WEBVTT 00:01.820 --> 00:03.230 Prof: I thought I'd begin today--this 00:03.233 --> 00:04.913 <> 00:04.910 --> 00:07.710 is, by the way, the regular practice. 00:07.710 --> 00:11.470 This is as close as I get to bulleted Power Point. 00:11.470 --> 00:12.880 It's all there. 00:12.880 --> 00:16.930 I ought to have got through those topics by the end of the 00:16.929 --> 00:17.639 lecture. 00:17.640 --> 00:19.540 If I don't, not to worry. 00:19.540 --> 00:23.310 I'll pick up wherever the dotted line emerges in the 00:23.308 --> 00:24.858 subsequent lecture. 00:24.860 --> 00:27.550 In any case, I thought I'd begin today by 00:27.546 --> 00:31.576 making a few remarks about the title of our course because it 00:31.575 --> 00:34.455 has some big words in it: "theory" 00:34.463 --> 00:36.813 and "literature," but also 00:36.813 --> 00:39.033 "introduction." 00:39.030 --> 00:41.700 I think it's worth saying a word or two about the word 00:41.698 --> 00:43.458 "introduction" as well. 00:43.460 --> 00:47.630 Now the word theory has a very complicated etymological 00:47.633 --> 00:50.373 history that I won't trouble you with. 00:50.370 --> 00:53.560 The trouble with the etymology of theory and the way in 00:53.558 --> 00:56.638 which the word has been used traditionally is that sometimes 00:56.641 --> 00:58.681 it actually means practice, 00:58.680 --> 01:02.820 and then at other historical periods it means something very 01:02.823 --> 01:07.323 different from practice, something typically from which 01:07.319 --> 01:09.139 practice is derived. 01:09.140 --> 01:13.260 Well, that's the sense of theory that I like to work with, 01:13.260 --> 01:16.590 and I would pause over it by saying that after all, 01:16.590 --> 01:19.410 there is a difference and practice and we shouldn't too 01:19.414 --> 01:21.334 quickly, at least, confuse the terms. 01:21.330 --> 01:24.810 There's a difference between theory and methodology. 01:24.810 --> 01:29.610 Yes, it's probably fair enough to say that methodology is 01:29.614 --> 01:33.454 applied theory, but there's a great danger in 01:33.453 --> 01:37.643 supposing that every aspect of theory has an immediate 01:37.643 --> 01:38.833 application. 01:38.830 --> 01:44.240 Theory is very often a purely speculative undertaking. 01:44.239 --> 01:48.299 It's an hypothesis about something, the exact nature of 01:48.303 --> 01:51.693 which one needn't necessarily have in view. 01:51.690 --> 01:55.270 It's a supposition that whatever the object of theory 01:55.272 --> 01:57.752 might be, theory itself must--owing to 01:57.745 --> 02:00.795 whatever intellectual constraints one can imagine-- 02:00.799 --> 02:03.209 be of such and such a form. 02:03.209 --> 02:08.249 At this level of abstraction, plainly there isn't all that 02:08.247 --> 02:12.577 much incentive to apply thinking of that kind, 02:12.580 --> 02:16.750 but on the other hand undoubtedly theory does exist 02:16.752 --> 02:19.592 for the most part to be applied. 02:19.590 --> 02:23.320 Very frequently, courses of this kind have a 02:23.316 --> 02:26.366 text-- Lycidas, The Rime of the 02:26.366 --> 02:30.126 Ancient Mariner, a short story--and 02:30.133 --> 02:34.373 then once in a while the disquisition of the lecture will 02:34.372 --> 02:36.872 pause, the text will be produced, 02:36.866 --> 02:40.466 and whatever theory has recently been talked about will 02:40.473 --> 02:43.123 be applied to the text; so that you'll get a 02:43.116 --> 02:45.876 postcolonial reading of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner-- 02:45.878 --> 02:47.758 something, by the way, which is absolutely 02:47.764 --> 02:49.234 fascinating and important to do-- 02:49.229 --> 02:52.599 and so on through the course. 02:52.598 --> 02:56.618 Now I suppose it's my reluctance to get into the 02:56.620 --> 03:01.840 intricacies of questions having to do with applied theory that 03:01.838 --> 03:05.088 makes me prefer to keep it simple. 03:05.090 --> 03:11.700 Our text is a story for toddlers called Tony the Tow 03:11.701 --> 03:12.571 Truck. 