WEBVTT 00:01.520 --> 00:03.060 Professor Shelly Kagan: All right. 00:03.055 --> 00:05.315 Last time we started asking ourselves about what are some of 00:05.319 --> 00:07.929 the other aspects of death that might contribute to its badness, 00:07.930 --> 00:10.670 or at least other features of death that are worth thinking 00:10.671 --> 00:11.881 about. Conceivably, 00:11.875 --> 00:15.035 some of them might reduce the badness of death, 00:15.038 --> 00:16.908 in some way. We talked about the 00:16.909 --> 00:19.429 inevitability of death; we talked about the 00:19.434 --> 00:24.144 variability, that people have different lengths of time before 00:24.135 --> 00:27.035 they die. And we turned to a discussion 00:27.041 --> 00:30.931 of the unpredictability of death, the fact that because we 00:30.934 --> 00:34.154 don't know--we can't predict--how much more time 00:34.145 --> 00:36.675 we've got, we may, as it were, 00:36.681 --> 00:38.911 pace ourselves incorrectly. 00:38.910 --> 00:42.810 You may take on a long-term project and then die before 00:42.806 --> 00:47.016 you've been able to complete it; or alternatively, 00:47.021 --> 00:53.241 you may peak too soon and then continue to stick around in an 00:53.240 --> 00:55.520 anti-climactic way. 00:55.520 --> 01:00.300 These are bads of life that could presumably be avoided if 01:00.298 --> 01:05.578 only we knew how much exactly we had--how much longer we had. 01:05.579 --> 01:07.359 On the other hand, we have to ask ourselves--and 01:07.359 --> 01:09.779 this the question that I left us with last time--whether it would 01:09.783 --> 01:11.543 really, all things considered, 01:11.544 --> 01:14.054 be better to know how much time you had. 01:14.049 --> 01:18.059 After all, if you knew--suppose we had the birthmarks that told 01:18.061 --> 01:21.681 you when you were going to die--if you had that kind of a 01:21.684 --> 01:24.884 birthmark, you would face your entire life 01:24.883 --> 01:28.733 with the burden of knowing, I've got 48 years left, 01:28.730 --> 01:32.240 47 years left, 50 years left. 01:32.239 --> 01:36.579 I should've been counting down--35,30, 25 and so forth. 01:36.580 --> 01:41.070 Many of us would find that was, as I say, a burden--something 01:41.070 --> 01:45.340 hanging constantly over us interfering with our ability to 01:45.337 --> 01:47.917 enjoy life. Suppose that there were some 01:47.917 --> 01:50.627 sort of genetic marker and, although we didn't have a 01:50.625 --> 01:53.015 tattoo that you would just have to look at, 01:53.019 --> 01:57.699 but you could have genetic counseling--have your DNA 01:57.704 --> 02:02.924 examined and you could tell, if you had the DNA testing, 02:02.919 --> 02:05.469 how much time you had left. 02:05.469 --> 02:08.919 Would you want to get that testing done? 02:08.919 --> 02:12.389 Now, that's of course science fiction, and I presume it's 02:12.391 --> 02:15.431 going to stay science fiction--though we're on the 02:15.430 --> 02:18.960 cusp of having something at least approximating that as we 02:18.964 --> 02:22.754 learn more and more about the various genes that carry various 02:22.746 --> 02:25.606 diseases, we--more and more of us face 02:25.607 --> 02:29.547 the question of whether or not we want to get tested for those 02:29.545 --> 02:31.395 diseases. Suppose there was a test. 02:31.400 --> 02:34.190 Indeed, one occasionally reads in the newspaper about this sort 02:34.190 --> 02:36.530 of thing where you can get tested for such and such a 02:36.530 --> 02:38.470 disease. You might know already that 02:38.469 --> 02:40.699 you've got a 50 percent chance of having it, 02:40.697 --> 02:43.337 but you don't know whether you yourself have it. 02:43.340 --> 02:46.750 If you do have it, the disease will always have 02:46.751 --> 02:49.571 onset by age 40,50 or what have you. 02:49.569 --> 02:53.719 Would you want to have that kind of information? 02:53.720 --> 02:55.840 Closely related question. 02:55.840 --> 02:59.960 If you did know how much time you had left, 02:59.956 --> 03:05.736 how would you act differently from what you're doing now? 03:05.740 --> 03:10.300 Would it focus your attention on making sure you did the 03:10.300 --> 03:13.700 things that were most important to you? 03:13.699 --> 03:17.409 And it's worth--;it's sort of a useful test for asking yourself 03:17.409 --> 03:20.579 what are the things you must value in life--to ask, 03:20.580 --> 03:25.100 what would you choose to do if you knew you had five years, 03:25.104 --> 03:27.214 ten years, what have you? 03:27.210 --> 03:31.640 There's an old Saturday Night Live routine where one 03:31.641 --> 03:34.851 of the actors is in the doctor's office, 03:34.849 --> 03:39.939 and the doctor gives him the very sad news that he's got two 03:39.944 --> 03:41.934 minutes left to live. 03:41.930 --> 03:45.120 And he says, "I'm going to pack a lifetime 03:45.117 --> 03:48.147 of enjoyment into those two minutes." 03:48.150 --> 03:50.230 And then of course, the point of the skit is he 03:50.228 --> 03:53.028 presses the down button on the elevator and a minute and a half 03:53.029 --> 03:55.559 goes by while he's waiting for the elevator to come. 03:55.560 --> 04:00.130 If you knew you had a year left or two years left, 04:00.133 --> 04:03.403 what would you do with that time? 04:03.400 --> 04:04.450 Would you be in school? 04:04.450 --> 04:05.130 Would you travel? 04:05.129 --> 04:08.409 Would you spend more time hanging out with your friends? 04:08.409 --> 04:12.009 A very, for me, extremely striking example of 04:12.014 --> 04:15.624 this question occurred in this very class. 04:15.620 --> 04:19.600 There was a student in this class some years ago who was 04:19.600 --> 04:21.560 dying. And he knew that he was dying. 04:21.560 --> 04:24.880 He'd been diagnosed with, if I recall correctly, 04:24.876 --> 04:28.826 cancer as a freshmen--and his doctor had told him that he 04:28.828 --> 04:32.918 pretty much had no chance of recovery and indeed had only a 04:32.921 --> 04:35.181 couple more years to live. 04:35.180 --> 04:38.310 Faced with that question, he had to ask himself, 04:38.311 --> 04:41.711 "Well, what should I do with my remaining years?" 04:41.709 --> 04:44.739 It was astonishing enough that somebody--but perhaps 04:44.741 --> 04:48.431 understandable--that somebody in that situation would decide to 04:48.426 --> 04:51.276 take a class on death and then have himself, 04:51.279 --> 04:53.429 submit himself, to my getting up here week 04:53.431 --> 04:55.951 after week, talking about how there's no soul, 04:55.949 --> 04:59.339 there's no prospect for an afterlife, it's a good thing 04:59.337 --> 05:01.217 that we're all going to die. 05:01.220 --> 05:03.480 But faced with the question what should he do, 05:03.482 --> 05:06.502 what did he want to do with his remaining couple of years, 05:06.500 --> 05:10.250 what he decided he wanted to do was finish his Yale 05:10.248 --> 05:14.898 degree--thought he'd set himself the goal of graduating college 05:14.895 --> 05:18.985 before he died. And he was taking this class 05:18.988 --> 05:22.418 second semester of his senior year. 05:22.420 --> 05:24.920 At least, he was taking it until Spring Break. 05:24.920 --> 05:27.530 By Spring Break he'd gotten sufficiently sick that his 05:27.533 --> 05:30.053 doctor basically said, "You can't continue in school 05:30.048 --> 05:32.198 anymore. You've got to go home." 05:32.199 --> 05:35.329 Basically, "You've got to go home to die." 05:35.329 --> 05:39.419 And indeed, he got progressively and then rapidly 05:39.419 --> 05:41.889 deteriorated at that point. 05:41.889 --> 05:44.819 The faculty members who were teaching his classes that 05:44.821 --> 05:47.921 semester then all faced the question posed to them by the 05:47.919 --> 05:51.419 administration, based on the work he's done so 05:51.415 --> 05:55.325 far this semester, has he--what kind of grade are 05:55.327 --> 05:57.607 you prepared to give him? 05:57.610 --> 06:01.070 Because, depending on which of his classes he passed and which 06:01.070 --> 06:03.910 of his classes he failed, the question was going to 06:03.907 --> 06:06.117 be,was he going to graduate or not? 06:06.120 --> 06:10.020 In fact, of course, he did manage to graduate. 