 24:51.172 which we don't have time to pursue further today--it seems 24:51.167 --> 24:55.687 to me more plausible to say morality includes rules not only 24:55.685 --> 25:00.505 governing how I treat others but also how I treat myself. 25:00.509 --> 25:03.219 Yet, if that's right, and if among the moral rules 25:03.220 --> 25:05.930 are a right to life, a prohibition against harming 25:05.931 --> 25:06.541 people, 25:06.540 --> 25:09.910 25:09.910 --> 25:16.400 then don't we have to say, look, it's wrong from the 25:16.396 --> 25:22.116 deontological perspective to kill yourself. 25:22.119 --> 25:24.009 Well, of course, the natural response to this 25:24.008 --> 25:25.638 line of thought is to say, but look, 25:25.640 --> 25:29.760 when I kill myself--unlike the case of chopping up John to save 25:29.760 --> 25:35.140 five others--when I kill myself, I'm doing it for my own 25:35.144 --> 25:37.824 sake. I'm harming myself for my 25:37.823 --> 25:41.233 own sake. That seems highly relevant in 25:41.228 --> 25:43.998 thinking about the morality of suicide. 25:44.000 --> 25:47.240 25:47.240 --> 25:49.730 It does seem relevant, though it's not 100 % clear 25:49.732 --> 25:51.312 what to do with that thought. 25:51.309 --> 25:54.809 Here are two possible interpretations of that thought. 25:54.809 --> 25:57.499 First of all, you might think that the 25:57.503 --> 26:01.733 relevance of saying that I'm harming myself for my own sake 26:01.726 --> 26:04.326 is this. If I'm harming myself for my 26:04.325 --> 26:07.645 own sake, what I'm saying is, despite the fact that I'm 26:07.654 --> 26:09.754 harming myself, I'm better off. 26:09.750 --> 26:13.420 After all, we stipulated that we were focusing on cases in 26:13.421 --> 26:15.291 which suicide was rational. 26:15.289 --> 26:17.069 So, the person is better off dead. 26:17.069 --> 26:20.599 If they're better off dead, then although it's certainly 26:20.599 --> 26:23.739 true that there's a sense in which they're harming 26:23.743 --> 26:26.893 themself--I mean killing yourself is doing harm to 26:26.887 --> 26:30.157 yourself--still it's not harm overall. 26:30.160 --> 26:32.910 The bottom line, we were imagining, 26:32.908 --> 26:35.898 is positive when you kill yourself. 26:35.900 --> 26:40.070 And so, although, unlike the case of John where 26:40.072 --> 26:45.602 you've harmed him and benefited others--so you have harmed him 26:45.604 --> 26:51.364 overall--in the case of suicide, when I harm myself to avoid the 26:51.357 --> 26:55.847 suffering I would otherwise go through, I'm not really, 26:55.849 --> 27:00.869 as we might say, harming myself overall. 27:00.869 --> 27:05.229 So, perhaps the deontological prohibition against harm is 27:05.225 --> 27:09.965 really a prohibition against harming people overall. 27:09.970 --> 27:15.200 Look, you've got some sort of a disease in your--infection in 27:15.197 --> 27:20.767 your leg that has now spread and it's going to kill you unless we 27:20.773 --> 27:22.693 amputate your leg. 27:22.690 --> 27:25.440 So, you go into surgery and the surgeon chops off your leg. 27:25.440 --> 27:27.820 Has he done something immoral? 27:27.819 --> 27:29.769 It doesn't seem as though he has. 27:29.769 --> 27:32.579 But after all, he chopped off your leg! 27:32.580 --> 27:34.880 He harmed you! You used to have a leg and now 27:34.875 --> 27:35.855 you don't have one. 27:35.859 --> 27:41.539 Well, what we want to say is he didn't harm you overall. 27:41.539 --> 27:44.849 He harmed you in such a way that it was the only way to 27:44.850 --> 27:48.470 leave you better off bottom line, and that's not a violation 27:48.468 --> 27:50.428 of the rule against harming. 27:50.430 --> 27:53.760 At least, that's a possible thing to say. 27:53.759 --> 27:56.989 And if that's the right thing to say, then maybe that's what 27:56.994 --> 27:59.684 we should say about the suicide case yet again. 