WEBVTT

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Prof: So anyway,
to get launched on today's

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topic, obviously we confront one
of the more formidable figures

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on our syllabus,
a person who recently passed

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away and who in his last years
and into the present has had a

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kind of second life as a person
who in his later work didn't at

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all repudiate his earlier
thoughts or indeed his earlier

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style,
but nevertheless did begin to

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apply central aspects of his
thinking to ethical and

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political issues.

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He and a number of other
writers like,

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for example,
the Italian philosopher Giorgio

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Agamben,
are the figures whom we

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identify with what's called
"the ethical turn"

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in thinking about texts,
literature and other matters

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that is very much of the current
moment.

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Hence Derrida's reputation and
the tendency of people

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interested in theory to read him
is alive and well today,

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but the materials that we are
reading for this sequence of

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lectures date back much earlier.

01:24.209 --> 01:29.299
The essay that you read in its
entirety for today,

01:29.299 --> 01:32.789
"Structure,
Sign and Play in the Language

01:32.792 --> 01:37.222
of the Human Sciences,"
was delivered on the occasion

01:37.215 --> 01:41.245
of a conference about "the
sciences of man"

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at Johns Hopkins University in
1966.

01:44.510 --> 01:49.320
It was an event that was really
meant to be a kind of coronation

01:49.316 --> 01:53.376
of Claude Levi-Strauss,
whose work had burst upon the

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American scene only a few years
earlier.

01:56.330 --> 01:58.000
Levi-Strauss was there.

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He gave a talk,
he was in the audience,

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and Derrida's essay was widely
taken--

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far from being a coronation of
Levi-Strauss--

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as a kind of dethroning of
Levi-Strauss.

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I have to tell you that
Levi-Strauss,

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who is still alive,
a very old man,

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expresses great bitterness in
his old age about what he takes

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to be the displacement of the
importance of his own work by

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what happened subsequently.

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What happened subsequently can,
I think, be traced to Derrida's

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lecture.

02:33.690 --> 02:37.040
One of the million
complications of thinking about

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this lecture and about Derrida's
work in general--

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and, for that matter,
about deconstruction--

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is indeed to what extent it
really is a significant

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departure from the work of
structuralism.

02:52.900 --> 02:57.370
There is a self-consciousness
in the thinking about structure

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that we find in many places in
Levi-Strauss that Derrida freely

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acknowledges in his essay.

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Again and again and again he
quotes Levi-Strauss in

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confirmation of his own
arguments,

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only then in a way to turn on
him by pointing out that there

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is something even in what he's
saying there that he hasn't

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quite thought through.

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So it is not anything like,
even as one reads it in

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retrospect, a wholesale
repudiation or even really a

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very devastating critique of
Levi-Strauss.

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Derrida, I think,
freely acknowledges in this

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essay the degree to which he is
standing on Levi-Strauss's

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shoulders.

03:42.348 --> 03:46.488
In any case,
this extraordinary event in the

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imaginations of people thinking
about theory in the West did,

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however, tend to bring about a
sense of almost overnight

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revolution from the
preoccupation we had in the

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mid-sixties with structuralism
to the subsequent preoccupation

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we had throughout the seventies
and into the early eighties with

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deconstruction.

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Derrida was,
of course, a central figure in

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this.

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He was here at Yale as a
visitor in the spring for many

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years.

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He influenced a great many
people whose work is still

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current throughout the United
States and elsewhere.

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He--after that--had a
comparable arrangement with the

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University of California at
Irvine and his influence there

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continued,
a key figure whom many of us

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remember from his period at Yale
as a galvanizing presence.

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The idea that there was what
was called by one critic a

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"hermeneutical mafia"
at Yale arose largely from the

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presence of Derrida together
with our own Paul de Man and,

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more loosely connected with
them, Geoffrey Hartman and

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Harold Bloom--
and also a scholar named J.

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Hillis Miller,
whose departure for the

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University of California,
Irvine resulted also in

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Derrida's decision to go there
and be with Miller rather than

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to continue to stay here.

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That was the so-called Yale
school.

05:31.660 --> 05:37.660
It generated extraordinary
influence in some circles but,

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well beyond its influence,
an atmosphere of hostility

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which had in many ways to do,
I think, with what might still

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be called "the crisis in
the humanities"

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as it is widely understood by
state legislators and boards of

05:56.814 --> 06:01.474
trustees as somehow or another
something needing to be

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overcome,
backed away from,

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and forgotten
>

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in the development of the
humanities in academia.

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The reasons for this we can
only imply,

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I think, probably,
in the context of a course of

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this nature,
but are nevertheless

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fascinating and will recur as we
think not just about

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deconstruction itself but about
the sorts of thinking that it

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has influenced.

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Now you have now read some
Derrida.

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You've read all of one essay
and you've read part of another,

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difficult.

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Indeed, in addition to finding
him very difficult you've

06:44.004 --> 06:45.984
probably said,
"Why does he have to write

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like that?"

06:46.860 --> 06:47.890
In other words,
"Yeah, okay.

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He's difficult,
but isn't he making it more

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difficult than it needs to
be?"

06:52.629 --> 06:53.649
you say to yourself.

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"I've never seen prose
like this,"

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you say.

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"This is ridiculous.

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Why doesn't he just say one
thing at a time?"

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you might also want to say.

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Well, of course it's all
deliberate on his part,

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and the idea is that
deconstruction is,

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as a thought process,
precisely a kind of evasive

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dance whereby one doesn't settle
for distinct positions,

07:20.740 --> 07:26.020
for any sort of idea that can
be understood as governed--

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this is what "Structure,
Sign and Play"

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is all about--
as governed by a blanket term,

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what Derrida often calls a
"transcendental

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signified."

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We'll have much more to say
about this.

07:38.319 --> 07:42.499
Derrida's prose style--its kind
of a crab-like,

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sideways movement around an
argument--

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is meant as rigorously as it
can to avoid seeming to derive

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itself from some definite
concept,

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because, of course,
deconstruction is precisely the

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deconstruction of the grounds
whereby we suppose our thinking

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can be derived from one or
another definite concept.

08:10.338 --> 08:13.718
Also--this is to be kept in
mind, and this is of course one

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of the key distinctions between
Derrida and de Man--

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we'll have more to say about
distinctions between them on

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Tuesday: Derrida is not a
literary theorist.

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Though he sometimes does talk
about texts that we call

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"literary,"
indeed he very often does,

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nevertheless Derrida's position
and the logic of that position

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suggest that we can't really
reliably discriminate among

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genres.

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In other words,
we can't use genre

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either as a blanket term;
and therefore he is one of the

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people--
one of the most influential

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people in persuading us that
there's no such thing as

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literature,
legal texts,

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theological texts,
philosophical texts,

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or scientific texts.

08:58.139 --> 09:02.199
There is discourse,
and to think about the field of

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texts is to think about
something which is full of

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difference.

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>

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Needless to say,
it's the central word in

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Derrida,
which is nevertheless not

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classifiable or categorizable,
and so for that reason we can't

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really say Derrida is
specifically a literary

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theorist.

