WEBVTT 00:01.050 --> 00:03.950 Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time, I invited you to 00:03.946 --> 00:06.076 think about life on the experience machine, 00:06.080 --> 00:09.180 where the scientists are busy stimulating your brain in such a 00:09.180 --> 00:11.980 way as to give you an exact replica, from the insides of 00:11.975 --> 00:14.815 what it would be like having identical experiences to the 00:14.821 --> 00:17.361 ones you would have if you were really doing--well, 00:17.362 --> 00:19.702 whatever it is that's worth doing. 00:19.700 --> 00:22.980 Climbing the alps, writing the great American 00:22.981 --> 00:26.261 novel, raising a great family that loves you, 00:26.262 --> 00:29.132 being creative. Whatever it is you think is 00:29.133 --> 00:31.343 worth having, the experience machine gives 00:31.341 --> 00:33.981 you all the experiential side of those things. 00:33.980 --> 00:35.700 But you're not really doing those things. 00:35.700 --> 00:39.420 You're actually just floating in the scientist's lab. 00:39.420 --> 00:41.960 And we ask ourselves, would you want to live a life 00:41.958 --> 00:43.378 on the experience machine? 00:43.380 --> 00:47.720 Would you be happy or would you be unhappy, to discover that you 00:47.718 --> 00:51.918 actually have been living a life on the experience machine? 00:51.920 --> 00:54.890 Most of us, when we think about this, find ourselves wanting to 00:54.887 --> 00:57.617 say, no, we wouldn't want to have a life on the experience 00:57.615 --> 01:00.135 machine. I've been discussing this sort 01:00.142 --> 01:02.292 of example for many, many years. 01:02.289 --> 01:05.129 And there's always a group of people who think, 01:05.132 --> 01:08.592 yes, life on the experience machine is perfect as long as 01:08.592 --> 01:10.942 you've got the right tape playing. 01:10.939 --> 01:14.709 But the vast majority always says, no, there's something 01:14.714 --> 01:16.434 missing from that life. 01:16.430 --> 01:19.410 It's not the ideal of human existences; 01:19.409 --> 01:24.189 it's not the best possible life we can imagine ourselves having. 01:24.189 --> 01:25.769 But that means, if we think something's 01:25.769 --> 01:28.179 missing, we then have to ask yourselves, what's missing? 01:28.180 --> 01:31.180 What's wrong with the experience machine? 01:31.180 --> 01:33.150 The one thing we can conclude immediately is, 01:33.150 --> 01:35.520 if you think life on the experience machine is missing 01:35.523 --> 01:38.103 something, that the hedonist--and views 01:38.102 --> 01:42.082 like hedonism--must be wrong, insofar as they say that all 01:42.077 --> 01:45.287 that matters for the best possible life is--for 01:45.285 --> 01:49.395 well-being--is getting the right kinds of experiences, 01:49.400 --> 01:52.070 getting the right kinds of mental states. 01:52.069 --> 01:56.359 Because by hypothesis, the experience machine gets the 01:56.358 --> 01:59.998 mental states right, get the insides right. 02:00.000 --> 02:03.040 So, if something's missing from that life, there's more to the 02:03.040 --> 02:06.080 best kind of life than just having the right mental states, 02:06.079 --> 02:08.899 than just getting the insides right. 02:08.900 --> 02:11.490 Well, we ask ourselves then, well, what's missing? 02:11.490 --> 02:15.250 I think different people will answer that in different ways. 02:15.250 --> 02:18.890 And if we had more time we could spell out rival theories 02:18.886 --> 02:21.606 of well-being, which could be interestingly 02:21.614 --> 02:25.584 distinguished one from another in terms of how they answer the 02:25.575 --> 02:28.215 question, "What's missing from the 02:28.224 --> 02:29.694 experience machine?" 02:29.689 --> 02:32.119 on the one hand, and "Why are the things that 02:32.118 --> 02:35.208 are missing from the experience machine worth having?" 02:35.210 --> 02:38.410 Different theories of well-being might answer that in 02:38.412 --> 02:41.032 different ways. Instead of trying to pursue 02:41.025 --> 02:44.035 those alternative theories in a systematic fashion, 02:44.039 --> 02:47.699 let me just gesture toward some of the things that seem to be 02:47.704 --> 02:49.724 missing from that kind of life. 02:49.720 --> 02:52.110 Well, first of all, and most, perhaps, 02:52.105 --> 02:55.645 obviously--if you're just spending your life floating in 02:55.652 --> 02:58.612 the scientist's lab, you're not actually 02:58.609 --> 03:00.389 accomplishing anything. 03:00.389 --> 03:04.159 You're not actually getting the things out of life you thought 03:04.156 --> 03:05.326 you were getting. 03:05.330 --> 03:08.010 You wanted to be climbing the mountain, but you're not 03:08.011 --> 03:09.581 actually climbing a mountain. 03:09.580 --> 03:11.190 You're just floating there. 03:11.189 --> 03:13.849 You wanted to be writing the great American novel, 03:13.852 --> 03:16.572 but you're not writing the great American novel. 03:16.570 --> 03:17.710 You're just floating there. 03:17.710 --> 03:20.040 You wanted to be finding the cure for cancer, 03:20.040 --> 03:22.900 but you're not actually finding the cure for cancer. 03:22.900 --> 03:27.050 You wanted to be loved, but you're not actually loved. 03:27.050 --> 03:28.280 You're just floating there. 03:28.280 --> 03:32.210 Nobody other than the scientist even knows that you exist. 03:32.210 --> 03:35.620 So, there's a variety of things you wanted. 03:35.620 --> 03:38.510 You wanted to know your place in the universe, 03:38.507 --> 03:42.097 but you don't even have that kind of knowledge either, 03:42.099 --> 03:44.199 because you think you're writing novels, 03:44.196 --> 03:47.096 finding the cure for cancer, climbing Mount Everest. 03:47.099 --> 03:50.259 You're completely deceived about all those things. 03:50.259 --> 03:54.339 So you don't have the kind of self-knowledge that many of us 03:54.337 --> 03:55.917 value. Well, as I say, 03:55.922 --> 04:00.052 different theories would try to systematize these examples in 04:00.051 --> 04:02.801 different ways; that we don't have any kind of 04:02.801 --> 04:04.821 accomplishments, we don't have knowledge, 04:04.817 --> 04:07.637 we're not in the right kinds of loving relationships. 04:07.639 --> 04:10.329 Different theories might have different explanations as 04:10.329 --> 04:12.969 to--are these things valuable because we want them, 04:12.969 --> 04:16.339 or do we want them because we recognize they're valuable? 04:16.339 --> 04:18.779 Rather than trying to pursue those questions--, 04:18.783 --> 04:22.083 And indeed, trying to work out the details of these views would 04:22.076 --> 04:23.506 be complicated as well. 04:23.509 --> 04:25.709 Take the example of accomplishment. 04:25.709 --> 04:28.289 Well, we all think accomplishment's important, 04:28.286 --> 04:31.776 but it's not as though any old accomplishment is important. 04:31.779 --> 04:35.989 If somebody sets themselves--or so it seems to me at least--if 04:35.990 --> 04:40.130 somebody sets theirself the goal of making the biggest rubber 04:40.131 --> 04:43.101 band ball in the Eastern United States, 04:43.100 --> 04:45.770 I suppose there's a sense of the word that that's an 04:45.774 --> 04:47.614 accomplishment if they've got it, 04:47.610 --> 04:50.740 but it doesn't strike me as the kind of accomplishment which 04:50.742 --> 04:52.922 makes for a particularly valuable life. 04:52.920 --> 04:55.380 So, we might have to distinguish between any old 04:55.384 --> 04:58.324 accomplishment and genuinely valuable accomplishments. 04:58.319 --> 05:01.899 But again, just put those details aside. 05:01.899 --> 05:05.209 We can say that there are certain things that are good 05:05.208 --> 05:08.138 above and beyond experiences--the right kinds of 05:08.141 --> 05:11.201 accomplishments, the right kind of knowledge. 