WEBVTT 00:01.190 --> 00:04.990 Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time we ended with the 00:04.985 --> 00:07.045 following puzzle or question. 00:07.050 --> 00:11.090 If we say that to be a person is to be a P-functioning 00:11.090 --> 00:15.000 body, it seems then as though we have to conclude that when 00:14.995 --> 00:19.815 you're not P-functioning, you're dead. 00:19.820 --> 00:21.160 That is, you're dead as a person. 00:21.160 --> 00:24.040 Previously, we distinguished between the death of my body and 00:24.044 --> 00:28.184 my death as a person; let's focus on my death as a 00:28.175 --> 00:29.585 person. If I'm not 00:29.587 --> 00:32.157 P-functioning, do we have to then say I'm 00:32.161 --> 00:34.541 dead? Well, that may seem to be the 00:34.537 --> 00:37.737 most natural way to define death, but it's not an 00:37.743 --> 00:39.283 acceptable approach. 00:39.280 --> 00:42.190 Because it would follow then, that when I'm asleep, 00:42.189 --> 00:45.389 I'm dead. Well, not during those times, 00:45.389 --> 00:49.359 perhaps, when I'm dreaming while I'm asleep. 00:49.360 --> 00:52.710 But think of the various periods during the night in 00:52.713 --> 00:55.873 which you are in a deep, deep dreamless sleep. 00:55.870 --> 00:56.720 You're not thinking. 00:56.720 --> 00:57.720 You're not planning. 00:57.720 --> 00:59.180 You're not communicating. 00:59.180 --> 01:02.150 Let's just suppose, as seems likely, 01:02.148 --> 01:05.458 that none of the P-functioning is 01:05.457 --> 01:09.017 occurring, at some point during sleep. 01:09.019 --> 01:11.289 Should we say then that you're dead? 01:11.290 --> 01:14.900 Well, that's clearly not the right thing to say. 01:14.900 --> 01:18.570 So we need to revise our account of what it is on the 01:18.571 --> 01:21.821 physicalist picture to say that you're dead. 01:21.820 --> 01:23.060 What is it to be dead? 01:23.060 --> 01:26.250 It can't just be a matter of not P-functioning. 01:26.250 --> 01:29.550 Well, one possibility would be to say, the question is not 01:29.545 --> 01:31.795 whether you are P-functioning. 01:31.799 --> 01:35.519 It's okay if you're not P-functioning, 01:35.522 --> 01:39.082 as long as your not P-functioning is 01:39.075 --> 01:42.125 temporary. If you will P-function 01:42.126 --> 01:45.666 again, if you have been P-functioning in the past 01:45.667 --> 01:48.497 and you will be P-functioning again in 01:48.500 --> 01:51.170 the future, P-functioning for person 01:51.174 --> 01:53.994 functioning, you will be P-functioning again in 01:53.987 --> 01:57.177 the future, then you're not dead. 01:57.180 --> 01:58.960 Well, that's at least an improvement, because then we 01:58.960 --> 02:01.260 say, look, while you're asleep, even though there's no 02:01.262 --> 02:03.452 P-functioning going on, the lack of 02:03.447 --> 02:05.417 P-functioning is temporary, 02:05.420 --> 02:07.430 so you're still alive. 02:07.430 --> 02:11.630 But I think that won't quite do either. 02:11.629 --> 02:16.019 Let's suppose that come Judgment Day, 02:16.015 --> 02:19.665 God will resurrect the dead. 02:19.669 --> 02:23.079 And let's just suppose the correct theory of personal 02:23.076 --> 02:27.196 identity is such as to put aside any worries we might have along 02:27.204 --> 02:29.824 with van Inwagen, that we discussed previously, 02:29.824 --> 02:31.974 as to whether or not on resurrection day that would 02:31.970 --> 02:33.000 really be you or not. 02:33.000 --> 02:35.010 Suppose it would be you. 02:35.010 --> 02:38.370 So God will resurrect the dead. 02:38.370 --> 02:39.800 Judgment Day comes. 02:39.800 --> 02:42.780 The dead are resurrected. 02:42.780 --> 02:45.380 Well, now they're P-functioning. 02:45.379 --> 02:49.029 So it turns out that during that period in which they were 02:49.033 --> 02:52.883 dead, they were only temporarily not P-functioning. 02:52.879 --> 02:56.119 But if death means permanent cessation of 02:56.116 --> 02:59.916 P-functioning, then it turns out the dead 02:59.919 --> 03:02.669 weren't really dead after all. 03:02.669 --> 03:06.599 They were only temporarily not P-functioning, 03:06.599 --> 03:10.989 just like we are temporarily not P-functioning when 03:10.990 --> 03:14.080 we're asleep. Well, that doesn't seem right 03:14.079 --> 03:15.819 either. On Judgment Day, 03:15.819 --> 03:18.319 God resurrects the dead. 03:18.319 --> 03:22.329 It's not that He simply wakes up those in a deep, 03:22.333 --> 03:25.943 deep sleep. So the proposal that death is a 03:25.939 --> 03:30.729 matter of permanent cessation of P-functioning versus 03:30.733 --> 03:33.443 temporary, that doesn't seem like it's 03:33.442 --> 03:34.852 going to do the trick. 03:34.849 --> 03:36.679 But what else do we have up our sleeves? 03:36.680 --> 03:41.620 Here's a different proposal that I think is probably closer 03:41.620 --> 03:43.580 to the right account. 03:43.580 --> 03:45.930 We might say, look, while you're asleep, 03:45.933 --> 03:48.893 it's true that you're not P-functioning. 03:48.889 --> 03:51.409 For example, you're not doing your 03:51.414 --> 03:53.254 multiplication tables. 03:53.250 --> 03:57.900 But although you are not engaged in P-functioning, 03:57.902 --> 04:03.222 it does seem true to say that you still can P-function. 04:03.219 --> 04:07.089 You still could do your multiplication tables. 04:07.090 --> 04:10.570 Although it's not true that you are speaking French--let's 04:10.567 --> 04:14.227 suppose that you know how to speak French--it's still true of 04:14.227 --> 04:18.067 you while you're asleep that you can or could speak French. 04:18.070 --> 04:18.890 How do we know this? 04:18.889 --> 04:23.269 Well, all we have to do is just wake you up. 04:23.269 --> 04:27.369 We wake you up and we say, "Hey John, what's three times 04:27.369 --> 04:29.979 three?" And after you stop swearing at 04:29.980 --> 04:32.050 us, you say, "Well, it's nine." 04:32.050 --> 04:35.630 Or we say, "Linda, hey, conjugate such and such a 04:35.628 --> 04:38.238 verb in French." And you can conjugate it. 04:38.240 --> 04:43.250 Even though you were not engaged in P-functioning 04:43.245 --> 04:48.285 while you were asleep, it's still true that while you 04:48.286 --> 04:52.476 were asleep, you had the ability to engage in 04:52.475 --> 04:54.755 P-functioning. 04:54.759 --> 05:00.069 Abilities aren't always actualized. 