WEBVTT 00:01.160 --> 00:04.590 Professor Shelly Kagan: We've been talking about the 00:04.586 --> 00:08.006 question as to whether or not it would be desirable to live 00:08.013 --> 00:11.503 forever, whether immortality would actually be a good thing, 00:11.498 --> 00:14.278 as most of normally presume, or whether in fact, 00:14.275 --> 00:17.815 as Bernard Williams argues, it would be undesirable. 00:17.820 --> 00:21.470 The question we turned to was, just let your imagination run 00:21.467 --> 00:23.777 free. Instead of asking what would it 00:23.779 --> 00:27.299 be like to continue living a longer kind of trajectory that 00:27.296 --> 00:30.806 humans have in the real world where you just get sicker and 00:30.812 --> 00:33.422 more and more frail and incapacitated, 00:33.420 --> 00:36.020 ask yourself not whether immortality of that sort 00:36.016 --> 00:38.266 would be valuable, but is it even so much as 00:38.266 --> 00:41.456 possible to describe a life that you would want to live 00:41.455 --> 00:44.385 forever? That's the question I left you 00:44.390 --> 00:47.930 with last time. I think I already tipped my 00:47.931 --> 00:49.791 cards on this matter. 00:49.790 --> 00:51.950 I'm inclined to agree with Williams. 00:51.950 --> 00:56.590 I think that no matter how we try to fill in the blank, 00:56.591 --> 00:58.741 it's a very long blank. 00:58.740 --> 01:01.990 The crucial point here for us is that immortality means not 01:01.985 --> 01:05.285 just living a very long time or even an extraordinarily long 01:05.286 --> 01:07.806 time, but literally living forever. 01:07.810 --> 01:11.360 I think it's very difficult, indeed I think it's impossible, 01:11.361 --> 01:14.251 to think of anything you'd want to do forever. 01:14.250 --> 01:17.250 I have a friend who once claimed to me that he wanted to 01:17.253 --> 01:20.583 live forever so that he could have Thai food every day for the 01:20.584 --> 01:23.654 rest of, well, the rest of eternity. 01:23.650 --> 01:27.450 I like Thai food just fine, but the prospect of having Thai 01:27.453 --> 01:31.063 food day after day after day after day for thousands, 01:31.060 --> 01:34.550 millions, billions, trillions of years no longer 01:34.554 --> 01:36.864 seems an attractive proposal. 01:36.860 --> 01:39.570 It seems like it becomes some kind of a nightmare. 01:39.569 --> 01:42.329 And the same way that I indicated previously that 01:42.329 --> 01:45.429 although I like chocolate--I love chocolate--the 01:45.433 --> 01:48.883 prospect of having to eat more and more and more and more and 01:48.882 --> 01:52.212 more chocolate, eventually the idea becomes a 01:52.205 --> 01:54.365 sickening one. Think of any activity. 01:54.370 --> 01:57.150 Some of you may enjoy doing crossword puzzles, 01:57.146 --> 02:00.726 and perhaps doing crossword puzzles a couple hours a day is 02:00.726 --> 02:03.546 enjoyable. But imagine doing crossword 02:03.547 --> 02:06.667 puzzles every day for 10 years, 1,000 years, 02:06.665 --> 02:08.985 a million years, a billion years, 02:08.985 --> 02:10.575 a trillion years. 02:10.580 --> 02:13.840 Eventually, presumably, so it seems to me, 02:13.840 --> 02:17.820 you'd end up saying, "I'm really tired of crossword 02:17.816 --> 02:21.046 puzzles." Sure, there'd be some new 02:21.054 --> 02:26.174 particular puzzle you hadn't seen before, but you'd sort of 02:26.169 --> 02:30.309 step up a level and say, "Although I haven't seen this 02:30.313 --> 02:33.293 particular one before, I've seen crossword puzzles 02:33.292 --> 02:35.832 before. There's really nothing new 02:35.833 --> 02:37.323 under the sun here. 02:37.319 --> 02:40.729 The fact that I haven't seen this particular combination of 02:40.732 --> 02:43.382 words isn't enough to make it interesting." 02:43.379 --> 02:46.399 Well, crossword puzzles aren't a very deep subject, 02:46.397 --> 02:49.897 and we might wonder whether or not we would do better if we 02:49.897 --> 02:53.877 were engaged in something more mentally challenging than that. 02:53.879 --> 02:57.189 This may indicate something unusual about me, 02:57.189 --> 02:59.069 but I rather like math. 02:59.069 --> 03:02.729 And the prospect of having a lot of time to pursue math 03:02.729 --> 03:06.999 problems of a richer and deeper sort seems fairly attractive. 03:07.000 --> 03:09.760 Yet even there, when I imagine an eternity of 03:09.757 --> 03:12.387 thinking about math--or for that matter, 03:12.389 --> 03:16.469 an eternity of thinking about philosophy, which I obviously 03:16.468 --> 03:20.618 like even more than math--the prospect seems an unattractive 03:20.617 --> 03:23.247 one. I can't think of any activity 03:23.253 --> 03:25.473 I'd want to do forever. 03:25.470 --> 03:28.510 Now, of course, that's a bit of a cheat because 03:28.512 --> 03:32.222 the claim isn't to spend eternity doing math problems and 03:32.215 --> 03:34.195 nothing but math problems. 03:34.199 --> 03:38.149 Right now, with our 50,80, 100 years, we don't fill our 03:38.150 --> 03:40.930 day doing only one kind of activity. 03:40.930 --> 03:45.650 We fill our day with a mixture of activities. 03:45.650 --> 03:49.970 But it doesn't really help having Thai food for dinner and 03:49.973 --> 03:51.493 Chinese for lunch. 03:51.490 --> 03:54.450 Or perhaps Chinese on Monday, Wednesdays, and Fridays and 03:54.451 --> 03:57.521 Thai on Saturdays and Sundays and spending two hours in the 03:57.519 --> 04:00.479 afternoon doing math and three hours in the morning doing 04:00.480 --> 04:02.830 philosophy. That sounds like a pretty 04:02.830 --> 04:05.850 pleasant life. But again, if you think of the 04:05.850 --> 04:10.010 possibility of doing that for all eternity and never 04:10.009 --> 04:13.969 getting away from it, never being free from it, 04:13.974 --> 04:17.754 the positive dream of immortality, I think, 04:17.745 --> 04:19.805 becomes a nightmare. 04:19.810 --> 04:23.590 Well again, maybe I'm not just being creative enough in my 04:23.591 --> 04:26.941 imagination. Different former colleague of 04:26.935 --> 04:31.425 mine once talked about the prospect of having a kind of 04:31.431 --> 04:34.181 heavenly vision of the divine. 04:34.180 --> 04:36.650 Maybe that would be desirable forever. 04:36.649 --> 04:39.789 And she described it as, think of what it's like to have 04:39.787 --> 04:43.207 a really great conversation with a friend that you wish would 04:43.211 --> 04:45.981 never end, except God's this infinitely 04:45.981 --> 04:49.501 rich friend and so the conversation ends up seeming 04:49.501 --> 04:50.981 desirable forever. 04:50.980 --> 04:55.230 Well again, I can say the words, but when I try to imagine 04:55.225 --> 04:58.275 that possibility and take it seriously, 04:58.279 --> 05:02.349 at least speaking personally, it doesn't--it doesn't hold up. 05:02.350 --> 05:07.260 No friend that I've ever talked with is one that I actually 05:07.261 --> 05:11.411 would want to spend eternity talking to. 05:11.410 --> 05:14.630 And it's of course possible to say, well, just imagine a friend 05:14.632 --> 05:17.442 that you would want to talk through all eternity to. 05:17.439 --> 05:20.599 But the whole point is, I can't imagine what that would 05:20.604 --> 05:23.264 be like. When I do my best to imagine 05:23.257 --> 05:27.607 some kind of existence that would be desirable or attractive 05:27.613 --> 05:30.053 forever, it just doesn't work. 05:30.050 --> 05:32.280 It becomes a nightmare. 05:32.279 --> 05:35.329 Well again, maybe what we need to do is not so much just 05:35.332 --> 05:38.612 imagine the same cycling going through week after week after 05:38.606 --> 05:40.156 week, but whole careers. 