WEBVTT 00:00.820 --> 00:01.610 Professor Shelly Kagan: All right. 00:01.610 --> 00:05.230 We've been talking about arguments that might give us 00:05.231 --> 00:09.341 reason to believe in the existence of an immaterial soul. 00:09.340 --> 00:12.710 The kinds of arguments we've been considering so far all fall 00:12.706 --> 00:15.456 under the general rubric of "inference to the best 00:15.456 --> 00:18.686 explanation." We posit--or the fans of souls 00:18.691 --> 00:23.251 posit--the existence of souls so as to explain something that 00:23.254 --> 00:25.464 needs explaining about us. 00:25.460 --> 00:27.900 I've gone through a series of such arguments, 00:27.901 --> 00:31.121 and the one that we ended with last time was the suggestion 00:31.120 --> 00:34.510 that we need to believe in the existence of a soul in order to 00:34.506 --> 00:37.166 explain the fact that we've got free will. 00:37.170 --> 00:40.660 The fact that we've got free will is something that most of 00:40.656 --> 00:42.936 us take for granted about ourselves. 00:42.940 --> 00:46.510 But the complaint then, or the objection to the 00:46.507 --> 00:51.467 physicalist, takes the form that we couldn't be a merely physical 00:51.471 --> 00:55.741 entity because no merely physical entity could have free 00:55.736 --> 00:57.676 will. But we've got free will, 00:57.678 --> 01:00.308 so there's got to be something more to us than just being a 01:00.308 --> 01:03.428 physical object. Now, if we push the dualist to 01:03.430 --> 01:07.350 explain what is it about free will that rules out the 01:07.347 --> 01:11.187 possibility that we are merely physical objects, 01:11.189 --> 01:14.749 I think the natural suggestion to spell out the argument goes 01:14.746 --> 01:18.476 like this, and this is where we were at the end of last time. 01:18.480 --> 01:21.710 The thought is that, there's a kind of 01:21.705 --> 01:26.495 incompatibility with being free and being determined. 01:26.500 --> 01:29.760 I mean, after all from the physicalist's point of view, 01:29.757 --> 01:32.107 we're just a kind of glorified robot, 01:32.110 --> 01:36.360 able to do all sorts of things that most robots in most science 01:36.363 --> 01:38.013 fiction movies can do. 01:38.010 --> 01:40.390 But still, in a sense, we're just a glorified physical 01:40.394 --> 01:42.204 object. We're just a robot. 01:42.200 --> 01:46.020 And robots, the objection goes, are programmed; 01:46.019 --> 01:48.709 they necessarily follow their program. 01:48.709 --> 01:51.039 More generally speaking, we might say, 01:51.036 --> 01:53.926 they're subject to deterministic laws--that, 01:53.930 --> 01:57.140 as physical objects, it's true of them that they 01:57.139 --> 02:01.439 must do what the laws of physics and laws of nature require that 02:01.440 --> 02:04.110 they do. And the laws of physics 02:04.107 --> 02:08.687 are--take a deterministic form, determinism being a bit of 02:08.687 --> 02:13.587 philosopher's jargon for when it's true of these laws that--or 02:13.587 --> 02:18.887 a physical--or a system--that if you set it up a certain way, 02:18.889 --> 02:23.249 cause and effect plays out such that, given that initial setup, 02:23.249 --> 02:25.709 the very same effect must follow. 02:25.710 --> 02:29.260 It's determined by the laws of nature that the effect that 02:29.256 --> 02:31.616 follows will follow from that cause. 02:31.620 --> 02:35.220 And so, if you rewind the tape and play it again over and over 02:35.217 --> 02:38.687 and over again, each time you set things up the 02:38.686 --> 02:43.696 very same way they must move or transform or change or end up in 02:43.699 --> 02:45.529 the very same state. 02:45.530 --> 02:49.090 Well, that's what determinism is all about. 02:49.090 --> 02:52.230 And intuitively, it seems plausible to many 02:52.232 --> 02:56.422 people that you couldn't have free will and be subject to 02:56.422 --> 02:59.262 determinism. Because the notion of free will 02:59.257 --> 03:01.897 was that even if I was in the very same spot again, 03:01.899 --> 03:05.279 the very same situation again, I could've chosen differently. 03:05.280 --> 03:09.370 So I wasn't determined or predetermined to make that 03:09.368 --> 03:12.458 choice. So if we were to spell out the 03:12.460 --> 03:15.700 argument somewhat more fully, it might be, 03:15.701 --> 03:20.001 "We have free will, but you can't both have free 03:19.997 --> 03:24.287 will and be subject to determinism or subject to 03:24.289 --> 03:26.389 deterministic laws." 03:26.389 --> 03:29.699 And every physical object, or every purely physical 03:29.699 --> 03:33.069 object, is subject to deterministic laws because the 03:33.074 --> 03:35.594 laws of physics are deterministic. 03:35.590 --> 03:39.220 You put these things together and you get the conclusion that 03:39.223 --> 03:42.613 we, since we've got free will, can't be a purely physical 03:42.613 --> 03:44.533 object. There must be something more 03:44.530 --> 03:45.960 than the purely physical to us. 03:45.960 --> 03:50.210 That's the argument I put up on the board at the end of last 03:50.213 --> 03:52.623 class. And here we've got it up here 03:52.623 --> 03:54.683 now. One, we have free will. 03:54.680 --> 03:59.010 Two, nothing subject to determinism has free will. 03:59.009 --> 04:02.589 Three, all purely physical systems are subject to 04:02.594 --> 04:05.904 determinism. So--a conclusion--we are not a 04:05.895 --> 04:07.695 purely physical system. 04:07.699 --> 04:10.499 To explain the fact that we've got free will, 04:10.495 --> 04:13.735 so the objection goes, we have to appeal to--we have 04:13.735 --> 04:16.145 to posit--the existence of a soul, 04:16.149 --> 04:20.169 something non-physical, something more than purely 04:20.168 --> 04:23.298 physical. Well, that's the argument. 04:23.300 --> 04:27.010 But I don't myself find the argument compelling. 04:27.009 --> 04:32.299 Now, the first thing to notice is that to get the conclusion we 04:32.301 --> 04:34.521 need all three premises. 04:34.519 --> 04:36.879 Give up the conclusion that we've got--Give up the premise 04:36.876 --> 04:39.066 that "we've got free will," it won't follow that we're 04:39.067 --> 04:41.207 non-physical. Even if something that did have 04:41.210 --> 04:43.020 free will would have to be non-physical, 04:43.022 --> 04:45.162 it wouldn't follow that we're non-physical. 04:45.160 --> 04:47.340 That's true for each one of the premises. 04:47.339 --> 04:49.519 Give it up, the conclusion doesn't go through. 04:49.519 --> 04:54.929 And the interesting thing is that each one of these premises 04:54.933 --> 04:57.873 could be plausibly challenged. 04:57.870 --> 05:01.440 Now, as I said last time, the subject of free will--or 05:01.437 --> 05:05.297 free will, determinism, causation and responsibility, 05:05.303 --> 05:09.373 this cluster of problems--is an extremely difficult and 05:09.370 --> 05:11.780 complicated physical problem. 05:11.779 --> 05:15.169 And we could easily devote an entire semester to discussing 05:15.167 --> 05:18.267 it. So all we're doing here is the 05:18.266 --> 05:21.536 most quick and superficial glance. 