WEBVTT 00:01.090 --> 00:04.320 Professor Shelly Kagan: We've begun to turn to Plato's 00:04.317 --> 00:07.107 dialogue Phaedo, and what I started doing last 00:07.114 --> 00:09.644 time was sketching the basic outlines of Plato's 00:09.642 --> 00:12.602 metaphysics--not so much to give a full investigation of 00:12.600 --> 00:15.670 that--clearly we're not going to do that here--but just to 00:15.666 --> 00:19.046 provide enough of the essential outlines of Plato's metaphysical 00:19.054 --> 00:22.444 views so that we can understand the arguments that come up later 00:22.443 --> 00:25.193 in the Phaedo, basically all of which or many 00:25.186 --> 00:27.606 of which presuppose something--certain central 00:27.606 --> 00:30.776 aspects about Plato's metaphysical views. 00:30.780 --> 00:34.320 The key point behind his metaphysics then was the thought 00:34.320 --> 00:37.540 that, in addition to the ordinary empirical physical 00:37.544 --> 00:40.014 world that we're all familiar with, 00:40.010 --> 00:44.760 we have to posit the existence of a kind of second realm, 00:44.762 --> 00:49.772 in which exist the Platonic--as they're nowadays called--the 00:49.769 --> 00:52.909 Platonic forms or Platonic ideas. 00:52.910 --> 00:56.160 The sort of thing that perhaps we might call or think of as 00:56.158 --> 00:58.508 abstract objects or abstract properties. 00:58.510 --> 01:02.760 And the reason for positing these things is because we're 01:02.755 --> 01:05.935 clearly able to think about these ideas, 01:05.939 --> 01:08.889 and yet, we recognize that the ordinary physical 01:08.893 --> 01:12.413 world--although things may participate in them to varying 01:12.412 --> 01:16.372 degrees--we don't actually come across these objects or entities 01:16.370 --> 01:18.130 in the physical world. 01:18.129 --> 01:21.999 So that we can talk about things being beautiful to 01:21.995 --> 01:25.625 varying degrees, but we never come across beauty 01:25.629 --> 01:28.799 itself in the actual empirical world. 01:28.799 --> 01:33.589 We are able to talk about the fact that two plus one equals 01:33.588 --> 01:38.868 three, but it's not as though we ever come across numbers--number 01:38.872 --> 01:43.002 three itself--anywhere in the empirical world. 01:43.000 --> 01:46.830 A further point that distinguishes the empirical 01:46.829 --> 01:51.799 world from this--this realm of Platonic ideal objects--is that 01:51.800 --> 01:56.200 indeed they--there's something perfect about them. 01:56.200 --> 01:57.480 They don't change. 01:57.480 --> 02:00.080 In contrast, physical objects are constantly 02:00.075 --> 02:02.905 changing. Something might be short at one 02:02.905 --> 02:07.095 point and become tall at another point, ugly at one point and 02:07.096 --> 02:10.166 become beautiful--like the ugly duckling. 02:10.169 --> 02:12.859 It starts out ugly and becomes a beautiful swan. 02:12.860 --> 02:17.330 In contrast, justice itself never changes. 02:17.330 --> 02:20.150 Beauty itself never changes. 02:20.150 --> 02:24.770 We have the thought that these things are eternal, 02:24.768 --> 02:29.858 and indeed, beyond change, in contrast to the empirical 02:29.857 --> 02:32.697 world. In fact, if you start thinking 02:32.699 --> 02:36.499 more about the world from this perspective, the world we live 02:36.500 --> 02:38.580 in is crazy. It's almost insanely 02:38.581 --> 02:42.281 contradictory. Plato thinks of it as crazy in 02:42.282 --> 02:44.662 the way that a dream is. 02:44.660 --> 02:48.300 When you're caught up in the dream, you don't notice just how 02:48.297 --> 02:49.447 insane it all is. 02:49.449 --> 02:52.089 But if you step back and reflect on it, 02:52.092 --> 02:55.152 "Well, let's see, I was eating a sandwich and 02:55.153 --> 02:58.773 suddenly the sandwich was the Statue of Liberty, 02:58.770 --> 03:01.650 except the Statue of Liberty was my mother. 03:01.650 --> 03:04.520 And she's flying over the ocean, except she's really a 03:04.519 --> 03:05.709 piece of spaghetti." 03:05.710 --> 03:07.690 That's how dreams are. 03:07.689 --> 03:09.759 And when you're in it, it sort of all makes sense. 03:09.760 --> 03:12.020 Right? You're kind of caught up, 03:12.021 --> 03:14.651 but you step back and say, "That's just insane." 03:14.650 --> 03:19.230 Well, Plato thinks that the empirical world has something of 03:19.234 --> 03:22.844 that kind of insanity, something of that kind 03:22.835 --> 03:26.375 contradictoriness, built into it that we don't 03:26.383 --> 03:28.043 ordinarily notice. 03:28.039 --> 03:30.549 "He's a basketball player, so he's really, 03:30.550 --> 03:33.060 really tall, except he's only six feet. 03:33.060 --> 03:35.860 So he's really, really short for a basketball 03:35.857 --> 03:37.647 player. This is a baby elephant, 03:37.651 --> 03:39.941 so it's really, really big--except it's a baby 03:39.941 --> 03:42.131 elephant, so it's really, really small." 03:42.129 --> 03:46.729 The world is constantly rolling--this is a Platonic 03:46.731 --> 03:51.611 expression--rolling between one form and the other. 03:51.610 --> 03:55.690 And it's hard to make sense of. 03:55.690 --> 03:59.080 In contrast, the mind is able to grasp the 03:59.080 --> 04:02.140 Platonic ideas, the Platonic forms; 04:02.139 --> 04:04.919 and they're stable, they're reliable, 04:04.916 --> 04:08.846 they are--they're law-like and we can grasp them. 04:08.850 --> 04:11.130 They don't change; they're eternal. 04:11.129 --> 04:13.909 That's, as I say, the Platonic picture. 04:13.909 --> 04:19.969 Now, it's not my purpose here to try to argue for or against 04:19.968 --> 04:24.588 Platonism with regard to abstract entities. 04:24.589 --> 04:28.579 As I suggested in talking about the example of math last time, 04:28.583 --> 04:32.053 it's not a silly view, even if it's not a view that we 04:32.052 --> 04:33.822 all take automatically. 04:33.819 --> 04:36.539 But in thinking about math, most of us are inclined to be 04:36.538 --> 04:38.878 Platonists. We all do believe something 04:38.884 --> 04:41.684 makes it true that two plus one equals three, 04:41.677 --> 04:45.227 but it's not the fact that empirical objects--We don't do 04:45.232 --> 04:48.722 empirical experiments to see whether two plus one equals 04:48.724 --> 04:51.234 three. Rather, we think our mind can 04:51.228 --> 04:53.078 grasp the truths about numbers. 04:53.079 --> 04:56.619 Plato thought everything was like that. 04:56.620 --> 04:59.400 Well, I'm not going to argue for and against that view--just 04:59.400 --> 05:01.430 wanted to sketch it, so as to understand the 05:01.426 --> 05:02.836 arguments that turn on it. 05:02.839 --> 05:07.019 So for our purposes, let's suppose Plato was right 05:07.022 --> 05:10.012 about that and ask, what follows? 