WEBVTT

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Prof: Last time I
lectured under the illusion

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that--
I really should get in the

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habit of looking at the
syllabus--

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that all you had been assigned
for Thursday's lecture was the

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Saussure.

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Lo and behold,
I did take a glance at the

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syllabus over the weekend and
realized that you'd also been

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assigned the Levi-Strauss,
so we have a little bit of

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ground to cover today.

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I think we can do it.

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I think I want to reserve
something like a critique of

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structuralism for the beginning
of Thursday's lecture,

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because it segues very nicely
into what we'll have to say

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about Derrida.

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I already promised that somehow
or another the critique of

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structuralism just was
deconstruction.

00:49.090 --> 00:52.640
I hope to be able to
demonstrate that on Thursday;

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but I do want to get up to the
point of launching a critique of

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structuralism on two or three
grounds,

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and so I hope to be able to
move along fairly quickly today.

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Now another thing that got left
out,

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even given the proviso that it
was only about Saussure on

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Thursday,
was an adequate account of the

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relationship between synchrony
and diachrony and the pivotal

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importance of this concept,
not only for semiotics but for

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its aftermath in structuralism,
and also for its relation to

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the Russian formalists;
because you remember that in

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talking about function,
the formalists who undertook to

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think about literary history and
the problems of literary

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historiography were very much
engaged in the notion that a

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function in a given text could
be understood in two different

01:51.435 --> 01:52.505
ways.

01:52.510 --> 01:55.800
There was the syn-function,
which was the relationship

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between that function and all of
the other functions in the

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text--
in other words,

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viewed as an aspect of that
text,

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but there was also of the same
function its auto-function,

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which is the way in which it
persists and recurs throughout

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the history of literature
sometimes as the dominant,

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sometimes latent or recessive,
but always in one form or

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another there.

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Now in Saussurian linguistics,
the relationship between

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synchrony and diachrony is very
much the same.

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To consider language in
toto is to consider it at a

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given moment synchronically.

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That is to say,
you don't think of language as

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a system if at the same time
you're thinking of it unfolding

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historically.

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Jakobson, you will notice,
introduces an element of time

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into the synchronic analysis of
a semiotic system by saying that

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you've got to take account both
of archaic and innovative

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features,
but nevertheless they are

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simply flagged as archaic or
innovative and not understood as

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changing in time as long as they
are read or analyzed

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synchronically.

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But at the same token,
a system does change through

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time.

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A semiotic system,
language, the history of

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literature,
the history of

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poetics--whatever it might be,
changes through time,

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and to analyze that change
through time you think of it

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diachronically.

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Now Saussure argues that the
relationship among the parts of

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something viewed
synchronically--

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a semiotic system,
let's say--are not necessary in

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the sense that they might be any
number of other relationships,

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but they are nevertheless fixed.

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That is to say,
they are what's there and they

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can't be other than what they
are,

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whereas through time,
if you're studying a semiotic

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system or studying language or
whatever it might be,

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change takes place and it's
necessary.

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You're looking back on it and
it simply did happen,

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>

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so change is determinant in
some sense.

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But at the same time,
it's not regular.

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This, by the way,
is a challenge to certain ideas

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in traditional linguistics like,
for example,

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the one you probably all know:
the great vowel shift.

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A structuralist's view of
language has to argue that the

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great vowel shift,
in which every vowel sound goes

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up a notch in some mysterious
period between the medieval and

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the early modern,
that this only has the

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appearance of regularity but
that it is actually a diachronic

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phenomenon that can't be
understood in terms of

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regularity.

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So the relationship between
synchronic and diachronic is of

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that kind.

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Now matters are complicated a
little bit on those occasions in

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your reading when people are
talking about the way in which a

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mass of material--
a system of language or other

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semiotic system,
let's say--is inferred from

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existing data:
in other words,

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the way in which I infer
language, langue,

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from a sentence,
parole--I'm actually

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concealing from you that in fact
Saussure uses a third term,

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langage,
to talk about the sum of all

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sentences,
but we won't get into that--the

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way in which language is
inferred from parole.

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Now language,
in other words,

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is viewed as something in
space,

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that is to say--or as
Levi-Strauss calls it,

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"revertible time,"
meaning you can go backward and

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forward within it,
but the temporal unfolding is

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not the important thing about
it.

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So in space,
whereas parole,

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speech, unfolds in time so
that parole,

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because it is temporal--because
any speech any of us makes is in

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a certain sense historical,
* because the

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beginning of the sentence is
earlier in history than the end

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of the sentence--
for that reason,

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there's a relationship between
diachrony and the unfolding of

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parole,
or of a sentence or of an

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utterance which is parallel,
though at the same time

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admittedly confusing.

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One doesn't really want to talk
about a sentence as diachronic,

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but at the same time it does
exist on that horizontal axis in

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which things in a combinatory
way unfold in time.

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All right.

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So much then for synchrony and
diachrony, something we can't

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get away from.

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It's in a way the central fact
of structuralism but which I

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don't think I did adequate
justice to at the end of the

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last lecture.

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Now structuralism.

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There was an incredible aura
about structuralism in the

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1960s.

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It crashed on the shores of the
United States coming in from

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France in a way that stunned,
amazed, and transformed

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people's lives.

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People like Kant reading Hume
woke up from their dogmatic

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slumbers or,
at least, that they felt that

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that's what they were doing when
encountering structuralism.

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I think to me it happened when
I was a graduate student at

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Harvard and absolutely nobody
else was paying any attention to

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it at all.

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At Yale, Johns Hopkins,
and Cornell people were paying

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attention to it,
but at Harvard I was initiated

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to structuralism by a bright
undergraduate who seemed to be

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the only >

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person in Cambridge who knew
anything about structuralism.

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Boy, did he know about
structuralism,

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and he got me up to speed as
quickly as he could;

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but it was a phenomenon that
was transformative

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intellectually for people in the
academic, and beyond the

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academic, world all over the
country.

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Of course it led,
in all sorts of ways,

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to most of what's been going on
in theory ever since.

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The amazing thing about it is
that as a flourishing and

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undisputed French contribution
to literary theory,

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it lasted two years because in
1966 at a famous conference,

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Jacques Derrida,
whom we'll be reading on

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Thursday,
blew it out of the water.

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I'll come back to that.

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At the same time,
to say that it really only

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lasted two years simply isn't
fair.

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The lasting contribution of
structuralism as it's indebted

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to semiotics,
but on its own terms as well,

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is something one still feels
and senses throughout literary

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theory.

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The concrete contributions,
not all between 1964 when the

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first structuralist texts were
translated in this country and

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1966 when the conference in
Baltimore took place,

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but the lasting concrete
contributions are also terribly

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important.

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There's a wonderful book called
On Racine by Roland

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Barthes.

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Those of you interested in
French neoclassical theater

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cannot imagine,
if you haven't read it already,

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reading a more bracing book.

09:30.470 --> 09:33.490
There is an essay on
Baudelaire, "Les

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Chats," or "The
Cats," written conjointly

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by Levi-Strauss and Jakobson,
an extraordinary performance

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which was the model of a good
deal else that was done in the

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academy during that period.

