WEBVTT

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Prof: Well,
I'd really better start.

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I can infer,
I think, from looking around

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the room that there is either
post-paper depression at work or

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that having written the paper,
you scarcely had time to read a

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fifteen-page labyrinthine essay
by Lacan.

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That's unfortunate,
and I hope you're able to make

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up for it soon.

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Those of you who are here today
can take such notes as you can

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figure out how to take and then
go back to the text of Lacan and

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try to make use of them.

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It is a pity that not
everyone's here,

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but we'll fare forward
nevertheless.

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Now there is an obvious link
between the work of Peter Brooks

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that you had last time and this
particular essay of Lacan which,

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of course, I'd like to begin by
underlining.

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It has to do with the part of
the argument of Lacan which

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probably is most accessible to
you after your tour through

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structuralism and related
"-isms"

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and which,
in a way, I think really can be

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used to anchor a certain
understanding of Lacan.

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It's something I am going to
want to spend a lot of time with

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in the long run today.

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In any case,
Brooks understood the fictional

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text and the completed fictional
narrative as a sustaining of

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detours, inadequate and
improper endpoints overcome,

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resulting in a continuation of
desire,

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resulting in a proper
ending--that is to say,

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something corresponding to what
Freud understood as the desire

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of the organism to die in its
own way and not according to the

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modification or pressure of
something from without.

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elaboration of a narrative plot
Brooks called metonymy,

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in a way that by this time we
ought to recognize as what

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happens in the putting together
of signs along the axis of

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combination as it's described by
Jakobson.

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But Brooks remarks also that at
the same time,

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there is a binding of
this sequence of signs--

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of events in the case of a
plot--there is an effect of

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unity,
a feeling that the experience

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one has in reading a fictional
plot is an experience of unity.

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This effect he calls
"metaphor":

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that is to say,
our sense of the unity of a

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fictional plot we understand as
metaphoric.

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Some kind of identity,
self-identity,

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or close correspondence in the
meaning of the variety of events

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that we have encountered results
in a unity that can be

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understood in metaphorical
terms.

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In other words,
something like what Jakobson

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calls the "poetic
function"

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has been superimposed on the
metonymic axis of combination in

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such a way that the feeling of
unity,

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the sense of the recurrence of
identity in the signs used,

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is something that we can come
away with.

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This, Brooks argues,
accounts for our sense of the

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unity of the plot even as we
understand it to be a perpetual

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form of the delay of desire.

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I speak of the delay of desire:
That's most obvious,

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of course, in a marriage plot,
the marriage plot being the

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heart of fiction,
perhaps, and most immediately

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intelligible--
but of course desire takes many

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forms.

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There are many sorts of plot,
and they always do in one form

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or another have to do,
in Brooks' sense,

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with desire.

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Now I pause in this way over
Brooks because I think you can

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see--
whatever frustration you may

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also be feeling in encountering
Lacan--

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I think you can see that the
same basic movement is at work

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in Lacan's understanding of the
unconscious.

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The discourse of desire for
Lacan, the perpetual deferral of

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bringing into consciousness,
into being, into presence,

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the object of desire--
Lacan, too, harkens back to

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Freud as Brooks does,
harkens back to the connection

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made in Freudian thought and
picked up by Jakobson between

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condensation in the dream work
and metaphor in the dream work,

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and displacement in the dream
work and metonymy in the dream

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work--
this is central as well to

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Lacan's argument.

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The deferral of desire,
and for Lacan the impossibility

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of ever realizing one's desire
for a certain kind of

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"other"
that I'm going to be trying to

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identify during the course of
the lecture,

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is understood as metonymy,
just as Brooks understands the

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movement of metonymy as not a
perpetual but as a

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of the end.

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So this, too,
one finds in desire in Lacan.

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Metaphor, on the other hand,
he understands to be what he

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calls at one interesting point
"the quilting"

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of the metonymic chain,
the point de capiton or

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"quilting button"
that suddenly holds together a

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sequence of disparate signifiers
in such a way that a kind of

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substitution of signs,
as opposed to a displacement of

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signs,
can be accomplished.

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We'll come back to this later
on in attempting to understand

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what Lacan has to say about that
line from Victor Hugo's poem,

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"Boaz Asleep,"
the line: "His sheaves

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were not miserly nor
spiteful."

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We'll come back to that.

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In the meantime,
the point of Lacan and what

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makes Lacan's reading of desire
different from Brooks's,

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and indeed what makes his
reading of desire different from

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that of anyone who thinks of
these structuralist issues in

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psychoanalytic terms,
is that Lacan really doesn't

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believe that we can ever have
what we desire.

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He has no doubt that we can
have what we need.

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He makes the fundamental
distinction between having what

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we desire and having what we
need.

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The distinction is often
put--and when you read Slavoj

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Žižek next week--
who makes a much more central

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point of this,
it's often put as the

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distinction between the
"big other"--

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>

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and later on we'll talk about
why it's big--

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the "big other,"
which one can never appropriate

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as an object of desire because
it is perpetually and always

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elusive,
and the "objet petit

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which is not really an object
of desire at all but is

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available to satisfy need.

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Sociobiologically,
you can get what you need.

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Psychoanalytically,
you cannot get what you desire.

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Now the obvious gloss here,
I think, is the Rolling Stones.

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If Lacan were the Rolling
Stones, he'd have slightly

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rewritten the famous refrain by
saying,

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"You can't ever 'git' what
you want,"

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right: "but sometimes if
you try"--

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and you got to try.

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Even for what you need,
you got to--

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>

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right?

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>

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You can't just sit
there--"Sometimes if you

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try you 'git' what you
need."

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I'm sure that Mick Jagger had
many sticky fingers in the pages

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of Lacan in order to be able to
make that important distinction,

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but I think it's one that
perhaps you might want to salt

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away the next time you feel
confused about the distinction

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between desire and need.

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Now obviously,
it'd be great if we could just

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stop there,
but we do have to get a little

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closer to the text and try to
figure out why in these terms

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given to us by Lacan,
terms both structuralist and

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psychoanalytic--
we have to figure out why this

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distinction prevails and what it
amounts to,

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so we soldier on.

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First of all,
let me just say a couple of

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things in passing.

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There is for humanistic studies
more than one Jacques Lacan.

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There is the Lacan for literary
studies who,

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I think, is very well
represented by the text we have

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before us,
even though some of his most

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important ideas are only hinted
at in this text.

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For example,
we hear nothing in this text

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about his famous triadic
distinction among the real,

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the imaginary and the symbolic.

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This is something we can't
really explore with only this

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text before us.

