WEBVTT

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Prof: So on Tuesday,
I talked about George

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Washington and some of the
reasons why he proved so

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invaluable during and after the
Revolution,

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and among other things I talked
about the ways in which he

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proved time and again that he
could be trusted with power.

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Well, today and on Tuesday
we're going to be looking at

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Washington in power,
commanding the Continental

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Army, as we sketch out the chain
of events on the battlefield

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that ultimately resulted in
American military victory.

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Now in a sense,
today's lecture and Tuesday's

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lecture--
it's sort of one big lecture

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that I've arbitrarily divided in
half because I can't fit it all

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into one lecture.

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So we're going to get part of
the fighting today and part of

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the fighting on Tuesday,
and the dividing line will

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basically be however much I
finish talking about today,

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as today's lecture and I'll
pick up after that on Tuesday.

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As you will see--and I'll come
to that in a few minutes--

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I have basically divided the
fighting of the Revolution into

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four phases--
and I'll explain in just a

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little bit why four phases,
and what that means,

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and why they make sense,
and then I'll sort of proceed

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through them as we unfold what's
happening during the actual

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fighting of the war.

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And during both of the
lectures--during today's lecture

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and during Tuesday's lecture--
I'm going to be looking at the

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unfolding events from two
vantage points,

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so I'm not just going to be
looking at how Americans view

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what's happening.

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I'm going to try to get at both
the British logic and the

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American logic as to why they're
doing what they're doing,

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why their strategy,
why their actions actually make

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sense,
because to really understand

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what's happening and why what
ultimately did happen did

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happen,
you really do need to

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understand the logic of both
sides in this conflict.

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Now in a sense,
the underlying question of both

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of these two lectures is:
How did America win?

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That's the real question.

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How in the world did America
win?

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Even to people at the time,
this hardly seemed like the

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most probable outcome of this
conflict when it was undertaken.

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And what we're going to be
seeing today and on Tuesday is

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that America's victory,
in the end, was the result of a

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combination of factors.

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I'm going to talk about a
number of them at the beginning

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of the lecture and then head off
into battles,

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now that we have sort of gotten
an understanding of some of the

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major complications and factors
really complicating things for

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the British more than anything
else--

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but I'll start out here just by
listing some of the things I'm

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going to be talking about
briefly here at the outset of

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the lecture.

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So a combination of factors
that helped decide the outcome

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of the war.

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One of them is,
as we'll see in just a moment:

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British logistical
disadvantages;

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British assumptions about the
logic of warfare--

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and, as we'll see,
some of these assumptions did

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not really apply well to the
situation in North America;

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George Washington's strategy
and the ways in which it

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sometimes differed from more
conventional Old World methods

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of fighting;
the different definitions of

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victory for the British and the
Americans, as again we'll see in

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a few minutes.

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It meant something very
different.

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The British had to accomplish
one thing for victory,

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the Americans had to accomplish
something different,

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and in the end what the British
had to accomplish was much more

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difficult than what the
Americans had to accomplish,

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and I'll explain that
momentarily.

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So British logistical
disadvantages,

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British assumptions about the
logic of warfare,

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George Washington's strategy,
and the different definitions

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of victory for the British and
the Americans are some of the

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factors that helped decide the
outcome of the war in favor of

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the Americans.

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Now what I'm not going to go
into here--

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and I will go into it on
Tuesday--which is another major

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factor that helped the Americans
win the war--

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that's the French.

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That's actually the French
joining the war on the side of

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the Americans.

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That has a huge impact for a
whole bunch of reasons,

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as I'll talk about next week.

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I'm not going to go into
that--into detail now,

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but I will say that it's hard
to imagine the Americans really

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winning the war without the
assistance of the French,

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and we'll see that play out on
Tuesday.

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Now before we start talking
about the unfolding of the war,

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I do want to look for just a
few minutes on some of these

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challenges,
particularly that faced the

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British at the opening of the
fighting of the Revolution,

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and how circumstances in the
American Revolution were

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different than circumstances in
some of the previous wars that

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the British had fought.

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And in a way this leads us to
the first of that chain of

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things I just mentioned a minute
ago: British logistical

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disadvantages.

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In a sense, that's what I'm
going to be talking about right

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now: the ways in which the war
in the American colonies

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presented some logistical
complications that the British

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hadn't necessarily faced in this
same way and with this same

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combination of factors before.

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For one thing--in a way the
most fundamental thing of

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all--was just the simple
question of supplies,

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the most basic logistical
concern of them all.

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Because, more commonly in the
past,

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when the British had fought
wars in distant territories,

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often their colonists had
provided supplies and even men

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to the British Army.

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Well obviously,
now the colonists are the

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enemy, so that's not going to be
happening in this particular

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war.

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So instead of a ready stream of
local supplies and local forces,

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British supplies and men had to
be shipped over three thousand

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miles of ocean and then lugged
around to the entire Eastern

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seaboard trailing after the
British army in countryside that

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often was not really friendly to
lugging around vast amounts of

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supplies following an army.

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And as we'll be seeing shortly,
two of the most significant

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battles of the war end up being
lost by the British in part

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because of problems with the
simple matter of supplies.

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So that's one logistical
problem.

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A second logistical problem for
the British involved the huge

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expanse of land that constituted
the colonies.

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Basically, the battlefield of
this war is pretty extensive.

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It's an enormous stretch of
land stretching from what would

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one day be Florida all the way
up to Canada and for a little

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while into Canada,
and from the Atlantic coast to

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the Mississippi.

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Unlike more traditional wars,
more conventional wars,

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wars of a sort that Britain
would have been more used to

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fighting,
there wasn't one central target

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to attack that could turn the
tide of war.

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Now the British don't
necessarily know this,

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and we're going to see them
actually try to play out this

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strategy more than once during
the war,

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but in fact there was not one
central target that they could

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have grabbed and turned the tide
of war.

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Usually, a really good military
strategy was to capture a

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nation's capital or the center
of government,

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and sometimes that really would
help push a war to its

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conclusion.

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You capture the capital
symbolically and also as a

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source of power and leadership,
and sometimes that really does

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push a war to its conclusion.

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But in the American
colonies--and then after 1776,

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states--there wasn't any one
city that represented America's

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center of government.

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There was one--no one single
real American capital,

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no one core of American
strength, and so,

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as we'll see shortly,
throughout the war the British

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struggled to determine which
major city's capture might

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defeat the American cause and
bring victory to Britain.

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And obviously,
in the end, this is not a

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strategy that worked in the
American states.

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A third logistical problem had
less to do with America and more

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to do with Britain--
and that is that the British

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found it extremely difficult to
raise troops to fight this war.

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First of all,
just fighting in a faraway

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overseas war would not have been
popular in and of itself.

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Add to this the fact that there
were some potential soldiers who

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would not have been that
enthusiastic about attacking

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British colonists,
and you end up with a serious

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problem enlisting men and
raising a large enough force for

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this war.

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As a result,
the British ended up hiring a

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large number of German mercenary
troops from a number of

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different independent German
states,

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and they end up getting lumped
under the heading

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"Hessian."

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That's sort of how we know
them, as Hessians--

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and this practice in and of
itself enraged Americans all the

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more,
because it suggested to them

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that the British were hiring
what they would have considered

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to be foreign assassins to kill
their own colonists.

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Fourth--and related to
everything that I've just said,

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and as I said at the
outset--the British and the

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Americans had different
definitions of victory.

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For the British to win the war,
they had to stamp out a

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widespread rebellion unfolding
under a vast expanse of land.

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They had to destroy the
American cause to emerge

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victorious from this war.

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The Americans did not have to
defeat the British to win the

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war.

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They just had to keep fighting
long enough to exhaust British

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funding and supplies and energy.

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So for the Americans,
the ultimate goal was just to

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keep fighting,
to keep the war going,

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to force the British to expend
as much money and as much

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manpower and as much energy as
possible.

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And, as we'll see in today's
lecture,

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Washington took full advantage
of this fact and fought the war

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with a strategy that maybe
wasn't always really

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awe-inspiring for onlookers,
but was highly effective in

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exhausting the British forces.

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And then finally,
fifth--a fifth logistical

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problem for the British actually
wasn't so much about the

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American colonists or the
British as it was about the

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British long-time enemy,
the French.

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The British could not just turn
their back on the rest of the

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world to entirely dedicate all
of their time and efforts to

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this colonial revolt.

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They had to keep their eye on
their long-time enemy,

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the French, particularly after
1778 when the French joined the

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war on the side of the American
colonists.

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As I said, I'll talk about that
in more detail Tuesday.