05:11.199 --> 05:14.549 After all, not every bit of knowledge is equally valuable. 05:14.550 --> 05:17.010 It's one thing to know your place in the universe, 05:17.005 --> 05:19.255 or to know the fundamental laws of physics. 05:19.259 --> 05:23.769 It's another thing to know what was the average rainfall in 05:23.770 --> 05:26.440 Bangkok in 1984. I'm not clear that that kind of 05:26.440 --> 05:28.530 knowledge gives a whole lot of value to your life. 05:28.529 --> 05:31.979 So, we need the right kinds of accomplishments and the right 05:31.978 --> 05:35.308 kind of knowledge and the right kinds of relationships. 05:35.310 --> 05:37.920 But imagine you've worked that out. 05:37.920 --> 05:41.620 The crucial point is that it takes more to have the best kind 05:41.621 --> 05:44.461 of life than just getting the insides right. 05:44.459 --> 05:48.469 It also requires getting the outsides right--whatever that 05:48.468 --> 05:52.478 comes to--having in your life not just experiences but the 05:52.476 --> 05:56.336 right kinds of goods or accomplishments or whatever term 05:56.343 --> 05:58.473 we use for it. Now, let's say, 05:58.465 --> 06:00.945 instead of pursuing the questions of how exactly that 06:00.945 --> 06:03.645 theory should go, notice that if we had that 06:03.651 --> 06:07.421 theory we could still evaluate in principle--whatever the 06:07.423 --> 06:11.403 practical difficulties might be--in principle we could still 06:11.398 --> 06:13.148 evaluate rival lives. 06:13.149 --> 06:17.609 We could talk about adding up all the positive experiences 06:17.614 --> 06:21.534 along with all the--ask yourself how many goods, 06:21.529 --> 06:25.559 how many accomplishments of the right sort were in that life? 06:25.560 --> 06:28.770 And that's on the positive side of the ledger. 06:28.769 --> 06:32.149 And against that we would then have to subtract the sum total 06:32.151 --> 06:35.481 of the negative experiences, all the failures and deceptions 06:35.476 --> 06:36.656 or what have you. 06:36.660 --> 06:39.700 Those would count against the overall value of your life. 06:39.699 --> 06:42.959 We could still say it's--how good your life is, 06:42.958 --> 06:47.348 is a matter of adding up the goods and subtracting the bads. 06:47.350 --> 06:49.520 But we would now have a somewhat broader, 06:49.523 --> 06:51.483 or more encompassing or inclusive, 06:51.480 --> 06:53.470 list of goods, and a more broad and 06:53.466 --> 06:56.326 encompassing list of bads--not just experience, 06:56.329 --> 06:59.899 but also these various other accomplishments, 06:59.898 --> 07:02.978 whatever exactly that list comes to. 07:02.980 --> 07:05.790 So, we could still evaluate rival lives. 07:05.790 --> 07:10.080 My life would've gone better had I chosen to become a farmer 07:10.082 --> 07:12.922 instead of chosen to become a doctor. 07:12.920 --> 07:15.940 Or my life would've gone better for this period of ten years, 07:15.944 --> 07:17.764 but then it would've become worse. 07:17.760 --> 07:18.630 Or what have you. 07:18.629 --> 07:22.499 Or when we ask ourselves, how will things go for me over 07:22.501 --> 07:26.941 the next couple of weeks if I go on vacation versus staying back 07:26.936 --> 07:28.986 here? We add up the goods, 07:28.991 --> 07:33.471 subtract the bads--whatever our favorite list is--and we come to 07:33.469 --> 07:37.519 our best educated guess about the rival evaluations of not 07:37.520 --> 07:42.180 just lives as a whole, but chunks of lives. 07:42.180 --> 07:46.670 Now, what do those totals come to? 07:46.670 --> 07:48.650 Well, you might think it's an empirical question, 07:48.650 --> 07:50.750 and in fact I am inclined to think it's an empirical 07:50.754 --> 07:52.574 question, varying from person to person. 07:52.569 --> 07:56.319 But it's worth taking a moment to flag the fact that there are 07:56.320 --> 07:59.890 people, there are philosophers, who think we can generalize 07:59.887 --> 08:01.237 across all humans. 08:01.240 --> 08:06.430 You might say that optimists are people who think that for 08:06.428 --> 08:10.618 everybody in every case, in every circumstance, 08:10.616 --> 08:13.616 the total is always positive. 08:13.620 --> 08:18.570 "Life's always worth living; it's always better than 08:18.566 --> 08:21.896 non-existence." That's what the optimist 08:21.900 --> 08:24.690 thinks--not just for themselves individually, 08:24.688 --> 08:27.918 but for everybody, the total is always positive. 08:27.920 --> 08:29.880 Against that, I suppose, you've got 08:29.879 --> 08:32.299 pessimists--pessimists who say, "No, no. 08:32.299 --> 08:36.419 Although life perhaps has some good things, the overall grand 08:36.418 --> 08:40.398 balance is negative for everybody in every circumstance. 08:40.399 --> 08:43.319 We'd all be better off dead, or perhaps more accurately 08:43.317 --> 08:46.507 still, all be better off never having been born in the first 08:46.505 --> 08:48.795 place." That's what the pessimists say. 08:48.799 --> 08:53.309 And in between the optimists on the one hand and the pessimists 08:53.306 --> 08:56.356 on the other, you've got moderates who say, 08:56.359 --> 08:59.309 "It varies. And for some people the balance 08:59.309 --> 09:03.029 is positive, for some people perhaps the balance is negative, 09:03.029 --> 09:05.829 whether for their life as a whole or for certain stretches 09:05.834 --> 09:08.494 of their lives." We then have to get down to 09:08.492 --> 09:11.712 facts about cases, try to describe the instance, 09:11.710 --> 09:15.860 perhaps somebody who's in the terminal stages of some illness 09:15.855 --> 09:18.615 where they're in a great deal of pain. 09:18.620 --> 09:20.890 And the various other external goods of life, 09:20.888 --> 09:22.948 they can't--because they're bedridden, 09:22.950 --> 09:26.240 they can no longer accomplish things, perhaps their family has 09:26.242 --> 09:29.342 abandoned them. Whatever the details might be, 09:29.341 --> 09:33.491 we could describe lives and say, whether or not their life 09:33.487 --> 09:38.227 was good as a whole, what the future holds out for 09:38.226 --> 09:40.126 them is negative. 09:40.129 --> 09:42.659 That's what the moderates would say. 09:42.660 --> 09:46.000 It varies from case to case. 09:46.000 --> 09:51.580 Well, however we settle that issue, notice there's still one 09:51.576 --> 09:57.716 other assumption that all these positions still have in common. 09:57.720 --> 10:01.780 We've expanded our list of goods so that--Nobody's going to 10:01.784 --> 10:05.644 deny that among the goods of life are pleasure and other 10:05.638 --> 10:07.388 positive experiences. 10:07.389 --> 10:10.359 And among the bads of life are pain and other negative 10:10.364 --> 10:13.414 experiences. But we've expanded the list of 10:13.414 --> 10:17.944 goods so it includes external goods and not only experiential 10:17.944 --> 10:19.534 or internal goods. 10:19.529 --> 10:23.329 Still, the views that I've been sketching all still have the 10:23.332 --> 10:25.462 following assumption in common. 10:25.460 --> 10:31.100 How good it is to be alive is a matter of adding up all of 10:31.097 --> 10:35.347 the--call it the contents of life. 10:35.350 --> 10:40.320 Add up your experiences and your accomplishments and the 10:40.318 --> 10:45.828 particular details of your life as what the story is about. 