WEBVTT

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Prof: Okay.

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Moving then as quickly as
possible into our subject matter

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for today,
we begin a series of lectures

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on various aspects of
twentieth-century formalism--

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a big word.

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At the end of our run through
the varieties of

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twentieth-century formalism,
I hope it doesn't seem quite as

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big and that its many meanings--
yet a finite number of

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meanings--have been made clear
to you.

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That is to say,
what we're taking up this week,

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is as much really the history
of criticism as literary theory.

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You remember in the first
lecture I said there's a

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difference between the history
of criticism and theory of

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literature,
one difference being that the

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history of criticism has a great
deal to do with literary

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evaluation: that is to say,
why do we care about literature

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and how can we find means of
saying that it's good or not

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good?

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This is an aspect of thought
concerning literature that tends

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to fall out of literary theory
but not out of the materials

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that we are reading this week.

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You can see that when Wimsatt
and Beardsley talk about the

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"success"
of the poem,

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they understand the whole
critical enterprise,

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including its theoretical
underpinnings--

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the question of what is a poem,
the question of how should we

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best read it--
to be still geared toward

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literary evaluation.

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That makes the subject matter
that we'll be discussing this

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week, as I say,
as much a part of the history

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of criticism as it is of
literary theory.

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We're going to be
reading it with a theoretical

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spin.

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That is to say,
we're going to focus on the

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question of what a poem is and
the question,

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"What criteria should we
invoke in order to read it for

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the best and correctly?"

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But there are other ways of
approaching this material.

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In any case, then, Wimsatt.

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Beardsley by the way was
actually a philosopher who

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taught at Temple University,
a good friend of his.

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In the book in which the essay
"The Intentional

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Fallacy" appeared,
a book called The Verbal

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Icon, Wimsatt collaborated
with Monroe Beardsley on three

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essays,
and this is one of them.

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So we try to remember to say
"Wimsatt and

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Beardsley"
even though it is Wimsatt who

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taught at Yale.

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That in itself needn't be
significant except that the New

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Critics,
the school of critics to which

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he belonged,
have always been identified

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with Yale and indeed
consolidated here a kind of

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teaching method and attitude
toward literature which

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constituted the first wave--
the first of two waves--of

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involvement in literary theory
which amounts to the Yale

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English and comparative
literature departments' claims

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to fame.

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Many of those figures who
belong to the New Critics did

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much of their important work
before they arrived at Yale.

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Others never were at Yale,
and yet at the same time it's a

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movement closely associated with
this institution.

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When I arrived at Yale,
Wimsatt was still teaching,

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Cleanth Brooks was still
teaching, and so I feel a kind

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of personal continuity with
these figures and understand,

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as we all will more fully later
on,

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the way in which the style,
and emphasis on the style,

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of close reading that evolved
within the New Criticism

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meaningfully and importantly
left its mark on much subsequent

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criticism and theory that hasn't
in fact always acknowledged the

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New Criticism perhaps to the
extent that it might have.

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Much of this should be reserved
for next time when I talk about

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Cleanth Brooks and return to the
whole subject of the New

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Criticism and the way in which
it's viewed historically--

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so much of it can be reserved
for next time.

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But what I do want to say now
is this.

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If it weren't for the New
Critics, none of you probably

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would have been able to sit
patiently through any of your

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middle or high school English
classes.

04:29.050 --> 04:33.060
When Cleanth Brooks and Robert
Penn Warren published a book

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called Understanding Poetry,
first published in 1939 and

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then subsequently reissued again
and again and again as it swept

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the country,
suddenly schoolteachers had a

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way of keeping kids in the
classroom for fifty minutes.

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Close reading,
the idea that you could take a

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text and do things with it--
that the interpretation of a

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text wasn't just a matter of
saying,

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"Oh, yes,
it's about this and isn't it

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beautiful?"--
reciting the text,

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emoting over it,
enthusing about it,

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and then looking around for
something else to say--

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it was no longer a question of
doing that.

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It was a question of
constructing an elaborate formal

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edifice to which everybody could
contribute.

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Students got excited about it.

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They saw certain patterns or
certain ways of elaborating

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patterns that the teachers were
talking about and,

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lo and behold,
the fifty minutes was over and

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everybody had had a pretty good
time.

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This had never happened in an
English class before.

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>

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>

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Seriously, you're English
majors because of the New

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Criticism--I admit,
especially if you went to

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private school.

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This way of teaching did not
perhaps quite so much for a

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variety of reasons permeate
public school literature

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teaching,
but it was simply,

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as a result of Understanding
Poetry,

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the way to go.

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It took time.

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If you had more than
fifty minutes,

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you could actually make ample
use of it.

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T.S. Eliot,
who was in many ways associated

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with the New Criticism,
one of its intellectual

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forebears, nevertheless took a
somewhat dim view of it and

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called it "lemon squeezer
criticism."

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What this meant is it takes
time.

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You've got to squeeze
absolutely everything out of it,

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and so it was ideal from the
standpoint of teaching and was,

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it seems to me,
also wonderfully galvanizing

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intellectually because it really
did make people think:

06:38.678 --> 06:43.138
"look how intricate what I
thought was simple turns out to

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be."

06:44.220 --> 06:48.320
The New Criticism,
incontestably and without

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rival,
created an atmosphere in which

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it was okay to notice that
things were a little more

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difficult than they'd been
supposed to be.

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This in itself was
extraordinarily useful and

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constructive,
not just for subsequent

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literary theory,
I think, but for the way in

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which English teaching actually
can help people think better.

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All of this the New Criticism
had a great deal to do with--

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and when I talk next time about
the way in which it's been

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vilified for the last
>

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forty or fifty years,
naturally I will have this in

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the back of my mind.

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So in any case,
where did this preoccupation

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with form--
because we're beginning to

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think about the way in which
theory can preoccupy itself with

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form--
where does it come from?

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Well, needless to say,
I'm about to say it goes back

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to the beginning.

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When Plato writes his
Republic and devotes Book

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Ten,
as I'm sure most of you know,

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to an argument in effect
banishing the poets from the

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ideal republic,
part of the argument is that

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poets are terrible imitators.

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They imitate reality as badly
as they possibly can.

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They are three times removed
from the ideal forms of objects

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in reality.

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They're a hopeless mess.

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They get everything wrong.