05:00.069 --> 05:02.529 Your P-functioning is actualized now, 05:02.530 --> 05:04.590 because you're engaged in thought, 05:04.589 --> 05:09.679 but you don't lose the ability to think during those moments 05:09.680 --> 05:12.010 when you're not thinking. 05:12.009 --> 05:18.259 Suppose we say then that to be alive as a person is to be able 05:18.260 --> 05:21.950 to engage in P-functioning. 05:21.949 --> 05:25.989 And to be dead then, is to be unable to engage in 05:25.992 --> 05:27.932 P-functioning. 05:27.930 --> 05:30.110 Why are you unable? 05:30.110 --> 05:35.290 Well, presumably because whatever cognitive structures it 05:35.288 --> 05:39.638 takes in your brain to underwrite the ability to 05:39.635 --> 05:44.745 P-function, those cognitive structures have 05:44.751 --> 05:48.431 been broken, so they no longer work. 05:48.430 --> 05:53.240 It's--When you're dead, your brain is broken. 05:53.240 --> 05:56.860 It's not just that you're not engaged in P-functioning, 05:56.856 --> 06:00.706 you're no longer able to engage in P-functioning. 06:00.709 --> 06:04.579 That, at least, seems to handle the case of 06:04.575 --> 06:07.855 sleep properly. Although you're not engaged in 06:07.860 --> 06:09.930 P-functioning, you're able to, 06:09.925 --> 06:11.355 so you're still alive. 06:11.360 --> 06:15.550 Take the dead who will be resurrected on Judgment Day. 06:15.550 --> 06:19.420 Although they will be engaged in P-functioning later 06:19.419 --> 06:23.219 on, it's not true right now that they can engage in 06:23.222 --> 06:24.892 P-functioning. 06:24.889 --> 06:30.219 Their bodies and brains are broken until God fixes them. 06:30.220 --> 06:34.680 So they're dead. All right, that seems to give 06:34.683 --> 06:36.833 the right answer and, in fact, it gives us some 06:36.829 --> 06:39.489 guidance how to think about some other puzzling cases. 06:39.490 --> 06:43.980 Take somebody who is in a coma, not engaged in 06:43.976 --> 06:46.266 P-functioning. 06:46.269 --> 06:49.779 Their body, let's stipulate, is still alive. 06:49.779 --> 06:53.069 Their heart's still beating, the lungs are still breathing 06:53.065 --> 06:55.215 and so forth. But we wonder, 06:55.217 --> 06:57.697 is the person still alive? 06:57.700 --> 06:58.990 Does the person still exist? 06:58.990 --> 07:02.420 07:02.420 --> 07:08.210 Well, they're not engaged in P-functioning. 07:08.210 --> 07:09.560 That's pretty clear. 07:09.560 --> 07:12.200 We want to know, can they engage in 07:12.199 --> 07:13.679 P-functioning? 07:13.680 --> 07:19.130 Now, at this point we'd want to know more about the underlying 07:19.133 --> 07:24.233 mechanics about what's gone on in the case of the coma. 07:24.230 --> 07:27.840 If the following is the right description, then we perhaps 07:27.839 --> 07:29.929 should say they're still alive. 07:29.930 --> 07:35.360 Look, when somebody's asleep, we need to do something to, 07:35.364 --> 07:39.734 in effect, wake them up, something to turn the 07:39.731 --> 07:42.061 functioning back on. 07:42.060 --> 07:46.690 The cognitive structures are still there, but the on-off 07:46.685 --> 07:49.035 switch is switched to off. 07:49.040 --> 07:53.240 Perhaps that's what it's like when somebody's in a coma, 07:53.236 --> 07:56.666 or perhaps at least certain types of comas. 07:56.670 --> 08:01.180 Of course, to turn the on-off switch on is harder when 08:01.181 --> 08:03.141 somebody's in a coma. 08:03.139 --> 08:07.559 It's a bit more--to continue with the metaphor of the on-of 08:07.560 --> 08:11.680 switch--as though not only is the switch turned to off, 08:11.675 --> 08:14.185 there's a lock on the switch. 08:14.189 --> 08:18.389 And so we can't turn the switch on in the normal way. 08:18.389 --> 08:22.209 Pushing the person in the coma and saying, "Wake up, 08:22.211 --> 08:24.461 Jimmy" doesn't do the trick. 08:24.459 --> 08:28.479 But for all that, although the on-off switch may 08:28.483 --> 08:32.163 be stuck in off, if the underlying cognitive 08:32.164 --> 08:37.904 structures of the brain are such as to still make it true that, 08:37.899 --> 08:42.379 flip the on switch back to on and the person can still engage 08:42.375 --> 08:45.055 in cognitive P-functioning, 08:45.059 --> 08:49.269 maybe the right thing to say is the person's still alive. 08:49.270 --> 08:52.110 Coma case two. I'm not sure whether this 08:52.112 --> 08:53.002 really should be called a coma. 08:53.000 --> 08:55.510 I don't know the biological and medical details. 08:55.509 --> 09:00.039 But imagine that what's gone on is there's been decay of the 09:00.038 --> 09:04.718 brain structures that underwrite the cognitive functioning. 09:04.720 --> 09:09.690 So now it's not just that the on-off switch is stuck in off, 09:09.694 --> 09:14.424 the brain's no longer capable of engaging in these higher 09:14.415 --> 09:16.855 order P-functions. 09:16.860 --> 09:21.500 This might be a persistent vegetative state with no 09:21.495 --> 09:26.125 possibility of turning it on, even in principle. 09:26.129 --> 09:30.229 Of such a person we might say, they're no longer capable of 09:30.232 --> 09:31.862 P-functioning. 09:31.860 --> 09:35.380 And then perhaps the right thing to say is the person no 09:35.382 --> 09:38.072 longer exists, so they no longer exist as a 09:38.072 --> 09:40.892 person, even if the body is still alive. 09:40.890 --> 09:45.920 So far, so good. Here's a harder case to think 09:45.916 --> 09:50.116 about. Suppose we put somebody in a 09:50.120 --> 09:57.210 state of suspended animation, cool their body down so that 09:57.205 --> 10:03.415 the various metabolic processes come to an end. 10:03.420 --> 10:07.350 They stop. As I'm sure you know, 10:07.352 --> 10:10.842 we're able, with various lower organisms, to put them in a 10:10.835 --> 10:13.335 state of suspended animation and then, 10:13.340 --> 10:17.470 the amazing thing is, if you heat them back up again 10:17.469 --> 10:20.789 properly, they start functioning again. 10:20.789 --> 10:25.609 Now, we can't do that yet with humans. 10:25.610 --> 10:31.590 But it doesn't jump out at us, at least, that that should be 10:31.593 --> 10:33.523 an impossibility. 10:33.519 --> 10:38.439 So suppose we eventually learn how to do this with humans. 10:38.440 --> 10:43.400 And now, suppose we take Larry and put him in a state of 10:43.397 --> 10:45.377 suspended animation. 