WEBVTT 00:01.210 --> 00:04.640 Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time, we talked about how 00:04.643 --> 00:07.453 you should live your life, in light of the fact of 00:07.446 --> 00:08.816 our--your mortality. 00:08.820 --> 00:12.300 How does the fact that we will die--how should that affect the 00:12.304 --> 00:13.394 way that we live? 00:13.390 --> 00:16.800 What we're going to turn to now, our final topic for the 00:16.801 --> 00:18.601 semester, is the flip side. 00:18.600 --> 00:21.370 The fact of our mortality raises the question as to 00:21.370 --> 00:24.140 whether or not we should put an end to our life. 00:24.140 --> 00:26.260 Strictly speaking, I suppose it's not the fact 00:26.258 --> 00:28.568 that we're mortal, per se, it's one of those extra 00:28.565 --> 00:31.055 features of death that I've discussed previously, 00:31.060 --> 00:33.680 the variability of death. 00:33.680 --> 00:38.150 And more particularly still, the fact that we can control 00:38.145 --> 00:39.655 how long we live. 00:39.660 --> 00:44.320 We face the possibility of ending our life earlier than it 00:44.321 --> 00:46.121 would end otherwise. 00:46.120 --> 00:47.630 That's suicide, of course. 00:47.630 --> 00:51.630 And so our final topic is, under what circumstances, 00:51.626 --> 00:54.286 if any, does suicide make sense? 00:54.290 --> 00:57.110 Under what circumstances, if any, is it an appropriate 00:57.106 --> 01:00.246 thing to do? Now, it's a fairly widespread 01:00.245 --> 01:05.115 feature of our culture that suicide is looked upon with such 01:05.117 --> 01:09.477 a mixture of disdain, fear, finding it offensive, 01:09.482 --> 01:13.632 that it's very hard, often, to think clearly and 01:13.630 --> 01:16.190 discuss the topic clearly. 01:16.189 --> 01:19.199 Most people think it's either that you've got to be crazy to 01:19.202 --> 01:21.652 kill yourself. The very fact that you are 01:21.652 --> 01:24.982 contemplating suicide is evidence that you're crazy. 01:24.980 --> 01:27.750 And if you're not crazy, then it shows that you're 01:27.745 --> 01:30.525 immoral. Suicide is clearly never, 01:30.527 --> 01:33.717 never right, the right thing to do. 01:33.720 --> 01:37.380 So, what I want to propose is that we take some time and look 01:37.381 --> 01:40.861 at the questions on both sides with a fair bit of care. 01:40.860 --> 01:44.140 And the very first thing to do, I think, in thinking about the 01:44.138 --> 01:47.868 topic of suicide, is to distinguish questions of 01:47.872 --> 01:51.492 rationality from questions of morality. 01:51.489 --> 01:53.899 That is, I want us to take a look at, initially, 01:53.900 --> 01:55.850 the question, under what circumstances, 01:55.849 --> 01:58.669 if ever, would suicide be the rational thing to do? 01:58.670 --> 02:01.660 And then later turn to the question, when, 02:01.663 --> 02:05.903 if ever, would suicide be a morally legitimate or a morally 02:05.898 --> 02:09.548 permissible or morally acceptable thing to do? 02:09.550 --> 02:13.800 In posing this distinction, I'm obviously presupposing that 02:13.800 --> 02:18.050 these questions can come apart, or at least they need to be 02:18.051 --> 02:19.811 examined separately. 02:19.810 --> 02:22.670 Questions of rationality on the one hand, and questions of 02:22.667 --> 02:23.867 morality on the other. 02:23.870 --> 02:27.700 These are both questions about oughts, as we might put it. 02:27.700 --> 02:29.420 They're evaluative questions. 02:29.419 --> 02:32.319 But at least most people are inclined to think that we are 02:32.322 --> 02:35.482 drawing on different evaluative standards when we raise the one 02:35.480 --> 02:38.140 set of questions, as opposed to when we raise the 02:38.140 --> 02:39.730 other. In many cases, 02:39.732 --> 02:44.312 no doubt, rationality and morality go hand in hand. 02:44.310 --> 02:48.260 And there are philosophical views about the nature of 02:48.263 --> 02:52.603 rationality and the nature of morality, according to which 02:52.597 --> 02:55.027 they always go hand in hand. 02:55.030 --> 02:57.420 But many of us are inclined to think that they can come apart. 02:57.419 --> 02:59.759 Take, for example, given the season of the year 02:59.763 --> 03:02.313 that it is, consider doing your income taxes or, 03:02.310 --> 03:05.860 more particularly still, cheating on your income taxes. 03:05.860 --> 03:10.990 The rate at which income tax forms get audited is very, 03:10.990 --> 03:14.350 very slight. And so--and the fines tend to 03:14.346 --> 03:18.256 not be especially egregious, even if you do get caught. 03:18.259 --> 03:22.159 So that from a rational point of view, many of us might think 03:22.157 --> 03:25.077 it might well be a rational decision to 03:25.080 --> 03:26.930 cheat. You're not likely to get caught. 03:26.930 --> 03:32.000 Even if you do get caught, how bad's the fine anyway? 03:32.000 --> 03:35.490 But even if we were to agree that it was rational to cheat, 03:35.493 --> 03:38.623 most of us would then immediately want to follow that 03:38.624 --> 03:42.184 remark up by pointing out that doesn't at all mean that it's 03:42.178 --> 03:45.368 morally acceptable to cheat on your income tax. 03:45.370 --> 03:49.180 There's a case perhaps where you're morally required to do 03:49.175 --> 03:52.775 something that you're not rationally required to do. 03:52.780 --> 03:55.480 Or, take a choice from the other point of view. 03:55.479 --> 04:00.399 There you are, trying to decide between--there 04:00.402 --> 04:06.532 you are, trying to decide between your various choices of 04:06.527 --> 04:10.177 college. And you've gotten into Yale on 04:10.178 --> 04:13.608 the one hand, and perhaps some crummy school, 04:13.608 --> 04:17.348 your second-rate backup school, on the other. 04:17.350 --> 04:21.630 And you're trying to decide what to do there. 04:21.629 --> 04:25.449 Well, you might think to yourself, morally I have no 04:25.447 --> 04:26.867 obligations here. 04:26.870 --> 04:29.460 There's no particular obligation, moral requirement, 04:29.462 --> 04:32.412 to go to the better school rather than the worse school. 04:32.410 --> 04:34.640 But for all that, it would be irrational 04:34.638 --> 04:36.768 of me, perhaps, to go to the worse school. 04:36.769 --> 04:39.099 So there's a case where there's no moral requirement, 04:39.101 --> 04:40.761 but there's a rational requirement. 04:40.759 --> 04:43.809 Again, we could debate the details of the two examples, 04:43.807 --> 04:45.837 but the point's just to show that, 04:45.839 --> 04:47.969 in principle at least, on the face of it, 04:47.969 --> 04:49.939 these two questions can come apart. 04:49.940 --> 04:52.900 Sometimes it's rationally acceptable to do something, 04:52.898 --> 04:53.978 but it's immoral. 04:53.980 --> 04:56.400 Sometimes it's morally acceptable to do something, 04:56.395 --> 04:57.475 but it's irrational. 04:57.480 --> 05:00.770 So in thinking about suicide, we need to pose the two 05:00.765 --> 05:02.845 questions, one after the other. 