27:59.680 --> 28:02.580 Yeah, there's a deontological prohibition against harming 28:02.579 --> 28:04.549 innocent people, but what it's really a 28:04.547 --> 28:08.387 prohibition against, is leaving them worse off 28:08.392 --> 28:11.082 overall. And when I kill myself, 28:11.081 --> 28:14.281 I'm not leaving myself worse off overall. 28:14.279 --> 28:16.789 And if that's right, then even from the 28:16.791 --> 28:19.901 deontological perspective suicide may be morally 28:19.898 --> 28:23.048 legitimate. Well, that's at least one 28:23.051 --> 28:27.461 possible way to carry out the deontological stand, 28:27.460 --> 28:29.790 one possible way of interpreting the remark, 28:29.787 --> 28:33.277 "But look, when I kill myself, I'm doing it for my own 28:33.283 --> 28:36.473 benefit." Here's another possible way of 28:36.465 --> 28:38.635 interpreting that thought. 28:38.640 --> 28:42.380 When I kill myself, given that I'm doing it for my 28:42.381 --> 28:46.811 own benefit, I've obviously got my own agreement. 28:46.809 --> 28:49.569 I can't kill myself against my will. 28:49.569 --> 28:53.259 Suicide is something you do to yourself. 28:53.259 --> 28:57.069 And so, I have my own consent to what I'm doing. 28:57.070 --> 29:00.430 That seems pretty important. 29:00.430 --> 29:02.640 Notice how different it is from the case of John. 29:02.640 --> 29:07.600 When I chopped up John, I imagine I don't have John's 29:07.600 --> 29:10.980 approval. Consent seems to be present in 29:10.977 --> 29:15.707 the case of suicide but not in the case of chopping up John. 29:15.710 --> 29:19.840 Maybe that's morally relevant as well. 29:19.839 --> 29:23.569 Now, to accept that view is, of course, to say we need to 29:23.568 --> 29:27.228 add yet another factor into our deontological theory. 29:27.230 --> 29:29.230 We have consequences, we have harm doing, 29:29.230 --> 29:31.630 but we also have the factor of consent. 29:31.630 --> 29:38.650 And so we need to think about the moral relevance of having 29:38.650 --> 29:42.040 the consent of the victim. 29:42.039 --> 29:46.769 And once we start thinking about that, I think most of us 29:46.770 --> 29:52.090 would be inclined to accept the conclusion that consent can make 29:52.091 --> 29:57.241 it acceptable to do to someone what would normally be wrong in 29:57.243 --> 30:00.203 the absence of their consent. 30:00.200 --> 30:02.500 By the by, you'll notice that that seems to be one of the 30:02.502 --> 30:04.972 things that's relevant in thinking about the surgery case, 30:04.970 --> 30:07.680 not the organ transplant case but the performing the 30:07.683 --> 30:11.933 amputation of the leg, to save the person who would 30:11.929 --> 30:16.209 otherwise die. Surely it seems relevant that 30:16.207 --> 30:21.487 the patient has given you permission to operate on them. 30:21.490 --> 30:23.800 Here's another example that shows you the relevance of 30:23.795 --> 30:26.685 consent. It would not be okay--it would 30:26.691 --> 30:31.531 not be morally acceptable for me to go up and hit you in the 30:31.533 --> 30:34.563 nose. Just like it wouldn't be okay 30:34.563 --> 30:38.823 for you to go up and hit me in the face or the gut. 30:38.819 --> 30:46.159 And yet, boxing matches are, I suppose, morally acceptable. 30:46.160 --> 30:49.910 Why is that? Because from a deontological 30:49.906 --> 30:54.876 perspective the answer is, when people are boxing they've 30:54.879 --> 30:57.949 agreed to it. I give you permission to hit 30:57.949 --> 31:01.479 me, or at least to try to hit me, in exchange for your giving 31:01.484 --> 31:04.964 me permission to hit you, or at least to try to hit you. 31:04.960 --> 31:08.920 And it's the presence of that consent that makes it 31:08.917 --> 31:13.547 permissible for you to harm me, assuming that you're a better 31:13.550 --> 31:16.760 boxer than I am, which I'm confident would have 31:16.755 --> 31:20.735 to be the case. So, consent makes it legitimate 31:20.744 --> 31:24.634 to harm people, even though in the absence of 31:24.626 --> 31:27.886 consent it wouldn't be legitimate. 