WEBVTT 00:02.040 --> 00:08.170 Prof: Today we have our first guest lecturer. 00:08.170 --> 00:11.290 I have the pleasure of introducing you to Dr. Michael 00:11.290 --> 00:12.190 Teitelbaum. 00:12.190 --> 00:17.480 He was an undergraduate at Reed College where he double majored 00:17.484 --> 00:21.234 in biology and sociology; that's an interesting 00:21.225 --> 00:25.525 combination, he's Phi Beta Kappa and at the end of that became a 00:25.530 --> 00:26.760 Rhodes scholar. 00:26.760 --> 00:32.260 How many prospective Rhodes scholars do we have in the 00:32.259 --> 00:33.089 class? 00:33.090 --> 00:38.540 Then he went to Oxford as a biologist to study reproductive 00:38.544 --> 00:41.464 biology and his advisor died. 00:41.460 --> 00:44.530 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Well first he was 00:44.528 --> 00:47.338 paralyzed for--he died a horrible slow death, 00:47.340 --> 00:47.980 yes. 00:47.980 --> 00:50.230 Prof: Something bad happened. 00:50.230 --> 00:52.130 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Something terrible 00:52.134 --> 00:52.644 happened. 00:52.640 --> 00:56.560 Prof: Then got into the statistical and quantitative 00:56.558 --> 00:59.938 aspects of that and then eventually he got a PhD in 00:59.936 --> 01:03.516 demography itself, and since then he's come back 01:03.520 --> 01:06.250 to America and he's taught at Oxford, 01:06.250 --> 01:10.730 and Princeton, and here at Yale. 01:10.730 --> 01:13.430 Unlike most academics, he actually ventured into the 01:13.426 --> 01:16.436 real world, although I'm not sure some of these are really 01:16.439 --> 01:19.189 like the real world, like the U.S. Government. 01:19.188 --> 01:21.428 Dr. Michael Titlebaum: Yeah, somewhat unreal. 01:21.430 --> 01:25.120 Prof: He was the staff director of a Select Committee 01:25.117 --> 01:28.237 on Population for the U.S. House of Representatives 01:28.244 --> 01:32.004 and then was U.S. Commissioner for the Study of International 01:31.995 --> 01:34.865 Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, 01:34.870 --> 01:37.310 so that's pretty important. 01:37.310 --> 01:39.240 He's been with the Ford Foundation, 01:39.239 --> 01:42.259 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 01:42.260 --> 01:47.480 and he's now with The Alfred Sloan Foundation where he's been 01:47.479 --> 01:53.219 vice president and in charge of science and technology programs. 01:53.220 --> 01:55.750 He's been on the advisory boards at National Academy 01:55.748 --> 01:58.918 Sciences, National Institutes of Health, American Association for 01:58.922 --> 02:00.462 the Advancement of Science. 02:00.459 --> 02:06.809 He's authored seven books, but I could only find four: 02:06.805 --> 02:09.675 one, two, three, four. 02:09.680 --> 02:14.990 So in addition to your reading packet, which I hope you all 02:14.990 --> 02:19.660 picked up--this is just your reading for tonight. 02:19.658 --> 02:26.438 In addition to--this is half his books--five major government 02:26.443 --> 02:29.613 reports, 75 articles, etc. 02:29.610 --> 02:32.150 One of his major contributions is what we've-- 02:32.150 --> 02:35.440 one of the topics we've just been--just finished discussing, 02:35.440 --> 02:38.820 he wrote--I think I mentioned this to you during the lecture 02:38.821 --> 02:41.631 that part of the Princeton project on Britain, 02:41.628 --> 02:44.558 the book on the British fertility decline, 02:44.559 --> 02:46.059 there's the author. 02:46.060 --> 02:51.690 And The Times Higher Education Supplement, 02:51.690 --> 02:55.130 wrote on that book: "An unsurpassed profusion 02:55.126 --> 02:59.256 of original data presented and analyzed with clarity all too 02:59.264 --> 03:02.074 often lacking in works of this kind. 03:02.069 --> 03:05.519 The book is invaluable; it clarifies and orders the 03:05.521 --> 03:08.571 complex rang of forces, which underlay the modern 03:08.566 --> 03:11.036 decline in rates of fertility." 03:11.038 --> 03:15.718 He's also worked on global environmental issues and 03:15.718 --> 03:19.438 population and resources, he wrote this, 03:19.437 --> 03:22.717 an environmental book, is one of the best 03:22.717 --> 03:23.957 investigations. 03:23.960 --> 03:27.390 So, you have the honor, not only the lecture today, 03:27.391 --> 03:31.311 but he's agreed to come to dinner and all the students are 03:31.306 --> 03:32.126 invited. 03:32.128 --> 03:35.548 It's going to be at Timothy Dwight starting at 5:30 and I 03:35.549 --> 03:37.319 know you have other things. 03:37.318 --> 03:39.208 If you can't--we'll probably have a leisurely-- 03:39.210 --> 03:42.740 casual leisurely dinner, so if you can't get there at 03:42.736 --> 03:44.406 5:30, come when you can--or if you 03:44.408 --> 03:47.508 have something else afterwards, come and go. 03:47.508 --> 03:48.088 At TD. 03:48.089 --> 03:53.879 There's some sort of a small dining room as you leave--as you 03:53.881 --> 03:55.331 come around. 03:55.330 --> 03:59.210 Okay in the last lecture we discussed the fertility declines 03:59.211 --> 04:02.631 in Europe and Tuesday we discussed how this fertility 04:02.633 --> 04:05.323 decline-- started discussing--has 04:05.319 --> 04:09.219 continued in Europe and spread around the world. 04:09.218 --> 04:13.458 I showed you a graph of the decline in fertility rates 04:13.460 --> 04:14.340 globally. 04:14.340 --> 04:18.910 In the developed countries--so in the world as a whole, 04:18.910 --> 04:22.160 as you've been told, the fertility decline has not 04:22.163 --> 04:25.683 been enough to keep the population from still going up 04:25.684 --> 04:28.134 very rapidly, we discussed that, 04:28.134 --> 04:29.744 but in Europe, Japan, 04:29.740 --> 04:32.810 the advanced countries, the fertility decline has 04:32.810 --> 04:35.690 caused the population to come down enough, 04:35.690 --> 04:40.980 and these countries are now facing rather serious problems 04:40.983 --> 04:43.393 of a decline, a possible decline, 04:43.391 --> 04:46.511 in their population, certainly a change in behavior 04:46.514 --> 04:50.354 structure and this is what Michael is an expert on and so 04:50.348 --> 04:54.388 that is what he will discuss today as soon as I shut up. 04:54.389 --> 04:56.779 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Well thank you very much 04:56.783 --> 04:58.833 Dr. Wyman and it's a pleasure to be here. 04:58.829 --> 05:02.409 I just want to say, you're a very lucky bunch of 05:02.411 --> 05:06.681 undergraduates to have Robert Wyman as your professor. 05:06.680 --> 05:13.270 He's a--I've heard him lecture and I know him and he's a 05:13.266 --> 05:17.216 wonderful academic and scholar. 05:17.220 --> 05:20.440 Going through that list of-- Prof: We give each other 05:20.437 --> 05:20.817 $100 tip. 05:20.819 --> 05:24.329 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Going through that list of 05:24.334 --> 05:28.044 publications makes me realize why my wife has been so annoyed 05:28.035 --> 05:31.915 with me for the 40 years nearly that we've been married, 05:31.920 --> 05:36.900 because a lot of that work has had to be done when I wasn't an 05:36.899 --> 05:42.049 academic and that means it comes out of your hide or out of your 05:42.045 --> 05:45.015 summer holidays, or weekends, 05:45.016 --> 05:48.786 or evenings, but it's interesting, 05:48.790 --> 05:53.390 exciting, and wonderful to do, and I've enjoyed doing it. 05:53.389 --> 05:57.939 I know that you have been discussing--because I've seen 05:57.935 --> 06:01.635 your prospectus for this excellent course. 06:01.639 --> 06:06.199 I know you've been discussing high fertility rates and the 06:06.197 --> 06:10.507 demographic transition and you know therefore that high 06:10.514 --> 06:15.394 fertility has attracted a great deal of attention for at least 06:15.391 --> 06:20.751 two centuries and has always been related to poverty issues, 06:20.750 --> 06:23.700 concerns about poverty, underdevelopment, 06:23.699 --> 06:28.069 developing countries and so on, or poverty back in the 1800s 06:28.067 --> 06:32.017 when Malthus was writing, and also related to concerns 06:32.016 --> 06:34.226 about the environment and so on. 06:34.230 --> 06:38.980 What is less known though is that, for at least 100 years of 06:38.978 --> 06:42.918 those two centuries, there's been discussion about 06:42.920 --> 06:46.060 low fertility as a problem as well. 06:46.060 --> 06:49.780 This has a long and, I would say, 06:49.781 --> 06:55.131 tumultuous history, lots of proponents worrying 06:55.129 --> 07:02.689 about it, often very prominent people in politics or science. 07:02.689 --> 07:06.969 I would say the debates have been plagued by misunderstanding 07:06.971 --> 07:11.111 and confusion as have the debates about high fertility, 07:11.110 --> 07:14.630 so there's something about population that stimulates 07:14.632 --> 07:16.872 misunderstanding and confusion. 07:16.870 --> 07:22.400 Now in general, low fertility has been linked 07:22.401 --> 07:25.421 to a decline in power. 07:25.420 --> 07:30.070 You have to think about this in political and economic terms. 07:30.069 --> 07:33.019 National power, empires, the decline of empires 07:33.019 --> 07:36.799 and so on, but the links have been made, but it's often very 07:36.803 --> 07:39.373 fuzzy as to what the causal flow is. 07:39.370 --> 07:43.460 Is the low fertility a cause of the decline of empires or 07:43.461 --> 07:46.971 decline of national power, or is it a symptom? 07:46.970 --> 07:49.130 Often the commentators don't make it very clear what they're 07:49.132 --> 07:49.722 talking about. 07:49.720 --> 07:53.500 Those of you who know the French debates about these 07:53.502 --> 07:57.952 issues will know that it's a very prominent feature of French 07:57.954 --> 08:01.514 intellectual discourse going back into the 1870s, 08:01.514 --> 08:02.854 for example. 08:02.850 --> 08:05.750 The French are hardly alone in this. 08:05.750 --> 08:09.550 You will find many such anxieties expressed in Germany 08:09.548 --> 08:11.698 in the 1930s, in Great Britain, 08:11.699 --> 08:13.849 Sweden, U.S., Russia, etc. 08:13.850 --> 08:17.430 More recently, let's say over the past four 08:17.425 --> 08:20.145 decades or so, in Eastern Europe, 08:20.151 --> 08:22.281 in Japan, in the U.S. 08:22.278 --> 08:27.658 certainly, and in the Asian Tigers most recently: 08:27.663 --> 08:31.143 Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea. 08:31.139 --> 08:34.569 Because it's about power, national power, 08:34.573 --> 08:39.383 or sub-national power low fertility has long been closely 08:39.383 --> 08:44.023 tied to political ideology and to cultural values. 