09:47.320 --> 09:52.040
The anthropologist Edmund Leach
wrote a structuralist analysis

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of Genesis in the Bible.

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Indeed, it's no accident that
he writes about Genesis,

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as I will indicate in a minute.

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Then subsequently,
and in addition to all of that,

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probably the most lasting and
rich contributions of the

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structuralists were in the field
that we know as narratology.

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We'll be taking a look at that
when we read Peter Brooks' text

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in conjunction with Freud a
couple of weeks from now,

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but in the meantime the key
texts in narratology are,

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again, by Roland Barthes in a
long,

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long essay called "The
Structural Analysis of

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Narrative"
in which he approaches a James

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Bond novel as a system of binary
pairs and unpacks a deep

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structure in the novel as a
result of this binary analysis;

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important books by Tzvetan
Todorov,

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crucial among them The
Grammar of The

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Decameron;
and then a good deal of work

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published in a series of books
called Figures by

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repeatedly in the work of Paul
de Man that you'll be reading

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for next Tuesday.

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All of this work and a great
deal else in the theory of

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narrative,
narratology,

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is directly indebted to,
or is actually an aspect of,

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structuralist thought.

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Now I promised that I would
talk a little bit about the

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relationship between formalism
and semiotics as it clarifies

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itself in the work of writers
like Levi-Strauss and,

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in particular, Jakobson.

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Structuralism takes from
formalism, as you can see from

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Jakobson's analysis,
the idea of function.

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Jakobson is originally,
of course, himself a member of

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the school of Russian
formalists.

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He eventually immigrates to
Prague,

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where he is in a circle of
people who are already calling

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themselves structuralists,
and moves from there to Paris

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and then to the United States.

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So Jakobson,
of course, is the one figure

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who definitely harkens back to
both worlds, having been a

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formalist and having become a
structuralist.

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One can see the amalgam of
these two sets of ideas in his

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work.

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From formalism then,
you get the idea of function

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and the relationship between
syn-function and auto-function,

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which becomes the relationship
between synchrony and diachrony.

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From semiotics you get the idea
of negative knowledge--

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that is to say,
in Levi-Strauss' analysis of

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the Oedipus myth,
for example,

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the notion that there is no
true version,

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there's no originary version,
and there's no sort of positive

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version of the myth of which
everything else is a version.

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You simply know what you know
as it is differentiated from the

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other things that you know--
one of the essential premises

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of semiotics,
which is essential,

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at the same time,
in structuralism,

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because here's where
structuralism can be understood

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as an entity in itself.

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Unlike formalism,
structuralism has an ambition

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with respect to the object,
to the nature of the object,

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which is quite new.

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I think that the best way to
epitomize that is to turn to an

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aphorism of Roland Barthes' in
the essay "The

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Structuralist Activity,"
on page 871 toward the bottom

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of the right-hand column,
where Barthes says,

13:52.796 --> 13:55.986
"Structural man takes the
real,

13:55.990 --> 14:01.140
decomposes it,
then recomposes it..."

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This is the moment in which you
can see the radical difference

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between what structuralism is
doing and what formalism is

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doing.

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Formalism takes the object and
it doesn't decompose it.

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It sees the object as it is;
it just breaks it down into its

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respective functions,
showing them dynamically in

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relationship with each other and
as a system of dominance and

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subordination,
all of it understood as the way

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in which something is made,
the way in which it is put

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together--
but there's no question of

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anything other than the object.

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Gogol's "Overcoat,"
Cervantes' Don Quixote,

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Sterne's Tristam
Shandy: these are

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objects,
and there's no question of

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somehow or another creating a
virtual object,

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for example "the
novel," out of one's

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remarks about individual texts.

14:59.519 --> 15:01.579
In a way, though,
that's what,

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as you can see again from
Levi-Strauss' analysis of the

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Oedipus myth,
structuralism is doing.

15:08.330 --> 15:11.230
As Barthes says,
"Structural man takes the

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real,
decomposes it,

15:12.860 --> 15:15.340
then recomposes
it…"

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What he means by that is that
you take a bunch of variants or

15:20.148 --> 15:23.588
versions,
you take a bunch of data--not

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necessarily all the data,
but a representative amount of

15:28.232 --> 15:32.422
the data relevant to any given
idea or concept--

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and then you say,
and this is where he gets into

15:37.926 --> 15:44.956
the idea of gross constituent
units: "What are the basic

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constituent units of all of
these items of data?

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Oh, yeah.

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I see we can put them into a
pattern."

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We'll work on this a little bit
in a minute.

15:56.600 --> 15:59.650
"Yeah, I see how this is
working.

15:59.649 --> 16:03.729
As a matter of fact,
there is a kind of virtual

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object that I can begin to
observe as I organize the data

16:08.697 --> 16:13.747
that I garner from all the
individual entities or versions

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that fall under this
umbrella."

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That's the recomposition not of
any particular object,

16:24.278 --> 16:29.148
but of a kind of virtual object
which begins to emerge from

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one's analysis:
in the case of Levi-Strauss'

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text,
the meaning of the Oedipus myth.

16:37.740 --> 16:44.290
That's the virtual object that
structuralist analysis arrives

16:44.285 --> 16:49.015
at by arranging,
analyzing and classifying the

16:49.019 --> 16:54.609
data that it can get from all of
the available versions of the

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Oedipus myth.

16:56.080 --> 17:01.180
So structuralism decomposes but
not just for the sake of seeing

17:01.177 --> 17:06.187
how something works,
like taking apart the parts of

17:06.191 --> 17:11.661
an engine,
but rather in order to lend the

17:11.656 --> 17:19.276
parts to an analysis of a body
of materials that makes it

17:19.277 --> 17:26.897
possible to recompose all of
those parts in a new virtual

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object.

17:28.528 --> 17:31.188
That's what's going on in what
Barthes calls "the

17:31.192 --> 17:32.752
structuralist activity."

17:32.750 --> 17:37.760
So quickly let's take a look at
the Levi-Strauss chart,

17:37.759 --> 17:43.089
if you want to call it that,
of the Oedipus myth which is on

17:43.094 --> 17:48.524
page 864 in your text and just
say a word or two about it.

17:48.519 --> 17:50.299
He takes a lot of versions.

17:50.298 --> 17:52.728
Let's not trouble ourselves
with how many.

17:52.730 --> 17:56.740
He doesn't have nearly as many
versions by the way as he would

17:56.744 --> 18:00.634
have if he were studying a North
American Indian myth or the

18:00.630 --> 18:04.710
sorts of myths that he did study
in a variety of versions as an

18:04.711 --> 18:08.191
anthropologist,
but he has some versions--one

18:08.190 --> 18:10.540
of them,
by the way, Freud's version,

18:10.541 --> 18:15.341
one of them Sophocles' version,
and a variety of versions

18:15.338 --> 18:17.048
besides those.

18:17.048 --> 18:19.518
He says, "Hmm,
as you look at these various

18:19.519 --> 18:22.199
versions [gestures towards graph
on chalkboard],

18:22.200 --> 18:24.790
you can see that certain things
are basically happening,

18:24.788 --> 18:29.158
and they fall into certain
discrete categories.