05:02.850 --> 05:05.240 So, let's start with the question about the 05:05.239 --> 05:07.059 rationality of suicide. 05:07.060 --> 05:13.290 When, if ever, is suicide a rational decision 05:13.293 --> 05:15.683 to make? Now, once again, 05:15.677 --> 05:19.367 the first thing I want to do in thinking about the rationality 05:19.365 --> 05:22.565 of suicide is to distinguish two different issues, 05:22.570 --> 05:24.400 or two different questions. 05:24.399 --> 05:26.389 The first question is going to be this. 05:26.389 --> 05:31.869 When, if ever, would it be true that you are 05:31.867 --> 05:36.397 better off dead? Could it be the case that your 05:36.399 --> 05:40.429 life is going so badly that you'd be better off dead? 05:40.430 --> 05:43.270 Second question, assuming that the answer to the 05:43.268 --> 05:45.498 first question is, under such and such 05:45.502 --> 05:48.682 circumstances, you would be better off dead, 05:48.679 --> 05:52.279 we still have to ask, could it ever be rational for 05:52.282 --> 05:56.032 you to trust your judgment that this is one of 05:56.029 --> 05:59.559 those cases in which you're better off dead? 05:59.560 --> 06:04.010 Could it ever be rational for you to kill yourself? 06:04.009 --> 06:09.559 Conceivably, the answer to the second might 06:09.562 --> 06:11.192 be no. All right. 06:11.190 --> 06:13.530 So, the question was this. 06:13.529 --> 06:17.769 It's conceivable you might have a thought like the following. 06:17.769 --> 06:21.859 In those circumstances in which life has gotten so horrible that 06:21.856 --> 06:25.226 you'd be better off dead, you can't think clearly. 06:25.230 --> 06:29.720 And the very fact that you can't think clearly would entail 06:29.722 --> 06:34.372 that you shouldn't trust your judgment that you are in one of 06:34.370 --> 06:37.320 those cases. Whether that's a good argument 06:37.318 --> 06:40.108 or not is something we'll have to turn to later. 06:40.110 --> 06:42.770 But it's because of the possibility of that argument 06:42.766 --> 06:45.316 that I wanted to distinguish the initial question, 06:45.318 --> 06:47.868 could it be true that you're better off dead? 06:47.870 --> 06:50.980 from the secondary question, even if it could be true that 06:50.977 --> 06:54.167 you're better off dead, could it ever be a reasonable 06:54.167 --> 06:57.947 or rational decision for you to believe that you're in one of 06:57.949 --> 06:59.209 those situations? 06:59.209 --> 07:02.759 Unless we've got the two things in place, it doesn't seem likely 07:02.757 --> 07:05.907 that it's ever going to be rational to commit suicide. 07:05.910 --> 07:09.360 So, the very first topic we have to look at is, 07:09.364 --> 07:13.424 could it ever be true that you'd be better off dead? 07:13.420 --> 07:17.260 And immediately, there's a kind of logical worry 07:17.263 --> 07:22.013 that may occur to some of you, certainly has been raised by 07:22.005 --> 07:24.045 various philosophers. 07:24.050 --> 07:29.380 And that's to say that the very judgment, the very claim, 07:29.382 --> 07:35.002 that Jones would be better off dead can't make any sense. 07:35.000 --> 07:38.990 On the assumption that, look, in order to make 07:38.989 --> 07:42.269 comparisons--better off, worse off; 07:42.269 --> 07:43.729 here he is in such and such a situation; 07:43.730 --> 07:46.920 he'd be better off in that other situation--you've got to 07:46.915 --> 07:49.585 be able to talk about, on the one hand, 07:49.592 --> 07:54.432 what condition or state the person is before and what 07:54.432 --> 07:59.602 condition or state the person would be in afterwards, 07:59.600 --> 08:01.320 if they were to make that choice. 08:01.319 --> 08:04.659 Call this the two-state requirement. 08:04.660 --> 08:07.390 Normally, when we make judgments about whether 08:07.393 --> 08:10.373 something would leave you better off or worse off, 08:10.369 --> 08:12.859 we satisfy the two-state requirement. 08:12.860 --> 08:17.670 You're trying to decide whether or not to lose some weight. 08:17.670 --> 08:20.640 And you think, well, here's how well off I am 08:20.639 --> 08:22.259 now, being overweight. 08:22.259 --> 08:26.069 Here's how well off I would be later, if I were to lose that 08:26.068 --> 08:28.428 weight. I can compare the two states, 08:28.429 --> 08:31.619 say the second state's better than the first state. 08:31.620 --> 08:36.720 That's what makes it true that I'd be better off. 08:36.720 --> 08:41.600 Trying to decide whether or not to marry the person or break up 08:41.601 --> 08:46.011 with the person or pick this career or change careers. 08:46.009 --> 08:49.939 You've got the state you're in and you compare it to the state 08:49.939 --> 08:51.549 you would be in. 08:51.550 --> 08:52.950 You compare the two states. 08:52.950 --> 08:57.050 That's what allows us to say, "Yeah, I'd be better off" or 08:57.051 --> 08:58.851 "No, I'd be worse off." 08:58.850 --> 09:02.640 But when we're talking about cases of suicide, 09:02.635 --> 09:05.575 cases where, well, here I am now, 09:05.580 --> 09:10.920 the before state requirement's in place, 09:10.919 --> 09:16.719 but if we contrast that with the after state 09:16.722 --> 09:20.312 requirement, well, that part's not met, 09:20.305 --> 09:22.995 right? When you--On the assumption 09:23.002 --> 09:26.562 that death is the end, that you won't exist, 09:26.557 --> 09:30.607 nonexistence isn't a state that you will be 09:30.608 --> 09:33.708 in. It's not a condition of 09:33.711 --> 09:38.351 you, because states and conditions presuppose existence. 09:38.350 --> 09:39.560 We can talk about are you happy? 09:39.560 --> 09:41.470 Are you sad? Are you bored? 09:41.470 --> 09:44.350 Are you excited? All of those things presuppose 09:44.353 --> 09:46.843 your existence. Even are you sleeping? 09:46.840 --> 09:51.100 is a state or condition you can be in, because you exist. 09:51.100 --> 09:54.400 But if I kill myself, I won't exist. 09:54.399 --> 09:59.379 There is no second state to compare. 09:59.379 --> 10:02.679 So, how could we possibly say, the objection goes, 10:02.683 --> 10:06.463 how could we possibly say that I'd be better off dead? 10:06.460 --> 10:09.460 That seems to presuppose that there's a second state that we 10:09.461 --> 10:11.141 can compare to my actual state. 10:11.139 --> 10:13.659 Since there isn't one, the judgment, 10:13.659 --> 10:17.689 I'd be better off dead, can't even get off the ground. 10:17.690 --> 10:24.370 It's got a logical mistake built right into it. 10:24.370 --> 10:26.410 Well, that's the objection. 10:26.409 --> 10:27.769 And, as I say, there are a number of 10:27.774 --> 10:29.144 philosophers who are drawn to it. 10:29.139 --> 10:30.689 Maybe some of you are drawn to it as well. 10:30.690 --> 10:33.820 It seems to me that it's mistaken. 