05:40.160 --> 05:44.960 Maybe you could spend 50 or 100 years pursuing philosophy as 05:44.960 --> 05:47.620 your career. And then 50 or 100 years 05:47.620 --> 05:49.520 pursuing math as your career. 05:49.519 --> 05:52.329 And 50 or 100 years traveling around the world. 05:52.329 --> 05:57.509 And 50 or 100 years being an artist and working on your water 05:57.511 --> 05:59.931 colors, or whatever it is. 05:59.930 --> 06:03.070 Well, that certainly seems like we could probably get more time 06:03.070 --> 06:05.740 out of that. But again, the crucial point to 06:05.739 --> 06:08.709 remember is that forever is literally forever. 06:08.709 --> 06:13.399 There's no life that I'm able to imagine for myself 06:13.403 --> 06:17.523 that's one that I would want to take on forever. 06:17.520 --> 06:20.940 06:20.939 --> 06:24.709 Well, you might say surely there could be creatures that 06:24.713 --> 06:28.353 would want to live forever, that would enjoy an 06:28.350 --> 06:29.860 eternal existence. 06:29.860 --> 06:32.200 And I think that's probably right. 06:32.199 --> 06:34.639 So scientists have learned how to do the following. 06:34.639 --> 06:37.949 There are certain--you can take a rat and put an electrode in 06:37.948 --> 06:39.928 his brain. If you put the electrode in 06:39.929 --> 06:42.319 just the right place, then when the electrode gets 06:42.324 --> 06:44.444 turned on, it stimulates the pleasure 06:44.443 --> 06:48.213 center in the rat's brain and it gets a little burst of pleasure, 06:48.209 --> 06:51.109 a pretty intense burst of pleasure. 06:51.110 --> 06:53.440 And in fact, you can take the wire, 06:53.443 --> 06:56.393 the electrode, and hook it up to a lever and 06:56.394 --> 07:00.444 teach the rat how to push the lever and give itself a little 07:00.442 --> 07:02.092 burst of pleasure. 07:02.089 --> 07:04.799 Now, what happens to rats when you do this? 07:04.800 --> 07:07.600 Well, maybe unsurprisingly, what they do is, 07:07.595 --> 07:09.605 they keep pressing the lever. 07:09.610 --> 07:12.740 Indeed, they press the lever and they'll stop eating, 07:12.741 --> 07:15.031 they're no longer interested in sex. 07:15.029 --> 07:18.909 They basically just give themselves this little orgasmic 07:18.914 --> 07:21.884 burst of pleasure--well, until they die. 07:21.879 --> 07:25.279 Now well, of course, it's too bad the rat dies, 07:25.279 --> 07:29.789 but if we imagine the rat not being mortal--perhaps you've got 07:29.787 --> 07:34.217 it on IV so it's getting its nutrients that way--then perhaps 07:34.221 --> 07:38.141 it's easy to imagine the rat simply pressing the lever 07:38.137 --> 07:41.927 forever, getting this intense burst of 07:41.926 --> 07:46.956 pleasure and being content to do that for all eternity. 07:46.959 --> 07:49.869 So if it's so easy to imagine that for the rat, 07:49.873 --> 07:52.503 why not for us? Why not just put our own 07:52.502 --> 07:55.542 orgasmitron hat on with a little--not rat lever, 07:55.542 --> 07:59.362 but now human lever--with the electrodes stimulating our own 07:59.358 --> 08:03.108 brains so that we get this intense burst of pleasure? 08:03.110 --> 08:07.770 And just imagine this intense burst of pleasure going on 08:07.772 --> 08:12.372 forever. What could be more desirable 08:12.374 --> 08:15.394 than that? Except, when I think about 08:15.394 --> 08:18.904 that, and I invite you to think about that, I don't actually 08:18.898 --> 08:21.688 find that an especially attractive prospect. 08:21.689 --> 08:26.269 Mind you, it's not that I think we couldn't be stimulated to get 08:26.269 --> 08:27.649 pleasure forever. 08:27.649 --> 08:32.889 It's that there's something that distinguishes humans from 08:32.886 --> 08:36.016 rats. When I--No doubt I would enjoy 08:36.018 --> 08:38.708 it. And no doubt you would enjoy it 08:38.713 --> 08:40.393 for a very long time. 08:40.389 --> 08:44.619 But I imagine that after a period, there'd be this--Well, 08:44.621 --> 08:49.231 humans have this ability to look down on their experiences, 08:49.230 --> 08:53.840 or step back from their experiences, and assess them. 08:53.840 --> 08:56.060 Even now, as I'm sitting here lecturing to you, 08:56.062 --> 08:59.012 part of me, because of this very question that I'm raising, 08:59.009 --> 09:00.869 is thinking about how's the lecture going, 09:00.867 --> 09:03.537 and am I going to get through what I need to get through, 09:03.540 --> 09:04.550 and so forth and so on. 09:04.549 --> 09:09.209 We can reflect on our first order or base level experiences. 09:09.210 --> 09:15.260 Now, imagine then that you're in the pleasure-making machine. 09:15.259 --> 09:18.079 After a while, part of you is going to start 09:18.080 --> 09:20.770 asking, "Huh, say, it feels the same as it 09:20.769 --> 09:23.729 was yesterday, and the day before that and the 09:23.726 --> 09:26.016 day before that. I imagine this is how it's 09:26.018 --> 09:28.708 going to feel tomorrow, and the day after that and the 09:28.706 --> 09:31.746 day after that." And eventually this question 09:31.750 --> 09:35.390 would start, "Is this really all there is to life, 09:35.389 --> 09:37.989 just simple pleasure like this?" 09:37.990 --> 09:41.700 The thing about being human is, unlike the rat, 09:41.697 --> 09:46.207 you're not just going to stay caught up in the moment. 09:46.210 --> 09:49.950 You're going to take this meta-level or higher level 09:49.948 --> 09:53.468 standpoint, look down at the pleasure and wonder, 09:53.467 --> 09:56.397 "Is this all that there is to life?" 09:56.399 --> 10:01.179 And I think eventually that question would gnaw at you and 10:01.175 --> 10:03.935 sour and override the pleasure. 10:03.940 --> 10:08.120 Eventually, you'd become horrified that you were, 10:08.117 --> 10:12.117 in effect, stuck in this rat-like existence. 10:12.120 --> 10:14.440 Of course, the human part of you is able to say there's 10:14.440 --> 10:16.590 more to you than this rat-like existence. 10:16.590 --> 10:21.190 But precisely, the human part of you is going 10:21.187 --> 10:27.767 to rebel at the unending parade of simple rat-like pleasures. 10:27.769 --> 10:30.499 So, I don't think an eternity like that would be such a good 10:30.499 --> 10:32.519 thing. Maybe it would be for a rat, 10:32.521 --> 10:33.761 but not for a human. 10:33.759 --> 10:38.729 Of course, we could perhaps deal with that problem by making 10:38.730 --> 10:43.280 us more rat-like in terms of our thinking processes. 10:43.279 --> 10:46.989 Perhaps the right kind of lobotomy would do the trick. 10:46.990 --> 10:50.510 I don't actually know exactly what it would take, 10:50.513 --> 10:54.773 but you just cut off and snip the relevant nerve endings so 10:54.771 --> 10:58.811 that we're no longer able to engage in that higher order 10:58.808 --> 11:01.848 thinking. No longer able to raise the 11:01.848 --> 11:04.288 question, "Is this all there is?" 11:04.289 --> 11:10.979 No longer able to step back from the first order pleasure. 11:10.980 --> 11:16.160 No doubt, you can turn us into creatures like rats in that way. 11:16.159 --> 11:20.639 And then, I presume, we would continue to enjoy it 11:20.644 --> 11:23.584 forever. But the question isn't really, 11:23.577 --> 11:27.807 is there something you could do to a human being so that he'd be 11:27.812 --> 11:31.042 happy, or at least enjoying himself, forever? 11:31.039 --> 11:34.869 It's rather, do you, sitting here now, 11:34.865 --> 11:40.345 thinking about that kind of life, do you want that for 11:40.345 --> 11:43.715 yourself? Do you want to be lobotomized 11:43.717 --> 11:47.697 where that's the only way, at least that we've got so far, 11:47.703 --> 11:51.203 to imagine a life that you would enjoy forever. 