18:29.160 --> 18:33.100
We can put them in
columns--that is to say,

18:33.098 --> 18:38.288
in terms of the way in which
they share a common theme,

18:38.288 --> 18:43.888
but we can also put those
columns in a row so that we can

18:43.890 --> 18:48.890
analyze the way in which the
columns relate to each

18:48.890 --> 18:50.490
other."

18:50.490 --> 18:53.340
For example,
there's a group of events,

18:53.338 --> 18:58.898
happenstances,
sort of naming accidents and so

18:58.897 --> 19:01.787
on,
that falls into a column called

19:01.794 --> 19:05.344
"over-determination of
blood relations."

19:05.338 --> 19:08.938
That is to say,
when Antigone tries to bury her

19:08.940 --> 19:12.150
brother and goes to the wall for
that,

19:12.150 --> 19:14.230
in ways that you might find
excessive,

19:14.230 --> 19:18.350
that's an over-determination of
blood relations.

19:18.348 --> 19:21.378
Then you notice that at the
same time,

19:21.380 --> 19:23.840
there's a series of actions in
the myth--

19:23.838 --> 19:27.268
going all the way back to
Oedipus' family history and then

19:27.265 --> 19:30.565
down through the history of his
offspring and so on--

19:30.568 --> 19:34.778
a series of actions which have
to do with the undervaluation of

19:34.778 --> 19:35.998
blood relations.

19:36.000 --> 19:38.720
People, well,
they don't really seem to care

19:38.719 --> 19:42.699
as much about blood relations as
they should, and as a result of

19:42.702 --> 19:44.792
that, bad things happen,
too.

19:44.788 --> 19:51.488
Then there's a column of issues
which have to do with the way in

19:51.487 --> 19:55.247
which recurrently,
in all of the versions of the

19:55.250 --> 19:57.640
myth,
there seems to be a strange

19:57.642 --> 20:01.542
preoccupation with that which is
born from the earth:

20:01.536 --> 20:05.426
monsters,
the teeth of monsters that are

20:05.432 --> 20:11.182
scattered and become the
alphabet in the story of Cadmos,

20:11.180 --> 20:15.660
and the variety of ways in
which heroes have to confront

20:15.657 --> 20:19.157
monsters as Oedipus confronts
the sphinx.

20:19.160 --> 20:23.580
All of these monsters are
understood as not being born

20:23.582 --> 20:26.752
from parents,
or as being born from two

20:26.753 --> 20:31.013
things, but instead as emerging
from the earth.

20:31.009 --> 20:35.329
They are thonic,
or "autochthonous"

20:35.325 --> 20:37.675
in Levi-Strauss' word.

20:37.680 --> 20:42.200
There seems to be a strange
preoccupation with autochthony

20:42.200 --> 20:49.260
in this myth,
but this is offset by the way

20:49.261 --> 20:52.681
in which--
that is to say,

20:52.675 --> 20:58.105
with fending off autochthony,
as if the crucial thing were to

20:58.105 --> 21:03.935
insist on the binary parental
relationship that produces us,

21:03.940 --> 21:09.920
to be reassured in our humanity
by the idea that one of us is

21:09.915 --> 21:11.505
born from two.

21:11.509 --> 21:14.939
But then on the other hand,
there are all kinds of things

21:14.935 --> 21:18.415
in the myth which are also
preoccupied with autochthony in

21:18.423 --> 21:20.323
precisely the opposite way.

21:20.318 --> 21:24.678
Lambda, the letter that begins
so many of the names of the

21:24.682 --> 21:28.902
figures in Oedipus' genealogy--
Labdacus, Laius and so

21:28.903 --> 21:32.523
on--lambda looks like a limping
person, right?

21:32.519 --> 21:35.999
Oedipus means "swell
foot," "one who

21:35.996 --> 21:36.966
limps."

21:36.970 --> 21:42.510
What emerges in the fourth
column is the idea that there

21:42.508 --> 21:47.038
are signs of autochthony in our
own makeup.

21:47.038 --> 21:50.408
The reason we limp is that we
have a foot of clay,

21:50.410 --> 21:54.540
that something of the earth
from which we were born sticks

21:54.538 --> 21:56.858
to us,
and this is a recurrent

21:56.863 --> 22:01.733
pattern, a recurrent idea,
in the unfolding of the Oedipus

22:01.730 --> 22:02.280
myth.

22:02.278 --> 22:05.908
It's a peculiar thing,
but notice that this is one of

22:05.905 --> 22:09.525
those occasions on which the
myth explodes into other

22:09.532 --> 22:10.442
cultures.

22:10.440 --> 22:13.520
Adam means "red clay."

22:13.519 --> 22:19.149
Adam is born from the earth in
the sense that red clay is taken

22:19.150 --> 22:22.420
from the earth and he is
created,

22:22.420 --> 22:27.480
and there seems to be this same
preoccupation with autochthony

22:27.484 --> 22:32.474
in the Oedipus myth as well,
one of the interesting links of

22:32.474 --> 22:36.844
that myth with the Christian
myth of the origin of man.

22:36.838 --> 22:40.458
So you've got four columns:
over-evaluation of blood

22:40.464 --> 22:42.594
relations,
under-evaluation of blood

22:42.592 --> 22:44.582
relations,
denial of autochthony,

22:44.583 --> 22:46.643
and persistence of autochthony.

22:46.640 --> 22:51.030
I'm going to leave it at that
for now because we'll come back

22:51.028 --> 22:55.408
later to see what interesting
thing is going on in the way in

22:55.414 --> 22:59.874
which these four columns,
all about two versus one:

22:59.871 --> 23:04.471
that is to say,
whether or not we are born from

23:04.473 --> 23:06.653
two or born from one.

23:06.650 --> 23:12.100
I want to come back to that in
the context of showing that in a

23:12.101 --> 23:15.551
certain way,
the question of whether

23:15.554 --> 23:19.124
things--ideas,
for example--come from two,

23:19.124 --> 23:23.954
two different things,
or whether ideas come from one

23:23.952 --> 23:26.922
object,
is after all this question is

23:26.922 --> 23:30.462
itself an allegory of the
structuralist activity.

23:30.460 --> 23:33.430
That's what structuralism
itself is about.

23:33.430 --> 23:37.350
That's what makes it so
interesting and even perhaps

23:37.347 --> 23:41.497
peculiar that Levi-Strauss is
able to find not just any

23:41.496 --> 23:45.876
thought in a myth but the very
thinking that he himself is

23:45.875 --> 23:47.945
doing about the myth.

23:47.950 --> 23:51.040
That, of course,
may have something to do with

23:51.038 --> 23:54.128
your sense that surely
decomposing in order to

23:54.130 --> 23:58.530
recompose,
creating a virtual systemic

23:58.527 --> 24:01.977
object--
notice that I have made this a

24:01.980 --> 24:05.400
dotted line [gestures towards
chalkboard]--

24:05.400 --> 24:07.780
that there is a kind of a
circularity in that.