09:24.970 --> 09:30.220
Now I've been talking so far
about difficulty and confusion,

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but in view of the fact that
we're all in a state of tension

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about this--
I'm in a state of tension about

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it too--
let me remind us that we've

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already been doing
deconstruction and that much of

09:45.437 --> 09:50.097
what's problematic in reading
Derrida really has already been

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explained.

09:51.259 --> 09:55.469
Let's begin with a kind of
warm-up sheet which we can

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anchor in these little drawings
I've made [gestures towards

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chalkboard].

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Obviously, you look at these
drawings and you say,

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"Ah ha.

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That's the vertical axis,"
right?

10:07.360 --> 10:11.430
Of course, once we get to
feminism, feminism will have

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certain ideas of its own about
the vertical axis.

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We will be getting into that
when the time comes.

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In the meantime the Eiffel
Tower [gestures towards

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chalkboard]
is a wonderful way of showing

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the degree to which the vertical
axis is virtual.

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That is to say,
if you ever saw a dotted line

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standing upright,
it's the Eiffel Tower.

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There's nothing in it.

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It's empty.

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It's transparent.

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Yet somehow or another,
if you're at the top of it--

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if you're in the viewing
station at the top of the Eiffel

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Tower--
suddenly all of Paris is

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organized at your feet.

10:50.250 --> 10:53.170
That is to say,
it's a wonderful axis of

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combination that you're looking
at.

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It is just there with its
landmarks,

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not having the same kind of
status as that which you are

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standing on,
but rather just in a kind of

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row as the key signs,
as it were, of the skyline of

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Paris: so you get the Notre
Dame,

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the Arc de Triomphe and so on,
all sort of lined up in a row,

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and there it is.

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Guy de Maupassant in a famous
anecdote complained rather

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bitterly about this,
according to Roland Barthes in

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an essay called "The Eiffel
Tower":

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Maupassant often ate at the
restaurant in the tower [up here

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someplace]
[gestures towards the

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chalkboard]
even though he didn't

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particularly like the food.

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"It's the only
place," he said,

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"where I don't have to see
it."

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In other words,
if--as Saussure says,

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once again--we "put both
feet squarely on the

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ground" of the Eiffel
Tower,

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we're liberated from the idea
that somehow or another it's a

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governing presence.

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If we're actually there,
we no longer have to worry

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about the way it organizes
everything around it into a kind

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of rigorous unfolding pattern.

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After all, there's a very real
sense in which we infer the

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Eiffel Tower from its
surroundings.

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It's built in the nineteenth
century.

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It's by no means causative of
the skyline of Paris.

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It's something that comes in
belatedly just as langue

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comes in belatedly with
relation to speech.

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The Eiffel Tower is a
virtuality that organizes

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things, as one might say,
arbitrarily.

12:45.860 --> 12:48.890
Sort of as a reflection on
these same ideas,

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you get the famous poem of
Wallace Stevens.

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I am sure you recognize this as
Stevens' "Anecdote of the

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Jar," but I will quickly
quote to you the poem.

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I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.

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It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.

13:09.440 --> 13:13.150
The wilderness rose up to it,
And sprawled around,

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no longer wild.

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[As Derrida would say,
the center limits free play,

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right?]
The jar was round upon the

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ground
And tall and of a port in air.

13:31.610 --> 13:35.050
It took dominion everywhere.

13:35.049 --> 13:37.709
The jar was gray and bare.

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It did not give of bird or
bush,

13:41.559 --> 13:44.349
Like nothing else in Tennessee.

13:44.350 --> 13:47.760
In other words,
it is arbitrarily placed in the

13:47.764 --> 13:51.334
middle of the free play of the
natural world,

13:51.330 --> 13:57.630
a free play which is full of
reproductive exuberance,

13:57.629 --> 14:01.789
full of a kind of joyous excess
which is part of what Derrida's

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talking about when he talks
about what's "left

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over": the surplusage of
the sign,

14:08.100 --> 14:10.430
the supplementarity of
the sign.

14:10.428 --> 14:14.978
There's an orgasmic element in
what Derrida has in mind,

14:14.980 --> 14:18.050
so that when he speaks of
"the seminal adventure of

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the trace,"
toward the end of your essay,

14:20.778 --> 14:23.328
you want to put some pressure
on that word

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"seminal."

14:24.700 --> 14:29.130
Well, in any case the jar is
just arbitrarily in the middle

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of that, organizing everything
without participating in the

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nature of anything.

14:35.320 --> 14:38.810
It is, in other words,
a center which is outside the

14:38.813 --> 14:42.453
structure: "a center which
is not a center,"

14:42.445 --> 14:45.455
and we'll come back to that in
a minute.

14:45.460 --> 14:50.520
Now the Twin Towers--and I
first started using this example

14:50.522 --> 14:54.912
decades before 2001--
the Twin Towers have a kind of

14:54.907 --> 14:59.817
poignancy and pathos today that
they would not have had then;

14:59.820 --> 15:07.450
but what they suggest is in a
way today--which overwhelms us

15:07.451 --> 15:14.181
with grief--the ephemerality of
the vertical axis.

15:14.178 --> 15:17.338
The Twin Towers had the same
function in New York that the

15:17.337 --> 15:18.887
Eiffel Tower has in Paris.

15:18.889 --> 15:22.679
It was a wonderful place from
which to see the city,

15:22.679 --> 15:26.769
a wonderful place from which to
feel that everything was

15:26.767 --> 15:28.697
organized at its feet.

15:28.700 --> 15:33.240
There's a very fine essay about
the Twin Towers--again,

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long before 2001--by Michel de
Certeau, which makes this

15:37.870 --> 15:40.480
argument in sustained form.

15:40.480 --> 15:41.980
I recommend it to you.

15:41.980 --> 15:46.070
In any case,
it's another example that we

15:46.066 --> 15:52.086
can take from our experience of
the uneasy sense we may have

15:52.094 --> 15:57.824
that to infer a spatial moment
from which the irreducibly

15:57.815 --> 16:02.715
temporal nature of experience is
derived--

16:02.720 --> 16:08.560
to infer a moment from the
fact of this experience

16:08.559 --> 16:12.419
as a necessary cause of
it--

16:12.419 --> 16:13.979
is always problematic.

16:13.980 --> 16:18.610
It always necessarily must,
as Derrida would say,

16:18.610 --> 16:23.440
put this sense of a spatial
full presence of everything

16:23.440 --> 16:26.750
there at once in systematic
order--

16:26.750 --> 16:29.600
as Derrida would say,
must put that "under

16:29.599 --> 16:30.589
erasure."

16:30.590 --> 16:33.050
In other words,
in a certain sense you can't do

16:33.053 --> 16:33.753
without it.

16:33.750 --> 16:36.780
Derrida never really claims
that you can do without it.

16:36.779 --> 16:39.039
If you want to get a sense of
structure,

16:39.038 --> 16:42.348
you've got to have some sort of
inference of this nature,

16:42.350 --> 16:46.720
but at the same time it had
better be in quotes

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because it is always tenuous,
ephemeral, dubious even as to

16:52.878 --> 16:57.338
its existence,
and necessarily needs to be

16:57.340 --> 16:59.580
understood in that way.