31:27.890 --> 31:31.100 All right, if that's right, then bring that thought home to 31:31.101 --> 31:33.151 thinking about the case of suicide. 31:33.150 --> 31:37.910 Suicide might be wrong, because after all I'm a person, 31:37.912 --> 31:42.292 at first glance. But since I'm killing myself, 31:42.291 --> 31:45.181 I've given myself permission. 31:45.180 --> 31:48.950 I've given myself consent to harm myself. 31:48.950 --> 31:53.300 And if consent makes it permissible to do what would 31:53.304 --> 31:56.984 normally be forbidden, then consent makes it 31:56.975 --> 32:00.215 permissible for me to kill myself. 32:00.220 --> 32:04.500 And so, now we're led again to the conclusion that from a more 32:04.498 --> 32:08.428 fully developed deontological perspective we ought to say 32:08.426 --> 32:12.276 suicide is permissible, at least if we're prepared to 32:12.279 --> 32:16.329 throw in this kind of factor of consent and think that it can 32:16.332 --> 32:20.452 just wipe out the protections that would otherwise normally be 32:20.454 --> 32:23.104 in place. Indeed, if we think that, 32:23.101 --> 32:26.441 we're going to be led to a rather bold and extreme 32:26.435 --> 32:29.425 conclusion about the morality of suicide. 32:29.430 --> 32:33.120 The person has killed himself, so he's clearly consented, 32:33.121 --> 32:37.011 and so in every case what he's done is acceptable. 32:37.009 --> 32:40.999 Well, maybe that's right--if we're prepared to go that far 32:41.000 --> 32:43.240 with the principle of consent. 32:43.240 --> 32:46.500 But maybe we shouldn't go that far with the principle of 32:46.497 --> 32:49.847 consent. Suppose we're talking after 32:49.847 --> 32:54.537 class and you say to me, "Shelly, you've got my 32:54.544 --> 32:57.204 permission to kill me." 32:57.200 --> 33:01.280 And so I get out my gun and I shoot you to death. 33:01.279 --> 33:07.379 It doesn't seem morally acceptable, even though you gave 33:07.377 --> 33:12.247 me your permission, especially--Think of even 33:12.254 --> 33:16.384 weirder cases. Suppose that you are feeling 33:16.377 --> 33:20.707 like you want to killed because you're overcome with guilt 33:20.710 --> 33:24.130 because you believe you killed John Smith. 33:24.130 --> 33:26.110 But you're crazy. 33:26.110 --> 33:28.180 You didn't kill John Smith. 33:28.180 --> 33:30.350 John Smith's not even dead. 33:30.349 --> 33:33.629 But in your insanity you think you did do it, 33:33.632 --> 33:36.842 and so you say, "Shelly, please kill me." 33:36.839 --> 33:40.009 And I know that you're insane, but hey, you know, 33:40.012 --> 33:42.592 consent's consent, and so I kill you. 33:42.589 --> 33:45.889 Well, that clearly isn't acceptable. 33:45.890 --> 33:51.590 Or suppose you're playing with your three-year-old nephew. 33:51.589 --> 33:53.099 He says, "Oh yeah, I don't really like being 33:53.099 --> 33:54.549 alive. Kill me." 33:54.549 --> 33:59.819 Well, that clearly doesn't make it acceptable to kill him or 33:59.821 --> 34:02.681 her--well, nephew, it's a him. 34:02.680 --> 34:06.800 So, if we start accepting this consent principle, 34:06.801 --> 34:11.181 we're led to some pretty implausible conclusions. 34:11.179 --> 34:13.239 So, maybe we should throw it out. 34:13.239 --> 34:15.589 Maybe we should say, no, consent really doesn't have 34:15.592 --> 34:18.362 the kind of power that a minute ago it looked like it did. 34:18.360 --> 34:21.540 34:21.539 --> 34:26.359 But I'm inclined to think we shouldn't go that far and throw 34:26.355 --> 34:29.615 away the consent principle altogether. 