11:51.200 --> 11:54.200 Sure. Screw me up enough and maybe 11:54.201 --> 11:56.541 I'd enjoy being alive forever. 11:56.539 --> 12:01.319 But that doesn't mean that I now want that for myself. 12:01.320 --> 12:05.190 That doesn't seem to me to be some gift you've given me. 12:05.190 --> 12:09.680 That seems to me to be some horrible penalty you've imposed 12:09.678 --> 12:14.088 on me, that you've reduced me from being a human being, 12:14.090 --> 12:18.700 able to engage in the full range of reflection, 12:18.704 --> 12:23.624 and simply turned me into something like a rat. 12:23.620 --> 12:28.260 So again, when the question is posed, "Is there a kind of life 12:28.255 --> 12:31.595 that I or you would want to live forever?" 12:31.600 --> 12:34.890 the question I'm asking is a question to you, 12:34.892 --> 12:37.452 here, now. Is there a kind of life that 12:37.453 --> 12:39.773 you would want to live forever? 12:39.769 --> 12:44.339 Not that, if we altered you, that that product would want to 12:44.338 --> 12:48.098 have forever. I can't see how to do it. 12:48.100 --> 12:51.170 Well look, there's one other possibility. 12:51.169 --> 12:53.339 Instead of imagining lobotomizing us, 12:53.336 --> 12:55.796 turning us into rats, suppose we just say, 12:55.803 --> 12:58.033 look, the problem is really this. 12:58.029 --> 12:59.499 The problem, of course, is boredom. 12:59.500 --> 13:01.010 The problem is tedium. 13:01.009 --> 13:04.389 The problem is that you get tired of doing math after a 13:04.390 --> 13:06.210 while, 100 years, 1,000 years, 13:06.206 --> 13:08.456 a million years, whatever it is. 13:08.460 --> 13:11.320 You say, "Yeah, here's a math problem I haven't 13:11.324 --> 13:13.134 solved before, but so what? 13:13.129 --> 13:17.339 I've just done so much math, it holds no appeal to me 13:17.340 --> 13:20.350 before." Or, you cycle through all the 13:20.346 --> 13:24.056 great art museums in the world and you say, "Yeah, 13:24.058 --> 13:26.178 I've seen these Picassos. 13:26.179 --> 13:29.199 I've seen these Rembrandts before. 13:29.200 --> 13:32.140 I've gotten what there is to get out of them. 13:32.140 --> 13:33.490 Isn't there anything new?" 13:33.490 --> 13:34.890 And the problem is no, no. 13:34.889 --> 13:37.799 We've--even if there's literally new things, 13:37.801 --> 13:41.801 they're not the new kinds of things that can still engage us 13:41.795 --> 13:43.695 afresh. Well, what's the solution to 13:43.701 --> 13:47.431 that? The solution to that might be a 13:47.432 --> 13:52.492 kind of amnesia, a kind of progressive lack of 13:52.486 --> 13:54.446 memory. So here I am, 13:54.454 --> 13:57.314 100 years, 1,000 years, around 500,000 years, 13:57.311 --> 13:58.741 whatever it may be. 13:58.740 --> 14:00.470 You're getting pretty bored with life. 14:00.470 --> 14:04.270 But if we now introduce some progressive memory, 14:04.269 --> 14:08.389 so--a progressive memory loss--so that I know longer 14:08.391 --> 14:12.111 remember what I did 100,000 years earlier. 14:12.110 --> 14:16.080 And by the time I'm a million, I no longer remember what I was 14:16.078 --> 14:18.418 doing when I was a lad of 500,000. 14:18.419 --> 14:21.979 And by the time I'm a million and a half, I no longer remember 14:21.982 --> 14:24.262 what was happening in oh, back, back. 14:24.260 --> 14:25.620 I know I was alive, perhaps. 14:25.620 --> 14:27.210 Or maybe I don't even remember that I was alive. 14:27.210 --> 14:32.260 I sort of remember the last 10-20,000 years and that's it. 14:32.259 --> 14:36.749 And while we're at it, why don't we have overhauling 14:36.749 --> 14:40.709 of your interests and desires, your tastes? 14:40.710 --> 14:44.300 So your tastes in music evolve over thousands of years. 14:44.299 --> 14:46.979 And your tastes in art or literature. 14:46.980 --> 14:50.060 Or, you like math now but then you lose your taste in math, 14:50.057 --> 14:53.077 and you become the kind of person perhaps who's interested 14:53.082 --> 14:56.192 in Chinese poetry, whatever it is. 14:56.190 --> 14:57.710 Wouldn't that do it? 14:57.710 --> 15:00.670 If we had this sort of progressive all-radical 15:00.668 --> 15:03.428 alteration, not just minimal alteration, 15:03.429 --> 15:07.759 but radical alterations of my memory, my beliefs, 15:07.763 --> 15:09.933 my desires, my tastes. 15:09.929 --> 15:13.229 Couldn't that be a kind of existence that would be forever 15:13.228 --> 15:16.468 enjoyable and yet it wouldn't be a rat-like existence? 15:16.470 --> 15:21.660 I'd be engaged in studying Chinese poetry. 15:21.660 --> 15:23.230 I'd be engaged in doing math. 15:23.230 --> 15:26.210 I'd be engaged in studying astronomy, what have you. 15:26.210 --> 15:29.470 That's far better than the rat's existence. 15:29.470 --> 15:32.260 And yet, at no point do I become bored, 15:32.264 --> 15:35.804 because, roughly, I'm so different from period to 15:35.795 --> 15:37.335 period to period. 15:37.340 --> 15:40.840 Well, I think actually, you probably could tell a story 15:40.839 --> 15:43.759 where that was true, especially if we throw in 15:43.756 --> 15:45.826 enough doses of memory loss. 15:45.830 --> 15:48.680 But this case should remind you of something, 15:48.677 --> 15:52.557 because this case is one that we've actually discussed before 15:52.560 --> 15:54.890 under the label of "Methuselah." 15:54.889 --> 15:57.579 Methuselah, remember, when we talked about personal 15:57.579 --> 16:00.379 identity, we imagined somebody--much shorter-lived at 16:00.376 --> 16:03.536 that time. I think it was several hundred 16:03.540 --> 16:06.830 years, a hundred years old, 200 years old, 16:06.834 --> 16:10.454 300 years old, 600,700, 800,900 years old. 16:10.450 --> 16:14.660 By the time Methuselah was 900 years old, he no longer 16:14.662 --> 16:18.002 remembered anything about his childhood. 16:18.000 --> 16:23.380 What I found when I thought about the Methuselah case was, 16:23.377 --> 16:26.677 even though it was me at age 800, 16:26.679 --> 16:30.469 the same person as the one who's standing here in front of 16:30.465 --> 16:32.785 you now, it didn't really matter. 16:32.790 --> 16:35.040 I said, "So what?" 16:35.039 --> 16:38.789 When I thought about what I wanted in survival, 16:38.788 --> 16:43.678 it wasn't enough that there be somebody in the distant future 16:43.677 --> 16:46.007 that be me. That wasn't good enough. 16:46.009 --> 16:51.149 It had to be somebody with a similar enough 16:51.151 --> 16:53.031 personality. You tell me, 16:53.033 --> 16:54.413 "Oh there's going to be somebody alive. 16:54.409 --> 16:57.669 It'll be you, but it'll be completely unlike 16:57.674 --> 16:59.074 you. Different tastes, 16:59.072 --> 17:02.122 no memories of having taught philosophy and so forth." 17:02.120 --> 17:05.240 I say, that's all rather interesting from a metaphysical 17:05.241 --> 17:07.401 point of view, but speaking personally, 17:07.397 --> 17:08.757 I don't really care. 17:08.759 --> 17:13.449 It's of no interest to me to survive, and merely saying the 17:13.447 --> 17:17.887 mantra, "Oh, but it's me" doesn't make it more desirable 17:17.891 --> 17:20.421 to me. What I want isn't merely for 17:20.421 --> 17:21.591 somebody to be me. 17:21.589 --> 17:25.349 I want them to be sufficiently like me. 17:25.349 --> 17:27.969 And the problem with the Methuselah case was, 17:27.972 --> 17:30.652 go far enough out, it's no longer sufficiently 17:30.654 --> 17:33.654 like me. So I don't really care that 17:33.647 --> 17:37.437 there'll be somebody out there who's still me, 17:37.444 --> 17:40.064 if they're so unlike me now. 17:40.059 --> 17:43.639 But that's, after all, what we've just described, 17:43.644 --> 17:47.234 in imagining the cycling with the memory loss. 17:47.230 --> 17:50.980 Yeah, there'll be somebody around 100,000 years from now, 17:50.980 --> 17:54.330 500,000 years from now, and maybe they'll be me. 17:54.330 --> 17:58.510 I don't care. It doesn't give me what I 17:58.511 --> 18:02.331 want when I want to survive. 