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There is only the slightest
hint at the very end of the

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essay on the last page of the
distinction I have just made

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between the "big
other" and the

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We'll have lots of time to
think about that because it's

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central to the essay of Žižek
that you'll read next week,

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but for literary studies
focusing on the structuralist

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legacy for Lacan,
this is an exemplary selection.

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But there's also the Lacan,
perhaps a more current Lacan--

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one better known,
perhaps, even to some of you in

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film studies:
the Lacan of "the

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gaze," the complicated
dialectic of "the

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gaze" which does very much
involve negotiating the

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distinctions among the real,
the imaginary and the symbolic.

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As I say, this Lacan we're
obliged largely to leave aside

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if only because of the
selectivity of what I've given

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you to read,
but as I say these are Lacans

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with quite different emphases
overlapping only to a certain

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degree.

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Now the other thing I want to
say in passing explains some of

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the rather strange tone of this
essay.

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You notice that Lacan is just
sort of bristling with hostility

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>

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and, of course,
as well, condescension.

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Of all the big egos in our
syllabus, this is by far the

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biggest.

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It's just something we have to
live with and come to terms

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with, but the condescension
isn't just toward the natural

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stupidity of all the rest of us.

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It's toward,
in particular,

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what he takes to be the
distortion of the legacy of

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Freud by most of his
psychoanalytic contemporaries,

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particularly the International
Psychoanalytic Association,

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many members of whom were the
so-called American "ego

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psychologists."

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Now what is an ego psychologist?

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It's somebody who begins as
Lacan does--

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and this is something we'll
want to come back to--

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somebody who begins with
Freud's famous proposition,

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"Wo es war soll ich
sein": "Where it was,

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there I should be."

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In other words,
out of the raw materials of the

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id--
it, es--in the

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unconscious, the ego--
that is to say,

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the capacity of the human
organism to develop into its

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maturity--
should arise.

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In other words,
the relationship between

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instinctual drives and the
proper inhibitions of human or

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adult consciousness should be a
progressive one,

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and the purpose of
psychoanalysis,

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the purpose of bringing people
beyond their entrapment in the

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various infantile stages or
beyond their entrapment in some

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form or another of neurosis,
the idea of progress or

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development in psychoanalysis--
it has to do with the emergence

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and reinforcement of the ego.

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Lacan hates this idea,
and the reason he hates it is

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because that idea of the
emergence of a stable and mature

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ego is presupposed by the idea
that there is such a thing as

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stable human subjectivity:
in other words,

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that there is such a thing as
consciousness from which our

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communicative and linguistic and
other sorts of systems derive.

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Lacan takes a completely
different view of consciousness.

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This, of course,
is something to which we will

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turn in a moment,
but the basic disagreement and

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the source of his most intense
hostility throughout this essay

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concerns the question whether or
not there is for each of us a

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stable and by implication unique
subjectivity.

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We are not each other.

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We suppose ourselves--indeed,
we complain when we think about

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ethics,
about our isolation from each

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other--
we suppose ourselves to be

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altogether
>

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individual whereas for Lacan,
there is a kind of

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continuousness in consciousness,
the reason for which I'll

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explain, which is not absolute.

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In the long run,
in this essay you will find--

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and I hope to be able to
understand this as a kind of

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turn in his argument--
you will find that Lacan does

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actually hold out a limited
sense of individual

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subjectivity,
not really as autonomous

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subjectivity,
not something that can

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authorize a sense of free will
or power of agency,

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but a way in which,
owing simply to the complexity

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of the unconscious,
each of us, as it were,

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inhabits a slightly different
form of that complexity.

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Lacan goes that far in the
direction of the subject,

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or of subjectivity,
but refuses the idea that the

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subject is something that can
emerge from analysis or--

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in the case of,
I suppose, most of us--

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simply through maturation as a
stable,

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coherent, well-organized sense
of self and identity.

15:49.149 --> 15:50.629
All right.

15:50.629 --> 15:54.239
Let's start,
then, with the one piece of

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really solid clinical work that
Lacan ever did.

15:58.769 --> 16:01.709
Lacan's psychoanalytic
philosophy is,

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as he would be the first to
admit and even sort of

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cheerfully to endorse,
largely speculative.

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That is to say,
he works in depth with

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philosophical and literary
materials.

16:15.158 --> 16:19.918
He is not glued to the
analyst's chair.

16:19.918 --> 16:26.898
He is notoriously impatient
with his analysands and is very

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interested in matters of
analysis either in,

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on the one hand,
shortcuts or,

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on the other hand--
championing Freud's late essay,

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"Analysis Terminable or
Interminable"--

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taking the side that analysis
is, just obviously,

16:44.389 --> 16:46.179
such is the complexity of the
thing,

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interminable.

16:47.320 --> 16:53.190
But the one really solid piece
of clinical research that Lacan

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did and that is accepted as part
of the psychoanalytic lore is

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the work that he did in the
1930s on the mirror stage.

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That work actually does
generate the system of ideas

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that Lacan has to offer.

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So what is the mirror stage?

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A baby in the anal phase--that
is to say,

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no longer identifying with the
breast of the mother,

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but aware of a sense of
difference between whatever it

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might be and that otherness
which is out there--

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a baby views itself in the
mirror, and maybe it views

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itself like this [turns towards
board with hands up].

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Right?

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It can only crawl.

17:42.380 --> 17:44.190
It can barely touch its nose.

17:44.190 --> 17:47.710
It can't feed itself,
and the actual nature of its

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body is still fragmented and
disorganized.

17:50.880 --> 17:52.300
It lacks coordination.

17:52.298 --> 17:56.538
In fact, it lacks,
in any ordinary sense of the

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term, "uprightness."

17:59.490 --> 18:02.100
But let's say it's looking at
itself in the mirror like this

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[turns towards board with hands
up],

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and so what it sees is
something like this [gestures

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towards diagram on board].

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In other words,
it sees something which is

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coherent, coordinated,
and really rather handsome.

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"Oh,"
>

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it says, "Wow,
you know, I'm

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>

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okay."

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>

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It acknowledges itself to be,
it recognizes itself to

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be--it's the object of the
mother's desire.

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Right?

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That is the moment in which it
no longer identifies with the

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breast but thinks of itself as
the object of the desire of

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another because it's so pleased
with itself.

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"Somebody's got to desire
me.

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It's probably Mom."

18:45.048 --> 18:47.928
So >

18:47.933 --> 18:52.663
there it is,
and this is the moment of the

18:52.663 --> 18:54.513
mirror stage.

18:54.509 --> 18:57.669
Now what happens after
that--and by the way,

18:57.670 --> 19:00.990
the rather wonderful epigraph
from Leonardo da Vinci which

19:00.993 --> 19:03.273
begins your essay is all about
this--

19:03.269 --> 19:07.539
what happens after that is
rather tragic.