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But once the French are in the
war,

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suddenly now,
the British,

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and in particular the British
Navy,

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have to really be worrying
about what the French are doing.

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What are they doing down there
in the West Indies,

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those French?

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Do we need to send ships to the
West Indies and defend some of

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our properties there?

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That really further complicates
things for the British,

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so they can't just focus on
what's going on in these North

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American colonies.

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Okay.

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So there we're seeing a couple
of different logistical

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complications for the British:
supplies--problems with

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supplies;
the problem with figuring out

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where is the best place to stage
an attack;

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the problem of raising troops;
the fact that victory meant

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something different for the
British than it did for the

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Americans;
and then the complications

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introduced by the French.

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In addition to all of these
logistical problems,

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there was the simple problem or
at least certainly,

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the unique challenges that
faced the British in staging a

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war fought by a citizen army.

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The British army was an
impressive force but it more

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typically fought conventional
European wars,

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tended to be fought on open
plains and open country where

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lines of troops advanced on each
other until one line or the

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other weakened from casualties
and retreated.

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And that's a war in which you
have men who are disciplined and

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trained to stay in rank and file
as this battle rages,

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until finally the tide turns
and one side or the other wins

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or loses.

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This is not the way that the
American war unfolded,

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although it is worth saying--I
think a lot of Americans have

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this image in their head that
the Americans were these sort of

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guerrilla combat folk,
sort of running around,

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hiding behind trees,
and sort of befuddled British

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are marching in their bright-red
coats getting shot down in

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massive numbers.

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And the fact of the matter is,
the British were not oblivious

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to the situation--
the military situation and they

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didn't sort of march single file
and get mowed down by people

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hiding behind trees.

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The fact is that the British
did, among other things,

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make pretty skillful use of
Native Americans in staging

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their own version of guerrilla
warfare.

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So they're not sort of just
hanging on to Old World methods

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of fighting and ignoring what's
going on here in the New World,

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but even so there were a lot of
challenges that they faced in

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fighting against a citizen army.

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For one thing,
a citizen army is just not

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going to be as predictable as a
professionally trained force.

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Sometimes the Continental Army
abided by predictable military

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conventions.

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Sometimes they didn't,
and we'll hear a little bit of

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this today.

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I've talked about it a little
bit before.

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The Continental Army--People
were always leaving the

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Continental Army when their term
was up,

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and new people came,
and so in a sense you kept

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having untrained people joining
the Continental Army again and

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again and again.

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So it's not even as though
necessarily, after a while these

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men were sort of all long-term
soldiers and knew what they were

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doing.

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That was never entirely true.

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So a citizen army is
unpredictable.

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Also, it's not just an army
that the British are facing.

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Americans, generally speaking,
were prepared to fight if

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necessary, not just soldiers but
farmers.

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If the British attacked a
locality, the people there were

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prepared to defend themselves
and their land and their

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property.

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We've already seen that just in
the talk that I gave about New

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Haven,
where you have Professor

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Daggett sort of riding out,
and the Yale students riding

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out to sort of fend off the
British.

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So in addition to whatever
actual organized army you have,

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you've just got local citizens
who are getting involved in

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whatever's happening as events
and battles come into their own

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backyard.

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So the British faced not only
an army but armed citizens as

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well.

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A third challenging aspect of a
citizen army was yet again

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something that wasn't
necessarily a common aspect of

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wars fought by the British Army
in the past,

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and that is--Americans are not
just fighting for defense of a

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realm or defense of a monarch.

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Intellectually,
they were fighting for

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political liberties and
ultimately for independence,

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which would have felt like a
more inspiring cause to many

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people,
a personal cause that would

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have been something that people
had a personal connection with,

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and certainly gave Americans
some staying power and endurance

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during the war,
so that the cause,

14:26.899 --> 14:27.749
again, persisted.

14:27.750 --> 14:29.720
We'll see even today one or two
low points,

14:29.720 --> 14:32.360
at which point you would think
things might have just faded,

14:32.360 --> 14:35.500
and they don't--and part of it
has to do with the personal

14:35.504 --> 14:38.874
implications and the personal
meaning of the war to the people

14:38.870 --> 14:41.520
who were fighting it in the
American states.

14:41.519 --> 14:44.379
Plus, personally,
many Americans were fighting

14:44.375 --> 14:47.225
for their own property and their
own land,

14:47.230 --> 14:49.530
right?--even more personal,
as I just mentioned a moment

14:49.529 --> 14:49.779
ago.

14:49.779 --> 14:51.909
If there is an army advancing
on your town,

14:51.908 --> 14:55.568
that's about as personal a war
as it can be,

14:55.570 --> 14:59.000
and again, it's going to bring
people out in numbers and with a

14:59.004 --> 15:02.054
kind of determination and
enthusiasm that they might not

15:02.053 --> 15:04.163
have in a different kind of a
war.

15:04.158 --> 15:07.448
So having a citizen army--the
kind of citizen army--

15:07.450 --> 15:09.830
the kind of warfare that's
going to be taking place in the

15:09.828 --> 15:12.108
colonies,
also all by itself presented

15:12.105 --> 15:15.655
some pretty interesting
challenges to the British Army.

15:15.658 --> 15:16.018
Okay.

15:16.019 --> 15:19.259
So we've seen a host of
logistical challenges,

15:19.256 --> 15:20.836
some complications.

15:20.840 --> 15:24.650
I'm going to throw into this
mix three bad assumptions on the

15:24.648 --> 15:27.948
part of the British that did not
help their cause.

15:27.950 --> 15:28.370
Okay.

15:28.374 --> 15:33.214
Bad assumption number one:
they continued to underestimate

15:33.207 --> 15:34.647
the Americans.

15:34.649 --> 15:37.639
They continued to underestimate
the persistence of the

15:37.636 --> 15:39.896
Americans,
the abilities of the Americans,

15:39.897 --> 15:42.357
the impact of whatever the
Americans were doing,

15:42.360 --> 15:46.530
and right alongside with that
they overestimated their

15:46.533 --> 15:50.713
popularity among American
Loyalists and the power that

15:50.706 --> 15:53.696
they had among American
Loyalists.

15:53.700 --> 15:57.810
Now, probably part of that
overestimating Loyalist support

15:57.808 --> 16:02.208
was born from reports of overly
optimistic royal officials and

16:02.207 --> 16:04.727
governors,
who reported back to London

16:04.730 --> 16:06.710
that--yes,
there's plenty of Loyalists

16:06.705 --> 16:09.075
here, and they're on hand to
defend the cause,

16:09.080 --> 16:12.070
and when things get underway
the Loyalists will rise up and

16:12.065 --> 16:12.935
be on our side.

16:12.940 --> 16:15.210
And there were some
Loyalists--there were a good

16:15.214 --> 16:18.074
number of Loyalists who actually
did join and fight with the

16:18.068 --> 16:18.648
British.

16:18.649 --> 16:21.079
Again, when I was talking about
the invasion of New Haven,

16:21.080 --> 16:24.070
we saw just here in the town of
New Haven how some people chose

16:24.070 --> 16:27.060
to help the British,
others--their neighbors--chose

16:27.058 --> 16:28.498
to fight against them.

16:28.500 --> 16:31.670
So there were Loyalists who
chose at any given moment to

16:31.673 --> 16:35.193
join and support British troops,
as opposed to the Continental

16:35.193 --> 16:36.813
Army or American troops.

16:36.808 --> 16:39.758
But even so,
discussion of really widespread

16:39.759 --> 16:42.159
Loyalist support was
exaggerated.

16:42.158 --> 16:45.148
And because of these sort of
rosier-than-they

16:45.154 --> 16:48.804
-should-have-been reports,
British officials in England,

16:48.801 --> 16:52.501
far from the American scene,
assumed that many colonies were

16:52.495 --> 16:56.365
basically Loyalist and all in
all you just needed a little bit

16:56.365 --> 16:59.405
of a shove and things would be
brought right.

16:59.408 --> 17:01.648
They assumed that probably,
there's a small band of

17:01.650 --> 17:03.220
radicals that are making
trouble.

17:03.220 --> 17:05.540
You hear this again and again
and again when you read British

17:05.542 --> 17:08.222
commentary on what's happening--
there's a band of radicals who

17:08.223 --> 17:11.043
are poisoning the public mind,
but that there are also

17:11.041 --> 17:14.361
Loyalists who will rise up and
help the British cause,

17:14.358 --> 17:18.268
so it won't take very much for
this to be pushed into some kind

17:18.272 --> 17:19.412
of a conclusion.

17:19.410 --> 17:21.710
That's certainly,
towards the beginning of the

17:21.707 --> 17:23.797
war, something that the British
assume.