10:45.380 --> 10:49.640 Is he dead? Well, most of us don't feel 10:49.642 --> 10:52.992 comfortable saying that he's dead. 10:52.990 --> 10:55.380 Just like we don't feel comfortable saying that the--I 10:55.377 --> 10:57.357 suppose we could do this with a fruit fly. 10:57.360 --> 10:58.490 I don't know whether we can or can't. 10:58.490 --> 11:01.360 Suppose we can. Suppose we do it with a fruit 11:01.364 --> 11:02.484 fly. We don't feel comfortable 11:02.481 --> 11:03.481 saying the fruit fly's dead. 11:03.480 --> 11:06.630 Rather, it's in a state of suspended animation. 11:06.629 --> 11:09.319 Well, similarly then, perhaps we wouldn't want to say 11:09.315 --> 11:10.395 that Larry is dead. 11:10.399 --> 11:17.319 And the "brokenness" account of death allows us to say Larry's 11:17.321 --> 11:20.841 not dead. The structures in the brain 11:20.835 --> 11:24.695 which would underwrite the ability to engage in 11:24.695 --> 11:28.465 P-functioning, they're not destroyed by 11:28.472 --> 11:30.572 suspended animation. 11:30.570 --> 11:34.200 So perhaps in the relevant sense, the person can still 11:34.200 --> 11:37.900 engage in P-functioning, so they're not dead. 11:37.900 --> 11:41.540 Good enough. On the other hand, 11:41.539 --> 11:46.299 it doesn't seem so plausible, it doesn't seem intuitively 11:46.299 --> 11:49.359 right, to say that they're alive. 11:49.360 --> 11:52.970 Is Larry alive when he's in a state of suspended animation? 11:52.970 --> 11:55.200 No. It seems like he's not alive 11:55.201 --> 11:56.691 either. Now that's a bit puzzling, 11:56.685 --> 11:58.085 right? It's as though we 11:58.085 --> 12:00.315 need--Normally, we think that look, 12:00.316 --> 12:02.806 either you're alive or you're dead. 12:02.809 --> 12:06.509 The two possibilities exhaust the possibilities. 12:06.509 --> 12:11.889 But thinking about suspended animation suggests that we may 12:11.886 --> 12:17.356 actually need a third category, suspended--neither alive nor 12:17.355 --> 12:19.325 dead. Well, all right, 12:19.330 --> 12:23.320 if we do introduce a third possibility--I'm not sure this 12:23.321 --> 12:24.891 is the right thing. 12:24.889 --> 12:27.889 It's not clear what's the right or best thing to say about 12:27.891 --> 12:29.051 suspended animation. 12:29.049 --> 12:31.439 But at least that doesn't seem like an unattractive 12:31.440 --> 12:33.710 possibility. If there are three 12:33.706 --> 12:37.786 possibilities--dead, alive, or suspended--to be 12:37.787 --> 12:42.397 dead, we could still say you've got to be broken, 12:42.399 --> 12:44.259 incapable of P-functioning. 12:44.260 --> 12:47.280 12:47.280 --> 12:50.910 Suspended isn't broken. 12:50.910 --> 12:53.290 It's just suspended. 12:53.289 --> 12:56.159 But then what do you need to be alive? 12:56.159 --> 12:59.309 In addition to not being broken, what do you need to be 12:59.312 --> 13:01.512 alive? Well, the initially tempting 13:01.511 --> 13:05.351 thing to say is not only aren't you broken, but you're actually 13:05.345 --> 13:07.505 engaged in P-functioning. 13:07.509 --> 13:09.969 But if we say that, then we're back to saying that 13:09.965 --> 13:12.115 somebody who's asleep isn't really alive. 13:12.120 --> 13:13.870 That doesn't seem right either. 13:13.870 --> 13:19.670 So we need some account to distinguish between suspended 13:19.665 --> 13:23.875 animation and out and out being alive. 13:23.879 --> 13:26.319 And I'm not quite sure how to draw that line. 13:26.320 --> 13:32.500 So I'll leave that to you as a puzzle to work on on your own. 13:32.500 --> 13:36.900 That puzzle aside, it seems to me that once we 13:36.899 --> 13:41.889 become physicalists, there's nothing especially deep 13:41.886 --> 13:44.816 or mysterious about death. 13:44.820 --> 13:50.870 The body is able to function in a variety of ways. 13:50.870 --> 13:54.030 When some of those lower biological functions are 13:54.033 --> 13:56.013 occurring, the body's alive. 13:56.009 --> 14:00.309 When all goes well, the body is also capable of 14:00.306 --> 14:05.626 engaging in higher order personal P-functioning. 14:05.630 --> 14:09.260 And then you've got a person. 14:09.259 --> 14:12.309 The body begins to break, you get the loss of 14:12.313 --> 14:13.913 P-functioning. 14:13.909 --> 14:16.279 At that point, you no longer exist as a 14:16.278 --> 14:20.028 person. When the body breaks some more, 14:20.034 --> 14:25.604 you get the loss of biological or B-functioning, 14:25.600 --> 14:28.280 and then the body dies. 14:28.279 --> 14:31.779 There's nothing especially mysterious about death, 14:31.775 --> 14:35.765 although there may be a lot of details to work out from a 14:35.771 --> 14:37.841 scientific point of view. 14:37.840 --> 14:41.190 What are the particular processes that underwrite 14:41.193 --> 14:42.943 biological functioning? 14:42.940 --> 14:47.510 What are the particular processes that underwrite 14:47.511 --> 14:50.941 personality or person functioning? 14:50.940 --> 14:58.330 Still, there are a couple of claims about death that get made 14:58.327 --> 15:03.257 frequently enough, about death being mysterious in 15:03.264 --> 15:06.864 one way or another, that I want--or special or 15:06.856 --> 15:09.646 unique--that I want to focus on. 15:09.649 --> 15:12.829 In effect, from the physicalist point of view, 15:12.827 --> 15:16.637 although death is unique because it comes at the end of 15:16.640 --> 15:20.030 this lifetime of various sorts of functions, 15:20.029 --> 15:25.519 there's nothing especially puzzling, nothing especially 15:25.519 --> 15:31.619 mysterious, nothing especially unusual or hard to grasp about 15:31.618 --> 15:34.088 it. But there are a handful of 15:34.089 --> 15:37.809 claims that people make about death suggesting that they 15:37.811 --> 15:40.911 think, and they think we all think, 15:40.913 --> 15:46.083 that death is mysterious or unique or hard to comprehend. 15:46.080 --> 15:47.870 I want to examine a couple of these. 15:47.870 --> 15:50.910 One of them I'll get to later; if not later today, 15:50.914 --> 15:52.064 then next lecture. 15:52.059 --> 15:57.739 Sometimes people say that we die alone or everybody 15:57.735 --> 16:00.865 dies alone. And this is something--This is 16:00.865 --> 16:04.285 supposed to express some deep insight into the nature and 16:04.292 --> 16:05.702 uniqueness of death. 