24:07.778 --> 24:11.158
I hope I have explained
Levi-Strauss' four columns

24:11.161 --> 24:13.711
intelligibly,
but if you look at those

24:13.714 --> 24:15.514
>

24:15.509 --> 24:18.279
four columns you say to
yourself, "How on earth did

24:18.278 --> 24:19.738
he come up with that?"

24:19.740 --> 24:23.810
He himself says, "Oh,
well, maybe I could have done

24:23.811 --> 24:27.721
it some other way,"
and you say to yourself,

24:27.720 --> 24:29.640
"How can this become
decisive?

24:29.640 --> 24:31.720
How can it become
authoritative?"

24:31.720 --> 24:33.430
Right?

24:33.430 --> 24:35.880
You can see what he's
doing--and by the way you can

24:35.881 --> 24:38.531
confirm it by thinking of things
that he leaves out.

24:38.529 --> 24:41.279
Jocasta hangs herself,
but he doesn't mention that.

24:41.279 --> 24:43.029
It's not in any of the four
columns,

24:43.029 --> 24:44.839
but obviously that has
something to do--

24:44.838 --> 24:47.498
you can take your
choice--either between the

24:47.500 --> 24:50.530
over-determination or
under-determination of blood

24:50.532 --> 24:51.402
relations.

24:51.400 --> 24:53.670
She feels guilty because she
committed incest,

24:53.674 --> 24:54.084
right?

24:54.078 --> 24:59.258
Oedipus at his birth is
hamstrung and exposed on Mount

24:59.257 --> 25:00.427
Cithaeron.

25:00.430 --> 25:03.440
Levi-Strauss doesn't mention
that either, but obviously

25:03.435 --> 25:04.935
that's why Oedipus limps.

25:04.940 --> 25:08.170
Oedipus is a limping person
like the letter lambda,

25:08.172 --> 25:08.692
right?

25:08.690 --> 25:11.930
So plainly that must have
something to do with the

25:11.931 --> 25:13.851
persistence of autochthony.

25:13.848 --> 25:16.688
Finally, if you read Oedipus
at Colonus,

25:16.688 --> 25:19.028
at the end of it Oedipus,
when he dies,

25:19.032 --> 25:22.362
is swallowed up by the earth;
"dust thou art,

25:22.359 --> 25:24.489
to dust thou shalt
return."

25:24.490 --> 25:29.330
The equivalent of this in the
Oedipus myth is that "where

25:29.326 --> 25:33.366
I came from [the earth]
is where I will go."

25:33.368 --> 25:38.128
He becomes a kind of genius of
the place at Colonus.

25:38.130 --> 25:42.550
As a result of having been
swallowed up there,

25:42.546 --> 25:48.726
he becomes a kind of presiding
spirit or genius of the place.

25:48.730 --> 25:52.330
So all of those things which we
ourselves thought of--

25:52.328 --> 25:55.598
he didn't think of them and he
didn't put them in his diagram--

25:55.598 --> 25:58.908
can, however,
be put in his diagram.

25:58.910 --> 26:01.600
If that's the case,
we have to say to ourselves,

26:01.601 --> 26:03.951
"There might be something
in this.

26:03.950 --> 26:08.380
Maybe this is a plausible and
interesting way of arranging

26:08.383 --> 26:10.253
these materials."

26:10.250 --> 26:14.740
So I really do think that ought
to be said in defense of what

26:14.741 --> 26:18.041
may seem, however,
to be a somewhat arbitrary

26:18.036 --> 26:19.006
exercise.

26:19.009 --> 26:22.249
Now turning to Jakobson,
you may say with all this

26:22.251 --> 26:26.161
emphasis I've been throwing on
"decomposing in order to

26:26.155 --> 26:29.065
recompose"
that you don't see that going

26:29.067 --> 26:31.447
on in what Jakobson is saying.

26:31.450 --> 26:34.460
You may say to yourself,
"Well, he seems to be just

26:34.455 --> 26:35.435
doing formalism.

26:35.440 --> 26:40.080
He breaks any speech act into
six functions.

26:40.078 --> 26:44.348
He talks about the
inter-determinacy of those six

26:44.353 --> 26:47.383
functions with a certain result.

26:47.380 --> 26:49.560
That sounds just like
formalism,"

26:49.559 --> 26:50.149
you say.

26:50.150 --> 26:54.120
Well, one way to show the way
in which what Jakobson is doing

26:54.117 --> 26:58.017
is structuralist is to say that
after all in this essay--

26:58.019 --> 27:00.519
there's a lot more of the
essay, by the way,

27:00.519 --> 27:01.979
which your editor doesn't give
you.

27:01.980 --> 27:03.950
It's mostly about
versification,

27:03.945 --> 27:07.435
which is the long-standing
specialty of Jakobson's work:

27:07.435 --> 27:11.775
Russian versification,
Czech versification and so on,

27:11.778 --> 27:16.218
a little technical,
but it is all about the poetic

27:16.221 --> 27:17.091
function.

27:17.088 --> 27:19.968
After all, this essay is about
the poetic function,

27:19.970 --> 27:22.620
what the formalists would call
literariness.

27:22.618 --> 27:26.408
But Jakobson has a real
contribution to make to this

27:26.407 --> 27:30.687
notion of the poetic function,
and what it is is basically

27:30.685 --> 27:34.055
this: the poetic function--
and I'm going to quote this for

27:34.064 --> 27:34.834
the first time.

27:34.828 --> 27:39.588
It's on page 858 in the
left-hand column and it's a

27:39.592 --> 27:40.642
mouthful.

27:40.640 --> 27:44.950
"The poetic function
projects the principle of

27:44.952 --> 27:49.612
equivalence from the axis of
selection into the axis of

27:49.612 --> 27:51.512
combination."

27:51.509 --> 27:52.589
Now you understand.

27:52.588 --> 27:55.908
"The poetic function
projects the principle of

27:55.911 --> 27:59.501
equivalence from the axis of
selection into the axis of

27:59.498 --> 28:00.958
combination."

28:00.960 --> 28:02.650
What is the principle of
equivalence?

28:02.650 --> 28:04.950
If you've got that,
you've got a good deal of it.

28:04.950 --> 28:08.100
The principle of equivalence
can be understood as what

28:08.096 --> 28:10.106
Jakobson in the
"aphasia"

28:10.114 --> 28:12.014
essay calls
"metaphor,"

28:12.013 --> 28:14.333
that is to say the way in
which--

28:14.328 --> 28:19.088
you remember last time I talked
about how signs cluster in the

28:19.090 --> 28:22.760
vertical axis [gestures towards
chalkboard],

28:22.759 --> 28:24.719
and if we understand language
as a system,

28:24.720 --> 28:27.350
there are some signs that
relate to other signs in ways

28:27.354 --> 28:29.944
that they probably don't relate
to yet other signs.

28:29.940 --> 28:32.320
Then I had an incredible lapse
of memory.

28:32.318 --> 28:35.858
I couldn't remember a synonym
for "ship,"

28:35.861 --> 28:40.251
but I hope that I got my point
across to you and indicated that

28:40.251 --> 28:44.431
there are varieties of ways in
which any given sign clusters

28:44.431 --> 28:46.061
with other signs.