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They think that a stick
refracted in the water is

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therefore a crooked stick.

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They are subject to every
conceivable kind of illusion,

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not to be trusted,
and Socrates calls them liars.

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Okay.

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Now when Aristotle writes his
Poetics he does so--

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and this is true and rewards
scrutiny if one thinks carefully

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about the Poetics--
he does so very consciously

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in refutation of Plato's
arguments in the Republic,

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and perhaps the keystone of
this refutation is simply this:

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Plato says poets imitate badly.

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Aristotle says this is a
category mistake because poets

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don't imitate reality.

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Poets don't imitate,
says Aristotle,

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things as they are.

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They imitate things as they
should be.

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In other words,
the business of poets is to

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organize,
to bring form to bear,

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on the messiness of reality
and,

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in so doing,
to construct not an alternate

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reality in the sense that it has
nothing to do with the real

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world--
that is to say,

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it doesn't mention anything in
the real world,

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or it somehow or other invents
human beings made out of

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chocolate or something like
that--

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instead, it idealizes the
elements existing in the real

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world such that its object is
something other than reality as

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such.

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This is really the origin of
formalism.

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Aristotle is considered the
ancestor of the varying sorts of

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thought about form,
and it's this move,

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this move that he makes in the
Poetics,

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that engenders this
possibility.

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Now turning to your sheet,
in the early,

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early modern period the poet
and courtier,

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Sir Philip Sidney,
wrote an elegant,

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really wonderfully written
defense of poetry,

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in one edition called The
Apology for Poesie.

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In this edition he,
while actually a fervent

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admirer of Plato,
nevertheless develops this idea

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of Aristotle with remarkable
rhetorical ingenuity and I think

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very impressively lays out the
case that Aristotle first makes,

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here in the first passage on
your sheet.

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Sidney's talking about the
various kinds of discourse:

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divinity,
hymnody, science,

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philosophy, history--
in other words,

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all the ways in which you can
contribute to human betterment

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and human welfare.

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He says in the case of all but
one of them, each discourse is a

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"serving science."

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That is to say,
it is subservient to the

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natural world;
its importance is that it

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refers to that world.

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The first sentence of your
passage: "There is no art

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but one delivered to mankind
that hath not the works of

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nature for his principal
object."

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This by the way-- although what
they serve is not exactly a work

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of nature--
is why even that which is

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incontestably better than
secular poetry,

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in other words hymnody,
and also divine knowledge or

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theology--
even these fields,

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which are the supreme fields,
are also serving sciences.

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They are subservient to an idea
that they have to express,

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which is the idea of God,
right, and God is real.

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There's no sense that we're
making God up in this kind of

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discourse.

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Sidney is a devoutly religious
person and there's no semblance

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of doubt in his attitude,
and yet he is saying something

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very special about the poet who
is somewhere in between divinity

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and the other sorts of discourse
with which poetry is

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traditionally in rivalry:
science,

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philosophy and history.

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And he says this is what's
unique about poetry.

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Only the poet disdaining to be
tied to any such subjection

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[subjection,
in other words,

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to things as they are],
lifted up with the vigor of his

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own invention,
doth grow in effect another

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nature....

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He nothing affirms and
therefore never lieth.

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In other words, Plato is wrong.

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The poet is not a liar because
he's not talking about anything

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that's verifiable or
falsifiable.

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He is simply talking about the
parameters of the world he has

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brought into being.

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Sidney thinks of it as a kind
of magic.

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He invokes, for example,
the science of astrology.

13:27.240 --> 13:31.440
The poet, he says,
ranges freely within the zodiac

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of his own wit.

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He also invokes the
pseudoscience of alchemy when he

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says that the poet inhabits a
brazen world,

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and of this--"brazen"
means brass--

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of this brazen world,
he makes a golden world.

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In other words,
poetry is transformational.

13:55.899 --> 14:00.149
In representing not things as
they are but things as they

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should be, it transforms
reality.

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All right.

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So this is an argument which in
outline,

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once again, justifies the idea
of literature as form,

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as that which brings form to
bear on the chaos and messiness

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of the real.

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Now I don't mean to say things
just stood still as Sidney said

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they were until you get to Kant.

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A great deal happens,
but one aspect of Kant's famous

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"Copernican
revolution" in

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the history of philosophy
is his ideas about

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aesthetics and the beautiful and
about the special faculty that

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he believes has to do with and
mediates our aesthetic

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understanding of things,
a faculty which he calls

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"the judgment";
so that in The Critique of

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Judgment of 1790,
he outlines a philosophy of the

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beautiful and of the means
whereby "the judgment"

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makes judgments of the
beautiful.

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He does a great deal else in
it, but I'm isolating this

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strand, which is what's relevant
to what we're talking about.

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In many ways Kant,
without knowing anything about

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Sidney, nevertheless follows
from Sidney particularly in

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this, as you'll see.

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I'm going to look sort of with
some care at these passages so

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all will become clear,
but particularly in this:

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Sidney--and I didn't exactly
quote the passage in which

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Sidney does this but I urged you
to believe that he does--

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Sidney actually ranks poetry
somewhere between divinity and

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the other sciences.

15:41.070 --> 15:44.420
In other words,
poetry is not the supreme thing

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that a person can do.

15:46.100 --> 15:49.580
Sidney believed this so much in
fact that when he knew himself

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to be dying,
having been mortally wounded in

15:52.217 --> 15:54.597
a battle,
he ordered that all of his own

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poems be burned.

15:55.590 --> 15:59.710
From the standpoint of a devout
person, he had no doubt that

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poetry was inferior to divinity.

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Now in a way that's what Kant's
saying, too.

16:05.808 --> 16:10.408
In the passages you'll read,
you'll see that the point is

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not that art and the judgment of
the beautiful is the supreme

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thing that humanity can be
engaged with.

16:18.960 --> 16:23.620
The point is only that it has a
special characteristic that

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nothing else has.

16:25.149 --> 16:29.819
That's the point that this
whole tradition is trying to

16:29.815 --> 16:30.415
make.

16:30.418 --> 16:33.298
This is the way Kant puts it,
turning first to the second

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passage:
The pleasant and the good both

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have a reference to the faculty
of desire [The pleasant is the

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way in which our appetency,
our sensuous faculty--which

16:46.889 --> 16:49.249
Kant calls "the
understanding,"

16:49.245 --> 16:51.875
by the way--
understands things.