05:10.009 --> 05:13.529 Well, Plato thinks what's going to follow is that we have some 05:13.526 --> 05:16.636 reason to believe in the immortality of the soul as, 05:16.639 --> 05:22.589 again, as we indicated last time, the picture is that the 05:22.594 --> 05:29.084 mind--the soul--is able to grasp these eternal Platonic forms, 05:29.081 --> 05:32.601 the ideas. Typically, we're distracted 05:32.597 --> 05:37.027 from thinking about them by the distractions provided by the 05:37.028 --> 05:40.928 body--the desire for food, drink, sex, what have you, 05:40.933 --> 05:43.553 sleep. But by distancing itself from 05:43.550 --> 05:46.390 the body, the mind, the soul, is able to better 05:46.391 --> 05:48.121 concentrate on the forms. 05:48.120 --> 05:51.390 And if you're good at that, if you practice while you're 05:51.386 --> 05:53.936 alive, separating yourself from the body, 05:53.940 --> 05:57.360 then when your body dies, the mind is able to go up to 05:57.363 --> 06:01.173 this Platonic heavenly realm and commune with gods and other 06:01.173 --> 06:04.083 immortal souls and think about the forms. 06:04.079 --> 06:09.149 But if you've not separated yourself from the body while in 06:09.145 --> 06:13.245 life, if you're too enmeshed in its concerns, 06:13.250 --> 06:17.550 then upon the death of your body your soul will get sucked 06:17.547 --> 06:21.057 back in, reincarnated perhaps, in another body. 06:21.060 --> 06:22.450 If you're lucky, as another person; 06:22.449 --> 06:26.739 if you're not so lucky, as a pig or a donkey or an ant 06:26.741 --> 06:28.281 or what have you. 06:28.279 --> 06:32.119 So your goal, Plato says, your goal should 06:32.117 --> 06:37.357 be, in life, to practice death--to separate yourself from 06:37.359 --> 06:40.359 your body. And because of this, 06:40.356 --> 06:44.736 Socrates, who's facing death, isn't distressed at the 06:44.740 --> 06:46.680 prospect, but happy. 06:46.680 --> 06:51.090 He's happy that the final separation will take place and 06:51.092 --> 06:53.662 he'll be able to go to heaven. 06:53.660 --> 06:56.310 The dialogue ends, of course, with the death 06:56.308 --> 06:59.328 scene--Socrates has been condemned to death by the 06:59.327 --> 07:02.297 Athenians, and it ends with his drinking 07:02.302 --> 07:06.312 the hemlock, not distressed but rather sort of joyful. 07:06.310 --> 07:10.730 And the dialogue ends with one of the great moving death scenes 07:10.731 --> 07:15.081 in western civilization and as Plato says--let's get the quote 07:15.081 --> 07:18.791 here exactly right--"Of all those we have known, 07:18.790 --> 07:22.230 he was the best and also the wisest and the most upright." 07:22.230 --> 07:25.470 07:25.470 --> 07:28.090 Just before the death scene, there's a long myth, 07:28.086 --> 07:31.356 which I draw your attention to but I don't want to discuss in 07:31.356 --> 07:32.606 any kind of detail. 07:32.610 --> 07:35.630 Plato says it's a story; it's a myth. 07:35.629 --> 07:40.839 He's trying to indicate that there are things that we can't 07:40.844 --> 07:45.614 really know in a scientific way but we can glimpse. 07:45.610 --> 07:48.840 And the myth has to do with these sort of pictures I was 07:48.842 --> 07:52.432 just describing where we don't actually live on the surface of 07:52.426 --> 07:56.346 the Earth of in the light, but rather live in certain 07:56.345 --> 08:01.235 hollows in the dark where we're mistaken about the nature of 08:01.237 --> 08:03.377 reality. Some of you who are maybe 08:03.383 --> 08:06.303 familiar with Plato's later dialogue The Republic may 08:06.295 --> 08:08.215 recognize at least what seems to me, 08:08.220 --> 08:11.260 what we have here, is a foreshadowing of the myth 08:11.263 --> 08:13.993 of the cave, or the allegory of the cave, 08:13.990 --> 08:18.260 which Plato describes there as well. 08:18.259 --> 08:23.599 Our concern is going to be the arguments that make up the 08:23.597 --> 08:25.977 center of the dialogue. 08:25.980 --> 08:28.920 Because in the center of the dialogue, before he dies, 08:28.918 --> 08:31.078 Socrates is arguing with his friends. 08:31.079 --> 08:32.849 Socrates is saying, "Look, I'm not worried. 08:32.850 --> 08:34.600 I'm going to live forever." 08:34.600 --> 08:37.700 And his disciples and friends are worried whether this is true 08:37.702 --> 08:39.652 or not. And so the heart of the 08:39.654 --> 08:43.494 dialogue consists of a series of arguments in which Socrates 08:43.490 --> 08:47.590 attempts to lay out his reasons for believing in the immortality 08:47.585 --> 08:50.115 of the soul. And that's going to be our 08:50.123 --> 08:52.493 concern. What I'm going to do is 08:52.494 --> 08:57.474 basically run through my attempt to reconstruct--my attempt to 08:57.465 --> 09:01.945 lay out the basic ideas from this series of four or five 09:01.947 --> 09:04.797 arguments that Plato gives us. 09:04.800 --> 09:05.790 I'm going to criticize them. 09:05.789 --> 09:09.649 I don't think they work, though I want to remark before 09:09.645 --> 09:13.425 I turn to them that in saying this I'm not necessarily 09:13.429 --> 09:14.999 criticizing Plato. 09:15.000 --> 09:18.460 As we'll see, some of the later arguments 09:18.455 --> 09:23.985 seem to be deliberately aimed at answering objections that we can 09:23.985 --> 09:27.695 raise to some of the earlier arguments. 09:27.700 --> 09:32.780 And so it might well be that Plato himself recognized that 09:32.776 --> 09:38.116 the initial arguments aren't as strong as they need to be. 09:38.120 --> 09:44.230 Plato wrote the dialogues as a kind of learning device, 09:44.232 --> 09:51.252 as a tool to help the reader get better at doing philosophy. 09:51.250 --> 09:54.790 They don't necessarily represent in a systematic 09:54.792 --> 09:59.162 fashion Plato's worked out axiomatic views about the nature 09:59.163 --> 10:02.383 of philosophy. It could be that Plato's 10:02.376 --> 10:06.856 deliberately putting mistakes in earlier arguments so as to 10:06.863 --> 10:09.883 encourage you to think for yourself, 10:09.879 --> 10:13.249 "Oh, this is--here's a problem with this argument. 10:13.250 --> 10:14.830 There's an objection with that argument." 10:14.830 --> 10:18.940 Some of these, Plato then may address later 10:18.940 --> 10:21.010 on. But whether or not he does 10:21.012 --> 10:23.752 address them--we're not doing Plato any honor, 10:23.750 --> 10:25.880 we're not doing him any service, 10:25.879 --> 10:29.879 if we limit ourselves to simply trying to grasp, 10:29.884 --> 10:32.274 here's what Plato thought. 