16:59.580 --> 17:00.850
All right.

17:00.850 --> 17:06.740
Now other ways in which we've
already been involved in the

17:06.744 --> 17:11.714
subject matter of what you've
been reading today:

17:11.710 --> 17:18.070
take a look at page 921,
a couple of passages in which

17:18.065 --> 17:24.425
Derrida is quoting Levi-Strauss
on the nature of myth.

17:24.430 --> 17:30.840
Once having quoted you these
two passages from Levi-Strauss,

17:30.838 --> 17:34.958
here's where I'll return just
for a moment to Levi-Strauss's

17:34.957 --> 17:39.347
analysis of the Oedipus myth and
show you how it is that Derrida

17:39.353 --> 17:43.053
is both benefiting from what
Levi-Strauss has said and

17:43.051 --> 17:47.171
ultimately able to criticize
Levi-Strauss's position.

17:47.170 --> 17:51.220
Bottom of the left-hand column,
page 921:

17:51.220 --> 17:55.410
"In opposition to
epistemic discourse [that is to

17:55.414 --> 17:58.874
say,
the kind of discourse which has

17:58.872 --> 18:04.862
some principle or transcendental
signified or blanket term as its

18:04.863 --> 18:07.333
basis--
in other words,

18:07.334 --> 18:13.274
something which in a given
moment makes it possible for all

18:13.268 --> 18:18.458
knowledge to flow from it],
structural discourse on

18:18.461 --> 18:21.891
myths--mythological
discourse--

18:21.890 --> 18:25.720
must itself be
mythomorphic.

18:25.720 --> 18:29.500
It must have the form of that
of which it speaks."

18:29.500 --> 18:31.940
[And Derrida then says]
This is what

18:36.042 --> 18:39.452
taken from one of Levi-Strauss'
most famous books]

18:39.453 --> 18:43.973
The Raw and the Cooked.
I just want to quote the end of

18:43.974 --> 18:47.744
it, the middle of the right-hand
column, still on page 921.

18:47.740 --> 18:51.490
Levi-Strauss says:
"In wanting to imitate the

18:51.487 --> 18:54.227
spontaneous movement of mythical
thought,

18:54.230 --> 18:58.690
my enterprise,
itself too brief and too long,

18:58.690 --> 19:05.540
has yet to yield to its demands
and respect its rhythm.

19:05.538 --> 19:10.088
Thus is this book on myths
itself and in its own way a

19:10.093 --> 19:11.213
myth."

19:11.210 --> 19:13.820
In other words,
here is a moment when

19:13.820 --> 19:17.670
Levi-Strauss is admitting
something about his own work

19:17.665 --> 19:22.235
which he is not admitting in his
analysis of the Oedipus myth in

19:22.236 --> 19:26.436
the essay from Structural
Anthropology that you read

19:26.443 --> 19:27.753
last time.

19:27.750 --> 19:33.540
What Levi-Strauss is saying
here is that his approach to

19:33.544 --> 19:38.184
myth is itself only a version of
the myth.

19:38.180 --> 19:42.280
That is to say,
it participates in the mythic

19:42.279 --> 19:45.169
way of thinking about things.

19:45.170 --> 19:48.430
It uses what in the
Structural Anthropology

19:48.434 --> 19:50.704
essay he calls
"mythemes"

19:50.701 --> 19:54.301
or "gross constituent
units" of thought.

19:54.298 --> 19:59.078
It deploys and manipulates
those gross constituent units of

19:59.083 --> 20:03.733
thought in the ways that we saw,
but notice what Levi-Strauss is

20:03.728 --> 20:06.678
saying in that essay as
opposed to the passage

20:06.678 --> 20:08.208
Derrida has just quoted.

20:08.210 --> 20:12.820
He says in effect,
"This form of the myth is

20:12.820 --> 20:14.070
scientific.

20:14.068 --> 20:19.418
One of the versions that I have
made use of to arrive at this

20:19.416 --> 20:22.706
scientific conclusion is,
for example,

20:22.714 --> 20:26.284
Freud's version of the Oedipus
myth.

20:26.278 --> 20:28.138
In other words,
Freud, Sophocles,

20:28.137 --> 20:31.097
all of the other versions I
have at my disposal,

20:31.098 --> 20:35.318
have equal merit as versions,
but none of them is a

20:35.324 --> 20:39.984
transcendental signified,
none of them is a blanket term,

20:39.977 --> 20:44.327
and none of them is the causal
explanation or meaning of the

20:44.328 --> 20:44.918
myth.

20:44.920 --> 20:48.130
The meaning of the myth is
discoverable only in my

20:48.131 --> 20:49.181
science."

20:49.180 --> 20:52.370
Now, of course,
Freud himself thought he was a

20:52.369 --> 20:56.699
scientist, and his reading of
the myth was also supposed to be

20:56.695 --> 20:57.755
scientific.

20:57.759 --> 21:01.609
What was Freud's reading of the
myth about?

21:01.608 --> 21:02.148
Two or one!

21:02.146 --> 21:03.266
>

21:03.269 --> 21:06.699
It was, in other words,
about the problem of incest,

21:06.700 --> 21:09.640
the problem of the
over-determination of blood

21:09.636 --> 21:12.576
relations and the
under-determination of blood

21:12.575 --> 21:13.485
relations.

21:13.490 --> 21:18.410
It was a thorough examination
of that problematic leading to

21:18.410 --> 21:22.830
the conclusion that that's what
the myth was about.

21:22.828 --> 21:26.008
In other words,
Levi-Strauss's conclusions are

21:26.009 --> 21:28.199
already anticipated in Freud.

21:28.200 --> 21:31.130
Furthermore,
what is Levi-Strauss doing?

21:31.130 --> 21:34.690
He's denying the influence of
Freud, right?

21:34.690 --> 21:37.800
It's my myth,
not his myth--right?--which of

21:37.799 --> 21:41.779
course is precisely what happens
in the primal horde.

21:41.779 --> 21:45.209
It is a perfect instance of the
Oedipus complex.

21:45.210 --> 21:48.920
Levi-Strauss is repudiating the
father and,

21:48.920 --> 21:52.670
in repudiating the father,
showing himself to fall into

21:52.673 --> 21:56.503
the very mythic pattern that
Freud had been the first to

21:56.498 --> 21:57.048
analyze.

21:57.054 --> 21:57.754
Okay?

21:57.750 --> 22:01.800
So when you say that what
you're doing is scientific in a

22:01.800 --> 22:04.980
context of this sort,
you are making yourself

22:04.983 --> 22:06.073
vulnerable.

22:06.068 --> 22:10.438
The moments in this essay in
which Derrida is criticizing

22:10.443 --> 22:14.743
Levi-Strauss are those moments
in which Levi-Strauss has

22:14.740 --> 22:19.270
unguardedly said something on
the order of "My work is

22:19.272 --> 22:22.312
scientific";
but there are lots of

22:22.306 --> 22:25.716
occasions, and he always quotes
Levi-Strauss to this

22:25.721 --> 22:28.141
effect,
when Levi-Strauss is not saying

22:28.140 --> 22:30.590
that--
when Levi-Strauss is conceding

22:30.586 --> 22:34.376
that his work,
that is to say his viewpoint,

22:34.382 --> 22:38.392
disappears unstably into the
thing viewed.