18:02.329 --> 18:06.629 So perhaps we should put the point in the form of a dilemma. 18:06.630 --> 18:10.840 Could immortality be something worth having forever? 18:10.839 --> 18:15.069 Well, on the one hand, if we make it be me and 18:15.069 --> 18:19.769 similar to me, boredom's going to set in. 18:19.769 --> 18:22.389 The only way to avoid that is to lobotomize me, 18:22.391 --> 18:23.931 and that's not desirable. 18:23.930 --> 18:27.880 If we make--If we solve the problem of boredom setting in 18:27.882 --> 18:32.332 with progressive memory loss and radical personality changes, 18:32.329 --> 18:36.759 maybe boredom won't set in, but it's not anything that I 18:36.762 --> 18:39.102 especially want for myself. 18:39.099 --> 18:41.219 It just doesn't matter to me that it's me, 18:41.216 --> 18:44.206 anymore than it would matter to me if they just tell me, 18:44.210 --> 18:47.780 "Oh, there'll be somebody else around there who will like 18:47.781 --> 18:51.551 Chinese poetry." So, is there a way of living 18:51.550 --> 18:54.640 forever that's attractive to me? 18:54.640 --> 18:57.640 I can't think of what it would look like. 18:57.640 --> 19:01.120 So, I agree with Bernard Williams when he says 19:01.123 --> 19:03.913 immortality wouldn't be desirable. 19:03.910 --> 19:08.120 It would actually be a nightmare, something you would 19:08.121 --> 19:10.471 long to free yourself from. 19:10.470 --> 19:14.760 Now, having said that, of course, that doesn't in any 19:14.759 --> 19:19.879 way mean that it's a good thing that we die when we do at 50 or 19:19.875 --> 19:22.795 80 or 100. From the fact that after 19:22.798 --> 19:26.628 100,000 years or a million years or whatever it is, 19:26.630 --> 19:30.680 eventually life would grow tiresome, that hardly shows that 19:30.680 --> 19:34.870 life has grown tiresome after 50 years or 80 years or 100. 19:34.869 --> 19:37.699 I don't believe we'll--I'll--come close to 19:37.704 --> 19:41.164 scratching the surface of what I would enjoy doing, 19:41.162 --> 19:42.962 by the time I've died. 19:42.960 --> 19:46.410 And I imagine the same thing is true for you. 19:46.410 --> 19:51.660 So perhaps the best form of life would be not immortality; 19:51.660 --> 19:54.450 I think that would be not particularly desirable. 19:54.450 --> 19:58.600 And not what we've got now, where you live after a mere 19:58.600 --> 20:01.060 drop of 50 or 80 or 100 years. 20:01.059 --> 20:06.169 But rather, the best thing I suppose would be to be able to 20:06.166 --> 20:08.716 live as long as you wanted. 20:08.720 --> 20:12.580 This is the sort of thing that Julian Barnes basically imagines 20:12.583 --> 20:16.263 in the chapter "The Dream" that I had you take a look at. 20:16.259 --> 20:21.019 Barnes envisions heaven as a situation which you can stick 20:21.016 --> 20:26.106 around doing what you want to do for as long as you want to do 20:26.105 --> 20:27.855 it. But Barnes says, 20:27.864 --> 20:30.144 eventually you'll have enough. 20:30.140 --> 20:33.940 And once you've had enough, you can put an end to it. 20:33.940 --> 20:36.320 Still--the fact that we can put an end to it, 20:36.322 --> 20:38.712 that's the point we've already been flagging, 20:38.705 --> 20:40.975 that immortality would not be so good. 20:40.980 --> 20:46.110 But the new thought here is what would be good would be 20:46.109 --> 20:50.479 being able to live until you were satisfied, 20:50.480 --> 20:54.550 until you'd gotten what goods there were to get out of life. 20:54.550 --> 20:58.740 20:58.740 --> 21:01.560 What all this suggests, then, and this is a point that 21:01.564 --> 21:04.434 I really made before, is that the best understanding 21:04.431 --> 21:07.501 of the deprivation account doesn't say that what's bad is 21:07.496 --> 21:09.736 the mere fact that we're going to die. 21:09.740 --> 21:12.100 If I'm right in thinking immortality would be 21:12.103 --> 21:15.383 undesirable, then the fact that we're going to die is good, 21:15.380 --> 21:17.750 because it guarantees that we won't be immortal, 21:17.748 --> 21:21.898 which would be a nightmare, an unending nightmare. 21:21.900 --> 21:26.650 Still, even though it's not a bad thing that we will die, 21:26.650 --> 21:31.910 it could still be a bad thing that we die when we do. 21:31.910 --> 21:37.680 It could still be the case that we die too soon. 21:37.680 --> 21:41.490 According to the deprivaton account, death is bad, 21:41.493 --> 21:44.683 when it's bad, because of the fact that it 21:44.683 --> 21:48.033 deprives us of the good things in life, 21:48.029 --> 21:51.799 insofar as we would have continued to get good things in 21:51.800 --> 21:53.930 life. But if life would no longer 21:53.932 --> 21:57.792 have anything good to offer you, if what you then would have had 21:57.788 --> 22:01.088 would have been something negative instead of something 22:01.093 --> 22:03.293 positive, then at that point, 22:03.286 --> 22:06.096 dying wouldn't actually be a bad thing. 22:06.100 --> 22:07.900 It would be a good thing. 22:07.900 --> 22:13.450 Death is bad insofar as it deprives you of a chunk of life 22:13.452 --> 22:16.182 that would have been good. 22:16.180 --> 22:21.270 Insofar as it deprives you of a future that would have been bad, 22:21.274 --> 22:25.484 then death's not actually bad, it's actually good. 22:25.480 --> 22:30.330 Now, in stating this view this way, I'm obviously presupposing 22:30.327 --> 22:35.067 that we can make these kinds of, at least, overall judgments in 22:35.071 --> 22:38.951 terms of the quality of your life, how well off you are. 22:38.950 --> 22:42.210 Is life giving you good things, or is life giving you bad 22:42.206 --> 22:45.606 things? Is it worth continuing to live, 22:45.608 --> 22:49.228 or is it not worth continuing to live? 22:49.230 --> 22:52.210 So, I want to turn to that topic and spend oh, 22:52.211 --> 22:55.261 probably the better part of a lecture or so. 22:55.259 --> 22:59.199 The rest of today and some of next time talking about the 22:59.199 --> 23:02.649 question of, well, what is it for a life to 23:02.645 --> 23:06.515 go well? How do we assess what makes a 23:06.521 --> 23:10.391 life--a good life versus a bad life? 23:10.390 --> 23:12.440 And I don't mean morally good life. 23:12.440 --> 23:16.270 I mean, good for the person whose life it is. 23:16.269 --> 23:21.159 A life that you think, "I'm benefiting from having 23:21.162 --> 23:24.122 this life." What are the ingredients or 23:24.123 --> 23:27.763 constituents or elements of a good life versus a bad life? 23:27.759 --> 23:29.939 And of course, since it's not just black and 23:29.943 --> 23:32.943 white, good life or bad life, but various shades of gray, 23:32.940 --> 23:37.820 better lives and worse lives, what's the yardstick by virtue 23:37.824 --> 23:41.554 of which we measure better and worse lives? 23:41.550 --> 23:43.170 What goes into a good life? 23:43.170 --> 23:46.210 Now, in thinking about this question, this is--you might 23:46.213 --> 23:48.873 think of the topic as the nature of wellbeing. 23:48.869 --> 23:51.849 And like all the other topics we've talked about in this 23:51.854 --> 23:54.844 class, it's a complicated subject, about which one could 23:54.838 --> 23:56.518 spend a great deal of time. 23:56.519 --> 23:59.429 All we're going to do here is really just, once again, 23:59.431 --> 24:00.641 scratch the surface. 