10:32.269 --> 10:34.779 We could do the history of ideas and say, 10:34.776 --> 10:36.276 "Here's Plato's views. 10:36.280 --> 10:37.430 Aren't they interesting? 10:37.429 --> 10:40.159 Notice how they differ from Aristotle's views. 10:40.160 --> 10:41.610 Aren't they interesting?" 10:41.610 --> 10:42.720 and move on like that. 10:42.720 --> 10:46.070 But that's not what the philosophers wanted us to do. 10:46.070 --> 10:50.480 The great philosophers had arguments that they were putting 10:50.478 --> 10:55.418 forward to try to persuade us of the truths of their positions. 10:55.419 --> 10:59.479 And the way you show respect for a philosopher is by taking 10:59.475 --> 11:02.615 those arguments seriously and asking yourself, 11:02.621 --> 11:04.301 do they work or not? 11:04.299 --> 11:09.189 So whether or not the views that are being put forward in 11:09.189 --> 11:12.419 Socrates' mouth are the considered, 11:12.419 --> 11:17.129 reflective judgments of Plato or not, for our purposes we can 11:17.129 --> 11:21.999 just act as though they were the arguments being put forward by 11:21.995 --> 11:24.335 Plato, and we can ask ourselves, 11:24.336 --> 11:26.886 "Do these arguments work or don't they?" 11:26.889 --> 11:30.169 So I'm going to run through a series of these arguments. 11:30.169 --> 11:32.469 I'm going to, as I've mentioned before, 11:32.471 --> 11:35.921 be a bit more exegetical than is normally the case for our 11:35.922 --> 11:38.552 readings. I'm going to actually pause, 11:38.545 --> 11:42.345 periodically look at my notes and make sure I'm remembering 11:42.348 --> 11:45.428 how I think Plato understands the arguments. 11:45.429 --> 11:48.639 Of course, since the dialogue is indeed a dialogue, 11:48.643 --> 11:52.243 we don't always have the arguments laid out with a series 11:52.243 --> 11:54.303 or premises and conclusions. 11:54.299 --> 11:57.659 And so it's always a matter of interpretation, 11:57.657 --> 12:02.127 what's the best reconstruction of the argument he's gesturing 12:02.134 --> 12:04.444 towards. How can we turn it into an 12:04.436 --> 12:06.596 argument with premises and conclusions? 12:06.600 --> 12:10.530 Well, that's what I'm going to try to do for us. 12:10.529 --> 12:13.519 Also going to give the arguments names. 12:13.519 --> 12:16.739 These are not names that Plato gives, but it will make it easy 12:16.739 --> 12:19.009 for us to get a fix, roughly, on the different 12:19.006 --> 12:20.906 arguments as we move from one to the next. 12:20.909 --> 12:23.769 So the first argument, and the worry that gets the 12:23.769 --> 12:25.519 whole things going, is this. 12:25.519 --> 12:29.009 So, we've got this nice Platonic picture where Plato 12:29.009 --> 12:30.309 says, "All right. 12:30.309 --> 12:32.959 So the mind can grasp the eternal forms, 12:32.960 --> 12:36.630 but it has to free itself from the body to do that." 12:36.629 --> 12:39.729 And so, the philosopher, who has sort of trained himself 12:39.726 --> 12:41.806 to separate his mind from his body, 12:41.809 --> 12:44.799 to disregard his bodily cravings and desires--the 12:44.798 --> 12:48.348 philosopher will welcome death because at that point he'll 12:48.347 --> 12:50.557 truly, finally, make the final break 12:50.558 --> 12:54.008 from the body. And the obvious worry that gets 12:54.014 --> 12:57.754 raised in the dialogue at this point is this: 12:57.752 --> 13:02.512 How do we know that when the death of the body occurs the 13:02.511 --> 13:05.911 soul doesn't get destroyed as well? 13:05.909 --> 13:07.569 That's the natural worry to have. 13:07.570 --> 13:13.180 Maybe what we need to do is separate ourselves as much as 13:13.176 --> 13:19.276 possible from the influence of our body without actually going 13:19.284 --> 13:23.694 all the way and breaking the connection. 13:23.690 --> 13:27.280 If you think about it like a rubber band, maybe the more we 13:27.275 --> 13:29.805 can stretch the rubber band the better; 13:29.809 --> 13:33.529 but if you stretch too far and the rubber band snaps, 13:33.532 --> 13:35.682 that's not good, that's bad. 13:35.679 --> 13:41.829 It could be that we need the body in order to continue 13:41.832 --> 13:45.142 thinking. We want to free ourselves from 13:45.135 --> 13:49.045 the distractions of the body, but we don't want the body to 13:49.051 --> 13:52.901 die, because when the body dies the soul dies as well. 13:52.899 --> 13:55.909 Even if we are dualists, as we've noticed before--even 13:55.911 --> 13:58.811 if the soul is something different from the body--it 13:58.809 --> 14:01.729 could still be the case, logically speaking, 14:01.732 --> 14:04.892 that if the body gets destroyed, the soul gets 14:04.887 --> 14:06.357 destroyed as well. 14:06.360 --> 14:10.360 And so, Socrates' friends ask him, how can we be confident 14:10.358 --> 14:14.638 that the soul will survive the death of the body and indeed be 14:14.638 --> 14:16.908 immortal? And that's what prompts the 14:16.905 --> 14:17.955 series of arguments. 14:17.960 --> 14:24.960 Now, the first such argument I dub "the argument from the 14:24.963 --> 14:27.843 nature of the forms." 14:27.840 --> 14:32.830 And the basic thought is fairly straightforward. 14:32.830 --> 14:37.710 The ideas or the forms--justice itself, beauty itself, 14:37.713 --> 14:42.693 goodness itself--the forms are not physical objects. 14:42.690 --> 14:47.040 Right? We don't ever bump into justice 14:47.040 --> 14:49.750 itself. We bump into societies that may 14:49.751 --> 14:52.671 be more or less just, or individuals who may be more 14:52.666 --> 14:55.116 or less just, but we never bump into justice 14:55.124 --> 14:57.044 itself. The number three is not a 14:57.036 --> 14:59.126 physical object. Goodness itself is not a 14:59.134 --> 15:02.534 physical object. Perfect roundness is not a 15:02.527 --> 15:06.147 physical object. Now, roughly speaking, 15:06.154 --> 15:10.144 Socrates' seems to think it's going to follow 15:10.144 --> 15:15.134 straightforwardly from that that the soul must itself be 15:15.131 --> 15:17.671 something non-physical. 15:17.669 --> 15:23.139 If the forms are not physical objects, then Socrates thinks it 15:23.140 --> 15:26.010 follows they can't be grasped. 