10:33.820 --> 10:37.670 Consider what we wanted to say when we talked about the 10:37.665 --> 10:41.155 deprivation account, the central account of what's 10:41.155 --> 10:43.955 bad about death. For most of us, 10:43.959 --> 10:48.469 dying would be bad, because it would deprive us of 10:48.466 --> 10:53.886 the good things in life that we would get, if only we didn't 10:53.892 --> 10:56.702 die. That seemed like a natural 10:56.702 --> 10:59.882 thing to say. It seemed like an appropriate 10:59.880 --> 11:02.520 thing to say. Of course, we might ask, 11:02.515 --> 11:06.685 if we believe in the two-state requirement, how could we 11:06.688 --> 11:09.988 have said that? After all, given the two-state 11:09.991 --> 11:13.061 requirement, to say that death is bad for me, 11:13.059 --> 11:15.499 I'd be better off staying alive. 11:15.500 --> 11:19.120 If we believe in the two-state requirement, we've got to say, 11:19.115 --> 11:22.085 Oh, so had I died, I would have been in some state 11:22.093 --> 11:25.363 that I could compare to my current state and say that it's 11:25.355 --> 11:26.685 worse. But, of course, 11:26.686 --> 11:27.826 death isn't a state. 11:27.830 --> 11:30.980 So, the two-state requirement's not met. 11:30.980 --> 11:33.890 Well, we might say this should give us some pause. 11:33.889 --> 11:36.789 If the two-state requirement--It would be one 11:36.787 --> 11:40.407 thing if all that the two-state requirement said was, 11:40.409 --> 11:43.459 you know, we can't ever say we'd be better off dead. 11:43.460 --> 11:45.400 But it turns out the two-state requirement's got more 11:45.404 --> 11:46.344 implications than that. 11:46.340 --> 11:49.880 It's got the implication that you can't even say you're better 11:49.875 --> 11:51.435 off staying alive. 11:51.440 --> 11:57.210 And that's very, very hard to believe. 11:57.210 --> 12:00.270 Imagine that you've got some happy person, 12:00.271 --> 12:04.451 some incredibly happy person with a wonderful life filled 12:04.453 --> 12:08.863 with whatever goods you think are worth having in life--love 12:08.858 --> 12:13.188 and accomplishment and knowledge and whatever it is. 12:13.190 --> 12:18.850 He's walking across the street and he's about to get hit by a 12:18.845 --> 12:20.945 truck. And so, at some risk to 12:20.954 --> 12:24.434 yourself, you leap into the way, pushing him out of the way, 12:24.430 --> 12:26.900 saving his life. And happily, 12:26.903 --> 12:29.953 you don't get hurt either. 12:29.950 --> 12:32.970 He looks up, realizes he was this close from 12:32.971 --> 12:35.221 death and he says, "Thank you. 12:35.220 --> 12:38.600 Thank you for saving my life." 12:38.600 --> 12:42.320 And now what you have to say is, "I'm afraid you're rather 12:42.321 --> 12:44.871 confused. Because to say ‘thank you' 12:44.866 --> 12:48.846 for my saving your life is to presuppose I've benefited you in 12:48.847 --> 12:51.367 some way. To presuppose I've benefited 12:51.374 --> 12:54.994 you in some way is to assume that you're--it's a good thing 12:54.986 --> 12:56.976 that your life has continued. 12:56.980 --> 12:58.290 But, you see, given the two-state 12:58.294 --> 13:00.644 requirement, we can't say it's a good thing that your life 13:00.635 --> 13:02.365 continued, because the two-state 13:02.365 --> 13:05.495 requirement says we can only make that kind of remark when 13:05.503 --> 13:07.983 there's a before state and an after state. 13:07.980 --> 13:09.950 And the after state would have been nonexistence. 13:09.950 --> 13:12.060 So, you see, you're really rather 13:12.064 --> 13:15.964 philosophically confused in thinking that I've done you some 13:15.962 --> 13:18.542 sort of favor by saving your life." 13:18.539 --> 13:24.109 I can't take that argument seriously. 13:24.110 --> 13:28.740 It seems to me that--and I hope that none of you would take it 13:28.741 --> 13:30.261 seriously, either. 13:30.259 --> 13:33.659 Of course, you are doing somebody a favor 13:33.655 --> 13:37.695 when you save their life, given the assumption that their 13:37.701 --> 13:41.531 life has been and would continue to be wonderful. 13:41.529 --> 13:46.709 And what that shows is not that so nonexistence really is a kind 13:46.706 --> 13:50.236 of spooky, super thin state or condition. 13:50.240 --> 13:51.050 No, of course it isn't. 13:51.050 --> 13:52.450 Nonexistence is nonexistence. 13:52.450 --> 13:54.980 It's no kind of condition or state at all. 13:54.980 --> 14:01.670 What it shows is the two-state requirement isn't a genuine 14:01.667 --> 14:06.827 requirement on these sorts of evaluations. 14:06.830 --> 14:11.520 We don't have to say that if you had died--when you point to 14:11.524 --> 14:17.384 the person whose life you saved, we don't have to say that had 14:17.378 --> 14:23.238 you died, you would have been in some inferior state. 14:23.240 --> 14:27.850 We simply have to say the life you would have had, 14:27.847 --> 14:33.487 had I saved you and indeed will have, given that I have saved 14:33.489 --> 14:35.839 you, is a great life. 14:35.840 --> 14:41.570 Since it's good, to lose it would be bad. 14:41.570 --> 14:48.540 Since losing it would be bad, saving it for you is benefiting 14:48.542 --> 14:53.342 you. It's doing you a favor. 14:53.340 --> 14:55.500 Two-state requirement says otherwise. 14:55.500 --> 14:57.880 Two-state requirement's got to go. 14:57.879 --> 15:01.569 But, having gotten rid of it, we can say the same thing in 15:01.568 --> 15:03.508 principle on the other side. 15:03.509 --> 15:07.549 Imagine there was somebody whose life was horrible, 15:07.554 --> 15:10.794 full of pain and suffering and misery. 15:10.789 --> 15:12.719 Now, whether there could be such a person, 15:12.717 --> 15:15.207 again, that's a question we'll turn to in a second. 15:15.210 --> 15:20.350 But if there were such a person, then we can say, 15:20.346 --> 15:25.586 for their life to continue isn't good for them; 15:25.590 --> 15:27.380 it's bad for them. 15:27.379 --> 15:31.639 Their life is full of misery and suffering and frustration 15:31.640 --> 15:33.210 and disappointment. 15:33.210 --> 15:36.780 And the more and more of that, the worse and worse the life 15:36.782 --> 15:39.442 is. To lead a life of 100 years, 15:39.440 --> 15:44.390 where every moment is torture and pain, is worse than a life 15:44.393 --> 15:49.013 of 30 years, where every moment is torture and pain. 15:49.009 --> 15:54.219 So, if you had such a person, for their life to go longer 15:54.223 --> 15:56.793 would be bad. In which case, 15:56.793 --> 16:01.323 for their life to be going shorter, would be better for 16:01.319 --> 16:04.069 them. And that's all we mean when we 16:04.065 --> 16:06.205 say they'd be better off dead. 16:06.210 --> 16:11.440 Not that there's some spooky super thin and hard to describe 16:11.437 --> 16:15.687 condition that they'd be in if they were dead. 16:15.690 --> 16:19.850 But simply, we look back at the two possible lives they could 16:19.854 --> 16:22.144 have. Just with the person whose life 16:22.139 --> 16:23.909 we saved. The first person, 16:23.906 --> 16:28.226 we compare the great life that lasts 100 years versus the great 16:28.233 --> 16:32.283 life that only lasts 20 years because you didn't save their 16:32.282 --> 16:35.082 life. We say, oh, the life of 100 16:35.076 --> 16:36.626 years, better life. 16:36.629 --> 16:41.329 And so, saving their life is a good thing for them. 16:41.330 --> 16:44.990 Similarly, we compare the lives of misery, the long life versus 16:44.994 --> 16:46.594 the short life of misery. 