WEBVTT 00:00.980 --> 00:03.780 Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time, I distinguished 00:03.776 --> 00:06.516 between two ways in which thinking about the facts about 00:06.523 --> 00:09.173 the nature of death could influence our behavior. 00:09.170 --> 00:12.490 On the one hand, it could give us reasons to 00:12.491 --> 00:17.131 behave or respond differently, and on the other hand it could 00:17.125 --> 00:20.365 merely cause us to behave differently. 00:20.370 --> 00:23.820 Insofar as it just happens to be some fact about human 00:23.820 --> 00:27.010 psychology that we behave this way or that way, 00:27.010 --> 00:30.690 perhaps the appropriate way to deal with the facts of death 00:30.687 --> 00:32.967 would be to simply disregard them. 00:32.970 --> 00:36.630 I'm inclined to believe, however, that there are ways in 00:36.634 --> 00:40.504 which thinking about the facts would not merely cause us to 00:40.498 --> 00:43.498 behave one way rather than another but give us 00:43.496 --> 00:47.356 reason to behave one way rather than another. 00:47.360 --> 00:50.590 And that's the question that I want to then explore from here 00:50.594 --> 00:52.644 on out. In what circumstances, 00:52.640 --> 00:55.970 or in what ways, should we behave one way rather 00:55.974 --> 00:59.154 than another? So, I'm not merely going to 00:59.145 --> 01:02.005 draw on facts about how, as it happens, 01:02.009 --> 01:05.319 we behave. It could be that if you dwelled 01:05.316 --> 01:09.516 upon the facts about death, you would scream interminably 01:09.518 --> 01:13.718 until the moment you died--taking a tip from Tolstoy. 01:13.719 --> 01:16.099 But that doesn't itself show that that's an appropriate 01:16.104 --> 01:18.214 response; that might just be a mere 01:18.210 --> 01:20.480 causal fact about how we're built. 01:20.480 --> 01:24.350 The question I want to ask is, how is it appropriate, 01:24.347 --> 01:28.587 in what ways is there reason, to react one way rather than 01:28.587 --> 01:30.197 another? Now as I say, 01:30.204 --> 01:33.104 the thought seems very compelling for most of us that 01:33.104 --> 01:36.624 there are ways in which it makes sense for the facts about death 01:36.617 --> 01:39.747 to influence how we live, what our attitudes are, 01:39.750 --> 01:41.210 what are emotions are. 01:41.209 --> 01:45.229 Kafka, for example, said the meaning of life is the 01:45.231 --> 01:46.841 fact that it ends. 01:46.840 --> 01:51.300 Nice little cryptic saying, as is typical of Kafka. 01:51.300 --> 01:54.630 But the suggestion, I suppose, is a fairly common 01:54.628 --> 01:58.578 one, that it's something deep about how we should live, 01:58.580 --> 02:01.880 that we're going to die, that our life will come to an 02:01.876 --> 02:03.816 end. And the question we want to 02:03.821 --> 02:07.431 then explore is how should the fact, how should recognizing the 02:07.430 --> 02:10.690 fact, that we're going to die, influence how we live? 02:10.689 --> 02:14.849 How should we respond to that fact? 02:14.849 --> 02:17.229 Now actually, the very first kind of 02:17.227 --> 02:20.617 behavior, quote/unquote behavior, that I want us to 02:20.623 --> 02:24.163 think about perhaps isn't strictly speaking a form of 02:24.155 --> 02:27.525 behavior at all. I rather have in mind our 02:27.525 --> 02:31.195 emotional response, because indeed one of the most 02:31.202 --> 02:35.252 common reactions to death, I suppose, is fear of 02:35.254 --> 02:38.474 death. Indeed, fear may in many cases 02:38.471 --> 02:43.411 be too weak a term--an extremely strong form of fear--terror of 02:43.413 --> 02:46.713 death is, I suppose, a very common 02:46.706 --> 02:49.526 emotional response to death. 02:49.530 --> 02:54.930 And what I want to do next is have us ask ourselves, 02:54.930 --> 03:01.920 well, is fear of death a rationally appropriate response? 03:01.919 --> 03:05.209 Now, the crucial word here is "appropriate." 03:05.210 --> 03:10.270 I don't want to deny at all what I take to be the empirical 03:10.270 --> 03:14.110 fact that many people are afraid of death. 03:14.110 --> 03:17.520 How common a reaction that is, and how strong the fear is, 03:17.521 --> 03:20.691 I suppose that would be something for psychologists or 03:20.693 --> 03:22.253 sociologists to study. 03:22.250 --> 03:23.510 And I'm not interested in that question. 03:23.509 --> 03:25.849 I take it that fear of death is very common. 03:25.849 --> 03:28.339 I want to know, is fear of death an 03:28.340 --> 03:31.490 appropriate, a reasonable emotion? 03:31.490 --> 03:37.130 Now, in raising that question, I'm obviously presupposing the 03:37.132 --> 03:42.772 larger philosophical thesis that it makes sense to talk about 03:42.774 --> 03:47.574 emotions as being appropriate or inappropriate. 03:47.569 --> 03:52.779 We can ask not only what emotions does somebody have, 03:52.783 --> 03:57.903 but we can also ask what emotions should they 03:57.897 --> 04:00.647 have? Now, this point perhaps isn't 04:00.653 --> 04:03.593 an obvious one, so maybe it's worth dwelling on 04:03.593 --> 04:06.853 for a moment or two, before we turn to fear of death 04:06.853 --> 04:09.013 per se. What's another example of an 04:09.013 --> 04:11.603 emotion that's got some appropriateness conditions? 04:11.599 --> 04:14.519 So, in a moment I'll turn to asking, what are the conditions 04:14.515 --> 04:17.575 under which it's appropriate to be afraid of something?--but to 04:17.578 --> 04:20.518 make the more general point, look, take something like pride; 04:20.520 --> 04:22.060 pride's an emotion. 04:22.060 --> 04:27.140 Under what conditions does it make sense to be proud of 04:27.140 --> 04:29.510 something? Well, I suppose at least two 04:29.509 --> 04:30.439 conditions jump out. 04:30.439 --> 04:33.759 First of all, the thing that you're proud of 04:33.755 --> 04:36.835 has to be some kind of accomplishment. 04:36.839 --> 04:40.569 If you were to say to me right now, "I'm really proud of the 04:40.572 --> 04:43.622 fact that I'm breathing," I'd look at you in a 04:43.622 --> 04:47.522 noncomprehending fashion because it doesn't seem to me that 04:47.516 --> 04:49.996 breathing is difficult in any way, 04:50.000 --> 04:52.430 doesn't count as an accomplishment, 04:52.431 --> 04:56.871 and as such I can't understand how or why you would be proud of 04:56.866 --> 04:59.366 the fact that you're breathing. 04:59.370 --> 05:03.250 Now, maybe if you suffered from asthma and you had to have gone 05:03.249 --> 05:07.069 through excruciating physical therapy in order to learn how to 05:07.066 --> 05:10.316 use your lungs after some accident or something; 05:10.319 --> 05:14.169 maybe if we told a story like that we could see how breathing 05:14.167 --> 05:17.307 naturally and normally would be an accomplishment, 05:17.310 --> 05:19.170 something to be proud of. 05:19.170 --> 05:21.470 But for all of us, I presume, it's not an 05:21.471 --> 05:25.251 accomplishment; hence it's not something that 05:25.247 --> 05:28.427 it's appropriate to be proud of. 05:28.430 --> 05:30.100 Even if we've got an accomplishment, 05:30.098 --> 05:31.288 that may not be enough. 