16:05.700 --> 16:09.370 So although we're able to eat meals together, 16:09.366 --> 16:13.866 we're able to go on vacations together and take classes 16:13.866 --> 16:17.776 together, death is something we all have 16:17.775 --> 16:19.655 to do by ourselves. 16:19.660 --> 16:20.750 That's the claim. 16:20.750 --> 16:22.050 We all die alone. 16:22.049 --> 16:24.249 That's a claim I'll come back to. 16:24.250 --> 16:29.800 What I want to look at first is the suggestion that somehow, 16:29.801 --> 16:33.941 at some level, nobody really believes they're 16:33.941 --> 16:36.201 going to die at all. 16:36.200 --> 16:39.540 16:39.539 --> 16:44.989 Now, having distinguished between what we've called the 16:44.987 --> 16:49.827 death of the body and the death of the person, 16:49.830 --> 16:53.220 the question whether or not you're going to die needs to be 16:53.223 --> 16:55.313 distinguished. The question whether or not you 16:55.306 --> 16:57.336 believe you're going to die needs to be distinguished. 16:57.340 --> 16:59.200 If somebody says, "You know, nobody really 16:59.198 --> 17:01.778 believes they're going to die," they could mean one of two 17:01.781 --> 17:04.991 things. They could mean nobody really 17:04.989 --> 17:09.849 believes they're going to cease to exist as a person, 17:09.847 --> 17:11.807 first possibility. 17:11.809 --> 17:17.399 Second possible claim, nobody really believes they're 17:17.401 --> 17:22.241 going to undergo the death of their bodies. 17:22.240 --> 17:25.880 Let's take these in turn. 17:25.880 --> 17:30.890 Is there any good reason to believe that we don't believe 17:30.887 --> 17:35.267 that we're going to cease to exist as a person? 17:35.270 --> 17:39.500 17:39.500 --> 17:45.830 Well, the most common argument for this claim I think takes the 17:45.833 --> 17:50.003 following form. People sometimes say, 17:49.997 --> 17:54.967 since it's impossible to picture being dead, 17:54.968 --> 17:59.938 it's impossible to picture being dead--, 17:59.940 --> 18:02.300 That is to say, it's impossible to picture your 18:02.298 --> 18:04.128 own being dead. Each one of us has to think 18:04.126 --> 18:06.286 about this from the first person perspective or something like 18:06.286 --> 18:08.196 that. Think about your dying, 18:08.204 --> 18:11.974 your being dead--Since that's impossible to picture, 18:11.970 --> 18:17.190 that's impossible to imagine, nobody believes in the 18:17.193 --> 18:21.293 possibility that they're going to die, 18:21.289 --> 18:24.919 that they're going to cease to exist. 18:24.920 --> 18:32.050 The idea seems to be that you can't believe in possibilities 18:32.049 --> 18:36.399 that you can't picture or imagine. 18:36.400 --> 18:39.410 Now, that hypothesis, that thesis, 18:39.411 --> 18:42.971 that assumption, could be challenged. 18:42.970 --> 18:47.930 I think probably we shouldn't believe the theory of belief 18:47.925 --> 18:52.355 which says that in order to believe in something, 18:52.359 --> 18:56.239 you've got to be able to picture it or believe it. 18:56.240 --> 18:59.940 18:59.940 --> 19:04.290 But let's grant that assumption for the sake of argument. 19:04.289 --> 19:06.429 Let's suppose that in order to believe in something, 19:06.433 --> 19:08.033 you've got to be able to picture it. 19:08.030 --> 19:11.050 What then? How do we get from there to the 19:11.047 --> 19:15.097 conclusion that I can't believe that I'm going to die, 19:15.095 --> 19:18.375 I'm going to cease to exist as a person? 19:18.380 --> 19:22.450 Well, the thought, of course, is I can't picture 19:22.446 --> 19:24.346 or imagine my death. 19:24.349 --> 19:27.709 I can't picture or imagine my being dead. 19:27.710 --> 19:29.380 It's important here to draw some distinctions. 19:29.380 --> 19:33.390 I can certainly picture being ill. 19:33.390 --> 19:38.370 There I am on my deathbed dying of cancer, growing weaker and 19:38.372 --> 19:42.212 weaker. I can perhaps even picture the 19:42.210 --> 19:44.270 moment of my death. 19:44.269 --> 19:47.949 I've said goodbye to my family and friends. 19:47.950 --> 19:51.850 I've the--Everything's growing greyer and dimmer. 19:51.849 --> 19:55.439 It's growing harder and harder to concentrate. 19:55.440 --> 19:58.260 And then, well, and then there is no "and 19:58.256 --> 19:59.926 more." The claim, however, 19:59.931 --> 20:02.741 is not that I can't picture being ill or dying. 20:02.740 --> 20:08.650 The claim's got to be, I can't picture being 20:08.652 --> 20:10.452 dead. Well, try it. 20:10.450 --> 20:12.280 Try to picture being dead. 20:12.280 --> 20:17.300 What's it like to be dead? 20:17.299 --> 20:21.799 Sometimes people claim it's a mystery. 20:21.799 --> 20:26.549 We don't know what it's like to be dead, because every time we 20:26.551 --> 20:28.811 try to imagine it, we fail. 20:28.810 --> 20:33.040 We don't do a very good job. 20:33.039 --> 20:38.279 I'm inclined to think that that way of thinking about the 20:38.281 --> 20:41.091 question is really confused. 20:41.089 --> 20:46.669 You set yourself the goal of trying to put yourself in the 20:46.667 --> 20:52.047 situation imaginatively of what it's like to be dead. 20:52.049 --> 20:57.389 So I start by trying to strip off the parts of my conscious 20:57.387 --> 21:01.617 life that I know I won't have when I'm dead. 21:01.620 --> 21:03.700 I won't hear anything. 21:03.700 --> 21:05.890 I won't see anything. 21:05.890 --> 21:07.700 I won't think anything. 21:07.700 --> 21:15.700 And you try to imagine what it's like to not think or feel 21:15.703 --> 21:19.793 or hear or see. And you don't do a very good 21:19.791 --> 21:22.251 job of it. So you throw your hands up and 21:22.249 --> 21:24.809 you say, "Oh, I guess I don't know what it's 21:24.813 --> 21:27.303 like." So it must be a mystery. 21:27.300 --> 21:30.900 It's not a mystery at all. 21:30.900 --> 21:36.810 Suppose I ask, "What's it like to be this cell 21:36.808 --> 21:39.268 phone?" The answer is, 21:39.273 --> 21:44.413 "It's not like anything," where that doesn't mean there's 21:44.409 --> 21:48.719 something that it's like to be a cell phone, 21:48.720 --> 21:52.590 but different from being anything else. 21:52.590 --> 21:56.620 So it's not like anything else; it's a special way of 21:56.621 --> 21:58.561 feeling or experiencing. 