24:00.640 --> 24:04.240 But the very first point that needs to be made, 24:04.235 --> 24:05.715 I think, is this. 24:05.720 --> 24:09.800 If you start listing all the things worth having in life, 24:09.801 --> 24:13.881 it might seem as though you couldn't possibly come to any 24:13.882 --> 24:16.362 general organizing principles. 24:16.360 --> 24:18.080 Think about it. What's worth having? 24:18.079 --> 24:19.919 Well yeah, jobs are worth having. 24:19.920 --> 24:20.930 Money's worth having. 24:20.930 --> 24:22.010 Sex is worth having. 24:22.010 --> 24:22.940 Chocolate's worth having. 24:22.940 --> 24:23.950 Ice cream's worth having. 24:23.950 --> 24:25.860 Air conditioners are worth having. 24:25.859 --> 24:27.949 What are some of the things worth avoiding? 24:27.950 --> 24:29.680 Well, being blind is worth avoiding. 24:29.680 --> 24:32.890 Being mugged is worth avoiding. 24:32.890 --> 24:34.820 Diarrhea is worth avoiding. 24:34.820 --> 24:36.090 Pain's worth avoiding. 24:36.089 --> 24:37.679 Getting unemployed is worth avoiding. 24:37.680 --> 24:39.280 War is worth avoiding. 24:39.279 --> 24:44.519 What kind of systematicity could we possibly bring to all 24:44.523 --> 24:46.633 of this? Well, the crucial, 24:46.633 --> 24:48.983 I think, first distinction is this. 24:48.980 --> 24:53.830 We need to separate between those things that are good 24:53.832 --> 24:56.672 because of what they lead to. 24:56.670 --> 24:59.650 That is, more strictly, only because of what 24:59.646 --> 25:02.076 they lead to. And those things that are 25:02.076 --> 25:05.206 valuable for their own sake or in their own right. 25:05.210 --> 25:07.260 Take something like a job. 25:07.260 --> 25:08.360 A job's worth having. 25:08.360 --> 25:09.350 Why is a job worth having? 25:09.349 --> 25:11.159 Well, a job's worth having because, well, 25:11.162 --> 25:13.022 among other things, it gives you money. 25:13.020 --> 25:14.680 All right. Money's worth having. 25:14.680 --> 25:17.300 All right. Why is money worth having? 25:17.299 --> 25:20.229 Well, money's worth having because, among other things, 25:20.226 --> 25:21.956 you can buy ice cream with it. 25:21.960 --> 25:24.840 All right. Why is ice cream worth having? 25:24.839 --> 25:28.709 Well, ice cream's worth having because when I eat ice cream it 25:28.709 --> 25:31.119 gives me this pleasurable sensation. 25:31.120 --> 25:33.690 All right. Why is the pleasurable 25:33.686 --> 25:35.566 sensation worth having? 25:35.569 --> 25:37.339 At this point, we get a different kind of 25:37.341 --> 25:38.881 answer. At this point, 25:38.879 --> 25:42.949 we say something like, pleasure is worth having for 25:42.948 --> 25:46.298 its own sake. The other things were valuable 25:46.295 --> 25:48.745 as a means, ultimately to pleasure. 25:48.750 --> 25:52.180 But pleasure is worth having for its own sake. 25:52.180 --> 25:56.630 The things that are valuable as a means we can say are 25:56.634 --> 25:58.824 instrumentally valuable. 25:58.819 --> 26:03.629 The things that are worth having for their own sake, 26:03.632 --> 26:07.692 philosophers call intrinsically valuable. 26:07.690 --> 26:11.830 If we look back at that long, open-ended list of things that 26:11.827 --> 26:15.227 were good or bad, we'll find that most of the 26:15.233 --> 26:18.693 things on that list are instrumentally good. 26:18.690 --> 26:21.090 They're good because of what they lead to. 26:21.089 --> 26:23.429 Or, for that matter, instrumentally bad. 26:23.430 --> 26:26.470 Why is disease bad? 26:26.470 --> 26:29.180 Well, among other things, it means perhaps that you can't 26:29.177 --> 26:31.957 enjoy yourself. So it deprives you of pleasure. 26:31.960 --> 26:34.240 Or perhaps it means because you're sick, you can't hold your 26:34.244 --> 26:35.734 job down. If you can't hold your job 26:35.729 --> 26:37.929 down, you can't get the money and so forth and so on. 26:37.930 --> 26:41.570 Ultimately, most of the negative things on that list 26:41.572 --> 26:43.432 were instrumentally bad. 26:43.430 --> 26:48.440 Most of the good things on that list were instrumentally good. 26:48.440 --> 26:52.650 If we want to get anyplace on the question about the nature of 26:52.646 --> 26:56.126 the good life, what we need to focus on is not 26:56.132 --> 27:00.902 the instrumental goods and bads, but rather the intrinsic goods 27:00.897 --> 27:04.197 and bads. You've got to ask yourself, 27:04.196 --> 27:07.626 "What's worth having for its own sake? 27:07.630 --> 27:12.500 What's worth having in and of itself?" 27:12.500 --> 27:16.170 Well, one natural suggestion is that pleasure is worth having 27:16.172 --> 27:19.782 for its own sake and pain is probably worth avoiding for its 27:19.784 --> 27:21.864 own sake. So pain's probably 27:21.864 --> 27:26.264 intrinsically bad; pleasure is intrinsically good. 27:26.259 --> 27:29.929 Notice by the by that logically speaking, there is nothing that 27:29.933 --> 27:32.543 stops the very same thing from being both. 27:32.539 --> 27:35.009 And actually you can get other weird combinations. 27:35.009 --> 27:38.019 You go to the dentist and he pokes you. 27:38.020 --> 27:38.770 He says, "Does this hurt? 27:38.770 --> 27:40.790 Does that hurt?" in order to try to figure out 27:40.785 --> 27:41.885 where there's gum disease. 27:41.890 --> 27:46.990 And the pain that he causes is intrinsically bad. 27:46.990 --> 27:48.400 In and of itself it's bad. 27:48.400 --> 27:51.400 Yet, for all that, it's being useful there. 27:51.400 --> 27:56.100 It's providing a means of deciding where the gum has 27:56.098 --> 27:59.208 decayed. And that allows the dentist to 27:59.213 --> 28:02.803 improve your gums, which avoids more pain down the 28:02.795 --> 28:05.485 road. So the pain you're suffering 28:05.492 --> 28:08.962 now is actually instrumentally valuable, 28:08.962 --> 28:11.532 useful as a means, even though it's 28:11.526 --> 28:13.786 intrinsically bad. 28:13.789 --> 28:20.329 Similarly, when I work, I enjoy myself. 28:20.329 --> 28:24.749 And so the pleasure I'm getting then is intrinsically good. 28:24.750 --> 28:26.330 But it's also instrumentally good. 28:26.329 --> 28:30.199 The fact that I'm enjoying myself makes it easier for me to 28:30.204 --> 28:32.684 work harder. Perhaps I'm more productive, 28:32.682 --> 28:33.952 I do better at my job. 28:33.950 --> 28:38.230 So the pleasure is both intrinsically valuable and 28:38.229 --> 28:40.499 instrumentally valuable. 28:40.500 --> 28:43.900 So there's no claiming that things have to be one or the 28:43.900 --> 28:45.260 other, but not both. 28:45.259 --> 28:49.249 Still, in trying to get clear about the nature of wellbeing, 28:49.252 --> 28:53.312 the crucial thing to do is to focus not on the question about 28:53.313 --> 28:56.973 instrumental value, but rather to focus on the 28:56.973 --> 28:59.323 question of intrinsic value. 28:59.319 --> 29:04.289 What things are worth having for their own sake, 29:04.289 --> 29:10.209 whether or not those things also have instrumental value, 29:10.209 --> 29:12.429 or what have you? 29:12.430 --> 29:15.350 What things are worth having for their own sake and what 29:15.352 --> 29:17.852 things are worth avoiding for their own sake? 29:17.849 --> 29:21.189 Well, in giving these examples, I've already indicated at least 29:21.187 --> 29:23.177 two things that belong on the list. 29:23.180 --> 29:29.070 It seems pretty plausible to think pleasure is intrinsically 29:29.071 --> 29:32.051 good. One thing, maybe not the only 29:32.045 --> 29:36.515 thing, but at least one thing, that goes into a life worth 29:36.518 --> 29:39.498 having is enjoying it, is pleasure. 