05:31.290 --> 05:36.170 For something to be something that it makes sense for you to 05:36.165 --> 05:39.795 be proud of it, it's got to be in some way an 05:39.801 --> 05:43.521 accomplishment that reflects well on you. 05:43.519 --> 05:46.399 Now, the most straightforward cases are cases where it's 05:46.400 --> 05:50.040 your accomplishment, and the reason that pride makes 05:50.043 --> 05:54.293 sense is because you're the one who did this difficult thing. 05:54.290 --> 05:56.970 So, you got an A on your philosophy paper and you tell me 05:56.970 --> 05:58.980 that you're proud and I understand that; 05:58.980 --> 06:01.760 getting an A on a philosophy paper is an accomplishment, 06:01.757 --> 06:04.987 and if you wrote the paper then I understand why you're proud. 06:04.990 --> 06:09.870 Of course, if what you did was go on the Internet and go to one 06:09.871 --> 06:14.441 of those sites where you pay money and somebody else writes 06:14.438 --> 06:17.988 an A paper for you, well, I understand why maybe 06:17.989 --> 06:21.409 they should be proud that they've written a great 06:21.407 --> 06:24.577 philosophy paper, but I don't see how this 06:24.581 --> 06:27.881 reflects especially positively upon you. 06:27.879 --> 06:32.459 So again, there's a kind of appropriateness condition for 06:32.461 --> 06:37.041 pride, where the object or the event or the activity that 06:37.043 --> 06:39.733 you're proud of, or the feature, 06:39.733 --> 06:41.913 has to somehow reflect on you. 06:41.910 --> 06:45.250 Now, that's not to say that it's got to be your 06:45.252 --> 06:47.402 accomplishment, at least not in any 06:47.396 --> 06:49.536 straightforward, narrow sense. 06:49.540 --> 06:51.070 It makes sense, for example, 06:51.074 --> 06:54.544 to be proud of your children's accomplishments because there's 06:54.540 --> 06:58.120 the right kind of connection between you and your children. 06:58.120 --> 07:00.920 So, in some sense it's connected to you. 07:00.920 --> 07:04.480 And we can have cases where we wonder about whether or not the 07:04.483 --> 07:07.933 connection is tight enough or what exactly the nature of the 07:07.929 --> 07:09.389 connection has to be. 07:09.389 --> 07:14.809 Perhaps as an American you took pride when the Americans win 07:14.806 --> 07:20.316 some event at the Olympics or the Tour de France or what have 07:20.315 --> 07:22.275 you, and you say to yourself, 07:22.278 --> 07:25.348 "well look, I didn't ride the bicycle but for all that I'm an 07:25.351 --> 07:27.911 American and an American won, I'm proud." 07:27.910 --> 07:31.410 And that makes sense; we can understand how you think 07:31.413 --> 07:33.113 the connection there is tight enough. 07:33.110 --> 07:37.490 On the other hand if you say, "look, the Germans won the 07:37.493 --> 07:41.163 event in the Olympics and I'm really proud," 07:41.160 --> 07:43.570 and I ask, well, are you yourself German, 07:43.572 --> 07:46.772 do you have German heritage, did you contribute to the 07:46.769 --> 07:48.759 German Olympics support team? 07:48.759 --> 07:51.459 If none of that's true, then again the appropriateness 07:51.455 --> 07:53.535 condition doesn't seem to be satisfied. 07:53.540 --> 07:56.000 It doesn't make sense to be proud. 07:56.000 --> 07:58.670 All right, look, we could spend more time 07:58.669 --> 08:02.539 worrying about the conditions under which it makes sense to 08:02.539 --> 08:04.869 feel pride. But of course that's not really 08:04.870 --> 08:07.550 my purpose here. My purpose of bringing that in 08:07.547 --> 08:11.377 was just to try to make good on the thought that emotions do 08:11.376 --> 08:14.736 have requirements; not necessarily requirements 08:14.742 --> 08:18.822 for what you have to have in place in order to feel 08:18.817 --> 08:21.247 the emotion. It's a harder question whether 08:21.250 --> 08:23.790 all these things need to be in place in order to feel the 08:23.791 --> 08:25.941 emotion. But at least these things need 08:25.935 --> 08:29.275 to be in place in order for it to make sense for you to 08:29.282 --> 08:32.292 have the emotion, in order for it to be rational 08:32.294 --> 08:35.554 or reasonable to feel the emotion, in order for that 08:35.548 --> 08:39.058 emotional response to be an appropriate response to your 08:39.058 --> 08:41.098 circumstances or situation. 08:41.100 --> 08:44.400 So, let's ask ourselves, then, what are the 08:44.397 --> 08:47.377 appropriateness conditions for fear? 08:47.379 --> 08:50.889 Because armed with that set of conditions, we'll then be able 08:50.894 --> 08:53.654 to go on and ask, is it appropriate to feel fear 08:53.648 --> 08:55.668 of death? Now, three conditions come to 08:55.674 --> 08:58.074 mind when I think about this question, when I've thought 08:58.072 --> 08:59.732 about this question over the years. 08:59.730 --> 09:01.960 The first is this--and I suppose this first one's going 09:01.961 --> 09:04.151 to be fairly uncontroversial--in order to be afraid of 09:04.150 --> 09:06.010 something--even though I slipped in this, 09:06.009 --> 09:09.569 to talk about what you need to have in order to feel 09:09.568 --> 09:12.638 fear, what I really mean is in order for it to make 09:12.636 --> 09:16.376 sense to feel fear--the thing that you're afraid of has 09:16.378 --> 09:17.788 to be bad. 09:17.789 --> 09:21.589 If somebody were to say to me, "I'm afraid that after class 09:21.589 --> 09:24.799 somebody's going to give me an ice cream cone", 09:24.799 --> 09:27.919 again I'd look at them in noncomprehension. 09:27.919 --> 09:30.339 I'd say, "Why are you afraid of that? 09:30.340 --> 09:33.010 How could it make any sense to be afraid?" 09:33.009 --> 09:36.389 And again, it's not that somebody couldn't give you an 09:36.386 --> 09:38.396 answer. They'd say, "Oh I'm trying to 09:38.404 --> 09:41.344 lose weight but I'm so weak and if they give me an ice cream 09:41.343 --> 09:44.233 cone then I'll just eat it and that'll ruin my diet for the 09:44.232 --> 09:45.662 week," well, then I'd understand. 09:45.659 --> 09:49.609 From that point of view an ice cream cone is a bad thing and so 09:49.612 --> 09:52.802 that first condition on fear would be satisfied. 09:52.799 --> 09:55.599 But if you don't have a story like that, if you're like most 09:55.604 --> 09:58.334 of us, most of the time, and an ice cream cone's a 09:58.327 --> 10:01.237 pretty good thing, a source of some passing but at 10:01.243 --> 10:03.823 least genuine pleasure, then you say, 10:03.821 --> 10:08.181 "How can you be afraid of having or getting or eating an 10:08.183 --> 10:10.633 ice cream cone?" It doesn't make sense. 10:10.629 --> 10:15.269 To be afraid of something, it's got to be bad. 10:15.269 --> 10:20.849 It's one of the reasons why we sometimes look askance at people 10:20.845 --> 10:25.965 who have various kinds of phobias--fear of spiders or fear 10:25.971 --> 10:30.531 of dust or what have you, fear of bunnies--and you think, 10:30.526 --> 10:32.406 how does this make any sense? 10:32.410 --> 10:35.540 It's this cute little bunny; it's not dangerous. 10:35.539 --> 10:39.549 And maybe there are poisonous spiders, but most of the spiders 10:39.550 --> 10:43.100 we run across here in Connecticut are not poisonous. 