34:29.619 --> 34:33.159 Because if we do throw out the consent principle, 34:33.163 --> 34:37.673 we're going to find ourselves unable to say some things that I 34:37.667 --> 34:40.987 think it's pretty important to us to say. 34:40.990 --> 34:43.620 Consider the following example. 34:43.619 --> 34:49.779 Suppose that we're in war and we're in the foxhole and a hand 34:49.783 --> 34:54.203 grenade has been thrown into the foxhole. 34:54.199 --> 34:58.949 And unless something happens quick, the hand grenade is going 34:58.951 --> 35:03.621 to blow up and it will kill my five buddies who are near the 35:03.623 --> 35:05.563 hand grenade. Unfortunately, 35:05.555 --> 35:08.145 because they're playing cards or whatever, they don't see it. 35:08.150 --> 35:09.380 But I see it. 35:09.380 --> 35:11.850 But I don't have time to warn them. 35:11.849 --> 35:16.379 By the time I tell them what's going on, they won't have time 35:16.379 --> 35:18.979 to react. Really, it's do nothing, 35:18.978 --> 35:22.808 let them get killed but I probably won't be hurt very 35:22.810 --> 35:25.780 much, or throw myself on the hand 35:25.779 --> 35:30.449 grenade, my body absorbs the blow, saves my buddies, 35:30.450 --> 35:33.740 kills me. Imagine what happens is that I 35:33.738 --> 35:35.458 throw myself on the hand grenade. 35:35.460 --> 35:38.350 I've sacrificed myself for them. 35:38.350 --> 35:41.940 I've done something amazing. 35:41.940 --> 35:45.650 Few of us would have it within ourselves to do this, 35:45.653 --> 35:48.423 but amazingly enough some people do. 35:48.420 --> 35:52.070 And we admire and praise these people. 35:52.070 --> 35:56.680 They've committed--they've undertaken an incredible act of 35:56.680 --> 36:00.320 heroic self-sacrifice--morally commendable, 36:00.320 --> 36:03.420 above and beyond the call of duty we want to say, 36:03.420 --> 36:05.760 praiseworthy. But wait a minute, 36:05.758 --> 36:08.038 how could it be praiseworthy? 36:08.039 --> 36:10.809 The person threw himself on a hand grenade, 36:10.811 --> 36:14.641 knowing the result of this was that he was going to die. 36:14.639 --> 36:17.469 And so he killed a person, thereby, apparently, 36:17.472 --> 36:20.742 violating the deontological right not to have innocent 36:20.736 --> 36:22.026 people be killed. 36:22.030 --> 36:25.420 36:25.420 --> 36:28.380 Don't talk about "the results are better." 36:28.380 --> 36:30.250 Yeah, of course, five buddies saved; 36:30.250 --> 36:31.300 the results are better. 36:31.300 --> 36:34.930 But that doesn't seem enough to use in our deontological moods. 36:34.929 --> 36:38.209 After all, suppose that I see the hand grenade, 36:38.212 --> 36:41.922 and so what I do is I take Jones and throw him on the 36:41.923 --> 36:44.123 grenade. Well, that's not okay, 36:44.118 --> 36:46.428 even though the results are the same. 36:46.430 --> 36:48.400 What makes the difference? 36:48.400 --> 36:52.940 Why is it morally legitimate for Jones to throw himself on 36:52.935 --> 36:56.125 the grenade? The only answer that I can see 36:56.129 --> 36:58.139 is, because he agrees to it. 36:58.140 --> 37:01.270 He did it to himself; he volunteered, 37:01.274 --> 37:03.644 it has his consent. 37:03.639 --> 37:07.779 If we throw away the consent principle, we're forced to say 37:07.776 --> 37:10.696 what Jones did isn't morally admirable. 37:10.699 --> 37:14.809 It's morally appalling, it's morally forbidden. 37:14.810 --> 37:16.950 I can't believe that. 37:16.950 --> 37:18.770 So, we need a consent principle. 37:18.769 --> 37:21.629 But on the other hand, we don't want to go with such a 37:21.627 --> 37:23.727 strong consent principle that we say, 37:23.730 --> 37:26.890 oh, it's okay to kill crazy people, or kill children, 37:26.891 --> 37:29.951 just because they say, "Oh, kill me." 37:29.949 --> 37:34.239 So we need something--a more moderate form of the consent 37:34.240 --> 37:37.990 principle. We need to say consent can do 37:37.994 --> 37:42.494 its thing, but only under certain conditions. 