22:38.390 --> 22:39.100
All right.

22:39.097 --> 22:42.497
Now also take a look
at--because we've been doing

22:42.499 --> 22:45.619
this too--
take a look at page 917,

22:45.619 --> 22:50.179
the left-hand column,
where Derrida is talking not

22:50.182 --> 22:53.602
about Levi-Strauss but about
Saussure.

22:53.598 --> 22:57.358
Here he's talking about the
nature of the sign,

22:57.358 --> 23:01.508
and he is concerned,
very much concerned,

23:01.509 --> 23:06.579
about this relationship between
the concept and the sound

23:06.584 --> 23:08.604
image--
which is to say,

23:08.603 --> 23:11.163
the signified and the
signifier--

23:11.160 --> 23:15.010
that is the basis of the
science of Saussure:

23:15.006 --> 23:18.856
that is to say,
the relationship that's

23:18.855 --> 23:24.395
involved in the pairing of
signified and signifier is the

23:24.400 --> 23:26.360
basis,
the cornerstone,

23:26.356 --> 23:28.046
of the science of Saussure.

23:28.048 --> 23:30.748
So here's what,
a little more than halfway

23:30.746 --> 23:34.356
down, the left-hand column,
page 917, Derrida has to say

23:34.363 --> 23:35.353
about that.

23:35.349 --> 23:37.619
He says:
… [T]he signification

23:37.615 --> 23:40.435
"sign"
has always been comprehended

23:40.440 --> 23:43.170
and determined,
in its sense,

23:43.171 --> 23:48.871
as sign-of, signifier referring
to a signified,

23:48.868 --> 23:52.928
signifier different from its
signified.

23:52.930 --> 23:56.820
If one erases the radical
difference between signifier and

23:56.821 --> 24:00.381
signified,
it is the word signifier itself

24:00.376 --> 24:05.706
which ought to be abandoned as a
metaphysical concept [which is

24:05.712 --> 24:08.882
to say,
a transcendental signified:

24:08.875 --> 24:12.885
in other words,
the idea that the concept in

24:12.893 --> 24:16.363
some sense generates the
signifier--

24:16.358 --> 24:22.138
right?--which is the basis of
Saussure's thinking about this].

24:22.140 --> 24:25.750
Here's where I come back to
that example that I already gave

24:25.747 --> 24:29.357
you with a question mark next to
it when I was talking about

24:29.355 --> 24:30.145
Saussure.

24:30.150 --> 24:33.260
Suppose I think of the
relationship between

24:33.257 --> 24:36.657
"signified"
and "signifier"

24:36.660 --> 24:40.360
as the relationship between two
terms--

24:40.358 --> 24:42.918
because after all,
one way of signifying the

24:42.919 --> 24:46.019
concept "tree"
[gestures towards the board]

24:46.015 --> 24:48.155
is to write the word
"tree"

24:48.157 --> 24:50.477
and put quotation marks about
it.

24:50.480 --> 24:53.850
So if I take away the quotation
marks, all I have is the word

24:53.847 --> 24:56.147
with no indication that it's a
concept.

24:56.150 --> 25:00.740
Notice that this is now a
relationship which Jakobson

25:00.736 --> 25:03.996
would call
"metalingual."

25:04.000 --> 25:06.700
What it suggests is that
"tree"

25:06.702 --> 25:09.882
is another word for
"arbor."

25:09.880 --> 25:13.070
In other words,
it's a relationship not between

25:13.066 --> 25:16.936
a signified and a signifier but
between a signifier and a

25:16.944 --> 25:20.554
signifier,
so that the binarism of the

25:20.554 --> 25:25.414
relationship is broken down,
and we begin to understand the

25:25.414 --> 25:30.344
combinatory structure of speech
or writing as one signifier

25:30.337 --> 25:34.827
leading to another--
I think-- signifier:

25:34.828 --> 25:37.958
Derrida says in effect,
"Let's banish the word

25:37.955 --> 25:39.275
'signifier,'"
but he might as well say,

25:39.279 --> 25:41.479
"Let's banish the word
'signified.'"

25:41.482 --> 25:44.662
I think a signifier,
and it triggers by

25:44.657 --> 25:48.867
association--as Saussure would
say--

25:48.868 --> 25:54.308
it triggers by association a
subsequent successive signifier,

25:54.308 --> 25:57.018
which triggers another,
which triggers another.

25:57.019 --> 25:59.319
That's what gives us,
in the language of

25:59.317 --> 26:02.377
deconstruction,
what we call "the

26:02.384 --> 26:07.394
chain," the signifying
chain: not an organizational

26:07.394 --> 26:10.954
pattern but an ever
self-replicating and

26:10.948 --> 26:16.838
self-extending pattern,
irreducibly linear and

26:16.838 --> 26:24.078
forward-progressing through a
sequence of temporal

26:24.076 --> 26:26.436
associations.

26:26.440 --> 26:30.430
One of the things that happens
when you demystify the

26:30.432 --> 26:35.192
relationship between a concept
and a signifier or a sound image

26:35.194 --> 26:39.194
is that you also demystify the
relationship between a

26:39.188 --> 26:43.628
set of associations,
which exist somehow in space,

26:43.634 --> 26:46.554
and the way in which
association actually takes

26:46.547 --> 26:49.377
place,
which is necessarily in time:

26:49.380 --> 26:52.780
in other words,
if one signifier leads to

26:52.779 --> 26:56.069
another--if like history,
where there's one damn thing

26:56.070 --> 27:00.880
after another,
speech is one damn signifier

27:00.875 --> 27:04.985
after another--
then that is actually the

27:04.990 --> 27:09.210
nature of the associations that
Saussure has been talking about

27:09.211 --> 27:10.711
in the first place.

27:10.710 --> 27:13.860
But it doesn't exist in a
systemic space;

27:13.858 --> 27:17.738
it exists in an unfolding time,
right?

27:17.740 --> 27:23.410
These are some of the
implications of no longer being

27:23.406 --> 27:29.946
satisfied with the way in which
a sign can be understood as a

27:29.948 --> 27:36.268
concept to which we attach
belatedly a signification,

27:36.269 --> 27:38.619
a signifier.

27:38.618 --> 27:44.398
What we have is a situation in
which we find ourselves caught

27:44.404 --> 27:48.804
up in a stream of signification,
all of which is,

27:48.804 --> 27:53.214
in a certain sense,
there before we came along and

27:53.207 --> 27:55.917
are moved,
as down a stream,

27:55.923 --> 28:00.503
by the way in which one
signifier succeeds another in

28:00.497 --> 28:03.877
ways that later on,
as we take up concepts like

28:06.868 --> 28:13.178
we can think of a little bit
more precisely.

28:13.180 --> 28:13.730
Okay.