16:51.879 --> 16:55.039
Things are either pleasant or
unpleasant.

16:55.038 --> 16:58.288
The good, on the contrary,
is the way in which our

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cognitive and moral faculty--
which Kant calls "the

17:01.395 --> 17:03.605
reason"--
understands things.

17:03.610 --> 17:06.870
Things are either to be
approved of or not to be

17:06.868 --> 17:09.368
approved of,
but in each case,

17:09.366 --> 17:13.046
as Kant argues,
they have a reference to the

17:13.053 --> 17:16.873
faculty of desire--
I want, I don't want,

17:16.865 --> 17:21.485
I approve, I disapprove],
and they bring with them the

17:21.490 --> 17:24.400
former [that is to say,
the pleasant],

17:24.396 --> 17:27.426
a satisfaction pathologically
conditioned;

17:27.430 --> 17:30.990
the latter a pure,
practical, purposeful

17:30.990 --> 17:36.830
satisfaction which is determined
not merely by the representation

17:36.834 --> 17:41.504
of the object [that is to say,
by the fact that the

17:41.499 --> 17:44.069
represented object exists for
me,

17:44.068 --> 17:47.018
right]
but also by the represented

17:47.021 --> 17:52.481
connection of the subject with
the existence of the object [in

17:52.479 --> 17:56.149
other words,
by the way in which I want it

17:56.150 --> 17:58.900
or don't want it,
approve of it or don't approve

17:58.902 --> 17:59.262
of it].

17:59.259 --> 18:01.719
My subjective wishes,
in other words,

18:01.720 --> 18:06.460
determine my attitude toward
it, whereas what Kant is saying

18:06.464 --> 18:11.534
is that my attitude toward that
which simply stands before us as

18:11.532 --> 18:14.672
what is neither pleasant nor
good,

18:14.670 --> 18:21.220
but is rather something else,
doesn't exist for me.

18:21.220 --> 18:24.800
It exists in and for itself.

18:24.798 --> 18:28.358
The next passage:
"Taste is the faculty of

18:28.355 --> 18:32.985
the judging of an object or a
method of representing it by an

18:32.992 --> 18:35.852
entirely disinterested
satisfaction or

18:35.853 --> 18:39.953
dissatisfaction."
In other words,

18:39.950 --> 18:42.410
yeah, I still like it or don't
like it,

18:42.410 --> 18:48.350
but my liking has nothing to do
either with desire or with

18:48.348 --> 18:50.738
approval--
moral, political,

18:50.740 --> 18:52.620
or however the case may be.

18:52.618 --> 18:56.538
I just like it or I just don't
like it according to principles

18:56.539 --> 18:59.879
that can be understood as
arising from the faculty of

18:59.883 --> 19:03.743
judgment and not from the
faculty of the understanding,

19:03.740 --> 19:06.040
which is appetitive,
and the faculty of reason,

19:06.039 --> 19:07.899
which is moral.

19:07.900 --> 19:13.790
So with that said,
perhaps just to add to that,

19:13.788 --> 19:18.068
the fourth passage:
"Beauty is the form of the

19:18.067 --> 19:22.937
purposiveness of an object so
far as it is perceived in it

19:22.942 --> 19:27.222
without any representation of a
purpose."

19:27.220 --> 19:30.290
You say, "Whoa,
what is this?"

19:30.289 --> 19:30.869
>

19:30.869 --> 19:31.789
>

19:31.788 --> 19:35.978
Kant makes a distinction
between the purposive and the

19:35.980 --> 19:37.010
purposeful.

19:37.009 --> 19:38.419
What is the distinction?

19:38.420 --> 19:42.930
The purposeful is the purpose
of the object in practical

19:42.932 --> 19:43.592
terms.

19:43.589 --> 19:45.049
What can it do?

19:45.049 --> 19:46.999
What can it do for me?

19:47.000 --> 19:49.450
How does it go to work in the
world?

19:49.450 --> 19:53.530
What is its function among
other objects?

19:53.529 --> 19:58.539
What bearing does it have
on--in particular--my life?

19:58.538 --> 20:04.878
But the purposiveness of the
object is the way in which it is

20:04.877 --> 20:07.517
sufficient unto itself.

20:07.519 --> 20:11.899
It has its own purpose,
which is not a purpose that has

20:11.901 --> 20:15.391
any bearing necessarily on
anything else.

20:15.390 --> 20:19.790
It has, in other words,
an internal coherence.

20:19.788 --> 20:25.838
It has a dynamism of parts that
is strictly with reference to

20:25.842 --> 20:27.862
its own existence.

20:27.859 --> 20:29.419
It is a form.

20:29.420 --> 20:33.610
It is a form and that form,
because we can see it has

20:33.609 --> 20:38.039
structure and because we can see
it has organization and

20:38.041 --> 20:40.381
complexity, is purposive.

20:40.380 --> 20:44.570
That is to say,
it manifests its

20:44.570 --> 20:47.140
self-sufficiency.

20:47.140 --> 20:50.790
So that's Kant's famous
distinction between the

20:50.788 --> 20:54.398
purposive,
which is the organization of an

20:54.404 --> 20:57.824
aesthetic object,
and the purposeful,

20:57.818 --> 21:03.598
which is the organization of
any object insofar as it goes to

21:03.595 --> 21:06.575
work in the world or for us.

21:06.578 --> 21:10.908
An aesthetic object can
be purposeful;

21:10.910 --> 21:14.100
that is to say we can view it
as purposeful.

21:14.098 --> 21:17.898
I see a naked body,
which the art historians call a

21:17.897 --> 21:18.427
nude.

21:18.430 --> 21:21.310
Let's say I don't accept that
it's merely a nude.

21:21.308 --> 21:24.968
I want it or I disapprove of it
and, lo and behold,

21:24.971 --> 21:26.951
it's no longer aesthetic.

21:26.950 --> 21:30.810
I'll come back to that in a
moment, but I hope you can see

21:30.808 --> 21:34.528
that that is a distinction
between the purposive and the

21:34.534 --> 21:35.554
purposeful.