10:45.830 --> 10:50.600 It's as though we've been assuming, and I have been 10:50.599 --> 10:56.039 assuming up to this moment, that being alive per se has no 10:56.036 --> 10:59.236 value. It's--life itself is a 10:59.240 --> 11:04.560 container which we fill with various goods or bads. 11:04.559 --> 11:08.719 And deciding how valuable it is, how good it is for me to be 11:08.717 --> 11:13.087 alive is a matter of adding up the value of the contents of the 11:13.085 --> 11:16.125 life. But the container itself is a 11:16.130 --> 11:19.540 mere container. It has no value in and of 11:19.535 --> 11:22.465 itself. We could say that what I've 11:22.474 --> 11:27.444 been presupposing up to this point is the "neutral container 11:27.444 --> 11:30.144 theory" of the value of life. 11:30.139 --> 11:34.259 Hedonism is a version of the neutral container theory. 11:34.259 --> 11:38.239 How valuable--how well off you are, how valuable your life is, 11:38.235 --> 11:42.075 is a function of the contents, the pleasure and the pain. 11:42.080 --> 11:46.270 We've expanded the list of goods that can go within 11:46.273 --> 11:49.893 your life, but for all that, we've still been acting as 11:49.890 --> 11:53.090 though the neutral container theory is the right approach. 11:53.090 --> 11:55.890 But against this there are those who think, 11:55.889 --> 11:59.689 no, in addition to thinking about the value of the content 11:59.690 --> 12:03.120 of life, we have to remember--so these 12:03.115 --> 12:07.455 people claim--that life itself is worth having. 12:07.460 --> 12:11.680 There's a benefit to me above and beyond the question of 12:11.678 --> 12:15.128 what's going on within my life--am I loved, 12:15.129 --> 12:17.899 am I accomplishing things, am I having nice experiences or 12:17.898 --> 12:20.738 not? Above and beyond the question 12:20.742 --> 12:25.582 of the contents of my life, we have to remember that the 12:25.584 --> 12:30.254 mere fact that I'm alive gives my life some value. 12:30.250 --> 12:32.480 So, these are "valuable container" theories. 12:32.480 --> 12:35.330 Now, think about what it would mean to accept a valuable 12:35.326 --> 12:36.306 container theory. 12:36.309 --> 12:42.839 You're saying that being alive per se has some positive value. 12:42.840 --> 12:45.270 Well, actually, the first remark is, 12:45.273 --> 12:48.543 probably wouldn't be completely accurate to say, 12:48.540 --> 12:52.360 to describe these views as saying, "It's being alive per 12:52.364 --> 12:55.434 se." After all, a blade of grass is 12:55.430 --> 13:00.250 alive, and I presume that even fans of the, what we might call 13:00.250 --> 13:03.610 valuable container theories, don't think that, 13:03.609 --> 13:06.709 "Oh, wouldn't it be wonderful if--as long as I was alive in 13:06.710 --> 13:09.010 the way that a blade of grass is alive." 13:09.009 --> 13:12.659 Life may have value in and of itself, but it's not mere 13:12.661 --> 13:15.941 life. What we want is the life of a 13:15.939 --> 13:18.739 human. We want a life in which we're 13:18.736 --> 13:21.346 accomplishing things, there's agency, 13:21.350 --> 13:23.820 and the life of knowing things. 13:23.820 --> 13:26.760 Because you have to be a knower in order to have knowledge. 13:26.759 --> 13:30.119 The life of somebody who can have an emotional side. 13:30.120 --> 13:33.510 So, it's something like the life of a person that, 13:33.514 --> 13:36.354 when we say, when there are people who are 13:36.354 --> 13:39.664 inclined to say, that being alive per so is 13:39.660 --> 13:44.170 valuable, presumably what they mean is being alive as a person 13:44.165 --> 13:45.785 per se is valuable. 13:45.790 --> 13:47.910 All right. Note that point; 13:47.910 --> 13:51.190 keep it in mind. For simplicity I'll talk about 13:51.187 --> 13:56.387 these views as though they say life per se is valuable. 13:56.389 --> 14:01.929 Actually, I suppose there could be a more extreme view still. 14:01.929 --> 14:04.669 It seems implausible to me, but I suppose it's worth 14:04.669 --> 14:06.709 noticing there are people who think, 14:06.710 --> 14:10.240 "No, being alive per se, right--even though there I am 14:10.238 --> 14:13.768 and my brain has been so thoroughly destroyed that I'm 14:13.766 --> 14:16.226 not longer able to know anything, 14:16.230 --> 14:18.840 no longer able to relate emotionally to anybody, 14:18.839 --> 14:21.059 no longer able to accomplish anything, 14:21.059 --> 14:24.499 there I am in a persistent vegetative state, 14:24.500 --> 14:26.580 but at least I'm alive." 14:26.580 --> 14:29.800 You can imagine somebody who has that view. 14:29.799 --> 14:31.949 I've got to say I find that a pretty implausible view. 14:31.950 --> 14:35.880 So I'm going to restrict myself, at least when I think 14:35.878 --> 14:40.328 about it, to versions that say, it's the life of a person per 14:40.325 --> 14:42.025 se that's valuable. 14:42.029 --> 14:48.889 Now, notice that if we accept this view to decide how well off 14:48.891 --> 14:54.631 I am, or somebody else is, you can't just add up the 14:54.627 --> 14:57.437 contents of the life. 14:57.440 --> 14:59.960 You can't just add up all the pleasures and subtract the 14:59.963 --> 15:02.533 pains, or add up all the accomplishments and subtract the 15:02.533 --> 15:05.523 failures, or add up all the knowledge and 15:05.515 --> 15:08.435 subtract the ignorance and deception. 15:08.440 --> 15:13.320 Doing that in terms of the contents gives you a subtotal, 15:13.316 --> 15:17.666 but that subtotal is no longer the entire story. 15:17.669 --> 15:21.879 Because we also have to add in, if we accept a valuable 15:21.879 --> 15:25.309 container theory, we also have to add in some 15:25.310 --> 15:29.910 extra positive points to take account of the fact that, 15:29.909 --> 15:34.109 well, at least you're alive or have the life or a person--or 15:34.113 --> 15:38.463 whatever it is that you think is valuable in and of itself. 15:38.460 --> 15:40.490 So first we get the content subtotal; 15:40.490 --> 15:45.630 then we add some extra points for the mere fact that you're 15:45.630 --> 15:48.790 alive. Now, notice that since we are 15:48.785 --> 15:53.165 adding extra positive facts, extra positive points, 15:53.169 --> 15:59.569 for the fact that you're alive, even if the contents subtotal 15:59.573 --> 16:06.193 is negative, the grand total could still be positive. 16:06.190 --> 16:11.020 Suppose that being alive per se is worth plus a hundred points, 16:11.015 --> 16:13.345 just to make up some number. 16:13.350 --> 16:16.970 Even if your content subtotal was negative ten, 16:16.971 --> 16:20.751 that doesn't mean you're not better off alive, 16:20.750 --> 16:23.930 because negative ten plus the extra hundred points for the 16:23.930 --> 16:27.000 mere fact that you're alive is still going to give you a 16:26.999 --> 16:28.209 positive total, plus 90. 16:28.210 --> 16:32.170 16:32.169 --> 16:37.189 So, the point of thinking about the possibility of accepting a 16:37.187 --> 16:42.207 valuable container theory is to remind us that in deciding are 16:42.205 --> 16:46.205 you better off dead, has death deprived me of 16:46.209 --> 16:50.269 something good or not, it's important to not just 16:50.269 --> 16:54.749 focus on the contents but to also remember to add some 16:54.752 --> 16:59.832 positive points above and beyond the content subtotal to take 16:59.827 --> 17:05.407 into account the value of the sheer fact that you're alive. 17:05.410 --> 17:08.530 If you're a fan of the neutral container theory, 17:08.530 --> 17:12.450 you won't have anything extra to add, because life per se is 17:12.447 --> 17:15.727 just a zero. It's strictly a matter of the 17:15.733 --> 17:17.803 contents. But if you accept a valuable 17:17.795 --> 17:20.105 container theory, you have to add something more. 17:20.109 --> 17:22.589 And so even if, you might say, 17:22.587 --> 17:27.367 the way my life is going in terms of its contents is bad, 17:27.372 --> 17:31.732 being alive per se might still be a good thing. 17:31.730 --> 17:32.990 Have to add some extra points. 17:32.990 --> 17:37.990 How much extra? Well, here we're going to have, 17:37.992 --> 17:42.802 of course, more modest and more bold versions of the valuable 17:42.798 --> 17:44.398 container theory. 