03:12.568 --> 03:15.208 I've decided not to pass it out today because, 03:15.211 --> 03:17.961 after all, I want to get it into the right hands! 03:17.960 --> 03:21.630 You can't read it unless you take the course!--and so I'm 03:21.628 --> 03:23.528 going to wait a little bit. 03:23.530 --> 03:23.900 <> 03:23.900 --> 03:27.020 We won't come back to it at least for the moment, 03:27.020 --> 03:30.300 but you see that it's mercifully short, 03:30.300 --> 03:35.660 and as time passes we will do some rather interesting tricks 03:35.661 --> 03:36.571 with it. 03:36.568 --> 03:38.688 We will revert, as others revert to 03:38.694 --> 03:42.074 Lycidas, to Tony the Tow Truck for 03:42.071 --> 03:45.761 the purpose of introducing questions of applied theory. 03:45.758 --> 03:49.748 Now this choice may suggest a certain condescension both 03:49.748 --> 03:52.508 toward theory and toward literary text, 03:52.506 --> 03:54.896 which is not at all intended. 03:54.900 --> 03:58.860 It's much more a question of reminding you that if you can do 03:58.863 --> 04:01.773 it with this, you can do it with anything; 04:01.770 --> 04:07.500 but also of reminding you that, after all, reading--reading 04:07.502 --> 04:13.342 just anything--is a complex and potentially almost unlimited 04:13.335 --> 04:14.615 activity. 04:14.620 --> 04:19.860 That's one of the good things that theory teaches us and that 04:19.860 --> 04:24.930 I hope to be able to get across in the course of our varied 04:24.927 --> 04:28.857 approaches to Tony the Tow Truck. 04:28.860 --> 04:33.390 Now theory resembles philosophy perhaps in this: 04:33.394 --> 04:38.324 that it asks fundamental questions and also at times 04:38.315 --> 04:40.145 builds systems. 04:40.149 --> 04:43.819 That is to say, theory has certain ambitions to 04:43.822 --> 04:48.692 a totalization of what can be thought that resembles or rivals 04:48.692 --> 04:49.892 philosophy. 04:49.889 --> 04:52.249 But theory differs from philosophy-- 04:52.250 --> 04:56.430 and this is something that I'm going to be coming back to 04:56.425 --> 05:00.975 persistingly in the second half of this lecture and many times 05:00.975 --> 05:05.145 hereafter: theory differs from most philosophy in that it 05:05.151 --> 05:08.001 involves a certain-- this is by no means 05:07.997 --> 05:09.817 self-evident, and "Why should this 05:09.815 --> 05:10.385 be?" 05:10.389 --> 05:13.519 is one of the questions we're going to be asking--it involves 05:13.519 --> 05:14.719 a certain skepticism. 05:14.720 --> 05:19.160 There seems to be a doubt, a variety of doubts, 05:19.160 --> 05:23.600 about the foundations of what we can think and the basis of 05:23.603 --> 05:26.353 our opinions, that pervades theory, 05:26.351 --> 05:30.701 and is seen somehow or another to characterize its history. 05:30.699 --> 05:35.079 Not all theory that we read in this course is skeptical. 05:35.079 --> 05:39.099 Some of the most powerful and profound thought that's been 05:39.098 --> 05:43.398 devoted to the subject of the theory of literature is positive 05:43.399 --> 05:46.219 in its intentions and in its views, 05:46.220 --> 05:50.560 but by and large you will happily or unhappily come to 05:50.557 --> 05:55.717 terms with the fact that much of what you're going to be reading 05:55.716 --> 05:59.596 this semester is undergirded, or perhaps I should say 05:59.598 --> 06:04.548 undermined, by this persisting skepticism. 06:04.550 --> 06:07.120 It's crucial, as I say, and I'm going to be 06:07.120 --> 06:10.120 coming back to it, but it's just a point I want to 06:10.117 --> 06:13.237 make in passing about the nature of theory now. 06:13.240 --> 06:15.720 Turning to the word literature, 06:15.718 --> 06:18.998 this is not theory of relativity, theory of music, 06:19.002 --> 06:20.882 or theory of government. 06:20.879 --> 06:25.229 This is a course in theory of literature, and theory of 06:25.232 --> 06:30.232 literature shares in common with other kinds of theory the need 06:30.228 --> 06:31.758 for definition. 