08:44.019 --> 08:47.639 In some cases, low fertility has even been 08:47.643 --> 08:52.243 used as a tool to achieve desired social policies. 08:52.240 --> 08:54.990 I want to make one point, that I hope you'll take away 08:54.985 --> 08:57.695 from this, which is that the concern about 08:57.698 --> 09:02.028 low fertility has never, ever, been solely about the 09:02.034 --> 09:06.974 number of warm bodies, human being warm bodies that 09:06.966 --> 09:12.066 is, but instead it's been visualized through the lens of 09:12.065 --> 09:14.935 these socio cultural values. 09:14.940 --> 09:20.770 The reason I say it's never been about warm bodies can be 09:20.772 --> 09:24.902 illustrated there, because if what I said is not 09:24.900 --> 09:28.650 true there really could never have been any concern about 09:28.649 --> 09:30.859 fertility since at least 1950. 09:30.860 --> 09:32.500 The world's population, as you see, 09:32.500 --> 09:37.160 has grown dramatically over that half century and neither 09:37.158 --> 09:42.228 could there be any concern about future population demographic 09:42.231 --> 09:47.391 trends because the projections no matter which variant you take 09:47.389 --> 09:52.379 from the UN all show substantial growth going forward. 09:52.379 --> 09:57.289 In reality, the fears about low fertility are also framed in 09:57.292 --> 10:01.172 terms of regional or national, or religious, 10:01.174 --> 10:06.244 or ethnic or sub-national populations defined culturally. 10:06.240 --> 10:11.080 I would put it rather crudely, if I may, 10:11.080 --> 10:16.080 that since the onset of mortality decline which you've 10:16.080 --> 10:20.570 heard about already, at least two centuries ago, 10:20.570 --> 10:24.610 there have never been any shortages of humans. 10:24.610 --> 10:27.930 There have only been perceived or relative shortages of 10:27.927 --> 10:29.707 particular kinds of humans. 10:29.710 --> 10:33.480 The most critical category is national groups in these 10:33.480 --> 10:36.750 discussions and then you can get into language, 10:36.753 --> 10:39.603 or religion, or the other subgroups. 10:39.600 --> 10:43.660 To give you an example of this I just want to point out that 10:43.657 --> 10:47.457 when he was Mayor of Paris, the later President of the 10:47.461 --> 10:50.571 Republic of France, Jacque Chirac, 10:50.572 --> 10:57.512 he warned about the decline in the population of France. 10:57.509 --> 11:04.299 This is consistent with French perspectives that right to left, 11:04.298 --> 11:10.148 all French people think that there are two few French people 11:10.148 --> 11:15.798 and yet at the same time he urged the repatriation of Arab 11:15.798 --> 11:21.448 immigrants and the restriction of future immigration. 11:21.450 --> 11:23.850 I mean now that classically shows you that it's not about 11:23.850 --> 11:27.530 the number of warm bodies; it's about the number of French 11:27.528 --> 11:29.368 warm bodies in France. 11:29.370 --> 11:34.060 There is no ideological uniformity in these things. 11:34.058 --> 11:37.938 I've already said that in France the range of concerns is 11:37.938 --> 11:41.748 right from the left to the right, right across political 11:41.749 --> 11:42.649 spectrum. 11:42.649 --> 11:46.729 Democratic thinkers of what you might call liberal in the U.S., 11:46.730 --> 11:50.540 or left wing in Europe say, and of conservative 11:50.543 --> 11:53.203 orientations, have all expressed concern 11:53.203 --> 11:55.003 about this in one form or another. 11:55.000 --> 12:00.110 Those are democratic thinkers, non-democrats such as the 12:00.114 --> 12:04.954 nationalist right in inter-war Germany and Italy, 12:08.551 --> 12:12.091 in France and other European countries have expressed such 12:12.090 --> 12:16.030 concerns, as have the authoritarian lefts 12:16.025 --> 12:20.375 of Stalin and Nicolea Ceausescu in Romania. 12:20.379 --> 12:22.819 There's a whole story about Romania which I've written 12:22.821 --> 12:23.191 about. 12:23.190 --> 12:28.180 If you want to see a bizarre situation read about what the 12:28.177 --> 12:31.587 Romanian government did in the 1960s. 12:31.590 --> 12:34.750 On the political right, low fertility has generally 12:34.750 --> 12:37.470 been seen as a threat to national power, 12:37.470 --> 12:40.470 imperial power, or from the point of some with 12:40.472 --> 12:45.942 a more economics orientation, to the capacity to restrain 12:45.937 --> 12:49.757 wages and the power of unions. 12:49.759 --> 12:53.199 Many on the right have also expressed alarm about fertility 12:53.202 --> 12:56.172 differentials between social classes and races, 12:56.168 --> 13:01.318 ethnic groups and so forth, but frankly such concerns are 13:01.322 --> 13:06.752 subliminal but there in other political persuasions than the 13:06.750 --> 13:07.670 right. 13:07.668 --> 13:10.868 Meanwhile, as I said, the political left has often 13:10.866 --> 13:14.256 shared these nationalistic and strategic concerns. 13:14.259 --> 13:17.299 In the 1930s, Hitler's Germany adopted very 13:17.301 --> 13:21.651 aggressive pronatalist policies to raise fertility in Germany 13:21.647 --> 13:25.407 but so did Stalin's USSR, same time, same place or 13:25.413 --> 13:29.093 different places same time, same policies in many ways. 13:29.090 --> 13:31.240 Then there were the socialist states, 13:31.240 --> 13:34.210 I mentioned Ceausescu, had a very strong pronatalist 13:34.207 --> 13:36.377 policy, but in the meantime the 13:36.383 --> 13:40.473 People's Republic of China went from pronatalism to strongly 13:40.471 --> 13:43.861 anti-natalist, probably the most energetic 13:43.860 --> 13:47.510 fertility reduction policy in world history, 13:47.509 --> 13:51.129 same country, same party in control -- 13:51.129 --> 13:55.779 taking population very significantly. 13:55.779 --> 13:58.669 Now, in the West, the democratic left has 13:58.668 --> 14:03.068 concentrated generally on the threat posed by low fertility to 14:03.072 --> 14:07.552 their desires to expand and strengthen the welfare state, 14:07.548 --> 14:10.428 and in fact, if you look at in 1930s you'll 14:10.426 --> 14:14.116 see a fascinating debate led by the Myrdal's (prominent 14:14.124 --> 14:17.374 economists, Nobel laureates later of the 14:17.365 --> 14:21.495 left in Sweden) who promoted what came to be called the 14:21.503 --> 14:25.333 welfare state to the conservative parties in Sweden 14:25.333 --> 14:29.553 on the grounds that they needed to do something to raise 14:29.548 --> 14:33.148 fertility and that was the way to do it. 14:33.149 --> 14:36.769 If they didn't raise fertility, there would be no Swedes left 14:36.772 --> 14:39.662 in 50 years or so, and they actually co-opted the 14:39.658 --> 14:42.408 right successfully into supporting the welfare state 14:42.412 --> 14:43.602 that they promoted. 14:43.600 --> 14:44.620 What about demographers? 14:44.620 --> 14:45.850 Have they been involved in this stuff? 14:45.850 --> 14:51.470 Yes, they have including some very prominent ones. 14:51.470 --> 14:55.630 One reason for this was the discovery, the development in 14:55.634 --> 15:00.024 the 1930s by demographers of some very powerful concepts and 15:00.024 --> 15:01.144 techniques. 15:01.139 --> 15:04.299 I don't know if you've actually studied yet the intrinsic rate 15:04.302 --> 15:06.022 of increase, net reproduction rate, 15:06.018 --> 15:08.918 total fertility rate, and demographic projection 15:08.918 --> 15:09.508 models. 15:09.509 --> 15:13.189 All of these being developed--technologies 15:13.186 --> 15:18.116 developed in the 1930s and these led to predictions from 15:18.119 --> 15:23.499 demographers that the population of the United Kingdom, 15:23.500 --> 15:28.260 for example from the 1930s to the 1960s, 15:28.259 --> 15:33.439 would decline very sharply and there were some very pathetic 15:33.437 --> 15:37.737 novels and academic books written with titles like 15:37.738 --> 15:43.108 Twilight of Parenthood, Race Suicide, 15:43.105 --> 15:45.625 and other such tomes. 15:45.629 --> 15:48.509 That forecast, using demographic projection 15:48.506 --> 15:51.656 models, that there would be too few whatever's, 15:51.658 --> 15:53.438 of the relevant group. 15:53.440 --> 15:55.830 Now in some respects these were flawed predictions, 15:55.827 --> 15:56.397 obviously. 15:56.399 --> 15:58.639 It didn't happen, and they arose from 15:58.644 --> 16:02.394 misunderstanding because these were new technologies that had 16:02.386 --> 16:05.996 only recently been understood and developed and there was a 16:06.004 --> 16:09.464 typical excess of enthusiasm, academic enthusiasm, 16:09.456 --> 16:12.766 they really thought they had developed a window into the 16:12.774 --> 16:13.864 distant future. 16:13.860 --> 16:16.970 They could project the population using intrinsic rates 16:16.971 --> 16:20.081 of increase and projection models and they could see 50 16:20.081 --> 16:21.581 years into the future. 16:21.580 --> 16:24.130 They thought. 16:24.129 --> 16:25.969 They were wrong. 16:25.970 --> 16:30.560 All of those projections proved to be empirically wrong. 16:30.558 --> 16:34.318 We know better now because we've seen they were wrong. 16:34.320 --> 16:37.870 It helps to actually see things go so badly wrong, 16:37.870 --> 16:41.990 but these same errors of believing demographic 16:41.985 --> 16:47.285 projections to be forecasts of future populations are being 16:47.292 --> 16:52.792 made right now as we speak, mostly by non-demographers. 16:52.788 --> 16:56.128 Demographers have all learned they can't believe projections 16:56.134 --> 16:57.104 as predictions. 16:57.100 --> 17:00.660 Non-demographers haven't learned that lesson or don't 17:00.655 --> 17:04.095 want to learn that lesson, and they use these projections 17:04.096 --> 17:07.366 to forecast decline of the West, and decline of the Soviet 17:07.365 --> 17:10.325 Union, decline of Russia, decline of Italy, 17:10.330 --> 17:13.420 whatever category they want to talk about. 17:13.420 --> 17:16.110 What about--I said there were a few very distinguished 17:16.113 --> 17:17.793 demographers who also did this? 17:17.788 --> 17:22.368 Yes, the most prominent was the great French demographer Alfred 17:22.365 --> 17:26.715 Sauvy, a very distinguished man indeed, probably the dean of 17:26.718 --> 17:28.488 French demographers. 17:28.490 --> 17:32.720 He did this kind of relationship of low fertility 17:32.717 --> 17:37.117 equals decline for most of his professional career, 17:37.121 --> 17:39.501 for 40 years basically. 