17:44.400 --> 17:49.650 Let me just distinguish two broad types. 17:49.650 --> 17:55.350 What we might call modest versions of the valuable 17:55.354 --> 18:01.294 container theory say, although being alive per se is 18:01.292 --> 18:05.832 good, if the contents of your life 18:05.828 --> 18:11.438 get bad enough, that can outweigh the value of 18:11.435 --> 18:17.785 being alive so that the grand total is negative. 18:17.789 --> 18:22.969 Modest container theories, that is, say there's a 18:22.970 --> 18:27.400 value to being alive, but it can in principle be 18:27.397 --> 18:30.137 outweighed. Whether it gets outweighed 18:30.137 --> 18:33.197 easily, or whether it's very, very difficult and the contents 18:33.200 --> 18:35.140 have to be horrible to outweigh it, 18:35.140 --> 18:40.130 depends on how much value you think being alive per se has. 18:40.130 --> 18:43.420 So, those are modest theories--positive value for 18:43.424 --> 18:45.694 life, but it can be outweighed. 18:45.690 --> 18:49.100 Against that, you can imagine someone who 18:49.095 --> 18:54.025 thinks being alive per se is so incredibly valuable that no 18:54.033 --> 18:58.123 matter how horrible the contents are, 18:58.119 --> 19:02.809 the grand total will always be positive. 19:02.809 --> 19:06.509 It's as though being alive is infinitely valuable in 19:06.512 --> 19:09.782 comparison to questions about the contents. 19:09.779 --> 19:15.329 We could call this the "fantastic valuable container 19:15.327 --> 19:20.867 theory" as opposed to the "modest valuable container 19:20.874 --> 19:23.674 theory." I suppose that label gives away 19:23.668 --> 19:25.348 where I want to come down on this. 19:25.349 --> 19:30.519 I find the fantastic valuable container theory fantastic in 19:30.521 --> 19:32.841 the sense of incredible. 19:32.839 --> 19:38.609 I can't bring myself to believe it, which--I have some 19:38.610 --> 19:43.510 sympathies for valuable container theories, 19:43.509 --> 19:49.139 but I also have some sympathy for neutral container theories. 19:49.140 --> 19:51.180 Sometimes I'm drawn toward the neutral view; 19:51.180 --> 19:55.020 sometimes I'm drawn toward the thought that being alive per se 19:55.017 --> 19:57.727 is good for you. But even in those moments when 19:57.732 --> 20:00.112 I'm drawn towards valuable container theories, 20:00.106 --> 20:01.896 it's always the modest version. 20:01.900 --> 20:07.770 I don't find myself drawn toward the fantastic version. 20:07.769 --> 20:10.159 Now, if we make these distinctions, 20:10.162 --> 20:14.242 then again, remembering that the question we've been asking 20:14.244 --> 20:17.064 ourselves is, "So why is death bad?" 20:17.059 --> 20:22.419 The deprivation account says, death is bad for you insofar 20:22.423 --> 20:27.223 as, or it's bad for you when, by virtue of dying now, 20:27.216 --> 20:31.946 what you've been deprived of is, another chunk of life that 20:31.949 --> 20:35.049 would've been good for you to have. 20:35.049 --> 20:38.769 And what we now see is that--to see whether that could be the 20:38.766 --> 20:42.296 case or not, we've got to get clear in our own minds about 20:42.297 --> 20:45.577 whether we believe in a neutral container theory, 20:45.579 --> 20:49.849 a positive, valuable container theory or--and among those, 20:49.847 --> 20:53.737 between a fantastic and a modest container theory. 20:53.740 --> 20:57.420 If we are neutralists, we're going to say, 20:57.415 --> 21:01.445 the question is, what would the contents of my 21:01.450 --> 21:04.410 life have been, for the next year, 21:04.408 --> 21:06.738 ten years, whatever? 21:06.740 --> 21:10.740 If that would've been worth having, then--if the next chunk 21:10.737 --> 21:14.727 of my life would've been worth having--then it's bad for me 21:14.734 --> 21:18.874 that I die now instead of living for the next ten years. 21:18.869 --> 21:21.849 On the other hand, if the balance from here on out 21:21.847 --> 21:24.947 would've been negative, then it's good for me that I 21:24.946 --> 21:28.406 died now instead of being kept alive with a life not worth 21:28.410 --> 21:30.250 living. That's how the neutralists put 21:30.250 --> 21:31.960 it. If we are valuable 21:31.964 --> 21:35.114 container theorists, we think the answer has got to 21:35.112 --> 21:37.342 be, well, look at the contents, 21:37.339 --> 21:40.149 but don't forget to add some extra points, 21:40.148 --> 21:43.778 even if the next five years for you would've been, 21:43.779 --> 21:47.899 in terms of the contents, modestly bad--perhaps the value 21:47.897 --> 21:51.277 of at least being alive at all outweighs it, 21:51.279 --> 21:54.239 so it still would've been better for you to be alive. 21:54.240 --> 21:59.120 But if the contents get bad enough, then you'd be better off 21:59.120 --> 22:02.320 dead. Notice that on the modest view, 22:02.321 --> 22:06.471 if we ask ourselves, would it have been good to be 22:06.465 --> 22:09.205 immortal? the answer's going to depend on 22:09.206 --> 22:12.206 not just whether we accept Bernard Williams' claim that 22:12.214 --> 22:14.224 immortality would be bad for you, 22:14.220 --> 22:17.910 because we now realize that what Williams was talking about 22:17.906 --> 22:20.826 was the contents of an immortal life. 22:20.829 --> 22:23.139 And that's no longer an adequate view, 22:23.143 --> 22:25.833 or at least it's no longer a complete story, 22:25.831 --> 22:28.521 if we are valuable container theorists. 22:28.519 --> 22:30.549 We could say--you could imagine somebody saying, 22:30.545 --> 22:32.005 "Oh yes, you're right, Williams, 22:32.009 --> 22:35.489 the contents get negative, but that's still outweighed by 22:35.494 --> 22:37.614 the mere fact that you're alive. 22:37.609 --> 22:40.339 So on balance, being immortal is a good 22:40.342 --> 22:43.342 thing." Whether that's right or not 22:43.337 --> 22:47.857 depends on just how bad would it be to be immortal. 22:47.859 --> 22:50.099 Because, of course, if you're a modest, 22:50.104 --> 22:52.884 if you accept the modest version of the valuable 22:52.879 --> 22:55.799 container theory, then if the contents get bad 22:55.799 --> 22:58.439 enough, that can outweigh the positive 22:58.440 --> 23:00.410 value of life. Against that, 23:00.408 --> 23:04.418 fans of the fantastic valuable container theory can say, 23:04.420 --> 23:08.360 it doesn't really matter whether Williams is right. 23:08.359 --> 23:13.329 Even if being immortal would become horrendously boring and 23:13.326 --> 23:16.576 tedious or worse, it doesn't matter. 23:16.579 --> 23:20.719 The value of being alive per se outweighs that. 23:20.720 --> 23:23.410 So you're always better off being alive. 23:23.410 --> 23:26.870 So more life would always be better, no matter how horrible 23:26.868 --> 23:28.298 the contents might be. 23:28.299 --> 23:31.289 So being immortal really would be a good thing for you. 23:31.289 --> 23:33.979 Death always is a bad thing. 23:33.980 --> 23:38.030 That's what you can say if you accept the fantastic container 23:38.032 --> 23:40.272 theory. I don't find the fantastic 23:40.270 --> 23:44.410 container theory myself--I don't find it particularly attractive. 23:44.410 --> 23:51.440 I'm inclined to think not only that--not only that the contents 23:51.441 --> 23:56.211 of life would be bad, eventually, for all of us if we 23:56.208 --> 24:00.178 were immortal--but that it would be bad enough to outweigh 24:00.176 --> 24:03.746 whatever value, whatever positive value being 24:03.750 --> 24:06.150 alive per se may have for us. 24:06.150 --> 24:12.260 So, I'm inclined to think, eventually immortality would 24:12.263 --> 24:14.983 always be bad overall. 