21:58.560 --> 22:02.430 No. Cell phones don't have any 22:02.433 --> 22:04.463 experience at all. 22:04.460 --> 22:10.400 There is nothing that it's like on the inside to be a 22:10.400 --> 22:13.100 cell phone. Imagine that I try to ask 22:13.099 --> 22:15.879 myself, "What's it like to be my ball point pen?" 22:15.880 --> 22:17.710 And I try to imagine, well, first, 22:17.713 --> 22:19.603 imagine being really, really stiff, 22:19.601 --> 22:22.991 because you're not flexible when you're a ball point pen. 22:22.990 --> 22:25.520 You can't move. And imagine being really, 22:25.524 --> 22:27.894 really bored, because you don't have any 22:27.885 --> 22:29.395 thoughts or interests. 22:29.400 --> 22:32.970 No. That's completely the wrong way 22:32.965 --> 22:38.525 to go about thinking what it's like to be a ball point pen. 22:38.529 --> 22:42.499 There's nothing that it's like to be a ball point 22:42.497 --> 22:45.947 pen. There's nothing to describe, 22:45.945 --> 22:48.095 nothing to imagine. 22:48.099 --> 22:54.279 No mystery about what it's like to be a ball point pen. 22:54.279 --> 22:59.729 No mystery about what it's like to be a cell phone. 22:59.730 --> 23:03.760 Well, similarly then, I put it to you, 23:03.762 --> 23:09.542 there's no mystery about what it's like to be dead. 23:09.540 --> 23:13.200 It isn't like anything. 23:13.200 --> 23:14.960 What I don't mean, "Oh, it's like something, 23:14.957 --> 23:16.507 but different from everything else." 23:16.509 --> 23:20.969 I mean, there is nothing there to describe. 23:20.970 --> 23:26.180 When you're dead, there's nothing happening on 23:26.178 --> 23:29.418 the inside to be imagined. 23:29.420 --> 23:35.150 Well, should we conclude therefore, given that we've got 23:35.152 --> 23:40.782 the premise, "If you can't picture it or imagine it, 23:40.779 --> 23:43.839 then you can't believe in it," since I've just said, 23:43.839 --> 23:46.059 look, you can't imagine being dead, 23:46.059 --> 23:48.779 but that's not due to any failure of imagination, 23:48.777 --> 23:52.227 that's because there's nothing there to imagine or picture. 23:52.230 --> 23:55.090 Still, granted the premise, if you can't picture it or 23:55.094 --> 23:58.234 imagine it, you can't believe in it--Should we conclude, 23:58.230 --> 24:04.190 therefore, that you can't believe you're going to be dead? 24:04.190 --> 24:08.760 No. We shouldn't conclude that. 24:08.759 --> 24:13.749 After all, not only is it true that you can't picture from the 24:13.748 --> 24:16.608 inside what it's like to be dead, 24:16.609 --> 24:22.549 you can't picture from the inside what it's like to be in 24:22.548 --> 24:25.198 dreamless sleep. 24:25.200 --> 24:28.880 There is nothing that it's like to be in dreamless sleep. 24:28.880 --> 24:32.670 When you're in dreamless sleep, you're not imagining or 24:32.666 --> 24:34.346 experiencing anything. 24:34.349 --> 24:39.399 Similarly, it's not possible to picture or imagine what it's 24:39.395 --> 24:44.005 like to have fainted and be completely unconscious with 24:44.012 --> 24:46.922 nothing happening cognitively. 24:46.920 --> 24:50.270 24:50.269 --> 24:51.769 There's nothing to picture or imagine. 24:51.769 --> 24:55.489 Well, should we conclude, therefore, so nobody really 24:55.493 --> 24:58.933 believes that they're ever in dreamless sleep? 24:58.930 --> 25:00.670 Well, that would be silly. 25:00.670 --> 25:05.010 Of course you believe that at times you're in dreamless sleep. 25:05.009 --> 25:08.209 Should we say of somebody who's fainted or knows that they're 25:08.207 --> 25:11.077 subject to fainting spells, they never actually believe 25:11.084 --> 25:12.314 that they pass out? 25:12.310 --> 25:13.630 That would be silly. 25:13.630 --> 25:18.610 Of course, they believe they pass out. 25:18.609 --> 25:22.709 From the mere fact that they can't picture it from the 25:22.711 --> 25:27.431 inside, it doesn't follow that nobody believes they're ever in 25:27.432 --> 25:30.682 dreamless sleep. From the mere fact that they 25:30.677 --> 25:34.247 can't picture from the inside what it's like to have fainted 25:34.254 --> 25:37.554 and not yet woken up, it doesn't mean that nobody 25:37.548 --> 25:39.658 believes that they ever faint. 25:39.660 --> 25:44.650 From the mere fact that you can't picture from the inside 25:44.649 --> 25:49.549 what it's like to be dead, it doesn't follow that nobody 25:49.550 --> 25:52.580 believes they're going to die. 25:52.579 --> 25:55.719 But didn't I start off by saying I was going to grant the 25:55.716 --> 25:58.516 person who is making this argument that in order to 25:58.517 --> 26:00.957 believe something, you've got to be able to 26:00.963 --> 26:03.153 picture it? And haven't I just said, 26:03.149 --> 26:05.649 "Look, you can't picture being dead"? 26:05.650 --> 26:07.030 So aren't I taking it back? 26:07.029 --> 26:09.489 Since I say you can believe you're going to die, 26:09.489 --> 26:11.739 yet you can't picture it from the inside. 26:11.740 --> 26:13.980 Haven't I taken back the assumption that in order to 26:13.981 --> 26:16.181 believe it, you've got to be able to picture it? 26:16.180 --> 26:19.000 Not quite. Although I am skeptical about 26:18.995 --> 26:21.715 that claim, I am going to continue giving it to the person 26:21.719 --> 26:25.169 who makes this argument, because I'm not so prepared to 26:25.173 --> 26:28.133 admit that you can't picture being dead. 26:28.130 --> 26:30.860 You can picture being dead, all right. 26:30.859 --> 26:36.489 You just can't picture it from the inside. 26:36.490 --> 26:40.350 You can picture it from the outside. 26:40.349 --> 26:45.449 I can picture being in dreamless sleep quite easily. 26:45.450 --> 26:46.850 I'm doing it right now. 26:46.849 --> 26:53.459 I've got a little mental image of my body lying in bed asleep, 26:53.462 --> 26:56.922 dreamlessly. I can picture fainting, 26:56.918 --> 26:59.698 or having fainted, quite easily. 26:59.700 --> 27:04.960 Picture my body lying on the ground unconscious. 27:04.960 --> 27:11.250 I can picture my being dead quite easily. 27:11.250 --> 27:17.640 It's a little mental picture of my body in a coffin. 27:17.640 --> 27:21.610 No functioning occurring in my body. 27:21.609 --> 27:25.709 So even if it were true that belief requires picturing, 27:25.710 --> 27:30.190 and even if were true that you can't picture being dead from 27:30.190 --> 27:32.930 the inside, it wouldn't follow that you 27:32.928 --> 27:34.998 can't believe you're going to die. 27:35.000 --> 27:39.070 All you have to do is picture it from the outside. 