17:39.500 --> 17:45.340 Let me just list for you some of the events in history that he 17:45.343 --> 17:49.753 attributed to fertility rates being too low. 17:49.750 --> 17:55.480 He said the decadence of ancient Athens and then of Rome, 17:55.482 --> 17:56.612 item one. 17:56.608 --> 18:01.388 The failure of France to industrialize, 18:01.390 --> 18:05.750 the decline of the French Navy in the nineteenth century, 18:05.750 --> 18:11.800 the collapse of the French army before the Germans in 1940. 18:11.799 --> 18:14.669 He used very evocative language. 18:14.670 --> 18:18.770 He said, for example, "The terrible failure of 18:18.772 --> 18:21.522 1940, more moral than material, 18:21.516 --> 18:26.436 must be linked in part to this dangerous sclerosis resulting 18:26.440 --> 18:28.360 from low birthrates. 18:28.358 --> 18:33.068 We saw all too often during the occupation," 18:33.073 --> 18:37.693 German occupation, "old men leaning wearily 18:37.689 --> 18:40.929 towards the servile solution. 18:40.930 --> 18:44.160 At the time that the young," that's the 18:44.157 --> 18:47.507 resistance, "were taking part in the 18:47.510 --> 18:51.560 national impulse towards independence and liberty. 18:51.558 --> 18:56.328 This crucial effect of our senility, is it not a grave 18:56.328 --> 18:57.228 warning? 18:57.230 --> 19:02.620 Depopulation for France carries with it, fatally, 19:02.615 --> 19:06.875 a general legacy of decadence." 19:06.880 --> 19:11.830 You see how powerful the rhetoric can be in this area. 19:11.828 --> 19:16.618 I do not want you to get the impression that demographers 19:16.619 --> 19:22.009 shared these lifelong concern about fertility being too low, 19:22.009 --> 19:25.629 to the contrary, they were not widely shared 19:25.632 --> 19:30.772 among demographers after all the gloomy forecasts of the 1930s 19:30.771 --> 19:32.711 proved to be wrong. 19:32.710 --> 19:36.150 The past is one of confusion and anxiety. 19:36.150 --> 19:37.360 What about the future? 19:37.358 --> 19:39.488 I'd say it's likely to be a future of great 19:39.493 --> 19:40.463 unpredictability. 19:40.460 --> 19:46.930 The truth is that currently we are in a period of low fertility 19:46.929 --> 19:52.459 rates that are without precedent in their lowness, 19:52.460 --> 19:55.090 if you will, their smallness and without 19:55.086 --> 19:59.396 precedent in how widespread they have become around the world. 19:59.400 --> 20:04.050 Having no precedent we actually lack any way of knowing if they 20:04.048 --> 20:07.198 will continue at these very low levels, 20:07.200 --> 20:12.590 if they'll rise somewhat, perhaps even above the magic 20:12.593 --> 20:17.583 2.11 replacement level, or could they decline further 20:17.584 --> 20:22.444 to levels such as the league table leaders with low fertility 20:22.435 --> 20:25.665 which would be surprisingly enough Italy, 20:25.671 --> 20:27.451 Spain, Hong Kong. 20:27.450 --> 20:28.690 We don't know. 20:28.690 --> 20:32.350 Anybody who tells you they know, you should not believe, 20:32.345 --> 20:34.335 they have no way of knowing. 20:34.338 --> 20:38.358 We do know that the very low fertility of 1930s was short 20:38.362 --> 20:42.742 lived but then was followed by a substantial baby boom in some 20:42.744 --> 20:47.634 countries that had low fertility in the 1930s and not in others. 20:47.630 --> 20:52.300 All I can say to you is why don't you all come back for your 20:52.297 --> 20:56.807 fiftieth reunion at Yale in 50 years and we'll have a talk 20:56.805 --> 21:00.835 about whether fertility rates stayed very low, 21:00.838 --> 21:04.018 went lower, or rose in these countries that were very low. 21:04.019 --> 21:09.539 That's the only way we're ever going to know. 21:09.538 --> 21:13.338 This graph will surely be wrong as a prediction, 21:13.339 --> 21:15.119 I will predict that. 21:15.118 --> 21:19.388 There's an irony here, we have moved from a society in 21:19.394 --> 21:23.754 which 90% of women have no effective control over their 21:23.748 --> 21:28.668 fertility to a society in which 90% of women do have effective 21:28.667 --> 21:33.347 control of their fertility, rational control of their 21:33.354 --> 21:34.214 fertility. 21:34.210 --> 21:38.350 The result is that analysts, demographers and you, 21:38.348 --> 21:42.968 are less able to rationally anticipate what they will 21:42.971 --> 21:47.061 collectively do now that they individually, 21:47.058 --> 21:51.808 rationally have control over their fertility. 21:51.808 --> 21:55.248 A very wide range of population projections is plausible, 21:55.250 --> 21:58.370 that's just a narrow range compared to some you could do if 21:58.366 --> 22:01.396 you wanted to make-- these are quite conservative 22:01.401 --> 22:04.511 assumptions on the high side and the low side. 22:04.509 --> 22:10.159 Under these kinds of conditions of really profound uncertainty, 22:10.160 --> 22:13.390 can we offer any cautious interpretations of historical 22:13.391 --> 22:17.101 experience that might provide us with some kind of insight into 22:17.102 --> 22:18.002 the future? 22:18.000 --> 22:21.850 Well I'll offer a few and you can shoot me down if you would 22:21.846 --> 22:22.886 like to do so. 22:22.890 --> 22:26.940 First, I think it's nearly inevitable that we'll see 22:26.938 --> 22:31.458 populations with much older age structures, much older age 22:31.463 --> 22:34.643 compositions then those of the past. 22:34.640 --> 22:37.540 That's the consequence of low fertility. 22:37.538 --> 22:40.658 Of course if there's a nuclear catastrophe or some other 22:40.660 --> 22:42.420 catastrophe all bets are off. 22:42.420 --> 22:47.130 None of these projections or future looks can assume 22:47.134 --> 22:48.434 catastrophe. 22:48.430 --> 22:52.320 The only way to return to the youthful age structures of the 22:52.324 --> 22:56.094 past would be to have very substantial fertility increases 22:56.086 --> 22:59.386 to those of the past and to sustain those very high 22:59.386 --> 23:00.836 fertility rates. 23:00.838 --> 23:04.658 This in turn would apply--would imply rapid population, 23:04.657 --> 23:06.847 increase ad infinitum. 23:06.848 --> 23:09.978 I think most of you know that that's not likely to happen. 23:09.980 --> 23:16.900 Now my other point here is that societies that have very low 23:16.901 --> 23:21.281 fertility rates, like 1.1 child per woman on 23:21.281 --> 23:25.111 average that you might find in Italy or Japan, 23:25.108 --> 23:28.808 Japan's a little higher but 1.3 in Japan. 23:28.808 --> 23:32.388 I think it would be desirable--this is a value 23:32.390 --> 23:36.190 judgment on my part, it would be desirable for 23:36.188 --> 23:40.988 fertility rates to rise somewhat to more moderate levels but I 23:40.992 --> 23:45.952 don't think they will ever rise in those countries to the levels 23:45.953 --> 23:47.533 pre-transition. 23:47.529 --> 23:51.509 The challenge is going to be find creative mechanisms to 23:51.507 --> 23:55.697 smooth the transition from younger to older demographic age 23:55.702 --> 23:59.972 structures and to put in place adaptive mechanisms that will 23:59.970 --> 24:04.530 allow such societies to prosper over the longer term under these 24:04.526 --> 24:06.186 new conditions. 24:06.190 --> 24:09.710 The second point I'd like to make is that we are in danger 24:09.711 --> 24:12.621 collectively of making two errors of demographic 24:12.616 --> 24:16.136 interpretation and these are both significant errors. 24:16.140 --> 24:19.790 First, we are in danger of putting undue emphasis upon what 24:19.785 --> 24:21.415 are called period rates. 24:21.420 --> 24:23.290 Have you discussed period rates? 24:23.288 --> 24:26.088 Prof: There's a reading from the last lecture. 24:26.088 --> 24:27.638 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Okay. 24:27.640 --> 24:29.750 We are in danger of focusing on period rates. 24:29.750 --> 24:34.540 I've just done it myself; 1.1 child per woman for Italy, 24:34.541 --> 24:39.331 even though we know they are distorted rates. 24:39.328 --> 24:42.528 They're well below the underlying rates of how many 24:42.531 --> 24:46.181 children the average woman will have when she finishes her 24:46.182 --> 24:48.682 childbearing, that's a cohort rate. 24:48.680 --> 24:53.670 Second danger is--and we're doing it every day, 24:53.674 --> 24:59.874 mis-specifying the category aged and thereby misconstruing 24:59.865 --> 25:03.445 what demographic aging means. 25:03.450 --> 25:06.210 Let me say a few words about both of those. 25:06.210 --> 25:07.770 In Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, 25:07.769 --> 25:10.689 Ireland, countries like that in Europe, 25:10.690 --> 25:13.500 there have been significant increases in the mean age of 25:13.497 --> 25:16.507 marriage and hence the mean age of first birth typically. 25:16.509 --> 25:20.949 These are large increases by demographic standards and they 25:20.952 --> 25:25.242 are large enough to cause distortions in the period rates 25:25.241 --> 25:28.921 over the time period during which the mean age of 25:28.917 --> 25:31.137 childbearing is rising. 25:31.140 --> 25:33.000 This is a well known phenomenon to demographers; 25:33.000 --> 25:38.860 it's not well understood among political leaderships. 25:38.858 --> 25:41.848 When I was working on The Hill running a congressional 25:41.846 --> 25:44.516 committee, I learned not to use the term 25:44.517 --> 25:48.317 'cohort,' because as soon as I said cohort the Congressman 25:48.324 --> 25:51.194 would say, 'you mean your friends, 25:51.192 --> 25:52.372 your cohort?' 25:52.368 --> 25:55.048 I said 'no, no it's a generation concept.' 25:55.048 --> 25:59.168 'Oh I don't get it, don't bother me with the 25:59.167 --> 26:00.027 facts.' 26:00.028 --> 26:05.138 But even the term is misunderstood. 26:05.140 --> 26:07.740 Given that it's really too easy to distort, 26:07.740 --> 26:11.630 for that kind of audience if you want to make the case that 26:11.632 --> 26:15.392 we're all going to hell in a hand basket to distort these 26:15.391 --> 26:18.881 period rates and say this is what's going to continue 26:18.880 --> 26:21.230 indefinitely into the future. 26:21.230 --> 26:23.970 Prof: Can you just say--repeat what period it is. 26:23.970 --> 26:25.180 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Period rate-- 26:25.180 --> 26:25.850 Prof: Not all of them have read about it. 26:25.848 --> 26:28.968 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Okay, a period rate is-- 26:28.970 --> 26:32.180 it is expressed--let's say--let's take the total 26:32.179 --> 26:34.979 fertility rate which is a period rate, 26:34.980 --> 26:39.980 it is synthetic in the sense that it is an attempt to 26:39.980 --> 26:46.040 summarize the fertility behavior let's say in 2009 of women, 26:46.038 --> 26:48.738 demographers care only about women by the way, 26:48.740 --> 26:53.400 of women of all ages. 26:53.400 --> 26:57.650 It's the fertility rates of women 15 to 19,20 to 24; 26:57.650 --> 27:01.650 these are different cohorts as you can see in 2009. 