06:10.019 --> 06:14.089 And Yale, to its, I think, real glory and credit 06:14.092 --> 06:18.082 sent a member of the administration down to his 06:18.077 --> 06:23.187 deathbed to award him his degree before he passed away. 06:23.189 --> 06:26.459 So, as I say, it's a very striking story. 06:26.459 --> 06:29.459 I'm not sure how many of us would decide the last thing we 06:29.458 --> 06:32.928 wanted to do with our remaining years is to spend it in college. 06:32.930 --> 06:35.330 Well, what is it that you'd want to do? 06:35.329 --> 06:38.729 And again, to move back and ask ourselves a larger question, 06:38.731 --> 06:42.131 would knowing how much time you have be something that would 06:42.132 --> 06:44.902 allow you to actually embrace those choices, 06:44.899 --> 06:47.989 or would it instead just be a burden? 06:47.990 --> 06:51.560 That's the kind of question we have to face when we think about 06:51.555 --> 06:54.655 the fact that we don't know how much time we've got. 06:54.660 --> 06:57.920 Is that something that increases the badness of death, 06:57.920 --> 07:00.750 or does it reduce its significance somewhat? 07:00.750 --> 07:02.960 Here's another feature. 07:02.959 --> 07:04.919 In addition to the inevitability, 07:04.920 --> 07:07.920 in addition to the variability, in addition to the 07:07.923 --> 07:11.303 unpredictability, there's the fact that death is, 07:11.302 --> 07:14.342 as I like to think of it, ubiquitous. 07:14.339 --> 07:18.779 I don't just mean the fact that people are dying all around us, 07:18.779 --> 07:22.149 but I mean rather, you yourself could die at any 07:22.145 --> 07:25.695 time. There's never any getting away 07:25.698 --> 07:29.768 from the possibility that you'll die now. 07:29.769 --> 07:32.789 Even if we didn't have unpredictability, 07:32.792 --> 07:34.962 I mean rather, even if we had 07:34.962 --> 07:38.992 unpredictability, it wouldn't necessarily follow 07:38.994 --> 07:42.044 that death was pervasive in this way. 07:42.040 --> 07:45.370 The point I've got in mind here is this--even when you think 07:45.368 --> 07:48.188 you're perfectly safe, you could of course die of a 07:48.189 --> 07:51.199 stroke. You could die of a heart attack. 07:51.199 --> 07:53.479 Even somebody who's young could have an aneurysm. 07:53.480 --> 07:57.460 Or one of my favorite examples, you could be sitting in 07:57.461 --> 08:01.071 your--you read this sort of thing in the newspaper 08:01.073 --> 08:05.353 periodically--you could be sitting in your living room when 08:05.349 --> 08:09.109 suddenly an airplane crashes into your house, 08:09.110 --> 08:11.990 killing you. These sorts of things happen. 08:11.990 --> 08:13.050 You thought you were safe. 08:13.050 --> 08:17.260 You were watching reruns on television--the next minute, 08:17.258 --> 08:20.128 you're dead. The fact that you could die and 08:20.125 --> 08:23.715 you don't know when you're going to die doesn't yet entail that 08:23.715 --> 08:26.375 you could die at any minute, at any moment. 08:26.379 --> 08:28.459 But in fact, that's true of us as well. 08:28.459 --> 08:31.969 Yet another example close to heart. 08:31.970 --> 08:35.080 I remember--before I taught here I used to teach at the 08:35.083 --> 08:37.163 University of Illinois at Chicago. 08:37.159 --> 08:42.219 And once I was driving down the highway and a car pulled in 08:42.215 --> 08:45.435 without looking and clipped my car, 08:45.440 --> 08:48.460 and caused my car--you know, so pulled in from the 08:48.464 --> 08:52.174 entrance--caused my car to go careening across three lanes of 08:52.167 --> 08:54.387 traffic spinning out of control. 08:54.389 --> 08:56.729 And I remember quite clearly thinking to myself as that 08:56.730 --> 08:59.200 happened--the whole thing lasted only a few moments--but I 08:59.200 --> 09:03.240 remember thinking quite clearly, "I'm going to die." 09:03.240 --> 09:04.950 Now, as it happens, I didn't die. 09:04.950 --> 09:07.770 I walked away from the accident, and the damage to my 09:07.772 --> 09:09.132 car was rather minimal. 09:09.129 --> 09:11.099 But it could've have happened like that. 09:11.100 --> 09:15.340 Death is--the possibility of death--is ubiquitous. 09:15.340 --> 09:19.390 It's pervasive. We have to ask ourselves then, 09:19.391 --> 09:21.781 does this make things worse? 09:21.779 --> 09:24.809 It certainly feels, to my mind, as though it's an 09:24.810 --> 09:27.210 extra bad about the nature of death. 09:27.210 --> 09:30.080 It would be nice to get a breather. 09:30.080 --> 09:33.680 Imagine, if you will, that there were certain 09:33.681 --> 09:38.511 locations, certain vacation spots, where as long as you were 09:38.510 --> 09:40.720 there you couldn't die. 09:40.720 --> 09:43.950 Wouldn't it be nice to be able to go someplace and just for a 09:43.951 --> 09:46.161 period think to yourself, "Well, you know, 09:46.158 --> 09:48.688 right now I don't have to worry about that. 09:48.690 --> 09:50.530 It doesn't even have to cross my mind." 09:50.529 --> 09:53.789 Maybe if there were these sort of death-free zones, 09:53.786 --> 09:55.606 they'd get rather crowded. 09:55.610 --> 09:57.500 So perhaps we should change the example. 09:57.500 --> 10:02.510 Instead of having death-free zones, imagine that there were 10:02.509 --> 10:04.149 death-free times. 10:04.149 --> 10:07.339 Just suppose, for whatever reason, 10:07.340 --> 10:11.400 nobody could die between twelve and one. 10:11.399 --> 10:13.979 You could just put it out of your mind. 10:13.980 --> 10:14.830 Wouldn't that be nice? 10:14.830 --> 10:18.920 All right, one o'clock, you take the mantle back on. 10:18.919 --> 10:23.279 But wouldn't it be nice to just have a certain period of time 10:23.282 --> 10:27.722 every day when you didn't have to even have it be so much as a 10:27.717 --> 10:29.387 remote possibility? 10:29.389 --> 10:33.359 Or suppose there were certain death-free activities. 10:33.360 --> 10:37.040 Maybe reading philosophy would be something that as long as you 10:37.035 --> 10:39.165 were doing it you couldn't die or, 10:39.169 --> 10:42.089 as perhaps some religious traditions might've taught, 10:42.094 --> 10:45.304 as long as you were engaged in prayer you couldn't die. 10:45.300 --> 10:46.340 Wouldn't that be nice? 10:46.340 --> 10:49.720 Or turn the entire thing the other way around. 10:49.720 --> 10:57.060 Suppose that most times and most activities were death free, 10:57.057 --> 11:03.277 but certain activities introduce the possibility of 11:03.276 --> 11:06.666 dying. So you couldn't die unless you 11:06.674 --> 11:09.264 were engaged in certain activities. 11:09.259 --> 11:12.909 So you would be immortal but not in the sense of immortal 11:12.907 --> 11:14.207 against your will. 11:14.210 --> 11:16.780 There'd be certain activities perhaps, for example putting a 11:16.782 --> 11:18.792 gun to your head, that would put an end to your 11:18.787 --> 11:21.197 life. So even if immortality would be 11:21.198 --> 11:24.908 bad, there would be certain things you could do that could 11:24.908 --> 11:27.088 end it. Ask yourself, 11:27.091 --> 11:34.161 what sorts of activities would you engage in if you knew that 11:34.161 --> 11:40.761 those activities carried with them the risk of dying? 