10:43.100 --> 10:45.590 Fear of spiders doesn't seem appropriate. 10:45.590 --> 10:48.750 It's not that people can't have this kind of 10:48.747 --> 10:51.527 emotional reaction, it's that it doesn't make 10:51.526 --> 10:54.136 sense. Maybe it's another matter if 10:54.139 --> 10:56.999 you live in Australia, where there's poisonous snakes 10:57.000 --> 10:59.420 and spiders and other insects everyplace. 10:59.419 --> 11:02.569 All right. So, condition number one: 11:02.566 --> 11:07.776 Fear requires something bad, as the object of your fear. 11:07.779 --> 11:13.239 I can fear getting a migraine, if I'm subject to migraines. 11:13.240 --> 11:18.520 I can't fear the pleasure of looking at a beautiful sunset. 11:18.519 --> 11:20.619 That's condition number one--bad object, 11:20.615 --> 11:21.685 something harmful. 11:21.690 --> 11:26.920 Condition number two is, there's got to be a 11:26.919 --> 11:33.969 nonnegligible chance of the bad state of affairs happening, 11:33.972 --> 11:38.352 of the bad object coming to you. 11:38.350 --> 11:43.420 It's not enough that it's a logical possibility for fear to 11:43.419 --> 11:45.779 be a reasonable reaction. 11:45.779 --> 11:49.399 There's nothing logically inconsistent or logically 11:49.401 --> 11:53.751 incoherent about the possibility that I will face my death by 11:53.747 --> 11:57.077 being ripped to pieces by Siberian tigers. 11:57.080 --> 12:03.610 It's not as though that's an inconsistent state of affairs. 12:03.610 --> 12:09.960 It's certainly logically possible, but it's so unlikely, 12:09.956 --> 12:14.106 it's so negligibly small a chance, 12:14.110 --> 12:19.400 that if anybody here is afraid that they'll be ripped to pieces 12:19.397 --> 12:24.937 by tigers, then I can only say the fear doesn't make any sense, 12:24.940 --> 12:26.020 it's not appropriate. 12:26.019 --> 12:28.469 Again, we can tell special stories where that might be 12:28.466 --> 12:30.306 different. Suppose you tell me that, 12:30.313 --> 12:33.213 oh, when you're not a student, your work study program, 12:33.210 --> 12:36.590 what you do is, you work as an animal trainer, 12:36.588 --> 12:40.718 or you're planning to work in the circus where you'll be 12:40.718 --> 12:42.888 training tigers, then I'll say, 12:42.886 --> 12:45.456 all right, now I suppose there's a nonnegligible chance 12:45.458 --> 12:47.218 you'll be mauled and killed by tigers. 12:47.220 --> 12:50.380 I understand it. But for the rest of us, 12:50.377 --> 12:55.067 I suppose, the chance of being killed by tigers is, 12:55.068 --> 13:00.038 well, it's not literally zero, but it's close to zero, 13:00.039 --> 13:05.399 it's negligible. And so, fear of being eaten by 13:05.403 --> 13:12.193 tigers or mauled to death by tigers doesn't make any sense. 13:12.190 --> 13:17.420 And once you get the point, of course, it would be easy to 13:17.424 --> 13:22.844 talk about a variety of other things that the chances are so 13:22.843 --> 13:28.263 small--fear of being kidnapped by space creatures from Alpha 13:28.262 --> 13:31.572 Centauri, where I'll be taken back to the 13:31.568 --> 13:35.238 lab and they'll prod me before they dissect me alive without 13:35.239 --> 13:37.659 anesthetic. Yes, I suppose there's some 13:37.656 --> 13:38.856 possibility of that. 13:38.860 --> 13:40.580 It's not logically impossible. 13:40.580 --> 13:44.100 But again it's so vanishingly small a chance, 13:44.100 --> 13:47.700 and anybody who actually is afraid of that, 13:47.700 --> 13:52.320 the appropriate thing for us to say is that their fear is not 13:52.321 --> 13:55.181 appropriate. All right, so you need to have 13:55.175 --> 13:58.245 a chance of the bad thing, and it's got to be a large 13:58.253 --> 14:01.283 enough chance. And I suppose again there would 14:01.276 --> 14:04.916 be room for us to argue about how large a chance is large 14:04.919 --> 14:07.709 enough, but when you have vanishingly 14:07.710 --> 14:11.550 small chances then the fear doesn't make any sense. 14:11.550 --> 14:13.070 That's condition number two. 14:13.070 --> 14:15.870 Condition number three, I think, is somewhat more 14:15.867 --> 14:18.487 controversial, but for all that it still seems 14:18.490 --> 14:20.530 correct to me, and that's this. 14:20.529 --> 14:27.929 We need to have a certain amount of uncertainty in order 14:27.932 --> 14:31.972 to have fear be appropriate. 14:31.970 --> 14:37.010 You need to have some--it's not clear how much--but at least 14:37.012 --> 14:41.712 some significant amount of uncertainty about whether the 14:41.713 --> 14:47.923 bad thing will occur, and/or how bad the bad thing 14:47.921 --> 14:50.271 will be. To see the point, 14:50.267 --> 14:52.947 to see the relevance of this third condition, 14:52.953 --> 14:56.433 imagine that a bad thing was going to happen to you with a 14:56.432 --> 14:58.022 nonnegligible chance. 14:58.019 --> 15:03.259 Indeed, far from being so small that it's virtually not worth 15:03.264 --> 15:07.204 even considering, imagine that it's guaranteed 15:07.198 --> 15:10.868 that the bad thing is going to happen. 15:10.870 --> 15:13.750 So, there's a bad thing that's going to happen, 15:13.754 --> 15:16.204 and you know precisely how bad it is. 15:16.200 --> 15:20.600 So you've got certainty with regard to the fact that the bad 15:20.600 --> 15:24.550 thing is going to happen, and certainly with regard to 15:24.552 --> 15:26.792 the size of the bad thing. 15:26.789 --> 15:30.319 I put it to you that in circumstances like that, 15:30.322 --> 15:33.932 fear is not an appropriate emotional response. 15:33.929 --> 15:36.409 Suppose that what happens is this. 15:36.409 --> 15:39.439 Every day you come to school, to the office, 15:39.439 --> 15:42.539 whatever it is, and you bring a bagged lunch, 15:42.539 --> 15:45.779 and you put it in the office refrigerator. 15:45.779 --> 15:48.269 And you include, along with your lunch, 15:48.272 --> 15:50.962 a dessert; let's say a cookie. 15:50.960 --> 15:55.760 And every day at one o'clock, when you go to grab your lunch 15:55.760 --> 15:59.910 out of the refrigerator, you look inside and you see 15:59.910 --> 16:02.840 somebody has stolen your cookie. 16:02.840 --> 16:05.750 Well, it's a bad thing; it's not the worst thing in the 16:05.753 --> 16:08.263 world, but it's a bad thing to have somebody steal your cookie. 16:08.259 --> 16:11.449 And furthermore, this is more than a negligible 16:11.446 --> 16:13.566 chance. So, we've got condition one, 16:13.573 --> 16:16.743 condition two in place--bad thing and a nonnegligible chance 16:16.740 --> 16:19.270 of it happening. In fact, not only is it not a 16:19.267 --> 16:21.807 negligible chance that it's happening--guaranteed, 16:21.814 --> 16:24.314 it happens day after day after day after day. 16:24.310 --> 16:25.700 Bad thing, guaranteed. 16:25.700 --> 16:28.640 And you know precisely how bad it is. 16:28.639 --> 16:33.109 I put it to you, fear in that case doesn't make 16:33.105 --> 16:35.845 any sense. Mind you, there are other 16:35.850 --> 16:39.450 negative emotions that probably make sense, like anger and 16:39.454 --> 16:41.604 resentment. Who does this thief, 16:41.596 --> 16:43.976 whoever it is, think that he or she is, 16:43.984 --> 16:45.874 to be stealing your cookie? 