27:01.650 --> 27:06.920 They're born in different years; they each have a characteristic 27:06.917 --> 27:09.177 fertility rate by age. 27:09.180 --> 27:15.700 If you sum up the rates of all of those age groups in a given 27:15.696 --> 27:21.286 year you will get a period rate, which is an attempt to 27:21.289 --> 27:25.599 summarize the overall fertility behavior of the entire 27:25.603 --> 27:27.723 population of all ages. 27:27.720 --> 27:32.720 Then we express it, probably confusingly, 27:32.715 --> 27:39.705 in terms such as 1.1 child per woman, or 2.1 children per 27:39.710 --> 27:40.960 woman. 27:40.960 --> 27:46.080 It's not actually any real woman, it's a synthetic woman. 27:46.079 --> 27:48.079 Prof: The best kind. 27:48.078 --> 27:49.578 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: The best kind of women 27:49.575 --> 27:49.825 yeah. 27:49.828 --> 27:56.938 If you--another way to imagine this--imagine you had 1,000 27:56.935 --> 27:59.675 female demographers. 27:59.680 --> 28:02.760 That's a frightening prospect when you think about it, 28:02.759 --> 28:07.779 and they formed a pact, they were all age 15, 28:07.778 --> 28:11.838 so they're 15-year-old demographers and they form a 28:11.836 --> 28:16.056 pact that they will bear children collectively at the 28:16.057 --> 28:20.757 rate of each age group in that year that they make the pact 28:20.763 --> 28:24.663 right through their reproductive lifespan. 28:24.660 --> 28:28.020 At the end of their reproductive lifespan, 28:28.019 --> 28:32.769 40 say or 45, they collectively would have an 28:32.766 --> 28:39.556 average children ever born equal to the total fertility rate for 28:39.560 --> 28:42.520 that year, but of course that would never 28:42.521 --> 28:42.881 happen. 28:42.880 --> 28:46.910 I mean I'm just trying to give you an--ask you to imagine what 28:46.914 --> 28:48.044 the rates mean. 28:48.038 --> 28:50.608 The problem with the rates--well let me say what's 28:50.614 --> 28:52.194 good about the period rates. 28:52.190 --> 28:55.980 They give you a summary of what's going on in a year or in 28:55.982 --> 28:59.312 a five year period, that's why it's called a period 28:59.310 --> 28:59.910 rate. 28:59.910 --> 29:05.270 It's a current kind of summary rate. 29:05.269 --> 29:09.319 The cohort rates don't do that, they tell you how many children 29:09.317 --> 29:12.907 women age 45 today had through their entire lifespan. 29:12.910 --> 29:17.220 The problem with the period rates is that they can be 29:17.218 --> 29:22.188 distorted if women delay or accelerate their childbearing. 29:22.190 --> 29:25.620 Each year if there's a delay they may end up with the same 29:25.618 --> 29:29.108 number of children when they finish their childbearing, 29:29.108 --> 29:31.978 but they stretch it out over more years, 29:31.980 --> 29:35.080 so the annual rates, the period rates are depressed 29:35.076 --> 29:35.816 therefore. 29:35.818 --> 29:39.178 We know that's happening in southern Europe, 29:39.180 --> 29:42.250 we know it's not happening in central Europe, 29:42.250 --> 29:46.690 so low rates in central Europe are not distorted in this way, 29:46.690 --> 29:49.580 the low rates in southern Europe are distorted in this 29:49.582 --> 29:49.912 way. 29:49.910 --> 29:52.930 That's probably enough about period rates. 29:52.930 --> 29:56.010 Now I've said the second possible error is the 29:56.011 --> 29:59.441 mis-specification by demographers and others of the 29:59.438 --> 30:02.588 boundaries of the age dependency category. 30:02.588 --> 30:07.608 Convention, when do you get to be aged dependent? 30:07.609 --> 30:10.649 The answer 65. 30:10.650 --> 30:12.840 Where did that number come from? 30:12.839 --> 30:15.839 Arbitrary. 30:15.839 --> 30:17.329 Who came up with it? 30:17.328 --> 30:22.248 The people who designed the Social Security Act of 1935 who 30:22.249 --> 30:27.169 had to decide at what age did a person qualify for a Social 30:27.167 --> 30:28.947 Security pension. 30:28.950 --> 30:31.620 Why did they say 65? 30:31.618 --> 30:34.758 Well actually initially they were going to say 70 because 30:34.762 --> 30:38.132 they were copying Bismarck's social insurance scheme from the 30:38.132 --> 30:41.662 nineteenth century, and the Bismarck system you got 30:41.664 --> 30:43.784 your state pension at age 70. 30:43.779 --> 30:47.139 It was a time of mass unemployment and so there was a 30:47.137 --> 30:50.757 desire to encourage older workers to leave the work force 30:50.755 --> 30:53.915 to make room for unemployed younger workers, 30:53.920 --> 30:57.800 so they moved it down by five years, 65. 30:57.798 --> 31:02.738 It's been that way in the statistics, in the data, 31:02.739 --> 31:04.049 ever since. 31:04.048 --> 31:09.378 Demographers have not adjusted to the reality that the meaning 31:09.376 --> 31:14.786 of 65 in 1935 was very different from the meaning of 65 in 2005 31:14.790 --> 31:15.840 or 2009. 31:15.838 --> 31:21.028 That's a problem because we will spend a lot of time 31:21.034 --> 31:27.454 calculating to the third decimal place the aged dependency ratio 31:27.450 --> 31:33.870 and yet we know that the meaning of the boundary between working 31:33.865 --> 31:39.565 age and aged dependency is increasingly out of touch with 31:39.569 --> 31:41.199 reality. 31:41.200 --> 31:44.080 The same is true, by the way, of the young 31:44.083 --> 31:48.113 dependency ratio, youthful dependency ratio, 31:48.107 --> 31:54.347 which is usually set at age 15 or 19 on grounds that after that 31:54.351 --> 31:59.991 people become productive labor force people like you. 31:59.990 --> 32:05.050 That's all changed too but we still stick to these boundaries 32:05.045 --> 32:10.185 and we're misleading ourselves and everyone else I'm afraid by 32:10.185 --> 32:11.445 doing that. 32:11.450 --> 32:13.390 There are a lot of alternatives to this. 32:13.390 --> 32:17.460 I won't go into them but one obvious possibility would be to 32:17.461 --> 32:21.601 shift the age boundaries upward for both the youthful and the 32:21.601 --> 32:25.561 older boundaries, say to 20 years and 70 years, 32:25.557 --> 32:29.337 rather than 15 and 65 that would make sense. 32:29.338 --> 32:32.898 You'd want to keep the old series as well because you would 32:32.904 --> 32:35.674 want to have some comparability over time, 32:35.670 --> 32:39.020 but to have an alternative ratio would be useful. 32:39.019 --> 32:44.439 Another possibility would be to fix the number of years of 32:44.444 --> 32:49.114 remaining life expectancy rather than the age, 32:49.108 --> 32:54.808 the absolute age as the boundary between aged dependency 32:54.813 --> 32:56.683 and working age. 32:56.680 --> 33:00.840 Now let me talk a bit about policy responses to very low 33:00.840 --> 33:01.750 fertility. 33:01.750 --> 33:05.930 There are basically two basic types of policy responses that 33:05.933 --> 33:07.853 have been strongly urged. 33:07.848 --> 33:10.898 First measures to increase fertility, that's a pretty 33:10.904 --> 33:14.084 obvious and direct one, and second measures to adapt to 33:14.077 --> 33:16.367 low fertility over the longer term. 33:16.368 --> 33:20.928 I am not embracing any of these recommendations but I do want to 33:20.932 --> 33:24.632 give you the analytic possibilities that might--that 33:24.625 --> 33:26.505 have been put forward. 33:26.509 --> 33:31.089 First, and this will offend most of you, it has been urged 33:31.086 --> 33:35.176 and implemented in some countries to limit access to 33:35.182 --> 33:36.952 fertility control. 33:36.950 --> 33:39.990 If you banned contraception, abortion, etc., 33:39.993 --> 33:43.183 sterilization, fertility rates would go up. 33:43.180 --> 33:49.360 That's basically what Ceausescu in Romania did in 1966. 33:49.358 --> 33:53.058 This would be probably unworkable in a liberal 33:53.061 --> 33:54.051 democracy. 33:54.048 --> 33:58.028 Romania was not a liberal democracy to say the least, 33:58.030 --> 34:01.860 and it would be unacceptable in many other ways. 34:01.858 --> 34:06.398 It would probably result in a revolution in the United States, 34:06.401 --> 34:09.381 but that's analytically a possibility. 34:09.380 --> 34:14.800 Second, economic incentives to encourage higher fertility and 34:14.797 --> 34:18.767 these have come in many forms in the past. 34:18.768 --> 34:22.288 How about cash bonuses for bearing a child? 34:22.289 --> 34:25.459 Or allowances, annual payments per child you 34:25.458 --> 34:28.478 have in the family, from the government, 34:28.483 --> 34:31.643 or tax preferences to people with children, 34:31.639 --> 34:33.479 those are part of U.S. 34:33.483 --> 34:35.163 tax law, of course. 34:35.159 --> 34:38.819 These can be flat, meaning each child is treated 34:38.815 --> 34:43.555 the same in terms of the amount of bonus or tax incentive, 34:43.559 --> 34:45.409 or they can be "progressive"-- 34:45.409 --> 34:50.499 I guess you put that in quotes--with increasing amounts 34:50.500 --> 34:52.600 per-- for later births. 34:52.599 --> 34:56.679 You might give no incentive for the first birth but a big 34:56.679 --> 34:59.959 incentive for the third birth, for example. 34:59.960 --> 35:02.540 You could give 'in-kind' benefits. 35:02.539 --> 35:05.209 For example, in much of Eastern Europe, 35:05.210 --> 35:09.190 families with more than two children had access to larger 35:09.190 --> 35:11.980 and preferential flats, preferred flats, 35:11.981 --> 35:13.041 government flats. 35:13.039 --> 35:17.159 They got preference in that way or subsidized housing, 35:17.161 --> 35:21.441 or you could give early retirement bonuses to people. 35:21.440 --> 35:23.780 You could say, well a woman who has three or 35:23.782 --> 35:26.402 more children can retire at age 55 instead of 65, 35:26.400 --> 35:28.090 that would be an incentive. 35:28.090 --> 35:33.880 In both the Soviet Union in the 1930s and in Nazi Germany in the 35:33.882 --> 35:36.572 1930s, women got prizes, 35:36.567 --> 35:40.607 gold medals, mother heroine awards, 35:40.610 --> 35:42.600 gold medals for eight or more children, 35:42.599 --> 35:46.439 for example, in the Soviet Union. 