29:39.500 --> 29:42.360 And one thing that seems intrinsically bad, 29:42.359 --> 29:45.759 one thing that seems to reduce the value of a life, 29:45.763 --> 29:47.633 is pain. Most of us agree then, 29:47.634 --> 29:49.364 pleasure is intrinsically valuable; 29:49.359 --> 29:57.229 pain is intrinsically negative, unvaluable, has anti-value. 29:57.230 --> 30:01.880 Well, suppose we make for, the moment, the bold 30:01.879 --> 30:05.719 conjecture, the philosophical claim, 30:05.720 --> 30:08.820 that not only is pleasure and the absence of pain, 30:08.822 --> 30:12.682 not only is pleasure one good thing and pain one 30:12.683 --> 30:16.293 bad thing. Suppose that's the entire list. 30:16.289 --> 30:21.889 Suppose we conjecture that the only thing intrinsically 30:21.893 --> 30:28.023 valuable is pleasure and the only thing intrinsically bad is 30:28.016 --> 30:34.476 pain. That view is called hedonism. 30:34.480 --> 30:37.200 So hedonism is a view that many people are attracted to, 30:37.197 --> 30:38.677 perhaps some of you believe. 30:38.680 --> 30:43.650 It's got a very simple theory of the nature of wellbeing. 30:43.650 --> 30:48.550 Being well off is a matter of experiencing pleasure and 30:48.552 --> 30:52.912 avoiding or minimizing the experience of pain. 30:52.910 --> 30:57.620 That's hedonism. A little later we'll turn to 30:57.619 --> 31:01.079 the question of, well, if hedonism is not the 31:01.075 --> 31:05.865 right story, what else belongs on the list, or is it the right 31:05.866 --> 31:07.656 story? We'll turn to that question a 31:07.661 --> 31:08.241 little bit later. 31:08.240 --> 31:11.920 But notice that if we've got hedonism or, for that matter as 31:11.920 --> 31:14.790 we'll see, some other theories of wellbeing, 31:14.789 --> 31:18.959 if we've got hedonism, we're able to make the kinds of 31:18.958 --> 31:23.828 evaluations that I was helping myself to when I started talking 31:23.834 --> 31:28.204 a few minutes ago about well, you know, if what life would 31:28.202 --> 31:31.752 hold for you is bad overall, then you're better off dying 31:31.747 --> 31:34.067 and so forth. What's going on when we make 31:34.066 --> 31:37.846 those judgments? Well, the hedonist offers us a 31:37.846 --> 31:41.426 very simple straightforward answer. 31:41.430 --> 31:47.150 In deciding whether what life holds for you is worth having, 31:47.147 --> 31:51.847 better than nothing, you, roughly speaking, 31:51.852 --> 31:58.752 add up all the good times and subtract all the bad times and 31:58.749 --> 32:05.179 see whether the net balance is positive or negative. 32:05.180 --> 32:08.800 Add up all the pleasures, subtract all the pains. 32:08.799 --> 32:13.549 If the balance is positive, your life is worth living. 32:13.549 --> 32:17.719 And the more positive the balance, the bigger the number, 32:17.716 --> 32:20.466 the more your life is worth living. 32:20.470 --> 32:22.990 If the balance is negative though, think about what that 32:22.985 --> 32:26.475 would mean. If the balance was negative, 32:26.479 --> 32:33.209 you're saying your future holds more pain overall than pleasure. 32:33.210 --> 32:35.660 And that's a negative. 32:35.660 --> 32:38.600 You'd be better off, well, you'd be better off dead, 32:38.598 --> 32:40.568 right? Because if you were dead, 32:40.567 --> 32:42.857 you'd have neither pleasure nor pain. 32:42.859 --> 32:46.119 That's going to presumably be given--mathematically if we gave 32:46.121 --> 32:48.261 it a number, we'd slap a zero on that. 32:48.259 --> 32:50.219 No positive number, no negative number. 32:50.220 --> 32:53.070 That's a zero. Obviously, if the balance of 32:53.072 --> 32:56.702 pleasure over pain is positive, that's better than zero. 32:56.700 --> 33:00.220 But if the balance of pain over pleasure--If there's more pain 33:00.217 --> 33:02.807 than pleasure so that the balance is negative, 33:02.812 --> 33:04.372 that's worse than zero. 33:04.370 --> 33:07.320 That's a life not worth having. 33:07.320 --> 33:09.770 That's what the hedonist says. 33:09.769 --> 33:12.929 Now, there's different ways of working out the details of the 33:12.927 --> 33:15.337 hedonist view. It's not, after all, 33:15.335 --> 33:19.635 as though all pleasures count equally or all pains count 33:19.639 --> 33:22.789 equally. The pain of stubbing your toe 33:22.787 --> 33:27.357 obviously doesn't count for nearly as much as the pain of a 33:27.363 --> 33:30.263 migraine, which doesn't count nearly as 33:30.258 --> 33:32.138 the pain of being tortured. 33:32.140 --> 33:36.620 And so we might need to work out various, more complicated, 33:36.621 --> 33:39.711 formulas here, where we multiply the pain 33:39.711 --> 33:44.271 times its duration and take into account its intensity, 33:44.269 --> 33:46.989 get the sheer quantity of pain that way. 33:46.990 --> 33:50.680 And similarly, pleasures can be longer 33:50.684 --> 33:53.384 lasting, or more intense. 33:53.380 --> 33:55.710 You can imagine how some of those details might go, 33:55.711 --> 33:58.091 and then some of the questions get rather tricky. 33:58.089 --> 34:01.829 But for our purposes, we don't really need to worry 34:01.832 --> 34:03.332 about the details. 34:03.329 --> 34:06.069 The thought is, roughly, weigh up the pleasures 34:06.073 --> 34:08.223 and pains in some appropriate way. 34:08.220 --> 34:10.110 Add up the pleasures. 34:10.110 --> 34:11.630 Add up the pains. 34:11.630 --> 34:14.930 See whether the grand total of pleasures is greater than the 34:14.932 --> 34:16.222 grand totals of pain. 34:16.219 --> 34:19.839 The more positive the number, the better your life. 34:19.840 --> 34:24.940 Now, armed with an approach like this, we can do more than 34:24.936 --> 34:27.526 just evaluate entire lives. 34:27.530 --> 34:29.200 Well, one thing we can do is just that. 34:29.200 --> 34:30.580 We can evaluate entire lives. 34:30.579 --> 34:35.519 There you are at the pearly gates and you look back on your 34:35.521 --> 34:38.061 life and you could, in principle, 34:38.059 --> 34:40.709 add up all the pleasures, add up all the pains, 34:40.713 --> 34:44.063 subtract the pains from the pleasures and ask yourself, 34:44.060 --> 34:47.050 "How good a life did I have? 34:47.050 --> 34:51.050 How well off was I, having lived that life?" 34:51.050 --> 34:54.410 And perhaps then you could imagine alternative lives. 34:54.409 --> 34:59.159 If only I had chosen to become a doctor, instead of having 34:59.157 --> 35:01.487 chosen to become a lawyer. 35:01.489 --> 35:05.509 How much better off or worse off would I have been? 35:05.510 --> 35:09.750 Or if I decided to become an artist or a scholar or a beach 35:09.751 --> 35:12.971 bum or a farmer, how much better off or worse 35:12.968 --> 35:14.868 off would I have been? 35:14.869 --> 35:19.899 How much greater or smaller would the number go? 35:19.900 --> 35:22.560 Despite my talking about numbers, of course, 35:22.561 --> 35:25.661 there's no particular assumption that we can really 35:25.657 --> 35:27.697 give precise numbers to this. 35:27.699 --> 35:31.949 And we certainly don't think that in fact most of us are in 35:31.953 --> 35:36.723 the position to actually crank out any kind of accurate number. 35:36.719 --> 35:41.499 Most of us don't know enough to know with a high degree of 35:41.496 --> 35:46.516 accuracy how things would have gone had I decided to become a 35:46.523 --> 35:49.543 farmer instead of a philosopher. 35:49.539 --> 35:52.949 Still, the hedonist isn't saying from a practical point of 35:52.947 --> 35:54.977 view we can necessarily do this. 35:54.980 --> 35:57.240 But in theory, in principle, 35:57.238 --> 36:02.088 this is what we're wondering about when we face choices. 36:02.090 --> 36:05.680 We can ask ourselves, "What would our life look like? 36:05.680 --> 36:06.760 Would it be better or worse?" 