19:07.538 --> 19:12.308
The baby falls into
language,

19:12.308 --> 19:15.588
and in the moment--and I'm
going to come back in a minute

19:15.588 --> 19:19.218
to the whole question of why it
is language that does this--

19:19.220 --> 19:22.860
in the moment at which it falls
into language,

19:22.858 --> 19:29.568
it no longer sees itself as the
ideal I--

19:29.568 --> 19:33.358
"das
Ideal-Ich"

19:33.359 --> 19:36.049
in Freud's language.

19:36.048 --> 19:40.868
It comes into the recognition
that it doesn't even have its

19:40.872 --> 19:43.702
own name, let alone an identity.

19:43.700 --> 19:46.660
It has "the name of the
father,"

19:46.661 --> 19:50.201
but it doesn't have the phallus
of the father,

19:50.200 --> 19:55.270
and it begins to recognize
competition in desire.

19:55.269 --> 20:01.269
It begins to recognize that
what it itself desires is not

20:01.265 --> 20:07.045
accessible in a kind of
mutuality of desire and that it

20:07.046 --> 20:12.866
has no choice but to admire--
while at the same time envying

20:12.868 --> 20:17.678
and indeed forming as an object
of desire because that's what it

20:17.675 --> 20:19.625
lacks--
the father.

20:19.630 --> 20:23.800
That's the sense in which--but
it's the father only in a

20:23.797 --> 20:25.537
phantasmagoric sense.

20:25.538 --> 20:31.588
In Lacan the object of desire
can be just absolutely

20:31.587 --> 20:39.057
anything depending on the
course of the unraveling of the

20:39.059 --> 20:44.159
metonymic sequence that desire
follows;

20:44.160 --> 20:47.920
but this is what Lacan
associates with the Oedipal

20:47.915 --> 20:49.375
phase;
that's why I say,

20:49.383 --> 20:51.193
in passing, "the
father."

20:51.190 --> 20:57.170
It does have something to do
with Lacan's revision of Freud

20:57.173 --> 21:03.263
in saying that the object of
lack that perpetually motivates

21:03.260 --> 21:07.370
desire,
the desire for what one lacks,

21:07.365 --> 21:09.655
is not at all physical.

21:09.660 --> 21:14.560
If you make that mistake,
you're right back in sort of

21:14.555 --> 21:16.675
mindless Freudianism.

21:16.680 --> 21:18.220
You know, it's not the
penis!

21:18.220 --> 21:21.890
It is, on the contrary,
something which is by nature

21:21.886 --> 21:27.056
symbolic,
something which is an ego ideal

21:27.058 --> 21:32.318
but no longer oneself--
that is to say,

21:32.317 --> 21:34.907
no longer what one has
but what,

21:34.910 --> 21:37.570
through the gap opened up by
language,

21:37.568 --> 21:40.158
one recognizes that one
lacks.

21:40.160 --> 21:44.400
So it takes a variety of,
let's just say,

21:44.396 --> 21:46.936
phallogocentric forms.

21:46.940 --> 21:50.710
In film criticism,
some of you may know the essay,

21:50.710 --> 21:54.990
the Lacanian essay of Laura
Mulvey in which the female

21:54.992 --> 21:58.552
object of the spectator's desire
or gaze,

21:58.548 --> 22:04.268
dressed in a sheath dress,
is actually just like the baby,

22:04.269 --> 22:05.739
just like anything else that's
upright,

22:05.740 --> 22:07.500
it is this [points to
the vertical axis on the board].

22:07.500 --> 22:10.760
In other words,
it is, despite being obviously

22:10.759 --> 22:14.669
an incredibly different kind of
thing, nevertheless.

22:14.670 --> 22:18.020
in symbolic terms, the phallus.

22:18.019 --> 22:18.559
All right.

22:18.558 --> 22:23.328
Now the question then is:
why is it that it's

22:23.325 --> 22:26.895
language that does this?

22:26.900 --> 22:31.810
Lacan speaks of the
impossibility of realizing an

22:31.805 --> 22:36.095
object of desire,
because the metonymic structure

22:36.097 --> 22:39.717
of desire follows what he calls
"an asymptotic

22:39.724 --> 22:42.264
course,"
"asymptotic"

22:42.263 --> 22:46.693
meaning the line which curves
toward the line it wants to meet

22:46.688 --> 22:48.718
but never reaches it.

22:48.720 --> 22:53.560
There's a kind of an underlying
punning sense in that word of

22:53.559 --> 22:58.319
the metonymic course of desire
not revealing the symptom.

22:58.318 --> 23:01.758
It's asymptotic in that sense
as well.

23:01.759 --> 23:05.869
The only thing that can reveal
the symptom is those moments of

23:05.871 --> 23:09.371
quilting,
the moments at the point de

23:09.374 --> 23:13.424
capiton when metaphor,
as Lacan says on two different

23:13.416 --> 23:16.986
occasions in the essay,
reveals the symptom.

23:16.990 --> 23:21.850
So this is what happens when
you can't "git"

23:21.849 --> 23:25.519
ever--when you can't ever
"git"

23:25.519 --> 23:27.169
what you want.

23:27.170 --> 23:29.980
But don't worry,
because you can always have

23:29.980 --> 23:32.270
what you need as long as you
try.

23:32.269 --> 23:37.079
So the question is:
why does language do this?

23:37.078 --> 23:43.458
What is it about language that
introduces this problematic

23:43.459 --> 23:45.249
beyond repair?

23:45.250 --> 23:51.200
Lacan begins the essay with a
claim about the Freudian

23:51.195 --> 23:54.335
unconscious,
a claim which he takes,

23:54.336 --> 23:57.376
he says, from The
Interpretation of Dreams

23:57.375 --> 24:00.215
where Freud speaks of the
relationship between

24:00.223 --> 24:03.583
condensation and displacement in
the dream work.

24:03.578 --> 24:07.748
Lacan says, "The
unconscious is structured like a

24:07.750 --> 24:09.090
language."

24:09.088 --> 24:13.488
That's perhaps the single
expression that people take away

24:13.489 --> 24:15.489
from Lacan,
and rightly so,

24:15.492 --> 24:16.912
because it is,
again,

24:16.910 --> 24:21.600
foundational for what we need
to understand if we're to get

24:21.601 --> 24:24.761
along with him:
"the unconscious is

24:24.756 --> 24:27.746
structured like a
language."

24:27.750 --> 24:28.990
Now what does this mean?

24:28.990 --> 24:32.160
He doesn't say,
"The unconscious is

24:32.155 --> 24:34.355
a language,"
by the way,

24:34.358 --> 24:37.288
and he doesn't say that he
means the unconscious is

24:37.290 --> 24:39.930
structured exclusively like
human language.