35:46.440 --> 35:50.280 You could counterweight existing dis-incentives to large 35:50.282 --> 35:54.722 families for example, by facilitating female labor 35:54.719 --> 36:00.339 force participation for women who have children in various 36:02.978 --> 36:05.898 which is a government financed early childhood, 36:05.900 --> 36:09.830 before the schools start, system of childcare is an 36:09.831 --> 36:11.721 example of doing that. 36:11.719 --> 36:14.989 The Swedish government has lots of policies of this kind. 36:14.989 --> 36:19.729 Those are benign examples but there are some harsh examples. 36:19.730 --> 36:23.390 You could take measures to deter female labor force 36:23.393 --> 36:27.503 participation on grounds that you think it conflicts with 36:27.496 --> 36:29.106 maternal behavior. 36:29.110 --> 36:34.800 Now among Western countries, there have really been only a 36:34.804 --> 36:40.904 few that have adopted explicitly pronatalist policies of these 36:40.900 --> 36:41.900 kinds. 36:41.900 --> 36:49.110 France, Luxemburg, Greece, Quebec come to mind, 36:49.110 --> 36:52.630 although other countries have policies they do not describe as 36:52.632 --> 36:55.512 pronatalist policies, they say they're social 36:55.510 --> 36:58.820 policies, but they have the implicit effect of being 36:58.815 --> 37:02.505 pronatalist and they don't acknowledge that typically. 37:02.510 --> 37:07.320 In France there have been proposals never adopted for an 37:07.317 --> 37:10.677 official maternal wage, and it's called that, 37:10.684 --> 37:13.714 in which mothers who stay at home with young children would 37:13.711 --> 37:16.061 get monthly payments from the government, 37:16.059 --> 37:20.019 they get paid to be mothers that would be calculated in 37:20.021 --> 37:24.651 those proposals at about 25% of the prevailing wage for employed 37:24.646 --> 37:25.376 women. 37:25.380 --> 37:28.670 In the socialist countries, former socialist countries of 37:28.672 --> 37:30.972 eastern Europe, there were lots of these 37:30.965 --> 37:31.725 policies. 37:31.730 --> 37:34.850 They've all disappeared or almost all have disappeared 37:34.853 --> 37:37.333 since the fall of the communist system, 37:37.329 --> 37:39.799 but those countries had child allowances, 37:39.800 --> 37:43.260 birth bonuses, maternity leave at full pay for 37:43.264 --> 37:47.104 five months, paid leave until the child is 37:47.099 --> 37:51.969 three years of age, and substantial subsidies and 37:51.965 --> 37:53.575 grants in kind. 37:53.579 --> 37:56.529 The only non-Western low fertility country that's pursued 37:56.534 --> 37:59.114 this kind of policy, that I'm familiar with it so 37:59.110 --> 38:01.020 far at least, but there will be others almost 38:01.018 --> 38:03.108 surely, is Singapore. 38:03.110 --> 38:07.390 Singapore has embraced strong pronatalist policies and there 38:07.391 --> 38:10.661 have been some modest ones in Korea, Thailand, 38:10.655 --> 38:11.885 and Malaysia. 38:11.889 --> 38:14.499 In Singapore too they have policies about encouraging 38:14.503 --> 38:17.423 highly educated young men and women to meet each other, 38:17.420 --> 38:20.900 they have dating services, they want them to meet each 38:20.900 --> 38:23.330 other and marry and have children, 38:23.329 --> 38:26.189 which always causes amusement outside of Singapore. 38:26.190 --> 38:30.260 They don't think it's funny; they think it's perfectly 38:30.255 --> 38:31.105 sensible. 38:31.110 --> 38:35.800 It's fair to say that the impacts of these policies on 38:35.802 --> 38:40.942 fertility are probably there, but they're small impacts. 38:40.940 --> 38:44.470 In some countries they were very expensive policies as well, 38:44.472 --> 38:46.572 but they didn't have much impact. 38:46.570 --> 38:51.250 If you tried to do the kinds of things that eastern European 38:51.250 --> 38:56.170 socialist countries did in the 1980s proportionately in Western 38:56.168 --> 38:59.578 countries the costs would be enormous, 38:59.579 --> 39:05.969 1/3 to 1/2 of average wages for a family with two or three 39:05.971 --> 39:10.721 children for example; the cost would be very large. 39:10.719 --> 39:14.349 Now what about measures to adapt to low fertility over the 39:14.346 --> 39:15.106 long term? 39:15.110 --> 39:18.850 Well, first it's easier to adapt if the shifts are gradual, 39:18.849 --> 39:22.059 so very low fertility countries having dramatic shifts in the 39:22.059 --> 39:24.209 age structure, it makes it much harder for 39:24.213 --> 39:24.493 them. 39:24.489 --> 39:28.089 Then I've already mentioned the question of the boundaries 39:28.094 --> 39:31.944 between dependency and so on, I won't repeat that, 39:31.942 --> 39:37.502 but it's fair to say that the elderly dependent population, 39:37.500 --> 39:41.830 however defined, is going to cost more than the 39:41.826 --> 39:47.976 youthful dependent population, mainly because of healthcare. 39:47.980 --> 39:51.470 Education is the main public investment in youthful dependent 39:51.465 --> 39:54.595 population, the rest of the costs of those children are 39:54.601 --> 39:55.881 borne by families. 39:55.880 --> 39:59.230 When it comes to the aged dependent population the 39:59.226 --> 40:03.186 families are no longer paying the costs, and the healthcare 40:03.188 --> 40:05.578 costs are very high and rising. 40:05.579 --> 40:09.789 Here I would have to say that, of the industrialized countries 40:09.786 --> 40:11.226 of the West, the U.S. 40:11.233 --> 40:14.133 has the largest problem in this regard. 40:14.130 --> 40:17.180 Not because it has the oldest age structure or the most 40:17.175 --> 40:19.315 rapidly growing elderly population, 40:19.320 --> 40:22.980 but because it is politically incapable of controlling it's 40:22.981 --> 40:26.771 expenditure on healthcare and that's a generic problem in the 40:26.768 --> 40:30.338 society, but it has special import for 40:30.344 --> 40:32.914 the elderly age structure. 40:32.909 --> 40:35.569 What could governments do? 40:35.570 --> 40:38.140 Well they could modify the terms of the social pension 40:38.139 --> 40:40.119 provisions, they could shift the effective 40:40.121 --> 40:42.491 age of retirement, they could privatize part of 40:42.492 --> 40:46.172 the pension system, they could subject pension 40:46.172 --> 40:52.262 benefits of well off retirees to substantial income taxation. 40:52.260 --> 40:55.220 But, in fact, the politics of pension policy 40:55.215 --> 40:59.545 in most of these countries have operated in the other direction, 40:59.547 --> 41:01.607 in the opposite direction. 41:01.610 --> 41:03.200 Most countries, if anything, 41:03.202 --> 41:06.632 have taken measures to lower the pension age until recently 41:06.626 --> 41:10.166 when they've started gradually now to reverse the lowering of 41:10.168 --> 41:12.588 pension ages that they engaged in, 41:12.590 --> 41:14.600 in the 1960s and 1970s. 41:14.599 --> 41:17.569 As far as the youthful population is concerned, 41:17.568 --> 41:21.698 it's going to be smaller with these low fertility populations. 41:21.699 --> 41:25.319 Well, one could certainly convert age related facilities, 41:25.320 --> 41:28.040 such as schools, for other purposes, 41:28.039 --> 41:30.919 and going forward, it would make a lot of sense to 41:30.922 --> 41:34.692 design new schools in a flexible way so they're easier to convert 41:34.688 --> 41:39.328 for other purposes, which leads me finally to 41:39.329 --> 41:41.009 immigration. 41:41.010 --> 41:45.860 Immigration is often put forward as a way to deal with an 41:45.855 --> 41:47.495 aging population. 41:47.500 --> 41:53.180 The truth is that the potential pool of immigrants to low 41:53.177 --> 41:57.127 fertility countries, the potential pool, 41:57.132 --> 42:02.002 is very large and it could easily be tapped. 42:02.000 --> 42:05.010 In fact, many of these countries are having problems 42:05.005 --> 42:08.475 restraining the flow which is exceeding what they would like 42:08.483 --> 42:09.253 it to be. 42:09.250 --> 42:12.590 It would be quite simple for a low fertility country, 42:12.590 --> 42:14.860 any one of the ones I've mentioned, 42:14.860 --> 42:16.990 to simply augment their populations by allowing 42:16.990 --> 42:18.150 additional immigration. 42:18.150 --> 42:22.150 That sounds a lot easier than changing the pension system and 42:22.153 --> 42:24.093 then all the other systems. 42:24.090 --> 42:28.620 Now let me take you back to my point about concerns about low 42:28.623 --> 42:32.783 fertility not being about the number of warm bodies, 42:32.780 --> 42:37.960 but about the numbers defined as part of the nation or other 42:37.960 --> 42:43.830 ethnic or cultural group, so that's the paradox. 42:43.829 --> 42:46.989 Under conditions of very low fertility, 42:46.989 --> 42:50.559 substantial immigration would produce very rapid 42:50.561 --> 42:54.211 transformation of the composition of a population 42:54.210 --> 42:58.000 socio-culturally defined, and historically such rapid 42:58.001 --> 43:00.801 changes have led to passionate public opposition. 43:00.800 --> 43:06.680 The irony here is that, while you might think, 43:06.679 --> 43:09.629 as an analyst, sitting here in lecture room at 43:09.626 --> 43:13.356 Yale that why not just have more warm bodies immigrate and 43:13.358 --> 43:15.648 that'll take care of the issue. 43:15.650 --> 43:20.050 It's exactly in a low fertility setting that the public 43:20.045 --> 43:24.115 opposition is strongest to increased or substantial 43:24.117 --> 43:25.417 immigration. 43:25.420 --> 43:29.430 There are some examples in which immigration can be of-- 43:29.429 --> 43:32.929 by people who are defined as part of, 43:32.929 --> 43:35.179 or similar to, the indigenous population, 43:35.179 --> 43:38.029 and in those cases, there's less--typically less 43:38.030 --> 43:40.880 opposition and I can give you a few examples. 43:40.880 --> 43:46.930 Like the post war migration of East Germans to West Germany, 43:46.932 --> 43:48.372 for example. 43:48.369 --> 43:52.019 Or the Germans, so called Germans -- 43:52.018 --> 43:57.438 the Volga Germans--from Russia to Germany which turned out to 43:57.440 --> 44:01.420 be quite controversial, but they were defined as 44:01.422 --> 44:05.162 Germans returning home even though they're ancestors had 44:05.161 --> 44:06.931 left 300 years earlier. 44:06.929 --> 44:12.689 The Pied Noir's to France after the collapse of the French 44:12.690 --> 44:17.930 Empire, in Africa mostly; the "return"-- think 44:17.934 --> 44:20.704 about that, the "return" 44:20.702 --> 44:25.402 of Jews from North Africa to the new state of Israel; 44:25.400 --> 44:32.030 of Italians or Italian Argentineans rather, 44:32.032 --> 44:37.452 to Italy; of Japanese origin people, 44:37.447 --> 44:43.247 the Nisei from Brazil and Peru to Japan; 44:43.250 --> 44:47.640 of Angolan colonial settlers to Portugal, so there are examples 44:47.643 --> 44:51.403 of this kind of migration being less controversial. 