17:23.798 --> 17:26.428
The British Army didn't help
matters--as far as the Loyalists

17:26.434 --> 17:28.544
are concerned--with their
behavior in some of the

17:28.542 --> 17:30.302
colonies, particularly in the
South.

17:30.298 --> 17:33.688
The British Army looted farms,
trampled fields,

17:33.690 --> 17:36.670
paraded their superiority--and
so there were places in the

17:36.674 --> 17:39.664
South where the British Army was
a little Patriot-creating

17:39.661 --> 17:40.291
machine.

17:40.288 --> 17:42.708
You had people who might have
been Loyalist-leaning,

17:42.710 --> 17:44.900
but they did not like the way
that they were treated by the

17:44.904 --> 17:46.884
British Army,
and so, pulled back from

17:46.884 --> 17:50.444
supporting the British when they
might have started out leaning

17:50.435 --> 17:51.635
in that direction.

17:51.640 --> 17:51.990
Okay.

17:51.991 --> 17:55.591
So we have underestimating
Americans, overestimating

17:55.586 --> 17:57.556
support of the Loyalists.

17:57.558 --> 18:01.568
The third bad assumption at the
outset of the war is that the

18:01.565 --> 18:05.505
British Navy would accomplish
most of the damage and largely

18:05.505 --> 18:07.895
win the war,
because Britain did have this

18:07.901 --> 18:10.341
colossal,
impressive navy.

18:10.338 --> 18:12.308
It was--Really,
what Britain was famous for

18:12.311 --> 18:15.551
militarily was its navy,
but England hadn't fought a

18:15.551 --> 18:19.351
long, sustained land campaign
for quite some time,

18:19.348 --> 18:22.638
and when it had fought long
land campaigns in the past,

18:22.640 --> 18:26.990
often they had been fought with
allies who supplied land power

18:26.994 --> 18:29.784
to complement Britain's naval
forces.

18:29.778 --> 18:32.368
So as we're about to see,
all of these bad assumptions

18:32.371 --> 18:34.721
joined with all of those
logistical things that I

18:34.718 --> 18:36.868
mentioned at the outset of the
lecture,

18:36.868 --> 18:41.218
all of these together are not
helping the British as the war

18:41.219 --> 18:44.109
unfolds,
and they all play a role in the

18:44.107 --> 18:45.447
outcome of the war.

18:45.450 --> 18:45.770
Okay.

18:45.771 --> 18:49.451
Let's now turn to the actual
war, to the actual battles.

18:49.450 --> 18:53.430
As I suggested at the outcome,
the opening of the lecture,

18:53.432 --> 18:56.022
I divided the war into four
phases.

18:56.019 --> 18:58.499
As we'll see,
each of these phases is

18:58.496 --> 19:02.486
initiated by a sort of major
decision of strategy or policy

19:02.487 --> 19:04.617
on the part of the British.

19:04.618 --> 19:07.988
Often it's a strategy that's
initiated by an assumption that

19:07.992 --> 19:11.312
makes perfect sense to the
British but that does not end up

19:11.308 --> 19:13.538
being necessarily a good
strategy,

19:13.539 --> 19:15.719
given the situation at the time.

19:15.720 --> 19:18.360
And again and again as these
phases unfold,

19:18.358 --> 19:20.658
you'll see the British make
what to them seems like a

19:20.657 --> 19:23.487
logical decision and then you'll
see it not play out particularly

19:23.487 --> 19:24.507
well,
or certainly,

19:24.509 --> 19:27.369
not in the way that the British
really wanted this to play out.

19:27.368 --> 19:30.028
So let's turn to the first
phase of the war--

19:30.028 --> 19:33.768
and we've already seen a little
bit of this first phase earlier

19:33.773 --> 19:37.583
on when I talked about Lexington
and Concord and Bunker Hill.

19:37.578 --> 19:41.228
This early phase of the war was
guided by the main assumption on

19:41.229 --> 19:44.589
the part of the British that all
the Americans needed was a

19:44.588 --> 19:47.928
little display of force,
a little bit of military

19:47.930 --> 19:51.460
coercion, and the war would come
to a quick close.

19:51.460 --> 19:53.550
So basically,
just sort of impress upon them

19:53.547 --> 19:55.437
the stupidity of what they are
doing.

19:55.440 --> 19:56.320
Right? 'We are the British Army.

19:56.318 --> 19:58.868
We will come in and remind them
what they are doing.

19:58.868 --> 20:01.548
They will be reminded that they
are behaving illogically,

20:01.548 --> 20:03.828
and one way or another,
this will end--

20:03.828 --> 20:06.338
maybe a little reconciliation,
a little friendly sort of

20:06.335 --> 20:08.335
gesture on our part toward the
colonists,

20:08.338 --> 20:10.698
and we can bring this whole
thing to a close.'

20:10.700 --> 20:14.140
And Lexington and Concord are
part of that strategy,

20:14.140 --> 20:14.680
right?

20:14.680 --> 20:16.930
Just a little display of force
and everything's going to be

20:16.931 --> 20:17.321
settled.

20:17.318 --> 20:20.228
Of course, the outcome is not
what they would expect;

20:20.230 --> 20:21.320
it's just the opposite.

20:21.318 --> 20:24.398
And the British movements,
the British troop movements,

20:24.400 --> 20:27.780
called forth an outpouring of
American enthusiasm and

20:27.776 --> 20:31.406
enlistments and alarm,
which was further bolstered by

20:31.413 --> 20:33.983
America's victories--
or I guess you could call them

20:33.983 --> 20:34.863
sort of semi-victories.

20:34.858 --> 20:35.928
I don't know what to call
Bunker Hill.

20:35.930 --> 20:37.530
It's sort of a victory but it
sort of isn't--

20:37.529 --> 20:39.909
but certainly,
some Americans at the time--

20:39.910 --> 20:41.760
I suppose because they weren't
crushed to death--

20:41.759 --> 20:44.199
would have seen Bunker Hill as
a victory.

20:44.200 --> 20:47.940
But--So the fact that things
were sort of persisting and they

20:47.938 --> 20:51.738
were standing up to the British
at Bunker Hill in June of 1775

20:51.738 --> 20:54.478
and at Fort Ticonderoga in May
of 1775,

20:54.480 --> 20:57.330
that sort of helps to bolster
American spirits.

20:57.328 --> 21:00.918
Now, I have discussed a little
bit the Battle of Bunker Hill,

21:00.920 --> 21:04.060
and you might remember that
that's the battle in which the

21:04.060 --> 21:07.370
British held the ground at the
end of the day but at the cost

21:07.366 --> 21:09.236
of so many men--
almost half of the men that

21:09.241 --> 21:11.311
were fighting there that day--
that their victory didn't

21:11.305 --> 21:13.415
really seem to be much of a
victory at all--

21:13.420 --> 21:16.610
which is why you can sort of
call it a semi-victory on both

21:16.608 --> 21:17.048
sides.

21:17.048 --> 21:19.608
And I mentioned on--in
Tuesday's lecture that New

21:19.609 --> 21:22.669
York Times article that I
had stumbled across that morning

21:22.673 --> 21:25.543
about that bundle of letters
that were going to be sold at

21:25.536 --> 21:27.746
Sotheby's--
that it had all of these

21:27.746 --> 21:30.966
letters between British generals
and diplomats who were in

21:30.968 --> 21:33.858
America writing to each other,
not back to London,

21:33.862 --> 21:36.882
but to each other about what
they were really thinking about

21:36.883 --> 21:38.013
what was unfolding.

21:38.009 --> 21:40.649
And there's a letter from
General John Burgoyne,

21:40.653 --> 21:43.803
British General John Burgoyne,
after the Battle of Bunker

21:43.803 --> 21:44.313
Hill.

21:44.308 --> 21:46.478
He's one of the leading
generals in the colonies at that

21:46.483 --> 21:48.633
point,
and he says in this letter to

21:48.632 --> 21:51.602
someone else in America,
that after that battle he

21:51.599 --> 21:54.809
believes that British military
prospects in America seem,

21:54.808 --> 21:57.568
to use his word,
"gloomy."

21:57.568 --> 22:01.228
"Such a pittance of troops
as Great Britain and Ireland can

22:01.228 --> 22:03.898
supply will only serve to
protract the war,

22:03.900 --> 22:08.260
to incur fruitless expense and
insure disappointment...

22:08.259 --> 22:11.849
.Our victory has been bought by
an uncommon loss of officers,

22:11.848 --> 22:14.698
some of them irreparable,
and I fear the consequence will

22:14.703 --> 22:18.123
not answer the expectations that
will be raised in England."