28:13.734 --> 28:19.294
So now finally then,
there's one other way in which

28:19.289 --> 28:25.959
Derrida's essay from the very
outset confirms what we've been

28:25.957 --> 28:32.287
saying about the crisis of
structuralism being the need to

28:32.289 --> 28:39.289
deny ordinary understandings of
genesis or cause.

28:39.288 --> 28:43.218
In structuralism,
if something emerges,

28:43.219 --> 28:47.769
it emerges from between
two things.

28:47.769 --> 28:50.499
That is to say,
it's not this and it's

28:50.500 --> 28:53.050
not this,
or it "emerges"

28:53.046 --> 28:55.526
as that which is not this,
not this.

28:55.529 --> 29:02.599
It doesn't, in other words,
derive from an antecedent

29:02.602 --> 29:06.412
single cause as an effect.

29:06.410 --> 29:13.800
It emerges, on the other hand,
as difference within a field.

29:13.798 --> 29:18.678
Now that's what Derrida is
talking about with extraordinary

29:18.682 --> 29:24.242
intensity of complication in the
first paragraph of your essay,

29:24.240 --> 29:27.840
page 915, left column,
first paragraph:

29:27.843 --> 29:33.533
his first words uttered at the
famous conference in- at Johns

29:33.532 --> 29:35.432
Hopkins in 1966.

29:35.430 --> 29:38.320
He says:
Perhaps something has occurred

29:38.319 --> 29:43.379
in the history of the concept of
structure that could be called

29:47.960 --> 29:52.440
something which emerges,
something which is there now

29:52.442 --> 29:57.112
and wasn't there before]…
That's the most problematic

29:57.111 --> 29:58.641
issue for structuralism.

29:58.640 --> 30:01.660
When structuralism thinks about
how yesterday things were

30:01.664 --> 30:03.884
different from the way they are
today,

30:03.880 --> 30:07.690
it has to say:
yesterday there was a certain

30:07.690 --> 30:10.880
synchronic cross-section of
data,

30:10.880 --> 30:14.340
and today there's a slightly
different synchronic

30:14.338 --> 30:16.068
cross-section of data.

30:16.068 --> 30:18.938
But structuralism is unable and
furthermore--

30:18.940 --> 30:21.890
much more
importantly--unwilling to

30:21.892 --> 30:25.492
say anything about how
yesterday's data turned into

30:25.492 --> 30:27.902
today's data--
in other words,

30:27.896 --> 30:30.626
to say anything about
change.

30:30.630 --> 30:32.730
It sees successive
cross-sections,

30:32.731 --> 30:35.281
and it calls that
"history."

30:35.279 --> 30:38.729
I am anticipating here,
and we'll come back to this in

30:38.727 --> 30:41.517
other contexts:
but it doesn't say "one

30:41.522 --> 30:45.582
thing led to another";
it says "one thing after

30:45.578 --> 30:49.798
another"--in my facetious
reference to history as I have

30:49.799 --> 30:51.699
already given it to you.

30:51.700 --> 30:56.170
Now this is what Derrida is
deliberately struggling with in

30:56.170 --> 30:59.820
this first paragraph:
… an "event"

30:59.820 --> 31:02.510
[quote,
unquote], if this loaded word

31:02.506 --> 31:06.976
did not entail a meaning which
it is precisely the function of

31:06.980 --> 31:10.290
structural--
or structuralist--thought to

31:10.286 --> 31:12.016
reduce or to suspect.

31:12.019 --> 31:15.459
But let me use the term
"event"

31:15.459 --> 31:18.979
[quote, unquote]
anyway, employing it with

31:18.983 --> 31:22.513
caution and as if in quotation
marks.

31:22.509 --> 31:25.039
In this sense,
this event will have the

31:25.039 --> 31:28.569
exterior form of a
rupture [that is to say,

31:28.568 --> 31:33.938
an emergence among things,
right--a rupture:

31:33.943 --> 31:39.573
the volcano parts and there you
have lava,

31:39.568 --> 31:43.318
right--an event]
and a redoubling [a

31:43.318 --> 31:47.508
redoubling in the sense that
"something has

31:47.513 --> 31:49.303
happened"].

31:49.298 --> 31:52.148
As Bob Dylan would say in
effect, "Something has

31:52.151 --> 31:54.291
happened, but it's not something
new.

31:54.288 --> 31:57.548
It is, in fact,
a replication of what was

31:57.551 --> 32:00.181
unbeknownst to you because,
Mr.

32:00.182 --> 32:03.002
Jones, you don't know very much
of what was,

32:03.000 --> 32:07.440
unbeknownst to you,
there always--as Derrida says--

32:07.440 --> 32:15.820
already: something that emerges
but at the same time presses on

32:15.815 --> 32:22.025
us its status as having already
been there,

32:22.029 --> 32:24.859
always already been there."

32:24.858 --> 32:25.648
All right.

32:25.654 --> 32:30.434
So in all these sorts of ways,
understanding structuralism as

32:30.426 --> 32:33.446
a problematic critique of
genesis--

32:33.450 --> 32:37.510
because it's still very hard to
grasp,

32:37.509 --> 32:40.999
to accept the notion of things
not having been caused--

32:41.000 --> 32:44.180
why can't we say things
were caused,

32:44.180 --> 32:49.640
just for example?--the notion
of the sign as an arbitrary

32:49.641 --> 32:54.711
relationship between a
substratum of thought which is

32:54.711 --> 33:00.471
then somehow or another hooked
onto a derivative series or a

33:00.465 --> 33:06.105
system of signifiers;
the notion of getting outside

33:06.105 --> 33:12.355
of myth and being scientific,
and the notion that we can

33:12.355 --> 33:16.905
ascribe reality to the vertical
axis--

33:16.910 --> 33:22.360
all of these are ways of
questioning the integrity,

33:22.358 --> 33:27.328
the security within its skin,
of structuralism we have

33:27.327 --> 33:30.137
actually already undertaken.

33:30.140 --> 33:34.520
I only want to suggest to you
with this long preamble that

33:34.523 --> 33:38.683
much of the work that lies
before us is actually in the

33:38.678 --> 33:42.138
past and we have already
accomplished it.

33:42.140 --> 33:44.900
Now "Structure,
Sign and Play"

33:44.896 --> 33:48.076
is a critique of
"structurality."

33:48.078 --> 33:51.188
It's not just a critique of
structuralism.

33:51.190 --> 33:57.320
It's a critique of the idea of
anything that has a center,

33:57.324 --> 34:03.894
one which is at the same time
an enabling causal principle.

34:03.890 --> 34:07.130
In other words,
I look at a structure and I say

34:07.131 --> 34:08.401
it has a center.

34:08.400 --> 34:09.750
What do I mean by a center?

34:09.750 --> 34:11.960
I mean a blanket term,
a guiding concept,

34:11.960 --> 34:16.050
a transcendental signified,
something that explains the

34:16.047 --> 34:19.527
nature of the structure and
something also,

34:19.530 --> 34:22.510
as Derrida says,
which allows for limited free

34:22.507 --> 34:25.977
play within the structure;
but at the same time the

34:25.978 --> 34:29.418
structure has this kind of
boundary nature.