44:51.400 --> 44:54.370 I think one should also say that moderate levels of 44:54.371 --> 44:57.761 immigration do not appear to be all that controversial. 44:57.760 --> 45:01.550 This is not a question of people being passionately 45:01.554 --> 45:04.744 against immigration, but it's a question of 45:04.742 --> 45:05.732 quantity. 45:05.730 --> 45:09.780 This will lead me, if I can get this to move 45:09.782 --> 45:15.722 forward--here's a Jacque Chirac quote which I meant to show you, 45:15.722 --> 45:18.082 I'll let you read it. 45:18.079 --> 45:31.259 45:31.260 --> 45:38.030 You see Chirac was saying that in 2004,--we already know what 45:38.032 --> 45:44.802 the population was in 2004--but that Europe would be empty in 45:44.804 --> 45:45.824 2004. 45:45.820 --> 45:49.760 He said that in 1984 and one thing the demographers have 45:49.762 --> 45:53.562 learned is never make a prediction over a time span in 45:53.559 --> 45:57.999 which you might still be alive because you will probably always 45:58.003 --> 46:05.533 be wrong; Chirac was clearly wrong. 46:05.530 --> 46:07.850 What I want to talk about is a study, 46:07.849 --> 46:10.319 and this will be my last section here, 46:10.320 --> 46:16.440 a study of the question of substituting immigration for 46:16.438 --> 46:21.648 missed fertility in low fertility societies. 46:21.650 --> 46:25.710 There was a study done by the United Nations Population 46:25.710 --> 46:27.140 Division in 2000. 46:27.139 --> 46:30.629 It asked the question, how many immigrants would be 46:30.630 --> 46:34.190 needed to compensate for low fertility in Europe? 46:34.190 --> 46:38.620 The answer was: A lot. 46:38.619 --> 46:42.439 This was no surprise to the UN Population Division or to 46:42.438 --> 46:46.188 demographers, but it was a surprise to The 46:46.190 --> 46:51.200 New York Times, which in 2001 ran this 46:51.201 --> 46:58.121 story--or 2000 I guess it is, back in January 2000 ran this 46:58.123 --> 47:03.553 story picked up by The Herald Tribune in Paris and so on, 47:03.550 --> 47:07.090 about this study. 47:07.090 --> 47:10.890 I know a little bit about the history of why it was published 47:10.889 --> 47:15.049 on the 2^(nd) of January 2000, which I can tell you because 47:15.050 --> 47:18.010 it's a story about how the press works. 47:18.010 --> 47:22.720 The study had been filed months before by the journalist Barbara 47:22.722 --> 47:25.662 Croset, and was literally filed in a 47:25.657 --> 47:28.187 file cabinet, had not been published, 47:28.186 --> 47:30.306 and then on the second of January, 47:30.309 --> 47:32.539 day after New Year's, slow news day, 47:32.539 --> 47:35.739 nothing was happening, the editor on duty said, 47:35.739 --> 47:39.839 'oh we have that story from six months ago let's just throw that 47:39.838 --> 47:40.878 in the paper.' 47:40.880 --> 47:43.450 They put it in the paper, it had already been written and 47:43.449 --> 47:48.529 edited, and notice the headline here, 47:48.529 --> 47:53.319 the subhead, 'It's The American Way,' you 47:53.315 --> 47:58.695 can imagine how this appealed to the nationalists in various 47:58.701 --> 48:00.711 European countries. 48:00.710 --> 48:04.970 Europe stares at a future built by immigrants, 48:04.974 --> 48:07.254 it's the American way. 48:07.250 --> 48:13.340 The reaction was described to me by the head of the UN 48:13.340 --> 48:17.250 population division in one word. 48:17.250 --> 48:19.720 He said it was "mayhem." 48:19.719 --> 48:24.979 They started to get calls almost immediately from almost 48:24.981 --> 48:27.661 every newspaper in Europe. 48:27.659 --> 48:32.099 The Secretary General of the United Nations got calls from 48:32.103 --> 48:35.473 most European countries, from the governments, 48:35.465 --> 48:38.455 and not surprisingly the Secretary General's office 48:38.458 --> 48:41.568 called over to the Population Division and said, 48:41.570 --> 48:45.760 'could you please send us the study.' 48:45.760 --> 48:49.420 The truth is, there was no study. 48:49.420 --> 48:54.290 They had done some back of the envelope calculations and had 48:54.289 --> 48:58.989 done a one page talking point thing for a General Assembly 48:58.992 --> 49:03.122 meeting that they thought it might come up at. 49:03.119 --> 49:07.439 What they did was a press release that was I think two 49:07.436 --> 49:10.196 pages, summarizing the back of the 49:10.202 --> 49:15.692 envelope calculations, and within a few days Le 49:15.686 --> 49:24.806 Monde story here, here's the press release. 49:24.809 --> 49:30.449 Here's Le Monde, I think, and Le Monde 49:30.445 --> 49:37.075 actually dropped the question mark at the end of the title of 49:37.077 --> 49:39.507 the press release. 49:39.510 --> 49:42.580 You see there, the press release says, 49:42.577 --> 49:47.307 "Replacement Migration, Is It A Solution To Declining 49:47.306 --> 49:49.956 And Aging Populations?" 49:49.960 --> 49:56.830 and Le Monde translated it as 'a solution to declining, 49:56.833 --> 49:59.203 etc., populations.' 49:59.199 --> 50:04.849 There was suddenly a big story in Europe, 50:04.849 --> 50:10.329 here we have Le Figaro, the report that alarmed Europe, 50:10.329 --> 50:15.559 it was translated--I think there's an Economist 50:15.559 --> 50:17.039 article here. 50:17.039 --> 50:19.199 Here's a cartoon from Figaro saying, 50:19.199 --> 50:24.449 what's the distance from Europe to the United Nations, 50:24.449 --> 50:27.979 etc., a man and a woman talking over the-- 50:27.980 --> 50:28.910 about that. 50:28.909 --> 50:33.909 Here's The Economist, fewer and wrinklier Europeans-- 50:33.909 --> 50:40.059 all the major German newspapers had articles, 50:40.059 --> 50:44.269 Belgium, Spanish, Italian, the French TV main 50:44.268 --> 50:49.908 channel sent crews to the UN to interview the authors of the 50:49.913 --> 50:50.873 study. 50:50.869 --> 50:54.219 There was still no study. 50:54.219 --> 50:58.349 All there was was that press release that you saw before. 50:58.349 --> 51:02.039 Well for some reason the Secretary General took the view 51:02.041 --> 51:06.071 that they should now do the study and they did the study, 51:06.070 --> 51:10.950 and unfortunately what happened was that the press in Europe 51:10.954 --> 51:15.434 interpreted the UN study or the press release as the UN 51:15.425 --> 51:19.475 recommendation to European countries to admit more 51:19.481 --> 51:20.891 immigrants. 51:20.889 --> 51:24.769 "The United Nations is preparing a new report which 51:24.773 --> 51:28.943 will argue that Europe may need to accept many more migrants 51:28.940 --> 51:32.830 over the next 50 years to maintain population levels and 51:32.826 --> 51:35.506 the size of its workforce." 51:35.510 --> 51:38.220 It's not--they did do the study, very quickly. 51:38.219 --> 51:40.589 It's not what the study did. 51:40.590 --> 51:44.410 This is an inventory of all the articles that were published 51:44.414 --> 51:46.104 after the press release. 51:46.099 --> 51:49.029 What did they actually find? 51:49.030 --> 51:52.630 Well what they did were hypothetical scenarios to 2050 51:52.626 --> 51:56.356 and they asked the following questions among others, 51:56.360 --> 52:00.590 how many immigrants would key countries need to prevent 52:00.588 --> 52:04.888 decline in the total population, assuming that their projections 52:04.885 --> 52:10.025 on fertility were accurate, to hold constant the population 52:10.030 --> 52:13.880 15 to 65, there we are again with those 52:13.876 --> 52:18.196 15 and 65 age boundaries, and to hold constant what they 52:18.199 --> 52:22.319 call the potential support ratio which they defined as the ratio 52:22.315 --> 52:27.055 of people of working age, meaning 15 to 64 to those who 52:27.056 --> 52:32.476 are aged dependent, meaning 65 and over. 52:32.480 --> 52:36.510 For the last, which was in a way the most 52:36.514 --> 52:41.444 important one, here were the numbers they came 52:41.440 --> 52:48.280 up with: that Germany would need 188 million immigrants by 2050, 52:48.280 --> 52:52.000 at which point 80% of the population within the boundaries 52:52.000 --> 52:55.920 of Germany would be represented by those immigrants and their 52:55.916 --> 52:56.826 offspring. 52:56.829 --> 53:00.479 Italy would need 120 million, and you see the percentages 53:00.478 --> 53:03.228 here, always 4/5^(ths) of the 53:03.230 --> 53:08.660 population would be accounted for by immigrants and their 53:08.659 --> 53:09.919 offspring. 53:09.920 --> 53:11.860 The U.S., even the U.S. 53:11.864 --> 53:16.854 which would need 593 million immigrants would be at 73% even 53:16.851 --> 53:19.811 with its higher fertility rates. 53:19.809 --> 53:24.139 The paradox here is that if you combine low fertility with high 53:24.141 --> 53:28.711 immigration, from an economic view or let's 53:28.713 --> 53:33.533 say our Yale undergraduate perspective, 53:33.530 --> 53:36.140 immigrants or substitutes are complements, 53:36.139 --> 53:38.209 they're workers, they have skills, 53:38.210 --> 53:41.610 they bring skills, they pay taxes, 53:41.605 --> 53:48.105 they subsidize retirement for older residents. 53:48.110 --> 53:51.070 But the public view is that immigrants are human beings, 53:51.070 --> 53:53.190 that they have cultures, religions, 53:53.190 --> 53:57.290 politics, languages, so if fertility is low, 53:57.289 --> 54:03.159 immigration is less acceptable to public's than if fertility is 54:03.159 --> 54:04.769 high or higher. 54:04.768 --> 54:08.818 Meanwhile, elites like us, take that more economic 54:08.822 --> 54:09.982 perspective. 54:09.980 --> 54:14.880 I think probably if we did a survey of this group we would be 54:14.876 --> 54:19.446 more positive about increasing immigration then would the 54:19.447 --> 54:21.077 public at large. 54:21.079 --> 54:26.659 The outcomes of this are really unknowable. 54:26.659 --> 54:29.789 There's been a lot of heat, there hasn't been a lot of 54:29.793 --> 54:32.043 light about international migration. 54:32.039 --> 54:38.259 The data are weak, fertility data are much better, 54:38.260 --> 54:40.820 mortality data are the best demographic data, 54:40.820 --> 54:43.230 fertility data are the second best, 54:43.230 --> 54:46.050 migration data are by far the worst. 