16:45.870 --> 16:47.610 They don't have the right to do that! 16:47.610 --> 16:50.820 You can be angry, you can be resentful. 16:50.820 --> 16:54.200 You can be sad that you don't have a dessert, 16:54.195 --> 16:56.185 day after day after day. 16:56.190 --> 17:00.580 But you can't be afraid, because there's nothing here 17:00.578 --> 17:03.998 that it makes sense for you to be afraid of. 17:04.000 --> 17:08.120 Again, being a little sloppy, maybe you are afraid, 17:08.123 --> 17:10.803 but if so, fear doesn't make sense, 17:10.799 --> 17:15.579 when you know for a certainty that the bad thing is coming and 17:15.577 --> 17:18.777 how bad it is. Suppose that the thief strikes 17:18.779 --> 17:22.619 at random, taking different people's desserts from different 17:22.615 --> 17:25.145 bags at different times of the week, 17:25.150 --> 17:29.050 and you never know who he or she is going to steal from. 17:29.049 --> 17:33.339 Then you might be afraid that you'll be the person whose 17:33.339 --> 17:34.899 cookie got stolen. 17:34.900 --> 17:38.120 Or if cookie seems to you too silly an example, 17:38.119 --> 17:42.529 imagine that what happens is somebody breaks into dorm rooms. 17:42.529 --> 17:47.719 There's been a thief going around various dorms on campus 17:47.722 --> 17:52.082 and stealing the computer from the dorm room. 17:52.080 --> 17:56.250 Well there, fear makes sense; you're afraid that they'll 17:56.251 --> 17:57.271 steal your computer. 17:57.269 --> 18:03.229 Bad thing, nonnegligible chance, and lack of certainty. 18:03.230 --> 18:05.160 On the other hand, suppose what happens is, 18:05.162 --> 18:07.692 this is one of those thieves like you always have in the 18:07.693 --> 18:10.073 movies, where he's such a master thief, 18:10.069 --> 18:13.569 or she's such a master thief, that they take pride in their 18:13.567 --> 18:15.867 work, and so they announce it. 18:15.869 --> 18:19.549 They take out an ad in the Yale Daily News and they 18:19.553 --> 18:22.543 say, "On Wednesday, April 27^(th), 18:22.544 --> 18:28.504 I shall steal the computer from so-and-so's room." 18:28.500 --> 18:31.370 And it doesn't matter what precautions you take, 18:31.373 --> 18:34.803 something always happens, and that person's computer gets 18:34.797 --> 18:36.197 stolen. Well, again, 18:36.202 --> 18:38.462 you could be angry, you can be pissed, 18:38.461 --> 18:41.331 you can be annoyed, you can feel stupid that you 18:41.330 --> 18:43.650 didn't take adequate precautions. 18:43.650 --> 18:47.750 But when the ad appears, with your name, 18:47.746 --> 18:51.946 and that date, and all year the thief has 18:51.948 --> 18:57.198 always carried through on the announced theft, 18:57.200 --> 19:01.050 I put it to you, fear doesn't make any sense, 19:01.045 --> 19:05.845 because if you know exactly what the size of the harm is 19:05.851 --> 19:09.891 going to be, and you're guaranteed that the 19:09.891 --> 19:14.031 harm is coming, fear is no longer appropriate. 19:14.029 --> 19:16.649 Suppose that I have a little torture machine, 19:16.652 --> 19:19.872 a little pain generator, where I put your hand down and 19:19.871 --> 19:23.511 I hook it up to the electrodes and I crank the dial and I pull 19:23.506 --> 19:27.496 the switch, and you feel an electric shock. 19:27.500 --> 19:31.780 It makes sense to feel fear what the next shock is going to 19:31.783 --> 19:35.553 feel like, if the shocks vary in their intensity. 19:35.549 --> 19:40.349 But if the machine's only got one setting, on and off, 19:40.347 --> 19:44.237 and all the shocks feel exactly the same, 19:44.240 --> 19:45.590 and I've done it for you, "so look, okay, 19:45.591 --> 19:47.551 let me show you what it feels like; it feels like that." 19:47.550 --> 19:48.720 Oh, not comfortable. 19:48.720 --> 19:50.190 Let me show you what it feels like, it feels like that; 19:50.190 --> 19:55.540 over and over, 5,6, 7,8 times; we're doing some sort of weird 19:55.542 --> 19:56.872 psychology experiment here. 19:56.869 --> 20:00.159 Well, you know exactly that it's coming, you know exactly 20:00.159 --> 20:01.979 what it's going to feel like. 20:01.980 --> 20:06.120 Fear, I put it to you, doesn't make any sense. 20:06.119 --> 20:09.559 Suppose the experiment's over now, and you think--you've 20:09.564 --> 20:13.514 gotten your ten dollars and I refuse to let you go and I say, 20:13.509 --> 20:20.469 "I'm going to do it one more time, no worse than before." 20:20.470 --> 20:23.330 Well, you might not believe me and that might introduce the 20:23.333 --> 20:25.903 element of uncertainty and then perhaps fear would be 20:25.900 --> 20:28.960 appropriate. But if you believe me that one 20:28.961 --> 20:33.431 more pain exactly like the ones you felt before is coming, 20:33.430 --> 20:37.350 fear--anger makes sense, resentment makes sense, 20:37.345 --> 20:42.005 sadness that you're going to feel this pain perhaps makes 20:42.010 --> 20:45.260 sense--but fear doesn't make sense. 20:45.260 --> 20:46.700 So, three conditions. 20:46.700 --> 20:48.300 You need to have it's something bad. 20:48.299 --> 20:52.199 You need to have on the one hand nonnegligible chance that 20:52.200 --> 20:56.440 the bad thing's going to happen, and you have to have a lack of 20:56.442 --> 20:59.162 certainty. If you've got certainty as to 20:59.163 --> 21:02.323 the nature of the bad and certainty that it's coming, 21:02.324 --> 21:04.274 then fear doesn't make sense. 21:04.269 --> 21:06.599 One of the points probably worth mentioning in 21:06.602 --> 21:08.782 passing--even when fear does make sense, 21:08.779 --> 21:12.779 there's a kind of proportionality condition that 21:12.777 --> 21:15.667 we need to keep in mind as well. 21:15.670 --> 21:20.710 Even if there's a nonnegligible chance of the harm coming, 21:20.707 --> 21:24.927 and so fear is appropriate, it doesn't make fear 21:24.934 --> 21:29.184 appropriate if it's obsessive fear, horrendous fear, 21:29.178 --> 21:34.098 tremendous fear. Maybe some mild concern is all 21:34.104 --> 21:39.124 that's appropriate if the chances are small. 21:39.119 --> 21:43.519 Similarly, the amount of fear needs to be proportioned to the 21:43.517 --> 21:45.347 size of the bad. 21:45.349 --> 21:48.799 That's perhaps why the cookie example, you might think a lot 21:48.796 --> 21:52.066 of fear there's not appropriate because even if it comes, 21:52.068 --> 21:55.078 how bad is it? Loss of a cookie. 21:55.079 --> 21:58.289 All right, so there are some conditions that need to be met 21:58.288 --> 22:00.278 before fear is appropriate at all, 22:00.279 --> 22:02.579 and on the other hand even when fear is appropriate, 22:02.581 --> 22:07.281 it's still legitimate to ask, how much fear is appropriate? 22:07.279 --> 22:13.329 So, armed with all of this, let's now turn to the question, 22:13.327 --> 22:18.747 is fear of death appropriate, and if so, how much? 22:18.750 --> 22:21.880 And immediately we see we need to draw some distinctions. 