34:29.420 --> 34:33.670
It may be amoeboid but it still
has boundaries--right?--and so

34:33.670 --> 34:37.920
at the same time limits the free
play within the structure.

34:37.920 --> 34:42.530
That's like the New Critics
saying that a text has

34:42.530 --> 34:43.660
structure.

34:43.659 --> 34:45.949
It has something that actually
in the phenomenological

34:45.949 --> 34:47.639
tradition is called an
"intentional

34:47.635 --> 34:48.495
structure."

34:48.500 --> 34:50.970
Kant calls it
"purposiveness"--

34:50.969 --> 34:54.449
that is to say,
the way in which the thing is

34:54.445 --> 34:58.705
organized according to some sort
of guiding pattern.

34:58.710 --> 35:03.890
But to speak of an intentional
structure as a center is not at

35:03.893 --> 35:08.743
all the same thing as to speak
of an intending person,

35:08.739 --> 35:14.079
author, being,
or idea that brought it into

35:14.077 --> 35:18.057
existence,
because that's extraneous.

35:18.059 --> 35:19.659
That's something prior.

35:19.659 --> 35:20.769
That's genesis.

35:20.769 --> 35:22.569
That's a cause, right?

35:22.570 --> 35:25.260
The intending author,
in other words,

35:25.262 --> 35:29.152
is outside, whereas we can
argue that the intentional

35:29.153 --> 35:30.953
structure is inside.

35:30.949 --> 35:32.339
But that's a problem.

35:32.340 --> 35:35.510
How do you get from an
intending author to an

35:35.510 --> 35:37.890
intentional structure and back?

35:37.889 --> 35:41.889
A center is both a center and
not a center,

35:41.885 --> 35:45.115
as Derrida maddeningly tells
us.

35:45.119 --> 35:49.159
It is both that which organizes
a structure and that which isn't

35:49.164 --> 35:52.634
really qualified to organize
anything, because it's not

35:52.632 --> 35:56.382
in the structure;
it's outside the structure,

35:56.380 --> 36:00.350
something that imposes itself
from without like a cookie

36:00.353 --> 36:02.813
cutter on the structure,
right?

36:02.809 --> 36:09.219
This then is an introductory
moment in Derrida's thinking

36:09.217 --> 36:11.047
about centers.

36:11.050 --> 36:15.980
On page 916 in the lower
left-hand column,

36:15.980 --> 36:20.980
he talks about the history of
metaphysics as a history of

36:20.976 --> 36:25.436
successive appeals to a center:
that is to say,

36:25.440 --> 36:30.310
to some idea from which
everything derives,

36:30.309 --> 36:35.909
some genesis or other that can
be understood as responsible for

36:35.909 --> 36:38.349
everything that there is.

36:38.349 --> 36:41.179
The list is very cunningly put
together.

36:41.179 --> 36:43.049
This is bottom of the left-hand
column.

36:43.050 --> 36:44.740
It's not necessarily
chronological,

36:44.739 --> 36:49.129
but at the same time it gives
you a sense of successive

36:49.132 --> 36:53.772
metaphysical philosophers
thinking about first causes,

36:53.768 --> 36:59.608
origins, and about whatever it
is that determines everything

36:59.606 --> 37:00.296
else.

37:00.300 --> 37:04.190
I'll just take up the list
toward the end:

37:04.186 --> 37:07.786
"transcendentality,
consciousness,

37:07.789 --> 37:12.339
or conscience,
God, man, and so forth."

37:12.340 --> 37:17.420
Notice that though the list
isn't strictly chronological,

37:17.416 --> 37:20.676
man nevertheless does succeed
God.

37:20.679 --> 37:22.889
In other words,
he's thinking about the

37:22.894 --> 37:24.824
development of Western culture.

37:24.820 --> 37:28.410
In the Middle Ages and to some
extent in the Early Modern

37:28.405 --> 37:31.025
period, we live in a theocentric
world.

37:31.030 --> 37:36.550
Insofar as he understands
himself as man at all,

37:36.550 --> 37:40.970
man understands himself as a
product of divine creativity,

37:40.969 --> 37:45.989
as something derived from God,
as one entity among all other

37:45.992 --> 37:50.332
entities who participate and
benefit from the divine

37:50.333 --> 37:51.443
presence.

37:51.440 --> 37:54.130
But then of course,
the rise of the Enlightenment

37:54.134 --> 37:56.384
is also the rise of
anthropocentrism,

37:56.380 --> 37:59.280
and by the time the
Enlightenment is in full cry you

37:59.275 --> 38:02.905
get everybody from Blake to Marx
to Nietzsche saying not that God

38:02.907 --> 38:06.317
invented man,
but that man invented God.

38:06.320 --> 38:09.650
Man has become the
transcendental signified.

38:09.650 --> 38:14.200
Everything derives now in this
historical moment from human

38:14.195 --> 38:17.485
consciousness,
and all concepts of whatever

38:17.485 --> 38:20.695
kind can be understood in that
light.

38:20.699 --> 38:23.379
But then of course he says,
having said "man,"

38:23.380 --> 38:24.550
>

38:24.550 --> 38:26.980
he says "and so
forth."

38:26.980 --> 38:30.520
In other words,
something comes after man.

38:30.518 --> 38:33.948
Man is, in other words,
an historical moment.

38:33.949 --> 38:37.249
There are lots of people who
have pointed out to us that

38:37.250 --> 38:40.750
before a certain period,
there was no such thing as man,

38:40.746 --> 38:43.166
and in a variety of quite real
senses,

38:43.170 --> 38:46.180
after a certain moment in the
history of culture,

38:46.179 --> 38:48.299
there is also no such thing as
man.

38:48.300 --> 38:52.800
The argument Derrida is making
about the emergence of his

38:52.804 --> 38:56.434
"event"
is that a new transcendental

38:56.425 --> 39:00.765
signified has actually
substituted itself for man.

39:00.768 --> 39:04.438
In other words,
the world is no longer

39:04.436 --> 39:08.006
anthropocentric;
it's linguistic.

39:08.010 --> 39:12.760
Obviously, the event that
Derrida is talking about--the

39:12.757 --> 39:16.707
emergence, the rupture,
an event which makes a

39:16.713 --> 39:20.673
difference--is the emergence of
language.

39:20.670 --> 39:31.150
What I really want to talk
about here is something that is

39:31.152 --> 39:38.142
on page 916, the right-hand
column:

39:38.139 --> 39:41.199
The moment [of emergence--the
event,

39:41.199 --> 39:43.259
in other words,
about halfway down]

39:43.257 --> 39:46.097
was that in which language
invaded the universal

39:46.101 --> 39:50.121
problematic [in other words,
that moment in which language

39:50.121 --> 39:53.611
displaced the previous
transcendental signified,

39:53.610 --> 39:56.040
which was man];
that in which,

39:56.043 --> 39:59.123
in the absence of a center or
origin,

39:59.119 --> 40:02.779
everything became
discourse--provided we can agree

40:02.782 --> 40:05.012
on this word--
that is to say,

40:05.007 --> 40:09.257
when everything became a system
where the central signified,

40:09.260 --> 40:12.470
the original or transcendental
signified,

40:12.469 --> 40:16.709
is never absolutely present
outside a system of differences.