37:42.489 --> 37:44.839 What exactly are the relevant conditions? 37:44.840 --> 37:48.270 Well, this is, of course, one more topic open 37:48.267 --> 37:50.887 for debate. We might insist that, 37:50.891 --> 37:54.651 look, the permission has got to be given freely. 37:54.650 --> 37:58.670 It's got to be given knowing what the upshots are going to 37:58.667 --> 38:00.827 be. It's got to be given by 38:00.831 --> 38:03.741 somebody who is sane, who is rational, 38:03.744 --> 38:07.234 who is competent, who's--and that may deal with 38:07.232 --> 38:10.532 the child case as well, who is not yet competent to 38:10.531 --> 38:12.511 make this sort of decision. 38:12.510 --> 38:16.430 There's room for disagreement about what exactly are the 38:16.431 --> 38:20.851 relevant conditions to put into a proper version of the consent 38:20.851 --> 38:23.821 principle. We might also want to throw in 38:23.824 --> 38:28.044 some requirement that the person have good reasons for his giving 38:28.035 --> 38:30.405 you permission. That might deal with the case 38:30.405 --> 38:32.365 where you just come up to me after class and say, 38:32.368 --> 38:34.338 "Kill me." I mean you're not insane. 38:34.340 --> 38:36.510 Well, at least you might not be insane. 38:36.510 --> 38:40.560 You know what's going to happen. 38:40.559 --> 38:42.669 In some sense, you've reached the age of 38:42.672 --> 38:45.762 competence, but you don't have any good reasons for it. 38:45.760 --> 38:48.910 Maybe that's enough to undermine the force of consent. 38:48.909 --> 38:52.459 Well, suppose we've got some kind of modified consent 38:52.460 --> 38:55.280 principle. What should we say about 38:55.282 --> 38:59.342 suicide then? Well, it seems to me what we're 38:59.337 --> 39:04.177 led to is, once again, a modest view about suicide. 39:04.179 --> 39:07.869 The mere fact that the person killed themself won't show that 39:07.873 --> 39:10.093 it was morally legitimate because, 39:10.090 --> 39:13.010 of course, even though they've given themself permission, 39:13.009 --> 39:15.239 they may not have had, for example, 39:15.236 --> 39:18.326 good reason, or they might be insane. 39:18.329 --> 39:21.719 But for all that, if we can have cases--and I 39:21.719 --> 39:26.189 take it we can have cases--where somebody rationally 39:26.186 --> 39:30.506 assesses their situation, sees that they're better off 39:30.511 --> 39:34.471 dead, thinks the case through, doesn't rush into it, 39:34.469 --> 39:38.779 makes an informed and voluntary decision, with good reason 39:38.784 --> 39:43.404 behind it--in a situation like that it seems to me the consent 39:43.402 --> 39:46.432 principle might well come into play, 39:46.429 --> 39:50.649 in which case consent will trump or nullify the force of 39:50.654 --> 39:55.574 the deontological prohibition against harming innocent people. 39:55.570 --> 40:00.120 So, suicide will again be acceptable in some cases, 40:00.119 --> 40:01.939 though not in all. 40:01.940 --> 40:04.910 And that's the conclusion that seems to me to be the right one, 40:04.913 --> 40:07.363 whether we accept the utilitarian position or one of 40:07.359 --> 40:08.989 these deontological positions. 40:08.989 --> 40:12.819 Suicide isn't always legitimate, but it's 40:12.818 --> 40:15.688 sometimes legitimate. 40:15.690 --> 40:20.030 It still leaves the question, what should we do when we see, 40:20.028 --> 40:23.188 when we come across, somebody trying to kill 40:23.190 --> 40:26.650 themself?" And there I think there is good 40:26.648 --> 40:30.488 reason to ask yourself, are you confident that the 40:30.486 --> 40:34.316 person has satisfied the conditions on the consent 40:34.324 --> 40:37.204 principle? Perhaps we should err on the 40:37.196 --> 40:39.976 side of caution, and assume that the person may 40:39.983 --> 40:42.813 be acting under distress, not thinking clearly, 40:42.813 --> 40:44.873 not informed, not altogether competent, 40:44.865 --> 40:46.535 not acting for good reasons. 