27:39.070 --> 27:42.500 We're done. So I conclude, 27:42.495 --> 27:49.455 of course you can and do believe you're going to die. 27:49.460 --> 27:52.540 But at this point, the person making the argument 27:52.541 --> 27:54.211 has a possible response. 27:54.210 --> 27:56.570 And it's a quite common response. 27:56.569 --> 27:59.209 He says, "Look, I try to picture the 27:59.209 --> 28:03.359 world--admittedly from the outside--I try to picture the 28:03.356 --> 28:07.726 world in which I don't exist, I'm no longer conscious. 28:07.730 --> 28:10.650 I'm no longer a person, no longer experiencing 28:10.654 --> 28:12.634 anything. I try to picture that world. 28:12.630 --> 28:15.720 I picture, for example, seeing my funeral. 28:15.720 --> 28:19.440 28:19.440 --> 28:25.270 And yet, when I try to do that, I'm observing it. 28:25.270 --> 28:29.790 I'm watching the funeral. 28:29.790 --> 28:31.870 I'm seeing the funeral. 28:31.870 --> 28:33.870 Consequently, I'm thinking. 28:33.869 --> 28:39.329 So I haven't really imagined the world in which I no longer 28:39.326 --> 28:42.616 exist, a world in which I'm dead, 28:42.619 --> 28:47.239 a world in which I'm incapable of thought and observation. 28:47.240 --> 28:54.590 I've smuggled myself back in as the observer of the funeral." 28:54.589 --> 28:59.449 Every time I try to picture myself being dead, 28:59.454 --> 29:05.084 I smuggle myself back in, conscious and existing as a 29:05.075 --> 29:09.395 person, hence, not dead as a person. 29:09.400 --> 29:16.150 Maybe my body--I'm imagining my body dead, but I'm not imagining 29:16.154 --> 29:19.054 myself, the person, dead. 29:19.049 --> 29:22.749 From which it follows, the argument goes, 29:22.754 --> 29:27.204 that I don't really believe I'll ever be dead. 29:27.200 --> 29:31.750 Because when I try to imagine a world in which I'm dead, 29:31.747 --> 29:33.977 I smuggle myself back in. 29:33.980 --> 29:37.520 This argument shows up in various places. 29:37.519 --> 29:43.409 Let me mention, let me quote one case of it, 29:43.413 --> 29:45.723 Freud. Freud says, this is, 29:45.722 --> 29:48.942 I'm quoting from one of the Walter Kaufman essays that 29:48.936 --> 29:51.176 you'll be reading, called "Death." 29:51.180 --> 29:53.530 He quotes Freud. Freud says, 29:53.529 --> 29:56.949 After all, one's own death is beyond 29:56.954 --> 30:02.134 imagining, and whenever we try to imagine it we can see that we 30:02.133 --> 30:04.893 really survive as spectators. 30:04.890 --> 30:09.490 Thus, the dictum could be dared in the psychoanalytic school: 30:09.486 --> 30:13.006 at bottom, nobody believes in his own death. 30:13.009 --> 30:16.499 Or, and this is the same: in his unconscious, 30:16.499 --> 30:20.939 every one of us is convinced of his immortality. 30:20.940 --> 30:23.350 All right, there's Freud. 30:23.349 --> 30:26.069 Basically, just running the argument I've just sketched for 30:26.068 --> 30:28.668 you. When you try to imagine your 30:28.672 --> 30:33.402 being dead, you smuggle yourself back in as a spectator. 30:33.400 --> 30:38.910 And so, Freud concludes, at some level none of us really 30:38.912 --> 30:41.922 believes we're going to die. 30:41.920 --> 30:47.010 I want to say, I think that argument's a 30:47.009 --> 30:49.619 horrible argument. 30:49.619 --> 30:54.869 How many of you believe that there are meetings that take 30:54.866 --> 30:56.736 place without you? 30:56.740 --> 31:01.520 Suppose you're a member of some club and there's a meeting this 31:01.524 --> 31:05.924 afternoon and you won't be there, because you've got to be 31:05.923 --> 31:08.463 someplace else. So you ask yourself, 31:08.460 --> 31:11.780 "Do I believe that meeting's going to take place without me?" 31:11.779 --> 31:14.469 At first glance, it looks like you do, 31:14.469 --> 31:18.249 but here's the Freudian argument that shows you don't 31:18.250 --> 31:20.570 really. Try to imagine, 31:20.566 --> 31:24.706 try to picture that meeting without you. 31:24.710 --> 31:28.410 Well, when you do picture it, there's that room in your 31:28.409 --> 31:30.669 mind's eye. You've got a little picture of 31:30.670 --> 31:33.550 people sitting around the table perhaps, discussing the business 31:33.548 --> 31:40.288 of your club. Uh-oh, I've smuggled myself in 31:40.293 --> 31:44.703 as a spectator. If, like you--, 31:44.701 --> 31:48.551 I think most of us picture these things up from a 31:48.546 --> 31:51.666 perspective in a corner of the room, 31:51.670 --> 31:55.090 up on the wall, looking down, 31:55.092 --> 31:58.762 kind of a fly's perspective. 31:58.759 --> 32:01.489 All right, I've smuggled myself in as a spectator. 32:01.490 --> 32:04.030 I'm actually in the room after all. 32:04.029 --> 32:07.259 So I haven't really pictured the meeting taking place without 32:07.260 --> 32:09.120 me. So I guess I don't really 32:09.121 --> 32:12.561 believe the meeting's going to take place without me. 32:12.559 --> 32:14.769 If Freud's argument for death, that is to say, 32:14.772 --> 32:16.742 none of us believe we're going to die, 32:16.740 --> 32:19.660 was any good, the argument that none of us 32:19.660 --> 32:24.220 believe meetings ever take place without us would have to work as 32:24.218 --> 32:26.408 well. But that's silly. 32:26.410 --> 32:30.540 It's clear that we all do believe in the possibility, 32:30.544 --> 32:34.764 indeed, more than a mere possibility, the actuality of 32:34.757 --> 32:37.537 meetings that occur without us. 32:37.539 --> 32:44.269 Even though when I imagine that meeting, I'm in some sense, 32:44.268 --> 32:48.558 smuggling myself in as an observer. 32:48.559 --> 32:53.449 From which I think it follows that the mere fact that I've 32:53.448 --> 32:57.908 smuggled myself in as an observer doesn't mean that I 32:57.908 --> 33:02.798 don't really believe in the possibility that I'm observing 33:02.797 --> 33:04.767 in my mind's eye. 33:04.769 --> 33:09.019 I can believe in the existence of a meeting that takes place, 33:09.018 --> 33:13.268 even though I smuggle myself in as an observer when I picture 33:13.266 --> 33:16.236 that meeting. I can believe in the 33:16.237 --> 33:21.717 possibility of a world without me, even though I smuggle myself 33:21.715 --> 33:26.835 in as an observer when I picture that world without me. 33:26.839 --> 33:29.979 Freud's mistake, and it's--although I'm picking 33:29.984 --> 33:34.364 on Freud, it's not only Freud that runs this sort of argument. 