40:16.710 --> 40:21.220
He's making a claim for
language while erasing

40:21.215 --> 40:21.645
it.

40:21.650 --> 40:24.640
In other words,
he's painfully aware that

40:24.635 --> 40:27.915
language is just the new God,
the new Man.

40:27.920 --> 40:31.590
Many critiques of
deconstruction take the form of

40:31.594 --> 40:35.354
saying that deconstruction
simply instrumentalizes

40:35.347 --> 40:37.377
language,
gives it agency,

40:37.375 --> 40:40.835
and gives it consciousness as
though it were God or man and

40:40.838 --> 40:42.688
then pretends that it isn't.

40:42.690 --> 40:45.720
This is a common response to
deconstruction.

40:45.719 --> 40:47.859
Derrida is aware of it in
advance.

40:47.860 --> 40:50.450
He says in effect, "Look,
I know we're running this risk

40:50.449 --> 40:52.099
in saying everything is
language,"

40:52.096 --> 40:53.476
or,
if you will here,

40:53.480 --> 40:55.070
everything is discourse.

40:55.070 --> 40:57.700
At the same time,
we are saying something

40:57.695 --> 41:01.465
different,
because hitherto we had this

41:01.469 --> 41:05.649
problem: in other words,
we had the problem of something

41:05.650 --> 41:07.310
being part of a
structure--

41:07.309 --> 41:10.199
that is to say God is immanent
in all things,

41:10.199 --> 41:14.509
human consciousness pervades
everything that it encounters--

41:14.510 --> 41:17.270
in other words,
something which is part of a

41:17.271 --> 41:20.871
structure but which is at the
same time outside of it.

41:20.869 --> 41:26.089
God creates the world and then
sort of, as Milton says himself,

41:26.085 --> 41:29.195
"uncircumscrib'd
withdraws,"

41:29.197 --> 41:30.037
right?

41:30.039 --> 41:31.319
God is not there.

41:33.543 --> 41:37.163
God is the hidden God who is
absent from the world and is,

41:37.164 --> 41:40.154
in effect, also the structure
of the world.

41:40.150 --> 41:42.210
The same thing can be said of
man.

41:42.210 --> 41:47.320
Man brings the sense of what
the world is into being and then

41:47.315 --> 41:52.755
stands aside and somehow sort of
takes it in through an aesthetic

41:52.760 --> 41:56.250
register or in some other remote
way.

41:56.250 --> 41:58.170
Language doesn't do that.

41:58.170 --> 42:01.110
Language is perpetually
immersed in itself.

42:01.110 --> 42:04.260
Derrida is claiming that
language is different in the

42:04.262 --> 42:07.662
sense that it makes no sense to
talk about it as standing

42:07.659 --> 42:09.539
outside of what's going on.

42:09.539 --> 42:12.439
This is an essential part of
the critique of structuralism.

42:12.440 --> 42:16.240
Language is not other
than speech;

42:16.239 --> 42:20.309
it is perpetually manifest in
speech, right?

42:20.309 --> 42:23.399
It's simply a distinction that
can't be maintained,

42:23.396 --> 42:26.356
which is why he calls it an
"event."

42:26.360 --> 42:29.940
In other words,
something of significance has

42:29.940 --> 42:31.000
happened, Mr.

42:30.998 --> 42:34.088
Jones, and that is language,
right?

42:34.090 --> 42:35.200
All right.

42:35.197 --> 42:39.397
So I suppose in the time
remaining and,

42:39.404 --> 42:44.944
alas, there isn't a lot of it,
we'd better ask what

42:44.938 --> 42:48.148
"language"
is.

42:48.150 --> 42:51.270
We've talked about it.

42:51.268 --> 42:54.088
We've had a great deal to do
with it, but of course we still

42:54.094 --> 42:56.014
haven't the slightest idea what
it is.

42:56.010 --> 42:57.090
Soon we'll know.

42:57.090 --> 42:59.640
First of all,
we'd better say,

42:59.635 --> 43:03.845
as is already clear from what
we've been quoting,

43:03.851 --> 43:07.101
language is not quite
Saussurian.

43:07.099 --> 43:10.619
That is to say,
it is not a system of signs

43:10.615 --> 43:14.885
understood as stable
relationships between a concept

43:14.885 --> 43:17.895
world and a world of signifying.

43:17.900 --> 43:24.960
It is not a world in which
language can be understood as

43:24.960 --> 43:31.510
somehow or another a means of
expressing thought.

43:31.510 --> 43:35.800
Deconstruction calls into
question the distinction between

43:35.802 --> 43:40.322
language and thought in calling
into question the distinction

43:40.322 --> 43:44.092
between signifier and signified,
so it's not quite

43:44.088 --> 43:47.078
Saussuria--even though,
as Derrida says,

43:47.077 --> 43:51.427
it can't do without a
Saussurian vocabulary.

43:51.429 --> 43:56.819
Another problem is--and also
related to the critique of

43:56.820 --> 44:01.190
Saussure--
is that this idea that what's

44:01.193 --> 44:03.703
inward,
what is essential,

44:03.702 --> 44:08.012
is something that can be
voiced and should be

44:08.014 --> 44:11.754
voiced;
so that if I think a sign is a

44:11.751 --> 44:16.671
way of talking about the
expression of a thought,

44:16.670 --> 44:19.850
notice that I call--if I am
Saussure--

44:19.849 --> 44:22.119
that expression a "sound
image."

44:22.119 --> 44:26.119
In other words,
language, according to Derrida,

44:26.123 --> 44:31.003
in the Saussurian tradition
seems to privilege sound over

44:30.996 --> 44:33.866
script, over what is graphic.

44:33.869 --> 44:40.449
He claims that this is a hidden
bias in the whole history of

44:40.447 --> 44:42.007
metaphysics.

44:42.010 --> 44:45.250
Why, in other words,
should we think of language as

44:45.248 --> 44:46.478
speech, as voice?

44:46.480 --> 44:49.670
Why do we think of voice--in
the sense of the divine

44:49.668 --> 44:52.298
logos,
the word: "in the

44:52.304 --> 44:57.134
beginning was the word"--
why do we think of voice as a

44:57.130 --> 45:01.650
kind of fully present
simultaneity that is absolutely

45:01.652 --> 45:06.092
present precisely in
consciousness or wherever it is

45:06.085 --> 45:10.255
that we understand language to
derive from?

45:10.260 --> 45:12.160
What's so special about voice?

45:12.159 --> 45:15.089
Why do they say all of these
terrible things about writing?

45:15.090 --> 45:18.530
Writing is no different from
voice.

45:18.530 --> 45:24.320
Voice, too, is articulated
combinatorially in time.

45:24.320 --> 45:29.580
Voice, too, can be understood
as inscribed on the ear.

45:29.579 --> 45:33.639
This is a metaphor that Derrida
frequently uses,

45:33.635 --> 45:36.565
as a kind of writing on the
ear.