05:21.540 --> 05:25.960 But still, let me quickly point out why you could resist the 05:25.964 --> 05:29.944 argument from free will to the existence of a soul. 05:29.939 --> 05:31.779 First of all, as I just noted, 05:31.776 --> 05:34.306 the argument needs premise number one. 05:34.310 --> 05:36.860 It's got to be the case, to prove that we've got a 05:36.856 --> 05:40.126 soul--at least for this argument to work to prove that we've got 05:40.130 --> 05:43.300 a soul--it's got to be the case that we've got free will. 05:43.300 --> 05:45.420 Now, that could be challenged. 05:45.420 --> 05:50.590 There are philosophers who have said we certainly believe that 05:50.590 --> 05:54.320 we've got free will, but it's an illusion. 05:54.320 --> 05:56.270 We don't really have free will. 05:56.269 --> 05:58.079 Indeed, why don't we have free will? 05:58.079 --> 06:01.419 For precisely the reasons that are pointed to by the rest of 06:01.420 --> 06:02.930 the argument. They might say, 06:02.927 --> 06:04.897 "Oh, well, you know, we're physical objects; 06:04.900 --> 06:06.560 determinism is true of us. 06:06.560 --> 06:09.530 No physical object that's subject to determinism could 06:09.534 --> 06:12.064 have free will, so we don't have free will. 06:12.060 --> 06:18.550 Of course, we mistakenly believe we've got free will. 06:18.550 --> 06:23.070 We are physical objects that labor under the illusion that we 06:23.070 --> 06:25.260 have free will, but after all, 06:25.255 --> 06:28.795 free will isn't something that you can just see, 06:28.795 --> 06:31.745 right? You can't peer into your mind 06:31.753 --> 06:34.873 and see the fact that you've got free will. 06:34.870 --> 06:38.350 Yes, we've got the sense that we could've acted differently, 06:38.351 --> 06:40.241 but maybe that's an illusion." 06:40.240 --> 06:43.440 As I say, there are philosophers who've argued that 06:43.437 --> 06:47.267 way, have denied that we have free will and if we do conclude 06:47.274 --> 06:49.964 that we don't actually have free will, 06:49.959 --> 06:54.359 then we no longer have this argument for the existence of a 06:54.359 --> 06:56.049 soul. It's a way to avoid the 06:56.046 --> 06:58.686 argument; although, for what it's worth, 06:58.685 --> 07:03.095 I should mention I don't myself believe that it's false that we 07:03.098 --> 07:05.088 have free will. That is to say, 07:05.088 --> 07:06.598 I do think premise one is true. 07:06.600 --> 07:09.690 I myself think we do have free will. 07:09.689 --> 07:13.289 So although I don't like, I don't believe the argument is 07:13.290 --> 07:16.630 sound--premise one doesn't happen to be the premise I 07:16.632 --> 07:18.692 myself would want to reject. 07:18.690 --> 07:22.030 07:22.029 --> 07:23.999 But there are other, there are two other key 07:23.996 --> 07:26.676 premises. What about premise number 07:26.683 --> 07:30.963 three, "All purely physical systems are subject to 07:30.962 --> 07:33.572 determinism." Well, we need that premise as 07:33.574 --> 07:34.834 well to make the argument go. 07:34.829 --> 07:39.639 Suppose we think, "Look, you can't have free will 07:39.637 --> 07:42.857 and determinism. You can't combine them." 07:42.860 --> 07:45.900 The view that you can't combine them is sometimes known as 07:45.903 --> 07:48.203 "incompatibilism" for the obvious reason. 07:48.199 --> 07:50.919 It's the view that these two things are incompatible. 07:50.920 --> 07:55.660 You can't have determinism and free will. 07:55.660 --> 08:00.620 Suppose we do believe in incompatibilism and believe that 08:00.621 --> 08:02.571 we've got free will. 08:02.569 --> 08:06.929 It would follow then that we're not subject to deterministic 08:06.932 --> 08:08.872 laws. Well, the dualist says, 08:08.868 --> 08:12.568 "That shows us that we have to believe that there's something 08:12.568 --> 08:14.108 non-physical about us. 08:14.110 --> 08:15.780 Because after all, premise three: 08:15.782 --> 08:18.972 ‘All purely physical systems are subject to determinism.' 08:18.970 --> 08:23.930 Isn't it true after all that the basic laws of physics are 08:23.926 --> 08:25.836 deterministic laws?" 08:25.839 --> 08:28.719 And the answer is, "Well it's not so clear that it 08:28.722 --> 08:31.452 is true." Which is just to say that 08:31.454 --> 08:36.044 premise three of the argument can be rejected as well. 08:36.039 --> 08:39.519 Now, at this point I have to just confess, 08:39.520 --> 08:42.830 as I've confessed at other times before, 08:42.830 --> 08:46.650 three is a claim about empirical science. 08:46.649 --> 08:50.569 What does our best theory about the laws of nature tell us? 08:50.570 --> 08:54.550 And I'm no scientist and I'm no specialist in sort of empirical 08:54.550 --> 08:58.420 matters, and believe me, I'm no authority on quantum 08:58.421 --> 09:02.581 mechanics, our best theory of fundamental physics. 09:02.580 --> 09:06.750 Still, I take it--I gather--here's what I'm 09:06.754 --> 09:11.524 told--that the standard interpretation of quantum 09:11.524 --> 09:15.274 mechanics says that, despite what many of us 09:15.272 --> 09:18.772 might've otherwise believed, the fundamental laws of physics 09:18.768 --> 09:22.168 are not, in fact, deterministic. 09:22.170 --> 09:23.880 What does that mean? 09:23.879 --> 09:28.029 Suppose we've got some sort of radioactive atom, 09:28.029 --> 09:31.649 which has a certain chance of decaying. 09:31.650 --> 09:32.580 What does that mean? 09:32.580 --> 09:35.670 Well, it means that, you know, there's maybe, 09:35.674 --> 09:39.824 let's say, an 80 percent chance that in the next 24 hours it 09:39.823 --> 09:42.663 will break down. Eighty percent of atoms that 09:42.657 --> 09:45.407 are set up like that break down in the next 24 hours; 09:45.410 --> 09:48.160 20 percent of them don't. 09:48.159 --> 09:50.999 Now, according to quantum mechanics under the standard 09:50.998 --> 09:53.188 interpretation, that's all there is to say 09:53.193 --> 09:55.483 about it. You have an atom like that, 09:55.484 --> 09:58.974 80 percent chance in the next 24 hours it will break down. 09:58.970 --> 10:01.090 Suppose it does break down! 10:01.090 --> 10:03.870 Can we say why it broke down? 10:03.870 --> 10:05.100 Sure. We can say, "Well, 10:05.096 --> 10:08.186 after all there was an 80 percent chance that it would." 10:08.190 --> 10:10.930 Take an atom that after 24 hours hasn't broken down. 10:10.929 --> 10:13.449 Can we say why it hasn't broken down? 10:13.450 --> 10:16.810 Sure. There was a 20 percent chance 10:16.805 --> 10:18.675 that it wouldn't. 10:18.679 --> 10:23.749 Can we explain why the ones that do break down break down 10:23.750 --> 10:28.640 and the ones that don't break down don't break down? 10:28.640 --> 10:31.060 No. All we can say is, 10:31.056 --> 10:35.276 there was an 80 percent chance it would, 20 percent chance it 10:35.279 --> 10:38.939 wouldn't, so most of them do, some of them don't. 10:38.940 --> 10:43.190 That's as deep as the explanation goes. 10:43.190 --> 10:44.690 There is nothing more. 10:44.690 --> 10:46.310 Now, you know, when we've got our 10:46.310 --> 10:48.690 deterministic hats on, we think to ourselves, 10:48.690 --> 10:52.450 "There's got to be some underlying causal explanation, 10:52.452 --> 10:56.142 some feature about the break-down atoms that explains 10:56.144 --> 11:00.624 why they broke down and that was missing from the non-break-down 11:00.618 --> 11:04.308 atoms that explains why they don't break down. 11:04.310 --> 11:06.000 After all, determinism, right? 