16:46.590 --> 16:49.710 And we say, oh, the long life of misery is a 16:49.705 --> 16:53.395 worse life to have than the short life of misery. 16:53.399 --> 16:57.089 And that being the case, we simply can say you'd be 16:57.091 --> 16:59.851 better off dead. Not that you'd be in some 16:59.850 --> 17:01.510 condition that's a good one. 17:01.509 --> 17:04.219 It's simply, you'd avoid this 17:04.221 --> 17:06.701 condition, which is a bad one. 17:06.700 --> 17:09.240 And if the two-state requirement says otherwise, 17:09.243 --> 17:11.953 so much the worse for the two state requirement. 17:11.950 --> 17:13.880 All right. So this is by way of the 17:13.878 --> 17:16.368 logical worry, that we can't even get off the 17:16.373 --> 17:19.723 ground in talking about the possibility that you'd be better 17:19.719 --> 17:22.309 off dead. I think if we believe in the 17:22.309 --> 17:25.539 two-state requirement, maybe we'd have to say that. 17:25.539 --> 17:29.929 But the cost of accepting the two-state requirement is so 17:29.927 --> 17:34.707 implausible, that the person's dying of a heart attack and you 17:34.706 --> 17:37.106 perform CPR. Instead of saying "Thank you," 17:37.110 --> 17:38.840 they say, "Oh, I'm really no better off than I 17:38.836 --> 17:40.746 would have been if I died, even though I'm having a 17:40.754 --> 17:43.034 wonderful life." The two-state requirement's 17:43.027 --> 17:45.307 just so implausible, we should let it go. 17:45.309 --> 17:49.229 Now, having done that, of course, doesn't yet tell us 17:49.233 --> 17:51.123 that it could, in fact, 17:51.119 --> 17:55.339 be the case that somebody's life could be so bad that they'd 17:55.338 --> 17:59.898 be better off dead, that the existence that they've 17:59.904 --> 18:03.764 got is worse than not existing at all. 18:03.759 --> 18:06.459 All we've done so far is leave open the door; 18:06.460 --> 18:10.180 open the door to the possibility of saying that 18:10.178 --> 18:13.158 coherently. But that doesn't mean it's true. 18:13.160 --> 18:19.200 Whether or not there could be such lives depends on your view 18:19.204 --> 18:24.144 about what's the correct account of well-being. 18:24.140 --> 18:29.740 What is it that goes into making somebody's life 18:29.740 --> 18:33.390 worthwhile? Now, as we've seen previously, 18:33.385 --> 18:35.545 this is a controversial topic. 18:35.549 --> 18:41.189 People disagree about the ingredients of the best kind of 18:41.194 --> 18:43.584 life. And because of these 18:43.579 --> 18:48.529 differences, we're going to get philosophical differences of 18:48.532 --> 18:53.492 opinion with regard to whether or not a life could be so bad 18:53.486 --> 18:58.016 that it would be better for it to come to an end. 18:58.019 --> 19:00.549 I'm not going to try to rehearse all the possible 19:00.552 --> 19:01.662 theories there are. 19:01.660 --> 19:03.450 Or, for that matter, even all the theories that 19:03.452 --> 19:04.702 we've talked about previously. 19:04.700 --> 19:08.700 But to give you an illustration of how it could be true, 19:08.695 --> 19:11.665 imagine, go back to our simplest theory of 19:11.673 --> 19:15.873 well-being--hedonism, according to which your quality 19:15.866 --> 19:20.766 of life is a matter of adding up all the pleasure and subtracting 19:20.773 --> 19:23.333 all the pain. And we need to take into 19:23.330 --> 19:26.440 account how long the pleasures and the pains last and how 19:26.435 --> 19:28.815 intense the pleasures and the pains are. 19:28.819 --> 19:31.779 But still, we add up the total amount of pleasure, 19:31.777 --> 19:33.827 add up the total amount of pain, 19:33.829 --> 19:38.049 subtract the pain from the pleasure and look to see what 19:38.049 --> 19:39.659 our grand total is. 19:39.660 --> 19:41.450 If it's positive, your life's worth living. 19:41.450 --> 19:44.750 And the greater the number, the greater the positive 19:44.749 --> 19:47.659 number, the more your life is worth living. 19:47.660 --> 19:51.890 If it's negative though, if your life is filled with 19:51.885 --> 19:55.775 pain and suffering, or at least so much pain and 19:55.779 --> 20:00.589 suffering that it outweighs whatever pleasures you may have 20:00.585 --> 20:04.155 in your life, so that your balance is a 20:04.160 --> 20:07.280 negative one, then your life's not worth 20:07.279 --> 20:09.819 living. Having that go longer and 20:09.816 --> 20:13.076 longer is just more and more negative balance. 20:13.079 --> 20:17.339 That's a life that's bad for you to have and you'd be better 20:17.336 --> 20:18.776 off not having it. 20:18.779 --> 20:21.539 You'd be better off having your life come to an end. 20:21.540 --> 20:25.130 You'd be better off dead. 20:25.130 --> 20:29.290 And, of course, the more and more negative the 20:29.289 --> 20:33.079 grand total is, the worse your life is. 20:33.079 --> 20:36.759 And so the more it's true that you'd be better off dead. 20:36.760 --> 20:38.510 Well, that's what hedonism says. 20:38.509 --> 20:40.489 If we're not hedonists, and of course, 20:40.487 --> 20:43.317 previously I've argued that we shouldn't be hedonists, 20:43.320 --> 20:46.260 then we need a more complicated theory of the good. 20:46.259 --> 20:48.659 We need to throw in other things, perhaps, 20:48.657 --> 20:50.117 certain external goods. 20:50.119 --> 20:52.629 It's not just a matter of getting the insides right--the 20:52.631 --> 20:55.331 pleasure and the pain and the other mental states--there are 20:55.326 --> 20:57.786 various facts about your objective hookup with the rest 20:57.792 --> 21:00.092 of the world. Are you really climbing Mount 21:00.087 --> 21:02.497 Everest? Are you really accomplishing 21:02.497 --> 21:04.557 things? Do people really love you, 21:04.562 --> 21:05.952 and so forth and so on? 21:05.950 --> 21:10.950 Whatever your list is of those other objective goods--well 21:10.951 --> 21:16.041 you'll probably also want to have a list of other objective 21:16.041 --> 21:18.061 bads, besides pain. 21:18.059 --> 21:21.149 But still, the same basic idea is going to be in place. 21:21.150 --> 21:25.630 We're going to want to somehow add up all of the various 21:25.634 --> 21:28.734 objective goods, add up all the various 21:28.732 --> 21:32.892 objective bads, and see where the balance lies. 21:32.890 --> 21:34.490 Do the goods outweigh the bad? 21:34.490 --> 21:36.490 If the goods outweigh the bad, that's great. 21:36.490 --> 21:37.870 Your life's worth living. 21:37.869 --> 21:43.749 But if the bads outweigh the good, then your life is not 21:43.746 --> 21:48.016 worth living, or not worth continuing. 