06:31.759 --> 06:34.679 That is to say, maybe the most central and, 06:34.680 --> 06:38.640 for me, possibly the most fascinating question theory asks 06:38.644 --> 06:40.944 is--well, what is literature? 06:40.940 --> 06:43.040 How do we know it when we see it? 06:43.040 --> 06:45.390 How can we define it? 06:45.389 --> 06:48.389 Much of what we'll be reading takes up the question "What 06:48.387 --> 06:49.467 is literature?" 06:49.470 --> 06:53.270 and provides us with fascinating and always--for the 06:53.274 --> 06:56.264 moment, I think--enticing definitions. 06:56.259 --> 06:59.979 There are definitions based on form, circularity, 06:59.980 --> 07:03.860 symmetry, economy of form, lack of economy of form, 07:03.857 --> 07:05.327 and repetition. 07:05.329 --> 07:09.419 There are definitions based on psychological complexity, 07:09.420 --> 07:12.670 psychological balance, psychological harmony, 07:12.670 --> 07:16.240 sometimes psychological imbalance and disharmony, 07:16.240 --> 07:20.700 and there are also definitions which insist that somehow there 07:20.696 --> 07:25.076 is an epistemological difference between literature and other 07:25.079 --> 07:26.759 kinds of utterance. 07:26.759 --> 07:30.619 Whereas most utterances purport to be saying something true 07:30.619 --> 07:33.879 about the actual state of things in the world, 07:33.879 --> 07:37.769 literary utterance is under no such obligation, 07:37.769 --> 07:40.649 the argument goes, and ought properly to be 07:40.653 --> 07:45.103 understood as fiction-- making it up as opposed to 07:45.103 --> 07:46.263 referring. 07:46.259 --> 07:47.129 All right. 07:47.129 --> 07:49.359 Now all of these definitions have had currency. 07:49.360 --> 07:53.510 We'll be going over them again and finding them, 07:53.507 --> 07:58.357 I hope, more fascinating as we learn more about them; 07:58.360 --> 08:02.130 but at the same time, even as I rattle off this list 08:02.127 --> 08:05.527 of possibilities, probably you felt in yourself 08:05.526 --> 08:07.666 an upsurge of skepticism. 08:07.670 --> 08:08.820 You say, "My goodness. 08:08.819 --> 08:11.429 I can easily find exceptions to all of those rules. 08:11.430 --> 08:15.190 It's ridiculous to think that literature could be defined in 08:15.194 --> 08:19.284 any one of those ways or even in a combination of all of them. 08:19.278 --> 08:22.378 Literature is many things, a many-splendored thing," 08:22.377 --> 08:25.587 you say to yourself, "and it simply cannot be 08:25.591 --> 08:29.611 confined or trapped within a definition of that kind." 08:29.610 --> 08:33.040 Well and good, properly ecumenical of you, 08:33.038 --> 08:37.448 but at the same time it gives rise to a sense that possibly 08:37.451 --> 08:40.621 after all, literature just isn't anything 08:40.621 --> 08:42.951 at all: in other words, 08:42.950 --> 08:47.220 that literature may not be susceptible of definition, 08:47.220 --> 08:50.990 of any one definition, but it is rather-- 08:50.990 --> 08:54.380 and this is the so-called neo-pragmatist argument-- 08:54.379 --> 08:59.559 but it is rather whatever you think it is or more precisely 08:59.563 --> 09:04.483 whatever your interpretive community says that it is. 09:04.480 --> 09:06.810 This isn't really a big problem. 09:06.808 --> 09:09.928 It's kind of unsettling because we like to know what things are, 09:09.928 --> 09:14.078 but at the same time it's not really a big problem because as 09:14.081 --> 09:17.821 long as we know about the fact that a certain notion of 09:17.817 --> 09:20.997 literature exists in certain communities, 09:21.000 --> 09:24.790 we can begin to do very interesting work precisely with 09:24.788 --> 09:25.628 that idea. 09:25.629 --> 09:31.489 We can say there's a great deal to learn about what people think 09:31.488 --> 09:36.788 literature is and we can develop very interesting kinds of 09:36.788 --> 09:42.178 thinking about the variety of ways in which these ideas are 09:42.182 --> 09:43.672 expressed. 