24:39.930 --> 24:43.850
He means that the unconscious
is structured like a semiotic

24:43.851 --> 24:44.461
system.

24:44.460 --> 24:48.000
In fact, he draws from Freud's
Interpretation of Dreams

24:48.000 --> 24:51.540
the idea that the way the
dream work works and the way

24:51.538 --> 24:54.118
everyday life,
in Freud's sense of the

24:54.115 --> 24:56.235
psychopathology of everyday
life,

24:56.240 --> 24:59.860
works is like a
rebus--in other words,

24:59.858 --> 25:04.018
one of those puzzles in which
you can find an underlying

25:04.018 --> 25:08.478
sentence if you figure out how
to put together drawings,

25:08.480 --> 25:12.220
numbers, and syllables:
in other words,

25:12.220 --> 25:17.230
a sequence of signs taken from
different semiotic systems that

25:17.231 --> 25:20.931
can put themselves together into
a meaning.

25:20.930 --> 25:26.310
That's how Lacan understands
the dream work and the movements

25:26.308 --> 25:28.908
of consciousness to unfold.

25:28.910 --> 25:32.660
The unconscious then is
structured like a language,

25:32.663 --> 25:37.473
which is not the same thing as
to say it is a language.

25:37.470 --> 25:38.960
Okay.

25:38.960 --> 25:40.340
Structured like a language.

25:40.338 --> 25:44.698
This means--and this is where
there is this enormous gulf

25:44.702 --> 25:48.132
between Lacan and most other
practitioners of

25:48.131 --> 25:51.381
psychoanalysis--
the unconscious is not,

25:51.384 --> 25:54.944
in that case,
to be understood as the seat of

25:54.935 --> 25:56.115
the instincts.

25:56.118 --> 25:59.758
It's not to be understood as
something prior,

25:59.759 --> 26:03.089
in other words,
to those forms of derivative

26:03.089 --> 26:06.019
articulation,
those forms of articulation

26:06.020 --> 26:09.400
emerging through maturity that
we're accustomed to call

26:09.404 --> 26:10.914
"language."

26:10.910 --> 26:14.690
If the unconscious is
structured like a language,

26:14.690 --> 26:21.270
then it--the id,
es--itself is precisely

26:21.268 --> 26:27.438
the signifier,
the signifier that emerges as

26:27.436 --> 26:34.136
language: not that it is
foundational to language,

26:34.140 --> 26:37.300
because Lacan's point,
like the point of many other

26:37.297 --> 26:42.817
people in our syllabus,
is not that language expresses

26:42.824 --> 26:43.994
thought.

26:43.990 --> 26:46.990
It's not at all that language
expresses thought,

26:46.990 --> 26:50.560
but that language constitutes
thought,

26:50.558 --> 26:54.018
that language brings thought,
consciousness,

26:54.019 --> 26:57.999
or a sense of things into
being, and that this is

26:57.999 --> 27:00.569
articulated through language.

27:00.568 --> 27:03.668
Now this, of course,
brings us immediately to

27:03.670 --> 27:07.900
certain issues of conflict that
Lacan has not just with other

27:07.897 --> 27:12.757
forms of psychoanalysis but with
a whole philosophical tradition.

27:12.759 --> 27:15.769
If you are a materialist--in
other words,

27:15.769 --> 27:20.439
if you believe that things come
first and consciousness comes

27:20.436 --> 27:24.556
second: that is to say,
if you're a Marxist,

27:24.558 --> 27:28.338
if you believe that
consciousness,

27:28.338 --> 27:30.738
ideology, or call it what you
will,

27:30.740 --> 27:34.880
is determined by existing
material circumstances--

27:34.880 --> 27:38.390
as one says--you can't very
well think that existing

27:38.388 --> 27:41.828
material circumstances are
produced by language.

27:41.829 --> 27:42.579
Whoa.

27:42.578 --> 27:45.488
If by the same token you're a
positivist,

27:45.490 --> 27:50.530
if you believe that the meaning
of things is something that is

27:50.532 --> 27:54.522
expressed by language,
something that language is

27:54.519 --> 27:58.509
brought into being to express:
then also you are giving

27:58.509 --> 28:01.549
priority to things,
to that which is behind

28:01.545 --> 28:04.385
language, to that which gives
rise to language--

28:04.390 --> 28:06.320
rather than,
as Lacan does,

28:06.316 --> 28:08.536
giving priority to language.

28:08.538 --> 28:12.608
He actually attacks both the
Marxist tradition and the

28:12.605 --> 28:16.745
positivist tradition at various
points in your text.

28:16.750 --> 28:21.970
The sideways blow at Marxism is
on page 1130,

28:21.971 --> 28:24.821
the right-hand column.

28:24.818 --> 28:29.048
The sideways blow at positivism
is on page 1132,

28:29.048 --> 28:31.208
the right-hand column.

28:31.210 --> 28:37.110
I don't want to pause to quote
them but you can go to them in

28:37.108 --> 28:38.288
your text.

28:38.288 --> 28:42.328
So what is it,
id, or es?

28:42.328 --> 28:49.068
What is that which is normally
called "the instinctual

28:49.068 --> 28:54.178
drives,"
the id, the unmediated wish for

28:54.182 --> 28:55.812
something?

28:55.808 --> 29:00.368
Well, Lacan says it is nothing
other than the signifier.

29:00.368 --> 29:04.168
He says, "What do I mean
by literalism?

29:04.170 --> 29:08.330
How else can I mean it except
literally?

29:08.329 --> 29:10.069
It is the letter."

29:10.068 --> 29:13.978
That is to say,
consciousness begins with the

29:13.980 --> 29:14.780
letter.

29:14.778 --> 29:20.288
Remember Levi-Strauss saying in
the text quoted by Derrida that

29:20.285 --> 29:25.875
language doesn't come into being
just a little bit at a time.

29:25.880 --> 29:29.060
One day there is no language,
and the next day there is

29:29.060 --> 29:32.790
language: which is to say,
suddenly there is a way of

29:32.786 --> 29:36.936
conferring meaning on things,
and that way of conferring

29:36.936 --> 29:39.286
meaning on things is
differential.

29:39.288 --> 29:42.128
That is to say,
it introduces the arbitrary

29:42.127 --> 29:45.777
nature of the sign and the
differential relations among

29:45.778 --> 29:49.358
signs which are featured in the
work of Saussure.

29:49.359 --> 29:52.049
So it is for Lacan.

29:52.048 --> 29:58.888
The letter is not that which is
brought into being to express

29:58.890 --> 30:02.550
things,
not that which is brought into

30:02.551 --> 30:07.681
being in the service of the ego
to discipline and civilize the

30:07.681 --> 30:10.731
id,
but rather is "it"

30:10.727 --> 30:11.427
itself.