54:46.050 --> 54:50.220 They are very weak, but we think there are about 54:50.215 --> 54:54.905 200 million international migrants around now and that 54:54.913 --> 54:58.993 it's gone up about 2/3^(rds) in 15 years, 54:58.989 --> 55:03.519 increasing at about 2.3 million per year. 55:03.518 --> 55:06.858 If you put them all together where do they fit? 55:06.860 --> 55:11.050 200 million would be the fifth largest population in the world, 55:11.050 --> 55:14.970 so it's a non-trivial number, but it's a very small fraction 55:14.972 --> 55:21.432 of the world's population, like 3% or less. 55:21.429 --> 55:24.659 We have tens of millions of people migrating, 55:24.659 --> 55:27.739 but overwhelmingly, the majority of people do not 55:27.742 --> 55:30.052 migrate, so just keep all of those 55:30.054 --> 55:33.524 paradoxes in your head about international migration. 55:33.518 --> 55:35.448 In absolute terms, the U.S. 55:35.445 --> 55:39.145 has the largest number of foreign-born people at 35 55:39.150 --> 55:42.490 million in 2000, and The Russian Federation is 55:42.485 --> 55:43.295 next. 55:43.300 --> 55:46.260 Here, if you can read that, I guess you can, 55:46.260 --> 55:47.500 you see the U.S. 55:47.500 --> 55:51.500 at the top there, The Russian Federation and then 55:51.496 --> 55:56.566 the other countries are a lot smaller in terms of foreign-born 55:56.574 --> 55:57.744 residents. 55:57.739 --> 56:01.379 If you look though at the percent of the population you 56:01.376 --> 56:05.206 get a different list then the one I just showed you of the 56:05.213 --> 56:07.103 different league table . 56:07.099 --> 56:11.049 The Persian Gulf states have the highest percentage of the 56:11.050 --> 56:15.140 populations who are immigrants or international migrants. 56:15.139 --> 56:17.839 Largely because they have substantial numbers, 56:17.840 --> 56:20.870 small compared to the U.S., but substantial numbers of 56:20.865 --> 56:24.285 international migrants of the base of a very small indigenous 56:24.293 --> 56:25.153 population. 56:25.150 --> 56:27.860 Most of their migrants are temporary workers; 56:27.860 --> 56:31.500 they are not immigrants in the sense that they're allowed to 56:31.498 --> 56:32.668 stay permanently. 56:32.670 --> 56:36.770 You have 3/4^(ths) of the populations of the United Arab 56:36.768 --> 56:41.318 Emirates and the Qatar who are foreign born and more than half 56:41.315 --> 56:42.355 in Kuwait. 56:42.360 --> 56:46.050 I say here that Israel and Jordan are about 40%, 56:46.050 --> 56:49.200 it depends on how you define the Palestinians in Jordan, 56:49.199 --> 56:53.489 but if you call them international migrants then it's 56:53.492 --> 56:55.312 40% or so in Jordan. 56:55.309 --> 56:58.609 Then you can find a few European countries but they're 56:58.610 --> 57:00.440 tiny, like Lichtenstein, 57:00.442 --> 57:04.292 that have high percentages of foreign born people, 57:04.289 --> 57:06.759 but generally speaking, the highest percentages are in 57:06.762 --> 57:09.192 small countries and here's the league table there. 57:09.190 --> 57:12.110 I don't know if you can read it, United Arab Emirates, 57:12.110 --> 57:14.590 Kuwait, Jordan, Israel, Singapore, 57:14.588 --> 57:17.118 Oman, Estonia, Saudi Arabia, 57:17.119 --> 57:21.289 Latvia, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, 57:21.289 --> 57:23.139 Gabon, and Canada. 57:23.139 --> 57:28.039 You see the big countries don't by and large appear in that 57:28.038 --> 57:29.388 league table . 57:29.389 --> 57:32.919 If you look at countries that have 50 million or more, 57:32.920 --> 57:36.430 so we're starting about--we're starting to talk about 57:36.434 --> 57:39.074 significant population of countries, 57:39.070 --> 57:43.240 the percent of foreign born exceeds 10% in only three such 57:43.239 --> 57:45.979 countries, in the Ukraine, 57:45.976 --> 57:49.306 in the U.S., and in France. 57:49.309 --> 57:52.969 The Russian Federation and Germany are getting--are pretty 57:52.967 --> 57:56.947 close so we should include them probably, but there aren't many 57:56.947 --> 57:58.807 others that are above 5%. 57:58.809 --> 58:02.589 I've already said that low fertility might imply increasing 58:02.592 --> 58:06.182 immigration and there are plausible arguments about-- 58:06.179 --> 58:10.179 in favor of that to meet the labor force needs that employers 58:10.184 --> 58:13.914 say they have, as there's more economic 58:13.914 --> 58:17.504 integration, more international migration is 58:17.501 --> 58:20.551 inevitable, and immigrants can arguably 58:20.554 --> 58:23.794 finance unsustainable pension systems, 58:23.789 --> 58:26.089 pay as you earn pension systems. 58:26.090 --> 58:28.670 There are equally plausible counterarguments, 58:28.666 --> 58:31.886 and you're just going to have to decide for yourself. 58:31.889 --> 58:35.659 I don't think anyone can convince you one way or another 58:35.663 --> 58:39.303 of what's right here, or what's the proper mindset. 58:39.300 --> 58:42.800 One argument here would be that low fertility rates are likely 58:42.795 --> 58:45.985 going to be temporary, that public opposition will 58:45.994 --> 58:49.464 prevent an increase of international migration to very 58:49.461 --> 58:53.451 high levels and that these pay as you earn pension systems are 58:53.452 --> 58:57.682 going to be restructured, and I am firmly on the fence on 58:57.675 --> 58:58.095 this. 58:58.099 --> 59:02.579 I will sit uncomfortably on the fence as long as I can stand it. 59:02.579 --> 59:06.659 It's painful to sit on the fence, but in this case I don't 59:06.664 --> 59:10.754 think there's a clear correct position on these things. 59:10.750 --> 59:14.600 Here are summary and conclusions: very low fertility 59:14.601 --> 59:18.381 now is widespread and it's continuing to spread. 59:18.380 --> 59:22.680 I think--the last I looked and don't quote me on this, 59:22.679 --> 59:27.799 but last I looked if you don't include China because China 59:27.795 --> 59:30.955 tilts everything, it's 20% of the world's 59:30.963 --> 59:32.893 population, so let's be conservative and 59:32.889 --> 59:35.069 not include China, which does have below 59:35.072 --> 59:36.762 replacement in fertility. 59:36.760 --> 59:39.860 Without China, 40% of the world's population 59:39.864 --> 59:44.054 now lives in countries with below replacement fertility and 59:44.054 --> 59:44.854 rising. 59:44.849 --> 59:50.819 With China, 60% of the world's population live in such 59:50.818 --> 59:52.168 countries. 59:52.170 --> 59:55.910 In the past we know that these low fertility rates, 59:55.909 --> 59:57.779 in fact, not as low as some of the rates we see today, 59:57.780 --> 1:00:04.830 have led to exaggerated alarm and to nationalist responses. 1:00:04.829 --> 1:00:08.199 Fertility rates could rise in the future, there's nothing to 1:00:08.195 --> 1:00:08.875 stop them. 1:00:08.880 --> 1:00:11.450 Most sociologists, anthropologists, 1:00:11.445 --> 1:00:15.895 and demographers don't think they will, but they have no way 1:00:15.898 --> 1:00:17.028 of knowing. 1:00:17.030 --> 1:00:21.220 I don't think they will, but I could easily be wrong. 1:00:21.219 --> 1:00:27.619 It's hard to increase fertility rates via policy in liberal 1:00:27.615 --> 1:00:29.155 democracies. 1:00:29.159 --> 1:00:32.809 Increased immigration is often invoked as a solution to the 1:00:32.811 --> 1:00:36.531 problems resulting from very low fertility but it's not very 1:00:36.525 --> 1:00:39.485 effective, and it's likely to stimulate 1:00:39.485 --> 1:00:41.715 its own passionate opposition. 1:00:41.719 --> 1:00:45.439 My bottom line is, and I'll stop with this, 1:00:45.440 --> 1:00:48.470 that adaptive societies, societies that are capable, 1:00:48.469 --> 1:00:51.269 flexible enough to adapt to changing age structures, 1:00:51.268 --> 1:00:56.238 up and down and sideways, are likely to fare the best in 1:00:56.235 --> 1:00:57.405 the future. 1:00:57.409 --> 1:01:08.189 Thank you. 1:01:08.190 --> 1:01:12.580 Prof: I think we have time to take questions--anybody 1:01:12.576 --> 1:01:13.316 has one? 1:01:13.320 --> 1:01:16.100 Dr. Michael Tietelbaum: There have got to be some 1:01:16.101 --> 1:01:18.931 questions because I didn't explain some things that I just 1:01:18.934 --> 1:01:19.684 asserted. 1:01:19.679 --> 1:01:22.719 Prof: Let me just start off--and this is a biggee. 1:01:22.719 --> 1:01:24.059 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Okay. 1:01:24.059 --> 1:01:26.459 Prof: I know there are whole lectures on this. 1:01:26.460 --> 1:01:28.430 There's bunches of theories, I was going to make the 1:01:28.425 --> 1:01:30.385 question more elaborate but let's make it simple. 1:01:30.389 --> 1:01:35.229 What do you think is causing this very low fertility in Japan 1:01:35.228 --> 1:01:36.518 and Singapore? 1:01:36.518 --> 1:01:41.158 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: How long do we have? 1:01:41.159 --> 1:01:45.179 There are a whole range of theories about this. 1:01:45.179 --> 1:01:49.779 There's a whole theoretical structure called the second 1:01:49.775 --> 1:01:54.875 demographic transition theory which explains low fertility on 1:01:54.884 --> 1:01:58.634 grounds of secularization of societies, 1:01:58.630 --> 1:02:03.790 the collapse of religious social control over behavior 1:02:03.786 --> 1:02:09.036 which relates heavily to marriage and childbearing, 1:02:09.039 --> 1:02:13.049 of the rising labor force participation of women, 1:02:13.050 --> 1:02:18.160 and women's labor force participation being in conflict 1:02:18.157 --> 1:02:23.167 with fertility and childbearing and child rearing, 1:02:23.170 --> 1:02:26.550 and a whole range of other things that you might just 1:02:26.550 --> 1:02:28.630 characterize as modernization. 1:02:28.630 --> 1:02:33.230 From this point of view theoretically, 1:02:33.231 --> 1:02:39.701 low fertility is permanent and inevitable in advanced 1:02:39.697 --> 1:02:41.437 societies. 1:02:41.440 --> 1:02:46.950 That no society of that kind is going to ever again approach-- 1:02:46.949 --> 1:02:49.209 well they would--I don't know if they would say this, 1:02:49.210 --> 1:02:52.240 but they might, would not ever exceed 1:02:52.237 --> 1:02:57.107 replacement level and you'll have high percentages of women 1:02:57.114 --> 1:03:01.324 who will be childless throughout their lives, 1:03:01.320 --> 1:03:04.920 low marriage rates, why should anybody bother 1:03:04.922 --> 1:03:09.842 getting married when there's no problem in cohabiting without 1:03:09.835 --> 1:03:14.455 being married socially, culturally, and legally if all 1:03:14.460 --> 1:03:19.200 the benefits of marriage can be accrued without needing to get 1:03:19.197 --> 1:03:21.457 married, why bother. 