22:18.118 --> 22:18.318
Okay.

22:18.317 --> 22:19.697
So there's Burgoyne saying,
'Okay.

22:19.700 --> 22:23.400
We won the Battle of Bunker
Hill.

22:23.400 --> 22:25.310
This just doesn't look good to
me.'

22:25.308 --> 22:27.938
He even says in that same
letter something along the lines

22:27.939 --> 22:30.609
of: 'When I think back into my
history books and my sort of

22:30.614 --> 22:33.684
military history past,
I can't seem to come up with a

22:33.683 --> 22:36.243
situation that quite looks like
this one.

22:36.240 --> 22:37.440
This is just weird.

22:37.440 --> 22:39.390
I don't know what's happening
here, but it doesn't look good

22:39.394 --> 22:39.664
to me.

22:39.660 --> 22:42.120
It looks gloomy,
and our victory was actually

22:42.118 --> 22:44.468
pretty distressing,
and it's not going to look

22:44.465 --> 22:46.995
particularly wonderful to people
in England when they see.

22:47.000 --> 22:49.860
It's certainly not what they're
going to be expecting from us at

22:49.856 --> 22:51.986
the outset of fighting here in
the colonies.'

22:51.990 --> 22:54.200
So there's Bunker Hill.

22:54.200 --> 22:55.060
I've mentioned that before.

22:55.058 --> 22:57.908
I don't know if I mentioned
Fort Ticonderoga before.

22:57.910 --> 23:00.520
I'll reiterate it here if I
have, and if not you'll get it

23:00.518 --> 23:01.478
for the first time.

23:01.480 --> 23:05.860
It was an important battle for
the American war effort as well

23:05.856 --> 23:08.006
as just for American morale.

23:08.009 --> 23:10.889
Fort Ticonderoga is a strategic
fort in upstate New York that

23:10.892 --> 23:13.752
was held by the British,
and in May of 1775,

23:13.750 --> 23:18.430
American troops led by Ethan
Allen and Benedict Arnold--

23:18.430 --> 23:20.390
We're going to have a lot of
Benedict Arnold today.

23:20.390 --> 23:23.440
You could see why he's this big
hero, and thus why it was so

23:23.440 --> 23:26.490
shocking that he did what he did
ultimately and deserted.

23:26.490 --> 23:27.890
He's a hero through all of
today's lecture.

23:27.890 --> 23:30.370
Here he's starting out his
heroic acts.

23:30.368 --> 23:33.248
At the Battle of Fort
Ticonderoga, Ethan Allen and

23:33.253 --> 23:35.023
Benedict Arnold are leading.

23:35.019 --> 23:38.309
They actually surprise the
British garrison and they won

23:38.305 --> 23:40.845
control of the fort,
declaring their victory,

23:40.846 --> 23:42.736
as Ethan Allen put it very
dramatically:

23:42.744 --> 23:45.524
"In the name of the great
Jehovah and the Continental

23:45.519 --> 23:47.659
Congress I take Fort
Ticonderoga."

23:47.660 --> 23:48.830
These guys know drama.

23:48.828 --> 23:49.548
The U.S.

23:49.551 --> 23:52.261
suffered one wounded soldier.

23:52.259 --> 23:55.009
The British had forty-eight men
captured,

23:55.009 --> 23:58.809
plus cannons,
mortars, musket flints,

23:58.808 --> 24:02.998
ammunition--and these kinds of
supplies were really invaluable

24:03.003 --> 24:05.483
for the American cause
generally,

24:05.480 --> 24:08.470
and specifically at this moment
they were really useful because

24:08.467 --> 24:10.247
the Americans take these
supplies,

24:10.250 --> 24:12.700
particularly these cannons,
that they win at Fort

24:12.702 --> 24:14.852
Ticonderoga and they lug them to
Boston.

24:14.848 --> 24:18.128
And they position them looking
down on the city of Boston,

24:18.130 --> 24:21.620
and not that long after,
the British evacuate Boston,

24:21.618 --> 24:23.238
right?--which is what they
would have wanted.

24:23.240 --> 24:25.850
So March of 1776,
the British say,

24:25.846 --> 24:26.476
'Okay.

24:26.480 --> 24:29.240
We lost Ticonderoga and there's
a cannon looking down on us.

24:29.240 --> 24:32.490
I think it's time to leave
Boston.'

24:32.490 --> 24:35.910
Now as long as I'm in upstate
New York, I'm going to mention

24:35.914 --> 24:39.404
some bad assumptions on the part
of Americans as well at this

24:39.398 --> 24:39.978
point.

24:39.980 --> 24:42.930
There was always the feeling in
America--

24:42.930 --> 24:45.410
and particularly during the
very beginning of the war--

24:45.410 --> 24:49.870
that Canada was just waiting to
be liberated from England,

24:49.868 --> 24:54.098
right?--that Quebec is just
waiting to be the fourteenth

24:54.095 --> 24:54.705
state.

24:54.710 --> 24:58.330
So after winning Ticonderoga,
part of the American army

24:58.327 --> 25:01.547
actually went north to attack
Quebec and free it,

25:01.545 --> 25:04.355
right?--this idea like,
'free Canada!'

25:04.359 --> 25:06.329
Canada doesn't want to be freed.

25:06.328 --> 25:08.188
[laughs]
It's just these Americans that

25:08.189 --> 25:10.439
are like: 'yeah,
they're just waiting for us to

25:10.440 --> 25:10.930
come.'

25:10.930 --> 25:14.330
So they stage this attack on
Quebec to free it.

25:14.328 --> 25:17.078
It's--This--As you'll see today
and Tuesday, this is pretty much

25:17.078 --> 25:19.128
a defensive war on the part of
the Americans.

25:19.130 --> 25:22.000
This is the one little moment
or one of very few little

25:22.000 --> 25:25.190
moments, that's really just an
offensive invasion on the part

25:25.192 --> 25:26.312
of the Americans.

25:26.309 --> 25:28.369
Once again, Benedict Arnold.

25:28.368 --> 25:31.328
There he is,
being heroic during the attack.

25:31.328 --> 25:34.878
So was the young Aaron Burr who
fought in this battle and

25:34.877 --> 25:37.727
supposedly pulled the body of
his general,

25:37.730 --> 25:40.150
Richard Montgomery,
off of the battlefield under

25:40.148 --> 25:41.888
heavy fire--
and since I think Montgomery

25:41.894 --> 25:44.024
was a big person and Aaron Burr
was a very small person,

25:44.019 --> 25:45.979
I think this was a hard thing
to do,

25:45.980 --> 25:49.460
and he became sort of a hero
afterwards for being the guy who

25:49.462 --> 25:52.832
saved his general's body under
heavy fire during battle.

25:52.828 --> 25:56.668
Ultimately, the Americans did
not liberate Canada.

25:56.670 --> 25:58.700
[laughs]
The Canadians just were not

25:58.702 --> 26:01.552
interested in joining the
American war effort,

26:01.548 --> 26:04.988
not even when a delegation from
the Continental Congress arrived

26:04.990 --> 26:07.150
in Canada,
led by Benjamin Franklin,

26:07.148 --> 26:10.568
to negotiate with the Canadians
about joining the revolt--

26:10.568 --> 26:12.418
so the Americans were serious
about this.

26:12.420 --> 26:15.120
The effort to free Canada ended
without effect,

26:15.123 --> 26:17.473
and ultimately,
during this war at least,

26:17.473 --> 26:21.063
the Americans abandoned the
idea about liberating Canada.

26:21.058 --> 26:23.188
And I say "during this war
at least"

26:23.190 --> 26:25.650
because during the War of 1812,
when once again we're fighting

26:25.652 --> 26:27.542
the British,
the Americans are right back

26:27.538 --> 26:28.708
there: 'free Canada!'

26:28.710 --> 26:32.030
[laughs]
It's like: 'no number two.

26:32.028 --> 26:34.688
[laughs]
Go away,' but they're back;

26:34.690 --> 26:36.760
they're persistent.

26:36.759 --> 26:40.869
Now the main part of the
American army at this point in

26:40.874 --> 26:44.764
1776, after the evacuation of
Boston by the British,

26:44.759 --> 26:46.359
is not in Canada.

26:46.358 --> 26:49.098
After the British evacuated
Boston,

26:49.098 --> 26:52.848
Washington and the main body of
American troops went to New York

26:52.853 --> 26:55.413
City,
convinced that after evacuating

26:55.405 --> 26:57.395
Boston,
that's likely to be where the

26:57.400 --> 26:59.080
British head,
to New York City,

26:59.083 --> 27:02.033
and sure enough that's exactly
what the British do.