33:34.359 --> 33:36.469 One comes across it periodically. 33:36.470 --> 33:40.340 Within the last year, a member of our law school here 33:40.342 --> 33:44.662 put forward this very argument and said he thought it was a 33:44.661 --> 33:46.831 good one. So people think the argument's 33:46.829 --> 33:49.219 a good one. It strikes me as it's got to be 33:49.221 --> 33:50.961 a bad one. The confusion, 33:50.955 --> 33:55.175 the mistake I think people are making when they make this 33:55.177 --> 33:59.397 argument, the mistake I think they're making is this. 33:59.400 --> 34:04.650 It's one thing to ask yourself, what's the content of the 34:04.652 --> 34:07.262 picture? It's another thing to ask, 34:07.258 --> 34:10.338 when you look at the picture, are you existing? 34:10.340 --> 34:13.940 Are you looking at the picture from a certain point of view? 34:13.940 --> 34:20.000 Suppose I hold up a photograph of a beach with nobody on it. 34:20.000 --> 34:24.200 All right, am I in that beach, as pictured in that photograph? 34:24.200 --> 34:28.690 Of course not. But as I look at it, 34:28.689 --> 34:33.889 whether in reality or in my mind's eye, I'm looking at it 34:33.894 --> 34:35.944 from a perspective. 34:35.940 --> 34:40.870 As I think about it, I'm viewing the beach from a 34:40.874 --> 34:45.404 point of view which may well be on the beach, 34:45.397 --> 34:49.917 if somebody draws a painting of a beach. 34:49.920 --> 34:54.000 But for all that, that doesn't mean that within 34:54.004 --> 34:58.004 the picture of the beach, I'm in the beach. 34:58.000 --> 35:03.160 Looking at a picture doesn't mean you're in the 35:03.156 --> 35:06.856 picture. Viewing the meeting from a 35:06.858 --> 35:11.058 point of view, doesn't mean you're in the 35:11.055 --> 35:15.125 meeting. Viewing the world without you 35:15.133 --> 35:19.873 from a point of view, doesn't mean you're in the 35:19.872 --> 35:22.692 world. So although of course it's 35:22.692 --> 35:26.742 true, when I imagine these various possibilities without 35:26.739 --> 35:29.019 me, I'm thinking about them. 35:29.020 --> 35:30.580 I'm observing them. 35:30.579 --> 35:34.439 And I'm observing them from a particular perspective, 35:34.439 --> 35:36.739 from a particular standpoint. 35:36.739 --> 35:41.029 For all that, I'm not in the picture 35:41.032 --> 35:43.692 that I'm thinking about. 35:43.690 --> 35:48.380 So I think the Freudian argument just fails. 35:48.380 --> 35:55.580 Now, maybe there's some other reason to believe the claim that 35:55.576 --> 36:00.646 nobody believes they will cease to exist. 36:00.650 --> 36:04.290 But if there is another argument for that claim, 36:04.290 --> 36:07.620 I'm eager to hear it, because this argument, 36:07.621 --> 36:11.341 at any rate, seems to me to be unsuccessful. 36:11.340 --> 36:13.850 Now, at the start, I distinguished two claims 36:13.850 --> 36:17.050 people might have in mind when they say, "Nobody believes 36:17.046 --> 36:18.526 they're going to die." 36:18.530 --> 36:22.540 The first possibility was the claim was, nobody believes that 36:22.541 --> 36:25.351 they'll ever cease to exist as a person. 36:25.349 --> 36:30.129 And I've just explained why at least the most familiar argument 36:30.127 --> 36:33.207 for that claim, I think, doesn't work. 36:33.210 --> 36:36.570 The second possible interpretation was this. 36:36.570 --> 36:40.640 Nobody believes their body is going to die. 36:40.639 --> 36:44.279 That is, the more familiar humdrum event of death where 36:44.283 --> 36:48.533 your body ceases functioning and you end up having a corpse that 36:48.533 --> 36:50.493 gets buried and so forth. 36:50.489 --> 36:55.369 Sometimes it's suggested that nobody believes that either. 36:55.369 --> 36:57.619 Of course, often, I think, people run together 36:57.619 --> 36:58.719 these two questions. 36:58.719 --> 37:00.869 When they say you don't believe you're going to die, 37:00.872 --> 37:02.602 do you mean, you don't believe your body's 37:02.602 --> 37:05.072 going to die? or you don't believe you're 37:05.074 --> 37:07.484 going to cease to exist as a person? 37:07.480 --> 37:10.010 Maybe when people make the claim, it's not clear which of 37:10.009 --> 37:11.589 these things they've got in mind. 37:11.590 --> 37:14.970 But let's, at least, try to now focus on the second 37:14.967 --> 37:17.087 question. Could it be true, 37:17.093 --> 37:20.843 is there any good reason to believe it is true, 37:20.835 --> 37:25.875 that nobody believes they're going to undergo bodily death? 37:25.880 --> 37:29.060 Now, after all, even if you believe that, 37:29.059 --> 37:33.349 well, your soul will go to heaven so you won't cease to 37:33.351 --> 37:37.391 exist as a person, you might still believe that 37:37.386 --> 37:39.016 your body will die. 37:39.019 --> 37:41.549 Most of us presumably do believe our bodies will die. 37:41.550 --> 37:44.210 At least, that's how it seems to me. 37:44.210 --> 37:47.520 So it's a bit odd to suggest, as it nonetheless does get 37:47.517 --> 37:49.737 suggested, that no, no, at some level, 37:49.742 --> 37:52.932 people don't really believe they're going to die. 37:52.929 --> 37:57.729 Let me point out just how odd a claim that is. 37:57.730 --> 38:02.600 Because people do all sorts of behaviors which become very, 38:02.602 --> 38:07.312 very hard to interpret if they don't really believe their 38:07.307 --> 38:09.657 bodies are going to die. 38:09.659 --> 38:13.759 People, for example, take out life insurance so 38:13.763 --> 38:18.583 that--well, here's what seems to be the explanation. 38:18.579 --> 38:21.469 They believe that there's a decent chance that they will die 38:21.466 --> 38:23.126 within a certain period of time. 38:23.130 --> 38:26.440 And so, if that happens, they want their children and 38:26.439 --> 38:28.539 family members to be cared for. 38:28.539 --> 38:31.999 If you didn't really believe you were going to die, 38:32.002 --> 38:35.882 that is undergo bodily death, why would you take out life 38:35.880 --> 38:39.080 insurance? People write wills. 