15:26.009 --> 15:28.729 We can certainly think about the forms, but if they're 15:28.727 --> 15:31.547 non-physical they can't be grasped by something physical 15:31.547 --> 15:34.427 like the body. They've got to be grasped by 15:34.426 --> 15:37.356 something non-physical--namely, the soul. 15:37.360 --> 15:40.680 But although that's, I think, the sketch of where 15:40.676 --> 15:44.126 Socrates wants to go, it doesn't quite give us what 15:44.130 --> 15:46.190 we want. On the one hand, 15:46.189 --> 15:50.569 even if it were true that the soul must be non-physical in 15:50.569 --> 15:53.719 order to grasp the non-physical forms, 15:53.720 --> 15:56.980 wouldn't follow that the soul will survive the death of the 15:56.976 --> 15:59.406 body. That's the problem we've been 15:59.408 --> 16:01.938 thinking about for the last minute. 16:01.940 --> 16:03.380 And there's something puzzling. 16:03.379 --> 16:07.389 We might wonder, well, just why is it that the 16:07.387 --> 16:09.967 body can't grasp the forms? 16:09.970 --> 16:14.360 So there's a fuller version of the argument that's the one I 16:14.364 --> 16:15.784 want to focus on. 16:15.779 --> 16:17.469 And indeed, I put it up on the board. 16:17.470 --> 16:21.330 16:21.330 --> 16:27.230 So Platonic metaphysics gives us premise number one--that 16:27.227 --> 16:31.017 ideas, forms, are eternal and they're 16:31.019 --> 16:35.799 non-physical. Two--that which is eternal or 16:35.797 --> 16:41.357 non-physical can only be grasped by the eternal and the 16:41.361 --> 16:45.051 non-physical. Suppose we had both of those. 16:45.049 --> 16:50.319 It would seem to give us three, the conclusion we want--that 16:50.323 --> 16:55.063 which grasps the ideas or the forms must be eternal or 16:55.060 --> 16:57.820 non-physical. What is it that grasps the 16:57.823 --> 16:58.783 ideas or the forms? 16:58.780 --> 17:00.500 Well, that's the soul. 17:00.500 --> 17:02.630 If that which grasps the ideas or the forms must be 17:02.630 --> 17:04.760 eternal/non-physical, well one thing we're going to 17:04.761 --> 17:07.781 get is, since that which grasps the 17:07.783 --> 17:12.893 forms must be non-physical, the soul is not the body. 17:12.890 --> 17:17.450 Since that which grasps the ideas or forms must be eternal 17:17.445 --> 17:20.955 or non-physical--it's eternal, it's immortal. 17:20.961 --> 17:24.101 All right. Let's look at this again more 17:24.095 --> 17:27.765 carefully. Ideas or forms are eternal; 17:27.770 --> 17:28.720 they're non-physical. 17:28.720 --> 17:31.540 Well, I've emphasized the non-physical aspect, 17:31.540 --> 17:35.050 and I've emphasized as well that they're not changing. 17:35.049 --> 17:39.599 But perhaps it's worth taking a moment to emphasize the eternal 17:39.596 --> 17:41.206 aspect of the forms. 17:41.210 --> 17:47.380 Now, people may come and go, but perfect justice--the idea 17:47.384 --> 17:51.504 of perfect justice--that's timeless. 17:51.500 --> 17:56.820 Nothing that happens here on Earth can change or alter or 17:56.823 --> 17:59.393 destroy the number three. 17:59.390 --> 18:02.680 Two plus one equaled three before there were people; 18:02.680 --> 18:07.590 two plus one equals three now; two plus one will always equal 18:07.589 --> 18:10.189 three. The number three is eternal, 18:10.187 --> 18:12.407 as well as being non-physical. 18:12.410 --> 18:15.460 So the Platonic metaphysics says quite generally, 18:15.455 --> 18:18.365 if we're thinking about the ideas or the forms, 18:18.374 --> 18:21.044 the point to grasp is they're eternal; 18:21.040 --> 18:23.500 they're non-physical. 18:23.500 --> 18:27.490 The crucial premise--since we're giving Plato number 18:27.492 --> 18:32.662 one--the crucial premise for our purposes is premise number two. 18:32.660 --> 18:38.310 Is it or isn't it true that those things which are eternal 18:38.309 --> 18:43.759 or non-physical can only be grasped by something that is 18:43.761 --> 18:47.331 itself eternal and non-physical? 18:47.329 --> 18:51.359 Again, it does seem as though the conclusion that he wants, 18:51.358 --> 18:53.718 number three, follows from that. 18:53.720 --> 18:56.750 If we give him number two, it's going to follow that 18:56.745 --> 18:59.585 whatever's doing the grasping--call that the soul 18:59.592 --> 19:03.272 since the soul is just Plato's word for our mind--if whatever's 19:03.270 --> 19:06.530 doing the grasping of the eternal and non-physical forms 19:06.532 --> 19:09.382 must itself be eternal and non-physical, 19:09.380 --> 19:12.670 it follows that the soul must be non-physical. 19:12.670 --> 19:17.060 So the physicalist view is wrong and the soul must be 19:17.056 --> 19:21.056 eternal. The soul is immortal. 19:21.059 --> 19:26.969 So Socrates has what he wants, once we give him premise number 19:26.974 --> 19:31.434 two, that the eternal, non-physical can only be 19:31.434 --> 19:35.414 grasped by the eternal, non-physical. 19:35.410 --> 19:43.790 As Socrates puts it at one point, "The impure cannot attain 19:43.786 --> 19:47.686 the pure." Bodies--corruptible, 19:47.694 --> 19:52.374 destroyable, physical, passing--whether they 19:52.370 --> 19:55.770 exist or not, whether they exist for a brief 19:55.767 --> 19:58.857 period and then they cease to exist--these impure objects 19:58.860 --> 20:01.000 cannot attain, cannot grasp, 20:00.998 --> 20:06.528 cannot have knowledge of the eternal, changeless non-physical 20:06.530 --> 20:10.500 forms. "The impure cannot attain the 20:10.501 --> 20:13.491 pure." That's the crucial premise, 20:13.485 --> 20:18.095 and what I want to say is, as far as I can see there's no 20:18.100 --> 20:21.150 good reason to believe number two. 20:21.150 --> 20:24.200 Now, number two is not an unfamiliar--premise number two 20:24.201 --> 20:25.811 is not an unfamiliar claim. 20:25.809 --> 20:30.609 I take it the claim basically is that, to put it in more 20:30.612 --> 20:34.632 familiar language, it takes one to know one. 20:34.630 --> 20:37.280 Or to use it, slightly other kind of language 20:37.278 --> 20:40.468 that Plato uses at various points, "Likes are known by 20:40.467 --> 20:43.027 likes." But it takes one to know one is 20:43.034 --> 20:46.294 probably the most familiar way of putting the point. 20:46.289 --> 20:49.749 Plato's saying, "What is it that we know? 20:49.750 --> 20:53.760 Well, we know the eternal forms; takes one to know one. 20:53.759 --> 20:57.919 So we must ourselves be eternal." 20:57.920 --> 20:59.680 Unfortunately, this thought, 20:59.679 --> 21:02.999 popular as it may be, that it takes one to know one, 21:03.001 --> 21:04.371 just seems false. 21:04.370 --> 21:05.970 Think about some examples. 21:05.970 --> 21:10.250 Well, let's see, a biologist might study, 21:10.252 --> 21:14.002 or a zoologist might study, cats. 21:14.000 --> 21:17.740 Takes one to know one, so the biologist must himself 21:17.742 --> 21:21.192 be a cat. Well, that's clearly false. 