11:40.759 --> 11:45.409 So most of the time you couldn't die. 11:45.409 --> 11:49.689 What things would be so important to you that you'd be 11:49.693 --> 11:54.303 willing to suddenly risk death for the sake of doing those 11:54.300 --> 11:56.470 things? You like art. 11:56.470 --> 12:00.030 Is art important enough to you that you'd be prepared to watch, 12:00.031 --> 12:02.991 look at a masterpiece, if you knew that while you were 12:02.992 --> 12:05.552 enjoying it you could die, but that wouldn't happen 12:05.546 --> 12:08.616 otherwise? Is sex great enough that you'd 12:08.619 --> 12:13.519 be prepared to run the risk of dying while you were engaged in 12:13.517 --> 12:16.057 sex? Again, it's a nice lens for 12:16.055 --> 12:19.265 asking yourself, what are the things that are 12:19.274 --> 12:21.034 most valuable to you? 12:21.029 --> 12:25.229 by asking, which of them are so valuable you'd be prepared to do 12:25.230 --> 12:28.760 them even if they would introduce what isn't otherwise 12:28.763 --> 12:32.343 there, namely, the risk of death? 12:32.340 --> 12:35.700 Now, in the posing the question that way, I've been assuming 12:35.700 --> 12:39.000 that these are things you'd do despite the fact that 12:39.004 --> 12:40.774 they run the risk of death. 12:40.769 --> 12:44.399 I suppose there's a further question we have to ask, 12:44.402 --> 12:48.032 are there things that would be worth doing precisely 12:48.034 --> 12:52.174 because of the fact that they introduced the risk of 12:52.165 --> 12:54.995 death? Now, I've got to admit that 12:54.995 --> 12:59.015 when I pose that question, that sounds rather bizarre. 12:59.019 --> 13:02.029 At least, putting aside the possibility that we've now lived 13:02.027 --> 13:05.087 our hundred thousand years and have exhausted all that life's 13:05.086 --> 13:07.946 got to offer for us, certainly to engage in 13:07.945 --> 13:11.135 activities now, while life still has so much 13:11.143 --> 13:15.013 more to offer--to engage in activities now where, 13:15.009 --> 13:19.049 precisely for the chance of dying, that strikes me as 13:19.054 --> 13:21.744 bizarre. And yet, it seems to me that 13:21.735 --> 13:25.295 there are many activities, and if not many at least 13:25.298 --> 13:28.648 several activities, that people do precisely for 13:28.648 --> 13:30.298 that reason. For example, 13:30.301 --> 13:32.511 let me tell you something I know that's going to shock you. 13:32.509 --> 13:38.179 Did you know there are people who jump out of airplanes? 13:38.179 --> 13:41.539 Now, admittedly they've got this little piece of cloth that 13:41.543 --> 13:45.083 gives them a decent chance of not killing themselves when they 13:45.081 --> 13:46.591 jump out of airplanes. 13:46.590 --> 13:49.380 But these things do fail. 13:49.379 --> 13:52.489 Every now and then you read in the newspaper about somebody 13:52.489 --> 13:55.169 whose parachute failed to open and so they died. 13:55.170 --> 13:57.810 And I ask myself, why? 13:57.809 --> 14:01.529 What could possibly drive somebody to jump out of an 14:01.533 --> 14:05.623 airplane with nothing but a little piece of cloth between 14:05.622 --> 14:09.242 them and death? And the answer that strikes me 14:09.241 --> 14:13.111 as most plausible is, it's the very fact that there's 14:13.109 --> 14:17.649 a significant chance of death that helps explain why people do 14:17.646 --> 14:19.726 this. Now, I know if you talk to some 14:19.725 --> 14:21.185 of these people, they'll often say, 14:21.191 --> 14:22.011 "Oh, no, no, no. 14:22.009 --> 14:24.539 The views are so glorious," or something like that. 14:24.539 --> 14:28.109 But I think this is rather an implausible suggestion because, 14:28.105 --> 14:31.785 of course, you could have these glorious views just by going up 14:31.790 --> 14:35.060 in the airplane and looking down from the safety of your 14:35.058 --> 14:38.468 airplane. Part of the thrill has got to 14:38.466 --> 14:43.756 be--or so it seems to me--part of the thrill has got to be the 14:43.760 --> 14:48.880 very fact that they now have an increased risk of death. 14:48.879 --> 14:53.509 The chance of dying is part of what drives somebody to jump out 14:53.510 --> 14:56.370 of an airplane. Well, if that's right, 14:56.365 --> 14:59.965 then should we say that the pervasiveness of death, 14:59.970 --> 15:03.720 ubiquitousness of death--the thing that I was earlier 15:03.718 --> 15:06.888 suggesting was oppressive--wouldn't it really 15:06.890 --> 15:11.220 be nice to have a death-free time or a death-free location or 15:11.215 --> 15:13.445 death-free activities? 15:13.450 --> 15:15.150 Maybe I was wrong in suggesting that. 15:15.149 --> 15:18.889 If the chance of death would add a kind of zest, 15:18.889 --> 15:23.579 then perhaps the ubiquity of death is actually a good 15:23.584 --> 15:26.294 thing rather than a bad thing. 15:26.289 --> 15:30.069 Well, I'm inclined to think, at least in my own case, 15:30.073 --> 15:31.823 that that's not right. 15:31.820 --> 15:37.140 And perhaps the explanation has got to be the ubiquity of death 15:37.140 --> 15:40.830 is this kind of background, constant hum. 15:40.830 --> 15:44.900 And the fact that we're always facing some risk of death 15:44.895 --> 15:49.255 recedes into the background in the way that most of us don't 15:49.256 --> 15:53.906 hear background noise--that what jumping out of an airplane does 15:53.913 --> 15:57.243 for you is it spikes the risk of death. 15:57.240 --> 16:00.580 So, it's not really good enough to just have some risk of 16:00.577 --> 16:03.117 death--it's got to be greater risk than usual. 16:03.120 --> 16:06.710 If that's right, if that's the psychology, 16:06.712 --> 16:10.482 then even for those death thrill seekers, 16:10.480 --> 16:13.020 the ubiquity of death won't necessarily be a good thing 16:13.021 --> 16:14.481 because of it being constant. 16:14.480 --> 16:17.740 It just recedes into the background. 16:17.740 --> 16:20.600 All right. So again, what I've been asking 16:20.601 --> 16:24.511 us to think about are various aspects of death that might 16:24.510 --> 16:28.840 contribute to either increase or perhaps in certain ways reduce 16:28.837 --> 16:31.347 somewhat the badness of death. 16:31.350 --> 16:35.270 There's one more aspect that I want to take a couple of minutes 16:35.270 --> 16:37.990 and have us think about, and that's this. 16:37.990 --> 16:42.290 Previously to this most recent discussion, I talked about the 16:42.292 --> 16:45.992 value of life. Some rival theories about what 16:45.987 --> 16:48.107 makes life worth living. 16:48.110 --> 16:50.950 And for the last lecture or so I've been talking about, 16:50.952 --> 16:53.112 in addition to the deprivation account, 16:53.110 --> 16:57.530 the additional things that contribute to the badness of 16:57.525 --> 16:59.275 death. So you might think, 16:59.283 --> 17:02.133 well, what about the human condition as a whole? 17:02.129 --> 17:04.699 What about the fact that it's not just that we live, 17:04.695 --> 17:07.055 or for that matter it's not just that we die. 17:07.059 --> 17:11.329 What's true about humans is that we live and then we 17:11.328 --> 17:13.128 die. That's the human 17:13.131 --> 17:16.111 condition--life followed by death. 17:16.109 --> 17:20.609 You might ask, what's the value of that entire 17:20.609 --> 17:24.469 combination? Now, the most natural thing to 17:24.472 --> 17:28.082 suggest would be, well, you get clear on your 17:28.083 --> 17:33.093 favorite theory about the value of life, whatever that is. 17:33.089 --> 17:36.289 You get clear about the kinds of questions we've just been 17:36.289 --> 17:39.319 asking about the badness of death, whatever that is. 17:39.319 --> 17:42.799 What's the overall assessment of the human condition? 