22:21.880 --> 22:26.420 Well, what are we supposedly being afraid of when we are 22:26.415 --> 22:30.415 afraid of death? And two or perhaps three things 22:30.423 --> 22:32.543 need to be distinguished. 22:32.539 --> 22:38.979 The first thing you might worry about is the process of dying. 22:38.980 --> 22:43.630 Some people find that the actual process at the end of 22:43.625 --> 22:47.565 their life is a painful and unpleasant one. 22:47.569 --> 22:52.169 Yes, I've given the example of being mauled to death by tigers 22:52.165 --> 22:54.195 or eaten alive by tigers. 22:54.200 --> 22:58.760 Well, I imagine that would be a pretty unpleasant way to die. 22:58.759 --> 23:06.479 And so insofar as there is some nonnegligible chance that you 23:06.484 --> 23:12.424 will die a painful death, then I suppose there's some 23:12.419 --> 23:16.699 room for some--an appropriate amount--of fear. 23:16.700 --> 23:19.510 Of course, we then have to ask, well, what is the chance that 23:19.512 --> 23:20.592 you'll die painfully? 23:20.589 --> 23:23.719 I've already indicated for people in this room I rather 23:23.718 --> 23:26.908 imagine the chance of being mauled to death by tigers is 23:26.905 --> 23:28.175 vanishingly small. 23:28.180 --> 23:32.390 So, I think, no fear of that form of painful 23:32.388 --> 23:34.638 death is appropriate. 23:34.640 --> 23:38.670 And for that matter, I've got to suggest that I 23:38.669 --> 23:43.579 suspect that fear of dying through a painful operation by 23:43.575 --> 23:48.915 the aliens from Alpha Centauri is not appropriate either. 23:48.920 --> 23:52.780 Still, the sad fact of the matter is that there are people 23:52.780 --> 23:55.760 in the world who do suffer painful deaths, 23:55.759 --> 23:58.389 in particular, of course, because the number 23:58.385 --> 24:01.985 of diseases that might kill us off in their final stages are 24:01.986 --> 24:03.326 sometimes painful. 24:03.329 --> 24:08.189 Now, one of the interesting facts is that we could of course 24:08.190 --> 24:13.130 minimize or eliminate the pain by giving people adequate pain 24:13.134 --> 24:16.624 medication. And so, it comes as a rather 24:16.617 --> 24:21.107 unpleasant bit of news that most hospitals do not provide 24:21.112 --> 24:26.372 adequate pain medication, in many, many instances, 24:26.370 --> 24:28.880 at the end of life. 24:28.880 --> 24:31.280 Why? That's a whole other 24:31.283 --> 24:32.753 complicated question. 24:32.750 --> 24:35.530 But I suppose if somebody were to say to me that--look, 24:35.534 --> 24:37.984 I read the newspaper, there are studies done 24:37.975 --> 24:41.055 periodically about whether or not there's adequate pain 24:41.057 --> 24:44.307 medication at the end of life and the studies suggest, 24:44.309 --> 24:46.849 year after year, that no, we still don't in 24:46.849 --> 24:49.449 general provide adequate pain medication. 24:49.450 --> 24:52.980 If you were to say to me, "In light of that I've got some 24:52.976 --> 24:56.876 fear that this may happen to me," well, I'd understand that. 24:56.880 --> 24:59.520 Again, if you said to me, "I can't sleep for fear that 24:59.517 --> 25:02.267 this is going to happen to me," I'd want to say, 25:02.271 --> 25:06.161 well, that sort of fear strikes me as disproportionate. 25:06.160 --> 25:08.870 But at any rate, I suppose that when people say 25:08.866 --> 25:12.106 that they're afraid of death, although some of them, 25:12.114 --> 25:14.384 in some moments, might have in mind, 25:14.380 --> 25:18.590 what they mean is that they're afraid of the process of dying, 25:18.589 --> 25:21.589 I take it that that's not actually the central fear that 25:21.589 --> 25:23.279 people mean to be expressing. 25:23.279 --> 25:29.229 People mean to suggest that they're afraid of death itself, 25:29.231 --> 25:33.131 they're afraid of being dead. 25:33.130 --> 25:36.730 And with regard to that, I want to suggest, 25:36.730 --> 25:40.930 I don't actually think the relevant conditions are 25:40.930 --> 25:43.340 satisfied. Look, let's think about what 25:43.343 --> 25:46.133 they were again. There was a certain amount of 25:46.130 --> 25:48.200 uncertainty. Well, of course, 25:48.202 --> 25:52.312 with regard to being dead there's no uncertainty at all. 25:52.309 --> 25:56.459 You're guaranteed that you're going to die. 25:56.460 --> 26:00.750 And indeed, condition number one, that the bad thing--for 26:00.750 --> 26:05.730 fear to make sense the object of my fear has to be a bad thing. 26:05.730 --> 26:11.800 Well, let's ask ourselves, is being dead intrinsically a 26:11.796 --> 26:15.346 bad thing? It doesn't seem to me that it 26:15.352 --> 26:18.172 is. Of course, this all presupposes 26:18.172 --> 26:22.952 the positions about the nature of death that I argued for in 26:22.953 --> 26:25.793 the first half of this semester. 26:25.789 --> 26:28.519 There's nothing mysterious or unknown about death. 26:28.519 --> 26:30.279 Look, suppose you thought there was. 26:30.279 --> 26:34.119 Suppose you believe in the afterlife, or at least the 26:34.115 --> 26:38.165 possibility of an afterlife, and you're worried that you 26:38.171 --> 26:39.721 might go to hell. 26:39.720 --> 26:42.800 Well, then fear makes some sense. 26:42.799 --> 26:46.179 If there's a possibility, nonnegligible in your mind, 26:46.181 --> 26:49.761 that there'll be a painful experience after you die--not 26:49.757 --> 26:53.327 guaranteed--if you're a bad enough sinner so that you're 26:53.334 --> 26:57.184 certain you're going to hell, then again I think condition 26:57.178 --> 26:58.858 number three isn't satisfied. 26:58.859 --> 27:02.649 But if like most of us you wouldn't know if you were a bad 27:02.650 --> 27:05.210 enough sinner or not, and so there's some 27:05.207 --> 27:08.397 nonnegligible chance of this bad thing, without certainly, 27:08.400 --> 27:10.500 well, somebody like that who says they're afraid of being 27:10.496 --> 27:12.626 dead, for fear that they might find themselves in hell, 27:12.630 --> 27:16.620 at least I understand that. 27:16.619 --> 27:21.479 But on the physicalist picture where death is the end, 27:21.479 --> 27:26.889 where when your body decays there's no experience at all, 27:26.890 --> 27:32.900 then it seems to me that the first condition on fear isn't 27:32.903 --> 27:36.853 satisfied. The badness of death after all, 27:36.848 --> 27:41.948 according to the deprivation account, is the mere absence of 27:41.945 --> 27:45.635 a good. And it seems to me the mere 27:45.643 --> 27:51.943 absence of a good is not the right kind of thing to be afraid 27:51.940 --> 27:55.300 of. Suppose I give you an ice cream 27:55.296 --> 27:57.316 cone, and you like it. 27:57.319 --> 28:00.909 You wish you could have a second ice cream cone. 28:00.910 --> 28:05.210 But I don't have a second ice cream cone to share with you. 28:05.210 --> 28:09.270 So you know that after the first ice cream cone is over, 28:09.271 --> 28:12.301 you won't have a second ice cream cone. 28:12.299 --> 28:16.389 That's a pity, that's a lack of something 28:16.393 --> 28:18.913 good. And now you're telling me, 28:18.910 --> 28:21.810 "I'm afraid; I'm afraid of the fact that 28:21.814 --> 28:26.494 there