21:48.019 --> 21:51.659 Now, as we've noted before, there are philosophical 21:51.658 --> 21:54.858 theories which go on to claim--pessimists, 21:54.859 --> 21:58.319 various versions of pessimistic views, which say, 21:58.316 --> 22:00.976 for everybody in all circumstances, 22:00.980 --> 22:06.060 life is so bad that they'd be better off dead. 22:06.059 --> 22:08.689 Life's so full of suffering and misery, that whatever pleasures 22:08.690 --> 22:10.940 there are and other goods there may be in the life, 22:10.940 --> 22:14.370 they get outweighed by the objective bads. 22:14.369 --> 22:19.289 There are philosophical views like that, but I suppose the 22:19.290 --> 22:23.210 commonsense view is, well, even if some lives may be 22:23.213 --> 22:27.393 so bad that the person is better off dead, that's not true of all 22:27.392 --> 22:31.912 lives. It depends on the facts of the 22:31.913 --> 22:35.123 case. So, let's focus on that 22:35.121 --> 22:37.541 possibility. Of course, even here, 22:37.537 --> 22:40.027 we still have to return to another issue that we've 22:40.032 --> 22:41.082 considered before. 22:41.079 --> 22:47.549 Namely, is life itself worth having? 22:47.549 --> 22:52.709 Is the very fact that you're alive itself a good thing? 22:52.710 --> 22:54.870 These are the valuable container theories, 22:54.869 --> 22:57.399 which I've previously contrasted with the neutral 22:57.398 --> 22:58.608 container theories. 22:58.609 --> 23:02.359 You'll recall that according to the neutral container theories, 23:02.356 --> 23:05.196 in thinking about the quality of someone's life, 23:05.195 --> 23:07.245 you just look at the contents. 23:07.250 --> 23:10.360 Life itself is only a container, good or bad, 23:10.361 --> 23:13.191 depending on what it's filled up with. 23:13.190 --> 23:16.670 But opposed to the neutral container theories, 23:16.672 --> 23:21.082 we had valuable container theories which say the very fact 23:21.083 --> 23:25.573 that you're alive adds some positive value above and beyond 23:25.571 --> 23:28.591 whatever's going on in your life. 23:28.589 --> 23:31.119 Now, even the valuable container theories came in 23:31.122 --> 23:32.232 different versions. 23:32.230 --> 23:35.810 There were more modest versions, where in principle, 23:35.811 --> 23:39.951 the positive value of being alive could be outweighed if the 23:39.953 --> 23:41.923 contents got bad enough. 23:41.920 --> 23:45.640 And we contrast that with fantastic container theories, 23:45.641 --> 23:48.951 according to which being alive is so valuable, 23:48.950 --> 23:52.050 that it doesn't matter how bad the contents get, 23:52.051 --> 23:54.891 the grand total is always a positive one. 23:54.890 --> 23:59.870 Now look, if you accept a fantastic container theory, 23:59.874 --> 24:04.574 then pretty clearly, it's never true that somebody 24:04.570 --> 24:07.350 could be better off dead. 24:07.349 --> 24:11.329 Because no matter how bad the contents get, 24:11.334 --> 24:14.944 the fact that they're alive, per se, 24:14.940 --> 24:19.390 is so valuable, it outweighs that subtotal, 24:19.385 --> 24:23.085 giving us a positive grand total. 24:23.089 --> 24:26.609 So pretty clearly, from the perspective of 24:26.606 --> 24:32.006 fantastic container theories, suicide will never be rational, 24:32.009 --> 24:35.079 because it's never true that you're better off dead, 24:35.080 --> 24:38.090 because it's never true that your life over all, 24:38.089 --> 24:42.029 taking everything that's relevant into consideration, 24:42.025 --> 24:43.685 gives us a negative. 24:43.690 --> 24:48.220 Yeah, question. Student: [inaudible] 24:48.224 --> 24:54.424 Professor Shelly Kagan: The question was, 24:54.420 --> 24:58.290 on the fantastic container theories, what's so incredible 24:58.288 --> 24:59.668 about life itself? 24:59.670 --> 25:01.660 Are we saying it's intrinsically valuable? 25:01.660 --> 25:03.930 And yes, the answer is: precisely. 25:03.930 --> 25:08.260 The fans of the valuable container theories are saying 25:08.256 --> 25:10.946 being alive itself is valuable. 25:10.950 --> 25:13.140 You may recall that I previously said although people 25:13.140 --> 25:14.910 talk that way, they probably don't actually 25:14.909 --> 25:16.449 mean it, right? If you told them, 25:16.448 --> 25:18.268 okay, you can be alive as a blade of grass, 25:18.273 --> 25:19.973 they wouldn't say, "Oh, wouldn't that be 25:19.968 --> 25:22.028 wonderful? That's worth having." 25:22.029 --> 25:24.919 Most fans of the claim that being alive, per se, 25:24.921 --> 25:28.061 is valuable don't really mean life per se. 25:28.059 --> 25:34.139 They mean something more like life as a person. 25:34.140 --> 25:38.110 Being the kind of entity who can think and plan, 25:38.113 --> 25:43.503 even if your plans go wrong, at least you were a person able 25:43.498 --> 25:46.528 to experience things, know things, 25:46.529 --> 25:50.539 and so forth. Of course, if that's the reason 25:50.540 --> 25:54.310 for accepting the fantastic container theory, 25:54.309 --> 25:58.499 then we might wonder what should we say about those cases 25:58.500 --> 26:02.620 where the P-functioning has decayed and the person is no 26:02.616 --> 26:05.606 longer able to continue as a person, 26:05.610 --> 26:09.030 but perhaps can still feel pain? 26:09.029 --> 26:11.219 In that case, perhaps, life could cease to be 26:11.215 --> 26:13.475 worth living. Though whether or not we should 26:13.478 --> 26:16.218 describe it in that way also depends on these complicated 26:16.222 --> 26:18.282 issues that we've discussed previously, 26:18.280 --> 26:19.590 about would that still be you? 26:19.590 --> 26:20.980 Would you still exist? 26:20.980 --> 26:23.470 Would you still be alive under those circumstances? 26:23.470 --> 26:27.320 So, the basic idea behind valuable container theories is 26:27.319 --> 26:29.909 that life, or the life of a person, 26:29.910 --> 26:32.710 or something like that, has intrinsic value above and 26:32.713 --> 26:35.843 beyond the question of what's going on within your life. 26:35.840 --> 26:39.500 26:39.500 --> 26:43.420 If we accept the fantastic container theory, 26:43.416 --> 26:47.966 maybe nobody's life is ever so bad, grand total. 26:47.970 --> 26:50.950 Because--so that suicide would be the rational thing to 26:50.953 --> 26:54.213 do--because the value of life, per se, is so incredible that 26:54.212 --> 26:55.872 it outweighs the contents. 26:55.869 --> 26:57.439 It has to outweigh the contents. 26:57.440 --> 27:00.870 That's a philosophical view at the opposite end of the 27:00.868 --> 27:02.838 pessimists. The pessimist said, 27:02.835 --> 27:06.145 "As a matter of philosophical reflection, we can see that 27:06.152 --> 27:08.702 everybody's life is worse than nothing." 27:08.700 --> 27:12.400 The fantastic container fans are saying, "As a matter of 27:12.396 --> 27:15.886 philosophical reflection, we can see that everybody's 27:15.891 --> 27:18.111 life is better than nothing." 27:18.109 --> 27:21.069 Most of us, I imagine, find ourselves somewhere in 27:21.066 --> 27:23.026 between. Either we believe in the 27:23.026 --> 27:26.296 neutral container theory and think it's a contingent matter 27:26.304 --> 27:29.304 whether the contents are sufficiently good or bad. 27:29.299 --> 27:33.389 Or, we may accept the modest version of the valuable 27:33.394 --> 27:34.924 container theory. 