27:02.028 --> 27:05.968
Thomas Gage,
commander of the British

27:05.973 --> 27:08.053
forces,
had been recalled by this time

27:08.054 --> 27:09.534
and he'd been replaced by Sir
William Howe,

27:09.528 --> 27:13.598
who arrived in New York City in
July of 1776.

27:13.598 --> 27:13.908
Okay.

27:13.907 --> 27:17.537
So here we see another British
assumption that does not play

27:17.544 --> 27:21.184
out the way in which clearly the
British hoped it would.

27:21.180 --> 27:23.420
I said a few minutes ago,
they assumed a little show of

27:23.416 --> 27:25.216
force,
a little show of reconciliation

27:25.218 --> 27:27.268
and this will end,
and we've seen a little show of

27:27.272 --> 27:27.532
force.

27:27.528 --> 27:30.068
Here we see an attempt at
reconciliation,

27:30.070 --> 27:33.630
the idea being--maybe if we
sort of extend a hand in some

27:33.627 --> 27:35.087
way, this will end.

27:35.088 --> 27:38.998
So newly installed General Howe
invited an American commission

27:39.001 --> 27:42.591
to hold a peace conference with
him on a boat in New York

27:42.594 --> 27:43.304
Harbor.

27:43.298 --> 27:46.218
This ends up being known as the
Staten Island Peace Conference,

27:46.220 --> 27:49.310
and somehow this--I have no
issue with Staten Island,

27:49.308 --> 27:51.528
but I just don't expect
that--all those words to go

27:51.527 --> 27:53.847
together,
the "Staten Island Peace

27:53.849 --> 27:55.519
Conference,"
[laughter]

27:55.518 --> 27:57.678
which is held September
11,1776.

27:57.680 --> 28:00.720
At the conference,
Howe tells the American

28:00.719 --> 28:03.039
commissioners--
Benjamin Franklin,

28:03.038 --> 28:05.508
John Adams (making a little
appearance),

28:05.509 --> 28:07.979
and South Carolinian Edward
Rutledge,

28:07.980 --> 28:09.930
all of them there from the
Continental Congress--

28:09.930 --> 28:13.850
that he would hate to be forced
to destroy his brothers,

28:13.849 --> 28:15.309
the Americans.

28:15.308 --> 28:19.158
He's wishing that there was
something they could do so that

28:19.160 --> 28:23.210
he can be spared the horror of
having to kill his brethren.

28:23.210 --> 28:25.270
At which point,
Franklin supposedly responded

28:25.271 --> 28:27.761
by saying, "We will try our
best to spare you the

28:27.756 --> 28:28.596
trouble."

28:28.598 --> 28:29.558
[laughs]
[laughter]

28:29.561 --> 28:31.221
Thank you, Benjamin Franklin.

28:31.220 --> 28:31.410
Okay.

28:31.407 --> 28:33.287
That conference did not
accomplish what the British

28:33.291 --> 28:34.311
wanted it to accomplish.

28:34.308 --> 28:37.668
Nothing happens as a result of
the Staten Island Peace

28:37.665 --> 28:38.485
Conference.

28:38.490 --> 28:42.310
Howe also wrote to George
Washington to see if he could

28:42.310 --> 28:45.920
get Washington to come to terms
with the British.

28:45.920 --> 28:46.280
Right?

28:46.276 --> 28:49.786
Maybe if I just deal with him
personally, he'll see that I'm

28:49.787 --> 28:52.997
being reasonable and work
towards ending this before it

28:52.999 --> 28:54.129
really begins.

28:54.130 --> 28:56.700
Unfortunately,
this is the letter that I

28:56.704 --> 28:59.984
mentioned on Tuesday,
addressed to Mr.***Washington,

28:59.980 --> 29:02.490
that he did not want to accept
because it wasn't addressed to

29:02.489 --> 29:04.049
General Washington--
the etcetera,

29:04.050 --> 29:06.860
etcetera letter--so basically,
Howe refuses to address

29:06.856 --> 29:10.006
Washington with his military
title and Washington refuses to

29:10.005 --> 29:12.695
accept the letter--
so this does not go well either.

29:12.700 --> 29:14.450
[laughs]
That's just like:

29:14.450 --> 29:15.640
oops, oh, well.

29:15.640 --> 29:18.750
That's an attempt that just
stalls before it even gets under

29:18.752 --> 29:19.072
way.

29:19.068 --> 29:23.578
So there we have basically the
first phase of the war,

29:23.578 --> 29:27.358
this idea that a little push,
a little shove,

29:27.358 --> 29:29.028
a little display of force,
a little reconciliation,

29:29.029 --> 29:31.439
and things will end.

29:31.440 --> 29:36.200
The second phase begins with a
switch in strategy on the part

29:36.201 --> 29:38.631
of the British,
a new strategy,

29:38.627 --> 29:41.957
but again, one that's still
grounded in traditional

29:41.958 --> 29:43.888
assumptions about warfare.

29:43.890 --> 29:46.570
And this new strategy is
accompanied by another

29:46.569 --> 29:48.959
assumption that does not play
out well.

29:48.960 --> 29:51.030
The little shove strategy
doesn't work,

29:51.034 --> 29:54.314
so now basically we'll up the
stakes--is what the British are

29:54.309 --> 29:57.269
thinking;
we'll seize a major city.

29:57.269 --> 30:01.329
Basically, the British assumed
that if they seized New York,

30:01.326 --> 30:05.446
they would split the colonies
in half along the Hudson Valley

30:05.453 --> 30:06.833
and end the war.

30:06.828 --> 30:09.828
To them, it seemed pretty
simple and easy to divide the

30:09.826 --> 30:12.996
colonies into two halves--
and particularly since at this

30:13.001 --> 30:16.411
point they still think that the
center of all the trouble is New

30:16.410 --> 30:18.100
England,
that there are these sort of

30:18.103 --> 30:19.523
crazy radical people in New
England,

30:19.519 --> 30:22.299
so if they can seize New York
and divide the colonies in half

30:22.298 --> 30:25.838
and isolate New England,
then maybe things will actually

30:25.838 --> 30:26.798
end quickly.

30:26.798 --> 30:30.808
So that's the strategy here as
we move into phase number two of

30:30.808 --> 30:31.778
the fighting.

30:31.778 --> 30:36.718
So the British descended on New
York with an armada bearing

30:36.724 --> 30:38.094
32,000 troops.

30:38.088 --> 30:38.398
Okay.

30:38.404 --> 30:41.054
That's just awe-inspiring
numbers of men.

30:41.048 --> 30:43.608
Washington dug in on Brooklyn
Heights,

30:43.608 --> 30:46.768
hoping that the British would
attack him frontally and that

30:46.767 --> 30:49.867
there'd be another kind of
Bunker Hill sort of battle,

30:49.868 --> 30:53.738
but instead Howe carried out
some kind of a flanking maneuver

30:53.743 --> 30:57.103
which resulted in American
losses of nearly 1,500 men

30:57.102 --> 31:00.592
compared with British losses of
less than 400 men.

31:00.588 --> 31:04.268
However, at this point,
Howe made a mistake of a sort

31:04.266 --> 31:08.576
that he made repeatedly again
and again throughout the war.

31:08.578 --> 31:12.338
He's so confident of victory
that he decides he won't deliver

31:12.344 --> 31:14.984
the final death-blow until the
next day.

31:14.980 --> 31:15.350
Right?

31:15.348 --> 31:17.258
'Oh, we'll let the night pass.

31:17.259 --> 31:19.469
Tomorrow morning we'll get up
and crush them.'

31:19.470 --> 31:19.780
Okay.

31:19.779 --> 31:22.079
Washington is the expert of
retreat.

31:22.078 --> 31:25.098
Overnight Washington removes
his troops under cover of

31:25.104 --> 31:28.704
darkness from Brooklyn Heights
and brings them into New York.

31:28.700 --> 31:32.090
And we'll see--I think--even in
the course of today's lecture,

31:32.088 --> 31:34.988
Howe does this again--that he
does well in a battle,

31:34.990 --> 31:37.420
he assumes that things are
going so swimmingly,

31:37.420 --> 31:40.130
that okay, tomorrow we'll
finish things off,

31:40.130 --> 31:43.410
and Washington manages to make
a hasty retreat and things

31:43.405 --> 31:44.045
continue.

31:44.048 --> 31:47.288
So Washington removes his
troops under cover of darkness

31:47.290 --> 31:50.130
to New York City,
and basically for the next two

31:50.130 --> 31:53.120
months there's a series of minor
battles in New York.