21:35.548 --> 21:40.808
Now just in order to reprise
these important distinctions,

21:40.808 --> 21:46.448
I want to turn to a passage in
Samuel Coleridge who is,

21:46.450 --> 21:50.140
at least on this occasion,
a disciple of Kant and is,

21:50.140 --> 21:54.260
I think, usefully paraphrasing
the arguments of Kant that we

21:54.262 --> 21:56.222
have just been engaged in.

21:56.220 --> 21:59.070
This is the fifth passage on
your sheet:

21:59.068 --> 22:03.138
The beautiful [says Coleridge]
is at once distinguished both

22:03.141 --> 22:07.141
from the agreeable which is
beneath it [and notice the sort

22:07.144 --> 22:11.214
of stationing of the beautiful
as Sidney stations it between

22:11.214 --> 22:14.394
what's beneath it and what's
above it]--

22:14.390 --> 22:17.890
from the agreeable which is
beneath it and from the good

22:17.892 --> 22:21.882
which is above it,
for both these necessarily have

22:21.876 --> 22:24.436
an interest attached to them.

22:24.440 --> 22:29.550
Both act on the will and excite
a desire for the actual

22:29.550 --> 22:34.000
existence of the image or idea
contemplated,

22:34.000 --> 22:38.780
while the sense of beauty rests
gratified in the mere

22:38.779 --> 22:43.559
contemplation or intuition
regardless whether it be a

22:43.559 --> 22:47.329
fictitious Apollo or a real
Antinous.

22:47.328 --> 22:51.928
In other words,
the judgment of beauty does not

22:51.930 --> 22:58.030
depend on the existence of the
object for its satisfaction.

22:58.029 --> 23:01.709
Now Oscar Wilde,
ever the wag and a person who

23:01.714 --> 23:06.554
generated more good literary
theory in ways that didn't seem

23:06.547 --> 23:10.957
like literary theory at all,
perhaps, in the entire history

23:10.961 --> 23:14.771
of thinking about the subject,
says in the famous series of

23:14.770 --> 23:18.240
aphorisms which constitute his
"Preface"

23:18.238 --> 23:21.138
to The Picture of Dorian
Gray--

23:21.140 --> 23:25.010
he concludes this series of
aphorisms by winking at us and

23:25.009 --> 23:27.469
saying,
"All art is quite

23:27.472 --> 23:28.692
useless."

23:28.690 --> 23:33.300
I hope that after reading these
passages and enduring the

23:33.301 --> 23:38.331
explication of them that you've
just heard you can immediately

23:38.327 --> 23:43.267
see what Wilde means by saying
all art is quite useless.

23:43.269 --> 23:49.319
He's appropriating a term of
opprobrium in the utilitarian

23:49.319 --> 23:51.379
tradition--
oh, my goodness,

23:51.375 --> 23:52.805
that something would be
useless,

23:52.808 --> 23:57.448
right?–he's appropriating
a term of opprobrium and

23:57.454 --> 24:02.024
pointing out that it is an
extraordinarily unique thing

24:02.017 --> 24:06.137
about art that it's useless;
in other words,

24:06.135 --> 24:11.325
that it appeals to no merely
appetitive or other form of

24:11.327 --> 24:13.497
subjective interest.

24:13.500 --> 24:16.510
We don't have to have an
"interest"

24:16.509 --> 24:19.479
in it in the sense of owning
part of a company.

24:19.480 --> 24:24.010
We don't have to have an
interest in it in order to

24:24.009 --> 24:25.459
appreciate it.

24:25.460 --> 24:29.760
In other words,
we can be objective about it.

24:29.759 --> 24:34.739
We can distance ourselves from
our subjective wants and needs

24:34.740 --> 24:40.470
and likes and dislikes,
and we can coexist with it in a

24:40.468 --> 24:47.028
happy and constructive way that
is good for both of us,

24:47.029 --> 24:52.949
because if we recognize that
there are things in the world

24:52.951 --> 24:58.871
which have intrinsic value and
importance and what we call

24:58.873 --> 25:02.763
beauty,
and yet are not the things that

25:02.755 --> 25:08.665
we covet or wish to banish,
we recognize in ourselves the

25:08.665 --> 25:12.465
capacity for disinterestedness.

25:12.470 --> 25:17.080
We recognize in ourselves a
virtue which is considered to be

25:17.077 --> 25:21.527
the cornerstone of many systems
of moral understanding.

25:21.528 --> 25:25.728
To realize that we're not
interested in everything and

25:25.730 --> 25:30.250
merely because we're interested
take a view of things,

25:30.250 --> 25:36.260
but that there are things that
we don't have to have that kind

25:36.259 --> 25:40.889
of interest in and can
nevertheless recognize as

25:40.888 --> 25:45.518
self-sufficient and valuable,
is important.

25:45.519 --> 25:48.599
Wilde's suggestion,
but I think also Kant's

25:48.598 --> 25:51.678
suggestion before him,
is important for our

25:51.680 --> 25:54.100
recognition of our own value.

25:54.098 --> 25:58.248
By the same token,
all this harping on the

25:58.247 --> 26:01.237
autonomy of art--
that is to say,

26:01.240 --> 26:05.220
the self-sufficiency of art,
the way in which it's not

26:05.215 --> 26:08.565
dependent on anything,
or as Sidney says,

26:08.571 --> 26:13.701
the way in which it's not a
serving science existing merely

26:13.703 --> 26:17.423
to represent things other than
itself,

26:17.420 --> 26:21.880
right?--the way in which this
is possible for art is,

26:21.880 --> 26:27.100
as also our own capacity to be
disinterested is,

26:27.098 --> 26:32.428
a way of acknowledging that
freedom exists:

26:32.432 --> 26:38.282
that I am free,
that things are free from my

26:38.276 --> 26:44.586
instrumental interest in them,
so that in general what's

26:44.592 --> 26:50.272
implicit in this view of art and
this view of human judgment,

26:50.269 --> 26:54.159
and what makes it so important
in the history of thought,

26:54.160 --> 26:58.030
is that once again--and this is
not the first time we've brought

26:58.032 --> 27:01.172
this up in these lectures and
won't be the last--

27:01.170 --> 27:06.640
it's a way of recognizing that
in addition to all the other

27:06.643 --> 27:12.233
things that we are,
some of them wonderful,

27:12.230 --> 27:14.980
we are also free.