11:06.000 --> 11:07.950 If you set up the atoms exactly the same way, 11:07.947 --> 11:09.537 they've always got to break down." 11:09.539 --> 11:12.309 But the answer is, according to the standard 11:12.314 --> 11:15.734 interpretation of quantum mechanics, that's not how it 11:15.734 --> 11:17.964 works. All there is to say is, 11:17.964 --> 11:21.824 "Some of these are going to break down, and some of these 11:21.821 --> 11:24.101 won't." The fundamental laws of 11:24.099 --> 11:27.629 physics, according to the standard interpretation of 11:27.625 --> 11:30.385 quantum mechanics, are probabilistic. 11:30.389 --> 11:38.039 Determinism is not true at the level of fundamental physics. 11:38.040 --> 11:39.390 Well, that's what I'm told. 11:39.389 --> 11:42.419 Believe me, I'm in no position to say, but that's what I'm 11:42.418 --> 11:44.208 told. And of course, 11:44.208 --> 11:48.768 if that's true, then premise three is false. 11:48.769 --> 11:53.899 It just isn't true that all purely physical systems are 11:53.896 --> 11:56.266 subject to determinism. 11:56.269 --> 11:59.799 So even if it does turn out that you can't have free will 11:59.802 --> 12:02.392 and determinism, that doesn't rule out the 12:02.389 --> 12:05.669 possibility that we are purely physical objects, 12:05.669 --> 12:09.399 because not all purely physical systems are subject to 12:09.403 --> 12:10.393 determinism. 12:10.390 --> 12:13.710 12:13.710 --> 12:17.680 If determinism isn't true of us at the fundamental level, 12:17.676 --> 12:22.206 then even if you couldn't both have determinism and free will, 12:22.210 --> 12:25.290 we could still have free will, and yet, for all that, 12:25.294 --> 12:27.374 still be purely physical systems. 12:27.370 --> 12:30.700 12:30.700 --> 12:34.030 While I'm busy pointing out ways in which the argument 12:34.028 --> 12:36.668 doesn't succeed, I also want to just take a 12:36.666 --> 12:39.996 moment and mention that premise two is also subject to 12:39.995 --> 12:42.315 criticism. Premise two was the 12:42.322 --> 12:46.362 incompatibilist claim that, "nothing subject to determinism 12:46.357 --> 12:49.377 has free will." You can't combine them. 12:49.380 --> 12:51.780 They're incompatible. 12:51.779 --> 12:55.389 Now, incompatibilism, I take it, is probably 12:55.392 --> 12:59.092 something like the common-sense view here. 12:59.090 --> 13:01.780 It's the view that probably most of you believe, 13:01.776 --> 13:05.086 but again, it's worth noting that philosophically it can be 13:05.092 --> 13:07.342 challenged. There are philosophers--and 13:07.344 --> 13:10.194 here I'll tip my hat and say, I'm one of them--there are 13:10.185 --> 13:16.345 philosophers who believe that, in fact, the idea of free will 13:16.350 --> 13:22.000 is not incompatible with determinism. 13:22.000 --> 13:28.170 So even if determinism were true of us, that wouldn't rule 13:28.168 --> 13:33.518 out our having free will, because you can--appearances to 13:33.519 --> 13:36.499 the contrary notwithstanding--have both 13:36.497 --> 13:38.767 determinism and free will. 13:38.770 --> 13:40.900 They're compatible. 13:40.899 --> 13:44.099 Hence, this view is known as compatibilism. 13:44.100 --> 13:47.910 If we accept compatibilism, we'll be able to say, 13:47.905 --> 13:52.895 "Look, maybe we have free will and determinism is true of us; 13:52.899 --> 13:56.709 but for all that, we're still just purely 13:56.706 --> 13:58.606 physical systems." 13:58.610 --> 14:01.980 Even if quantum mechanics was wrong and somehow, 14:01.978 --> 14:05.918 you know, at the macro level all the indeterminism boils 14:05.920 --> 14:10.010 out--whatever--and at the macro level we are deterministic 14:10.006 --> 14:11.876 systems, so what? 14:11.879 --> 14:16.079 If a deterministic system could nonetheless have free will, 14:16.076 --> 14:19.256 we could still be purely physical systems. 14:19.259 --> 14:23.029 Now, mind you, I haven't said anything today 14:23.033 --> 14:26.983 to convince you of the truth of compatibilism, 14:26.982 --> 14:30.232 nor am I going to try to do that. 14:30.230 --> 14:35.420 My point here was only to say we shouldn't be so quick to 14:35.417 --> 14:41.347 think that we have to believe in the existence of a soul in order 14:41.345 --> 14:44.675 to explain our having free will. 14:44.679 --> 14:47.779 It takes all of the premises of the argument to get the 14:47.778 --> 14:49.728 conclusion that the soul exists. 14:49.730 --> 14:54.830 And each one of the premises can be challenged. 14:54.830 --> 14:57.790 And here I mean not merely, well, logically speaking, 14:57.785 --> 15:00.735 you know, of course you can reject any premise of any 15:00.741 --> 15:01.711 argument. No. 15:01.708 --> 15:05.898 I mean, there are reasonable philosophical or scientific 15:05.899 --> 15:10.089 grounds for worrying about each one of the premises. 15:10.090 --> 15:12.360 The argument requires a lot. 15:12.360 --> 15:14.690 That doesn't prove that the argument fails, 15:14.692 --> 15:17.972 but it does mean that you're going to have your work cut out 15:17.969 --> 15:21.249 for you if you're going to use this route to arguing for the 15:21.246 --> 15:22.686 existence of a soul. 15:22.690 --> 15:25.120 All right. Let's recap. 15:25.120 --> 15:28.120 As I said, we've been considering different kinds of 15:28.118 --> 15:30.468 arguments for the existence of a soul, 15:30.470 --> 15:34.070 each of which appeals to some feature about us--our 15:34.071 --> 15:37.741 creativity, our ability to feel, the fact that we have a 15:37.740 --> 15:40.230 qualitative aspect of experience, our ability to 15:40.233 --> 15:41.563 reason--what have you. 15:41.559 --> 15:44.979 Some fact about us that calls out for explanation, 15:44.980 --> 15:48.120 and the claim on the part of the dualists was, 15:48.121 --> 15:51.961 we couldn't explain it without appealing to a soul. 15:51.960 --> 15:56.100 And I've argued--I've shared with you my reasons for thinking 15:56.101 --> 15:59.001 that those arguments are not compelling. 15:59.000 --> 16:02.830 But notice that all of the kinds of considerations I 16:02.828 --> 16:07.028 pointed to so far are what we might think of as everyday, 16:07.032 --> 16:09.362 familiar features about us. 16:09.360 --> 16:13.340 It's an everyday occurrence that we can think and reason and 16:13.344 --> 16:16.654 feel and be creative, or choose otherwise and have 16:16.654 --> 16:20.374 free will. Maybe the better arguments for 16:20.365 --> 16:25.245 the soul focus not on the everyday but on the unusual, 16:25.250 --> 16:27.370 on the supernatural. 16:27.370 --> 16:31.010 Here we might then have an entire other family of 16:31.007 --> 16:33.577 arguments, set of arguments--again, 16:33.584 --> 16:37.984 still of the form "inference to the best explanation." 