31:53.119 --> 31:54.789
There's one in Harlem Heights.

31:54.789 --> 31:56.909
There's one in White Plains.

31:56.910 --> 32:00.870
Howe keeps trying to circle the
Continental Army and Washington

32:00.868 --> 32:03.358
keeps retreating one way or
another,

32:03.358 --> 32:06.228
pretty skillfully,
helped always in his retreating

32:06.233 --> 32:09.933
by the fact that Howe is so slow
to just advance and conquer.

32:09.930 --> 32:13.880
Ultimately, Washington fled
across New Jersey,

32:13.880 --> 32:16.810
over the Delaware River,
while Howe,

32:16.808 --> 32:18.918
who now is in possession of New
York,

32:18.920 --> 32:21.210
also seizes Newport,
Rhode Island,

32:21.207 --> 32:24.047
and establishes outposts in New
Jersey.

32:24.048 --> 32:26.698
So things are not looking
wonderful for the Americans at

32:26.702 --> 32:29.502
this point, and the British seem
to be doing quite well.

32:29.500 --> 32:33.470
But here we do see one of
Washington's most characteristic

32:33.473 --> 32:36.233
war maneuvers,
because rather than just sort

32:36.233 --> 32:38.953
of standing there and engaging
with the British,

32:38.950 --> 32:43.630
he withdraws and he withdraws
and he withdraws again and again

32:43.628 --> 32:44.548
and again.

32:44.548 --> 32:47.908
Throughout the entire war,
he continually maneuvered his

32:47.911 --> 32:50.601
army so that if the
circumstances didn't seem

32:50.601 --> 32:53.781
overwhelmingly favorable for the
American army,

32:53.779 --> 32:57.979
he could just retreat to a more
secure spot.

32:57.980 --> 33:01.240
Now obviously the strategy of
retreat would not have been

33:01.237 --> 33:04.437
necessarily overwhelmingly
inspiring to Americans at the

33:04.435 --> 33:04.955
time.

33:04.960 --> 33:07.740
It did not also necessarily
strike fear into the hearts of

33:07.744 --> 33:08.874
the British at first.

33:08.868 --> 33:10.928
Washington's the guy who
retreats.

33:10.930 --> 33:14.230
This had some people feeling a
little bit gloomy and not always

33:14.228 --> 33:14.758
hopeful.

33:14.759 --> 33:16.319
He's the army that disappears.

33:16.318 --> 33:20.518
But now in 1776,
Washington uses this typical

33:20.519 --> 33:21.569
strategy.

33:21.568 --> 33:23.698
He doesn't want to get penned
into New York City.

33:23.700 --> 33:27.040
He retreats across New Jersey,
retreats across the Delaware,

33:27.042 --> 33:28.462
goes into Pennsylvania.

33:28.460 --> 33:31.480
The British head after him as
far as Trenton,

33:31.481 --> 33:34.921
New Jersey, led by British
General Lord Cornwallis,

33:34.915 --> 33:37.865
and there they go into winter
quarters.

33:37.868 --> 33:40.608
And--Lord Cornwallis had
arrived in America in 1776,

33:40.605 --> 33:43.335
and he brought with him even
more British troops.

33:43.338 --> 33:47.008
And here we have yet another
letter from that collection I

33:47.013 --> 33:49.403
mentioned being sold at
Sotheby's,

33:49.400 --> 33:52.600
and this one's from an observer
who's on a ship,

33:52.598 --> 33:55.998
a British ship in New York
Harbor, as he's watching the

33:55.998 --> 33:58.788
Americans leave New York,
and he's writing again to

33:58.785 --> 33:59.395
somebody else.

33:59.400 --> 34:00.070
He's a diplomat.

34:00.068 --> 34:04.708
He's writing to someone else in
the colonies and he says that he

34:04.712 --> 34:08.032
watched the colonists abandon
their homes,

34:08.030 --> 34:10.250
quote, "to follow the
standard of rebellion at the

34:10.246 --> 34:13.506
hazard of all they are worth,
rather than acknowledge George

34:13.510 --> 34:14.550
for their king.

34:14.550 --> 34:17.550
The infatuation is inscrutable.

34:17.550 --> 34:20.050
I have read somewhere,
and I begin to think it

34:20.050 --> 34:23.440
possible, that a whole country
as well as an individual may be

34:23.438 --> 34:25.048
struck with lunacy."

34:25.050 --> 34:26.790
He can't believe what he's
seeing.

34:26.789 --> 34:27.109
Right?

34:27.106 --> 34:29.106
He's watching Washington's army
run,

34:29.110 --> 34:33.550
and he watches some colonists
basically follow,

34:33.550 --> 34:36.970
abandon what they own and
follow, as he puts it,

34:36.969 --> 34:39.369
rather than acknowledge George
for their King.

34:39.369 --> 34:41.109
He can't quite believe what
he's seeing.

34:41.110 --> 34:45.270
Now by this point--this is
December of 1776--

34:45.268 --> 34:49.968
Washington had roughly 3,000
men fit for duty in the army,

34:49.969 --> 34:53.449
a really sad point for
Washington and the army.

34:53.449 --> 34:56.969
It's at this point that Thomas
Paine makes another appearance,

34:56.969 --> 34:58.469
comes to the fore again.

34:58.469 --> 35:02.899
He writes a series of pamphlets
published under the title The

35:02.898 --> 35:07.678
Crisis, and the first
one appears in December of 1776,

35:07.679 --> 35:10.299
actually I think December
19,1776.

35:10.300 --> 35:13.040
By this point Paine had
actually joined the American

35:13.039 --> 35:15.939
army, so he's in the army,
and he wrote these Crisis

35:15.940 --> 35:18.090
essays while he was in the
army.

35:18.090 --> 35:23.140
And Washington had them read to
the troops to boost their

35:23.137 --> 35:24.897
morale--
and as with Common

35:24.896 --> 35:26.976
Sense, these
Crisis essays include

35:26.980 --> 35:29.350
some of the most famous prose of
the revolutionary era.

35:29.349 --> 35:31.119
And I'll just read the most
obvious ones,

35:31.117 --> 35:33.017
which some of you probably
already know:

35:33.018 --> 35:35.798
"These are the times that
try men's souls:

35:35.802 --> 35:38.952
The summer soldier and the
sunshine patriot will,

35:38.949 --> 35:41.029
in this crisis,
shrink from the service of

35:41.027 --> 35:43.847
their country;
but he that stands by it now,

35:43.853 --> 35:47.123
deserves the love and thanks of
man and woman.

35:47.119 --> 35:50.679
Tyranny, like hell,
is not easily conquered;

35:50.679 --> 35:54.469
yet we have this consolation
with us, that the harder the

35:54.469 --> 35:57.719
conflict, the more glorious the
triumph."

35:57.719 --> 36:00.549
He's good at coming forward at
tough moments and then having

36:00.547 --> 36:02.887
these sort of inspiring words--
again, which is why

36:02.894 --> 36:04.714
Washington's having them read to
the troops.

36:04.710 --> 36:08.280
Paine's words were really
needed in December of 1776,

36:08.275 --> 36:12.385
because it's a real low point
for Washington and the army.

36:12.389 --> 36:16.079
Failure literally seemed to be
just on the horizon.

36:16.079 --> 36:18.979
In less than three months,
the British had captured New

36:18.976 --> 36:21.126
York City;
they had captured part of New

36:21.132 --> 36:23.862
Jersey;
food supplies and pay in the

36:23.856 --> 36:27.066
American army were at an
all-time low;

36:27.070 --> 36:30.950
and, almost worst of all,
enlistments of soldiers in the

36:30.945 --> 36:34.325
Continental Army ended at the
end of the year.

36:34.329 --> 36:35.859
And so Washington,
there he is,

36:35.864 --> 36:38.734
and he knows that the people in
the Continental Army--

36:38.730 --> 36:41.180
their formal enlistments end at
the end of December,

36:41.179 --> 36:44.269
and they could all just walk
away and say,

36:44.268 --> 36:45.798
'Oops, my enlistment's done,
thanks,

36:45.800 --> 36:47.280
Sir, nice fighting with you,
goodbye'--

36:47.280 --> 36:51.100
and Washington could literally
be left without an army.

36:51.099 --> 36:55.639
So he does one last desperate
measure literally to prevent the

36:55.639 --> 36:58.169
army from entirely disappearing.

36:58.170 --> 37:01.000
He uses the only thing that's
available to him at this

37:01.003 --> 37:03.413
moment--and that is his personal
influence.