09:43.668 --> 09:46.468 And so it's not, perhaps, crippling if this is 09:46.466 --> 09:49.756 the conclusion we reach, but at the same time it's not 09:49.759 --> 09:51.809 the only possible conclusion. 09:51.808 --> 09:54.348 The possibility of definition persists. 09:54.350 --> 09:58.390 Definition is important to us, and we're certainly not going 09:58.390 --> 10:01.200 to give it short shrift in this course. 10:01.200 --> 10:06.200 We're going to make every effort to define literature as 10:06.200 --> 10:08.200 carefully as we can. 10:08.200 --> 10:12.210 Now in addition to defining literature, literary theory also 10:12.205 --> 10:16.205 asks questions obviously not unrelated but which open up the 10:16.210 --> 10:17.500 field somewhat. 10:17.500 --> 10:23.340 What causes literature and what are the effects of literature? 10:23.340 --> 10:26.950 In a way, there's a subset of questions that arises from 10:26.948 --> 10:28.728 those, and as to causes these are, 10:28.730 --> 10:30.910 of course, what we'll be taking up next 10:30.907 --> 10:33.847 time: the question "What is an author?" 10:33.850 --> 10:36.180 That is to say, if something causes literature, 10:36.178 --> 10:40.258 there must be some sort of authority behind it and 10:40.256 --> 10:43.416 therefore we find ourselves asking, 10:43.419 --> 10:45.019 "What is an author?" 10:45.019 --> 10:47.679 By the same token, if literature has effects, 10:47.678 --> 10:51.058 it must have effects on someone, and this gives rise to 10:51.058 --> 10:53.998 the equally interesting and vexing question, 10:54.000 --> 10:55.840 "What is a reader?" 10:55.840 --> 11:00.230 Literary theory is very much involved with questions of that 11:00.225 --> 11:03.025 kind, and organizing those questions 11:03.027 --> 11:07.587 is basically what rationalizes the structure of our syllabus. 11:07.590 --> 11:10.340 You'll notice that we move in the syllabus-- 11:10.340 --> 11:14.700 after a couple of introductory talks that I'll mention in a 11:14.697 --> 11:17.977 minute-- we move from the idea that 11:17.976 --> 11:23.516 literature is in some sense caused by language to the idea 11:23.518 --> 11:29.738 that literature is in some sense caused by the human psyche, 11:29.740 --> 11:34.530 to the idea that literature is in some sense caused by social, 11:34.529 --> 11:37.739 economic, and historical forces. 11:37.740 --> 11:43.070 There are corollaries for those ideas in terms of the kinds of 11:43.066 --> 11:48.476 effects that literature has and what we might imagine ourselves 11:48.479 --> 11:50.749 to conclude from them. 11:50.750 --> 11:55.020 Finally, literary theory asks one other important question-- 11:55.019 --> 11:57.179 it asks many, but this is the way at least 11:57.178 --> 12:00.268 I'm organizing it for today-- it asks one other important 12:00.265 --> 12:02.395 question, the one with which we will 12:02.400 --> 12:04.890 actually begin: not so much "What is a 12:04.890 --> 12:05.840 reader?" 12:05.840 --> 12:08.600 but "How does reading get done?" 12:08.600 --> 12:11.770 That is to say, how do we form the conclusion 12:11.769 --> 12:15.299 that we are interpreting something adequately, 12:15.298 --> 12:18.628 that we have a basis for the kind of reading that we're 12:18.634 --> 12:19.134 doing? 12:19.129 --> 12:21.429 What is the reading experience like? 12:21.428 --> 12:26.998 How do we meet the text face-to-face? 12:27.000 --> 12:31.190 How do we put ourselves in touch with the text which may 12:31.192 --> 12:35.082 after all in a variety of ways be remote from us? 12:35.080 --> 12:39.030 These are the questions that are asked by what's called 12:39.034 --> 12:42.114 hermeneutics, a difficult word that we will 12:42.111 --> 12:44.091 be taking up next week. 12:44.090 --> 12:48.230 It has to do with the god Hermes who conveyed language to 12:48.231 --> 12:49.801 man, who was in a certain sense, 12:49.801 --> 12:52.761 among many other functions, the god of communication, 12:52.764 --> 12:56.354 and hermeneutics is, after all, obviously about 12:56.351 --> 12:57.491 communication. 