28:46.058 --> 28:50.278
Those ways of clustering are
what Jakobson calls "the

28:50.278 --> 28:52.718
principle of equivalence."

28:52.720 --> 28:53.910
What is it?

28:53.910 --> 28:58.260
Well, it's the way in which
signs either are similar to each

28:58.259 --> 29:01.209
other or are dissimilar to each
other.

29:01.210 --> 29:04.700
If that sounds too vague,
maybe it's better not to use

29:04.700 --> 29:08.320
language of difference or
similarity but actually to use

29:08.321 --> 29:11.221
language of opposition:
in other words,

29:11.220 --> 29:14.210
the way in which signs are
virtually synonymous,

29:14.210 --> 29:18.430
or the way in which signs are
really and truly opposed to each

29:18.434 --> 29:18.994
other.

29:18.990 --> 29:23.340
Obviously, it stretches just as
in versification.

29:23.339 --> 29:26.349
You don't just have full rhyme;
you have slant rhyme.

29:26.348 --> 29:32.388
These relationships stretch in
varieties of ways of this kind,

29:32.390 --> 29:37.190
but the principle of
equivalence is the way in which

29:37.188 --> 29:42.108
signs understood as phonemes,
lexemes, tagmemes--how ever you

29:42.107 --> 29:46.627
want to understand them--
the way in which signs are

29:46.627 --> 29:49.207
similar or dissimilar.

29:49.210 --> 29:54.760
The readiness with which we
combine signs of that kind is

29:54.756 --> 30:00.596
what a person attending to the
poetic function looks for.

30:00.598 --> 30:06.818
If the utterance seems to
involve a predominance of

30:06.821 --> 30:12.471
equivalences of various kinds,
then this utterance,

30:12.468 --> 30:16.158
which is unfolding on the axis
of combination,

30:16.160 --> 30:19.530
right [gestures towards
chalkboard], is the result of

30:19.528 --> 30:22.768
having projected that principle
of equivalence--

30:22.769 --> 30:25.839
call it metaphor,
call it a principle of

30:25.838 --> 30:31.118
similarity or dissimilarity--
from the axis of selection;

30:31.118 --> 30:34.358
that is to say,
that axis, perhaps a virtual

30:34.362 --> 30:37.942
one,
in which language is a system

30:37.943 --> 30:42.813
to the axis of combination,
that real axis--because nobody

30:42.808 --> 30:46.408
doubts the existence of speech--
that real axis in which

30:46.414 --> 30:51.054
language is not a system but has
become speech unfolding in time.

30:51.048 --> 30:55.678
The principle of the poetic
function, however,

30:55.676 --> 31:01.326
can be understood then as the
metaphorization of what is

31:01.332 --> 31:03.802
otherwise metonymic.

31:03.798 --> 31:06.268
In other words,
if I put together a sentence,

31:06.269 --> 31:09.299
what I'm doing is I'm putting
words next to each other,

31:09.303 --> 31:11.103
and that's what metonymy is.

31:11.098 --> 31:16.018
Metonymy is a selection of
signs, if you will,

31:16.019 --> 31:19.649
that go appropriately next to
each other according to the

31:19.648 --> 31:23.728
rules of grammar and syntax and
according to the rules of logic,

31:23.730 --> 31:27.560
right;
but also perhaps in the ways in

31:27.555 --> 31:33.595
which the rhetorical device of
metonymy can be understood.

31:33.598 --> 31:40.318
If I say "hut"
instead of "house"--

31:40.318 --> 31:43.238
I'm using an example actually
taken from Jakobson's

31:43.237 --> 31:44.927
"aphasia"
essay--

31:44.930 --> 31:49.600
and if I say,
"The hut is small,"

31:49.596 --> 31:54.596
there is a metonymic
relationship implied with

31:54.596 --> 31:58.106
houses,
shacks, mansions,

31:58.114 --> 32:03.094
and other sorts of edifice,
but which can only really be

32:03.088 --> 32:05.828
resolved,
perhaps, by the unfolding of

32:05.826 --> 32:09.436
the logic of the sentence as in
when I say,

32:09.440 --> 32:10.740
"The hut is small."

32:10.740 --> 32:14.100
So combinatory
processes--borrowing the

32:14.096 --> 32:17.186
rhetorical term
"metonymy"

32:17.188 --> 32:21.868
as "that which is next to
each other"--

32:21.869 --> 32:23.809
are basically metonymic.

32:23.808 --> 32:28.858
The available signs to be
selected, on the other hand,

32:28.862 --> 32:34.582
on the axis of selection are
selected for certain purposes if

32:34.582 --> 32:36.872
they are metaphoric.

32:36.868 --> 32:40.388
Obviously, if I'm just making a
sentence, I'm not selecting

32:40.386 --> 32:42.506
signs because they're
metaphoric.

32:42.509 --> 32:46.059
I select them because they go
easily next to each other,

32:46.064 --> 32:49.364
either for reasons of grammar
or syntax or logic.

32:49.358 --> 32:53.428
Now let's look at Jakobson's
six functions [gestures towards

32:53.434 --> 32:55.374
board]
taken all together.

32:55.368 --> 32:58.868
I think this is by no means
difficult, and I think that

32:58.874 --> 33:02.704
Jakobson's analysis of the six
functions is just absolutely,

33:02.701 --> 33:04.131
totally brilliant.

33:04.130 --> 33:07.710
In fact, I'm so profoundly
convinced by what Jakobson says

33:07.708 --> 33:11.538
about these six functions that I
really think there isn't much

33:11.537 --> 33:13.167
>

33:13.170 --> 33:15.500
else to say about an utterance.

33:15.500 --> 33:18.030
Obviously in different
registers there's lots to say,

33:18.028 --> 33:22.718
but in the spirit of
Jakobsonian analysis there's no

33:22.723 --> 33:28.803
possible complaint you can make
about this except possibly one,

33:28.798 --> 33:31.978
which I probably won't get to
until next time.

33:31.980 --> 33:35.070
In the meantime,
it's just staggeringly

33:35.065 --> 33:36.035
effective.

33:36.038 --> 33:41.478
Let me use the example of an
expression which is surely as

33:41.484 --> 33:45.434
uninteresting--
I've groped as much as I could

33:45.425 --> 33:50.135
to find the most uninteresting
possible expression to show the

33:50.135 --> 33:54.305
way in which any utterance
whatsoever entails these six

33:54.306 --> 33:57.546
functions: "It is
raining."

33:57.548 --> 34:00.568
Oh, boy, "Excitement
rains," as they say.

34:00.568 --> 34:04.248
In any case,
let's say that I am an

34:04.248 --> 34:09.548
addresser--that is to say,
I'm a Romantic poet.

34:09.550 --> 34:13.860
I say--probably ill advisedly
if I'm a poet,

34:13.860 --> 34:18.510
but I'm a Romantic poet--I say,
sort of waking everybody up

34:18.514 --> 34:20.834
when I say it,
"It is raining."

34:20.829 --> 34:21.729
All right.

34:21.730 --> 34:23.280
What do I mean
>

34:23.280 --> 34:25.420
if I'm a Romantic poet?