38:39.079 --> 38:42.549 "Here's what you should do with my estate after I die." 38:42.550 --> 38:46.660 If you didn't really believe that your body was going to die, 38:46.656 --> 38:49.596 why would you ever bother writing a will? 38:49.599 --> 38:53.649 Since many people write wills, many people take out life 38:53.650 --> 38:58.070 insurance, it seems as though the natural thing to suggest is 38:58.068 --> 39:00.718 that many, or at least perhaps most, 39:00.718 --> 39:04.018 at least many people believe they're going to die. 39:04.020 --> 39:08.250 Why would we think otherwise? 39:08.250 --> 39:11.510 Well, the reason for thinking otherwise, the reason for not 39:11.512 --> 39:14.102 being utterly dismissive of this suggestion, 39:14.099 --> 39:18.569 is that when people get ill, terminally ill, 39:18.572 --> 39:22.942 it often seems to take them by surprise. 39:22.940 --> 39:27.010 So I've been having you read Tolstoy's novella, 39:27.010 --> 39:30.020 The Death of Ivan Ilyich. 39:30.019 --> 39:33.769 Ivan Ilyich falls, he hurts himself. 39:33.770 --> 39:36.280 The injury doesn't get better. 39:36.280 --> 39:39.630 He gets worse and worse and eventually it kills him. 39:39.630 --> 39:48.200 The astonishing thing is that Ivan Ilyich is shocked to 39:48.197 --> 39:52.637 discover that he's mortal. 39:52.639 --> 39:56.459 And of course, what Tolstoy is trying to 39:56.464 --> 40:00.784 convince us of, what he's trying to argue, 40:00.780 --> 40:06.570 by illustrating the claim, I take it, that Tolstoy is 40:06.571 --> 40:13.701 making, is that most of us are actually in Ivan Ilyich's boat. 40:13.699 --> 40:19.249 We give lip service to the claim that we're going to die, 40:19.251 --> 40:24.011 but at some level, we don't really believe it. 40:24.010 --> 40:26.810 And notice again, just to emphasize the point, 40:26.809 --> 40:30.479 the relevant lack of belief here has to do with the death of 40:30.481 --> 40:32.671 the body. That's the thing that Ivan 40:32.673 --> 40:34.113 Ilyich is skeptical about. 40:34.110 --> 40:35.800 Is his body going to die? 40:35.800 --> 40:38.300 Is he mortal in that sense? 40:38.300 --> 40:44.730 This is what takes him aback, to discover that he's mortal. 40:44.730 --> 40:46.670 For all we know, Ivan Ilyich still believes in 40:46.665 --> 40:49.155 souls, believes he's going to go to heaven and so forth. 40:49.159 --> 40:53.999 So it's not his death as a person that he's puzzled by. 40:54.000 --> 40:56.020 He may not think he's going to die as a person. 40:56.019 --> 40:59.899 It's his bodily death that surprises him, 40:59.902 --> 41:03.982 his bodily mortality that surprises him. 41:03.980 --> 41:08.940 Tolstoy draws a highly realistic and believable 41:08.943 --> 41:15.203 portrait of somebody who is surprised to discover that he's 41:15.202 --> 41:17.302 mortal. As he puts it, 41:17.301 --> 41:21.081 there's a famous syllogism that people learn in their logic 41:21.077 --> 41:22.767 classes from Aristotle. 41:22.770 --> 41:24.900 All men are mortal. 41:24.900 --> 41:29.020 Socrates is a man, so Socrates is mortal. 41:29.019 --> 41:31.909 Ivan Ilyich says, "Yes, yes, I knew that. 41:31.909 --> 41:36.839 But what did that have to do with me?" 41:36.840 --> 41:40.880 Well, it may be a kind of irrationality. 41:40.880 --> 41:45.730 It may be a kind of failure to conduct the logic. 41:45.730 --> 41:49.220 But we're not asking, is it rational or irrational to 41:49.218 --> 41:52.168 not believe that your body's going to die, 41:52.170 --> 41:56.090 we're simply asking, noting the fact that, 41:56.090 --> 42:02.110 there to seem to be cases where people are surprised to discover 42:02.114 --> 42:04.414 that they're mortal. 42:04.409 --> 42:08.519 Now, for all that, notice, I presume that Ivan 42:08.515 --> 42:10.335 Ilyich had a will. 42:10.340 --> 42:14.000 And for all I know, Ivan Ilyich had life insurance. 42:14.000 --> 42:18.380 So we're in the peculiar situation where on the one hand, 42:18.376 --> 42:23.296 some of Ivan Ilyich's behaviors indicate that he believed he was 42:23.300 --> 42:26.500 mortal, that his body was going to die. 42:26.500 --> 42:32.430 And yet, the shock and surprise that faces, that overcomes him 42:32.427 --> 42:36.797 when he actually has to face his mortality, 42:36.800 --> 42:40.330 strongly suggests that he's reporting correctly. 42:40.329 --> 42:44.219 He didn't believe he was going to die. 42:44.220 --> 42:46.020 How could that be? 42:46.019 --> 42:48.709 There's a kind of puzzle there as to--even if, 42:48.712 --> 42:52.302 before we move to the question, how widespread are cases like 42:52.301 --> 42:56.151 this? there's a puzzle as to how are 42:56.154 --> 42:59.804 we even to understand this case? 42:59.800 --> 43:04.080 We need to distinguish perhaps between what he consciously 43:04.083 --> 43:07.543 believes and what he unconsciously believes. 43:07.539 --> 43:10.979 Maybe at the conscious level he believed he was mortal, 43:10.975 --> 43:14.725 but at the unconscious level he believed he was immortal. 43:14.730 --> 43:18.760 Or maybe we need to distinguish between those things he gives a 43:18.760 --> 43:22.070 kind of lip service to, versus those things he truly 43:22.074 --> 43:24.094 and fundamentally believes. 43:24.090 --> 43:26.960 Maybe he gives lip service to the claim that he was mortal. 43:26.960 --> 43:28.250 If you would have asked him "Are you mortal?" 43:28.250 --> 43:29.660 he would have said "Oh, of course I am." 43:29.659 --> 43:32.049 And he buys life insurance accordingly. 43:32.050 --> 43:36.240 But does he thoroughly and truly and fundamentally believe 43:36.240 --> 43:39.220 he's mortal? Perhaps not. 43:39.219 --> 43:43.809 We need some such distinction if we're going to make sense of 43:43.809 --> 43:46.829 Ivan Ilyich. Well, let's suppose we've done 43:46.829 --> 43:48.299 it. Still have to ask, 43:48.298 --> 43:52.058 not, are there are ever cases of people who don't believe 43:52.058 --> 43:53.668 they're going to die? 43:53.670 --> 43:57.780 but rather, is there any good reason to think that we're all 43:57.781 --> 44:00.431 or most of us are in that situation, 44:00.429 --> 44:03.329 are in that state of belief where, although we give lip 44:03.327 --> 44:05.847 service to the claim that we're going to die, 44:05.849 --> 44:09.419 is there any good reason to believe that fundamentally we 44:09.423 --> 44:11.213 don't actually believe it? 44:11.210 --> 44:15.000 That's the question we have to turn to next time.