21:21.190 --> 21:28.440 You don't have to be feline to study the feline. 21:28.440 --> 21:33.030 Takes one to know one; so, you can't be a Canadian and 21:33.033 --> 21:36.983 study Mexicans, because it takes one to know 21:36.977 --> 21:39.197 one. Well, that's just clearly 21:39.195 --> 21:41.795 stupid. Of course the Canadians can 21:41.795 --> 21:46.215 study the Mexicans and the Germans can study the French. 21:46.220 --> 21:48.720 It does not take one to know one; 21:48.720 --> 21:53.070 to understand the truths about the French, you do not yourself 21:53.072 --> 21:54.502 need to be French. 21:54.500 --> 22:01.800 Or take the fact that some doctors study dead bodies. 22:01.800 --> 22:04.600 Aha! So to study and grasp things 22:04.599 --> 22:08.379 about dead bodies, corpses, you must yourself be a 22:08.377 --> 22:10.757 dead body. No, that certainly doesn't 22:10.764 --> 22:13.074 follow. So if we start actually pushing 22:13.073 --> 22:16.293 ourselves to think about examples--does it really take 22:16.294 --> 22:21.074 one to know one--the answer is, at least as a general claim, 22:21.068 --> 22:26.248 it's not true. It doesn't normally take one to 22:26.247 --> 22:30.447 know one. Now, strictly speaking, 22:30.446 --> 22:36.436 that doesn't prove that premise two is false. 22:36.440 --> 22:40.430 It could still be that, although normally you don't 22:40.427 --> 22:44.967 have to be like the thing that you're studying in order to 22:44.973 --> 22:48.683 study it, although that's not normally 22:48.682 --> 22:54.412 true, it could be that in the particular case of non-physical 22:54.410 --> 22:57.630 objects, in the particular case of 22:57.627 --> 23:01.267 eternal objects, you do have to be eternal, 23:01.268 --> 23:03.868 non-physical to study them. 23:03.869 --> 23:06.809 It could be that even though the general claim, 23:06.805 --> 23:09.225 "it takes one to know one" is false, 23:09.230 --> 23:12.530 the particular claim, "eternal, non-physical can only 23:12.531 --> 23:16.561 be grasped by the eternal, non-physical," maybe that 23:16.559 --> 23:18.899 particular claim is true. 23:18.900 --> 23:24.210 And it's only the particular claim that Plato needs. 23:24.210 --> 23:32.320 Still, all I can say is, why should we believe two? 23:32.319 --> 23:37.099 Why should we think there's some--Even though, 23:37.099 --> 23:43.049 normally, the barrier can be crossed and Xs can study the 23:43.047 --> 23:45.627 non-X, why should that barrier 23:45.633 --> 23:49.543 suddenly become un-crossable in the particular instance when 23:49.539 --> 23:51.989 we're dealing with Platonic forms? 23:51.990 --> 23:58.010 Give us some reason to believe premise two. 23:58.009 --> 24:01.519 I can't see any good reason to believe premise two, 24:01.520 --> 24:05.310 and as far as I can see, Plato doesn't actually give us 24:05.310 --> 24:08.470 any reason to believe it in the dialogue. 24:08.470 --> 24:10.540 Consequently, we have to say, 24:10.539 --> 24:13.869 as far as I can see, we haven't been given any 24:13.865 --> 24:18.005 adequate argument for the conclusion that the soul--which 24:18.005 --> 24:22.285 admittedly can think about forms and ideas--we have no good 24:22.292 --> 24:25.422 reason yet to believe, to be persuaded, 24:25.418 --> 24:28.538 that the soul must itself be eternal and non-physical. 24:28.540 --> 24:32.020 24:32.020 --> 24:33.890 That's the first argument. 24:33.890 --> 24:36.870 As I say though, Plato may well recognize the 24:36.865 --> 24:40.845 inadequacy of that argument, because after all Socrates goes 24:40.854 --> 24:43.834 on to offer a series of other arguments. 24:43.830 --> 24:46.860 So let's turn to the next. 24:46.859 --> 24:51.139 I call the second argument "the argument from recycling"--not 24:51.144 --> 24:54.864 the best label I suppose, but I've never been able to 24:54.857 --> 24:56.997 come up with a better one. 24:57.000 --> 25:02.750 And the basic idea is that parts get re-used. 25:02.750 --> 25:07.420 Things move from one state to another state and then back to 25:07.416 --> 25:09.996 the first state. So, for example, 25:10.002 --> 25:14.362 to give an example that Plato actually gives in the dialogue, 25:14.363 --> 25:18.363 we are all awake now, but previously we were asleep. 25:18.359 --> 25:22.629 We went from being in the realm of the asleep to being in the 25:22.626 --> 25:26.216 realm of the awake, and we're going to return from 25:26.222 --> 25:30.572 the realm of the awake back to the realm of the asleep and over 25:30.567 --> 25:32.457 and over and over again. 25:32.460 --> 25:35.000 Hence, recycling. 25:35.000 --> 25:38.630 I think that actually a better example for Plato's purposes, 25:38.631 --> 25:41.891 not that I expect him to have this particular example, 25:41.892 --> 25:43.372 but, would be a car. 25:43.369 --> 25:52.099 Cars are made up of parts that existed before the car itself 25:52.100 --> 25:55.650 existed. There was the engine and the 25:55.646 --> 25:58.816 steering wheel and the tires and so forth. 25:58.819 --> 26:03.829 And these parts got assembled and put together to make up a 26:03.831 --> 26:07.801 car. So the parts of the car existed 26:07.802 --> 26:12.482 prior to the existence of the car itself. 26:12.480 --> 26:18.000 And the time is going to come when the car will cease to exist 26:18.001 --> 26:21.351 but its parts will still be around. 26:21.350 --> 26:23.690 Right? It'll get taken apart for 26:23.688 --> 26:25.488 parts, sold for parts. 26:25.490 --> 26:28.350 There will be the distributor cap, and there will be the 26:28.349 --> 26:31.309 tires, and there will be the carburetor, there will be the 26:31.312 --> 26:33.722 steering wheel. Hence, the name, 26:33.717 --> 26:38.677 that I dub the argument, "the argument from recycling." 26:38.680 --> 26:44.350 That's the nature of reality for Plato. 26:44.349 --> 26:47.099 And it seems like a plausible enough view. 26:47.099 --> 26:53.679 Things come into being by being composed of previously existing 26:53.680 --> 26:56.490 parts. And then, when those things 26:56.490 --> 27:00.850 cease to have the form they had, the parts get used for other 27:00.848 --> 27:04.558 purposes. They get recycled. 