16:37.980 --> 16:42.860 Maybe we need to posit the soul in order to explain ghosts. 16:42.860 --> 16:46.920 Maybe we need to posit the soul in order to explain ESP; 16:46.919 --> 16:51.149 maybe we need to posit the soul in order to explain near-death 16:51.149 --> 16:54.179 experiences. Maybe we need to posit the soul 16:54.179 --> 16:58.229 in order to explain what goes on in séances or communications 16:58.231 --> 17:00.491 from the dead or what have you. 17:00.490 --> 17:03.250 For any one of those, we could again run an argument 17:03.250 --> 17:05.520 where we say, "Look, here is something that 17:05.523 --> 17:06.663 needs explaining. 17:06.660 --> 17:09.600 The best explanation appeals to the soul." 17:09.599 --> 17:13.149 Now, I'm going to be rather quicker in discussing this 17:13.149 --> 17:16.229 family of arguments, but let me take at least a 17:16.231 --> 17:19.581 couple of minutes and do something about that. 17:19.579 --> 17:23.599 Take, for example, near-death experiences. 17:23.599 --> 17:27.739 This is something that you read a bit about in the selection 17:27.741 --> 17:31.041 from Schick and Vaughn in your course packet. 17:31.039 --> 17:36.159 The basic idea was probably familiar to most of you anyway, 17:36.158 --> 17:40.658 that the following thing happens with people who, 17:40.660 --> 17:43.530 you know, maybe their heart goes into a cardiac arrest--what 17:43.525 --> 17:45.785 have you. They die on the operating 17:45.786 --> 17:48.826 table, but then they're brought back to life, 17:48.825 --> 17:51.675 as we put it. And many such people, 17:51.683 --> 17:56.113 when we question them afterwards, have a very striking 17:56.110 --> 17:59.180 experience. And one of the things that's 17:59.179 --> 18:02.979 striking is, how similar the experience is from person to 18:02.977 --> 18:06.777 person and from culture to culture--that they've got some 18:06.776 --> 18:09.466 notion, as they were dead on the 18:09.468 --> 18:12.598 operating table, of leaving their body. 18:12.599 --> 18:17.839 Perhaps they begin to view their body from up--floating up 18:17.838 --> 18:20.228 above it. Eventually, perhaps, 18:20.225 --> 18:24.205 they leave the operating room altogether in this experience 18:24.213 --> 18:27.653 that they're having, and they have a feeling of joy 18:27.652 --> 18:30.602 and euphoria; they have some experience of 18:30.602 --> 18:33.902 going through a tunnel, seeing some light at the end of 18:33.903 --> 18:36.943 the tunnel. Perhaps at the other end of the 18:36.943 --> 18:41.313 tunnel they begin to have some communications or see some loved 18:41.309 --> 18:45.459 one who has died previously or perhaps some famous religious 18:45.464 --> 18:49.484 person in their--in the teaching of their tradition--their 18:49.478 --> 18:51.378 religious tradition. 18:51.380 --> 18:55.120 They have the sense that what they've done is basically died 18:55.119 --> 18:56.449 and gone to heaven. 18:56.450 --> 19:01.630 But then suddenly they get yanked back, and they wake up, 19:01.634 --> 19:04.694 you know, in the hospital room. 19:04.690 --> 19:07.040 So they've had near-death experiences. 19:07.039 --> 19:09.949 Or perhaps a better way to put it would be they've had death 19:09.953 --> 19:12.623 experiences but then have been brought back to life. 19:12.620 --> 19:15.340 Now, there it is, right? 19:15.339 --> 19:17.169 You survey people, and people have these 19:17.172 --> 19:19.732 experiences. And now we have to ask 19:19.730 --> 19:22.580 ourselves, "What explains this?" 19:22.579 --> 19:26.619 And here's a perfectly straightforward and natural 19:26.616 --> 19:29.856 explanation. These people died. 19:29.859 --> 19:34.589 Their bodies died, and they went to the next 19:34.589 --> 19:37.329 world. They went to the next life. 19:37.329 --> 19:41.759 They went to heaven but then were yanked back. 19:41.759 --> 19:45.489 Now, their bodies were lying there on the operating table; 19:45.490 --> 19:47.180 their bodies weren't in heaven. 19:47.180 --> 19:49.360 So something non-bodily went to heaven. 19:49.360 --> 19:51.130 That's how the explanation goes. 19:51.130 --> 19:56.010 It's a natural, straightforward explanation of 19:56.012 --> 19:58.402 what's gone on here. 19:58.400 --> 20:00.770 Hence, inference to the best explanation. 20:00.769 --> 20:04.749 We need to posit the soul, something immaterial that 20:04.752 --> 20:09.052 survives the death of the body, that can leave the body, 20:09.048 --> 20:12.568 go up to heaven; though, as it happens in these 20:12.570 --> 20:15.380 cases, the tie is never completely broken. 20:15.380 --> 20:18.430 They get yanked back; the soul gets yanked back by 20:18.426 --> 20:21.646 whatever cause, and reconnected to the body. 20:21.650 --> 20:24.850 It's as though we might think of there being two rooms, 20:24.852 --> 20:26.752 to use a kind of analogy here. 20:26.750 --> 20:30.130 There is the room that this world represents, 20:30.125 --> 20:31.885 this life represents. 20:31.890 --> 20:36.360 And what happens in these experiences is that your soul 20:36.359 --> 20:40.249 leaves this room and goes into a second room, 20:40.250 --> 20:43.740 the room of the next world or the next life, 20:43.741 --> 20:47.961 but for various reasons, isn't allowed to stay in the 20:47.963 --> 20:52.733 next room. It gets yanked back to this 20:52.732 --> 20:55.252 room. Well, that's a possible 20:55.245 --> 20:57.205 explanation. And in a moment, 20:57.211 --> 21:00.401 I'll ask whether it's the best possible explanation, 21:00.402 --> 21:03.032 but before we do turn to that question, 21:03.029 --> 21:06.469 there is an objection to this entire way of looking at things 21:06.466 --> 21:09.956 that's probably worth pausing for a moment and considering. 21:09.960 --> 21:13.680 The objection is similar to the kind of dismissive attitude that 21:13.676 --> 21:16.976 we saw at the beginning of the course about the question, 21:16.980 --> 21:18.810 "Could I survive my death?" 21:18.810 --> 21:20.460 Well, duh. Could there be life after there 21:20.456 --> 21:22.156 is no more life? Well, of course not. 21:22.160 --> 21:28.480 Here the objection says, this two-room notion's got to 21:28.480 --> 21:32.490 be mistaken. It can't be that what's going 21:32.491 --> 21:37.501 on in near-death experiences is that people are reporting about 21:37.497 --> 21:41.527 what it's like to be dead because--so the objection 21:41.534 --> 21:44.284 says--they never really died. 21:44.279 --> 21:47.569 After all, 20 minutes later, or whatever it is, 21:47.566 --> 21:49.706 there they are up and about. 21:49.710 --> 21:51.920 Well, not up and about; they're presumably lying in 21:51.921 --> 21:54.521 their hospital beds, but they're clearly alive. 21:54.519 --> 21:57.219 Hence, it follows that they never really died. 21:57.220 --> 22:01.190 Or, if you want, you could say maybe they died, 22:01.186 --> 22:06.526 but since they obviously didn't die permanently--after all they 22:06.531 --> 22:11.881 were brought back to life--how could they possibly tell us what 22:11.877 --> 22:15.237 it's like to be permanently dead? 22:15.240 --> 22:21.630 How can we take their experiences as veridical reports 22:21.629 --> 22:23.919 of the afterlife? 