12:57.490 --> 13:02.260 So hermeneutics will be our first topic, and it attempts to 13:02.264 --> 13:07.124 answer the last question that I've mentioned which is raised 13:07.124 --> 13:09.434 by theory of literature. 13:09.429 --> 13:10.529 All right. 13:10.528 --> 13:15.118 Now let me pause quickly over the word introduction. 13:15.120 --> 13:19.790 I first started teaching this course in the late 1970s and 80s 13:19.793 --> 13:24.393 when literary theory was a thing absolutely of the moment. 13:24.389 --> 13:28.939 As I told the teaching fellows, I had a colleague in those days 13:28.937 --> 13:33.407 who looked at me enviously and said he wished he had the black 13:33.412 --> 13:35.982 leather concession at the door. 13:35.980 --> 13:40.980 Theory was both hot and cool, and it was something about 13:40.976 --> 13:46.056 which, following from that, one had not just opinions but 13:46.062 --> 13:48.882 very, very strong opinions. 13:48.879 --> 13:51.029 In other words, the teaching fellows I had in 13:51.028 --> 13:52.198 those days--who knows? 13:52.200 --> 13:55.140 They may rise up against me in the same way this semester-- 13:55.139 --> 13:57.329 but the teaching fellows I had in those days said, 13:57.330 --> 13:59.950 "You can't teach an introduction. 13:59.950 --> 14:02.300 You can't teach a survey. 14:02.298 --> 14:03.968 You can't say, 'If it's Tuesday, 14:03.971 --> 14:05.161 it must be Foucault. 14:05.158 --> 14:07.598 If it's Thursday, it must be Lacan.' 14:07.600 --> 14:09.150 You can't approach theory that way. 14:09.149 --> 14:11.889 Theory is important and it's important to know what you 14:11.893 --> 14:13.573 believe," in other words, 14:13.570 --> 14:17.570 what the basis of all other possible theory is."I am a 14:17.571 --> 14:18.331 feminist. 14:18.330 --> 14:20.500 I'm a Lacanian. 14:20.500 --> 14:23.030 I am a student of Paul de Man. 14:23.028 --> 14:26.748 I believe that these are the foundational moments of 14:26.750 --> 14:31.050 theorizing and that if you're going to teach anything like a 14:31.053 --> 14:33.583 survey, you've got to derive the rest 14:33.577 --> 14:36.987 of it from whatever the moment I happen to subscribe to might 14:36.988 --> 14:37.668 be." 14:37.668 --> 14:42.028 That's the way it felt to teach theory in those days. 14:42.029 --> 14:44.529 It was awkward teaching an introduction and probably for 14:44.532 --> 14:46.172 that reason > 14:46.168 --> 14:49.858 while I was teaching Lit 300, which was then called Lit Y, 14:49.861 --> 14:52.001 Paul de Man was teaching Lit Z. 14:52.000 --> 14:55.920 He was teaching a lecture course nearby, 14:55.921 --> 15:00.751 not at the same time, which was interpretation as 15:00.748 --> 15:04.568 practiced by the School of de Man. 15:04.570 --> 15:07.920 That was Lit Z, and it did indeed imply every 15:07.921 --> 15:11.731 other form of theory, and it was extremely rigorous 15:11.727 --> 15:15.077 and interesting, but it wasn't a survey. 15:15.080 --> 15:17.690 It took for granted, in other words, 15:17.687 --> 15:21.637 that everything else would derive from the fundamental 15:21.639 --> 15:24.059 idea; but it didn't for a minute 15:24.057 --> 15:27.887 think that a whole series of fundamental ideas could share 15:27.886 --> 15:30.516 space, could be a kind of smorgasbord 15:30.524 --> 15:34.394 that you could mix and match in a kind of happy-go-lucky, 15:34.389 --> 15:37.089 eclectic way, which perhaps we will be 15:37.085 --> 15:41.525 seeming to do from time to time in our introductory course. 15:41.529 --> 15:45.509 Well, does one feel any nostalgia now for the coolness 15:45.508 --> 15:47.458 and heat of this moment? 15:47.460 --> 15:49.330 Yes and no. 15:49.330 --> 15:54.560 It was fascinating to be--as Wordsworth says, 15:54.558 --> 15:58.508 "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive"-- 15:58.509 --> 16:02.329 to be around in those days, but at the same time I think 16:02.325 --> 16:06.135 it's rather advantageous for us too to be still "in 16:06.139 --> 16:07.319 theory." 