will be this period after the first ice cream cone is done 28:26.490 --> 28:30.350 in which I'm not getting a second ice cream cone. 28:30.349 --> 28:35.569 I'm afraid because of the badness of deprivation of ice 28:35.569 --> 28:37.819 cream." I say to you, 28:37.820 --> 28:44.510 deprivations per se are not the kind of thing to be afraid of; 28:44.509 --> 28:49.129 they're not bad in the right kind of way. 28:49.130 --> 28:55.560 So, if death is bad only or most centrally insofar as it's a 28:55.562 --> 29:01.892 deprivation of the good things in life, there's nothing bad 29:01.885 --> 29:04.715 there to be afraid of. 29:04.720 --> 29:09.550 Well, that doesn't mean there isn't anything here in the 29:09.552 --> 29:13.102 neighborhood. After all, we have to worry not 29:13.095 --> 29:16.175 just about the fact that we're going to die, 29:16.181 --> 29:19.771 we have to worry about when we're going to die. 29:19.769 --> 29:25.259 We might be certain that death is going to come, 29:25.255 --> 29:31.665 but we're not certain that death is going to come a long 29:31.674 --> 29:36.114 time from now, as opposed to soon. 29:36.109 --> 29:40.589 So, perhaps the relevant thing to be afraid of is the 29:40.585 --> 29:44.195 possibility that you'll die soon. 29:44.200 --> 29:45.560 Consider an analogy. 29:45.559 --> 29:48.369 Suppose that you're at a party, it's a great party, 29:48.368 --> 29:50.838 you wish you could stay and stay and stay, 29:50.839 --> 29:53.499 but this is taking place back in high school, 29:53.499 --> 29:57.129 and what's going to happen is your mother is going to call at 29:57.126 --> 30:00.386 a certain point and tell you it's time to go home. 30:00.390 --> 30:03.680 Now, let's just imagine there's nothing bad about being at home; 30:03.680 --> 30:07.510 it's neutral. You just wish you could stay 30:07.514 --> 30:09.014 but you know you can't. 30:09.009 --> 30:12.739 If you know the call is going to come at midnight, 30:12.738 --> 30:16.618 guaranteed, then there's nothing to be afraid of. 30:16.619 --> 30:19.679 You might resent the fact that your mother is going to call you 30:19.679 --> 30:22.009 at midnight, be annoyed at the fact that she 30:22.013 --> 30:25.463 won't let you stay out till one o'clock like your other friends, 30:25.460 --> 30:27.990 but there's nothing to be afraid of. 30:27.990 --> 30:29.970 There, it's 11 o'clock and you're saying, 30:29.968 --> 30:32.838 "I'm terrified of the fact that the call's going to come at 30:32.837 --> 30:35.247 midnight; I know it's going to come." 30:35.250 --> 30:40.230 See, fear there doesn't make sense, because it doesn't have 30:40.225 --> 30:43.395 the relevant degree of uncertainty. 30:43.400 --> 30:46.390 You know exactly what's coming and you know for a certainty 30:46.390 --> 30:49.760 that it's coming; fear isn't appropriate. 30:49.759 --> 30:52.289 Well, suppose instead of what happens is a guarantee that your 30:52.287 --> 30:53.817 mother's going to call at midnight, 30:53.819 --> 31:00.289 what we've got is your mother's going to call sometime between 31:00.292 --> 31:05.532 11 and 1. Now, some fear makes sense. 31:05.529 --> 31:09.269 Most of the time she calls around 12,12:30; 31:09.269 --> 31:12.279 sometimes she calls at 1 for parties; 31:12.280 --> 31:15.960 occasionally she calls at 11. 31:15.960 --> 31:18.930 You're worried now, there's a nonnegligible chance 31:18.930 --> 31:21.600 she'll call at 11 rather than sometime later, 31:21.597 --> 31:24.507 12 or 1 o'clock. There's a bad thing, 31:24.506 --> 31:29.336 some nonnegligible chance, and the absence of certainty. 31:29.339 --> 31:31.649 Now some degree of fear makes sense. 31:31.650 --> 31:37.110 And perhaps that's what we've got with regard to death. 31:37.109 --> 31:40.299 If so, we might say the crucial ingredient here, 31:40.304 --> 31:44.254 by virtue of which death is something that it's appropriate 31:44.246 --> 31:48.456 for us to be afraid of is because of the unpredictability. 31:48.460 --> 31:51.910 31:51.910 --> 31:55.950 Even if we had variability we might not have unpredictability. 31:55.950 --> 31:59.580 That's a point that we touched upon previously. 31:59.579 --> 32:03.949 It's the unpredictability that leaves you in a position of not 32:03.952 --> 32:08.542 knowing whether death will come soon, or death will come late. 32:08.539 --> 32:12.049 Will you die at 20, will you die at 50, 32:12.051 --> 32:16.211 will you die at 80, or will you die at 100? 32:16.210 --> 32:19.770 It seems to me that if it weren't for the 32:19.771 --> 32:24.051 unpredictability, fear of death wouldn't make any 32:24.046 --> 32:26.986 sense at all. Given that we do have 32:26.985 --> 32:30.105 unpredictability, some fear of death might make 32:30.108 --> 32:32.748 sense; although again it's important 32:32.750 --> 32:36.950 to be clear about what it is that it makes sense to be afraid 32:36.950 --> 32:40.420 of. It's not being dead per se. 32:40.420 --> 32:45.000 I remain of the opinion that being dead per se is not the 32:45.002 --> 32:48.602 sort of thing it makes sense to be afraid of, 32:48.602 --> 32:52.532 once you've concluded that death is the end. 32:52.529 --> 32:57.559 The only thing that it might make some sense to be afraid of 32:57.557 --> 33:02.667 is that you might die too soon--earlier rather than later. 33:02.670 --> 33:08.060 Of course, having noted that point, we then have to ask, 33:08.055 --> 33:11.575 well how much fear is appropriate? 33:11.579 --> 33:16.739 How great is the chance that you'll die too soon? 33:16.740 --> 33:22.400 Your fear needs to be proportioned to the likelihood. 33:22.400 --> 33:26.750 How likely is it that you will die in the next year, 33:26.750 --> 33:30.250 or five years, or for that matter 10 or 20 33:30.247 --> 33:33.707 years? The fact of the matter is for 33:33.710 --> 33:39.110 most of you, almost all of you, the chances are very unlikely 33:39.109 --> 33:42.699 indeed; not quite negligible, 33:42.702 --> 33:45.012 but rather small. 33:45.009 --> 33:47.829 For a healthy 20-year-old, for example, 33:47.834 --> 33:51.774 the chances of dying in the next five or ten years are 33:51.773 --> 33:56.293 extremely small, in which case even if some 33:56.292 --> 34:03.412 slight fear might be called for, no significant amount of fear 34:03.407 --> 34:05.737 seems called for. 34:05.740 --> 34:11.370 So, if somebody were to say to me, "look, the facts about death 34:11.369 --> 34:15.999 are so overwhelming that I'm terrified of death," 34:16.000 --> 34:20.280 all I can say in response is not, that I don't believe you, 34:20.281 --> 34:24.411 but for all that it seems to me terror of death is not an 34:24.414 --> 34:26.264 appropriate response. 34:26.260 --> 34:30.430 It doesn't make sense given the facts. 34:30.429 --> 34:34.479 Now, having said that, that doesn't mean that there 34:34.479 --> 34:39.099 may not be some other emotion, some other negative emotion 34:39.096 --> 34:41.036 that is appropriate. 34:41.039 --> 34:44.049 Fear of death strikes me as, for the most part, 34:44.045 --> 34:46.275 overblown; it's widespread, 34:46.284 --> 34:50.654 I suppose, but for the most part inappropriate. 