24:14.980 --> 24:18.530 But let me remind you that saying that does not rule out 24:18.533 --> 24:22.603 the possibility of consistently going on to say that even though 24:22.603 --> 24:27.713 it's a good thing that we die, because eventually immortality 24:27.709 --> 24:33.629 would be horrible--for all that, death could still come too 24:33.626 --> 24:38.076 soon. It could still be the case that 24:38.082 --> 24:41.802 we die before life has turned bad. 24:41.799 --> 24:45.429 We die while it's still the case that living another ten 24:45.427 --> 24:48.917 years or twenty years--or for that matter five hundred 24:48.922 --> 24:52.882 years--would still or could still have been good for us. 24:52.880 --> 24:58.420 It's compatible with thinking that immortality would be bad to 24:58.417 --> 25:02.227 think that in fact death comes too soon. 25:02.230 --> 25:06.100 But of course, we now have a return of the 25:06.103 --> 25:11.303 division between moderates, optimists and pessimists. 25:11.299 --> 25:14.189 You might say, optimists are those--now in 25:14.194 --> 25:17.164 this more chastened version of optimism, 25:17.160 --> 25:20.130 optimists say, "Even if immortality would be 25:20.126 --> 25:24.196 bad eventually after a million years or ten million years or 25:24.198 --> 25:28.178 what have you, the next chunk of life would've 25:28.175 --> 25:30.465 been good for all of us." 25:30.470 --> 25:33.380 So that death--they're optimists in this strange sense, 25:33.376 --> 25:35.526 if they think life would've been good, 25:35.529 --> 25:39.809 which means of course that that we die is bad for 25:39.810 --> 25:42.120 us. Because we all die too soon. 25:42.119 --> 25:45.449 That's what the optimists might say. 25:45.450 --> 25:48.110 Against that, the pessimists might say, 25:48.114 --> 25:52.044 "Boy, death comes not a moment too soon for any of us. 25:52.039 --> 25:56.409 The next chunk of life is always not worth having, 25:56.406 --> 25:58.986 always worse than nothing." 25:58.990 --> 26:02.970 And in between these two extremes are the moderates, 26:02.973 --> 26:06.803 who say, "For some of us, death comes too soon. 26:06.799 --> 26:10.009 For some of us, death does not come too soon." 26:10.010 --> 26:13.880 26:13.880 --> 26:15.670 There's a quote I want to read. 26:15.670 --> 26:17.440 It's actually out of place now. 26:17.440 --> 26:21.460 I should have read it a lecture or two ago when I started 26:21.462 --> 26:24.912 talking about immortality, but I misplaced it. 26:24.910 --> 26:27.300 So, I found it this morning. 26:27.299 --> 26:30.599 So before I just leave the subject of immortality, 26:30.598 --> 26:34.838 let me conclude with some words of wisdom from a former Miss USA 26:34.840 --> 26:37.290 contestant. She was asked the question, 26:37.292 --> 26:39.112 "Would you want to live forever?" 26:39.109 --> 26:42.219 And she responded, "I would not live forever, 26:42.222 --> 26:44.842 because we should not live forever. 26:44.839 --> 26:47.299 Because if we were supposed to live forever, 26:47.300 --> 26:48.960 then we would live forever. 26:48.960 --> 26:53.060 But we cannot live forever, which is why I would not live 26:53.063 --> 26:56.873 forever." Isn't that nice? 26:56.870 --> 26:59.960 All right. So I've been talking for, 26:59.964 --> 27:06.034 actually now a couple of weeks I suppose, about the central 27:06.028 --> 27:08.118 badness of death. 27:08.119 --> 27:10.529 Why is it that death is bad for me? 27:10.529 --> 27:15.589 And the answer I propose is the deprivation account. 27:15.589 --> 27:19.599 The central bad thing about the fact that I'm going to die is 27:19.602 --> 27:23.412 the fact that because I'll be dead I'll be deprived of the 27:23.414 --> 27:25.024 good things in life. 27:25.019 --> 27:27.009 And we've now seen that that's a bit crude, right? 27:27.009 --> 27:30.129 We have to not talk--just talk about the good things in the 27:30.125 --> 27:32.055 life, but the good of life itself, 27:32.059 --> 27:34.949 and we have to notice that perhaps on certain views, 27:34.953 --> 27:37.623 for certain cases, it's not really the case that 27:37.619 --> 27:40.399 when I die I'm being deprived of a good life. 27:40.400 --> 27:42.900 Because the next chunk, or perhaps from there on out, 27:42.902 --> 27:44.012 it would've been bad. 27:44.009 --> 27:48.139 But still, details and complications of the sort we've 27:48.141 --> 27:52.861 been considering aside, the fundamental badness of 27:52.862 --> 27:58.302 death is that it deprives me of life worth having. 27:58.299 --> 28:00.949 But although I've been at pains to say this is the 28:00.947 --> 28:03.267 fundamental bad thing about death, 28:03.269 --> 28:06.939 I think it's arguable that--I think one could make the case 28:06.939 --> 28:10.039 that this isn't the only bad thing about death, 28:10.039 --> 28:15.249 even if we're focusing on why is death bad for me? 28:15.250 --> 28:21.260 There are other features of death, as we experience it, 28:21.262 --> 28:26.192 that are separable from the deprivation account, 28:26.190 --> 28:30.820 that at least add to the way that death occurs for us, 28:30.819 --> 28:34.399 where we then have to ask the question, 28:34.400 --> 28:37.570 does this add to the badness of death? 28:37.569 --> 28:39.999 Or conceivably for some of these things, 28:40.000 --> 28:44.170 perhaps it mitigates it; it minimizes it in one way or 28:44.168 --> 28:47.018 another. So, what I want to do is take 28:47.019 --> 28:51.139 at least a couple of minutes and pursue some of these extra 28:51.139 --> 28:52.559 features as well. 28:52.560 --> 28:54.570 Here's an example. 28:54.569 --> 28:59.849 It's not merely the fact--it's not merely true that you're 28:59.850 --> 29:03.320 going to die. It's inevitable that 29:03.315 --> 29:04.925 you're going to die. 29:04.930 --> 29:08.830 There's no avoiding the fact that you're going to die. 29:08.829 --> 29:10.939 I mean look, you're all going to college, 29:10.941 --> 29:13.581 but it wasn't inevitable that you go to college. 29:13.579 --> 29:17.549 Had you chosen not to, you could've avoided going to 29:17.551 --> 29:21.411 college. But it doesn't matter what you 29:21.413 --> 29:24.603 choose, you can't avoid dying. 29:24.599 --> 29:28.389 So it's not just merely the case that in fact we are all 29:28.394 --> 29:31.464 going to die; it's a necessary truth 29:31.460 --> 29:33.490 that we're all going to die. 29:33.490 --> 29:36.980 So we might ask, what about this inevitability 29:36.977 --> 29:41.437 of death? Does that make things worse? 29:41.440 --> 29:44.870 And here I want to distinguish between the individual question 29:44.873 --> 29:47.693 about the inevitability of death, and the universal 29:47.688 --> 29:50.438 question. So just start by thinking about 29:50.439 --> 29:54.609 the fact that it's unavoidable that you're going to die. 29:54.609 --> 29:59.709 Does the unavoidability of death make it better or worse? 29:59.710 --> 30:04.300 And the interesting thing is, I think you can see--you can 30:04.303 --> 30:07.853 get a feel for both possible answers here. 30:07.849 --> 30:10.839 On the one hand, you can imagine somebody who 30:10.843 --> 30:14.453 says, "Look, it's bad enough that I'm going to die, 30:14.450 --> 30:19.660 but the fact that there's nothing I could do about it just 30:19.664 --> 30:23.494 makes it worse. It's like adding insult to 30:23.489 --> 30:27.679 injury that I'm powerless in the face of death. 30:27.680 --> 30:31.130 I cannot escape the Grim Reaper. 30:31.130 --> 30:36.330 This sheer powerlessness about this central fact about the 30:36.330 --> 30:41.170 nature of my existence is an extra insult added to the 30:41.165 --> 30:42.875 injury." Against that, 30:42.881 --> 30:45.231 however, there are those people who'd want to say, 30:45.225 --> 30:49.165 "No. Actually, the inevitability of 30:49.168 --> 30:53.738 my death reduces the badness." 