27:14.980 --> 27:22.140
There is in us at least an
element that is free,

27:22.144 --> 27:26.414
independent,
serving nothing,

27:26.413 --> 27:28.703
autonomous.

27:28.700 --> 27:34.800
This idea of our freedom,
and by implication of the

27:34.797 --> 27:41.407
freedom of other things,
from our instrumental interests

27:41.406 --> 27:46.006
is what sustains the formalist
tradition,

27:46.009 --> 27:51.429
and against various kinds of
criticism and objection that

27:51.432 --> 27:56.182
we'll be taking up in turn as
the case arises,

27:56.180 --> 28:04.030
sustains and keeps bringing
back into the history of thought

28:04.034 --> 28:11.494
on these subjects the notion
that form simply for its own

28:11.488 --> 28:14.878
sake--
as the notorious Aestheticism

28:14.876 --> 28:18.776
movement at the end of the
nineteenth century put it--

28:18.779 --> 28:20.159
is valuable.

28:20.160 --> 28:21.710
All right.

28:21.710 --> 28:26.340
Now John Crowe Ransom,
who was never at Yale but is

28:26.343 --> 28:31.253
nevertheless one of the founders
or first members of a

28:31.253 --> 28:36.263
self-identified school of
figures who called themselves

28:36.258 --> 28:39.928
the New Critics,
published a book called The

28:39.930 --> 28:43.010
New Criticism, and
that's >

28:43.009 --> 28:45.989
where the term "the New
Critics"

28:45.992 --> 28:46.942
comes from.

28:46.940 --> 28:50.220
You may have noticed in your
Wimsatt essay that there is a

28:50.220 --> 28:53.560
footnote to somebody named Joel
Spingarn who wrote an essay

28:53.558 --> 28:55.568
called "The New
Criticism"

28:55.574 --> 28:56.384
in 1924.

28:56.380 --> 28:57.310
Not to worry.

28:57.308 --> 28:58.958
That has nothing to do with the
New Criticism.

28:58.960 --> 29:01.020
That just means criticism which
is recent,

29:01.016 --> 29:02.216
>

29:02.220 --> 29:04.070
a different matter altogether.

29:04.068 --> 29:08.088
By the same token,
there is the work of Roland

29:08.087 --> 29:11.837
Barthes and some of his
contemporaries--

29:11.838 --> 29:15.998
Poulet, whom I mentioned,
Jean Starobinski and others--

29:16.000 --> 29:18.720
that was called in the French
press La Nouvelle

29:18.717 --> 29:19.547
Critique.

29:19.548 --> 29:24.308
That, too then is an instance
of the New Criticism being used

29:24.309 --> 29:29.149
as a term, but that too has
nothing to do with our subject.

29:29.150 --> 29:32.000
The New Critics,
the American New Critics as

29:32.000 --> 29:36.320
they are sometimes identified,
were a school--and I use that

29:36.323 --> 29:40.813
term advisedly because they are
self-identified as a group--

29:40.808 --> 29:48.088
a school of people who evolved
this idea of the independent

29:48.094 --> 29:50.904
status--
Ransom calls it a

29:50.896 --> 29:54.716
"discrete ontological
object"--

29:54.720 --> 30:00.370
of the work of art and the
means whereby it can be

30:00.365 --> 30:06.585
appreciated as independent in
all of its complexity.

30:06.588 --> 30:10.758
Our first foray into the
thinking of this school will be

30:10.759 --> 30:14.319
our reading of Wimsatt and
Beardsley's "The

30:14.323 --> 30:16.983
Intentional
Fallacy,"

30:16.977 --> 30:20.007
which I'll get to in a
minute;

30:20.009 --> 30:23.849
but, simply as a reprise,
take a look at the two passages

30:23.853 --> 30:28.043
from Ransom which complete
what's on your sheet and which,

30:28.038 --> 30:31.208
I think you can see,
create a link between the sort

30:31.211 --> 30:35.141
of thinking you've encountered
in reading "The Intentional

30:35.144 --> 30:38.894
Fallacy" and the
tradition that I've been trying

30:38.887 --> 30:40.027
to describe.

30:40.029 --> 30:44.169
Passage seven ought to be
completely transparent to you

30:44.171 --> 30:48.311
now because it is simply a
paraphrase of the passages I

30:48.313 --> 30:52.843
have given you from Kant and
Coleridge: "The experience

30:52.838 --> 30:55.908
[says Ransom]
called beauty is beyond the

30:55.906 --> 31:00.276
powerful ethical will precisely
as it is beyond the animal

31:00.278 --> 31:01.658
passion.

31:01.660 --> 31:05.630
Indeed, these last two are
competitive and

31:05.630 --> 31:07.470
coordinate."

31:07.470 --> 31:10.010
In other words,
what they have in common with

31:10.009 --> 31:12.489
each other, ethical will and
animal passion,

31:12.492 --> 31:15.152
is that they're both grounded
in interest.

31:15.150 --> 31:15.850
Right?

31:15.848 --> 31:18.408
That's the point of Sir Kenneth
Clark's word,

31:18.411 --> 31:19.631
"the nude."

31:19.633 --> 31:22.373
<<pronounced
"nyewd">>

31:22.368 --> 31:28.998
For the naked human being,
as viewed both by the appetites

31:28.996 --> 31:33.126
and by moral reason,
as a common term from the

31:33.134 --> 31:35.654
standpoint both of what Kant
calls "the

31:35.653 --> 31:38.173
understanding"
and from what Kant calls

31:38.173 --> 31:41.043
"the reason,"
the expression "naked

31:41.042 --> 31:45.632
body" is just fine;
but if we do believe there is

31:45.633 --> 31:48.423
another category,
the aesthetic,

31:48.417 --> 31:51.737
viewed by an independent
faculty called "the

31:51.737 --> 31:54.777
judgment,"
we need another word for what

31:54.779 --> 31:57.969
we're looking at--
modern painters like Philip

31:57.965 --> 32:01.155
Pearlstein and Lucian Freud
would strongly disagree,

32:01.160 --> 32:02.490
but in a way that's the point.

32:02.490 --> 32:05.120
When we're looking at a
painting of a naked body

32:05.123 --> 32:06.933
we don't say,
"Oh, that's a naked

32:06.928 --> 32:07.658
body."