37:03.409 --> 37:07.889
He makes a personal plea to the
army to please stay with him for

37:07.891 --> 37:11.161
just six more weeks as a
personal favor to him:

37:11.161 --> 37:12.871
'Please don't leave.

37:12.869 --> 37:14.729
Just--For me,
for your commander,

37:14.731 --> 37:17.641
just give me six more weeks and
then you can go.

37:17.639 --> 37:20.609
As a personal favor to me,
who you respect,

37:20.614 --> 37:22.814
give me just six more weeks.'

37:22.809 --> 37:25.539
Most of the soldiers agreed,
and with that,

37:25.543 --> 37:29.123
Washington made one last
desperate attempt to attack the

37:29.121 --> 37:31.401
British at Trenton,
New Jersey.

37:31.400 --> 37:34.390
And Washington's strategy is
good in this case.

37:34.389 --> 37:35.859
He basically waits until
Christmas,

37:35.860 --> 37:39.950
really banking on the element
of surprise,

37:39.949 --> 37:43.569
and then he launches a surprise
attack against an encampment of

37:43.567 --> 37:46.857
Hessians at Trenton--
and he wins the day with a loss

37:46.862 --> 37:50.202
of only four men and he gains
roughly 900 prisoners.

37:50.199 --> 37:52.139
This is great for Washington.

37:52.139 --> 37:54.809
This is such a low moment,
and he really does get the

37:54.809 --> 37:55.939
element of surprise.

37:55.940 --> 37:57.800
The Hessians are just sort of
stunned,

37:57.800 --> 38:00.900
and at first apparently think
that there's a little sort of

38:00.898 --> 38:03.728
advance guard of Americans who
are attacking them,

38:03.730 --> 38:06.040
and they suddenly realize to
their horror--

38:06.039 --> 38:08.179
no, this would be the American
army;

38:08.179 --> 38:10.219
[laughs] we're in trouble.

38:10.219 --> 38:12.989
And they fight and there is a
battle--but again,

38:12.989 --> 38:14.579
they really lose the day.

38:14.579 --> 38:16.679
The British,
learning of the attack,

38:16.679 --> 38:18.239
are somewhat distressed.

38:18.239 --> 38:21.589
However, they think--they
assume at this point that they

38:21.588 --> 38:24.388
have the American army cornered
at Trenton,

38:24.389 --> 38:27.309
and thus they decide the next
day [laughs]

38:27.309 --> 38:30.159
they will attack the
Continental Army.

38:30.159 --> 38:30.389
Okay.

38:30.389 --> 38:32.999
So once again they're not good
at the element of surprise,

38:33.001 --> 38:33.691
the British.

38:33.690 --> 38:35.700
They keep sort of taking their
time.

38:35.699 --> 38:39.069
Taking your time was not good
at this point of the war.

38:39.070 --> 38:41.110
It is not a strategy that is
working for the British.

38:41.110 --> 38:44.250
So sure enough,
Washington does what Washington

38:44.253 --> 38:46.893
does so well;
he retreats under cover of

38:46.885 --> 38:50.215
night, and in this case rather
than just retreating,

38:50.219 --> 38:53.619
he actually leaves campfires
burning in their camp so it

38:53.621 --> 38:56.221
looks as though the army is
still there.

38:56.219 --> 38:58.629
And then leaving what looks
like the encampment there,

38:58.630 --> 39:01.770
under complete darkness he
moves his troops away,

39:01.768 --> 39:05.348
directly into enemy lines in
Princeton,

39:05.349 --> 39:08.149
New Jersey, which he also
captured.

39:08.150 --> 39:09.830
Again, he did two unexpected
things.

39:09.829 --> 39:12.539
He manages to retreat--he
pretends as though he's not

39:12.541 --> 39:14.801
retreating;
and then he moves his troops

39:14.795 --> 39:17.435
into enemy lines in Princeton
and captures it.

39:17.440 --> 39:20.000
Now during the battle,
supposedly there was a

39:20.003 --> 39:22.803
cannonball that was shot through
Nassau Hall,

39:22.800 --> 39:25.530
the big main hall of Princeton,
the College of New Jersey,

39:25.530 --> 39:27.520
and there's a story that goes
along with that.

39:27.518 --> 39:29.278
There's no actual evidence to
support the story,

39:29.280 --> 39:31.300
but I'll offer it because
people tell it over and over and

39:31.295 --> 39:33.205
over and over again,
so clearly someone somewhere

39:33.210 --> 39:35.240
believes it,
and even though it might not be

39:35.235 --> 39:37.105
true,
I'll give it to you anyway.

39:37.110 --> 39:39.880
The story is basically that
Alexander Hamilton is the guy

39:39.878 --> 39:42.798
who shot the cannon or had the
cannon shot that went through

39:42.795 --> 39:45.065
Nassau Hall at the College of
New Jersey,

39:45.070 --> 39:47.630
the theory behind that being,
he actually really wanted to go

39:47.634 --> 39:48.964
to the College of New Jersey.

39:48.960 --> 39:49.570
He's fighting.

39:49.565 --> 39:52.285
He is fighting at the Battle of
Princeton--and he wants to go.

39:52.289 --> 39:53.709
That's his first choice for a
college.

39:53.710 --> 39:55.430
'Where do I want to go?

39:55.429 --> 39:56.529
Ah, the College of New Jersey.'

39:56.530 --> 39:58.150
But he's in such a hurry.

39:58.150 --> 40:01.800
He wants to advance through the
program at Princeton as fast as

40:01.800 --> 40:02.330
he can.

40:02.329 --> 40:05.079
So basically--'I don't want to
have to wait for everyone else.

40:05.079 --> 40:07.679
If I finish a course in a
month, then I want to move on to

40:07.679 --> 40:08.409
the next one.'

40:08.409 --> 40:10.069
This is a little bit of a
radical proposal,

40:10.070 --> 40:12.240
and the people at Princeton,
at the College of New Jersey,

40:12.239 --> 40:16.079
say no, so he ends up going to
King's College,

40:16.079 --> 40:17.239
to Columbia, instead.

40:17.239 --> 40:19.109
He is fighting at the Battle of
Princeton.

40:19.110 --> 40:21.170
He is in command of a small
artillery group,

40:21.170 --> 40:24.890
which is firing cannon,
so the story is,

40:24.889 --> 40:28.489
he was rather pleased to see a
cannonball go firing into Nassau

40:28.485 --> 40:30.565
Hall,
since they had rejected him

40:30.570 --> 40:32.240
basically;
they didn't take him for

40:32.239 --> 40:32.619
college.

40:32.619 --> 40:35.709
One way or another,
Washington wins at Trenton;

40:35.710 --> 40:39.790
Washington wins at Princeton;
and then he settles into winter

40:39.786 --> 40:44.236
quarters at Morristown,
New Jersey, for the winter of

40:44.244 --> 40:44.934
1776.

40:44.929 --> 40:52.019
So basically in nine days in
the dead of winter--

40:52.018 --> 40:54.888
and really in the dead of
winter when gentlemen do not

40:54.893 --> 40:58.043
normally stage military
campaigns in a traditional war--

40:58.039 --> 41:00.609
the American army pushed the
British back sixty miles from

41:00.605 --> 41:03.615
their ultimate goal,
which was Philadelphia.

41:03.619 --> 41:06.699
And, as important,
the battles of Trenton and

41:06.699 --> 41:11.039
Princeton were vital to American
morale--to civilian morale and

41:11.039 --> 41:12.859
military morale alike.

41:12.860 --> 41:16.930
As an Englishman said at the
time, "a few days ago these

41:16.932 --> 41:19.922
Americans had given up the cause
for lost.

41:19.920 --> 41:22.940
Their late successes have
turned the scale and now they

41:22.943 --> 41:24.683
are all liberty mad again....

41:24.679 --> 41:27.459
They have recovered from their
panic, and it will not be an

41:27.458 --> 41:30.378
easy matter to throw them in to
that confusion again."

41:30.380 --> 41:35.240
So here ends the second phase
of the war, with the Eastern

41:35.237 --> 41:40.347
seaboard definitely not cut in
half, the Americans definitely

41:40.351 --> 41:41.801
not defeated.

41:41.800 --> 41:48.310
The third phase of the war
begins in 1777.

41:48.309 --> 41:51.629
Largely, it consisted of the
British attempting to subdue the

41:51.628 --> 41:54.358
middle colonies,
once again proceeding under the

41:54.364 --> 41:57.744
assumption that if they get the
right city it will cause things

41:57.735 --> 41:58.275
to end.

41:58.280 --> 42:00.160
In this case they think:
'okay, we did New York;

42:00.159 --> 42:02.259
we're heading for Philadelphia.