27:04.559 --> 27:09.429 If we grant that to Plato, he thinks we've got an argument 27:09.426 --> 27:12.326 for the immortality of the soul. 27:12.329 --> 27:16.759 Because after all, what are the parts that make us 27:16.758 --> 27:18.548 up? Well, there are the various 27:18.553 --> 27:21.293 parts of our physical body, but there's also our soul. 27:21.289 --> 27:24.439 Remember, as I said, in introducing the 27:24.438 --> 27:28.168 Phaedo, Plato doesn't so much argue for 27:28.166 --> 27:31.476 the existence of something separate, 27:31.480 --> 27:33.650 the soul, as presuppose it. 27:33.650 --> 27:37.720 His fundamental concern is to try to argue for the immortality 27:37.724 --> 27:40.254 of the soul. So he's just helping himself to 27:40.251 --> 27:42.151 the assumption that there is a soul. 27:42.150 --> 27:46.010 It's one of the parts that makes us, that goes up into 27:46.009 --> 27:48.849 making us up, goes into making us up. 27:48.849 --> 27:51.949 It's one of the pieces that constitutes us. 27:51.950 --> 27:55.240 Given the thesis about recycling, then, 27:55.238 --> 28:00.088 we have reason to believe the soul will continue to exist 28:00.085 --> 28:03.615 after we break. Even after our death, 28:03.619 --> 28:06.679 our parts will continue to exist. 28:06.680 --> 28:10.270 Our body continues to exist even after our death. 28:10.270 --> 28:12.180 Our soul will continue to exist. 28:12.180 --> 28:17.310 28:17.309 --> 28:22.689 Well, there's a problem with the argument from recycling, 28:22.692 --> 28:26.772 and it's this. Even if the recycling thesis 28:26.772 --> 28:32.132 shows us that we're made up of something that existed before 28:32.130 --> 28:37.940 our birth and that some kinds of parts are going to have to exist 28:37.942 --> 28:42.132 after our death, we can't conclude that the soul 28:42.132 --> 28:46.702 is one of the parts that's going to continue to exist after our 28:46.697 --> 28:47.357 death. 28:47.360 --> 28:50.940 28:50.940 --> 28:54.560 Consider some familiar facts about human bodies. 28:54.559 --> 28:58.829 As we nowadays know, human bodies are made up of 28:58.832 --> 29:01.952 atoms. And it's certainly true that 29:01.954 --> 29:06.834 the atoms that make up my body existed long before my body 29:06.829 --> 29:09.589 existed. And it's certainly true that 29:09.588 --> 29:13.418 after my death those atoms are going to continue to exist. 29:13.420 --> 29:16.740 So there's some--and will eventually get used to make 29:16.743 --> 29:20.473 something else. So Plato's certainly right 29:20.469 --> 29:24.529 about recycling as a fundamental truth. 29:24.529 --> 29:27.009 The things that make me up existed before, 29:27.009 --> 29:29.669 and will continue to exist after my death. 29:29.670 --> 29:33.100 29:33.099 --> 29:39.019 But that doesn't mean that every part of my body existed 29:39.018 --> 29:44.178 before I was born, and that every part of my body 29:44.183 --> 29:48.383 will continue to exist after I die. 29:48.380 --> 29:54.870 Take my heart. My heart is a part of my body. 29:54.869 --> 29:58.429 Yet, for all that, it didn't exist before my body 29:58.429 --> 30:02.159 began to exist. It came into existence as part 30:02.162 --> 30:05.382 of, along with, the creation of my body, 30:05.377 --> 30:09.857 and it won't continue to exist, at least not very long, 30:09.858 --> 30:12.338 after the destruction of my body. 30:12.339 --> 30:15.259 There'll be a brief period in which, as a cadaver I suppose, 30:15.264 --> 30:16.954 my heart will continue to exist. 30:16.950 --> 30:20.180 But eventually my body will decompose. 30:20.180 --> 30:24.040 We certainly wouldn't have any grounds to conclude my heart is 30:24.038 --> 30:25.998 immortal, will exist forever. 30:26.000 --> 30:29.790 That just seems wrong. 30:29.789 --> 30:35.319 So even though it's true that some kind of recycling takes 30:35.324 --> 30:41.154 place, we can't conclude that everything that's now a part of 30:41.149 --> 30:45.129 me will continue to exist afterwards. 30:45.130 --> 30:49.230 It might not have been one of the parts, one of the 30:49.227 --> 30:53.157 fundamental parts, from which I'm built--like the 30:53.160 --> 30:56.070 heart. And if that's right, 30:56.070 --> 31:02.340 if there can be parts that I have now that weren't one of the 31:02.340 --> 31:07.150 parts from which I was made, there's no particular reason to 31:07.148 --> 31:09.878 think it's going to be one of the parts that's going to 31:09.880 --> 31:11.550 continue to exist after I die. 31:11.549 --> 31:15.699 Once we see that kind of worry, we have to see, 31:15.699 --> 31:20.209 look, the same thing could be true for the soul. 31:20.210 --> 31:24.690 Even if there is an immortal soul--Sorry. 31:24.690 --> 31:28.920 Even if there is a non-physical soul that's part of me, 31:28.921 --> 31:33.541 we don't yet have any reason to believe that it's one of the 31:33.543 --> 31:38.013 fundamental building blocks that were being recycled. 31:38.009 --> 31:41.959 We don't have adequate reason to conclude that it's something 31:41.960 --> 31:44.660 that existed before I was put together, 31:44.660 --> 31:48.710 it's something that will be recycled and continue to exist 31:48.708 --> 31:51.948 after I fall apart, after my body decomposes, 31:51.953 --> 31:55.603 after I'm separated from my body, or what have you. 31:55.599 --> 32:02.519 Even if recycling takes place, we don't have any good reason 32:02.521 --> 32:09.561 yet to believe that the soul is one of the recycled parts. 32:09.559 --> 32:14.709 So it seems to me "the argument from recycling," as I call it, 32:14.710 --> 32:16.990 is not successful either. 32:16.990 --> 32:23.220 32:23.220 --> 32:26.190 Now, as I say, many times when you read the 32:26.193 --> 32:29.383 dialogue, this or other dialogues by Plato, 32:29.380 --> 32:34.640 it seems as though he's fully cognizant of the objections that 32:34.639 --> 32:39.729 at least an attentive reader will raise about earlier stages 32:39.725 --> 32:43.845 of the argument. Because sometimes the best way 32:43.849 --> 32:48.569 to understand a later argument is to see it as responding to 32:48.569 --> 32:51.689 the weaknesses of earlier arguments. 32:51.690 --> 32:56.030 And I think that's pretty clearly what's going on in the 32:56.032 --> 33:00.062 very next argument that comes up in the dialogue. 33:00.059 --> 33:04.339 The objection I just raised, after all, to the argument from 33:04.335 --> 33:08.165 recycling, said, in effect, even though some 33:08.167 --> 33:13.967 kind of recycling takes place, not all my parts get recycled, 33:13.970 --> 33:18.710 because not all of my parts were among the pre-existing 33:18.705 --> 33:22.735 constituent pieces from which I am built up. 33:22.740 --> 33:26.150 We don't have any particular reason to think my heart's one 33:26.148 --> 33:30.028 of the prior-existing pieces; we don't have any good reason 33:30.029 --> 33:34.219 to assume that my soul's one of the prior-existing pieces. 