30:11.430 --> 30:13.490
That is to say,
it is the beginning.

30:13.490 --> 30:15.390
"In the beginning was the
word."

30:15.390 --> 30:19.390
In the beginning was the
letter, which disseminates

30:19.394 --> 30:23.884
consciousness through the
signifying system that it makes

30:23.877 --> 30:24.997
available.

30:25.000 --> 30:29.650
Now actually I'm hoping that in
saying these things you find me

30:29.650 --> 30:32.950
merely and rather dully
repeating myself,

30:32.950 --> 30:35.340
saying things that I've said
before,

30:35.338 --> 30:39.288
because it seems to me that
this is the part of Lacan which

30:39.287 --> 30:43.097
is accessible and which is
central to the sorts of things

30:43.097 --> 30:47.377
that we've been talking about,
which I rather imagine you must

30:47.377 --> 30:49.397
be getting used to by this time.

30:49.400 --> 30:55.500
Lacan shares a structuralist
understanding of how the

30:55.503 --> 30:58.443
unconscious discourses.

30:58.440 --> 31:02.350
He accepts Jakobson's
distinction between metaphor and

31:02.354 --> 31:05.834
metonymy and he sees the
cooperative building-up

31:05.825 --> 31:10.255
relationship of metaphor and
metonymy in the discourse of the

31:10.256 --> 31:14.236
unconscious and of the
psychopathology of everyday life

31:14.243 --> 31:17.793
in much the same way that
Jakobson does.

31:17.788 --> 31:21.898
Remember Jakobson associates
metaphor and metonymy not just

31:21.904 --> 31:25.544
with poetry and prose,
not just with certain kinds of

31:25.535 --> 31:28.095
style,
but actually with pathologies.

31:28.098 --> 31:32.418
In its extreme forms,
metaphor and metonymy as

31:32.421 --> 31:37.891
manifest in linguistic practice
take the form of aphasias,

31:37.894 --> 31:41.304
as Lacan points out;
and so Jakobson,

31:41.300 --> 31:44.880
too, is concerned with
something sort of built-in,

31:44.880 --> 31:50.040
hard-wired in the way in which
language works in and as the

31:50.039 --> 31:53.539
unconscious that,
in its extreme forms,

31:53.537 --> 31:58.277
is aphasic and always expresses
itself in tendencies either

31:58.280 --> 32:00.490
metonymic or metaphoric.

32:00.490 --> 32:04.870
Now, of course,
he also draws on Saussure but--

32:04.868 --> 32:07.688
as your editor rightly points
out in a footnote--

32:07.690 --> 32:14.580
the way in which he reads
Saussure [draws on chalkboard],

32:14.578 --> 32:18.098
the signifier,
the big signifier over

32:18.102 --> 32:20.292
the little,
rather insignificant

32:20.288 --> 32:23.388
signified--because after all,
what does the signified matter?

32:23.390 --> 32:28.760
You can never cross the
bar--right?--to get to it.

32:28.759 --> 32:30.139
You are barred from it.

32:30.140 --> 32:35.390
The signified is that from
which you are forever excluded,

32:35.390 --> 32:40.640
and we'll go into Lacan's
examples of this in a minute.

32:40.640 --> 32:45.210
This is actually quite
different from Saussure's [draws

32:45.210 --> 32:48.430
on chalkboard]
"signified over the

32:48.426 --> 32:52.396
signifier,"
anchored by a kind of mutuality

32:52.404 --> 32:57.234
whereby it's never a question
what generates what,

32:57.230 --> 33:02.560
but rather a question which has
in common,

33:02.558 --> 33:07.058
I think, with Lacan's so-called
algorithm only in fact

33:07.063 --> 33:10.103
the bar itself;
the fact that the relationship

33:10.102 --> 33:14.262
between signifier and signified,
or signified and signifier,

33:14.262 --> 33:19.072
is an arbitrary one that can't
be crossed by evoking anything

33:19.069 --> 33:23.719
natural in the nature of the
signified that calls forth the

33:23.718 --> 33:24.918
signifier.

33:24.920 --> 33:28.850
There they agree,
but as to what produces what:

33:28.848 --> 33:33.888
Saussure is agnostic about it
and Lacan insists that the big

33:33.887 --> 33:38.327
S is that which generates
the signified--

33:38.328 --> 33:43.838
that from which any possibility
of grasping a signified arises

33:43.844 --> 33:45.114
and derives.

33:45.108 --> 33:51.028
So Lacan's algorithm is,
in fact, rather different from

33:51.028 --> 33:53.328
Saussure's diagram.

33:53.329 --> 33:54.739
Okay.

33:54.740 --> 33:57.280
Let's exemplify this by going
back to what I said about the

33:57.284 --> 33:59.834
red light [gestures to the board
repeatedly throughout this

33:59.827 --> 34:01.597
paragraph]--
right?--because here,

34:01.597 --> 34:03.427
too, I think we'll have
continuity.

34:03.430 --> 34:09.300
The red light over a door is a
signifier which has a great deal

34:09.302 --> 34:11.862
to do with desire,
right?

34:11.860 --> 34:14.340
This we take for granted.

34:14.340 --> 34:17.660
The red light in other contexts
has nothing to do with desire,

34:17.659 --> 34:20.989
but the signifier,
"red light over a

34:20.994 --> 34:25.524
door," suggests desire--
but desire for what?

34:25.518 --> 34:28.398
Well, we think we know
"desire for what,"

34:28.398 --> 34:30.008
but look at the signifier.

34:30.010 --> 34:32.970
"Desire for the
door," right?

34:32.969 --> 34:37.069
What is the relationship
between the signifier and what

34:37.065 --> 34:39.565
would seem to be the signified?

34:39.570 --> 34:41.950
That's not what you desire.

34:41.949 --> 34:44.629
You don't desire the door,
and it's the same with

34:44.628 --> 34:46.468
hommes et femmes,
right?

34:46.469 --> 34:49.289
What is this hommes et
femmes?

34:49.289 --> 34:50.089
Well, okay.

34:50.090 --> 34:52.410
The little girl says,
"We've arrived at

34:52.411 --> 34:54.791
Gentlemen,"
and the little boy says,

34:54.789 --> 34:56.279
"We've arrived at
Ladies."

34:56.280 --> 34:58.010
Well, that seems to be quite
healthy, right?

34:58.010 --> 35:02.570
We're on our way to something
like hetero-normative

35:02.568 --> 35:04.938
desire--great,
terrific.

35:04.940 --> 35:06.010
But wait a minute.

35:06.010 --> 35:09.610
This hommes here:
what is hommes?

35:09.610 --> 35:13.370
What does that have to do with
the price of--the only thing you

35:13.373 --> 35:17.263
can do even behind this door is
restore your personal comfort.