27:34.920 --> 27:37.830 On that theory, of course, life has some 27:37.832 --> 27:41.342 intrinsic value, but it's got a finite intrinsic 27:41.343 --> 27:43.153 value. And in principle, 27:43.151 --> 27:46.591 even that could be outweighed if the contents get 27:46.585 --> 27:48.095 bad enough. And so again, 27:48.104 --> 27:49.844 it would be an empirical question. 27:49.839 --> 27:55.969 We have to take a look and see, in which cases do the contents 27:55.971 --> 27:59.991 get bad enough? Now, I guess I'm one of these 27:59.988 --> 28:01.738 people in the middle. 28:01.740 --> 28:04.910 I'm inclined to think it's not true that everybody's life is 28:04.911 --> 28:06.041 worse than nothing. 28:06.039 --> 28:09.259 Nor is it true that everybody's life is better than nothing. 28:09.260 --> 28:11.980 It varies from person to person. 28:11.980 --> 28:14.310 And indeed, not just--since we're thinking about suicide, 28:14.311 --> 28:16.311 we're not talking about their life as a whole, 28:16.309 --> 28:21.379 but really, what does life promise from here on out? 28:21.380 --> 28:24.050 Sadly enough, sad to say, it seems to me 28:24.054 --> 28:27.004 there are cases, and probably most of us are 28:27.003 --> 28:30.873 familiar with cases, where the correct description, 28:30.871 --> 28:35.311 given the--your favorite theory of well-being--is going to be 28:35.314 --> 28:38.694 that for this person, here on out, 28:38.691 --> 28:42.481 what life has to offer is sufficiently bad, 28:42.476 --> 28:47.066 so that the contents are sufficiently negative as to 28:47.073 --> 28:51.763 outweigh whatever value life itself might have. 28:51.759 --> 28:56.869 We could imagine somebody in the terminal stages of some 28:56.866 --> 29:02.246 illness, where their cancer perhaps is causing them a great 29:02.251 --> 29:05.531 deal of pain. And the pain is so bad that 29:05.526 --> 29:08.286 they can't really do much of anything else. 29:08.289 --> 29:11.969 It's not as though they could continue working on their novel 29:11.968 --> 29:15.338 or continue talking with the members of their family, 29:15.339 --> 29:19.509 because they're just distracted by the pain and wishing it would 29:19.513 --> 29:21.993 come to an end. Horribly enough, 29:21.988 --> 29:26.708 many degenerative diseases leave the person less and less 29:26.707 --> 29:31.087 capable of doing the things that give life value. 29:31.089 --> 29:35.219 And the very realization that you're in that situation and no 29:35.218 --> 29:38.038 longer able to spend time doing things, 29:38.039 --> 29:40.549 or hanging out with your family, or talking with them, 29:40.552 --> 29:44.682 or whatever it is may, itself, be a source of more 29:44.676 --> 29:47.106 frustration and pain. 29:47.109 --> 29:51.219 There are medical conditions where, horribly enough, 29:51.218 --> 29:56.128 infants get born where they're just in continual pain and they 29:56.133 --> 29:58.553 never develop cognitively. 29:58.549 --> 30:00.569 Their brain doesn't develop and then they die. 30:00.569 --> 30:05.209 And you look at these lives and you say these are lives--I want 30:05.211 --> 30:09.181 to say, these are lives that were not worth having. 30:09.180 --> 30:13.250 These children would have been better off never having been 30:13.252 --> 30:17.112 born at all, certainly not any kind of favor for them to 30:17.114 --> 30:18.874 continue their lives. 30:18.869 --> 30:24.449 Well, let's focus on some case like the terminal patient. 30:24.450 --> 30:27.530 A person's got a disease--at least, that would be a nice easy 30:27.527 --> 30:29.117 example. Not easy to live through, 30:29.123 --> 30:30.253 but easy philosophically. 30:30.250 --> 30:32.800 Easy example to think about--some terminally ill 30:32.801 --> 30:35.571 patient whose disease is getting worse and worse. 30:35.569 --> 30:39.389 And so, there are fewer and fewer of the good things in life 30:39.385 --> 30:41.515 that the future holds for them. 30:41.519 --> 30:45.719 Instead, what the future holds is more and more pain, 30:45.724 --> 30:49.044 suffering, incapacity, and frustration. 30:49.039 --> 30:51.849 When it gets bad enough, it seems to me, 30:51.853 --> 30:55.753 in some of those cases the person can correctly say, 30:55.750 --> 30:59.070 or we, at least, can correctly say of them, 30:59.067 --> 31:01.277 they'd be better off dead. 31:01.280 --> 31:06.250 All right. Let me try to draw some 31:06.251 --> 31:09.181 examples. Again, we're bracketing the 31:09.183 --> 31:12.953 question: Can the person think clearly about their case? 31:12.950 --> 31:14.100 That'll come later. 31:14.099 --> 31:19.689 Let's just try to talk about when would suicide make sense? 31:19.690 --> 31:25.360 When would it be sort of a rational thing to do to end your 31:25.356 --> 31:26.786 life? A couple of different cases. 31:26.790 --> 31:31.530 31:31.530 --> 31:32.620 I'm going to draw graphs. 31:32.620 --> 31:37.130 31:37.130 --> 31:42.400 We'll let the x-axis represent time. 31:42.400 --> 31:48.780 And the y-axis represents how good or bad your life is at that 31:48.778 --> 31:49.508 time. 31:49.510 --> 31:53.570 31:53.569 --> 31:57.099 For those of us who are fans of the neutral container theory, 31:57.098 --> 32:00.328 the thing to say is this represents the overall goodness 32:00.332 --> 32:03.922 of your contents or the overall badness of your contents. 32:03.920 --> 32:05.380 The higher up, the better the contents. 32:05.380 --> 32:08.330 The lower down, the worse the contents. 32:08.329 --> 32:12.419 For those who are fans of the modest container theory, 32:12.415 --> 32:15.185 this represents the grand balance. 32:15.190 --> 32:20.950 So it's contents plus the extra bit you get from being alive. 32:20.950 --> 32:23.020 But of course, if you're a fan of the modest 32:23.022 --> 32:25.242 container theory, then even if the contents are 32:25.240 --> 32:27.940 negative, the grand balance might still be positive. 32:27.940 --> 32:32.550 But this represents the overall bottom line, whether you accept 32:32.545 --> 32:37.145 the neutral container theory or the modest container theory. 32:37.150 --> 32:41.070 So, here's an example of what a life might look like. 32:41.069 --> 32:45.179 It's going along pretty well and then things get worse. 32:45.180 --> 32:47.710 And things sort of deteriorate. 32:47.710 --> 32:53.490 And let's suppose this point represents when you would die of 32:53.494 --> 32:56.584 natural causes, natural death. 32:56.579 --> 32:59.149 So, towards the end, life's not as great as it was 32:59.150 --> 33:02.510 when you were young and vigorous and healthy and had all sorts of 33:02.506 --> 33:04.496 opportunities and accomplishments. 33:04.500 --> 33:11.070 But still, till the very end, it stays positive. 33:11.069 --> 33:16.079 Well, if that's what your lifeline would look like, 33:16.084 --> 33:20.504 pretty clearly, suicide doesn't ever make any 33:20.497 --> 33:22.337 sense. In particular, 33:22.341 --> 33:25.831 you wouldn't want to say oh, look, here's the place where I 33:25.830 --> 33:28.660 should kill myself, because here is where things 33:28.656 --> 33:30.096 start to get worse. 