17:42.799 --> 17:45.839 You might think, well, that's just a matter of 17:45.840 --> 17:49.890 adding up the goodness of life and subtracting the badness of 17:49.894 --> 17:52.804 death and summing whatever it comes to. 17:52.799 --> 17:54.819 I suppose, again, the optimist says, 17:54.815 --> 17:56.945 "Yeah, death is bad, but life is good, 17:56.947 --> 18:00.227 sufficiently good to outweigh the badness of the fact that 18:00.230 --> 18:01.670 we're going to die. 18:01.670 --> 18:04.300 On balance, it's a good thing to be born." 18:04.299 --> 18:06.469 And pessimists might be those who say, "No, 18:06.471 --> 18:08.831 no. On balance, the negative of 18:08.832 --> 18:12.262 death outweighs the positive-ness of life." 18:12.259 --> 18:15.079 But I want to pause for a moment and note that this 18:15.079 --> 18:18.129 assumption that the way to think about the value of the 18:18.125 --> 18:21.615 combination as just a matter of adding the goodness of life and 18:21.621 --> 18:25.011 the badness of death and just summing them that way--that may 18:25.005 --> 18:28.425 not be right. Because sometimes the value of 18:28.433 --> 18:33.073 a combination is different than the value you would get by just 18:33.070 --> 18:37.330 thinking about each one of the parts in isolation and then 18:37.334 --> 18:41.694 adding them up. A kind of addition approach to 18:41.692 --> 18:45.892 values of wholes may not always be correct. 18:45.890 --> 18:50.170 Here's a nice simple example to make that point. 18:50.170 --> 18:55.910 My two favorite foods in the world are probably pizza on the 18:55.905 --> 18:59.595 one hand and chocolate on the other. 18:59.599 --> 19:01.649 I know I've shared my love of chocolate with you before. 19:01.650 --> 19:04.800 I don't recall having shared my love of pizza with you before, 19:04.797 --> 19:07.787 but there it is--two favorite things I love--love pizza, 19:07.789 --> 19:10.319 delicious, love chocolate, delicious. 19:10.319 --> 19:13.649 Take these two delicious things and combine them into a 19:13.654 --> 19:15.264 chocolate covered pizza. 19:15.260 --> 19:18.110 Oh my God! The whole idea just sounds 19:18.111 --> 19:21.161 disgusting. And it is, I take it, 19:21.164 --> 19:24.014 disgusting. But you wouldn't notice the 19:24.008 --> 19:27.658 disgustingness if you just thought about the value of pizza 19:27.657 --> 19:31.177 in isolation and the value of chocolate in isolation. 19:31.180 --> 19:36.380 The value of chocolate-covered pizza is not just a matter of 19:36.381 --> 19:41.231 summing up the value of the parts taken in isolation. 19:41.230 --> 19:46.540 You've got to think about what we might dub "the interaction 19:46.539 --> 19:48.859 effects." So let's ask ourselves, 19:48.862 --> 19:52.052 are there any interaction effects when we talk about the 19:52.049 --> 19:55.119 human condition that it's life followed by death?" 19:55.119 --> 19:56.959 We've thought about the value of life in isolation; 19:56.960 --> 19:59.780 we've been, in effect, thinking about the value of 19:59.780 --> 20:00.990 death in isolation. 20:00.990 --> 20:04.710 Does the fact that death follows life--does that produce 20:04.709 --> 20:07.549 any interaction effects between the two, 20:07.549 --> 20:11.629 which need to be added into our formula--added into the mix as 20:11.631 --> 20:13.161 well? Well, there's obviously, 20:13.162 --> 20:14.492 I suppose, two possibilities. 20:14.490 --> 20:15.470 Well, really three. 20:15.470 --> 20:18.370 Possibility number one is, no it doesn't make any 20:18.366 --> 20:20.776 difference--uninteresting possibility. 20:20.779 --> 20:23.779 More interestingly--two remaining possibilities. 20:23.779 --> 20:27.159 Yeah, there are actually some ways in which the combination 20:27.162 --> 20:28.622 ends up becoming worse. 20:28.619 --> 20:31.179 The interaction effects make things even worse, 20:31.178 --> 20:34.458 and we can't overlook those negative interaction effects. 20:34.460 --> 20:37.410 Also, the possibility that there might be some 20:37.409 --> 20:39.899 positive interaction effects. 20:39.900 --> 20:44.930 Let me start briefly by mentioning a possibility for a 20:44.931 --> 20:47.781 positive interaction effect. 20:47.779 --> 20:50.789 Because of the fact that you're going to die, 20:50.791 --> 20:53.941 obviously enough, it's not just that you'll get 20:53.940 --> 20:57.380 whatever life you get, but there's a finite 20:57.379 --> 20:59.899 amount of life that you're going to get. 20:59.900 --> 21:02.830 Life is a scarce resource. 21:02.830 --> 21:08.900 It's precious. And we might be attracted to 21:08.900 --> 21:14.950 the thought that the value of life is increased by its very 21:14.950 --> 21:18.710 preciousness. There's a kind of aspect of 21:18.711 --> 21:23.441 value for many of us where we feel that something's especially 21:23.438 --> 21:27.438 valuable if it won't endure, if it's fragile, 21:27.435 --> 21:31.195 or if it's rare. This can enhance the value of 21:31.203 --> 21:33.763 something. And so, arguably, 21:33.756 --> 21:39.156 the fact that life is precious, that it won't endure, 21:39.158 --> 21:43.728 could actually increase its value for us. 21:43.730 --> 21:49.040 There's a short story by the science fiction writer Orson 21:49.040 --> 21:54.350 Scott Card, where the basic point of the story is that of 21:54.351 --> 21:58.051 all the life forms in the universe, 21:58.049 --> 22:02.329 we, here on Earth, are the only ones that are 22:02.333 --> 22:06.623 mortal. And because of this we are the 22:06.617 --> 22:10.477 envy of the rest of the universe. 22:10.480 --> 22:13.420 It's not so much that immortality, what the rest of 22:13.423 --> 22:15.723 them have, is unattractive or boring. 22:15.720 --> 22:19.670 It's perfectly fine, but they envy us for our finite 22:19.671 --> 22:23.931 lifespans, because what we've got and they don't have is 22:23.932 --> 22:27.882 something that's for each individual rare--something 22:27.883 --> 22:31.963 that's not lasting, something that's precious in 22:31.964 --> 22:34.584 that way. All right, it's a possibility. 22:34.579 --> 22:39.689 So, it's possible that the very fact that we're going to die 22:39.687 --> 22:44.447 causes an interaction effect with our life so there's an 22:44.448 --> 22:48.378 upside to it. It makes our life fragile, 22:48.381 --> 22:53.211 ephemeral, and as a result of that, more precious. 22:53.210 --> 22:54.960 But it's also possible--actually compatible 22:54.959 --> 22:56.999 with accepting that fact--there are two additional 22:57.000 --> 22:59.390 possibilities, that there might be some 22:59.386 --> 23:01.906 negative interaction effects. 23:01.910 --> 23:04.870 It could be that in thinking about the nature of the 23:04.873 --> 23:07.893 combination we're led to see that in certain ways the 23:07.894 --> 23:11.094 combination--the interaction effects--are negative, 23:11.090 --> 23:13.990 are bad ones. Well, here are two 23:13.988 --> 23:16.738 possibilities for that thought. 23:16.740 --> 23:23.030 First possibility I think of under the heading "A Taste is 23:23.033 --> 23:27.243 Just a Tease." It's as though we live life for 23:27.238 --> 23:32.118 a while, getting a feel for all the wonderful things life could 23:32.115 --> 23:35.295 offer us, and then a moment later, 23:35.295 --> 23:39.015 as it were, it's snatched away from us. 23:39.019 --> 23:43.979 It's sort of adding insult to injury that we're offered just a 23:43.979 --> 23:46.829 whiff. It's as though somebody brought 23:46.825 --> 23:50.365 in this delicious meal to a hungry--before a hungry 23:50.367 --> 23:53.977 person--allowed them to see what it looked like, 23:53.980 --> 23:56.810 allowed them to smell the delicious aromas, 23:56.810 --> 24:00.650 perhaps gave them just one little tiny forkful to see just 24:00.652 --> 24:03.552 how beautifully delicious the food was. 24:03.549 --> 24:06.839 And then they snatched the whole thing away. 24:06.839 --> 24:11.659 You can imagine somebody who says, "Look, it would be better 24:11.658 --> 24:16.558 never to have had the taste at all than to have the taste and 24:16.558 --> 24:20.558 then not be allowed to have the entire meal." 24:20.559 --> 24:24.199 That's something that you might not notice if you just focus on 24:24.204 --> 24:26.324 the intrinsic nature of the taste. 24:26.319 --> 24:29.069 After all, the intrinsic nature of the taste was positive. 