40:46.540 --> 40:51.420 40:51.420 --> 40:56.140 But to accept that is not to accept the stronger conclusion 40:56.142 --> 41:00.542 that we must never permit somebody to kill themself. 41:00.539 --> 41:03.949 If we become convinced that they have thought it through, 41:03.950 --> 41:07.410 that they do have good reason, that they are informed, 41:07.413 --> 41:10.773 that they are acting voluntarily, in some such cases 41:10.769 --> 41:14.059 it may be legitimate for them to kill themself, 41:14.060 --> 41:18.230 and for us to let them. 41:18.230 --> 41:21.300 All right, almost out of time. 41:21.300 --> 41:26.080 So, let me shift gears for the very last time, 41:26.083 --> 41:30.763 and take a quick look at where we've been. 41:30.760 --> 41:34.960 At the start of the semester, I invited you to think hard 41:34.960 --> 41:39.610 about the nature of death or the facts about life and death. 41:39.610 --> 41:47.200 Most of us try very hard to not think hard about death. 41:47.199 --> 41:51.459 It seems to be an unpleasant topic, and we put it out of our 41:51.464 --> 41:53.504 mind. We don't think about it, 41:53.502 --> 41:57.082 even when there's a sense in which it's staring us in the 41:57.079 --> 41:59.689 face. Every single class of this 41:59.686 --> 42:03.146 semester, every single day of this semester, 42:03.153 --> 42:08.073 you've come into this building and have walked past a cemetery 42:08.071 --> 42:10.411 right across the street. 42:10.409 --> 42:13.299 How many times did you notice it? 42:13.300 --> 42:19.660 How many times did you stop to think about the complete visual 42:19.656 --> 42:24.446 reminder that we are on this Earth for a while, 42:24.449 --> 42:27.679 and then we're not anymore? 42:27.679 --> 42:29.719 Most of us just don't think about it. 42:29.719 --> 42:31.539 Well, of course you are, in some sense, 42:31.543 --> 42:34.203 the exceptions. You've spent a semester 42:34.202 --> 42:38.052 thinking about it, and I'll be largely content if 42:38.048 --> 42:42.538 you've taken the opportunity this semester to take a hard 42:42.535 --> 42:45.415 look at the things you believe. 42:45.420 --> 42:49.020 Whether or not you ended up agreeing with me, 42:49.015 --> 42:53.015 about the various claims that I've put forward, 42:53.019 --> 42:57.099 is less important than that you've taken the chance to take 42:57.100 --> 43:01.530 a hard look at your beliefs and asked yourself not just what you 43:01.532 --> 43:04.982 hoped or wished or kind of believed was true, 43:04.980 --> 43:09.050 but what you could actually defend. 43:09.050 --> 43:12.650 Still, having said that, it would be disingenuous of me 43:12.645 --> 43:16.635 to pretend that I don't also hope that you've come around--if 43:16.641 --> 43:20.771 you didn't start out believing what I believe--that you've come 43:20.769 --> 43:23.499 around to believing what I believe. 43:23.500 --> 43:28.080 As I pointed out on the first day, most people accept a great 43:28.081 --> 43:32.591 deal of this package of beliefs about the nature of life and 43:32.586 --> 43:35.066 death, that--They believe we have a 43:35.069 --> 43:38.569 soul, that there's something more to us than our bodies. 43:38.570 --> 43:43.350 And they believe that because they think, given the existence 43:43.349 --> 43:47.969 of a soul, we'll have the possibility of living forever. 43:47.969 --> 43:54.299 Immortality is a possibility, and we all hope for and crave 43:54.296 --> 44:00.616 the possibility that we will live forever because death is, 44:00.623 --> 44:03.463 and must be, horrible. 