33:34.220 --> 33:40.350 Well, Plato's very next argument attempts to persuade us 33:40.351 --> 33:47.381 that indeed we do have reason to believe that the soul is one of 33:47.375 --> 33:50.715 the prior-existing pieces. 33:50.720 --> 33:57.540 And this argument is known as "the argument from 33:57.538 --> 34:00.778 recollection." The idea is, 34:00.783 --> 34:05.093 he's going to tell us certain facts that need explaining, 34:05.094 --> 34:09.174 and the best explanation involves a certain fact about 34:09.174 --> 34:11.954 recollecting, or a certain claim about 34:11.954 --> 34:13.644 recollecting or remembering. 34:13.639 --> 34:17.419 But we can only remember, he thinks, in the relevant way 34:17.422 --> 34:20.722 if our soul existed before the birth of our body, 34:20.724 --> 34:23.204 before the creation of our body. 34:23.200 --> 34:29.250 All right. What's the crucial fact? 34:29.250 --> 34:32.910 Well, let's start by--Plato starts by telling us, 34:32.905 --> 34:36.785 reminding us of what it is to remember something. 34:36.789 --> 34:43.019 Or perhaps a better word would be what is it to be reminded of 34:43.021 --> 34:49.051 something by something else that resembles it but is not the 34:49.049 --> 34:51.909 thing it reminds you of. 34:51.909 --> 34:58.459 I might have a photograph of my friend Ruth. 34:58.460 --> 35:03.260 And looking at the photograph reminds me of Ruth. 35:03.260 --> 35:05.810 It brings Ruth to mind. 35:05.810 --> 35:07.680 I start thinking about Ruth. 35:07.679 --> 35:11.209 I remember various things I know about Ruth. 35:11.210 --> 35:15.240 The photograph is able to do that, is able to trigger these 35:15.244 --> 35:16.944 thoughts. But of course, 35:16.943 --> 35:18.813 the photograph is not Ruth. 35:18.810 --> 35:21.780 Right? Nobody would--who's thinking 35:21.775 --> 35:25.965 clearly--would confuse the photograph with my friend. 35:25.969 --> 35:30.579 But the photograph resembles Ruth. 35:30.579 --> 35:35.619 It resembles Ruth well enough to remind me of her, 35:35.621 --> 35:40.661 and interestingly, it can do that even if it's not 35:40.662 --> 35:43.442 a very good photograph. 35:43.440 --> 35:46.400 You might hold up the photograph and I might say, 35:46.397 --> 35:50.277 "Gosh, that really doesn't look very much like Ruth does it?" 35:50.280 --> 35:54.120 Even though I see that it is a photograph of Ruth; 35:54.120 --> 35:56.760 it reminds me of her. 35:56.760 --> 36:02.970 Now, how could it be that a photograph reminds me of my 36:02.974 --> 36:05.654 friend? Well, this isn't some deep 36:05.651 --> 36:09.241 mystery. Presumably the way it works is, 36:09.244 --> 36:13.444 as I just said, it looks sort of like her. 36:13.440 --> 36:15.360 It doesn't have to look very much like her. 36:15.360 --> 36:16.750 It looks sort of like her. 36:16.750 --> 36:21.550 Your young brother or sister, or my little children, 36:21.554 --> 36:26.834 can draw pictures of family members that barely look like 36:26.830 --> 36:30.650 family members. My niece drew a picture of my 36:30.645 --> 36:32.875 family once when she was three. 36:32.880 --> 36:36.770 It didn't look very much like us at all, but we could sort of 36:36.769 --> 36:40.139 see the resemblance in a vague kind of way, right? 36:40.139 --> 36:45.849 So it's got to look at least somewhat like the missing 36:45.850 --> 36:49.000 friend. But that's not enough. 36:49.000 --> 36:51.540 You've never met Ruth, let's suppose. 36:51.539 --> 36:54.259 I hold up the photograph without having told you anything 36:54.257 --> 36:56.847 about her. The photograph's not going to 36:56.852 --> 36:58.242 remind you of Ruth. 36:58.240 --> 37:02.090 Why not? Well, you don't know Ruth. 37:02.090 --> 37:07.340 So the pieces we need are not only an image of Ruth, 37:07.336 --> 37:13.296 even if an imperfect image of Ruth, we also need some prior 37:13.302 --> 37:16.082 acquaintance with Ruth. 37:16.079 --> 37:17.509 That's pretty much what it takes, right? 37:17.510 --> 37:23.500 So on the one hand--temporal sequence--first you know Ruth, 37:23.497 --> 37:27.417 you meet Ruth, you get to know Ruth. 37:27.420 --> 37:32.840 Then at a later time you're shown an image of Ruth--maybe 37:32.836 --> 37:38.346 not even an especially good image of Ruth--but good enough 37:38.349 --> 37:41.219 to remind you. And suddenly, 37:41.221 --> 37:45.311 you're remembering things you know about Ruth. 37:45.310 --> 37:47.180 That's how recollection works. 37:47.180 --> 37:50.810 37:50.810 --> 37:55.630 All right. Now, Plato points out that we 37:55.630 --> 37:59.440 all know things about the Platonic forms. 37:59.440 --> 38:03.020 38:03.019 --> 38:07.139 But the Platonic forms, as we also know, 38:07.143 --> 38:10.953 are not to be found in this world. 38:10.949 --> 38:14.069 The number three is not a physical object, 38:14.067 --> 38:17.257 perfect roundness is not a physical object, 38:17.261 --> 38:20.761 perfect goodness is not a physical object. 38:20.760 --> 38:24.040 We can think about these things; our mind can grasp them, 38:24.038 --> 38:27.348 but they're not to be found in this world. 38:27.349 --> 38:31.919 Yet, various things that we do find in this world get us 38:31.918 --> 38:34.408 thinking about those things. 38:34.410 --> 38:37.500 38:37.500 --> 38:40.950 I look at the plate on my kitchen table, 38:40.949 --> 38:45.459 it's not perfectly round, it's got imperfections; 38:45.460 --> 38:48.860 but suddenly I start thinking about circles, 38:48.856 --> 38:50.906 perfectly round objects. 38:50.910 --> 38:57.030 I look at somebody who's pretty. 38:57.030 --> 39:01.420 He or she is not perfectly beautiful, but suddenly I start 39:01.416 --> 39:04.876 thinking about the nature of beauty itself. 39:04.880 --> 39:10.370 Ordinary objects in the world participate to a greater or 39:10.366 --> 39:14.086 lesser degree in the Platonic forms. 39:14.090 --> 39:17.710 That's Plato's picture of metaphysics. 39:17.710 --> 39:21.820 And we bump up against, we look at, we have 39:21.815 --> 39:26.405 interactions with these everyday objects and, 39:26.409 --> 39:32.149 somehow, they get us thinking about the Platonic forms 39:32.151 --> 39:35.601 themselves. How does it happen? 39:35.600 --> 39:38.010 Plato has a theory. 39:38.010 --> 39:45.310 He says, "These things remind us of the Platonic forms." 39:45.309 --> 39:50.339 We see something that's beautiful to some degree, 39:50.344 --> 39:54.334 and it reminds us of perfect beauty. 39:54.329 --> 39:59.929 We see something that's more or less round, and it reminds us of 39:59.933 --> 40:01.893 perfect circularity. 