24:29.069 --> 24:32.009 Or, if you just focused on the intrinsic character of the 24:32.013 --> 24:33.173 not-having the meal. 24:33.170 --> 24:36.570 After all, not having the meal is just an absence of a certain 24:36.566 --> 24:38.696 experience. To capture what's 24:38.704 --> 24:44.034 excruciatingly undesirable about the two, you need to think about 24:44.027 --> 24:46.187 the two in combination. 24:46.190 --> 24:48.960 It's an interaction effect. 24:48.960 --> 24:51.660 And we might think, look, this is one of the 24:51.658 --> 24:55.608 negative things about the human condition that we get a taste of 24:55.612 --> 24:58.752 life--nothing more--before it's snatched away. 24:58.750 --> 24:59.740 That's one possibility. 24:59.740 --> 25:02.540 The second possible thought that comes to mind for me, 25:02.539 --> 25:05.339 in thinking about the negative interaction effects, 25:05.339 --> 25:10.169 I call under the title--I think about under the title--"How the 25:10.165 --> 25:11.795 Noble Have Fallen." 25:11.799 --> 25:16.159 Right now, there's something amazing about us. 25:16.160 --> 25:22.720 We are people. In the universe we--Who knows 25:22.718 --> 25:26.918 what is out there in the universe but at least on Earth 25:26.923 --> 25:30.353 we may well be the only people there are. 25:30.350 --> 25:33.680 Now, who knows? Maybe dolphins or certain--some 25:33.681 --> 25:34.971 of the great apes. 25:34.970 --> 25:39.530 But at any rate, it's a rather select club. 25:39.529 --> 25:42.219 We are, as I said, early in the semester when I 25:42.218 --> 25:45.318 said I'm a physicalist, I believe that people are just 25:45.316 --> 25:48.176 machines, but we're not just any old machine. 25:48.180 --> 25:50.610 We're amazing machines. 25:50.610 --> 25:52.290 We're able to love. 25:52.290 --> 25:54.330 We're able to write poetry. 25:54.329 --> 25:58.509 We're able to think about the farthest reaches of the universe 25:58.507 --> 26:01.517 and ask what our place is in the universe. 26:01.520 --> 26:05.440 People are amazing. 26:05.440 --> 26:08.240 And we end up rotting. 26:08.240 --> 26:12.440 We end up corpses. 26:12.440 --> 26:18.010 There's something--For many of us, there's something horrifying 26:18.009 --> 26:22.679 about the thought that something as amazing as us, 26:22.680 --> 26:28.190 as exalted and valuable as us, could end up something as lowly 26:28.192 --> 26:32.352 and unimportant as a piece of rotting flesh. 26:32.350 --> 26:37.040 Again, think about it. 26:37.039 --> 26:41.339 The image here that comes to mind for me is one of these 26:41.338 --> 26:45.398 deposed kings who ends up waiting on tables to make a 26:45.402 --> 26:47.202 living in New York. 26:47.200 --> 26:49.030 And it's--you might think, "All right. 26:49.029 --> 26:51.979 The life of a waiter is not the worst thing in the world." 26:51.980 --> 26:55.080 But there's extra, again, insult to injury, 26:55.075 --> 26:58.825 when the person's got to remember that he used to be 26:58.833 --> 27:01.563 something extraordinary, a ruler. 27:01.559 --> 27:03.759 Again, if you just thought about life as a ruler, 27:03.759 --> 27:06.049 well pretty good thinking about it in isolation. 27:06.049 --> 27:09.709 Life as a waiter, not so bad thinking about it in 27:09.705 --> 27:12.185 isolation. To see the nature of the 27:12.189 --> 27:15.659 problem you've got to think about the fact that it's a 27:15.655 --> 27:17.155 combination package. 27:17.160 --> 27:21.070 There is something especially insulting about having gone from 27:21.070 --> 27:23.710 king to waiter. How the mighty have fallen. 27:23.710 --> 27:29.310 And that fate is waiting for all of us. 27:29.309 --> 27:33.299 It's a fact about the human condition that the amazing 27:33.303 --> 27:35.943 things we are don't stay amazing. 27:35.940 --> 27:41.650 We turn into pieces of rotting flesh, decaying. 27:41.650 --> 27:45.310 So two possible negative effects--the taste is just a 27:45.309 --> 27:49.249 tease, the how the noble have fallen--on the one hand. 27:49.250 --> 27:54.520 One possible positive effect, the extra preciousness of life. 27:54.519 --> 27:58.739 I'm not quite sure where, on balance, we should say how 27:58.736 --> 28:00.606 these things play out. 28:00.609 --> 28:03.689 Again, I suppose we could have different views. 28:03.690 --> 28:07.410 On the one hand, the optimists might say, 28:07.407 --> 28:12.517 "Even when we throw in the extra interaction effects, 28:12.519 --> 28:17.989 even the negative interaction effects, the overall nature of 28:17.988 --> 28:21.138 the human condition is positive. 28:21.140 --> 28:25.550 So that it's a good thing to be born, even though your life is 28:25.546 --> 28:27.926 going to be followed by death." 28:27.930 --> 28:31.160 And against that, we could have the pessimists 28:31.162 --> 28:35.402 who say, "The negative side, especially once we throw in the 28:35.399 --> 28:40.629 negative interaction effects, the negative side is so great 28:40.626 --> 28:46.236 that it would be better never to have been born at all." 28:46.240 --> 28:47.760 That's the pessimist view. 28:47.759 --> 28:53.529 Given that we're going to die, this fact seeps back in and 28:53.526 --> 28:59.386 poisons the nature of life or perhaps poisons the nature of 28:59.393 --> 29:02.393 the whole, life followed by death, 29:02.393 --> 29:05.633 so that on balance the whole thing's negative. 29:05.630 --> 29:09.490 Better to have not had any of it, better to have not been born 29:09.493 --> 29:13.903 at all, say the pessimists, than to have this combination 29:13.899 --> 29:16.999 package of life followed by death. 29:17.000 --> 29:19.700 Now, for myself, I'm sufficiently optimistic 29:19.700 --> 29:22.590 that I'm inclined to think life's wonderful. 29:22.589 --> 29:25.649 The negative combination effects that I was talking about 29:25.648 --> 29:28.128 are certainly there, but on balance I think the 29:28.128 --> 29:30.388 human condition for must of us is a good one. 29:30.390 --> 29:33.630 It's better to have been born than never to--even though 29:33.625 --> 29:37.385 that's followed by death--than never to have been born at all. 29:37.390 --> 29:41.040 But I do want to emphasize the point that even if we were to 29:41.036 --> 29:44.056 accept the pessimist's conclusion that it would be 29:44.064 --> 29:46.664 better never to have been born at all, 29:46.660 --> 29:49.660 it doesn't follow, at least doesn't follow without 29:49.663 --> 29:52.543 further argument, that the right response to the 29:52.544 --> 29:55.734 realization--if it is the correct realization that it 29:55.732 --> 29:59.472 would be better never to have been born at all--doesn't follow 29:59.471 --> 30:02.721 that the right response is to commit suicide. 30:02.720 --> 30:04.000 It's a tempting thought right? 30:04.000 --> 30:07.290 To go philosophically from life's so bad given the nature 30:07.290 --> 30:10.110 of the human condition, life followed by death, 30:10.105 --> 30:13.605 that better to never have had any of it than to have just had 30:13.614 --> 30:15.724 a taste and a tease and so forth. 30:15.720 --> 30:18.060 But it's a tempting philosophical thought to say, 30:18.059 --> 30:20.739 "Once I've shown it's better never to have been born, 30:20.740 --> 30:23.880 it follows that suicide is the appropriate response." 30:23.880 --> 30:26.020 But in fact, as a matter of logic, 30:26.019 --> 30:27.899 that doesn't follow at all. 30:27.900 --> 30:32.680 Because if you think about it, suicide doesn't change the 30:32.682 --> 30:37.642 fundamental nature of the human condition, life followed by 30:37.635 --> 30:40.195 death. It's not as though if you kill 30:40.195 --> 30:43.435 yourself you somehow bring it about that you've never been 30:43.437 --> 30:45.877 born at all. It's still the case that if 30:45.875 --> 30:49.395 there's something horrible about having just a taste--well, 30:49.400 --> 30:53.250 indeed, if you commit suicide you've made it an even shorter 30:53.248 --> 30:55.838 taste. If there's something sort of 30:55.844 --> 31:00.514 degrading or unnoble about being a person who is going to become 31:00.511 --> 31:02.951 a corpse, committing suicide doesn't 31:02.947 --> 31:05.087 alter that fundamental fact either. 