22:23.920 --> 22:27.140 Because what we want to know is what is like to be permanently 22:27.141 --> 22:29.941 dead, and these people were never permanently dead. 22:29.940 --> 22:33.770 So whatever unusual experiences they may be having, 22:33.773 --> 22:36.843 they are not reports of the afterlife. 22:36.840 --> 22:37.590 That's how the objection goes. 22:37.590 --> 22:41.470 22:41.470 --> 22:44.610 Although, I think, I was pausing for a moment to 22:44.608 --> 22:47.878 raise that objection, it's not an objection that I 22:47.881 --> 22:50.821 think we should take all that seriously. 22:50.819 --> 22:55.739 Suppose we were to agree, all right, strictly speaking 22:55.744 --> 22:58.164 these people didn't die. 22:58.160 --> 23:01.260 Or strictly speaking they didn't die, certainly at least, 23:01.263 --> 23:04.043 permanently. Does it follow from that that 23:04.040 --> 23:08.180 their experiences should not be taken as evidence of what the 23:08.181 --> 23:09.631 afterlife is like? 23:09.630 --> 23:14.030 I think that's really a misguided objection. 23:14.029 --> 23:18.309 Suppose somebody said, "Look, I spent 20 years living 23:18.306 --> 23:22.826 in France, and then I came back to the United States. 23:22.829 --> 23:25.029 And so I want to tell you what it's like in France." 23:25.029 --> 23:29.739 And somebody says, "You know, you never really 23:29.740 --> 23:32.880 moved to France permanently. 23:32.880 --> 23:37.280 So your experiences in France, whatever they are--interesting 23:37.281 --> 23:41.611 as they may be--can't really cast any light on what it would 23:41.609 --> 23:44.689 be like to permanently move to France. 23:44.690 --> 23:47.190 You'd say, "Give me a break!" 23:47.190 --> 23:48.530 Right? "It's true that, 23:48.525 --> 23:51.295 of course, I didn't move to France permanently. 23:51.299 --> 23:56.749 Still, I have some experience of France. 23:56.750 --> 24:00.940 And so I can--a great deal after all, 20 years--I can give 24:00.938 --> 24:05.418 you a pretty good idea of what it's like to live in France, 24:05.420 --> 24:10.920 even if I didn't move there for the rest of my life without ever 24:10.920 --> 24:13.810 coming back." You can't say quite as much if 24:13.813 --> 24:16.983 you've only been in France for a couple of days before coming 24:16.980 --> 24:19.620 back, but still you can say something relevant. 24:19.619 --> 24:23.119 Indeed, suppose I never went into France at all. 24:23.119 --> 24:28.469 Suppose all that happened was I stood right on the border and 24:28.472 --> 24:32.312 peered into France, talked to some people in 24:32.308 --> 24:34.718 France. They were on the French side of 24:34.718 --> 24:37.578 the border, I was on the other side, but I talked to them for a 24:37.575 --> 24:39.525 while. Still, I never went in, 24:39.533 --> 24:43.493 but for all that I might have something helpful to say about 24:43.491 --> 24:45.371 what it's like in France. 24:45.369 --> 24:49.339 Well, if that's the right thing to say about the France case, 24:49.336 --> 24:53.436 then why not say the same thing about the near-death experience 24:53.435 --> 24:56.535 case? Even if these people didn't 24:56.542 --> 25:00.822 stay in the second room, they didn't stay dead, 25:00.822 --> 25:04.732 they had some experience of being dead. 25:04.730 --> 25:07.970 Isn't that relevant to what it would be like to be dead? 25:07.970 --> 25:09.200 Or even if we say, "No. 25:09.200 --> 25:12.620 Strictly speaking, these people didn't die at all. 25:12.619 --> 25:17.249 They were just on the border looking in. 25:17.250 --> 25:20.030 They never, strictly speaking, died at all." 25:20.030 --> 25:23.210 So what? They were on the border looking 25:23.211 --> 25:25.211 in. To suggest that that couldn't 25:25.213 --> 25:28.863 be relevant evidence is like saying I can't tell you anything 25:28.860 --> 25:32.630 interesting about what's going on in the hallway right now, 25:32.630 --> 25:34.700 because after all I'm not in the hallway; 25:34.700 --> 25:36.430 I'm here in the lecture hall. 25:36.430 --> 25:39.500 So what? Even though I'm here in the 25:39.504 --> 25:43.334 lecture hall, I can see into the hallway and 25:43.332 --> 25:46.362 tell you what's going on in it. 25:46.359 --> 25:50.589 So attempts to dismiss the appeal to near-death experiences 25:50.586 --> 25:54.076 on what we might call philosophical grounds--this 25:54.084 --> 25:58.024 would be the bad notion of philosophy--on philosophical 25:58.019 --> 26:01.379 grounds, I think that's got to be 26:01.378 --> 26:04.628 misguided. Still, that doesn't mean that 26:04.626 --> 26:09.046 we should believe the argument for the existence of the soul 26:09.053 --> 26:13.363 from near-death experiences, because the question remains, 26:13.360 --> 26:17.460 "What's the best explanation of what's going on in near-death 26:17.457 --> 26:19.977 experiences?" Now, one possibility, 26:19.978 --> 26:23.038 as I suggested, was what I called a second ago 26:23.039 --> 26:25.079 the "two-room explanation." 26:25.079 --> 26:28.479 There's the room of this life, and there's the room of the 26:28.481 --> 26:31.941 next life and people who have near-death experiences either 26:31.942 --> 26:35.582 temporarily were in the second room or else at least they were 26:35.581 --> 26:37.731 glancing into the second room. 26:37.730 --> 26:39.030 That's one possible explanation. 26:39.029 --> 26:42.779 But of course, there's a different possible 26:42.784 --> 26:46.364 explanation--the one-room explanation. 26:46.359 --> 26:52.839 There's just life, this life, and as you come very 26:52.844 --> 26:59.374 close to the wall of the room, things end up looking and 26:59.369 --> 27:04.409 seeming and feeling rather different than they do in the 27:04.405 --> 27:06.415 middle of the room. 27:06.420 --> 27:10.980 27:10.980 --> 27:14.370 Now, maybe the one-room metaphor is not the best 27:14.374 --> 27:18.204 metaphor, because it immediately prompts the question, 27:18.201 --> 27:21.741 "Well, what's on the other side of the wall?" 27:21.740 --> 27:24.940 And of course, the physicalist's suggestion is 27:24.935 --> 27:28.695 there isn't anything on the other side of the wall. 27:28.700 --> 27:32.540 So maybe a better way to talk about it would just be: 27:32.542 --> 27:37.262 Life's a biological process; we're all familiar with that 27:37.256 --> 27:41.086 process, sort of, in its middle stretches. 27:41.089 --> 27:46.729 In its closing stretches, some fairly unusual biological 27:46.729 --> 27:48.779 processes kick in. 27:48.779 --> 27:52.479 In rare, but not unheard of, cases, some people begin to 27:52.481 --> 27:56.591 have those unusual biological processes and then return to the 27:56.586 --> 28:00.216 normal biological processes and can talk about what was 28:00.220 --> 28:03.720 happening in the unusual biological processes. 