33:30.099 --> 33:34.959 Yes, things are beginning to get worse, but they never get so 33:34.963 --> 33:37.723 bad that you're better off dead. 33:37.720 --> 33:43.390 So, suicide wouldn't make any sense at all. 33:43.390 --> 33:48.420 For suicide to make sense, it's got to be the case that 33:48.418 --> 33:52.048 your life takes a turn for the worse. 33:52.049 --> 33:57.409 Not just any old turn for the worse, but a turn so much for 33:57.414 --> 34:01.674 the worse, that for some chunk of your life, 34:01.670 --> 34:04.840 your life is worse than nonexistence, 34:04.842 --> 34:07.312 the zero line, the x-axis. 34:07.310 --> 34:10.010 All right. Imagine that's what's happened. 34:10.010 --> 34:11.870 Here you are. You're healthy, 34:11.870 --> 34:13.950 you're vigorous, you're accomplishing things, 34:13.953 --> 34:16.133 but you've got some degenerative disease that's 34:16.131 --> 34:18.121 going to make things worse and worse. 34:18.119 --> 34:19.749 Here's the period in which it's getting worse. 34:19.750 --> 34:23.710 And then after a while, your existence is going to be 34:23.710 --> 34:25.310 worse than nothing. 34:25.309 --> 34:28.639 Here, we can at least broach the question in an intelligible 34:28.641 --> 34:31.901 way. Might suicide make sense? 34:31.900 --> 34:36.320 Suppose this is the point where the downturn begins. 34:36.320 --> 34:39.540 Should you kill yourself at that stage? 34:39.540 --> 34:42.420 No. Because, after all, 34:42.424 --> 34:46.594 even though there's a downturn, things are getting worse, 34:46.590 --> 34:49.280 there's still going to be another period of life, 34:49.279 --> 34:51.519 another chunk of whatever it is--year, 34:51.519 --> 34:55.569 five years, six months, whatever it is--where although 34:55.566 --> 34:58.846 life isn't as good as it had been before, 34:58.850 --> 35:02.610 it's still better than nothing. 35:02.610 --> 35:06.590 Killing yourself at this earlier moment is, 35:06.593 --> 35:09.063 we might say, premature. 35:09.059 --> 35:13.779 It's throwing away a chunk of life that would still be worth 35:13.780 --> 35:16.000 having. It's not the right thing to do. 35:16.000 --> 35:17.540 It doesn't make sense rationally. 35:17.540 --> 35:21.130 35:21.130 --> 35:23.120 Well, if not that moment, what about this moment? 35:23.120 --> 35:26.420 35:26.420 --> 35:31.490 Here's the precise point at which your life is becoming 35:31.488 --> 35:33.458 worse than nothing. 35:33.460 --> 35:36.000 For some initial stretch of that, it won't be very much 35:36.001 --> 35:36.991 worse than nothing. 35:36.989 --> 35:41.089 But still, overall, it's a negative. 35:41.090 --> 35:43.970 Up to that moment, your life was worth living. 35:43.969 --> 35:47.479 From that moment on, your life is worse than 35:47.483 --> 35:50.983 nothing. If you've got complete control 35:50.975 --> 35:56.145 over when to kill yourself, well, that would be the time to 35:56.147 --> 36:01.017 do it. Suppose you don't have complete 36:01.018 --> 36:04.358 control. It's straightforward enough to 36:04.362 --> 36:08.472 say if your life is going to become worse than nothing and 36:08.471 --> 36:12.581 you have complete control over when you kill yourself, 36:12.579 --> 36:16.419 it seems pretty plausible to say the precise moment at which 36:16.424 --> 36:20.334 suicide would become rational would be exactly that moment at 36:20.333 --> 36:23.203 which your life became not worth having. 36:23.199 --> 36:26.119 But you might not have that kind of control. 36:26.120 --> 36:29.130 36:29.130 --> 36:34.120 Suppose that what you've got is a degenerative disease that is 36:34.120 --> 36:39.190 going to progressively strip you of the ability to control your 36:39.193 --> 36:41.923 body. Still, your mind works for a 36:41.920 --> 36:43.200 much longer time. 36:43.199 --> 36:47.649 And so, for a period of time, you're basically stuck in your 36:47.651 --> 36:50.821 hospital bed being fed by somebody else. 36:50.820 --> 36:53.940 But perhaps you're able to listen to your family talk about 36:53.936 --> 36:55.706 things, have books read to you. 36:55.710 --> 36:57.220 Maybe you can engage in conversation, 36:57.224 --> 36:59.374 even though you can't use your arms and so forth. 36:59.369 --> 37:03.539 Your life's still worth living, but the time's going to come 37:03.536 --> 37:06.286 when your life won't be worth living. 37:06.289 --> 37:10.229 And at that point, you'll no longer have the 37:10.226 --> 37:15.256 ability to kill yourself, because you won't have control 37:15.260 --> 37:18.410 over your body. It raises the question of--I'm 37:18.410 --> 37:21.140 sure you can all see at this point, the question of suicide 37:21.136 --> 37:22.966 also turns into or comes up against, 37:22.969 --> 37:26.199 the question about euthanasia, mercy killing. 37:26.199 --> 37:29.179 Under what circumstances is it ever rational to ask somebody 37:29.180 --> 37:30.140 else to kill you? 37:30.139 --> 37:33.449 Under what circumstances, if ever, is it morally 37:33.447 --> 37:35.907 legitimate to kill somebody else? 37:35.909 --> 37:40.039 But let's continue to focus on the case of suicide. 37:40.039 --> 37:45.659 Suppose you live in a society which is so unenlightened as to 37:45.658 --> 37:48.278 have ruled out euthanasia. 37:48.280 --> 37:50.420 In fact, you live in our society. 37:50.420 --> 37:54.830 And so, what we don't allow is the possibility of somebody else 37:54.825 --> 37:58.445 coming along and killing you when the time comes. 37:58.449 --> 38:03.209 So, you know the time is going to come at which you'd be better 38:03.206 --> 38:05.646 off dead. But once you're there, 38:05.646 --> 38:08.036 once you're here, it's too late. 38:08.040 --> 38:10.580 You can't do it. You won't have the ability to 38:10.582 --> 38:12.982 kill yourself, and nobody else will be able to 38:12.975 --> 38:15.195 do it for you. In that case, 38:15.198 --> 38:20.168 killing yourself earlier might still make sense. 38:20.170 --> 38:21.910 Take this earlier point, for example. 38:21.910 --> 38:24.970 38:24.969 --> 38:29.369 Here, if you kill yourself now, you're throwing away some life 38:29.372 --> 38:30.962 that's worth living. 38:30.960 --> 38:35.630 But if this is the last moment at which you're going to be able 38:35.630 --> 38:38.870 to kill yourself, it might still make sense, 38:38.869 --> 38:42.679 rationally. Because your choice is not end 38:42.683 --> 38:44.923 it here or end it there. 38:44.920 --> 38:48.800 We're assuming you don't have the possibility of ending it 38:48.796 --> 38:52.666 here, at the precise moment at which life became no longer 38:52.673 --> 38:54.723 worth having. Your choice, 38:54.721 --> 38:56.951 instead, is really just this. 38:56.949 --> 39:01.289 End it here and throw away this whole last bit. 39:01.289 --> 39:07.639 Or not end it and then continue until you die from the disease. 