36:06.760 --> 36:11.410 And the yardstick that we're at least doing our best to apply is 36:11.410 --> 36:15.840 one of measuring up the pleasure and subtracting the pain. 36:15.840 --> 36:18.270 And of course, the hedonist will also hasten 36:18.269 --> 36:21.599 to point out that just because we can't do this perfectly or 36:21.602 --> 36:24.162 infallibly, that doesn't mean we can't make 36:24.160 --> 36:25.540 educated guesses, right? 36:25.539 --> 36:31.129 You're trying to decide should you go to Yale for college or 36:31.126 --> 36:36.996 should you go to Ohio State or Harvard or wherever else you got 36:36.997 --> 36:39.307 into, and you ask yourself, 36:39.308 --> 36:42.638 well, you try to project your future and you ask, 36:42.641 --> 36:45.351 "Where do I think I'd be better off? 36:45.349 --> 36:48.489 Which of these branches that are available to me, 36:48.487 --> 36:53.207 the branches of my life story, which is the one in which the 36:53.214 --> 36:58.394 future from here on out holds more pleasure and holds less 36:58.392 --> 37:00.462 pain?" That's how the hedonist says we 37:00.461 --> 37:01.391 should think about it. 37:01.389 --> 37:04.739 And notice by the by, that when we make choices about 37:04.743 --> 37:07.713 our future, from the hedonist point of view, 37:07.710 --> 37:11.480 at least, there's no particular need to dwell a whole lot on the 37:11.477 --> 37:13.627 past, because what's done is done. 37:13.630 --> 37:17.560 You're not going to alter how much pleasur you enjoyed 37:17.558 --> 37:22.078 previously, how much suffering you've undergone previously. 37:22.080 --> 37:24.100 What's open is the future. 37:24.099 --> 37:27.989 And so we're able to evaluate not just lives as a whole, 37:27.993 --> 37:30.403 looking back at the pearly gate. 37:30.400 --> 37:35.850 We're able to evaluate lives from here on out. 37:35.849 --> 37:40.749 Which of the various futures that are open to me are likely 37:40.746 --> 37:44.706 to give me the better life, leave me better off, 37:44.714 --> 37:48.264 measured in terms of pleasure or pain? 37:48.260 --> 37:51.650 And we do our best, however good or bad that may 37:51.649 --> 37:54.709 be. We do our best to make such 37:54.710 --> 37:57.210 comparative evaluations. 37:57.210 --> 37:59.950 And of course, we can do more than just 37:59.945 --> 38:02.675 evaluate the entire rest of my life. 38:02.679 --> 38:06.389 We can evaluate the next year or the next six months or, 38:06.386 --> 38:08.876 for that matter, just this evening. 38:08.880 --> 38:11.300 I can talk about, well, what should I do tonight? 38:11.300 --> 38:14.310 Should I stay home and work on my paper? 38:14.310 --> 38:16.230 Should I go to the party? 38:16.230 --> 38:19.640 Where will I be better off tonight? 38:19.639 --> 38:22.199 Well, I'll probably enjoy myself more at the party than I 38:22.199 --> 38:23.479 will working on the paper. 38:23.480 --> 38:26.430 And the paper's not due for a while and so forth. 38:26.429 --> 38:33.069 We make evaluations not just of entire lives, 38:33.068 --> 38:36.838 but of chunks of lives. 38:36.840 --> 38:40.250 All right. That's what we can do if we 38:40.249 --> 38:43.739 accept hedonism. But haven't yet asked, 38:43.738 --> 38:46.718 should we accept hedonism? 38:46.719 --> 38:50.949 Now, it will not come as news to me if I were to learn that 38:50.954 --> 38:53.734 several of you, maybe even many of you, 38:53.728 --> 38:56.208 in this class accept hedonism. 38:56.210 --> 38:59.140 It's a very popular view. 38:59.139 --> 39:02.349 Not just among philosophers where it's a view that's been 39:02.347 --> 39:05.837 around as long as there's been philosophy, but among people in 39:05.840 --> 39:09.120 the street. It's a very tempting view to 39:09.119 --> 39:14.219 think, what makes life worth having and the only thing worth 39:14.217 --> 39:18.877 having for its own sake, is having pleasure and avoiding 39:18.879 --> 39:20.629 pain. But for all that, 39:20.630 --> 39:25.220 despite the popularity of that view, I'm inclined to think it 39:25.219 --> 39:28.219 must be wrong. It's not that I think pleasure 39:28.216 --> 39:29.966 isn't good and pain isn't bad. 39:29.969 --> 39:34.509 Where hedonism goes wrong is when they say it's the 39:34.506 --> 39:37.496 only thing that matters. 39:37.500 --> 39:42.250 I'm inclined to think there's more to the best kind of life 39:42.245 --> 39:46.005 than just having pleasure and avoiding pain. 39:46.010 --> 39:51.990 Now, I already revealed that, when I was talking about the 39:51.991 --> 39:54.091 rat lever machine. 39:54.090 --> 39:58.610 I said, hook me up to that machine and I'll enjoy myself. 39:58.610 --> 40:01.660 But I don't want that for myself. 40:01.660 --> 40:04.670 Why? Because there's more to 40:04.673 --> 40:08.523 life than just pleasure and the absence of pain, 40:08.517 --> 40:10.477 or so it seems to me. 40:10.480 --> 40:13.420 Still, we might say, but the rat lever is not the 40:13.417 --> 40:15.557 only kind of pleasures there are. 40:15.559 --> 40:20.359 There's all these pleasures of experiencing art and seeing a 40:20.355 --> 40:21.895 beautiful sunset. 40:21.900 --> 40:24.940 And I don't know about you, but at least when I imagine the 40:24.938 --> 40:26.928 rat lever thing, it's a sort of simple, 40:26.928 --> 40:28.498 undifferentiated pleasure. 40:28.500 --> 40:33.260 So, that really won't do the trick in giving us the best 40:33.261 --> 40:38.201 quality pleasures of the kinds that humans most crave--the 40:38.195 --> 40:43.645 pleasures of friendship and discussion and sexual intimacy. 40:43.650 --> 40:47.650 These pleasures the rat lever machine wasn't giving us. 40:47.650 --> 40:49.890 So couldn't hedonism still be true? 40:49.889 --> 40:52.799 Couldn't it still be the case that as long as we take into 40:52.801 --> 40:55.611 account the importance of getting the right kinds 40:55.611 --> 40:57.691 of pleasures, then really pleasure is what 40:57.694 --> 40:59.434 it's all about and all that it's about? 40:59.429 --> 41:01.349 No, I think that's still not right. 41:01.349 --> 41:05.499 But indeed, we'll need to move to something fancier than the 41:05.502 --> 41:06.912 rat lever machine. 41:06.909 --> 41:10.589 Here, the relevant thought experiment was suggested by 41:10.590 --> 41:13.510 Robert Nozick, a philosopher who died a few 41:13.506 --> 41:16.836 years ago, taught for many years at Harvard. 41:16.840 --> 41:22.880 Nozick invited us to imagine an experience machine. 41:22.880 --> 41:26.370 So, suppose that the scientists have discovered a way not just 41:26.367 --> 41:29.567 to stimulate the particular little pleasure center of the 41:29.568 --> 41:33.408 brain, but basically to--give you 41:33.405 --> 41:39.555 basically, completely realistic virtual reality. 41:39.559 --> 41:43.819 So that when you are hooked up to the machine, 41:43.815 --> 41:49.205 it seems to you exactly the same on the inside as it would 41:49.206 --> 41:55.066 seem to you if you really were--and now fill in the blank. 41:55.070 --> 42:00.900 You could have the identical experience of climbing Mount 42:00.895 --> 42:05.785 Everest, let's say, so that you'll feel the wind 42:05.785 --> 42:08.565 bracing you. Of course, you won't really 42:08.568 --> 42:09.838 feel any wind. Strictly speaking, 42:09.840 --> 42:11.500 that's not true, because you're not up on Mount 42:11.502 --> 42:12.692 Everest. There is no wind. 42:12.690 --> 42:16.170 What's really going on is you're floating in the 42:16.174 --> 42:20.704 psychologist's tank in their lab with the electrodes hooked up 42:20.697 --> 42:24.637 your brain. But you don't know that you are 42:24.640 --> 42:26.650 floating in the tank. 42:26.650 --> 42:32.330 Hooked up to the machine, you believe you are climbing 42:32.334 --> 42:36.524 Mount Everest. You feel the thrill of having 42:36.522 --> 42:41.892 made it to the top and the wind bracingly striking your chin and 42:41.893 --> 42:46.583 you feel the satisfaction and you've got the memories of 42:46.582 --> 42:50.932 having almost died when the rope broke before. 