32:07.660 --> 32:11.550
We say, "That's a
nyewd," and that

32:11.548 --> 32:16.218
distinction is what,
as it were, bears out the

32:16.217 --> 32:19.477
implicit way,
the semiconscious way,

32:19.480 --> 32:24.150
in which all of us acknowledge
there to be a category that we

32:24.147 --> 32:26.557
call the aesthetic judgment.

32:26.558 --> 32:29.308
On the other hand,
a lot of people think it's all

32:29.313 --> 32:31.673
hokum,
and in fact the predominant

32:31.674 --> 32:35.644
view in the twentieth century
has been that there's no such

32:35.640 --> 32:40.980
thing as disinterestedness,
that whatever we are looking at

32:40.984 --> 32:45.464
we have an interest in and form
views of,

32:45.460 --> 32:50.300
and that this Kantian moment of
dispassionate or disinterested

32:50.301 --> 32:54.671
contemplation is what the early
twentieth-century critic

32:54.669 --> 32:58.239
I.A. Richards called a
"phantom aesthetic

32:58.241 --> 32:59.831
state."

32:59.828 --> 33:03.098
The predominant view is of this
kind of--but,

33:03.102 --> 33:06.892
just to do it justice in
passing, there is a certain

33:06.894 --> 33:08.684
sense, is there not?

33:08.680 --> 33:10.680
in which we suddenly find
ourselves,

33:10.680 --> 33:15.210
without meaning to and without
being simply victims of any sort

33:15.209 --> 33:18.439
of cultural tyranny,
standing in front of something,

33:18.444 --> 33:21.394
clasping our hands,
tilting our head and feeling

33:21.392 --> 33:25.182
somehow or another different
from the way we feel when we

33:25.176 --> 33:27.066
typically look at things.

33:27.068 --> 33:30.858
And that, too,
is an intuitive way of saying,

33:30.858 --> 33:36.438
"Yeah, however rigorously
we can define it or defend it,

33:36.440 --> 33:40.660
something like this does seem
to go on in our minds at certain

33:40.661 --> 33:43.361
kinds of moments of
experience."

33:43.358 --> 33:48.818
We just feel differently
looking at a certain work of art

33:48.823 --> 33:54.093
or a certain landscape,
let's say, than we feel looking

33:54.089 --> 33:56.919
at other sorts of things.

33:56.920 --> 33:58.830
Maybe we don't know why.

33:58.828 --> 34:01.778
Maybe we doubt that the
difference is absolute in the

34:01.781 --> 34:03.941
way that Kant wants to insist it
is.

34:03.940 --> 34:06.670
Nevertheless,
we have in tendency feelings of

34:06.670 --> 34:10.270
this kind and we should
acknowledge them because again,

34:10.268 --> 34:16.888
at least in terms of a weak
understanding of these

34:16.885 --> 34:21.815
positions,
it does tend to justify them.

34:21.820 --> 34:25.530
At least it explains to us why
people can have had such

34:25.525 --> 34:26.275
thoughts.

34:26.280 --> 34:26.890
Okay.

34:26.889 --> 34:34.469
Wimsatt--I keep saying Wimsatt.

34:34.469 --> 34:36.809
Again it's Wimsatt and
Beardsley, but I already

34:36.809 --> 34:38.029
explained how that is.

34:38.030 --> 34:42.140
Wimsatt right off the bat
attacks what he calls "the

34:42.137 --> 34:45.437
Romantic understanding of
literature."

34:45.440 --> 34:47.770
Now what does he mean by
Romantic?

34:47.768 --> 34:50.408
It's the attitude which
supposes that a

34:50.405 --> 34:53.725
"poem,"
and that's Wimsatt's privileged

34:53.733 --> 34:58.473
word which I'll try to explain,
that a poem is an

34:58.472 --> 35:03.002
expression--
that is to say,

35:03.001 --> 35:09.431
is the expression of some
passion or profound genius

35:09.434 --> 35:15.884
working its way into a form,
but that the important thing is

35:15.884 --> 35:17.134
the expression.

35:17.130 --> 35:20.650
This much, by the way,
Wimsatt has in common with

35:20.652 --> 35:22.862
Gadamer,
because Gadamer doesn't talk

35:22.860 --> 35:26.010
much about authors either,
and Gadamer is interested in

35:26.014 --> 35:28.634
what he calls meaning,
the subject matter,

35:28.634 --> 35:29.694
die Sache.

35:29.690 --> 35:30.690
Right?

35:30.690 --> 35:33.920
He's not interested in
your sort of expression

35:33.918 --> 35:37.518
of that meaning or my
expression of that meaning.

35:37.518 --> 35:41.038
He's interested in the way in
which a reader can come to terms

35:41.036 --> 35:43.166
with a meaning conveyed by a
text,

35:43.170 --> 35:45.170
and that much,
as I say, despite the

35:45.170 --> 35:47.970
profoundly different nature of
their projects,

35:47.969 --> 35:51.059
Wimsatt and Gadamer have in
common.

35:51.059 --> 35:56.919
So a poem is not an expression
but an independent object with a

35:56.920 --> 36:01.730
self-contained meaning,
and if this meaning is not

36:01.726 --> 36:07.046
self-evident to the attentive
reader then we don't judge the

36:07.054 --> 36:08.684
poem a success.

36:08.679 --> 36:11.209
This is where evaluation comes
in.

36:11.210 --> 36:17.400
The success or failure of a
poem depends on the realization

36:17.402 --> 36:18.792
of meaning.

36:18.789 --> 36:22.309
It doesn't depend on our going
to the archive,

36:22.309 --> 36:25.889
finding out what the author
said in his letters about it,

36:25.889 --> 36:27.989
finding out what he told his
friends,

36:27.989 --> 36:29.509
or what he told the newspapers.

36:29.510 --> 36:31.800
It doesn't involve any of that.

36:31.800 --> 36:37.040
If the meaning is not clear in
the poem, we judge the poem a

36:37.041 --> 36:37.931
failure.

36:37.929 --> 36:42.359
We don't refer--we have no
reason to refer,

36:42.360 --> 36:46.680
if we respect the autonomy of
the poem as such,

36:46.679 --> 36:52.519
we don't refer--we don't appeal
to an authorial intention.