35:17.260 --> 35:19.960
It has nothing to do with
hommes,

35:19.960 --> 35:22.870
right, or anything else for
that matter.

35:22.869 --> 35:27.479
If the visible signified is in
question, well,

35:27.476 --> 35:32.796
in what sense can we call this
door hommes?

35:32.800 --> 35:33.500
Right?

35:33.500 --> 35:35.790
It's the same with
femmes.

35:35.789 --> 35:39.969
There is, in any case,
in Lacan's anecdote the

35:39.967 --> 35:44.237
wonderful existence of the
railroad tracks,

35:44.239 --> 35:47.049
which for him constitutes the
bar: that is to say,

35:47.050 --> 35:49.920
that owing to the nature of
language,

35:49.920 --> 35:54.170
owing to the arbitrary relation
of the signifier to the

35:54.166 --> 35:56.666
signified,
the little boy and little

35:56.670 --> 35:59.400
girl--who are wonderful
characters right out of

35:59.398 --> 36:03.088
Nabokov's Ada--
I don't know if any of you know

36:03.092 --> 36:05.722
that novel,
but the little boy is sort of a

36:05.715 --> 36:07.445
little genius,
obviously Lacan,

36:07.454 --> 36:09.784
but his sister is even smarter
than he is.

36:09.780 --> 36:12.910
"Idiot," she says,
just like a character in

36:12.911 --> 36:17.511
Nabokov, but both this little
boy and little girl are barred

36:17.512 --> 36:21.502
from desire--
from their desire--because they

36:21.500 --> 36:26.800
are already putting up with a
substitute precisely insofar as

36:26.804 --> 36:31.144
they seem to be on track toward
something like the

36:31.137 --> 36:34.937
hetero-normative expression of
desire.

36:34.940 --> 36:37.040
It's not an expression of
desire at all.

36:37.039 --> 36:40.319
It's an expression of need
because they are not able to

36:40.315 --> 36:42.855
bring into being,
consciousness,

36:42.862 --> 36:48.292
or before themselves the object
of desire indicated by the

36:48.291 --> 36:49.531
signifier.

36:49.530 --> 36:54.390
The signifier is always
displaced from the object of

36:54.393 --> 36:58.783
desire in precisely the ways
that are borne out

36:58.780 --> 37:02.500
diagrammatically in these
formulas.

37:02.500 --> 37:03.620
All right.

37:03.619 --> 37:08.029
So what then is desire?

37:08.030 --> 37:13.320
Well, perhaps we've covered it:
it is the endless deferral of

37:13.320 --> 37:18.440
that which cannot be signified
in the metonymic movement of

37:18.436 --> 37:20.896
discourse,
of dreaming,

37:20.898 --> 37:25.638
or of the way in which the
unconscious functions.

37:25.639 --> 37:29.709
Lacan is very ingenious in,
I think,

37:29.710 --> 37:32.640
convincingly showing us how it
is that we get from one

37:32.639 --> 37:34.849
signifier to another:
in other words,

37:34.849 --> 37:38.289
how what he calls the chain of
the signifier works.

37:38.289 --> 37:41.489
You have a series of concentric
rings [gestures to the board],

37:41.489 --> 37:45.779
but each concentric ring is
made up of a lot of little

37:45.780 --> 37:50.240
concentric rings which hook on
to associated surrounding

37:50.235 --> 37:53.955
signifiers in ways that could be
variable.

37:53.960 --> 37:57.100
This, I think,
very nicely re-diagrams

37:57.099 --> 38:01.429
Saussure's sense of the
associative structure of the

38:01.429 --> 38:04.399
vertical axis:
that is to say,

38:04.400 --> 38:07.430
of the synchronic moment of
language,

38:07.429 --> 38:10.939
the way in which some
signifiers naturally cluster

38:10.938 --> 38:14.388
with other signifiers,
and not just with one group of

38:14.391 --> 38:17.161
signifiers but a variety of
groups of signifiers.

38:17.159 --> 38:21.269
But they don't at all naturally
cluster with just any or all

38:21.273 --> 38:24.193
signifiers,
so that you get associative

38:24.190 --> 38:26.780
clusters in the axis of
selection,

38:26.780 --> 38:29.740
and they are indicated by this
[gestures to board].

38:29.739 --> 38:32.799
As the chain of signifiers
unfolds,

38:32.800 --> 38:38.690
the one or another of these
possible associations links on--

38:38.690 --> 38:43.850
and remember all of these
signifiers are made up,

38:43.849 --> 38:47.729
in turn, of a chain of
concentric circles.

38:47.730 --> 38:52.440
So I think this is a rather
good way of understanding the

38:52.440 --> 38:54.460
unfolding of metonymy.

38:54.460 --> 38:57.300
Now every once in a while you
get metaphor--

38:57.300 --> 39:02.060
whoa!--and it's a moment to be
celebrated in Lacan because

39:02.061 --> 39:04.621
it's,
as he says, "poetic"

39:04.619 --> 39:07.239
and it is also,
as he says, in a number of

39:07.244 --> 39:10.064
places the manifestation,
the only possible

39:10.063 --> 39:12.263
manifestation,
of the symptom.

39:12.260 --> 39:13.270
What is the symptom?

39:13.268 --> 39:19.958
It is the awareness of the lack
of an object of desire expressed

39:19.956 --> 39:23.566
in a displaced manner--
that is to say,

39:23.572 --> 39:25.952
expressed in a manner which is
not,

39:25.949 --> 39:31.189
however, completely obfuscatory
of the lack of the object of

39:31.190 --> 39:33.860
desire,
just sort of caught up in my

39:33.862 --> 39:37.322
endless babbling;
but rather is that moment of

39:37.324 --> 39:42.044
pause in which there is a
gathering together of signifiers

39:42.038 --> 39:44.398
and,
ultimately, a substitution of

39:44.398 --> 39:47.678
one signifier for another in
such a way that one says,

39:47.679 --> 39:48.639
"Aha.

39:48.643 --> 39:49.513
I see it.

39:49.510 --> 39:52.690
I can't grasp it,
I can't have it,

39:52.690 --> 39:54.330
but I see it.

39:54.329 --> 39:56.319
I see the object of desire.

39:56.320 --> 39:59.750
I see what has been displaced
by the very act of

39:59.753 --> 40:01.363
signification."

40:01.360 --> 40:03.750
That's what he calls
"metaphor,"

40:03.748 --> 40:06.898
and he sees metaphor as
appearing at these points de

40:06.896 --> 40:07.826
capiton.

40:07.829 --> 40:09.319
Think of this as a quilt.

40:09.320 --> 40:19.180
You know what I'm talking
about: quilting knots,

40:19.182 --> 40:24.222
pins--no, not needles.