28:03.720 --> 28:07.560 Which is just to say, we need to offer a 28:07.562 --> 28:13.472 biological/physical explanation of what goes on in near-death 28:13.473 --> 28:16.523 experiences. Now, mind you, 28:16.524 --> 28:21.794 that's not yet to offer the physical explanation; 28:21.790 --> 28:24.530 it's just a promissory note. 28:24.529 --> 28:27.009 We now have two rival explanations, 28:27.013 --> 28:30.453 the soul, dualist, explanation that we went into 28:30.447 --> 28:33.367 the other world and the physicalist, 28:33.369 --> 28:38.099 promissory note that we can explain the white lights and the 28:38.098 --> 28:42.748 feeling of euphoria and seeing your body from a distance in 28:42.747 --> 28:46.517 physical terms. We don't really have very much 28:46.517 --> 28:50.937 of a physical explanation until we begin to offer scientific 28:50.936 --> 28:54.376 accounts of each of those aspects of near-death 28:54.381 --> 28:56.641 experience. But this is, 28:56.640 --> 29:00.440 in fact, an area on which scientists work. 29:00.440 --> 29:03.350 And you saw some of the beginnings of an explanation 29:03.352 --> 29:05.982 offered in the reading by Schick and Vaughn. 29:05.980 --> 29:08.890 So, for example, when the body is in stress, 29:08.893 --> 29:12.553 as would likely happen toward the end of the biological 29:12.551 --> 29:15.161 processes, when the body is in stress, 29:15.164 --> 29:17.944 certain endorphins get released by the body. 29:17.940 --> 29:22.480 Perhaps that explains the feelings of euphoria. 29:22.480 --> 29:27.500 When the body is in stress, we have various unusual 29:27.504 --> 29:32.634 stimulations of the visual sections of the brain, 29:32.630 --> 29:36.470 and perhaps that explains the white light or the feeling of 29:36.467 --> 29:38.317 compression in the tunnel. 29:38.319 --> 29:42.909 Now, again, I'm not any kind of scientist and so I'm not in any 29:42.914 --> 29:46.324 position to say, "Look, here are the details of 29:46.323 --> 29:47.883 the explanation." 29:47.880 --> 29:53.040 But you get the beginnings of that sketched in the readings, 29:53.043 --> 29:57.073 and it's a judgment call you've got to make. 29:57.069 --> 30:02.549 Does it seem more plausible that we can explain these 30:02.550 --> 30:08.660 experiences in terms of the traumatic stress that your body 30:08.663 --> 30:14.463 and brain is going through when you are near dying? 30:14.460 --> 30:16.490 Or is it more plausible to suggest, "No. 30:16.490 --> 30:20.160 What's happened here is a soul has been released from 30:20.155 --> 30:22.125 connection with the body." 30:22.130 --> 30:24.800 For my money, I find the beginnings of the 30:24.798 --> 30:27.988 scientific explanation sufficiently persuasive and 30:27.988 --> 30:31.758 sufficiently compelling that I don't find the argument from 30:31.764 --> 30:35.604 near-death experience--as an argument for the existence of a 30:35.604 --> 30:38.994 soul--I don't find it especially persuasive. 30:38.990 --> 30:42.250 30:42.250 --> 30:45.680 Of course, there are various other things we could appeal to 30:45.683 --> 30:48.363 in terms of supernatural occurrences, right? 30:48.359 --> 30:51.119 I've only mentioned--only discussed now in detail--one of 30:51.124 --> 30:52.894 them. But there are a variety of 30:52.886 --> 30:55.876 things about people who can communicate from the dead or 30:55.884 --> 30:58.014 ghosts or séances or what have you. 30:58.009 --> 31:01.889 And what the physicalist would need to do for each one of 31:01.893 --> 31:06.473 those--For each one of those you can imagine a dualist who says, 31:06.470 --> 31:11.290 "We need to believe in a soul so as to explain séances. 31:11.289 --> 31:16.589 How do we explain the fact that the person who's conducting the 31:16.592 --> 31:21.212 séance knows things about, your history that only your 31:21.210 --> 31:23.520 dead uncle would know?" 31:23.519 --> 31:26.729 The dualist can explain that by appealing to ghosts and the 31:26.732 --> 31:29.012 like. How does the physicalist 31:29.011 --> 31:31.061 explain things like that? 31:31.060 --> 31:34.480 Short answer is, I don't know. 31:34.480 --> 31:39.960 I'm not the kind of person who makes it his business to try to 31:39.958 --> 31:43.818 explain away those things in physicalist, 31:43.819 --> 31:46.639 naturalistic, materialistic, 31:46.643 --> 31:48.633 scientific terms. 31:48.630 --> 31:51.490 But there are people who make it their business. 31:51.490 --> 31:53.950 So, for example, there's a magician--The 31:53.952 --> 31:56.862 question is not, could I explain to you how the 31:56.857 --> 32:00.517 séance manages to do the amazing things that it does? 32:00.519 --> 32:02.649 You're wasting your time asking somebody like me. 32:02.650 --> 32:06.970 The person to ask is a magician, somebody whose 32:06.974 --> 32:12.714 profession it is to fool people and make it look like they can 32:12.709 --> 32:15.059 do things with magic. 32:15.059 --> 32:19.409 So in fact, there are professional magicians who make 32:19.410 --> 32:24.350 it their business to debunk people who claim to genuinely be 32:24.346 --> 32:27.856 in contact with the dead and the like. 32:27.859 --> 32:30.149 There's a magician, I think his name is The Amazing 32:30.153 --> 32:32.083 Randi, who has a sort of standing offer; 32:32.079 --> 32:35.519 he says, "You show me what happened in the séance or in 32:35.523 --> 32:38.283 communication with the dead or what have you, 32:38.278 --> 32:40.468 and I'll show you how to do it. 32:40.470 --> 32:42.910 I'll debunk it for you." 32:42.910 --> 32:47.610 Spoiler alert. And he has a standing offer, 32:47.611 --> 32:53.081 he says, "I'll pay whatever the amount is, $10,000 to the first 32:53.084 --> 32:57.944 person who can document some effect done in supernatural 32:57.939 --> 33:02.529 terms that I can't reproduce through trickery." 33:02.529 --> 33:06.469 So far he's never had to pay out. 33:06.470 --> 33:10.650 Well again, that doesn't prove the dualist is wrong. 33:10.650 --> 33:13.970 It could be that there are genuine séances. 33:13.970 --> 33:16.630 It could be that there really are ghosts. 33:16.630 --> 33:19.520 It could be that there really is communication from the dead. 33:19.520 --> 33:22.530 33:22.529 --> 33:26.829 As is typically the case, you've got to decide for 33:26.830 --> 33:31.570 yourself what strikes you as the better explanation. 33:31.569 --> 33:36.179 Is the supernatural, dualist explanation the more 33:36.181 --> 33:39.511 likely one? Or is the physicalist 33:39.506 --> 33:42.766 explanation the more likely one? 33:42.769 --> 33:49.309 Look, you have a dream where your dead mother has come back 33:49.312 --> 33:53.092 to talk to you. One possible explanation, 33:53.090 --> 33:55.770 the dualist, that's the ghost of your 33:55.770 --> 34:00.390 mother, immaterial soul that she is, communicating to you while 34:00.385 --> 34:04.405 you're asleep. Second possible explanation, 34:04.409 --> 34:06.179 it's just a dream. 34:06.180 --> 34:10.300 Of course you dream about your mother because your unconscious 34:10.303 --> 34:14.383 cares about her. What's the better explanation? 34:14.380 --> 34:18.690 We don't have the time here to go case, by case, 34:18.685 --> 34:23.625 by case, and ask ourselves, "How does the evidence fall 34:23.632 --> 34:26.932 down one side versus the other?" 