34:50.650 --> 34:53.880 But that doesn't mean that--As I suggested before in working 34:53.877 --> 34:57.267 through some of these examples, sometimes anger makes sense; 34:57.269 --> 34:59.479 sometimes resentment makes sense; 34:59.480 --> 35:04.060 sorrow, regret, sadness, that may make sense. 35:04.059 --> 35:07.739 So, in having argued that for the most part fear of death does 35:07.735 --> 35:10.315 not make sense, I haven't yet given us any 35:10.320 --> 35:13.680 reason to think that there might not be other emotions, 35:13.679 --> 35:17.899 negative emotions, that do make sense. 35:17.900 --> 35:21.500 So let's ask. What about some of those other 35:21.496 --> 35:22.846 possible emotions? 35:22.850 --> 35:28.020 35:28.019 --> 35:32.359 What negative emotion, if any, does it make sense to 35:32.364 --> 35:36.884 feel about death itself, the fact that you're going to 35:36.878 --> 35:38.348 die? Well, of course, 35:38.352 --> 35:41.322 look, it's also worth bearing in mind, since I've argued that 35:41.323 --> 35:45.303 immortality would be bad, the fact that you will die is 35:45.295 --> 35:46.895 not actually bad. 35:46.900 --> 35:53.080 It's good because it saves you from the unpleasant aspect of an 35:53.077 --> 35:57.757 eternal, dreary, dreadful immortal existence. 35:57.760 --> 36:02.420 Still, we might say, most of us, almost all of us, 36:02.422 --> 36:05.272 die too soon. So, what about that? 36:05.269 --> 36:12.679 We die before life has yielded up all the goods that it could 36:12.675 --> 36:16.655 have given us. So what is the appropriate 36:16.656 --> 36:19.276 negative emotional response here? 36:19.280 --> 36:23.240 Or is there one? I suppose the natural second 36:23.242 --> 36:24.792 suggestion is anger. 36:24.789 --> 36:28.739 You might say, look, maybe fear isn't right, 36:28.741 --> 36:31.591 isn't appropriate, but anger. 36:31.590 --> 36:35.280 I'm angry. I want to shake my fist at the 36:35.284 --> 36:40.364 universe and curse the universe for giving me only 50 years or 36:40.356 --> 36:43.596 70 years or 80 years even 100 years, 36:43.599 --> 36:49.099 when the world is such a rich, incredibly fantastic place that 36:49.103 --> 36:54.883 it would take thousands of years or longer to exhaust what it has 36:54.877 --> 36:59.587 to offer. So, isn't anger an appropriate 36:59.590 --> 37:03.440 response? And again, I think the answer 37:03.438 --> 37:08.408 is not so clear that it is, because, like all the other 37:08.405 --> 37:13.645 emotions, anger itself has appropriateness conditions. 37:13.650 --> 37:19.190 In order for anger to make sense, well, here's condition 37:19.190 --> 37:22.980 number one. It seems to me it's got to be 37:22.981 --> 37:27.261 directed at a person, it's got to be directed at an 37:27.259 --> 37:30.819 agent, it's got to be directed at some 37:30.820 --> 37:36.040 thing that had some choice over what it was doing to you. 37:36.039 --> 37:40.149 So, when your roommate, whatever it is, 37:40.151 --> 37:46.531 spills coffee on your computer, destroying the hard drive or 37:46.534 --> 37:50.234 whatever it is, because they were careless, 37:50.229 --> 37:53.689 even though you told them previously to be more careful, 37:53.690 --> 37:55.840 anger makes sense. 37:55.840 --> 37:59.240 It's directed at your roommate, who's a person, 37:59.244 --> 38:02.874 who had some control over what they were doing. 38:02.870 --> 38:06.160 Your roommate's an agent. 38:06.159 --> 38:09.519 If you want to get angry at me for the grades that 38:09.515 --> 38:12.925 you receive in this class, well, at least condition number 38:12.931 --> 38:16.511 one makes sense; you're directing your anger at 38:16.507 --> 38:21.097 an agent, at an individual person who has some control over 38:21.104 --> 38:23.724 how I behave, how they behave. 38:23.719 --> 38:26.379 Condition number two, I suppose--this may not be all 38:26.382 --> 38:28.472 the conditions, but at least a second one 38:28.471 --> 38:31.281 is--anger makes sense when, and only when, 38:31.281 --> 38:35.961 the agent has wronged you, has treated you in a way that 38:35.960 --> 38:40.470 it was morally inappropriate for them to teat you. 38:40.470 --> 38:44.850 38:44.849 --> 38:51.049 If your roommate has been doing things that you don't like, 38:51.050 --> 38:58.000 but they haven't done anything wrong, anger doesn't make sense. 38:58.000 --> 39:03.570 When you are angry at them, you are revealing the fact that 39:03.569 --> 39:06.929 you think they've mistreated you. 39:06.929 --> 39:11.279 Mistreatment requires the notion of they've behaved toward 39:11.279 --> 39:14.559 you in a way that morally they shouldn't. 39:14.559 --> 39:18.229 All right, these strike me as two conditions that need to be 39:18.232 --> 39:21.782 in place in order for anger to be an appropriate emotional 39:21.780 --> 39:23.800 response. Of course, again, 39:23.804 --> 39:28.164 we no doubt feel anger in other cases, although typically when 39:28.164 --> 39:32.604 we're angry at inanimate objects it's because we've personified 39:32.595 --> 39:34.615 them. Your paper is due, 39:34.615 --> 39:38.745 you're rushing off to class, you're about to print it out, 39:38.748 --> 39:42.368 and your computer crashes, and you get angry at the 39:42.374 --> 39:45.554 computer. Well, what's going on there, 39:45.547 --> 39:49.167 I suppose, is you've personified the computer. 39:49.170 --> 39:52.970 You have fallen into the trap, understandable, 39:52.965 --> 39:57.175 natural, of viewing the computer as though it was a 39:57.182 --> 40:01.992 person who had deliberately chosen to fail right now, 40:01.990 --> 40:04.820 letting you down yet again. 40:04.820 --> 40:07.340 And I understand this sort of behavior; 40:07.340 --> 40:09.790 I do this sort of thing as well. 40:09.790 --> 40:11.400 But of course you can step back. 40:11.400 --> 40:16.020 At least, once your anger has subsided, you can step back and 40:16.024 --> 40:20.654 say, look, getting angry at your computer doesn't really make 40:20.649 --> 40:23.389 sense, because your computer is not a 40:23.393 --> 40:26.443 person; your computer is not an agent; 40:26.440 --> 40:29.660 your computer didn't have any choice or control. 40:29.660 --> 40:32.770 40:32.769 --> 40:36.299 Suppose that--take those two conditions and now ask 40:36.303 --> 40:40.333 ourselves, does it make sense then to be angry at the fact 40:40.331 --> 40:42.311 that we're going to die? 40:42.309 --> 40:45.559 And I suppose the answer is going to be, well, 40:45.558 --> 40:48.948 look, who is it, or what is it that you think is 40:48.951 --> 40:52.871 the cause of our mortality, or the fact that we only get 40:52.869 --> 40:54.069 our 50 or 80 years? 40:54.070 --> 40:58.860 Here's two crude, basic alternatives. 40:58.860 --> 41:01.700 You might believe in God, a kind of classic, 41:01.699 --> 41:05.329 theistic, conception of God, according to which God is a 41:05.330 --> 41:08.500 person who makes decisions about what to do. 41:08.500 --> 41:14.800 And God has condemned us to death. 