34:25.420 --> 34:28.840
What I mean to say is "I'm
singing in the rain"

34:28.836 --> 34:31.396
or "It's raining in my
heart."

34:31.400 --> 34:34.240
In other words,
I'm expressing something

34:34.237 --> 34:37.507
emotional in saying "It is
raining,"

34:37.514 --> 34:41.594
so that sense of the expression
"It is raining"

34:41.590 --> 34:45.230
is what Jakobson calls the
emotive function.

34:45.230 --> 34:47.810
Now I'm being addressed.

34:47.809 --> 34:51.429
The thrust of the message is
toward the addressee.

34:51.429 --> 34:54.959
It's being spoken by an
addresser, but it's aimed at an

34:54.963 --> 34:55.753
addressee.

34:55.750 --> 35:01.280
That addressee is a small child
going out the door without his

35:01.282 --> 35:04.992
coat on,
and his mother or father says,

35:04.989 --> 35:08.149
"It is raining,"
right,

35:08.150 --> 35:12.130
which means--of course as a
conative function,

35:12.130 --> 35:15.610
as a command,
as something which has a design

35:15.608 --> 35:18.998
on the addressee--
what it means is "Put your

35:18.996 --> 35:19.866
coat on."

35:19.869 --> 35:24.449
But you don't necessarily say,
"Put your coat on."

35:24.449 --> 35:26.659
You say, "It is
raining,"

35:26.657 --> 35:28.927
and that's the conative
function.

35:28.929 --> 35:31.539
That's what Jakobson calls
"the set to the

35:31.541 --> 35:33.531
addressee":
that is to say,

35:33.530 --> 35:37.510
the basic dominant bearing that
the message has,

35:37.510 --> 35:41.230
the "set,"
is a set to the addressee.

35:41.230 --> 35:44.480
Now there's a context for any
utterance.

35:44.480 --> 35:47.810
This much I suppose none of us
would think to disagree with:

35:47.807 --> 35:49.887
I'm a weatherman,
I'm a meteorologist,

35:49.894 --> 35:50.464
right?

35:50.460 --> 35:52.400
I don't even have to look out
the window.

35:52.400 --> 35:55.880
I look at my charts and I
announce confidently through the

35:55.884 --> 35:58.334
microphone, "It is
raining."

35:58.329 --> 35:59.249
Right?

35:59.250 --> 36:01.630
Everybody takes me seriously.

36:01.630 --> 36:04.850
The referential function of
"It is raining"

36:04.849 --> 36:07.079
is supposed to convey
information.

36:07.079 --> 36:08.859
I'm a weatherman,
and I'm supposed to know what

36:08.864 --> 36:09.644
I'm talking about.

36:09.639 --> 36:12.879
So if a weatherman tells me
"It is raining,"

36:12.882 --> 36:14.782
I believe that it is raining.

36:14.780 --> 36:17.570
I put my hand out the door and,
sure enough,

36:17.570 --> 36:20.600
it is raining,
and the referential function--

36:20.599 --> 36:24.229
the dominant in the expression
"It is raining"

36:24.228 --> 36:28.308
as referential function--
has been confirmed.

36:28.309 --> 36:31.709
I don't expect the weatherman
to be telling me somehow

36:31.710 --> 36:34.850
secretly that he's crying when
he says "It is

36:34.853 --> 36:36.143
raining,"
right?

36:36.135 --> 36:37.675
>

36:37.675 --> 36:38.505
Right?

36:38.510 --> 36:42.010
I expect him to tell me the
truth about the weather,

36:42.014 --> 36:45.454
right, and that's what I'm
listening to him for.

36:45.449 --> 36:46.449
All right.

36:46.449 --> 36:48.369
Now "the set to the
contact."

36:48.369 --> 36:52.379
Jakobson gives you those
wonderful examples from Dorothy

36:52.375 --> 36:55.505
Parker's representation of a
date: "Oh,

36:55.507 --> 36:56.087
boy.

36:56.090 --> 36:57.930
Well, here we are,
yeah, here we are,

36:57.925 --> 36:59.145
>

36:59.150 --> 37:02.420
yeah, we sure are here,"
and so on,

37:02.420 --> 37:05.980
right--in other words,
in a state of abject and acute

37:05.981 --> 37:08.861
nervousness filling the air with
words,

37:08.860 --> 37:13.330
right, so that you're on a
date, right,

37:13.329 --> 37:15.589
and you can't think of anything
to say.

37:15.590 --> 37:17.020
>

37:17.018 --> 37:18.168
I really feel sorry for you.

37:18.172 --> 37:19.082
>

37:19.079 --> 37:20.149
>

37:20.150 --> 37:23.760
You're on a date and you can't
think of anything to say so you

37:23.755 --> 37:25.585
say,
"It is raining,"

37:25.585 --> 37:27.705
and of course your interlocutor
says,

37:27.710 --> 37:30.460
"Yeah, it's raining,"
and you say,

37:30.460 --> 37:32.900
"It's raining hard,"
and she says,

37:32.900 --> 37:34.270
"Well, yeah.

37:34.269 --> 37:35.679
Maybe it'll stop soon."

37:35.679 --> 37:39.479
So the conversation continues,
and that's phatic

37:39.478 --> 37:43.838
function--checking to make sure
the contact is working:

37:43.842 --> 37:46.592
"testing one,
two, three;

37:46.590 --> 37:48.360
can you hear me?"

37:48.360 --> 37:53.730
That's what the set to the
contact is: anything that

37:53.733 --> 37:59.843
confirms that you're actually
sort of in communication with

37:59.844 --> 38:03.374
somebody,
and anything we can say has

38:03.373 --> 38:04.593
that component.

38:04.590 --> 38:07.660
I mean, if I'm a physicist and
I'm going out on a date with

38:07.657 --> 38:09.877
another physicist,
I say, "E equals MC

38:09.878 --> 38:10.828
squared."

38:10.829 --> 38:13.869
Only I'm not saying "E
equals MC squared";

38:13.869 --> 38:15.229
I'm filling the air with words.

38:15.230 --> 38:19.410
So once again,
it's the set to the contact,

38:19.407 --> 38:25.077
and any message in the right
context has that function.

38:25.079 --> 38:29.869
The set to the code is when
we're not sure that we

38:29.867 --> 38:35.237
adequately share the code with
another person on a given

38:35.242 --> 38:40.812
occasion so that we back away
from simply saying things to

38:40.811 --> 38:45.601
make sure that what we're saying
is clear,

38:45.599 --> 38:47.189
in other words to define them.

38:47.190 --> 38:49.400
I say, "There's a mare in
the field."

38:49.400 --> 38:51.170
Somebody says,
"What is a mare?"

38:51.170 --> 38:52.550
"Well, it's a female
horse."

38:52.550 --> 38:56.170
"Well, it's a female
horse" is the metalingual

38:56.166 --> 38:56.886
function.

38:56.889 --> 38:59.269
But we're talking about
"It is raining."

38:59.268 --> 39:00.778
This is where it really gets
interesting.