36:52.518 --> 36:56.498
Hence, on page 811,
the left-hand column,

36:56.498 --> 37:00.798
about a third of the way down:
"…

37:00.797 --> 37:05.087
[T]he design or intention of
the author is neither available

37:05.085 --> 37:09.655
nor desirable as a standard for
judging the success of a work of

37:09.664 --> 37:16.244
literary art…"
It follows from this that even

37:16.235 --> 37:19.815
a short poem,
even a short lyric poem--and

37:19.815 --> 37:22.615
here you could see
Wimsatt "following"

37:22.623 --> 37:24.793
Foucault,
though obviously not following

37:24.789 --> 37:27.269
but anticipating Foucault,
and again they have nothing to

37:27.273 --> 37:30.773
do with each other,
but there is this overlap--even

37:30.771 --> 37:34.651
a short poem doesn't really have
an author.

37:34.650 --> 37:41.660
It has a "speaker,"
a figure speaking in the poem,

37:41.659 --> 37:44.469
that needs to be understood
dramatically,

37:44.469 --> 37:48.799
that is to say as though the
poem were one of Browning's or

37:48.804 --> 37:52.844
T.S. Eliot's dramatic
monologues--in other words,

37:52.840 --> 37:58.410
so that the speaker of any poem
on Wimsatt's view is a speaker

37:58.405 --> 38:01.685
endowed with a certain
character,

38:01.690 --> 38:05.080
a certain viewpoint,
a certain argument to be put

38:05.081 --> 38:07.861
forward,
and our concern about the

38:07.855 --> 38:12.565
speaker has to be a concern
within the poem about the way in

38:12.565 --> 38:15.675
which this character is
elaborated,

38:15.679 --> 38:19.109
and not reinforced,
somehow, by biographical

38:19.105 --> 38:23.565
reference to that which is not
the speaker but the author

38:23.565 --> 38:27.545
standing back there somewhere
behind the poem.

38:27.550 --> 38:34.150
Now why focus on the
"poem"?

38:34.150 --> 38:37.040
Notice that we never hear about
literature.

38:37.039 --> 38:40.249
We never even hear about
"poetry."

38:40.250 --> 38:45.670
The object of attention for an
analysis of this kind is the

38:45.666 --> 38:46.316
poem.

38:46.320 --> 38:50.540
Well, the poem is,
as John Donne puts it,

38:50.541 --> 38:53.921
a little world made cunningly.

38:53.920 --> 38:55.950
It's a microcosm.

38:55.949 --> 38:59.509
It is a distillation or
quintessence.

38:59.510 --> 39:04.360
It is a model in other words
for the way in which literature

39:04.364 --> 39:07.414
can be understood as
world-making--

39:07.409 --> 39:11.409
not a representation,
again, of things as they are

39:11.411 --> 39:16.661
but of things as they should be;
whereby "things as they

39:16.657 --> 39:20.707
should be"
is not necessarily an ideal but

39:20.710 --> 39:25.380
rather that which is formal,
that which is organized,

39:25.376 --> 39:28.836
and that which has a coherence
and makes sense

39:28.838 --> 39:31.838
self-sufficiently and within
itself.

39:31.840 --> 39:34.820
That's why the poem,
the lyric poem,

39:34.815 --> 39:39.995
is privileged among the forms
of literary discourse in the New

39:40.000 --> 39:41.190
Criticism.

39:41.190 --> 39:43.900
All literature is by
implication a "poem,"

39:43.896 --> 39:45.166
>

39:45.170 --> 39:51.100
but the poem is the privileged
site of analysis whereby this

39:51.099 --> 39:55.919
broader statement can be made to
seem reasonable,

39:55.922 --> 39:59.442
hence the emphasis on the poem.

39:59.440 --> 40:03.630
The absence of the Romantic
word "poetry"

40:03.626 --> 40:06.386
is therefore not insignificant.

40:06.389 --> 40:09.099
Poetry is that which just sort
of spills out of me.

40:09.099 --> 40:13.309
It's the spontaneous overflow
of powerful feelings.

40:13.309 --> 40:14.239
(Never mind that.)

40:14.239 --> 40:17.669
The New Criticism isn't
interested in spontaneous

40:17.670 --> 40:20.030
overflows of powerful feelings.

40:20.030 --> 40:23.110
Wimsatt has his little joke
about drinking a pint of beer,

40:23.106 --> 40:23.966
taking a walk.

40:23.969 --> 40:28.959
So the New Criticism just isn't
interested in those sorts of

40:28.963 --> 40:30.913
spontaneous overflow.

40:30.909 --> 40:32.259
Sorry.

40:32.260 --> 40:32.860
>

40:32.860 --> 40:33.880
I won't go there.

40:33.880 --> 40:34.490
>

40:34.489 --> 40:40.229
But in any case, he goes on.

40:40.230 --> 40:43.000
He goes on to say,
"All right.

40:43.000 --> 40:46.370
If we're focused on the work of
art in and of itself,

40:46.369 --> 40:49.779
on the poem,
we obviously in thinking about

40:49.784 --> 40:54.184
what it means need to come to
terms with three kinds of

40:54.175 --> 40:55.715
evidence."

40:55.719 --> 40:58.399
That is to say,
some things have a bearing on

40:58.402 --> 41:00.722
what it means and some things
don't.

41:00.719 --> 41:03.659
What does have a bearing is
language--

41:03.659 --> 41:07.199
that is to say,
words in the public domain

41:07.201 --> 41:12.641
which all of us share and which
we can study in order to come to

41:12.643 --> 41:16.533
terms with the exact meaning of
the poem.

41:16.530 --> 41:19.310
A certain word--this is,
of course, what kept you in

41:19.306 --> 41:22.736
your high school classes for so
long--a certain word has five or

41:22.739 --> 41:24.209
six different meanings.

41:24.210 --> 41:27.630
The New Criticism delights in
showing how all five or six of

41:27.630 --> 41:30.880
those meanings do have some
bearing on the meaning of the

41:30.878 --> 41:31.398
poem.

41:31.400 --> 41:33.270
That's all legitimate evidence.

41:33.268 --> 41:37.528
That is what one uses to build
up the structure of the

41:37.529 --> 41:39.859
interpretation of the poem.

41:39.860 --> 41:43.980
What is not relevant is what
I've mentioned already:

41:43.976 --> 41:48.576
what the author said about the
poem in letters to friends,

41:48.579 --> 41:50.839
to newspapers and so on.