41:14.800 --> 41:19.840 That's what happens in Genesis, God punishes Adam and Eve by 41:19.841 --> 41:22.791 making them die. All right, that's picture 41:22.792 --> 41:26.422 number one. Picture number two is you just 41:26.421 --> 41:32.321 think there's this impersonal universe, atoms swirling in the 41:32.323 --> 41:35.243 void, coming together in various 41:35.235 --> 41:38.585 combinations, but there's no person behind 41:38.588 --> 41:41.448 the scene controlling all of it. 41:41.449 --> 41:43.439 Let's consider the two possibilities. 41:43.440 --> 41:46.700 Possibility number one, God. 41:46.699 --> 41:50.969 Well, look, if you've got the God view, at least we satisfy 41:50.971 --> 41:54.361 the first of our appropriateness conditions. 41:54.360 --> 41:59.220 We can say, look; we can say, I'm angry at God 41:59.219 --> 42:03.649 for condemning us to a life that's short, 42:03.648 --> 42:09.408 that's so inadequate, relative to the riches that the 42:09.405 --> 42:13.505 world offers us. That's condition number one. 42:13.510 --> 42:15.520 But what about condition number two? 42:15.519 --> 42:20.349 Condition number two, after all, requires that God 42:20.347 --> 42:26.157 has mistreated us in giving us our 50 or 80 or 100 years. 42:26.160 --> 42:27.750 And is that the case? 42:27.750 --> 42:29.560 Has God wronged us? 42:29.559 --> 42:34.409 Has God treated us in some way that isn't morally justified? 42:34.409 --> 42:37.909 If not, anger at God, resentment of God, 42:37.913 --> 42:39.893 wouldn't make sense. 42:39.889 --> 42:43.279 Suppose your roommate comes into the suite and has a box of 42:43.282 --> 42:46.852 candy, and he gives you a piece of candy, and you enjoy it. 42:46.849 --> 42:49.279 And he gives you a second piece of candy and you enjoy it. 42:49.280 --> 42:51.790 And he gives you a third piece of candy and you enjoy it. 42:51.789 --> 42:55.779 And you ask for a fourth piece of candy, and he won't give it 42:55.780 --> 42:58.240 you. Has he wronged you? 42:58.240 --> 43:00.300 Has he treated you immorally? 43:00.300 --> 43:03.970 Does he owe you more candy? 43:03.969 --> 43:07.159 It's not clear that he or she does. 43:07.159 --> 43:09.439 But if not, then being angry--again, 43:09.441 --> 43:12.571 I would certainly understand it if you got angry, 43:12.569 --> 43:15.629 in the sense that it's a perfectly common enough 43:15.632 --> 43:17.552 response. But is anger an 43:17.546 --> 43:21.166 appropriate response to your roommate for giving you 43:21.166 --> 43:23.846 something, and then not giving you more? 43:23.849 --> 43:26.169 It's not clear that it is an appropriate 43:26.166 --> 43:28.306 response. The appropriate response 43:28.312 --> 43:31.232 actually seems to me to be, not one of anger, 43:31.231 --> 43:34.321 but gratitude. Your roommate didn't owe you 43:34.322 --> 43:37.622 any candy at all, and they gave you four pieces, 43:37.616 --> 43:40.626 or whatever it was, the number just was. 43:40.630 --> 43:45.870 You might wish you could have more, you might be sad that you 43:45.866 --> 43:49.176 can't have more, but anger doesn't seem 43:49.183 --> 43:51.573 appropriate. God doesn't, 43:51.572 --> 43:55.542 as far as I can see, owe it to us to give us more 43:55.542 --> 43:57.612 life than what we get. 43:57.610 --> 44:01.150 Well, suppose we don't believe in the God theory but the 44:01.151 --> 44:03.651 universe theory. Well then, of course ,even 44:03.654 --> 44:05.624 condition number one isn't satisfied. 44:05.619 --> 44:10.019 The universe is not a person, is not an agent, 44:10.015 --> 44:12.745 has no choice and control. 44:12.750 --> 44:16.140 And as such, again, it just seems to me that 44:16.137 --> 44:20.547 anger then--I can lift my fist and curse the universe; 44:20.550 --> 44:23.780 of course, what I'm doing then is, I'm personifying the 44:23.780 --> 44:27.430 universe, treating the universe as though it was a person that 44:27.428 --> 44:30.358 deliberately decided to make us die too soon. 44:30.360 --> 44:33.260 But however common that response might be, 44:33.261 --> 44:37.721 it makes no sense rationally if the universe is not a person. 44:37.719 --> 44:42.519 It's just atoms swirling, forming various kinds of 44:42.520 --> 44:45.990 combinations. Anger at the fact that I'm 44:45.989 --> 44:48.219 going to die, or die too soon, 44:48.219 --> 44:50.449 doesn't make sense either. 44:50.450 --> 44:53.360 Well, what about sorrow? 44:53.360 --> 44:58.770 Maybe I should just be sad at the fact that I'm going to die 44:58.771 --> 45:02.801 too soon. And I think some emotion along 45:02.801 --> 45:05.521 that line does make sense. 45:05.520 --> 45:06.990 The world's a wonderful place. 45:06.989 --> 45:10.349 It would be better to have more of it. 45:10.349 --> 45:15.809 I'm sad that I don't get more, that I'm not going to get more. 45:15.809 --> 45:21.539 But having had that thought, I immediately find myself with 45:21.541 --> 45:26.751 another thought. Although it's a pity I don't 45:26.750 --> 45:34.470 get more, I'm extremely lucky to have gotten as much as I get. 45:34.469 --> 45:37.719 The universe is just this swirling mass of atoms, 45:37.723 --> 45:41.793 forming clumps of various kinds of things, and dissolving. 45:41.789 --> 45:48.259 Most of those atoms don't get to be alive at all. 45:48.260 --> 45:54.350 Most of those atoms don't get to be a person, 45:54.351 --> 45:58.641 falling in love, seeing sunsets, 45:58.642 --> 46:01.552 eating ice cream. 46:01.550 --> 46:08.190 It's extraordinarily lucky of us to be in this select, 46:08.194 --> 46:11.794 fortunate few. Let me close then with an 46:11.794 --> 46:13.584 expression of this thought. 46:13.579 --> 46:18.229 This is from Kurt Vonnegut's book, Cat's Cradle. 46:18.230 --> 46:24.120 This is a kind of prayer that one of the characters in the 46:24.116 --> 46:29.276 novel says--is supposed to say--at the deathbed. 46:29.280 --> 46:32.110 God made mud. 46:32.110 --> 46:34.060 God got lonesome. 46:34.059 --> 46:38.149 So God said to some of the mud, "Sit up." 46:38.150 --> 46:41.390 "See all I've made," said God. 46:41.389 --> 46:46.339 "The hills, the sea, the sky, the stars." 46:46.340 --> 46:50.630 And I, with some of the mud, had got to sit up and look 46:50.634 --> 46:54.234 around. Lucky me, lucky mud. 46:54.230 --> 46:59.120 I, mud, sat up and saw what a nice job God had done. 46:59.120 --> 47:03.150 Nice going God! Nobody but you could have done 47:03.145 --> 47:05.405 it God! I certainly couldn't have. 47:05.409 --> 47:09.169 I feel very unimportant compared to You. 47:09.170 --> 47:13.310 The only way I can feel the least bit important is to think 47:13.310 --> 47:17.880 of all the mud that didn't even get to sit up and look around. 47:17.880 --> 47:22.050 I got so much, and most mud got so little. 47:22.050 --> 47:24.110 Thank you for the honor! 47:24.110 --> 47:28.120 Now mud lies down again and goes to sleep. 47:28.120 --> 47:30.380 What memories for mud to have! 47:30.380 --> 47:34.570 What interesting other kinds of sitting-up mud I met! 47:34.570 --> 47:38.010 I loved everything I saw [Vonnegut 1963]. 47:38.010 --> 47:42.850 It seems to me that the right emotional response isn't fear, 47:42.848 --> 47:46.208 it isn't anger, it's gratitude that 47:46.211 --> 47:49.001 we're able to be alive at all.