31:05.089 --> 31:08.679 It just makes the insult come sooner. 31:08.680 --> 31:12.290 So, even if we were to agree with the pessimists that it 31:12.286 --> 31:15.496 would be better never to have been born at all, 31:15.500 --> 31:19.110 as the old joke goes, show me one person in a 31:19.105 --> 31:21.805 thousand who's so lucky, right? 31:21.810 --> 31:24.650 We have all been born. 31:24.650 --> 31:27.180 And from the fact, even if we were to agree with 31:27.177 --> 31:30.567 it, that it would've been better if we hadn't been born--instead 31:30.566 --> 31:32.606 of feeling sorry for unborn Larry, 31:32.609 --> 31:34.969 perhaps we should envy unborn Larry; 31:34.970 --> 31:39.130 that's what the pessimists say--even if that were true, 31:39.131 --> 31:43.911 it wouldn't follow that suicide was an appropriate response. 31:43.910 --> 31:46.970 It doesn't mean of course that suicide isn't ever an 31:46.970 --> 31:48.350 appropriate response. 31:48.349 --> 31:51.419 We're coming on toward the end of the semester, 31:51.417 --> 31:55.017 and the last topic we'll be talking about is indeed the 31:55.019 --> 31:56.419 topic of suicide. 31:56.420 --> 32:00.240 When, if ever, is suicide an appropriate, 32:00.238 --> 32:04.818 rational or moral response to one's situation? 32:04.819 --> 32:08.359 Let's hold off on thinking about that question a bit 32:08.356 --> 32:10.856 further. Before we get to suicide, 32:10.860 --> 32:13.900 you might say, the question that's going to 32:13.903 --> 32:17.673 entertain us for the remaining few weeks is this. 32:17.670 --> 32:21.480 How should one live, in light of the facts about 32:21.483 --> 32:26.113 death that I've been laying out in the semester up to this 32:26.108 --> 32:28.138 point? How should we live, 32:28.144 --> 32:30.404 in light of the facts about death? 32:30.400 --> 32:33.650 And one possible response, the last one we'll look at, 32:33.650 --> 32:36.040 is, what you should, at least sometimes, 32:36.042 --> 32:37.332 is kill yourself. 32:37.330 --> 32:39.630 We'll come to that. 32:39.630 --> 32:42.580 We're going to spend the next couple of weeks asking ourselves 32:42.579 --> 32:44.319 different aspects of the question, 32:44.319 --> 32:49.419 what should our response be to the fact of our death and the 32:49.420 --> 32:54.610 specific features of death and the nature of death that we've 32:54.607 --> 32:58.487 been exploring? But the very first question I 32:58.493 --> 33:01.513 suppose we really need to ask is this. 33:01.509 --> 33:05.769 Should we be thinking about all this at all? 33:05.769 --> 33:09.359 Well, I realize that for you guys it's too late, 33:09.359 --> 33:11.389 right? It's sort of late in the day 33:11.392 --> 33:14.142 for students who have been through the better part of a 33:14.135 --> 33:16.975 semester thinking about the nature of death to argue, 33:16.980 --> 33:20.020 maybe, it wasn't such a good idea for you to take this class 33:20.018 --> 33:21.098 in the first place. 33:21.099 --> 33:24.309 But as theorists, we could be interested in the 33:24.310 --> 33:28.640 theoretical possibility that the right response is to not think 33:28.637 --> 33:31.147 about the facts of death at all. 33:31.150 --> 33:38.050 Look, in principle I suppose there are three different 33:38.048 --> 33:41.348 reactions. So, I make various claims of 33:41.345 --> 33:44.315 the sort that I've been making about, "Well look, 33:44.319 --> 33:46.859 you know, we're just physical objects. 33:46.859 --> 33:50.439 When these objects break, we cease to exist. 33:50.440 --> 33:54.260 The objects don't get put back together," and so forth and so 33:54.261 --> 33:55.721 on. One possibility, 33:55.723 --> 33:59.233 of course, is simply to disagree with me about the 33:59.226 --> 34:01.266 facts. And so you--of course, 34:01.274 --> 34:03.964 if you do disagree I think you're mistaken, 34:03.955 --> 34:07.525 so I'll think of you as denying the facts, but all right, 34:07.530 --> 34:09.190 that's a possibility. 34:09.190 --> 34:12.670 Another possibility, the one I'll turn to a little 34:12.668 --> 34:16.428 bit later, is admit the facts and live accordingly. 34:16.429 --> 34:19.979 Of course, we haven't yet asked ourselves, how should you 34:19.980 --> 34:23.250 live if you recognize and take into account those facts? 34:23.250 --> 34:24.620 That's the question we'll turn to. 34:24.619 --> 34:28.609 But there's the middle possibility, which is not so 34:28.614 --> 34:31.654 much think about them and deny them, 34:31.650 --> 34:35.490 not so much think about them, accept them and act 34:35.485 --> 34:39.395 accordingly, but simply don't think about them. 34:39.400 --> 34:44.630 Maybe the best response to the facts of death is just put it 34:44.626 --> 34:46.306 out of your mind. 34:46.309 --> 34:47.499 Don't give it any thought at all. 34:47.500 --> 34:51.040 34:51.039 --> 34:56.179 Now, on the one hand you might think, that can't possibly be 34:56.183 --> 35:00.283 the right response, the appropriate response. 35:00.280 --> 35:05.540 After all, how can it be appropriate to disregard, 35:05.544 --> 35:09.094 to put out of your mind, facts? 35:09.090 --> 35:11.720 Well, that all sounds very nice, but I think that claim has 35:11.720 --> 35:12.900 got to just be mistaken. 35:12.900 --> 35:17.240 There's nothing unacceptable or inappropriate or misguided about 35:17.242 --> 35:21.102 not thinking about all sorts of facts that you might have 35:21.101 --> 35:23.791 learned at some point or the other. 35:23.789 --> 35:27.999 Here's my favorite example of stupid facts I was forced to 35:27.998 --> 35:31.688 learn when I was younger--state capitals, right? 35:31.690 --> 35:36.630 I've gotten pretty far in my life, and as far as I can tell 35:36.631 --> 35:40.121 I've never, ever, ever had to remember the 35:40.124 --> 35:42.684 capitals of the 50 states. 35:42.680 --> 35:45.330 So, I just don't think about it. 35:45.329 --> 35:47.969 Pretty much I think about it only once a year, 35:47.968 --> 35:50.078 when I'm giving this very lecture. 35:50.079 --> 35:51.939 I start asking, how many state capitals can I 35:51.936 --> 35:53.056 remember? And the answer is, 35:53.061 --> 35:54.311 really not all that many of them. 35:54.309 --> 35:59.219 Not thinking about those facts that I knew at one point--just 35:59.217 --> 36:01.587 not all that objectionable. 36:01.590 --> 36:03.500 So, the mere fact, if it is a fact, 36:03.503 --> 36:06.823 suppose the facts about life and death are as I've described 36:06.823 --> 36:08.643 them. Until we say something more, 36:08.640 --> 36:10.370 it's not clear that we shouldn't just, 36:10.371 --> 36:12.351 all right, note it, store it away, 36:12.347 --> 36:15.257 and forget about it, just like the facts about the 36:15.260 --> 36:18.050 state capitals. That seems odd; 36:18.050 --> 36:20.230 that seems misguided. 36:20.230 --> 36:23.200 But why? What is it about the facts 36:23.200 --> 36:27.570 about life and death that seem to make it misguided to think we 36:27.565 --> 36:31.715 should just put them aside and pay no attention to them? 36:31.719 --> 36:35.809 Presumably because we're led to the thought, we're attracted to 36:35.807 --> 36:39.207 the thought, that the nature of death, 36:39.210 --> 36:45.360 the facts about death--whatever they are--should have an impact 36:45.363 --> 36:49.713 on how we live. The appropriate way to live 36:49.710 --> 36:55.500 gets shaped, at least in part, by the fact that we're going to 36:55.496 --> 36:59.286 die, that we won't be around forever. 36:59.289 --> 37:02.789 If that's right, then it seems as though there'd 37:02.787 --> 37:06.727 be something irrational and inappropriate about simply 37:06.731 --> 37:08.891 disregarding those facts. 