45:36.570 --> 45:39.380
The distinction,
which Derrida takes to be

45:39.375 --> 45:42.355
metaphysical,
that Saussure wants to make

45:42.360 --> 45:46.050
between something primary,
something immediate and

45:46.050 --> 45:49.770
underivative--
voice--and something merely

45:49.768 --> 45:52.778
repetitious,
merely reproductive,

45:52.775 --> 45:58.055
merely a handmaiden to voice--
namely writing--needs to be

45:58.059 --> 46:00.259
called into question.

46:00.260 --> 46:06.060
Now this is the point at which
we need to say something about a

46:06.059 --> 46:11.669
number of key terms that Derrida
uses to sustain this sort of

46:11.672 --> 46:16.072
criticism of traditional ideas
of language.

46:16.070 --> 46:22.120
The first has to do with the
notion of supplementarity.

46:22.119 --> 46:23.949
A supplement,
he points out,

46:23.951 --> 46:27.611
is something that either
completes something that isn't

46:27.612 --> 46:32.092
complete or adds to something
that already is complete.

46:32.090 --> 46:33.380
For example, I take vitamin C.

46:33.380 --> 46:35.850
I also drink a lot of orange
juice,

46:35.849 --> 46:40.079
so I've got plenty of vitamin
C, and if I take a vitamin C

46:40.077 --> 46:43.567
pill I am supplementing
something that's already

46:43.565 --> 46:46.165
complete;
but if I don't drink any orange

46:46.166 --> 46:48.206
juice,
then of course if I take a

46:48.206 --> 46:51.246
vitamin C pill I am
supplementing something that's

46:51.253 --> 46:53.553
not complete,
but either way we always call

46:53.550 --> 46:54.280
it a supplement.

46:54.280 --> 46:58.600
It's very difficult even to
keep in mind the conceptual

46:58.599 --> 47:02.679
difference between these two
sorts of supplement.

47:02.679 --> 47:07.449
Now a sign traditionally
understood is self-sufficient,

47:07.447 --> 47:08.947
self-contained.

47:08.949 --> 47:12.369
Saussure has made it a
scientific object by saying that

47:12.373 --> 47:14.913
it's both arbitrary and
differential,

47:14.909 --> 47:19.789
but a sign understood under the
critique of deconstruction is

47:19.793 --> 47:24.763
something that is perpetually
proliferating signification,

47:24.760 --> 47:26.860
something that doesn't stand
still,

47:26.860 --> 47:30.930
and something that can't be
understood as self-sufficient or

47:30.925 --> 47:34.505
independent in its nature as
being both arbitrary and

47:34.507 --> 47:35.677
differential.

47:35.679 --> 47:40.109
It is a bleeding or spilling
into successive signs in such a

47:40.105 --> 47:43.695
way that it perpetually leaves
what Derrida calls

47:43.704 --> 47:45.434
"traces."

47:45.429 --> 47:48.879
That is to say,
as we examine the unfolding of

47:48.882 --> 47:51.642
a speech act,
we see the way in which

47:51.643 --> 47:54.563
successive signs are
contaminated.

47:54.559 --> 47:56.989
That's not meant to be a bad
word but suggests being

47:56.992 --> 47:58.982
influenced,
one might say,

47:58.976 --> 48:04.326
in the sense of "open the
window and influenza,"

48:04.333 --> 48:07.533
by those signs that precede it.

48:07.530 --> 48:13.290
Supplementarity is a way of
understanding the simultaneously

48:13.289 --> 48:19.049
linear and ever proliferating,
ever self-complicating nature

48:19.048 --> 48:21.488
of verbal expression.

48:27.164 --> 48:33.144
of talking about the difference
between voice and writing.

48:33.139 --> 48:36.149
There is a difference between
voice and writing even though

48:36.152 --> 48:37.712
they have so much in common.

48:37.710 --> 48:40.640
Voice and writing,
by the way, are not a stable

48:40.637 --> 48:41.207
binary.

48:41.210 --> 48:43.270
There are no stable binaries in
Derrida.

48:43.268 --> 48:48.598
The difference between voice
and writing is that writing can

48:48.597 --> 48:54.107
give us all kinds of indication
of difference that voice can't

48:54.106 --> 48:55.186
give us.

48:55.190 --> 48:58.120
Part of the interest of
misspelling

49:02.791 --> 49:05.491
is that we can't,
in terms of voice as sound,

49:09.110 --> 49:13.410
Actually, one can,
slightly, but it's not a

49:13.409 --> 49:16.889
difference worth lingering over.

49:19.110 --> 49:23.100
with its substitution of the
a--

49:23.099 --> 49:24.899
and remember the riff in the
essay

49:28.059 --> 49:31.189
as alpha, as origin,
and as killing the king because

49:31.192 --> 49:33.612
the king,
remember, is the transcendental

49:33.614 --> 49:36.764
signified: God,
man and so forth.

49:41.068 --> 49:45.378
of those things is something
that we can only pick up if we

49:45.376 --> 49:50.946
understand language as writing,
because in speech these modes

49:50.949 --> 49:53.949
of difference don't register.

49:58.208 --> 50:01.958
linguistic system,
a system of differences

50:01.956 --> 50:05.876
understood as spatial:
that is to say,

50:05.880 --> 50:11.990
understood as available to us
as a kind of smorgasbord as we

50:11.994 --> 50:14.384
stand in front of it.

50:18.360 --> 50:22.180
deferral and reminds us that
difference--

50:22.179 --> 50:23.899
that is to say,
our understanding of

50:23.900 --> 50:26.100
difference,
our means of negotiating

50:26.101 --> 50:27.891
difference--
is not something that's

50:27.893 --> 50:29.963
actually done in space;
it's done in time.

50:29.960 --> 50:34.270
When I perceive a difference,
I perceive it temporally.

50:34.268 --> 50:39.618
I do not understand the
relation among signs as a

50:39.617 --> 50:41.287
simultaneity.

50:41.289 --> 50:43.659
I want to, if I want to pin it
down scientifically,

50:43.659 --> 50:47.469
but in the actual--as Joyce
would say--

50:47.469 --> 50:50.849
stream of consciousness,
I understand difference

50:50.846 --> 50:51.776
temporally.

50:51.780 --> 50:55.410
I defer difference.

50:55.409 --> 50:57.489
I unfold.

50:57.489 --> 51:03.779
I successively negotiate
difference, and in doing that I

51:09.159 --> 51:13.039
All right.

51:13.039 --> 51:18.159
There a couple of things that I
want to say about the key moves

51:18.157 --> 51:19.227
of Derrida.

51:19.230 --> 51:22.870
I will mention those next time.

51:22.869 --> 51:27.469
I will also look over my notes
and see what I might say further

51:27.474 --> 51:31.934
about these troublesome terms
and their relation to Derrida's

51:31.929 --> 51:36.159
understanding of language so
that Tuesday our introduction

51:36.164 --> 51:40.474
will still have to do with
Derrida and then we'll move into

51:40.471 --> 51:42.701
thinking about de Man.

51:42.699 --> 51:47.999