40:24.219 --> 40:26.839
That's what you make a quilt
with.

40:26.840 --> 40:29.680
* Those little
buttons, quilting buttons,

40:29.675 --> 40:30.075
right?

40:30.079 --> 40:31.469
That's what a quilt is like.

40:31.469 --> 40:35.849
It's filled with something and
then the stuffing is held in

40:35.853 --> 40:37.293
place by buttons.

40:37.289 --> 40:37.739
Right?

40:37.739 --> 40:42.359
So the stuffing of metonymic
signification is held in place

40:42.358 --> 40:45.408
usefully for the analyst,
for the reader,

40:45.411 --> 40:48.201
and for the interpreter by
these quilting buttons or

40:48.204 --> 40:49.744
points de capiton.

40:49.739 --> 40:55.069
So the example that Lacan gives
is--as I say,

40:55.074 --> 40:58.474
he gives several examples.

40:58.469 --> 41:01.649
There are wonderful,
dazzling readings,

41:06.076 --> 41:08.246
line from Victor Hugo.

41:08.250 --> 41:11.310
I focus on the Hugo because
it's a little easier,

41:11.306 --> 41:12.576
just the one line.

41:12.579 --> 41:16.209
He says, "There is
something that happens in this

41:16.210 --> 41:20.390
line which is metaphoric,"
and I'm delighted that he uses

41:20.387 --> 41:22.577
the word "sparks."

41:22.579 --> 41:24.509
In other words,
the metaphoric,

41:24.514 --> 41:27.294
the presence of the metaphor,
is a spark.

41:27.289 --> 41:30.649
Remember I was talking about,
in Wolfgang Iser,

41:30.650 --> 41:33.970
the need to gap a sparkplug:
in other words,

41:33.969 --> 41:37.219
the need to have a certain
distance between two points in

41:37.215 --> 41:39.065
order for the spark to happen.

41:39.070 --> 41:40.660
If it's too close,
it doesn't happen;

41:40.659 --> 41:41.969
you just short out.

41:41.969 --> 41:44.779
If it's too distant,
it doesn't happen because the

41:44.782 --> 41:46.162
distance is too great.

41:46.159 --> 41:49.709
So the spark that Lacan is
talking about is the

41:49.706 --> 41:52.796
relationship--
"his sheaves were neither

41:52.795 --> 41:59.475
miserly nor spiteful"--
between Boaz and his sheaves;

41:59.480 --> 42:01.780
because the sheaves themselves
which give of themselves--

42:01.780 --> 42:07.220
just as certain other things we
could mention give of

42:07.224 --> 42:11.004
themselves--
the sheaves themselves which

42:10.998 --> 42:14.758
give of themselves,
and certainly are not miserly

42:14.755 --> 42:17.635
or spiteful for that reason--
they're generous,

42:17.635 --> 42:18.835
they're open,
they give,

42:18.840 --> 42:23.340
they feed us,
etc., etc., etc.--are supposed,

42:23.340 --> 42:27.290
in metonymy,
to indicate that Boaz is like

42:27.293 --> 42:27.973
that.

42:27.969 --> 42:31.269
Look at the munificence of
Boaz's crop.

42:31.268 --> 42:35.928
It's neither miserly nor
spiteful, but as Lacan points

42:35.934 --> 42:37.764
out,
the miserliness and

42:37.762 --> 42:41.402
spitefulness comes back in an
unfortunate way precisely in

42:41.400 --> 42:44.720
that word "his":
>

42:44.719 --> 42:49.969
because if he is a possessor of
the sheaf,

42:49.969 --> 42:57.159
he is--this involves the whole,
as it were,

42:57.159 --> 43:01.419
structure of capitalist or
Darwinian competition and

43:01.418 --> 43:04.888
involves,
at least in an underlying way,

43:04.885 --> 43:08.405
all the elements of thrift,
if you will,

43:08.414 --> 43:12.474
and competitive envy or spite,
if you will,

43:12.467 --> 43:16.707
that seem to have been banished
from the sentence.

43:16.710 --> 43:20.770
In other words,
metaphorically speaking,

43:20.768 --> 43:23.888
Boaz returns in his absence.

43:23.889 --> 43:26.119
He substitutes.

43:26.119 --> 43:30.829
He is substituted for by the
expression "his

43:30.829 --> 43:32.399
sheaves."

43:32.400 --> 43:37.310
The possessive means that he is
not the things that he's said to

43:37.311 --> 43:39.631
be,
metonymically speaking,

43:39.634 --> 43:44.234
and the sheaves themselves are
precisely what he is in the

43:44.228 --> 43:46.968
Oedipal phase:
that is to say,

43:46.969 --> 43:52.799
precisely what he is if he is
objectified by a baby looking at

43:52.795 --> 43:55.705
him;
but at the same time,

43:55.710 --> 44:01.060
not at all what or where we
expected him to be.

44:01.059 --> 44:05.199
In other words,
the point de capiton of

44:05.201 --> 44:07.501
the sentence,
of the line,

44:07.501 --> 44:13.211
is the substitution of Boaz for
his sheaves and his sheaves for

44:13.206 --> 44:14.216
Boaz.

44:14.219 --> 44:18.629
So the line has both a
metonymic reading and a

44:18.630 --> 44:20.690
metaphoric reading.

44:20.690 --> 44:24.340
Here I think you can see
Lacan's sense of the relation

44:24.335 --> 44:27.905
between metaphor or metonymy
hovering between that of

44:27.911 --> 44:30.871
Jakobson or Brooks and that of
de Man,

44:30.869 --> 44:36.679
because there seems to be an
underlying irreducible tension

44:36.681 --> 44:42.191
between reading the line as
though it says that Boaz was

44:42.193 --> 44:47.583
generous and free of spite,
and reading the line as though

44:47.579 --> 44:50.269
it said that Boaz just
necessarily--

44:50.268 --> 44:52.948
because he's one who possesses
something--

44:52.949 --> 44:57.769
is a person who has the
characteristics of miserliness

44:57.771 --> 44:59.501
and spitefulness.

44:59.500 --> 45:01.370
The tension,
in other words,

45:01.367 --> 45:05.307
seems to me to be in Lacan an
irreducible one so that,

45:05.309 --> 45:09.619
at least in that regard,
we can place him closer to de

45:09.619 --> 45:13.769
Man than we have to,
say, Brooks or Jakobson;

45:13.768 --> 45:18.128
which isn't to say that
Jakobson is not the primary and

45:18.130 --> 45:23.060
central influence on Lacan's way
of thinking about the axis of

45:23.056 --> 45:24.346
combination.