16:07.320 --> 16:10.310 That is to say we still have views. 16:10.308 --> 16:14.588 We still have to recognize that what we think derives from this 16:14.591 --> 16:18.801 or that understanding of theory and these or those theoretical 16:18.803 --> 16:19.843 principles. 16:19.840 --> 16:23.240 We have to understand the way in which what we do and say, 16:23.240 --> 16:25.480 what we write in our papers and articles, 16:25.480 --> 16:28.490 is grounded in theoretical premises which, 16:28.490 --> 16:31.030 if we don't come to terms with them, 16:31.028 --> 16:34.768 we will simply naively reproduce without being fully 16:34.770 --> 16:37.780 aware of how we're using them and how, 16:37.779 --> 16:39.659 indeed, they are using us. 16:39.658 --> 16:43.878 So it is as crucial as ever to understand theory. 16:43.879 --> 16:47.439 In addition, we have the vantage point of, 16:47.441 --> 16:51.091 I suppose, what we can now call history. 16:51.090 --> 16:57.140 Some of what we'll be studying is no longer practiced as that 16:57.138 --> 17:01.978 which is the absolutely necessary central path to 17:01.976 --> 17:03.586 methodology. 17:03.590 --> 17:07.740 Some of what we're studying has had its moment of flourishing, 17:07.740 --> 17:11.560 has remained influential as a paradigm that shapes other 17:11.557 --> 17:14.087 paradigms, but is not itself, 17:14.093 --> 17:17.273 perhaps, today the sole paradigm-- 17:17.269 --> 17:20.729 which gives us the opportunity of historical perspective, 17:20.730 --> 17:24.130 so that from time to time during the course of the course, 17:24.130 --> 17:27.850 I'll be trying to say something about why certain theoretical 17:27.849 --> 17:31.079 issues and ideas pushed themselves into prominence at 17:31.075 --> 17:35.245 certain historical moments, and that too then can become 17:35.246 --> 17:37.116 part of our enterprise. 17:37.118 --> 17:40.608 So an introduction is not only valuable for those of us who 17:40.605 --> 17:42.705 simply wish to acquire knowledge. 17:42.710 --> 17:45.470 It's also valuable, I think, in lending an 17:45.471 --> 17:49.111 additional perspective to the topic of theory and to an 17:49.111 --> 17:51.741 understanding about how theory is, 17:51.740 --> 17:54.610 on the one hand and perhaps in a certain sense, 17:54.608 --> 17:59.518 now an historical topic and is, on the other hand, 17:59.519 --> 18:04.169 something that we're very much engaged in and still committed 18:04.172 --> 18:08.442 to: so all that then by way of rationale for teaching an 18:08.435 --> 18:10.525 introduction to theory. 18:10.529 --> 18:12.139 All right. 18:12.140 --> 18:16.610 Now the question, "How does literary theory 18:16.605 --> 18:20.685 relate to the history of criticism?" 18:20.690 --> 18:23.470 That is a course that I like to teach, too; 18:23.470 --> 18:27.240 usually I teach Plato to T.S. Eliot or Plato to 18:27.239 --> 18:31.829 I.A. Richards or some other important figure in the early 18:31.828 --> 18:33.958 twentieth century. 18:33.960 --> 18:37.420 It's a course which is absolutely fascinating in all 18:37.416 --> 18:40.306 sorts of ways, and it has one very important 18:40.308 --> 18:43.608 thing in common with literary theory: that is to say, 18:43.608 --> 18:48.258 literary criticism is, too, perpetually concerned with 18:48.259 --> 18:50.979 the definition of literature. 18:50.980 --> 18:55.050 Many of the issues that I raised in talking about defining 18:55.046 --> 18:59.326 literature are as relevant for literary criticism as they are 18:59.326 --> 19:02.956 for literary theory, and yet we all instinctively 19:02.958 --> 19:06.388 know that these are two very different enterprises. 19:06.390 --> 19:11.020 Literary theory loses something that literary criticism just 19:11.019 --> 19:12.589 takes for granted. 19:12.588 --> 19:17.108 Literary theory is not concerned with issues of 19:17.107 --> 19:22.707 evaluation, and it's not really concerned with concomitant 19:22.707 --> 19:25.357 issues of appreciation. 