30:53.740 --> 30:57.100 You all know the expression, "Don't cry over spilt milk." 30:57.100 --> 30:59.330 Right? That what's done is done. 30:59.330 --> 31:01.140 You can't change it. 31:01.140 --> 31:06.130 What you can't change, loses--when you focus on the 31:06.131 --> 31:11.921 fact that you can't change it, it loses some of its grip to 31:11.922 --> 31:15.022 upset you. Well, if that's right, 31:15.017 --> 31:19.417 and if we then realize that there's nothing I can do about 31:19.416 --> 31:25.016 the fact that I'm going to die, then perhaps some of the sting, 31:25.023 --> 31:28.203 some of the bite, is eliminated. 31:28.200 --> 31:32.700 It's as though you try--try getting upset about the fact 31:32.701 --> 31:35.321 that two plus two equals four. 31:35.319 --> 31:41.099 Try feeling upset at your powerlessness to change the fact 31:41.096 --> 31:44.336 that two plus two equals four. 31:44.339 --> 31:47.689 Suppose you wanted two plus two to equal five. 31:47.690 --> 31:54.400 Can you work up anger and regret and dismay over that? 31:54.400 --> 31:56.530 Well, most of us, of course, can't. 31:56.529 --> 32:04.339 Because when we see that something is just necessary, 32:04.336 --> 32:09.286 we--it reduces the sting of it. 32:09.289 --> 32:12.369 The philosopher Spinoza thought that if we could only recognize 32:12.373 --> 32:14.813 the fact, what he at least took to be the fact, 32:14.809 --> 32:18.979 that everything that happens in life is necessary, 32:18.979 --> 32:23.489 then we'd get a kind of emotional distance from it; 32:23.490 --> 32:25.540 it would no longer upset us. 32:25.539 --> 32:28.019 We could no longer be disappointed, 32:28.017 --> 32:32.237 because to be disappointed in something presupposes that it 32:32.244 --> 32:34.654 could've been some other way. 32:34.650 --> 32:39.560 And Spinoza thought if you see that it couldn't go any other 32:39.564 --> 32:42.734 way, then you can't be sad about it. 32:42.730 --> 32:46.400 Well, if we see that our death is inevitable and we really 32:46.398 --> 32:49.678 internalize that fact, perhaps that would reduce the 32:49.681 --> 32:52.261 badness of it. Well, maybe that's right, 32:52.263 --> 32:55.283 but going back to the firsthand, I don't know how many 32:55.282 --> 32:58.702 of you have read Dostoyevsky's short novel The Underground 32:58.699 --> 33:01.179 Man. The Underground Man is upset 33:01.180 --> 33:04.350 about--if I remember correctly--he's upset about the 33:04.351 --> 33:08.141 fact that two plus two equals four and there's nothing that he 33:08.144 --> 33:11.844 can do about it. So he curses existence, 33:11.844 --> 33:18.204 curses God at having made him so impotent that he can't change 33:18.196 --> 33:22.566 the fact that two plus two equals four. 33:22.569 --> 33:25.879 And another philosopher, Descartes, in thinking about 33:25.877 --> 33:28.737 God's omnipotence, thought that it wouldn't be 33:28.739 --> 33:32.559 good enough if God as omnipotent couldn't change the facts of 33:32.555 --> 33:35.595 mathematics. And so he imagines that God, 33:35.602 --> 33:38.322 as omnipotent, could've made two plus two 33:38.320 --> 33:41.010 equals five. And so it's a kind of--;So, 33:41.010 --> 33:44.480 it is indeed a fact of our powerlessness that we're stuck 33:44.475 --> 33:45.955 with the necessities. 33:45.960 --> 33:47.340 God isn't stuck with them. 33:47.339 --> 33:50.899 And so Dostoyevsky takes that thought and runs with it and 33:50.896 --> 33:53.716 says, "Yeah. It doesn't help to say that 33:53.721 --> 33:56.861 it's inevitable. It makes it worse." 33:56.860 --> 33:58.600 Well, there's both sides. 33:58.599 --> 34:01.789 And as I say, I myself, in different moods, 34:01.787 --> 34:03.757 get pulled in both ways. 34:03.759 --> 34:07.409 What about the fact that not only is it inevitable that I'm 34:07.411 --> 34:09.871 going to die, it's inevitable that we're 34:09.867 --> 34:11.627 all going to die. 34:11.630 --> 34:18.440 Does the universality of death make things better or 34:18.440 --> 34:21.560 worse? And again, you can sort of feel 34:21.556 --> 34:22.956 the pull both ways. 34:22.960 --> 34:26.750 On the one hand you say, it's bad that I'm going to die, 34:26.752 --> 34:28.892 but I'm not a monster. 34:28.889 --> 34:31.899 It makes me feel even worse that everybody else 34:31.900 --> 34:35.140 is stuck dying--or perhaps we should say dying too soon in 34:35.137 --> 34:37.747 light of our discussion about immortality. 34:37.750 --> 34:40.620 It's a pity that most everybody, or perhaps everybody, 34:40.622 --> 34:43.002 dies too soon. That makes it even worse. 34:43.000 --> 34:45.980 On the other hand, you know, let's be honest here, 34:45.982 --> 34:49.272 we also know the expression, "Misery loves company." 34:49.269 --> 34:52.739 And there's at least some comfort to be had, 34:52.739 --> 34:55.969 isn't there, in the realization that this 34:55.967 --> 34:58.627 thing isn't just true for me. 34:58.630 --> 35:03.920 It's not like the universe has singled me out for the 35:03.922 --> 35:07.182 deprivation of dying too soon. 35:07.179 --> 35:10.839 It's something that it does to everybody. 35:10.840 --> 35:15.910 So perhaps there's some comfort in the inevitability of death. 35:15.909 --> 35:19.879 Well, here's a different aspect of death worth thinking about. 35:19.880 --> 35:23.970 What about the variability of death? 35:23.969 --> 35:27.589 After all, it's not just the case that we all die. 35:27.590 --> 35:29.550 And I'll stop saying die too soon. 35:29.550 --> 35:31.740 Let's just suppose we understand that clause to be 35:31.736 --> 35:33.026 implied in what I'm saying. 35:33.030 --> 35:36.700 It's not just the case that we all die. 35:36.699 --> 35:41.689 There's a great deal of variation in how much 35:41.690 --> 35:45.350 life we get. Some of us make it to the ripe 35:45.353 --> 35:47.803 old age of 80,90 a 100 or more. 35:47.800 --> 35:52.730 Others of us die at 20, or 15, or 10, 35:52.729 --> 35:56.939 or younger. Even if death were inevitable, 35:56.938 --> 36:01.308 it wouldn't have to come in different-sized packages. 36:01.309 --> 36:03.519 That is, it wouldn't have to have variability. 36:03.519 --> 36:08.299 We could imagine a world in which everybody dies--everybody 36:08.303 --> 36:10.863 dies at the age of a hundred. 36:10.860 --> 36:18.140 Does it make things worse or better that there's this kind of 36:18.141 --> 36:21.571 variability? From the moral point of view, 36:21.574 --> 36:24.624 I suppose, it's fairly straightforward to suggest it 36:24.624 --> 36:25.944 makes things worse. 36:25.940 --> 36:29.940 After all, most of us are inclined to think that 36:29.937 --> 36:33.167 inequality is morally objectionable. 36:33.170 --> 36:36.680 It's bad that, through no fault of their own, 36:36.680 --> 36:40.590 some people are poor and other people are rich. 36:40.590 --> 36:43.970 If inequality is morally objectionable, 36:43.974 --> 36:48.794 then it's very likely we're going to think it's morally 36:48.785 --> 36:52.965 horrendous that there's this crucial inequality: 36:52.971 --> 36:58.941 some of us die a the age of 5 while others get to live to 90. 36:58.940 --> 37:03.510 But in keeping with the focus of our discussion about the 37:03.511 --> 37:07.271 badness of death, I want to put aside the moral 37:07.267 --> 37:12.077 question and think about how good or bad for me is it 37:12.084 --> 37:15.354 that there's variability in death? 37:15.349 --> 37:19.169 Well, we might say, let's look at it from two basic 37:19.168 --> 37:22.218 perspectives, those who get less than the 37:22.223 --> 37:26.423 average lifespan and those who get more than the average 37:26.424 --> 37:28.834 lifespan. From the point of view of 37:28.825 --> 37:31.935 somebody who gets less, this is obviously a bad thing. 