39:00.782 --> 39:01.692
>

39:01.690 --> 39:04.830
The most interesting thing
about "It is raining"

39:04.831 --> 39:07.591
in terms of these six functions
is metalingual,

39:07.590 --> 39:10.160
because what on earth is
"it"?

39:10.159 --> 39:11.259
Right?

39:11.260 --> 39:13.110
Somebody tells me "It is
raining."

39:13.110 --> 39:14.260
I say, "What?

39:14.260 --> 39:15.530
What are you talking about?

39:15.530 --> 39:16.590
What is 'it'?

39:16.590 --> 39:19.180
I have absolutely no idea what
you're saying."

39:19.179 --> 39:21.849
I've noticed that other
languages have this same weird

39:21.851 --> 39:23.721
phenomenon"
"Il pleut,"

39:23.717 --> 39:25.027
"Es regnet."

39:25.030 --> 39:26.870
What on earth does any of that
mean?

39:26.869 --> 39:28.099
What is "il"?

39:28.099 --> 39:28.899
What is "es"?

39:28.900 --> 39:29.740
What is "it"?

39:29.739 --> 39:31.109
Is it God?

39:31.110 --> 39:31.860
Is it Jupiter Pluvius?

39:31.860 --> 39:33.720
Is it the cloud canopy?

39:33.719 --> 39:36.919
Well, it sort of is the cloud
canopy, but that's sort of

39:36.922 --> 39:39.372
clearly not what's meant by
"it,"

39:39.367 --> 39:39.947
right?

39:39.949 --> 39:43.469
"It"
is a kind of grammatical and

39:43.474 --> 39:48.174
syntactical anomaly which is
extremely difficult even for

39:48.172 --> 39:51.532
linguists to analyze and to
explain;

39:51.530 --> 39:56.780
so that when I try to say,
"It is raining,"

39:56.782 --> 39:59.492
I can expect,
if I am talking to a

39:59.489 --> 40:03.189
literalist, of course,
the metalingual function to

40:03.190 --> 40:06.340
kick in and,
in fact, bite me in the shin.

40:06.340 --> 40:10.910
It's no picnic with the
metalingual function in mind

40:10.911 --> 40:14.141
saying, "It is
raining."

40:14.139 --> 40:16.199
What kind of a definition of
"it"

40:16.195 --> 40:17.565
is "It's raining?"

40:17.565 --> 40:18.785
>

40:18.789 --> 40:23.899
So problems arise but they're
interesting problems,

40:23.900 --> 40:26.770
and they are a function,
one of the six functions,

40:26.768 --> 40:28.888
of the expression "It is
raining."

40:28.889 --> 40:31.469
Poetic function is
unfortunately not very

40:31.474 --> 40:32.384
interesting.

40:32.380 --> 40:35.340
That's the one drawback of this
example,

40:35.340 --> 40:37.840
but there's still plenty to
say: "ih-ih"

40:37.836 --> 40:40.076
and the "ih"
in raining,

40:40.079 --> 40:41.929
which one can hear--the double
"ih"

40:41.934 --> 40:45.384
in raining,
the monosyllables suggesting a

40:45.380 --> 40:50.670
kind of a quick declaration of
something followed by a sense of

40:50.672 --> 40:55.372
duration that one always feels
when one is aware of rain

40:55.367 --> 40:59.117
coming: that "It is
rainnnnnnning,"

40:59.121 --> 41:03.651
so that the duration of
prolongation of the word has a

41:03.646 --> 41:07.996
kind of semantic value
indicating to us that this is

41:07.998 --> 41:11.638
something ongoing--
in other words,

41:11.641 --> 41:15.971
a variety of ways in which the
poetic function of "It is

41:15.972 --> 41:18.502
raining"
can be considered.

41:18.500 --> 41:21.090
For the poetic function to be
dominant--

41:21.090 --> 41:26.000
as I suggested when I said a
Romantic poet wouldn't be very

41:26.003 --> 41:30.583
smart if he or she said "It
was raining"--

41:30.579 --> 41:36.759
would really be taxing for
anyone who wanted to make it so.

41:36.760 --> 41:43.700
But any function could be the
dominant in a certain situation

41:43.697 --> 41:46.587
of any given utterance.

41:46.590 --> 41:51.430
So that then,
sort of, perhaps serves to

41:51.425 --> 41:58.365
suffice as an analysis of
Jakobson's understanding of the

41:58.369 --> 42:02.089
structure of an utterance.

42:02.090 --> 42:06.120
It has a structure
insofar--that is to say a

42:06.119 --> 42:11.369
metaphoric as opposed to a
metonymic structure insofar as

42:11.367 --> 42:17.087
we observe the presence of some
kind of pressure from the axis

42:17.085 --> 42:20.385
of selection,
the principle of equivalence

42:20.385 --> 42:24.135
and the axis of selection,
bringing itself to bear on the

42:24.135 --> 42:27.385
way in which the combination
takes place.

42:27.389 --> 42:31.859
It's just incredible that you
say, "It is raining."

42:31.860 --> 42:33.740
What could be more prosaic than
"It is raining?"

42:33.739 --> 42:35.659
All of a sudden you notice that
string of "i's."

42:35.659 --> 42:37.659
You notice all kinds of other
things about it.

42:37.659 --> 42:44.249
The way in which the most banal
utterance is combined is likely

42:44.246 --> 42:48.916
in one form or another almost
unavoidable.

42:48.920 --> 42:52.260
I suppose I should use the
strong argument and say

42:52.257 --> 42:56.007
"unavoidably":
is likely unavoidably to entail

42:56.005 --> 42:58.385
aspects of the poetic function.

42:58.389 --> 43:03.449
Where the poetic function is
dominant you have literariness,

43:03.454 --> 43:07.754
and that of course,
is the old object of scientific

43:07.746 --> 43:11.176
attention of the Russian
formalists;

43:11.179 --> 43:14.499
but it is refined in a way
that, I think,

43:14.500 --> 43:20.240
is structuralist by Jakobson
because he insists on the binary

43:20.235 --> 43:25.585
nature of the process of
combining elements from the axis

43:25.590 --> 43:29.510
of selection if they are
equivalent--

43:29.510 --> 43:33.250
binary being "same,"
"opposite,"

43:33.253 --> 43:36.413
"similar,"
"dissimilar,"

43:36.411 --> 43:40.671
and the variety of patterns in
which those relations,

43:40.670 --> 43:42.760
"same,"
"opposite,"

43:42.760 --> 43:45.340
"similar,"
and "dissimilar,"

43:45.344 --> 43:46.944
can be launched into use.

43:46.940 --> 43:56.190
Now I've actually reached the
point at which possibly I could

43:56.193 --> 44:05.453
get involved in some elements of
critique, and I suppose I'll

44:05.447 --> 44:06.987
begin.

44:06.989 --> 44:11.139
I may not finish but we can
always carry over into the next

44:11.143 --> 44:11.863
lecture.

44:11.860 --> 44:14.470
So since we've been talking
about Jakobson,

44:14.469 --> 44:19.299
let me call your attention to
one problem in what seems to me

44:19.295 --> 44:23.875
otherwise to be a truly
remarkable exercise of thought.