19:25.358 --> 19:31.148 Literary theory just takes those for granted as part of the 19:31.152 --> 19:34.682 sense experience, as one might say, 19:34.680 --> 19:39.300 of any reader and prefers, rather, to dwell on questions 19:39.298 --> 19:43.418 of description, analysis and speculation, 19:43.421 --> 19:45.041 as I've said. 19:45.038 --> 19:48.538 So that's what's lost in theory, but what's new in 19:48.537 --> 19:49.177 theory? 19:49.180 --> 19:52.920 Here I come to the topic which will occupy most of my attention 19:52.924 --> 19:55.044 for the remainder of the lecture. 19:55.038 --> 19:59.768 What's new in theory is the element of skepticism that 19:59.772 --> 20:02.902 literary criticism by and large-- 20:02.900 --> 20:06.590 which is usually affirming a canon of some sort-- 20:06.589 --> 20:08.669 doesn't reflect. 20:08.670 --> 20:12.120 Literary theory, as I say, is skeptical about 20:12.124 --> 20:16.054 the foundations of its subject matter and also, 20:16.048 --> 20:19.468 in many cases, about the foundations of what 20:19.469 --> 20:21.139 it itself is doing. 20:21.140 --> 20:24.900 So the question is: how on earth did this come 20:24.901 --> 20:25.571 about? 20:25.568 --> 20:29.208 It's an historical question, as I say, and I want to devote 20:29.211 --> 20:31.221 the rest of the lecture to it. 20:31.220 --> 20:36.670 Why should doubt about the veridical or truth-affirming 20:36.669 --> 20:42.119 possibilities of interpretation be so widespread in the 20:42.118 --> 20:44.338 twentieth century? 20:44.338 --> 20:48.948 Now here is a big glop of intellectual history. 20:48.950 --> 20:52.430 I think the sort of skepticism I mean arises from what one 20:52.429 --> 20:55.419 might call and what often is called modernity-- 20:55.420 --> 20:57.400 not to be confused with Modernism, an early 20:57.400 --> 21:00.930 twentieth-century phenomenon, but the history of modern 21:00.925 --> 21:05.035 thought as it usually derives from the generation of 21:05.039 --> 21:08.289 Descartes, Shakespeare, and Cervantes. 21:08.288 --> 21:11.198 Notice something about all of those figures: 21:11.201 --> 21:15.261 Shakespeare is preoccupied with figures who may or may not be 21:15.262 --> 21:15.942 crazy. 21:15.940 --> 21:20.200 Cervantes is preoccupied with a figure who is crazy--we're 21:20.201 --> 21:23.641 pretty sure of that, but he certainly isn't. 21:23.640 --> 21:28.620 He takes it for granted that he is the most rational and 21:28.624 --> 21:33.794 systematic of all thinkers and raises questions about-- 21:33.788 --> 21:36.078 since we all take ourselves to be rational too-- 21:36.078 --> 21:40.228 raises questions about just how we know ourselves not to be 21:40.230 --> 21:42.950 paranoid delusives like Don Quixote. 21:42.950 --> 21:47.840 So that can be unsettling when we think of this as happening at 21:47.838 --> 21:52.648 a certain contemporaneous moment in the history of thought. 21:52.650 --> 21:54.360 Now Descartes, you remember, 21:54.358 --> 21:57.718 in his Meditations begins by asking a series of 21:57.715 --> 22:00.625 questions about how we can know anything, 22:00.630 --> 22:03.480 and one of the skeptical questions he asks is, 22:03.480 --> 22:05.240 "Well, might I not be crazy?" 22:05.240 --> 22:08.090 In other words, Descartes is still thinking 22:08.092 --> 22:09.792 along these same lines. 22:09.788 --> 22:12.498 He says, "Well, maybe I've been seized by an 22:12.496 --> 22:15.706 evil genius of some kind or maybe I'm just crazy." 22:15.710 --> 22:19.970 Now why--and here is the question--why do we get this 22:19.967 --> 22:24.307 nervousness about the relationship between what I know 22:24.306 --> 22:27.986 and how I know it arising at this moment? 22:27.990 --> 22:31.130 Well, I think it's characterized at least in part 22:31.125 --> 22:35.105 by what Descartes goes on to say in his Meditations. 