1:03:21.460 --> 1:03:24.360 You actually see that, especially in the Nordic 1:03:24.360 --> 1:03:29.510 countries, where very high percentages of 1:03:29.514 --> 1:03:33.094 the population, again of women, 1:03:33.090 --> 1:03:36.750 we can look at men too but women are the important 1:03:36.750 --> 1:03:39.290 fertility carriers if you will. 1:03:39.289 --> 1:03:42.999 Very high percentages of women age 30 are never married and 1:03:42.998 --> 1:03:45.938 don't look like they ever will get married, 1:03:45.940 --> 1:03:48.180 very high rates of cohabitation, 1:03:48.175 --> 1:03:52.135 and in the case of Sweden fertility has been rising from 1:03:52.141 --> 1:03:55.171 low levels under those circumstances, 1:03:55.170 --> 1:03:57.970 which is posing some theoretical problems for the 1:03:57.965 --> 1:04:00.875 proponents of the second demographic transition. 1:04:00.880 --> 1:04:06.320 We can't explain things like this. 1:04:06.320 --> 1:04:09.690 Life is too complicated, and collective fertility 1:04:09.693 --> 1:04:13.773 behavior is too complicated to explain things like this. 1:04:13.768 --> 1:04:17.388 If you look at Japan, for example, 1:04:17.387 --> 1:04:23.737 in Japan you have very low rates of marriage among women in 1:04:23.744 --> 1:04:25.284 their 20s. 1:04:25.280 --> 1:04:31.650 It looks like Sweden in terms of marriage behavior, 1:04:31.650 --> 1:04:36.330 but there's a huge difference in the percentage of births in 1:04:36.327 --> 1:04:40.367 Japan versus Sweden that are outside of marriage. 1:04:40.369 --> 1:04:44.669 If I remember correctly, it's like 2% of births in Japan 1:04:44.672 --> 1:04:49.532 are outside of marriage and in Sweden it's almost 50% of births 1:04:49.525 --> 1:04:52.965 are outside marriage, so you have the same marriage 1:04:52.967 --> 1:04:55.287 behavior roughly, but higher fertility 1:04:55.293 --> 1:04:58.453 collectively in Sweden then you do in Japan. 1:04:58.449 --> 1:05:05.099 Italy, European country, looks more like Japan in this 1:05:05.101 --> 1:05:11.001 respect then it looks like Sweden or Germany. 1:05:11.000 --> 1:05:13.140 Student: In the media, this isn't as much of the 1:05:13.135 --> 1:05:14.645 crisis that you talk about it being, 1:05:14.650 --> 1:05:22.590 or at least in America you hear more about terrorism or the war, 1:05:22.585 --> 1:05:23.715 health. 1:05:23.719 --> 1:05:28.109 Within the government how much of a big issue is this and at 1:05:28.108 --> 1:05:31.158 what time in history is it prioritized? 1:05:31.159 --> 1:05:33.279 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Well the U.S. 1:05:33.284 --> 1:05:36.284 has high fertility by the standards of its peer countries. 1:05:36.280 --> 1:05:40.650 It's very close to replacement level to--last time I looked it 1:05:40.646 --> 1:05:42.146 was 2.0 versus 2.1. 1:05:42.150 --> 1:05:46.190 It was one 1.1 or so in Italy, 1.3 in Japan, 1:05:46.190 --> 1:05:50.980 so there's less concern here than there is in--among 1:05:50.981 --> 1:05:54.741 political elites in other countries. 1:05:54.739 --> 1:05:55.869 What the U.S. 1:05:55.867 --> 1:05:59.937 does have that most of them don't have, however, 1:05:59.942 --> 1:06:03.412 is a very large baby boom generation. 1:06:03.409 --> 1:06:03.889 The U.S. 1:06:03.894 --> 1:06:06.934 had a big baby boom, you've probably discussed this 1:06:06.931 --> 1:06:09.181 in previous lectures, or you will. 1:06:09.179 --> 1:06:12.569 The U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 1:06:12.574 --> 1:06:17.394 really were the four baby boom countries post World War II. 1:06:17.389 --> 1:06:22.479 In the case of the U.S., fertility went from below 1:06:22.476 --> 1:06:27.456 replacement level to 3.7, doubled essentially. 1:06:27.460 --> 1:06:34.720 It peaked in 1957 and started declining sharply in 1965 but 1:06:34.717 --> 1:06:38.747 there was a period-- the so called baby boom 1:06:38.753 --> 1:06:40.763 generation, if you will, 1:06:40.764 --> 1:06:45.374 1947 birth to 1965, who are now reaching the 1:06:45.365 --> 1:06:51.565 statutory retirement age and that bulge is going to rapidly 1:06:51.574 --> 1:06:58.004 increase the proportion of the population in that post 65 age 1:06:57.996 --> 1:07:04.736 group for about 20 years because it's just aging its way through 1:07:04.739 --> 1:07:07.629 the age structure. 1:07:07.630 --> 1:07:09.410 Given that the U.S. 1:07:09.409 --> 1:07:13.949 government has proven itself incapable of getting control 1:07:13.949 --> 1:07:18.809 over health care expenditures that will be a major crisis for 1:07:18.813 --> 1:07:20.763 the Medicare system. 1:07:20.760 --> 1:07:23.930 I can predict that without any doubt whatever. 1:07:23.929 --> 1:07:26.959 I don't know what's going to happen, how it will be handled; 1:07:26.960 --> 1:07:28.990 I just know it's going to be a major crisis. 1:07:28.989 --> 1:07:33.319 Yes, ma'am? 1:07:33.320 --> 1:07:34.950 Student: Could you speak briefly to-- 1:07:34.949 --> 1:07:41.139 could you provide a response to theorists who would argue that 1:07:41.135 --> 1:07:46.715 widespread moderate decline-- or moderate to severe decline 1:07:46.719 --> 1:07:51.539 in populations is actually, isn't addressing social and 1:07:51.538 --> 1:07:55.678 environmental concerns and that kind of thing? 1:07:55.679 --> 1:07:57.789 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Yes. 1:07:57.789 --> 1:08:02.579 I have a firmly on the fence moderate position on these 1:08:02.581 --> 1:08:03.381 things. 1:08:03.380 --> 1:08:08.170 I think both rapid population growth and rapid population 1:08:08.168 --> 1:08:11.588 decline are problematic for societies. 1:08:11.590 --> 1:08:15.800 There are too many things tied to age in these societies like 1:08:15.804 --> 1:08:19.604 public provision of schools versus healthcare and other 1:08:19.596 --> 1:08:23.036 things that rapid shifts will cause problems. 1:08:23.039 --> 1:08:27.469 I think I alluded to this; it's easier for societies to 1:08:27.467 --> 1:08:31.077 adjust to change if it's slower in general. 1:08:31.078 --> 1:08:35.518 Whether it would be desirable as some environmentalist's think 1:08:35.520 --> 1:08:40.110 for the population of the world to decline sharply from where it 1:08:40.106 --> 1:08:42.216 is, six point some billion to 1:08:42.219 --> 1:08:45.889 whatever they think the carrying capacity of the earth is, 1:08:45.890 --> 1:08:49.720 and that's a highly speculative calculation of course is another 1:08:49.721 --> 1:08:53.131 matter and I don't think anybody can really resolve those 1:08:53.128 --> 1:08:53.858 debates. 1:08:53.859 --> 1:08:58.139 People feel very strongly in both directions about those 1:08:58.136 --> 1:08:59.766 sorts of arguments. 1:08:59.770 --> 1:09:04.280 I would say myself that the optimal trajectory would be 1:09:04.282 --> 1:09:08.192 fertility rates, plus or minus 10%, 1:09:08.194 --> 1:09:12.944 15% of replacement level, not 50% above, 1:09:12.935 --> 1:09:16.785 not 50% below, not fluctuating a lot because 1:09:16.792 --> 1:09:21.992 if they fluctuate a lot it causes all kinds of oscillations 1:09:21.993 --> 1:09:26.303 in the age structure over 75 or 100 years, 1:09:26.300 --> 1:09:30.940 and those are problematic for societies but moderation in all 1:09:30.939 --> 1:09:35.269 things is probably a good a maxim for these kinds of long 1:09:35.269 --> 1:09:38.929 lived, slow changing but powerful. 1:09:38.930 --> 1:09:42.540 They're--demography is like--I think of demography as being 1:09:42.537 --> 1:09:45.087 like the tectonic plates of the earth, 1:09:45.090 --> 1:09:49.890 it's moving very slowly by the standards of elections or 1:09:49.890 --> 1:09:53.480 economic collapses, or economic booms, 1:09:53.481 --> 1:09:58.411 very slowly but huge force behind it and huge momentum 1:09:58.407 --> 1:10:02.367 behind it too, so you don't want to get in the 1:10:02.372 --> 1:10:05.632 way of tectonic plates if you can avoid it. 1:10:05.630 --> 1:10:08.070 I saw another hand, yes sir? 1:10:08.069 --> 1:10:09.109 Student: From a policy perspective, 1:10:09.109 --> 1:10:13.699 I guess specifically for the U.S., are all warm American 1:10:13.699 --> 1:10:18.209 bodies equal or do you take into consideration economic 1:10:18.207 --> 1:10:21.127 circumstances or anything else? 1:10:21.130 --> 1:10:24.050 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: From whose perspective? 1:10:24.050 --> 1:10:26.420 Student: The government's or whoever's 1:10:26.422 --> 1:10:27.902 working on this currently. 1:10:27.899 --> 1:10:29.359 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Well the government 1:10:29.359 --> 1:10:30.089 doesn't have a brain. 1:10:30.090 --> 1:10:32.770 I mean the government-- Student: In your 1:10:32.774 --> 1:10:35.614 perspective, are all warm bodies equal or-- Dr. 1:10:35.609 --> 1:10:38.739 Michael Teitelbaum: I would say it depends on 1:10:38.735 --> 1:10:39.625 the economy. 1:10:39.630 --> 1:10:42.790 If you had to choose, this is a personal 1:10:42.791 --> 1:10:45.511 interpretation, it's not a fact, 1:10:45.511 --> 1:10:50.241 if you had to choose let's say between a group of very highly 1:10:50.242 --> 1:10:54.502 skilled immigrants or a group of very low skilled, 1:10:54.500 --> 1:10:58.090 let's say illiterate immigrants, and they were moving 1:10:58.086 --> 1:11:02.566 into society where the-- most of the population was 1:11:02.572 --> 1:11:07.962 illiterate then it wouldn't-- the illiterate immigrant 1:11:07.957 --> 1:11:12.607 population would not be a serious issue really, 1:11:12.609 --> 1:11:17.249 but if they're moving into a society in which you have to be 1:11:17.251 --> 1:11:20.951 literate in order to have any chance of economic 1:11:20.948 --> 1:11:25.338 sustainability and advancement, it would not be a good idea to 1:11:25.337 --> 1:11:28.507 import large numbers of people who are not going to make it in 1:11:28.507 --> 1:11:29.337 that society. 1:11:29.340 --> 1:11:32.860 It's a question of both the nature and characteristics of 1:11:32.863 --> 1:11:36.323 the immigrants and the nature and characteristics of the 1:11:36.323 --> 1:11:39.473 economy and society into which they're moving. 1:11:39.470 --> 1:11:43.170 Governments--if you ask me what is the position of the U.S. 1:11:43.171 --> 1:11:47.001 or British government on this, they don't really have one. 1:11:47.000 --> 1:11:50.520 It's just the pushing and shoving of different interest 1:11:50.524 --> 1:11:54.644 groups and wherever the vectors of pushing and shoving end up is 1:11:54.635 --> 1:11:58.715 what the government policy is, but it's not necessarily 1:11:58.722 --> 1:12:01.882 thought through in a kind of logical way. 1:12:01.880 --> 1:12:03.270 I think I saw one other hand. 1:12:03.270 --> 1:12:04.810 We're running out of time. 1:12:04.810 --> 1:12:05.910 Prof: Time's up. 1:12:05.908 --> 1:12:07.568 Dr. Michael Teitelbaum: Okay, good. 1:12:07.569 --> 1:12:10.829 > 1:12:10.829 --> 1:12:16.999