42:50.930 --> 42:55.480 It's not like being at the IMAX. 42:55.480 --> 42:58.320 The crucial point, when you're at the IMAX is, 42:58.315 --> 43:01.715 although it's very realistic, part of you is aware that 43:01.717 --> 43:03.667 you're just in the theatre. 43:03.670 --> 43:09.440 But on the experience machine, you don't know you're just in 43:09.441 --> 43:12.701 the lab. When you're on the experience 43:12.703 --> 43:17.433 machine, you've got--your brain is being stimulated in such a 43:17.428 --> 43:21.368 way that you've got the identical experience on the 43:21.365 --> 43:25.925 inside to what it would feel like if you really were 43:25.932 --> 43:27.982 doing these things. 43:27.980 --> 43:31.200 So, imagine a life on the experience machine. 43:31.200 --> 43:34.190 Imagine plugging in the tape. 43:34.190 --> 43:36.770 Says something about how old this example is that we talk 43:36.768 --> 43:38.148 about plugging in the tapes. 43:38.150 --> 43:43.190 Imagine plugging in the DVD, or whatever it is, 43:43.194 --> 43:48.024 with all of the best possible experiences. 43:48.020 --> 43:49.530 Whatever you think those are. 43:49.530 --> 43:52.410 Here, you might imagine different people disagreeing 43:52.405 --> 43:55.445 about--oh, but throw in something--but if what you want 43:55.449 --> 43:57.929 to do is write the great American novel, 43:57.929 --> 44:01.749 then you've got the experience of staying up late at night not 44:01.747 --> 44:04.247 knowing how to make the plot work out, 44:04.250 --> 44:08.270 crushing pieces of paper and throwing them away. 44:08.269 --> 44:09.969 Crushing your computer, or whatever it is that you do 44:09.971 --> 44:11.281 as you write the great American novel. 44:11.280 --> 44:14.690 Or you want to be finding the cure for cancer. 44:14.690 --> 44:18.010 So you've got exactly the experience you would have if you 44:18.013 --> 44:21.633 were working in your lab having the brilliant breakthrough when 44:21.628 --> 44:25.008 you finally realize what the combination is that would make 44:25.009 --> 44:27.399 the right antibody, whatever it is. 44:27.400 --> 44:32.720 Or if you want to be observing all the most beautiful sunsets 44:32.719 --> 44:37.329 and the most exotic locales, you've got exactly the 44:37.331 --> 44:42.831 experience you would have if you were doing all these things. 44:42.829 --> 44:45.619 That's life on the experience machine. 44:45.619 --> 44:47.129 You're not doing any of it. 44:47.130 --> 44:48.380 You're floating in the lab. 44:48.380 --> 44:51.960 But the experiences are identical. 44:51.960 --> 44:58.690 Now, ask yourself then, would you want to spend your 44:58.693 --> 45:04.373 life hooked up to the experience machine? 45:04.369 --> 45:07.599 Ask yourself, how would you feel if you 45:07.601 --> 45:11.941 discovered now that you have been living your 45:11.938 --> 45:15.678 life hooked up to an experience machine? 45:15.679 --> 45:18.289 Now, I've got to make a footnote here. 45:18.289 --> 45:23.069 This perfectly glorious philosophical example has been 45:23.069 --> 45:28.119 ruined in recent years by the movie The Matrix. 45:28.119 --> 45:31.559 Because whenever I tell this story now, people start saying, 45:31.556 --> 45:34.816 "Oh, well the evil machines are busy using your body as a 45:34.818 --> 45:37.438 battery" or whatever it was in the movie, 45:37.440 --> 45:38.970 right? And "What if people are 45:38.967 --> 45:41.927 nefariously feasting on my liver while I'm having these little 45:41.932 --> 45:46.432 experiences?" Don't imagine any of that. 45:46.429 --> 45:50.639 It's not that the evil scientist is just deliberately 45:50.641 --> 45:55.421 deceiving you so as to conduct his nefarious experiments. 45:55.420 --> 45:56.900 Nothing like that. 45:56.900 --> 45:59.220 And similarly, while we're at it--this is not 45:59.216 --> 46:02.056 a Matrix-like worry--if you're worried about, 46:02.059 --> 46:04.629 yeah, but what's happening to world poverty while I'm doing 46:04.629 --> 46:07.629 all of this? Just imagine that everybody's 46:07.629 --> 46:11.889 hooked up to experience machines, but everybody's got 46:11.894 --> 46:14.114 the best possible tapes. 46:14.110 --> 46:17.030 Now you ask yourself, what I'm asking you to ask 46:17.033 --> 46:20.893 yourself, is would you want to spend your life hooked up to the 46:20.889 --> 46:22.319 experience machine? 46:22.320 --> 46:25.350 I'm not talking about, wouldn't it be interesting to 46:25.349 --> 46:28.319 try it out for a week or a month or even a year? 46:28.320 --> 46:32.810 And indeed, the question, strictly speaking, 46:32.805 --> 46:38.645 isn't even would life on the experience machine be better 46:38.647 --> 46:42.567 than it is now? Although it would make me very, 46:42.571 --> 46:46.141 very sad to discover this, I suppose it's possible some of 46:46.141 --> 46:49.591 you have such bad lives that moving on to the experience 46:49.585 --> 46:51.585 machine would be a step up. 46:51.590 --> 46:53.100 That's not the question. 46:53.099 --> 46:57.309 The question is, does life on the experience 46:57.306 --> 47:01.806 machine give you everything worth having 47:01.806 --> 47:04.956 in life? Everything worth having 47:04.964 --> 47:10.424 in life. Is it the best possible form of 47:10.423 --> 47:15.353 human existence? According to the hedonists, 47:15.348 --> 47:19.028 the answer's got to be, it has to be "yes." 47:19.030 --> 47:23.410 Life on the experience machine is perfect, as long as you've 47:23.406 --> 47:25.776 got the right tape plugged in. 47:25.780 --> 47:29.590 So, you've got the best possible balance of wonderful 47:29.589 --> 47:32.959 pleasures and wonderful, fantastic experiences, 47:32.960 --> 47:36.550 since that's all there is to human wellbeing. 47:36.550 --> 47:39.860 By hypothesis, the machine is giving us that. 47:39.860 --> 47:42.840 There couldn't possibly be anything more. 47:42.840 --> 47:48.480 There couldn't possibly be anything missing. 47:48.480 --> 47:52.690 But when I think about the question, would I want to spend 47:52.687 --> 47:56.007 my life hooked up to an experience machine? 47:56.010 --> 48:00.230 the answer is "no." 48:00.230 --> 48:03.810 And I imagine that for most of you, when you ask yourself, 48:03.809 --> 48:07.519 would you want your entire life to be spent hooked up to the 48:07.515 --> 48:08.955 experience machine? 48:08.960 --> 48:11.680 your answer is "no." 48:11.679 --> 48:18.529 But if the answer is "no," then that means hedonism's got to be 48:18.526 --> 48:21.986 wrong. If life on the experience 48:21.993 --> 48:27.683 machine is not everything, then there's more to the best 48:27.678 --> 48:32.638 possible life than getting the insides right. 48:32.639 --> 48:35.469 The experience machine gets the pleasures right, 48:35.466 --> 48:39.486 gets the experiences right, gets the mental states right, 48:39.487 --> 48:43.807 it gets the insides right, but if life on the experience 48:43.808 --> 48:48.048 machine isn't all that's worth wanting out of life, 48:48.050 --> 48:52.930 then there's more to the best possible life than getting the 48:52.927 --> 48:56.127 insides right. What we've got to turn to next 48:56.130 --> 48:59.390 time, then, is the question, what else might it be? 48:59.390 --> 49:01.000 Okay.