42:02.260 --> 42:05.280
Yet another major city,
and the government's in

42:05.277 --> 42:07.967
Philadelphia,
so maybe if we manage to get

42:07.965 --> 42:11.175
that city as well,
things will turn our way.'

42:11.179 --> 42:13.889
That's how things happen in a
conventional war:

42:13.885 --> 42:17.905
capture a key city,
things turn your way often--and

42:17.905 --> 42:19.445
again,
in America this is not a

42:19.449 --> 42:20.359
strategy that works well.

42:20.360 --> 42:23.660
As Cornwallis put it at the
time, in the end he decides that

42:23.663 --> 42:27.023
the only way to really defeat
the Americans would be to catch

42:27.021 --> 42:29.891
George Washington,
or, as Cornwallis put it,

42:29.889 --> 42:32.229
"to bag the fox,"
right?--

42:32.230 --> 42:33.960
and so he's on a traditional
fox hunt.

42:33.960 --> 42:36.210
You have to bag the fox and
then it will be over.

42:36.210 --> 42:38.140
I don't know if Philadelphia's
going to do it.

42:38.139 --> 42:41.029
But at any rate,
the British do head off for

42:41.027 --> 42:43.777
Philadelphia,
1777, the third phase of the

42:43.782 --> 42:44.322
war.

42:44.320 --> 42:48.040
This is Howe's plan,
and at first the British do

42:48.039 --> 42:49.859
well in Pennsylvania.

42:49.860 --> 42:53.130
There are actually a couple of
clashes in Pennsylvania at

42:53.130 --> 42:56.050
Brandywine and at Germantown,
and both times,

42:56.052 --> 42:58.442
Continental Army units
crumbled,

42:58.440 --> 43:01.310
and Howe was ultimately able to
enter Philadelphia.

43:01.309 --> 43:03.679
And in these skirmishes,
one after another,

43:03.679 --> 43:06.739
nearly twenty percent of the
Continental troops were either

43:06.742 --> 43:08.352
killed,
wounded or captured,

43:08.347 --> 43:10.877
so the British are doing pretty
well at first.

43:10.880 --> 43:13.870
Not helping matters,
as far as American morale goes,

43:13.869 --> 43:17.439
is the fact that when Congress
hears that the British are

43:17.436 --> 43:20.616
headed for Philadelphia they run
in mass panic,

43:20.619 --> 43:22.229
like: 'ah, [laughs]
[laughter]

43:22.226 --> 43:25.176
the British are coming.'--
which does not really make the

43:25.175 --> 43:27.815
Continental Army feel like they
have much faith in them to

43:27.824 --> 43:28.574
protect them.

43:28.570 --> 43:28.740
Right?

43:28.737 --> 43:29.487
They literally leave town.

43:29.489 --> 43:32.629
There's actually a really
amusing letter.

43:32.630 --> 43:35.050
I think by this point Alexander
Hamilton is an aide to George

43:35.045 --> 43:37.415
Washington and he sends a letter
to the Continental Congress

43:37.422 --> 43:38.512
basically saying:
'Run!

43:38.510 --> 43:41.990
[laughter] They're coming!'

43:41.989 --> 43:44.419
So the Continental Army flees
to another city in

43:44.423 --> 43:47.433
Pennsylvania--so things are
looking good for the British in

43:47.429 --> 43:48.309
Pennsylvania.

43:48.309 --> 43:51.449
However, further north
something else is happening to

43:51.445 --> 43:54.995
the wing of the British Army
that had been in Canada and now

43:55.003 --> 43:58.633
is headed south,
led by British General John

43:58.625 --> 44:01.675
Burgoyne in a battle at
Saratoga,

44:01.679 --> 44:05.499
New York, with Burgoyne's
troops suffering from supply

44:05.496 --> 44:06.286
problems.

44:06.289 --> 44:09.589
So here we have a battle where
supplies are a major problem.

44:09.590 --> 44:13.020
Burgoyne ends up,
at the Battle of Saratoga,

44:13.018 --> 44:17.708
surrendering almost 6,000 men
to American forces led by

44:17.710 --> 44:22.400
General Horatio Gates and aided
by Benedict Arnold,

44:22.400 --> 44:25.450
the man who appears to be
everywhere in this phase of the

44:25.452 --> 44:25.782
war.

44:25.780 --> 44:29.600
For the Americans,
this feels like a real turning

44:29.601 --> 44:30.241
point.

44:30.239 --> 44:33.879
It's a stunning victory for the
Americans, really unexpected,

44:33.876 --> 44:37.086
and it's just as stunning a
defeat for the British.

44:37.090 --> 44:40.860
And there's actually a journal
entry by one of Burgoyne's

44:40.860 --> 44:44.160
lieutenants describing the
events with the British

44:44.159 --> 44:45.739
commander,
with Burgoyne,

44:45.744 --> 44:47.354
and with the troops and the
surrender.

44:47.349 --> 44:48.379
He describes what he sees.

44:48.380 --> 44:50.720
And he writes in his journal
"Gen.

44:50.722 --> 44:54.182
Burgoyne desired a meeting of
all the officers early that

44:54.177 --> 44:56.307
morning,
at which he entered into a

44:56.309 --> 44:59.179
detail of his manner of acting
since he had the honour of

44:59.175 --> 45:00.655
commanding the Army."

45:00.659 --> 45:02.649
So basically Burgoyne calls all
of his officers,

45:02.650 --> 45:05.480
and he's trying to explain to
them how they ended up in the

45:05.483 --> 45:08.563
situation that they're in,
how--what logic did he follow

45:08.559 --> 45:10.619
so that they're where they are
now.

45:10.619 --> 45:14.339
And the lieutenant continues in
his diary, that Burgoyne was,

45:14.335 --> 45:17.905
quote, "too full to speak;
Heaven only could tell his

45:17.905 --> 45:19.425
feelings at this time....

45:19.429 --> 45:21.489
About 10 o'clock,
we marched out,

45:21.485 --> 45:24.375
according to treaty,
marched out to surrender,

45:24.375 --> 45:26.105
with drums beating,
...

45:26.110 --> 45:28.890
but the drums seemed to have
lost their former inspiriting

45:28.891 --> 45:31.901
sounds" and seemed
"as if almost ashamed to

45:31.900 --> 45:33.700
be heard on such an occasion.

45:33.699 --> 45:37.069
As to my own feelings,
I cannot express them.

45:37.070 --> 45:40.990
Tears (though unmanly) forced
their way, and if alone,

45:40.994 --> 45:44.034
I could have burst to give
myself vent.

45:44.030 --> 45:46.920
I never shall forget the
appearance of the American

45:46.918 --> 45:48.938
troops on our marching past
them;

45:48.940 --> 45:52.320
a dead silence universally
reigned through their numerous

45:52.324 --> 45:54.844
columns,
and even they seemed struck

45:54.840 --> 45:58.610
with our situation and dare
scarce lift up their eyes to

45:58.610 --> 46:01.560
view British Troops in such a
situation.

46:01.559 --> 46:04.609
I must say their decent
behavior during the time (to us

46:04.606 --> 46:07.536
so greatly fallen) merited the
utmost approbation and

46:07.539 --> 46:08.499
praise."

46:08.500 --> 46:11.280
So he's actually describing
this shocking moment where the

46:11.275 --> 46:14.195
British can't believe they're
surrendering that number of men

46:14.195 --> 46:16.545
to the American forces,
and the Americans are so

46:16.552 --> 46:19.082
stunned that this is happening,
that they're actually just

46:19.083 --> 46:20.073
silently watching it.

46:20.070 --> 46:22.680
They can't--No one can quite
believe what's happening at

46:22.677 --> 46:23.197
Saratoga.

46:23.199 --> 46:25.289
It's a huge victory.

46:25.289 --> 46:28.719
It has important consequences
that I'll talk about more next

46:28.724 --> 46:31.814
Tuesday as we head into the last
phase of the war,

46:31.809 --> 46:34.099
which largely takes place in
the South,

46:34.099 --> 46:37.639
and see its repercussions and
its implications.

46:37.639 --> 46:39.779
Have a great weekend.

46:39.780 --> 46:41.920
I think lurking somewhere is
that sheet of paper.

46:41.920 --> 46:44.210
I assume it made its way
somewhere.

46:44.210 --> 46:46.960
Whoever has that magical sheet
of paper--There it is.

46:46.960 --> 46:47.130
Okay.

46:47.134 --> 46:48.184
Bring it up when you're done.

46:48.179 --> 46:49.389
Have a great weekend.

46:49.389 --> 46:53.999