41:50.840 --> 41:52.660
That has no relevance.

41:52.659 --> 41:56.369
Then Wimsatt acknowledges that
there's a sort of messy third

41:56.373 --> 41:59.903
category of evidence which has
to do with language and is

41:59.900 --> 42:03.810
therefore legitimate to a point,
but also has to do with the

42:03.809 --> 42:06.149
author's idiosyncrasies--
that is to say,

42:06.152 --> 42:08.902
the way that author in
particular used language,

42:08.900 --> 42:12.170
certain coterie words,
or simply a private

42:12.173 --> 42:15.053
misunderstanding of certain
words.

42:15.050 --> 42:19.240
You've got to know when you're
reading Whitman what he means by

42:19.235 --> 42:20.785
"camerado."

42:20.789 --> 42:22.189
It's not exactly
>

42:22.190 --> 42:25.030
what the rest of us typically
mean when we--well,

42:25.030 --> 42:27.340
we don't use that word exactly,
but it's

42:27.340 --> 42:28.760
>

42:28.760 --> 42:30.360
>

42:30.360 --> 42:33.600
what we typically mean when we
speak of comrades or

42:33.601 --> 42:34.511
comradeship.

42:34.510 --> 42:37.750
In other words,
the word is loaded in ways

42:37.748 --> 42:39.348
that--
Wimsatt would probably

42:39.351 --> 42:41.751
acknowledge--
need to be taken into account

42:41.748 --> 42:44.938
if we're going to understand
what Whitman is up to.

42:44.940 --> 42:49.090
Now this is very tricky,
and he spends the rest of his

42:49.085 --> 42:53.465
essay talking about the murky
boundaries between types of

42:53.465 --> 42:56.235
evidence,
type of evidence number two

42:56.242 --> 43:00.172
which is out of play and type of
evidence number three which may

43:00.168 --> 43:03.908
be in play but has to be dealt
with in a gingerly and careful

43:03.909 --> 43:04.469
way.

43:04.469 --> 43:08.529
But I'm more interested,
actually,

43:08.530 --> 43:13.860
in a footnote which arises from
this argument about the

43:13.858 --> 43:19.968
idiosyncratic nature of language
as a particular author may use

43:19.974 --> 43:24.284
it because the footnote says,
you know what?

43:24.280 --> 43:28.020
That's just one consideration
we bring to bear on the function

43:28.018 --> 43:29.488
of language in a poem.

43:29.489 --> 43:33.349
This footnote,
number eleven at the bottom of

43:33.346 --> 43:37.656
page 814 over to 815,
is just about as devastating

43:37.655 --> 43:41.275
and counterintuitive a
pronouncement as is made

43:41.282 --> 43:47.202
anywhere in our entire syllabus,
the most earth-shattering

43:47.202 --> 43:54.732
pronouncement that anybody could
ever possibly make in the New

43:54.726 --> 43:56.326
Criticism.

43:56.329 --> 43:59.139
Well, look at this footnote:
And the history of words

43:59.143 --> 44:03.193
after a poem is written
may contribute meanings which if

44:03.186 --> 44:07.096
relevant to the original pattern
should not be ruled out by a

44:07.099 --> 44:08.989
scruple about intention.

44:08.989 --> 44:10.649
That is bold.

44:10.650 --> 44:15.580
The great creator raised his
plastic arm, right?

44:15.579 --> 44:19.779
Everybody knows Akenside didn't
mean polymers,

44:19.782 --> 44:24.552
but now we're all into
cyberborgs and we take all of

44:24.547 --> 44:26.787
this very seriously.

44:26.789 --> 44:30.089
In a way it's a tribute to the
great creator and also an

44:30.085 --> 44:33.795
acknowledgement of the fact that
the great creator lives in the

44:33.800 --> 44:34.940
Eternal Moment.

44:34.940 --> 44:36.860
He's not subject to history.

44:36.860 --> 44:40.570
The great creator knew in the
eighteenth century that some day

44:40.570 --> 44:42.760
plastic would mean polymer,
right?

44:42.760 --> 44:47.180
Obviously that's one of the
divine attributes.

44:47.179 --> 44:51.359
Therefore, if the great creator
chooses to raise his prosthetic

44:51.360 --> 44:53.810
limb,
that is simply a way of

44:53.806 --> 44:57.866
understanding what it is like to
be everything,

44:57.869 --> 45:01.479
omnipotent and omniscient in
the Eternal Moment.

45:01.480 --> 45:04.830
In other words,
if you take Wimsatt's eleventh

45:04.831 --> 45:08.741
footnote seriously,
that is a perfectly legitimate

45:08.737 --> 45:13.427
way not to ironically undermine
Akenside's line but actually to

45:13.425 --> 45:18.035
reinforce it and to give it a
kind of formal richness which it

45:18.036 --> 45:20.226
does not otherwise have.

45:20.230 --> 45:24.260
I realize that I'm out of time,
and so I'll begin the next

45:24.262 --> 45:28.362
lecture by talking about a poem
of Yeats called "Lapis

45:28.364 --> 45:33.034
Lazuli" written in 1935,
in which he talks about the way

45:33.034 --> 45:37.354
in which people who build up
things that have been destroyed

45:37.347 --> 45:39.537
are always "gay."

45:39.539 --> 45:44.029
And of course,
if we invoke intention,

45:44.025 --> 45:51.055
Yeats doesn't mean that they're
always gay in our sense.

45:51.059 --> 45:54.359
He is using the English
translation of the German

45:54.362 --> 45:58.492
word froehlich from
Nietzsche's The Gay Science.

45:58.489 --> 46:02.449
Yeats is an astute and
careful reader of Nietzsche and

46:02.451 --> 46:06.761
in some ways is elaborating on
what Nietzsche says in that book

46:06.760 --> 46:09.610
in his poem "Lapis
Lazuli."

46:09.610 --> 46:12.640
At the beginning of the next
lecture we will do the same

46:12.643 --> 46:14.523
thing with the word
"gay"

46:14.518 --> 46:17.438
that we've just done with the
word "plastic"

46:17.442 --> 46:20.642
and then we will go ahead and
consider the essay of Cleanth

46:20.641 --> 46:23.621
Brooks and other aspects of the
New Criticism.

46:23.619 --> 46:29.999