34:26.929 --> 34:33.989 But when I review the evidence, I come away thinking there's no 34:33.994 --> 34:38.784 good reason to move beyond the physical. 34:38.780 --> 34:40.990 So again, let's recap. 34:40.989 --> 34:45.979 One group of arguments for the existence of a soul says, 34:45.979 --> 34:51.149 "We need to posit a soul in order to explain something, 34:51.150 --> 34:54.160 whether it's something everyday or something supernatural." 34:54.160 --> 34:57.490 34:57.489 --> 35:03.869 The existence of a soul would be the beginnings of a possible 35:03.871 --> 35:07.021 explanation. But the question is never, 35:07.023 --> 35:09.203 "Is that a possible explanation?" 35:09.199 --> 35:13.179 but, "Is it the best explanation?" 35:13.179 --> 35:18.819 And when I review these various arguments, I come away thinking 35:18.819 --> 35:23.549 the better explanation falls with the physicalist. 35:23.550 --> 35:29.830 Mind you, I don't want to deny that there are some things the 35:29.828 --> 35:35.268 physicalist has not yet done a very compelling job of 35:35.270 --> 35:37.730 explaining. In particular, 35:37.731 --> 35:41.551 as I've mentioned previously, I think there are mysteries and 35:41.553 --> 35:44.423 puzzles about the nature of consciousness, 35:44.420 --> 35:49.260 the qualitative aspect of experience, what it's like to 35:49.258 --> 35:53.288 smell coffee or taste pineapple or see red. 35:53.289 --> 35:57.549 It's very hard to see how you explain that in physicalist 35:57.551 --> 36:00.241 terms. So to that extent, 36:00.235 --> 36:05.535 I think we can say the jury may still be out. 36:05.539 --> 36:09.099 But I don't think what we should say is, 36:09.103 --> 36:13.583 "The better explanation lies with the dualist." 36:13.579 --> 36:19.069 Because I think positing a soul doesn't really yet offer us the 36:19.070 --> 36:22.910 explanation. It just holds out the promise 36:22.907 --> 36:24.607 of an explanation. 36:24.610 --> 36:28.030 So at best that's a tie, and hence, no compelling reason 36:28.030 --> 36:30.270 to accept the existence of a soul. 36:30.270 --> 36:34.040 36:34.039 --> 36:40.049 It would be one thing if we could see that no conceivable 36:40.051 --> 36:44.991 physicalist explanation could possibly work. 36:44.989 --> 36:48.609 But I don't think we're in that situation. 36:48.610 --> 36:52.220 All we're in right now is, perhaps in existence of that 36:52.216 --> 36:55.756 with regard to consciousness, maybe some other things, 36:55.755 --> 36:58.355 we don't yet see how to explain it. 36:58.360 --> 37:03.340 But not yet seeing how to explain it is not the same thing 37:03.343 --> 37:08.593 as seeing that it can't be explained on physicalist terms. 37:08.590 --> 37:11.690 Of course, again, if we had a dualist explanation 37:11.693 --> 37:15.513 with some details really worked out, maybe we'd have to say, 37:15.509 --> 37:18.289 "Look, this is the better explanation." 37:18.289 --> 37:22.589 But dualism doesn't so much offer the explanation typically 37:22.588 --> 37:25.778 as just say, "Well, maybe we'd be better off 37:25.775 --> 37:28.365 positing something immaterial." 37:28.369 --> 37:31.459 That, I think, is not a very compelling 37:31.456 --> 37:34.036 argument. Well, let's ask. 37:34.039 --> 37:37.599 What other kinds of arguments could be offered for the 37:37.601 --> 37:39.081 existence of a soul? 37:39.079 --> 37:42.139 I want to emphasize the point that the various arguments that 37:42.143 --> 37:43.933 I have been talking about so far, 37:43.929 --> 37:47.859 although they have this common strand--"inference to the best 37:47.863 --> 37:51.603 explanation"--are each separate and distinct arguments. 37:51.599 --> 37:54.889 One of them might work even though the other ones don't 37:54.893 --> 37:57.043 work. But I want to turn now to a 37:57.035 --> 37:59.255 rather different kind of argument. 37:59.260 --> 38:04.580 The argument I'm about to sketch is a purely philosophical 38:04.576 --> 38:10.166 argument, not really so much a matter of who can explain this 38:10.173 --> 38:14.933 or that feature of us better than anybody else. 38:14.929 --> 38:19.359 It's an argument that doesn't seem to have any empirical 38:19.355 --> 38:22.645 premises; it works from purely armchair 38:22.654 --> 38:24.824 philosophical reflection. 38:24.820 --> 38:27.820 And the striking thing is that many people find this a pretty 38:27.820 --> 38:28.920 compelling argument. 38:28.920 --> 38:35.320 The argument I'm going to give traces back to Descartes, 38:35.316 --> 38:39.616 the great early modern philosopher. 38:39.619 --> 38:42.049 Well, I'm not going to follow the details of this argument, 38:42.048 --> 38:43.888 but the basic idea goes back to Descartes. 38:43.889 --> 38:49.479 And it starts by asking you to imagine a story. 38:49.480 --> 38:51.610 So I'm going to tell the story in the first person. 38:51.610 --> 38:54.260 I'm going to tell about myself, but you know, 38:54.255 --> 38:56.355 you'll find the argument sort of, 38:56.360 --> 38:59.330 perhaps more persuasive if, as I tell the story, 38:59.328 --> 39:02.168 you imagine the story being told about you. 39:02.170 --> 39:04.660 So each one of you should translate this into a story 39:04.656 --> 39:06.916 about yourself. You know, your morning. 39:06.920 --> 39:08.540 So this is a story about my morning. 39:08.539 --> 39:11.439 Imagine--this didn't, of course, actually happen, 39:11.437 --> 39:14.817 but imagine--the crucial point here is simply that we can 39:14.817 --> 39:18.657 imagine this story happening, not even that we think it's 39:18.658 --> 39:21.598 empirically possible, just it's conceivable, 39:21.602 --> 39:23.522 it's an imaginable story. 39:23.520 --> 39:27.010 All right. So suppose that I woke up this 39:27.014 --> 39:32.124 morning, that is to say, at a certain point I look 39:32.116 --> 39:38.156 around my room and I see the familiar sights of my darkened 39:38.156 --> 39:40.966 bedroom. I hear, perhaps, 39:40.966 --> 39:45.876 the sounds of the cars outside my house, my alarm clock 39:45.882 --> 39:48.252 ringing, what have you. 39:48.250 --> 39:51.310 I move out of the room toward the bathroom, 39:51.308 --> 39:53.418 planning to brush my teeth. 39:53.420 --> 39:57.490 As I enter the bathroom, it's much more light, 39:57.493 --> 40:01.843 I look in the mirror and--here's where things get 40:01.839 --> 40:05.369 really weird--I don't see anything. 40:05.369 --> 40:09.149 Normally, of course, when I look in the mirror I see 40:09.149 --> 40:10.769 my face. I see my head; 40:10.769 --> 40:12.979 I see the reflection of my torso. 40:12.980 --> 40:16.280 But now, as I'm looking into the mirror, I don't see anything 40:16.284 --> 40:19.114 at all. Instead, I see the shower 40:19.111 --> 40:21.071 reflected behind me. 40:21.070 --> 40:23.960 Normally, that's blocked of course by me, 40:23.960 --> 40:26.890 by my body. But I don't see my body. 40:26.889 --> 40:30.559 Slightly freaked out, I reach for my head, 40:30.560 --> 40:35.570 or perhaps we should say I reach for where I would expect 40:35.574 --> 40:39.074 my head to be, but I don't feel anything 40:39.065 --> 40:43.435 there. Glancing down at my arms, 40:43.437 --> 40:46.337 I don't see any arms. 40:46.340 --> 40:49.230 Now, I'm really panicking. 