37:08.889 --> 37:12.359 Let me tell you two stories that might--well, 37:12.363 --> 37:17.103 look, before I tell you the stories here's the other side. 37:17.099 --> 37:21.349 Suppose somebody said, "Yeah, it's true if I thought 37:21.347 --> 37:25.497 about the nature of death, the fact that the 50,80, 37:25.497 --> 37:29.887 90 years I've got on this Earth is all I'm going to have. 37:29.889 --> 37:35.419 If I thought about that fact, it would just be overwhelming. 37:35.420 --> 37:37.700 It would be crushing. 37:37.699 --> 37:40.989 I'd be unable to go on with my life." 37:40.989 --> 37:44.939 People sometimes claim that that's the case and, 37:44.941 --> 37:48.891 because of that, the right thing to do is to not 37:48.892 --> 37:52.542 think about it. You've read at this point, 37:52.539 --> 37:57.429 long since, Tolstoy's Death of Ivan Ilych. The people in 37:57.427 --> 38:02.077 the Tolstoy story seem to have put facts of mortality out of 38:02.078 --> 38:03.838 their mind. Why? 38:03.840 --> 38:07.880 Presumably because they think that facing it is just too 38:07.875 --> 38:09.925 crushing and overwhelming. 38:09.929 --> 38:14.379 So the way they cope with it--they think the appropriate 38:14.377 --> 38:18.417 response is put it aside, disregard the facts about 38:18.421 --> 38:20.271 death. Well, as I say, 38:20.271 --> 38:24.091 there seems to be something amiss about that reaction. 38:24.090 --> 38:26.450 That was certainly the point that Tolstoy was trying to get 38:26.451 --> 38:29.011 us to see. There's something wrong about 38:29.010 --> 38:32.870 lives, something inauthentic about lives that are lived 38:32.865 --> 38:36.505 without facing the facts of our mortality and living 38:36.506 --> 38:39.636 accordingly, whatever the appropriate 38:39.639 --> 38:41.239 responses might be. 38:41.239 --> 38:45.969 Here are two stories not having to do with death per se that may 38:45.965 --> 38:50.085 help us get a feel for the oddity of trying to disregard 38:50.090 --> 38:53.390 these facts. Suppose that you're on a hot 38:53.393 --> 38:57.673 date, or about to go out on a hot date, with Peggy Sue or, 38:57.674 --> 39:00.984 depending on your preferences, Billy Bob. 39:00.980 --> 39:05.940 And your roommate holds up an envelope and says, 39:05.938 --> 39:12.368 "Written in this envelope are certain facts about Peggy Sue or 39:12.373 --> 39:15.563 Billy Bob. I'm not going to tell you what 39:15.555 --> 39:16.745 these facts are yet. 39:16.750 --> 39:18.780 They're in the envelope. 39:18.780 --> 39:21.000 But I'll give you the envelope and you can open it up and read 39:20.995 --> 39:23.555 them. But I do want to tell you this 39:23.562 --> 39:26.412 one thing. It is indeed the case that if 39:26.413 --> 39:30.213 you were to read these facts, if you were to think about 39:30.213 --> 39:33.703 these facts, if you were to know the things 39:33.698 --> 39:38.348 written down in the envelope, you would not want to go out 39:38.349 --> 39:40.869 with Peggy Sue." And you say to yourself, 39:40.871 --> 39:43.061 well, let's see. Right now I want to go out with 39:43.057 --> 39:45.957 Peggy Sue, but if I knew these true--It's not that you think, 39:45.955 --> 39:48.655 oh your roommate has made it up, that these are lies; 39:48.660 --> 39:49.670 these are slander. 39:49.670 --> 39:52.750 You really believe, and it is in fact the case that 39:52.749 --> 39:55.889 the things written down in the envelope are true. 39:55.889 --> 39:59.089 And so you know that if only you were to read these things in 39:59.090 --> 40:01.380 the envelope, you would change your mind and 40:01.383 --> 40:03.413 no longer want to go out with her. 40:03.409 --> 40:07.109 And so what you say is, "Don't show me the envelope." 40:07.110 --> 40:11.900 That seems odd. It doesn't seem like it makes 40:11.902 --> 40:13.862 sense. If there are things that would 40:13.855 --> 40:16.625 change your mind and you know that they would change your mind 40:16.632 --> 40:20.282 about your behavior, how can it be rational to 40:20.283 --> 40:24.753 disregard them? Here's another story. 40:24.750 --> 40:28.640 You're about to drink a milkshake, and your roommate 40:28.635 --> 40:32.745 comes rushing in and says, "I've got the lab report. 40:32.750 --> 40:35.990 I had my suspicions about the milkshake, and so I took a 40:35.992 --> 40:38.412 sample and I rushed it down to the lab. 40:38.410 --> 40:39.690 I've got the lab report." 40:39.690 --> 40:41.960 You're about to drink it, right, because you're thirsty, 40:41.960 --> 40:43.530 it's a hot day, you love milkshakes. 40:43.530 --> 40:46.880 And your roommate says, "Inside the envelope are facts 40:46.884 --> 40:50.624 about this milkshake that if--I promise you it is indeed the 40:50.618 --> 40:54.028 case--if you knew these facts, you would not drink the 40:54.032 --> 40:55.132 milkshake anymore." 40:55.130 --> 40:56.230 And you say, "Oh, thank God. 40:56.230 --> 41:00.110 Don't open the envelope," and you drink the milkshake, 41:00.109 --> 41:01.939 disregarding the facts. 41:01.940 --> 41:06.190 That seems inappropriate. 41:06.190 --> 41:12.370 Well, if it really was true then that if only we faced the 41:12.366 --> 41:18.326 facts about our mortality that we would live life rather 41:18.326 --> 41:22.106 differently, how could it be reasonable for 41:22.109 --> 41:24.089 us to disregard those facts? 41:24.090 --> 41:28.270 41:28.270 --> 41:29.700 Well, that's the puzzle. 41:29.699 --> 41:32.019 Or maybe we shouldn't call it a puzzle at all. 41:32.019 --> 41:35.439 Maybe the answer is, that just shows the disregard 41:35.439 --> 41:38.369 option is not really all that reputable. 41:38.369 --> 41:41.459 What we either have to do is deny the claims I'm made about 41:41.458 --> 41:44.678 the nature of death, or else go on to ask--supposing 41:44.680 --> 41:48.120 they are true--how should we live in light of them? 41:48.119 --> 41:52.799 Maybe the disregard option just is one that we can't actually 41:52.798 --> 41:57.008 take on as an intellectually acceptable alternative. 41:57.010 --> 42:01.620 But I suspect that that's probably a little bit too quick, 42:01.620 --> 42:06.230 because really there are two different ways in which facts 42:06.230 --> 42:08.900 could influence our behavior. 42:08.900 --> 42:11.470 And if we're not careful we'll disregard this distinction, 42:11.473 --> 42:13.463 even though I think it's an important one. 42:13.460 --> 42:15.010 Here's the two ways. 42:15.010 --> 42:19.990 On the one hand, it could be that certain facts, 42:19.992 --> 42:24.442 if you knew them, would cause you to 42:24.443 --> 42:29.643 behave differently without actually giving you any 42:29.637 --> 42:34.087 reason to behave differently. 42:34.090 --> 42:36.900 That's possibility number one. 42:36.900 --> 42:43.060 Possibility number two is the facts change your behavior by 42:43.056 --> 42:48.466 giving you a reason to behave differently. 42:48.469 --> 42:51.029 Let me show you an example of the first possibility, 42:51.026 --> 42:53.976 because that's the one I think we may be overlooking when we 42:53.983 --> 42:56.743 assume that disregarding can't ever make any sense. 42:56.739 --> 43:00.769 So, there you are kissing, making out with Peggy Sue or 43:00.774 --> 43:04.964 Billy Bob--whoever it is--and your roommate bursts in and 43:04.957 --> 43:07.757 says, "I have in the envelope certain 43:07.759 --> 43:11.809 facts such that if you were to think about them you would no 43:11.812 --> 43:17.262 longer want to kiss Peggy Sue, Billy Bob." 43:17.260 --> 43:19.490 Let me just tell you what the facts in the envelope are. 43:19.489 --> 43:23.249 They're certain facts about the nature of Peggy Sue's digestive 43:23.253 --> 43:25.043 system. Now, well, you're making out 43:25.042 --> 43:27.442 after having had dinner, and while you're sitting there 43:27.438 --> 43:30.948 making out, food is making its way down 43:30.952 --> 43:36.632 Peggy Sue's digestive tract, being turned into shit. 43:36.630 --> 43:38.690 And eventually it's going to be excreted. 