37:31.940 --> 37:35.410 It's bad enough that I'm going to die too soon. 37:35.409 --> 37:36.899 I said I wasn't going to keep saying that remark, 37:36.903 --> 37:37.933 and here I am saying it anyway. 37:37.929 --> 37:40.529 It's bad enough that I'm going to die. 37:40.530 --> 37:45.660 But what's even worse is I'm going to get even less than the 37:45.664 --> 37:47.844 average amount of life. 37:47.840 --> 37:49.830 That's clearly an extra-bad. 37:49.829 --> 37:53.799 But we might then wonder, for every person who gets less 37:53.797 --> 37:57.477 than the average amount of life--suppose we take the 37:57.476 --> 37:59.526 median, take the amount of life that's 37:59.530 --> 38:01.300 exactly, 50 percent of the people get more, 38:01.295 --> 38:02.845 50 percent of the people get less. 38:02.849 --> 38:06.529 For every person who has less than the median amount of life, 38:06.533 --> 38:10.033 there's another person who has more than the median 38:10.033 --> 38:12.633 amount of life. That person gets to say, hey. 38:12.630 --> 38:14.920 Well, you know, it's a pity that I'm going to 38:14.918 --> 38:17.468 die or die too soon, but at least I'm getting more 38:17.467 --> 38:18.557 than the average. 38:18.560 --> 38:23.630 That's a plus. So perhaps these two aspects 38:23.633 --> 38:25.723 balance themselves out. 38:25.719 --> 38:28.459 There are people who are basically screwed by the fact 38:28.455 --> 38:31.345 that they get less than the average amount and people who 38:31.346 --> 38:34.336 are benefited by getting more than the average amount. 38:34.340 --> 38:37.670 So perhaps in terms of the individual badness of death 38:37.665 --> 38:40.405 that's a wash. Maybe. 38:40.409 --> 38:44.269 Except it seems to me it's a further fact about human 38:44.274 --> 38:48.594 psychology that we care more about being short-changed than 38:48.585 --> 38:52.375 we do about being, as we might put it, 38:52.378 --> 38:56.918 overcompensated. I rather suspect that people 38:56.918 --> 39:00.918 who have less than the average of something, 39:00.923 --> 39:05.953 it hurts them more than it benefits the people who have 39:05.953 --> 39:09.683 more than the average of something. 39:09.679 --> 39:14.369 And if that's right--and that seems likely to be the case, 39:14.371 --> 39:19.391 especially for something like death--the extra bad of the fact 39:19.391 --> 39:24.001 that there's variability and so some people get less than 39:24.000 --> 39:29.510 average--that extra bad, I suspect, outweighs the extra 39:29.511 --> 39:34.481 benefit of some people having more than average. 39:34.480 --> 39:37.240 Well, let's consider a different feature. 39:37.240 --> 39:41.570 We've had inevitability; we had variability. 39:41.570 --> 39:46.440 What about unpredictability? 39:46.440 --> 39:48.790 Not only is it inevitable that you're going to die; 39:48.789 --> 39:53.639 not only do some people live longer than others, 39:53.635 --> 39:58.475 you don't know how much more time you've got. 39:58.480 --> 40:00.070 Now, you might think, well, didn't we already discuss 40:00.065 --> 40:01.585 that when we started thinking about variability? 40:01.590 --> 40:04.140 But in fact, logically speaking at least, 40:04.141 --> 40:06.881 variability, although it's a requirement for 40:06.884 --> 40:09.054 unpredictability, doesn't guarantee 40:09.052 --> 40:10.522 unpredictability. 40:10.519 --> 40:15.889 You could have variability with complete predictability. 40:15.889 --> 40:20.969 Imagine that when everybody's born, on their wrist everybody's 40:20.970 --> 40:26.300 born with a natural birthmark that indicates the precise year, 40:26.300 --> 40:31.590 day, and time in which they're going to die. 40:31.590 --> 40:35.780 We could imagine a world like this where it's inevitable; 40:35.780 --> 40:38.670 everybody's got some date on it. 40:38.670 --> 40:40.950 And for that matter, there could still be 40:40.951 --> 40:43.151 variability. Some people live 80 years, 40:43.153 --> 40:44.613 some people live 20 years. 40:44.610 --> 40:48.560 But there's no unpredictability. 40:48.559 --> 40:52.849 Because of the birthmark, everybody knows exactly how 40:52.846 --> 40:54.986 much longer they've got. 40:54.990 --> 40:59.160 40:59.159 --> 41:01.689 Well, so in our world we don't have that. 41:01.690 --> 41:03.990 In our world, not only do we have 41:03.986 --> 41:06.996 variability, we've got unpredictability. 41:07.000 --> 41:08.680 Does that make things better? 41:08.680 --> 41:11.560 Or does that make things worse? 41:11.559 --> 41:16.909 Would it be better to know when you were going to die? 41:16.909 --> 41:22.179 Well, one way in which unpredictability at least has 41:22.181 --> 41:27.041 the potential of making things worse is this. 41:27.039 --> 41:31.739 Because you don't know how much more time you've got--You can 41:31.742 --> 41:35.432 make a guess based on statistics, but as we saw, 41:35.425 --> 41:38.085 there's wild unpredictability. 41:38.090 --> 41:40.480 You can think, look, "the average lifespan in 41:40.481 --> 41:43.091 the United States is whatever it is, 82 years. 41:43.090 --> 41:45.720 So I probably have, you guys are in your 20s--you 41:45.717 --> 41:48.287 know 20--roughly another 60 years are going." 41:48.289 --> 41:50.709 And as you're busy calculating all this, you're walking across 41:50.714 --> 41:52.904 Chapel Street and you get hit by a truck and you die. 41:52.900 --> 41:56.370 Right? Because of unpredictability, 41:56.372 --> 41:58.332 you can't really know. 41:58.329 --> 42:04.429 And because you can't really know, it's difficult to make the 42:04.431 --> 42:06.771 right kinds of plans. 42:06.769 --> 42:12.349 And in particular, it's hard to know how to pace 42:12.353 --> 42:17.683 yourself. You decide to go off to medical 42:17.678 --> 42:20.918 school, become a doctor. 42:20.920 --> 42:23.280 And so not only do you put the time into college, 42:23.281 --> 42:25.201 you put the time into medical school, 42:25.199 --> 42:28.619 and you put the time into your residency and you put your time 42:28.620 --> 42:29.910 into your internship. 42:29.909 --> 42:33.719 And that's a very long commitment. 42:33.719 --> 42:39.509 It's a long-term plan, which can go wrong if you get 42:39.512 --> 42:43.262 sick and die in your early 20s. 42:43.260 --> 42:46.660 Well, that's a rather dramatic example, but the same sort of 42:46.658 --> 42:49.248 thing in principle can happen to all of us. 42:49.250 --> 42:53.540 You make a life plan, what you want to accomplish in 42:53.537 --> 42:56.897 your life, and well, obviously enough, 42:56.900 --> 42:59.820 some of us will die too soon, not just in terms of, 42:59.824 --> 43:02.754 "oh, well, life still could've had good things," 43:02.750 --> 43:06.480 but too soon in terms of you didn't get where you wanted to 43:06.484 --> 43:08.614 get in terms of your life plan. 43:08.610 --> 43:12.390 If only you'd known you were only going to have 20 more years 43:12.394 --> 43:15.934 instead of 50 more years, you would've picked a different 43:15.927 --> 43:17.817 kind of life for yourself. 43:17.820 --> 43:22.030 The unpredictability makes it worse. 43:22.030 --> 43:24.950 And indeed, less obviously, it can work the other way as 43:24.948 --> 43:27.308 well. You make a life plan, 43:27.307 --> 43:30.997 and then, you know, you don't die yet. 43:31.000 --> 43:35.450 You continue to stick around, and then your life has this 43:35.451 --> 43:39.901 feeling of--at least we can imagine this happening--being 43:39.903 --> 43:41.973 sort of anticlimactic. 