44:23.880 --> 44:28.170
That problem arises on page 858.

44:28.170 --> 44:31.570


44:31.570 --> 44:34.400
He himself recognizes that it's
a problem.

44:34.400 --> 44:38.040
He acknowledges it's a problem,
but he wants to say that he's

44:38.036 --> 44:40.156
solved it in saying what he
says.

44:40.159 --> 44:45.039
It's about two thirds of the
way down the page and it's about

44:45.043 --> 44:49.193
the relationship between the
poetic function and the

44:49.193 --> 44:53.813
metalingual function,
between the set to the message

44:53.811 --> 44:57.021
and the set to the code,
as he puts it.

44:57.019 --> 45:00.009
This is what he says:
It may be objected [Yes,

45:00.012 --> 45:02.702
and here we are objecting,
right?]

45:02.704 --> 45:07.384
that metalanguage also makes a
sequential use of equivalent

45:07.382 --> 45:12.222
units when combining synonymic
expressions into an equational

45:12.222 --> 45:16.502
sentence: A = A
("Mare is the female of

45:16.496 --> 45:19.316
the horse").

45:19.320 --> 45:23.470
Poetry and metalanguage,
however, are in diametrical

45:23.471 --> 45:27.221
opposition to each other
[They're not the same,

45:27.215 --> 45:28.025
right?

45:28.030 --> 45:31.390
They're in diametrical
opposition to each other]:

45:31.385 --> 45:35.575
in metalanguage the sequence is
used to build an equation [in

45:35.581 --> 45:39.961
other words,
to prove that one term can be

45:39.960 --> 45:44.140
understood in terms of other
terms],

45:44.139 --> 45:51.119
whereas in poetry the equation
is used to build a sequence.

45:51.119 --> 45:51.679
Okay.

45:51.679 --> 45:53.919
Now in one sense this is true,
obviously.

45:53.920 --> 45:56.190
Yes, that is,
I know when I'm speaking

45:56.190 --> 45:59.320
metalanguage and I know when I'm
speaking poetry.

45:59.320 --> 46:03.960
Maybe you know it too,
but what Jakobson has actually

46:03.960 --> 46:08.780
done is he's sort of exposed a
structuralist nerve,

46:08.780 --> 46:14.260
because he has appealed to
intention: that is to say,

46:14.260 --> 46:18.950
he's said the metalingual
expression has one intention and

46:18.952 --> 46:22.742
the poetic expression has
another intention.

46:22.739 --> 46:23.529
What does that mean?

46:23.530 --> 46:27.880
It has a genesis;
it has an origin in an

46:27.878 --> 46:33.938
intending consciousness just as
in traditions that are not

46:33.936 --> 46:39.206
structuralist,
things have origins in prior

46:39.210 --> 46:45.690
causes and not in their
structural relationship between

46:45.690 --> 46:47.370
two things.

46:47.369 --> 46:50.649
In other words,
if structuralism is a critique

46:50.648 --> 46:53.728
of genesis,
as is the case with Edmund

46:53.728 --> 46:57.528
Leach's analysis of the biblical
text Genesis,

46:57.530 --> 47:02.900
as is the case certainly with
Levi-Strauss' understanding of

47:02.898 --> 47:07.028
the Oedipus myth,
from two and not from one--if

47:07.027 --> 47:10.287
structuralism is a critique of
genesis,

47:10.289 --> 47:14.219
what happens when you have to
make a distinction between two

47:14.221 --> 47:17.461
entities in your system,
the poetic function and the

47:17.460 --> 47:20.590
metalingual function,
in terms of their genesis:

47:20.588 --> 47:23.988
that is to say,
in terms of the intention that

47:23.989 --> 47:25.429
stands behind them?

47:25.429 --> 47:28.859
As I said, the example seems
trivial because we're all more

47:28.858 --> 47:31.928
than prepared to agree with
Jakobson that we know the

47:31.931 --> 47:35.241
difference when we see it
between the metalingual and the

47:35.240 --> 47:38.100
poetic functions,
but he's not actually saying we

47:38.097 --> 47:39.767
know the difference when we see
it.

47:39.768 --> 47:42.068
Maybe it would have been better
if he had said,

47:42.070 --> 47:44.870
"Well, anybody can see
what's metalingual and what's

47:44.869 --> 47:45.719
poetic."

47:45.719 --> 47:47.969
Maybe it would have been better
if he had.

47:47.969 --> 47:50.909
What he says instead is that
metalingual is intended to do

47:50.909 --> 47:53.329
one thing;
poetic is intended to do

47:53.333 --> 47:54.463
another thing.

47:54.460 --> 47:57.950
That opens, actually,
a can of worms about all six

47:57.954 --> 47:58.814
functions.

47:58.809 --> 48:02.009
I stand here in front of you
and I say "It is

48:02.012 --> 48:03.062
raining."

48:03.059 --> 48:06.869
How do you know what I am
intending, right:

48:06.865 --> 48:11.575
whether I'm nervous and sort of
just being phatic;

48:11.579 --> 48:15.949
whether I am really unhappy or
happy;

48:15.949 --> 48:18.429
whether I think you're
crazy--it is in fact raining

48:18.431 --> 48:20.221
outside and I don't see any
coats;

48:20.219 --> 48:24.199
or whether I am actually sort
of just masquerading as an

48:24.195 --> 48:27.735
English professor--I am really a
meteorologist?

48:27.739 --> 48:31.689
You don't know any of these
things.

48:31.690 --> 48:34.590
You have to infer an intention,
right?

48:34.590 --> 48:38.610
If you infer an intention in
order to make these

48:38.610 --> 48:43.010
distinctions,
how can the structuralist

48:43.010 --> 48:49.680
imperative of structure rather
than genesis be preserved

48:49.677 --> 48:50.887
intact?

48:50.889 --> 48:56.319
How can we insist that we know
things negatively and not

48:56.320 --> 49:01.160
positively if we have to infer a
direct cause,

49:01.159 --> 49:05.169
a positive cause,
in order to grasp distinctions

49:05.166 --> 49:07.976
even between the six functions?

49:07.980 --> 49:12.190
That's a rhetorical question
with which I don't necessarily

49:12.190 --> 49:16.330
agree but it is a potential
objection that you may wish to

49:16.327 --> 49:18.067
explore on your own.

49:18.070 --> 49:21.080
Now the critique of
Levi-Strauss I have already

49:21.083 --> 49:24.363
hinted at, but there's another
aspect of it too.

49:24.360 --> 49:28.570
That I will defer until next
time because you'll find that

49:28.572 --> 49:32.862
the essay of Derrida's that
you're reading is largely about

49:32.858 --> 49:35.968
Levi-Strauss,
so it will make a natural segue

49:35.969 --> 49:39.589
between what we're talking about
today and what we'll be talking

49:39.588 --> 49:42.758
about Thursday,
to return first to certain

49:42.755 --> 49:47.215
aspects of Levi-Strauss'
argument and then get going with

49:47.224 --> 49:49.304
what Derrida is saying.

49:49.300 --> 49:50.590
Thank you.

49:50.590 --> 49:52.200
See you then.

49:52.199 --> 49:58.999