40:01.889 --> 40:06.159 We see somebody who's fairly decent morally, 40:06.164 --> 40:11.834 and it reminds us of perfect justice or perfect virtue. 40:11.829 --> 40:18.409 It's just like the photograph, perhaps the not very good 40:18.413 --> 40:24.163 photograph, that reminds me of my friend Ruth. 40:24.160 --> 40:26.370 All right. Well, there's an explanation of 40:26.365 --> 40:29.525 how it could be that things that are not themselves perfectly 40:29.531 --> 40:31.951 round could remind us, could make us think about 40:31.946 --> 40:32.776 perfect roundness. 40:32.780 --> 40:36.660 But then Plato says, "Okay, but keep in mind 40:36.656 --> 40:41.516 all of what you need in order to have reminding, 40:41.524 --> 40:44.864 to have recollecting take place." 40:44.860 --> 40:50.440 In order for the photograph to remind me of Ruth, 40:50.444 --> 40:54.404 I have to already have met Ruth. 40:54.400 --> 40:57.030 I have to already be acquainted with her. 40:57.030 --> 41:00.200 41:00.199 --> 41:07.309 In order for a more or less round plate to remind me of 41:07.310 --> 41:13.630 roundness, Plato says, I have to have already met 41:13.631 --> 41:17.451 perfect roundness itself. 41:17.449 --> 41:21.519 In order for a more or less just society to remind me of 41:21.524 --> 41:24.714 justice itself, so that I can start thinking 41:24.710 --> 41:27.600 about the nature of justice itself, 41:27.599 --> 41:32.189 I have to somehow have already been acquainted with perfect 41:32.188 --> 41:32.978 justice. 41:32.980 --> 41:36.210 41:36.210 --> 41:38.940 But how and when did it happen? 41:38.940 --> 41:42.310 Not in this life, not in this world. 41:42.309 --> 41:45.559 In this world nothing is perfectly round, 41:45.557 --> 41:50.427 nothing is perfectly beautiful, nothing is perfectly just. 41:50.429 --> 41:55.859 So it's got to have happened before. 41:55.860 --> 42:01.630 If seeing the photograph of my friend now can remind me of my 42:01.627 --> 42:07.007 friend, it's got to be because I met my friend before. 42:07.010 --> 42:12.980 If seeing things that participate in the forms remind 42:12.978 --> 42:18.368 me of the forms, it's got to be because I've met 42:18.372 --> 42:24.572 or been acquainted directly with the forms before. 42:24.570 --> 42:28.380 But you don't bump up against, you don't meet, 42:28.379 --> 42:33.199 you don't see or grasp or become directly acquainted with, 42:33.204 --> 42:35.494 the forms in this life. 42:35.489 --> 42:40.569 So it's got to have happened before this life. 42:40.570 --> 42:42.990 That's Plato's argument. 42:42.989 --> 42:50.669 Plato says, thinking about the way in which we grasp the forms 42:50.674 --> 42:58.614 helps us to see that the soul must have existed before birth, 42:58.610 --> 43:03.520 in the Platonic heavenly realm, directly grasping, 43:03.516 --> 43:09.476 directly communing with, directly understanding the 43:09.484 --> 43:12.794 forms. It's not taking place in this 43:12.788 --> 43:16.178 life, so it has to have happened before. 43:16.179 --> 43:20.359 Well, look, now we've got the kind of argument we were looking 43:20.358 --> 43:22.448 for. Earlier the objection was, 43:22.447 --> 43:26.447 we had no good reason to think the soul was one of the building 43:26.447 --> 43:28.767 blocks from which we're composed; 43:28.769 --> 43:33.679 we have no good reason to think it's one of the pieces that was 43:33.684 --> 43:38.444 around before our body got put together, before our birth. 43:38.440 --> 43:39.460 Socrates says, "No. 43:39.460 --> 43:41.870 On the contrary, we do have reason, 43:41.870 --> 43:44.630 based on the argument from recollection, 43:44.634 --> 43:49.034 to conclude that the soul was around before we were born." 43:49.030 --> 43:54.570 43:54.570 --> 43:56.510 All right. So the next question is, 43:56.508 --> 43:59.418 is the argument from recollection a good one? 43:59.420 --> 44:02.490 44:02.489 --> 44:05.089 Now, let's say, I'm not really much concerned 44:05.087 --> 44:08.097 with whether this was an argument that Plato thought 44:08.097 --> 44:10.317 worked or not. Our question is, 44:10.316 --> 44:12.916 do we think it works or not? 44:12.920 --> 44:15.870 Although this is a form of an argument that Plato does put 44:15.873 --> 44:17.793 forward in other dialogues as well, 44:17.789 --> 44:21.419 and so it strikes me so there's at least some reason to think 44:21.416 --> 44:24.736 this is an argument that he felt might well be right. 44:24.739 --> 44:29.359 The crucial premise--Again, we're going to just grant Plato 44:29.357 --> 44:33.997 the metaphysics. The crucial question is going 44:33.995 --> 44:40.735 to be, is it right that in order to explain how it is we could 44:40.738 --> 44:47.148 have knowledge of the forms now that we have to appeal to a 44:47.149 --> 44:53.449 prior existence in which we had direct acquaintance? 44:53.449 --> 44:58.739 It's not obvious to me that that's true. 44:58.739 --> 45:00.399 It's not obvious to me for a couple of reasons. 45:00.400 --> 45:04.710 One question is this: Is it really true that in order 45:04.712 --> 45:08.032 to think about the perfectly straight, 45:08.030 --> 45:12.850 I must have somehow, somewhere at some point come up 45:12.851 --> 45:16.161 against, had direct knowledge of, 45:16.160 --> 45:19.430 the perfectly straight? 45:19.429 --> 45:25.829 Isn't it enough for me to extrapolate from cases that I do 45:25.829 --> 45:29.309 come up against in this life? 45:29.309 --> 45:32.179 I come across things that are bent; 45:32.179 --> 45:34.799 I come across things that are more straight, 45:34.797 --> 45:36.317 more and more straight. 45:36.320 --> 45:42.720 Can't my mind take off from there and push straight ahead to 45:42.717 --> 45:48.677 the idea of the perfectly straight, even if I never have 45:48.680 --> 45:51.500 encountered it before? 45:51.500 --> 45:55.380 45:55.380 --> 45:59.220 Let me stop with this idea. 45:59.219 --> 46:02.909 Even if Plato is right, that we need to have 46:02.910 --> 46:07.890 acquaintance with the Platonic forms themselves in order to 46:07.887 --> 46:12.177 think about them, and even if Plato is right that 46:12.182 --> 46:15.802 we never get the acquaintance in this world, 46:15.800 --> 46:20.920 in the interaction with ordinary physical objects, 46:20.922 --> 46:26.882 why couldn't it be that our acquaintance with the Platonic 46:26.881 --> 46:33.051 forms comes about in this life for the very first time? 46:33.050 --> 46:35.420 That's the question, or that's the objection, 46:35.417 --> 46:37.997 that we'll turn to at the start of next class.