43:38.690 --> 43:44.440 And if you started picturing to yourself the feces inside Peggy 43:44.443 --> 43:48.113 Sue's digestive tract, and the fact that she's 43:48.106 --> 43:51.786 eventually going to be wiping the feces off of her behind, 43:51.789 --> 43:55.759 you might find it difficult to continue to engage in making out 43:55.761 --> 43:58.291 with Peggy Sue. It's not so--now these are just 43:58.289 --> 44:00.449 facts, right? I didn't make any of these up, 44:00.451 --> 44:02.671 but there you are, as I'm talking about them, 44:02.669 --> 44:05.289 you're just being grossed out as I describe them. 44:05.289 --> 44:09.969 Now, do any of these facts about the digestive system make 44:09.970 --> 44:13.830 it inappropriate to kiss another human being? 44:13.830 --> 44:15.210 Well, of course not. 44:15.210 --> 44:19.250 But for all that, thinking about those facts make 44:19.248 --> 44:23.538 it rather difficult, while you're thinking about the 44:23.539 --> 44:27.829 facts, to continue enjoying kissing the person. 44:27.829 --> 44:32.729 So there are certain facts about the digestive tract such 44:32.733 --> 44:37.203 that if you think about them you can't do something, 44:37.198 --> 44:39.808 kiss the person. But for all that, 44:39.809 --> 44:42.889 it's not because you've got any good reason not to kiss 44:42.892 --> 44:45.352 the person. It's not that the facts about 44:45.352 --> 44:49.042 the human digestive process give you reason not to kiss her. 44:49.039 --> 44:53.999 They cause you to change you behavior without giving you 44:54.000 --> 44:57.520 any reason to change your behavior. 44:57.519 --> 44:59.669 So, when the roommate comes running in, holding the 44:59.668 --> 45:01.518 envelope, and says, "I have in this envelope 45:01.515 --> 45:03.745 certain facts such that if you read these facts, 45:03.750 --> 45:06.770 and thought about these facts, you would stop kissing this 45:06.767 --> 45:09.887 person," the question you should put to your roommate is, 45:09.889 --> 45:15.379 "Are these facts that would merely cause me to change 45:15.378 --> 45:18.678 what I'm doing, or are these facts things that 45:18.677 --> 45:21.537 would give me some good reason to change?" 45:21.539 --> 45:24.489 If these are facts about how Peggy Sue likes to kiss and 45:24.491 --> 45:27.711 tell, or then goes around and talks about who's a good kisser 45:27.711 --> 45:30.861 and who's a bad kisser, maybe that gives you a reason 45:30.863 --> 45:32.923 to not continue what you're doing. 45:32.920 --> 45:35.450 So the facts could be things that would give you 45:35.448 --> 45:37.598 reason to change your behavior. 45:37.599 --> 45:40.869 But the mere fact that they would change your 45:40.871 --> 45:43.691 behavior doesn't yet tell you whether they're 45:43.693 --> 45:45.493 reason-generating facts. 45:45.489 --> 45:49.859 If they're mere causes and not reasons, then maybe it's 45:49.858 --> 45:52.688 perfectly okay to disregard them. 45:52.690 --> 45:56.260 If your roommate comes in and starts trying to tell you facts 45:56.263 --> 45:58.713 about the human digestive system, you say, 45:58.706 --> 46:01.426 "Not now." Disregarding is sometimes the 46:01.425 --> 46:03.045 appropriate thing to do. 46:03.050 --> 46:06.490 46:06.489 --> 46:08.989 Well, what about the facts about death? 46:08.989 --> 46:15.379 Are the facts about death things that it's appropriate to 46:15.380 --> 46:20.660 disregard? A bold claim would say, "Yes." 46:20.659 --> 46:24.919 A bold claim would say, "The facts about death, 46:24.917 --> 46:29.727 if I thought about them, would change my behavior, 46:29.730 --> 46:33.110 but not because it would give me a reason to change my 46:33.105 --> 46:36.415 behavior--simply because it would influence my 46:36.418 --> 46:38.238 behavior." And, given that, 46:38.244 --> 46:40.934 we might say, better to not think about them. 46:40.929 --> 46:45.149 That would be the bold claim to make at this point. 46:45.150 --> 46:48.400 Suppose, for example, that, the right way to live, 46:48.395 --> 46:52.105 in light of the facts about death, is to live life to the 46:52.105 --> 46:54.695 fullest. But suppose if you think about 46:54.699 --> 46:58.419 death you just get too depressed and you can't live life to the 46:58.420 --> 47:01.040 fullest. It's not that the facts about 47:01.035 --> 47:04.605 death give you reason to stay in your room and sulk. 47:04.610 --> 47:08.350 It's just that the facts about death cause you to stay 47:08.352 --> 47:09.852 in your room and sulk. 47:09.849 --> 47:13.479 If that was the case, then disregarding, 47:13.477 --> 47:17.847 always disregarding, the facts about death might 47:17.848 --> 47:21.288 well be the appropriate response. 47:21.289 --> 47:22.859 Well, that would be a rather bold claim. 47:22.860 --> 47:27.340 I'm not inclined to believe that the bold claim is right. 47:27.340 --> 47:30.280 Should we conclude therefore that, no, you should always be 47:30.281 --> 47:32.261 thinking about the facts about death? 47:32.260 --> 47:35.540 No, I'm inclined to think that that other bold claim, 47:35.538 --> 47:38.688 on the other side, is probably mistaken as well. 47:38.690 --> 47:40.670 So there you are, one more time, 47:40.669 --> 47:43.349 one last time, making out with Peggy Sue or 47:43.351 --> 47:46.931 Billy Bob and your roommate comes in and starts trying to 47:46.927 --> 47:50.687 tell you about the fact that he's taken Shelly Kagan's class 47:50.694 --> 47:54.594 on death or he's been studying in some biology class, 47:54.590 --> 48:00.520 and he wants to tell you about how human bodies decay when they 48:00.517 --> 48:02.427 turn into corpses. 48:02.429 --> 48:07.719 As he begins to tell you this story, you start picturing Peggy 48:07.723 --> 48:09.983 Sue as a rotting corpse. 48:09.980 --> 48:12.480 Suddenly, you don't really feel like kissing her anymore. 48:12.480 --> 48:14.840 It's sort of like the digestive tract story. 48:14.840 --> 48:17.210 It's not that, as far as I can see, 48:17.214 --> 48:20.924 the fact that she's going to be a corpse gives you any 48:20.915 --> 48:23.285 reason not to kiss her. 48:23.289 --> 48:27.569 It's just that thinking about the fact that she's going to be 48:27.567 --> 48:31.127 a corpse causes you to not want to kiss her, 48:31.132 --> 48:33.772 not be able to enjoy kissing her. 48:33.769 --> 48:38.029 So, I'm inclined to think that the right position here is a 48:38.031 --> 48:40.751 kind of moderate one, a modest one. 48:40.750 --> 48:46.560 There are times and places for thinking about the facts of 48:46.563 --> 48:48.963 death. When you're kissing 48:48.961 --> 48:53.791 somebody--that is not the time and that is not the place. 48:53.789 --> 48:58.129 The position that says, you should always have the fact 48:58.130 --> 49:03.190 of your mortality forever before your mind's eye--I think that's 49:03.194 --> 49:05.614 misguided. Similarly, though, 49:05.613 --> 49:08.853 anybody who says, you should never think about 49:08.845 --> 49:13.225 the facts of mortality and the nature of death--I think that's 49:13.227 --> 49:14.877 misguided as well. 49:14.880 --> 49:18.610 There's a time and place. 49:18.610 --> 49:21.260 But that still leaves us with the question. 49:21.260 --> 49:23.990 All right, so suppose this is the time and place. 49:23.989 --> 49:26.829 If ever there was a time and place for thinking about the 49:26.828 --> 49:29.408 facts of death and how it should influence our life, 49:29.412 --> 49:31.442 it's right now, in a class on death. 49:31.440 --> 49:36.560 So, we still have to face the question, how should you live? 49:36.559 --> 49:42.019 What is the appropriate response to the facts about life 49:42.022 --> 49:45.482 and death? That's the question we have to 49:45.480 --> 49:47.000 turn to next time.