44:03.460 --> 44:05.910 It's so horrible that we try not to think about it. 44:05.909 --> 44:09.909 It's so horrible that when we do think about it we're filled 44:09.914 --> 44:11.954 with dread, terror and fear. 44:11.949 --> 44:16.399 And it's just obvious that that's the only sensible 44:16.397 --> 44:20.397 reaction to the facts about life and death. 44:20.400 --> 44:24.770 Life is so incredible that under no circumstances could it 44:24.773 --> 44:29.073 ever make sense to be glad that it had come to an end. 44:29.070 --> 44:33.730 Immortality would be desirable; suicide could never be a 44:33.732 --> 44:36.222 reasonable response. 44:36.219 --> 44:40.539 Over the course of this semester, I've argued that that 44:40.539 --> 44:43.659 package of beliefs, common as it may be, 44:43.659 --> 44:47.499 is mistaken, virtually from start to finish. 44:47.500 --> 44:51.880 There is no soul, we are just machines. 44:51.880 --> 44:56.270 We're not just any old machine; we are amazing machines. 44:56.269 --> 45:00.189 We are machines capable of loving, capable of dreaming, 45:00.192 --> 45:04.042 capable of being creative, capable of making plans and 45:04.043 --> 45:06.153 sharing them with others. 45:06.150 --> 45:11.270 We are people. But we're just machines anyway. 45:11.269 --> 45:16.529 And when the machine breaks, that's the end. 45:16.530 --> 45:23.020 Death is not some big mystery which we can't get our heads 45:23.015 --> 45:26.235 around. Death is in some sense no more 45:26.239 --> 45:29.979 mysterious than the fact that your lamp can break, 45:29.980 --> 45:35.870 or your computer can break, or any other machine will 45:35.870 --> 45:40.780 eventually fail. I never meant to claim that 45:40.779 --> 45:45.879 it's not regrettable that we die the way we do. 45:45.880 --> 45:50.870 As I argued when talking about immortality, better still would 45:50.872 --> 45:55.872 be if only we had the prospect of living as long as life still 45:55.865 --> 45:58.725 had something left to offer us. 45:58.730 --> 46:02.810 As long as life would be good overall, death is bad, 46:02.809 --> 46:06.809 and I think for most of us death comes too soon. 46:06.809 --> 46:09.589 But having said that, it doesn't follow that 46:09.585 --> 46:11.905 immortality would be a good thing. 46:11.909 --> 46:16.779 On the contrary, immortality would be a bad 46:16.782 --> 46:19.782 thing. The reaction that makes sense 46:19.776 --> 46:24.116 in thinking about the facts of death is not to find it as some 46:24.123 --> 46:27.333 great mystery too dreadful to think about, 46:27.330 --> 46:29.160 too overwhelming. 46:29.159 --> 46:32.009 But rather, fear, far from being the rationally 46:32.008 --> 46:35.408 appropriate response I think, is an inappropriate 46:35.414 --> 46:38.804 response. Although we can be sad that we 46:38.798 --> 46:42.578 die too soon, that perhaps should be balanced 46:42.581 --> 46:48.001 by the fact of--the recognition of--just how incredibly lucky we 46:47.997 --> 46:51.347 all are to have been alive at all. 46:51.349 --> 46:55.739 Yet, at the same time, recognizing that sense of luck 46:55.740 --> 47:00.890 and being fortunate doesn't mean that we're always lucky to be 47:00.891 --> 47:04.721 remaining alive. For some of us the time will 47:04.724 --> 47:09.474 come in which that's no longer true, and when that happens life 47:09.472 --> 47:12.232 is not something to be held onto, 47:12.230 --> 47:14.470 come what may, under any and all 47:14.472 --> 47:18.692 circumstances. The time could come for some of 47:18.686 --> 47:21.936 us in which it's time to let go. 47:21.940 --> 47:26.040 What I then invited you to do, over the course of the 47:26.044 --> 47:30.864 semester, is not only to think for yourself about the facts of 47:30.860 --> 47:35.780 life and death, but I invite you all to come to 47:35.782 --> 47:40.862 face death without fear and without illusion. 47:40.860 --> 47:46.000 Thanks very much [applause].