45:24.349 --> 45:29.699
The appearance of metaphor on
the axis of combination,

45:29.699 --> 45:33.539
the way in which we can
identify these quilting buttons

45:33.536 --> 45:38.036
on the axis of combination,
is nothing other than what

45:38.038 --> 45:43.778
Jakobson said and meant when he
said that the poetic function is

45:43.775 --> 45:48.505
the transference of the
principle of equivalence from

45:48.512 --> 45:52.892
the axis of selection to the
axis of combination,

45:52.885 --> 45:54.065
right?

45:54.070 --> 45:57.470
I'm not saying--in speaking in
passing of the sort of

45:57.471 --> 46:01.391
irreducible conflict one senses
between metonymy and metaphor

46:01.394 --> 46:04.744
here--
I'm not saying that Jakobson is

46:04.737 --> 46:10.457
not the primary influence behind
Lacan's thinking in this regard.

46:10.460 --> 46:11.370
All right.

46:11.365 --> 46:14.715
Now Lacan says language is a
rebus,

46:14.719 --> 46:17.849
as I've said,
and he says the movement of the

46:17.846 --> 46:20.506
signifier,
which is the movement of

46:20.510 --> 46:23.340
desire, is the articulation of a
lack.

46:23.340 --> 46:26.910
That is to say,
it is in the impossibility,

46:26.909 --> 46:32.779
as certain kinds of language
philosophers would say,

46:32.780 --> 46:38.150
of making the signifier hook on
to the signified or,

46:38.150 --> 46:40.870
as we might say,
hook up with the signified--

46:40.869 --> 46:45.459
in the impossibility of doing
that is precisely the

46:45.460 --> 46:49.960
impossibility of realizing an
object of desire.

46:49.960 --> 46:55.200
So all of this should I hope
now be clear.

46:55.199 --> 46:59.549
So some of the consequences are
that language--

46:59.550 --> 47:02.720
the most obvious consequence
is, and this isn't the first

47:02.717 --> 47:06.227
time or last time that we will
have encountered this in various

47:06.226 --> 47:10.486
vocabularies and contexts--
that "language thinks

47:10.492 --> 47:11.462
me."

47:11.460 --> 47:14.240
On page 1142,
the right-hand column,

47:14.237 --> 47:17.487
for example:
"I think where I am not,

47:17.489 --> 47:21.139
therefore I am where I do not
think."

47:21.139 --> 47:25.439
That is to say,
that which brings my thinking

47:25.443 --> 47:28.773
into being is not present to me.

47:28.769 --> 47:29.579
It is it.

47:29.579 --> 47:31.719
It is the letter.

47:31.719 --> 47:40.089
It is the signified which
perpetually evades us and which

47:40.088 --> 47:45.318
cannot possibly be present to
us.

47:45.320 --> 47:47.190
I am not present to myself.

47:47.190 --> 47:52.020
I cannot be present to myself
because what is present is the

47:52.021 --> 47:57.101
way in which my self comes into
being in discourse which cannot

47:57.099 --> 47:58.409
identify me.

47:58.409 --> 48:02.999
It cannot identify me either as
subject,

48:03.000 --> 48:08.230
or, in a phase of narcissism,
supposing I can somehow or

48:08.230 --> 48:12.890
another re-imagine myself in the
mirror phase,

48:12.889 --> 48:16.249
as an object of desire.

48:16.250 --> 48:17.340
All right.

48:17.335 --> 48:23.195
So I actually think that
without quite having meant to,

48:23.201 --> 48:29.391
I have pretty much exhausted
what I have to say in outline

48:29.393 --> 48:31.243
about Lacan.

48:31.239 --> 48:35.349
I haven't said nearly enough
about the relationship between

48:35.353 --> 48:39.393
desire and need as it plots
itself in our actual lives and

48:39.394 --> 48:42.664
in fiction,
because the extraordinary thing

48:42.655 --> 48:46.555
about it is it's not just a
slogan from the Rolling Stones

48:46.563 --> 48:47.733
or from Lacan.

48:47.730 --> 48:52.640
As we think about it,
it's not that we're not happy

48:52.643 --> 48:57.563
with our relationship with the
things that we need:

48:57.556 --> 49:01.366
obviously we are,
but the extraordinary thing

49:01.373 --> 49:04.133
about it is that we recognize in
our lives,

49:04.130 --> 49:08.350
in the magical world of
film--that is to say,

49:08.349 --> 49:12.309
the world of illusion
deliberately promoted by film

49:12.313 --> 49:16.193
and in fiction--
we recognize the absolutely

49:16.188 --> 49:19.998
central significance of this
distinction.

49:20.000 --> 49:24.510
That's what's so wonderful and
amazing about the essay by

49:24.507 --> 49:29.257
Žižek you'll be reading for
next week called "Courtly

49:29.255 --> 49:33.275
Love," which I love and
which headlines,

49:33.280 --> 49:37.970
which features readings of a
series of films in which the

49:37.965 --> 49:43.235
Lacanian distinction between the
impossibility ever of achieving

49:43.239 --> 49:46.879
the Big Other--
by the way, there are times in

49:46.880 --> 49:51.120
various kinds of fictional plots
in which you can actually have

49:51.119 --> 49:54.679
the object of desire,
but what always happens in

49:54.684 --> 49:57.684
plots like that is that the
unconscious,

49:57.679 --> 50:01.289
the psyche, finds ways of
rejecting it.

50:01.289 --> 50:03.899
I can't have that--it's my
brother;

50:03.900 --> 50:09.340
or I can't have that--it is in
one form or another forbidden.

50:09.340 --> 50:11.820
In other words,
in actuality,

50:11.818 --> 50:17.308
in the way in which the psyche
works according to the structure

50:17.309 --> 50:21.559
of the films Žižek undertakes
to analyze--

50:21.559 --> 50:24.479
and he's so profuse in examples
that he really does leave us

50:24.476 --> 50:27.196
feeling that there's a kind of
universality in what he's

50:27.195 --> 50:30.375
saying--
yeah, there are all kinds of

50:30.378 --> 50:36.018
object choices that can happen
and do happen and may even seem

50:36.018 --> 50:39.918
satisfactory,
but those are all objects,

50:44.771 --> 50:50.401
that which is the true object
of desire, is something that

50:50.396 --> 50:54.046
will perpetually evade
possession.

50:54.050 --> 50:54.680
Okay.

50:54.679 --> 50:57.759
So next time we're actually
talking about the anxiety of

50:57.757 --> 51:01.317
influence in Harold Bloom,
and then in the ensuing lecture

51:01.320 --> 51:04.890
we'll return in a way to Lacan
when we take up Deleuze,

51:04.889 --> 51:07.679
Guattari and Slavoj Žižek.

51:07.679 --> 51:08.999
Thank you.

51:09.000 --> 51:14.000