43:41.970 --> 43:44.610 You peaked too soon. 43:44.610 --> 43:46.990 If only you'd known you had another 50 years, 43:46.986 --> 43:49.846 that you weren't going to die young--or James Dean, 43:49.849 --> 43:53.349 going to burn out fast and die young--if only you'd realized 43:53.347 --> 43:56.367 you were going to live to the ripe old age of 97, 43:56.369 --> 43:59.829 you would have picked a different life for yourself. 43:59.829 --> 44:04.719 Now, in thinking about these points, in effect I'm suggesting 44:04.718 --> 44:07.568 that the value of your life--so , 44:07.570 --> 44:09.450 we previously were talking about different theories of 44:09.447 --> 44:11.357 well-being and what makes for the best kind of life. 44:11.360 --> 44:14.290 Here we have yet another kind of feature that we haven't 44:14.290 --> 44:17.590 talked about. We might think of it as, 44:17.591 --> 44:21.761 the overall shape of your life matters. 44:21.760 --> 44:28.180 What we could also call "the narrative arc of your life" 44:28.182 --> 44:31.582 matters. Let me illustrate the point 44:31.582 --> 44:34.562 with some very, very simple graphs. 44:34.559 --> 44:37.589 These are not meant to be realistic, but they'll give you 44:37.585 --> 44:40.475 the idea. So, we all know the Horatio 44:40.480 --> 44:42.100 Alger story right? 44:42.099 --> 44:47.979 Somebody starts out poor and makes his way through hard work 44:47.978 --> 44:52.958 and dedication and effort to riches and success. 44:52.960 --> 44:56.920 Rags to riches--that's a wonderful, inspiring life. 44:56.920 --> 45:00.220 Let's draw the graph of that life. 45:00.219 --> 45:03.869 So here's how well off you are, here is time, 45:03.874 --> 45:09.194 and you start with nothing and you end up incredibly well off. 45:09.190 --> 45:11.050 That's a great life. 45:11.050 --> 45:14.850 That's the Horatio Alger life--H.A. 45:14.850 --> 45:18.320 Great life. All right. 45:18.320 --> 45:21.440 Now, consider the following story. 45:21.440 --> 45:23.990 Here are the axes again. 45:23.989 --> 45:30.439 Instead of the rags to riches life, imagine the riches to rags 45:30.439 --> 45:33.329 life. Starts off with everything, 45:33.334 --> 45:35.094 ends up with nothing. 45:35.090 --> 45:38.880 That's the Algers Horatio story. 45:38.880 --> 45:42.380 It's the reverse. 45:42.380 --> 45:48.190 Now, I doubt if there's anybody here who is indifferent between 45:48.187 --> 45:53.527 the choices, indifferent with regard to the choice between 45:53.526 --> 45:58.776 these two lives. I imagine that everybody here 45:58.777 --> 46:00.987 prefers this life. 46:00.989 --> 46:04.339 But notice that in terms of the contents of the life, 46:04.344 --> 46:08.154 at least the local contents, it's a bit hard to see why that 46:08.149 --> 46:10.019 would be the case, right? 46:10.019 --> 46:13.919 We've got equal periods of suffering and doing slightly 46:13.917 --> 46:18.247 better and slightly better and slightly better--equal periods 46:18.247 --> 46:20.337 of success and suffering. 46:20.340 --> 46:23.440 For every bad period here there's a corresponding bad 46:23.436 --> 46:25.726 period here. For every good period here 46:25.726 --> 46:28.076 there's a corresponding good period here. 46:28.079 --> 46:31.219 In terms of the contents of your life, being crude but you 46:31.219 --> 46:33.479 see the point, in terms of the contents of 46:33.477 --> 46:35.017 your life--equally good. 46:35.019 --> 46:38.119 And even if we accept the valuable container theory, 46:38.122 --> 46:39.892 and so we say, "Hah, you know, 46:39.887 --> 46:42.987 being alive per se is worth something as well." 46:42.989 --> 46:45.919 Well, you're alive for equal periods of time. 46:45.920 --> 46:50.240 So the extra points get added either way. 46:50.239 --> 46:54.399 You might say, look, if we're not indifferent 46:54.404 --> 46:59.234 between these two lives, that's because we think the 46:59.231 --> 47:03.681 overall shape of your life matters as well. 47:03.680 --> 47:06.490 The narrative arc, as I put it. 47:06.489 --> 47:11.309 The story "bad to good" is the kind of story we want for 47:11.309 --> 47:16.829 ourselves, while the story "good to bad" is the kind of story we 47:16.829 --> 47:19.369 don't want for ourselves. 47:19.370 --> 47:21.250 Interesting question. 47:21.250 --> 47:25.710 Why is that? And this of course should 47:25.706 --> 47:28.666 remind us of the puzzle about Lucretius. 47:28.670 --> 47:32.990 Why do we care more about future non-existence than past 47:32.992 --> 47:36.242 non-existence? When the bad is behind us, 47:36.240 --> 47:41.140 that seems less bothersome than when the bad is in front of us. 47:41.139 --> 47:45.049 You may remember the story from Derek Parfit about having the 47:45.047 --> 47:46.347 painful operation. 47:46.349 --> 47:49.279 Was it going to be in the future or did it take place 47:49.278 --> 47:51.208 earlier today? You don't remember. 47:51.210 --> 47:52.340 We're not indifferent. 47:52.340 --> 47:57.560 We want the bad behind us, not the bad in front of us. 47:57.559 --> 48:03.759 So, whatever the explanation is, we care about the overall 48:03.755 --> 48:07.555 shape and trajectory of our life. 48:07.559 --> 48:11.669 Now, that being the case, we have to worry then that 48:11.669 --> 48:16.669 because of the unpredictability of death that our lives may not 48:16.665 --> 48:18.675 have the ideal shape. 48:18.680 --> 48:22.050 48:22.050 --> 48:26.950 A lot of us might feel that a life like this, 48:26.950 --> 48:32.630 where we peak but then we stick around--you know, 48:32.630 --> 48:37.310 isn't--can at least fail to be as desirable in which we end 48:37.310 --> 48:39.690 with a bang. If you start thinking about 48:39.689 --> 48:41.539 narrative arcs--imagine a novel, right? 48:41.539 --> 48:45.999 It's one thing to have--it's not to say that the best--if you 48:45.997 --> 48:50.007 want your life to be like the plot of a great story, 48:50.010 --> 48:53.910 it's not as though you think, "All right, the dénouement 48:53.911 --> 48:56.421 must occur at the very last page." 48:56.420 --> 49:01.720 It's okay to stick around for a while, but if the high point of 49:01.720 --> 49:06.680 the story occurs in chapter 2 and then there are another 67 49:06.678 --> 49:10.618 chapters after that, you think, this was not a 49:10.617 --> 49:12.427 well-constructed novel. 49:12.429 --> 49:17.659 And insofar as we care about the overall shape of our lives, 49:17.659 --> 49:23.509 we might worry about wanting it to have the right shape overall. 49:23.510 --> 49:27.130 Where and when do you want to peak, as it were, 49:27.127 --> 49:29.877 in terms of your accomplishments? 49:29.880 --> 49:33.570 Well, that matters to us, but the trouble is, 49:33.566 --> 49:38.006 without predictability you don't know where to put the 49:38.006 --> 49:41.006 peak. Because if you try to aim for 49:41.014 --> 49:44.594 peaking later, you might not make it to that. 49:44.590 --> 49:48.650 If you put it too soon, you might stick around for 49:48.645 --> 49:52.535 longer than that, and then the peak has come too 49:52.535 --> 49:56.135 soon. All of this suggests then that 49:56.142 --> 50:01.392 the unpredictability of our death adds an extra negative 50:01.390 --> 50:05.310 element. It makes it harder to plan what 50:05.309 --> 50:08.919 the best way to live my life would be. 50:08.920 --> 50:13.480 And from that perspective it looks as though it would be 50:13.481 --> 50:17.381 better to know how much time you've got left. 50:17.380 --> 50:20.790 But then we have to ask--so I'll throw the question out and 50:20.787 --> 50:24.487 we'll call it a day, start with this next time--then 50:24.491 --> 50:27.841 we have to ask, would it really be better to 50:27.837 --> 50:30.777 know? Would you want the birthmark? 50:30.780 --> 50:35.880 Would you want to know exactly how much time you've got left? 50:35.880 --> 50:39.000 All Right. See you next time.