39:07.639 --> 39:13.039 So, your question is only, what do I think about the value 39:13.039 --> 39:14.839 of this last bit? 39:14.840 --> 39:17.100 On the whole, it's got a good part and it's 39:17.103 --> 39:20.233 god a bad part. Is it better to have the good 39:20.229 --> 39:24.189 part and the bad part or better to have none of it? 39:24.190 --> 39:26.750 And the answer, of course, is well, 39:26.748 --> 39:30.288 if the bad part's going to continue long enough, 39:30.285 --> 39:32.915 it's better to have none of it. 39:32.920 --> 39:36.380 The bad outweighs the good. 39:36.380 --> 39:40.090 So that the rational thing to do would be to decide to end 39:40.091 --> 39:42.501 your life then, when you still can, 39:42.500 --> 39:47.360 rather than condemn yourself to the long final stretch of life 39:47.364 --> 39:48.884 not worth living. 39:48.880 --> 39:53.600 39:53.599 --> 40:00.359 Well, what if the last time that you could actually control 40:00.361 --> 40:06.191 it was way back here, for whatever reason it is. 40:06.190 --> 40:09.960 Here, you've got access to the means of killing yourself and 40:09.962 --> 40:11.882 you won't have access later. 40:11.880 --> 40:15.530 Your life's still going to be great for a very long time. 40:15.530 --> 40:19.070 And then, inevitably, it'll be bad for a period of 40:19.065 --> 40:21.585 time. But at least if I've drawn it 40:21.591 --> 40:24.101 right, if not, we can shorten this. 40:24.100 --> 40:25.590 I suppose death would come here. 40:25.590 --> 40:30.360 40:30.360 --> 40:34.050 Here's a case where if you don't kill yourself now, 40:34.050 --> 40:38.480 you're condemning yourself to the whole rest of the story. 40:38.480 --> 40:40.570 But we might say, "All right. 40:40.570 --> 40:44.770 Although, admittedly, the end of the story's going to 40:44.767 --> 40:49.607 be negative, the only way to avoid that negative last part is 40:49.611 --> 40:53.891 to throw away this very long great initial part." 40:53.890 --> 40:56.030 That doesn't make sense. 40:56.030 --> 41:00.680 Although your life is now still going to be a mixture of good 41:00.679 --> 41:04.789 and bad, and you wish there were a way to end it here, 41:04.787 --> 41:07.187 you don't have that choice. 41:07.190 --> 41:09.570 It's throw away the good and the bad, 41:09.572 --> 41:10.682 or keep them both. 41:10.679 --> 41:14.239 And in this story, obviously enough, 41:14.235 --> 41:18.395 the good is enough to outweigh the bad. 41:18.400 --> 41:24.070 So, suicide doesn't make sense in that situation. 41:24.070 --> 41:29.100 Here's a rather different way the story might go. 41:29.100 --> 41:34.400 41:34.400 --> 41:39.390 Suppose your life's going along really great and it takes a turn 41:39.388 --> 41:43.188 for the worse but then is going to get better. 41:43.190 --> 41:48.810 So, it ends here with death by natural causes. 41:48.810 --> 41:53.780 Could suicide make sense here? 41:53.780 --> 41:56.790 Does it make sense to say, "Look, I'm going to kill myself 41:56.788 --> 41:59.108 in order to avoid the downturn" or indeed, 41:59.110 --> 42:05.660 even if the recovery wasn't so long a recovery, 42:05.656 --> 42:11.806 could suicide make sense here, because you're about to take 42:11.809 --> 42:15.009 this big dip down and be condemned to most of the rest of 42:15.007 --> 42:18.317 your life being significantly worse than it was before? 42:18.320 --> 42:24.510 No, suicide doesn't make sense in this situation. 42:24.510 --> 42:28.710 Because even though what you're going to have during this period 42:28.708 --> 42:31.838 is a life worse than the life you had before, 42:31.840 --> 42:36.280 the life you've got here is still above the x-axis. 42:36.280 --> 42:38.810 It's still a life worth living. 42:38.809 --> 42:41.189 This point, I think, is probably crucial enough that 42:41.186 --> 42:43.186 it's worth taking a moment to reflect on. 42:43.190 --> 42:47.470 The fact that your life is less good than it had been, 42:47.468 --> 42:51.908 less good than indeed maybe all the lives around you are 42:51.908 --> 42:56.588 having--all the people around you are having lives that are 42:56.589 --> 43:01.509 better than yours--still doesn't mean that your life is so bad 43:01.513 --> 43:04.423 that you're better off dead. 43:04.420 --> 43:06.030 It's easy to lose sight of that, right? 43:06.030 --> 43:11.300 Here we are sliding down and all we see is the fact that 43:11.295 --> 43:13.205 we're moving down. 43:13.210 --> 43:18.030 It's natural to get caught up in the thought "I'm better off 43:18.031 --> 43:20.321 dead," but it's a mistake. 43:20.320 --> 43:22.380 You're not better off dead. 43:22.380 --> 43:24.770 This situation, I suppose, is probably--I 43:24.769 --> 43:28.409 always worry when I spend--when I end this class talking about 43:28.413 --> 43:30.813 suicide, because what's the major cause 43:30.812 --> 43:32.272 of death among teenagers? 43:32.270 --> 43:33.610 Well, it's suicide. 43:33.610 --> 43:36.610 That's not really so all that surprising, because teenagers 43:36.609 --> 43:38.419 are pretty healthy, as people go. 43:38.420 --> 43:42.740 And so the--you're either going to get killed by an accident or 43:42.743 --> 43:46.443 you're going to get killed by doing it to yourself. 43:46.440 --> 43:51.330 The kind of mistake that I think leads most teenagers into 43:51.332 --> 43:55.112 killing themselves is something like this. 43:55.110 --> 43:57.400 They've broken up with their girlfriend. 43:57.400 --> 43:59.550 They've flunked out of school. 43:59.550 --> 44:03.910 They didn't get into medical school or law school or what 44:03.912 --> 44:06.532 have you. And they think to themselves, 44:06.531 --> 44:09.691 "Oh, from here on out, my life's not worth living." 44:09.690 --> 44:12.190 And the answer is, no, that's actually, 44:12.190 --> 44:15.350 as an objective matter, probably not the case. 44:15.349 --> 44:18.599 Even if your life would be less worth living than you had hoped 44:18.599 --> 44:21.009 it would be, it's still better than nothing. 44:21.010 --> 44:26.250 Of course, in the typical case, I suppose what it really looks 44:26.251 --> 44:29.951 like is this. Small dip then continues 44:29.952 --> 44:33.192 wonderfully. But you lose sight of all the 44:33.194 --> 44:37.334 good stuff yet to come while you're in the middle of the dip. 44:37.329 --> 44:41.199 So, although I'm taking time now to talk about the question, 44:41.196 --> 44:44.666 under what circumstances might suicide be a rationally 44:44.670 --> 44:48.350 justified one? I should hasten to add the 44:48.347 --> 44:54.207 remark that I'm fairly confident that for nobody in this class 44:54.207 --> 44:57.667 would suicide, in fact, be a rational 44:57.665 --> 45:00.685 decision. Now, that doesn't mean it 45:00.692 --> 45:04.462 couldn't turn out to be a rational decision later in your 45:04.461 --> 45:07.141 life, but that, very likely, 45:07.141 --> 45:11.621 overwhelmingly likely, is not one now. 45:11.619 --> 45:13.949 Well, a couple other cases that I still want to have us 45:13.947 --> 45:16.277 consider, but I think that's probably enough for today, 45:16.275 --> 45:17.995 so we'll take it up there next time.