40:49.230 --> 40:53.650 As I begin trying to touch my body, I don't feel anything. 40:53.650 --> 40:57.500 I don't--Not only can't I feel anything with my fingers, 40:57.500 --> 41:01.280 I don't have any sensations where my body should be. 41:01.280 --> 41:05.410 Now, we could continue this story, but I've probably said 41:05.411 --> 41:09.771 enough for you to grant that what I've just started doing--a 41:09.765 --> 41:14.335 novelist could do a better job of telling the story than I just 41:14.339 --> 41:19.059 did--but what I've just done was basically imagine--I've imagined 41:19.061 --> 41:23.711 a story in which I discover that my body doesn't exist. 41:23.710 --> 41:27.910 Or I've imagined a story in which my body has perhaps ceased 41:27.906 --> 41:31.526 to exist, or I've imagined a story in which I exist, 41:31.534 --> 41:33.744 or at least my mind exists. 41:33.739 --> 41:37.819 You know, I'm thinking thoughts like, "Why can't I see my body 41:37.819 --> 41:41.079 in the mirror? Why can't I feel my head? 41:41.080 --> 41:42.390 What's going on?" 41:42.390 --> 41:43.540 I'm panicking, right? 41:43.539 --> 41:49.449 We've got a story in which I'm thinking all sorts of thoughts; 41:49.449 --> 41:54.229 my mind clearly exists, and yet, for all that, 41:54.232 --> 41:56.892 my body does not exist. 41:56.889 --> 42:02.859 We could--certainly it seems--imagine that possibility. 42:02.860 --> 42:08.110 Now, the brilliant thing about this argument is it goes from 42:08.111 --> 42:13.541 that to a conclusion about there being a difference between my 42:13.540 --> 42:15.410 mind and my body. 42:15.409 --> 42:21.279 What we've just done, after all, is imagine that my 42:21.280 --> 42:25.390 mind exists but my body does not. 42:25.390 --> 42:27.040 Now, what does that show? 42:27.039 --> 42:36.989 Descartes says what it shows is the mind and the body must be 42:36.992 --> 42:42.302 two logically distinct things. 42:42.300 --> 42:48.470 The mind and the body cannot be the same thing. 42:48.469 --> 42:54.589 Because, after all, what I just did was imagine my 42:54.591 --> 42:58.591 mind existing without my body. 42:58.590 --> 43:02.490 How could I even do that, even in imagination? 43:02.489 --> 43:08.069 How could it even be possible to imagine my mind without my 43:08.066 --> 43:13.836 body, if talking about my mind is just a way of talking about 43:13.836 --> 43:16.526 my body? If they're really, 43:16.528 --> 43:19.608 bottom line, metaphysically speaking, 43:19.605 --> 43:23.105 the same thing, then you couldn't have one 43:23.109 --> 43:25.929 without the other after all. 43:25.930 --> 43:31.730 So here's a podium. 43:31.730 --> 43:37.560 Try to tell a story in which this podium exists but this 43:37.557 --> 43:40.097 podium does not exist. 43:40.100 --> 43:42.450 You can't do it, right? 43:42.449 --> 43:45.379 The podium is just one thing, the podium. 43:45.380 --> 43:48.340 And if it is just one thing, you could tell a story in which 43:48.338 --> 43:50.408 it exists; you could tell a story in which 43:50.407 --> 43:51.257 it doesn't exist. 43:51.260 --> 43:56.450 But you can't tell a story in which it exists and doesn't 43:56.448 --> 44:01.508 exist. If I can tell a story in which 44:01.508 --> 44:10.148 A exists and B doesn't exist, it's got to follow that A and B 44:10.146 --> 44:13.886 are not the same thing. 44:13.889 --> 44:19.589 Because if B was just another word for, another way of talking 44:19.594 --> 44:24.654 about, A, then to imagine A existing but B not existing 44:24.645 --> 44:28.755 would be imagining A existing but--well, 44:28.760 --> 44:32.200 B is just A--A not existing. 44:32.199 --> 44:36.969 But of course, you can't imagine a world in 44:36.974 --> 44:41.184 which A exists but A doesn't exist. 44:41.179 --> 44:48.349 Put the same point the other way around: If I can imagine A 44:48.350 --> 44:56.140 without B, then A and B have to be logically distinct things. 44:56.140 --> 44:58.170 They cannot be identical. 44:58.170 --> 45:01.560 45:01.559 --> 45:09.649 But since I can imagine my mind existing without my body, 45:09.647 --> 45:17.587 it follows that my mind and my body have to be logically 45:17.591 --> 45:24.011 distinct things. They cannot be identical. 45:24.010 --> 45:28.160 My mind cannot just be a way of talking. 45:28.159 --> 45:34.159 Talking about my mind cannot just be a way of talking about 45:34.156 --> 45:40.246 my body. Now, it's a very cool argument. 45:40.250 --> 45:42.060 You know, philosophers love this argument. 45:42.059 --> 45:46.719 And I've got to tell you, to this day there's a debate in 45:46.716 --> 45:51.036 the philosophical community about whether or not this 45:51.040 --> 45:52.620 argument works. 45:52.620 --> 46:00.840 46:00.840 --> 46:03.510 It's one thing to be clear--a couple of things to be clear 46:03.514 --> 46:07.234 about. What exactly is this argument 46:07.232 --> 46:10.852 not doing? The argument is not saying, 46:10.849 --> 46:14.849 "If something is possible, if I can imagine it, 46:14.851 --> 46:16.561 it's true." No. 46:16.560 --> 46:18.890 I can imagine unicorns. 46:18.890 --> 46:20.990 It doesn't mean unicorns exist. 46:20.990 --> 46:24.500 46:24.500 --> 46:26.720 That's not what the argument is saying. 46:26.719 --> 46:32.409 The argument is only making a much more specific claim. 46:32.409 --> 46:36.149 If I can imagine one thing without the other, 46:36.152 --> 46:38.792 they must be separate things. 46:38.789 --> 46:41.679 Now, of course, it could still be that in the 46:41.675 --> 46:45.475 real world the one thing cannot exist without the other. 46:45.480 --> 46:48.790 There may be some sort of metaphysical laws that tie the 46:48.791 --> 46:52.401 two things so tightly together that you'll never actually get 46:52.404 --> 46:53.974 one without the other. 46:53.970 --> 46:55.800 That's not the question. 46:55.800 --> 47:01.300 The point is just if I can at least imagine the one thing 47:01.295 --> 47:05.415 without the other, they must in fact be two 47:05.417 --> 47:09.557 separate things. Because if there was really 47:09.559 --> 47:13.759 just one thing there, you couldn't imagine it without 47:13.755 --> 47:17.325 it. Since I can imagine my mind 47:17.329 --> 47:22.249 without my body, it must be the case that my 47:22.251 --> 47:28.661 mind is something separate and distinct from my body. 47:28.659 --> 47:33.649 Otherwise, how could I imagine it existing without the body? 47:33.650 --> 47:36.910 If they were the same thing, I couldn't--I can't imagine the 47:36.907 --> 47:38.727 body existing without the body. 47:38.730 --> 47:41.610 If the mind is just a way of talking about the body, 47:41.614 --> 47:44.334 how could I imagine the mind without the body? 47:44.329 --> 47:47.989 Since I can imagine the mind without the body, 47:47.986 --> 47:50.826 it follows that they're separate. 47:50.829 --> 47:53.319 So the mind is not the body after all. 47:53.320 --> 47:54.500 It's something different. 47:54.500 --> 47:59.590 It's the soul. Is that a good argument or not? 47:59.590 --> 48:02.000 That's where we'll start next time.