22:35.108 --> 22:37.748 Descartes settles the matter--perhaps somewhat 22:37.750 --> 22:41.100 sweeping the question of whether he is crazy under the rug 22:41.095 --> 22:44.435 because I'm still not sure he answers that question-- 22:44.440 --> 22:47.750 but he settles the matter famously by saying, 22:47.750 --> 22:48.270 "I think. 22:48.269 --> 22:49.969 Therefore, I am," and furthermore, 22:49.970 --> 22:51.360 as a concomitant, "I think, 22:51.358 --> 22:55.168 therefore, all the things that I'm thinking about can be 22:55.173 --> 22:57.673 understood to exist as well." 22:57.670 --> 23:02.000 Now the Cartesian Revolution establishes something that is 23:02.003 --> 23:06.493 absolutely crucial for what we call the Enlightenment of the 23:06.490 --> 23:09.190 next hundred, hundred and fifty years--in 23:09.190 --> 23:11.160 other words, the idea that there is a 23:11.161 --> 23:14.581 distance between the mind and the things that it thinks about, 23:14.578 --> 23:17.908 but that this distance is a good thing. 23:17.910 --> 23:20.630 In other words, if you look too closely at a 23:20.630 --> 23:24.430 picture or if you stand too far away from it you don't see it 23:24.426 --> 23:26.806 clearly-- it's out of focus--but if you 23:26.814 --> 23:29.084 achieve just the right distance from it, 23:29.079 --> 23:31.529 it comes into focus. 23:31.528 --> 23:34.868 The idea of scientific objectivity, 23:34.868 --> 23:37.648 the idea that motivates the creation of the great 23:37.647 --> 23:40.367 Encyclopedia by the figures of the French 23:40.368 --> 23:44.098 Enlightenment-- this idea all arises out of the 23:44.099 --> 23:49.019 idea that there is a certain appropriate objective distance 23:49.020 --> 23:52.670 between the perceiver and the perceived. 23:52.670 --> 23:57.630 Gradually, however, the idea that this distance is 23:57.626 --> 24:03.086 not too great begins to erode so that in 1796 Kant, 24:03.088 --> 24:06.318 who isn't exactly enlisted on the side of the skeptics by most 24:06.319 --> 24:10.269 of his serious students, nevertheless does say something 24:10.269 --> 24:14.979 equally famous as that which Descartes said and a good deal 24:14.983 --> 24:18.723 more disturbing: "We cannot know the thing 24:18.722 --> 24:20.432 in itself." 24:20.430 --> 24:23.790 Now as I said, Kant erected such an incredibly 24:23.788 --> 24:27.818 magnificent scaffolding around the thing in itself-- 24:27.818 --> 24:30.418 that is to say, the variety of ways in which 24:30.416 --> 24:33.616 although we can't know it, we can sort of triangulate it 24:33.624 --> 24:35.534 and come to terms with it obliquely-- 24:35.529 --> 24:39.259 that it seems churlish to enlist him on the side of the 24:39.259 --> 24:42.579 skeptics, but at the same time there's a 24:42.576 --> 24:46.876 sense of a danger in the distance between subject and 24:46.884 --> 24:51.614 object that begins to emerge in thinking of this kind. 24:51.608 --> 24:54.788 Now by 1807, Hegel in The Phenomenology 24:54.789 --> 24:59.209 of Mind is saying that in recent history and in recent 24:59.211 --> 25:03.711 developments of consciousness something unfortunate has set 25:03.711 --> 25:04.411 in. 25:04.410 --> 25:07.530 We have "unhappy consciousness," 25:07.532 --> 25:12.182 unhappy consciousness which is the result of estrangement, 25:12.180 --> 25:15.590 or Verfremdung, and which drives us too far 25:15.587 --> 25:18.647 away from the thing that we're looking at. 25:18.650 --> 25:22.790 We are no longer certain at all of what we're looking at, 25:22.785 --> 25:26.325 and consciousness, therefore, feels alienated. 25:26.329 --> 25:27.019 All right. 25:27.019 --> 25:30.919 So you can already begin to see a development in intellectual 25:30.922 --> 25:34.892 history that perhaps opens the way to a certain skepticism. 25:34.890 --> 25:38.280 But the crucial thing hasn't yet happened, 25:38.279 --> 25:41.249 because after all, in all of these accounts, 25:41.250 --> 25:44.500 even that of Hegel, there is no doubt about the 25:44.501 --> 25:48.251 authority of consciousness to think what it thinks. 25:48.250 --> 25:52.350 It may not clearly think about things, about objects, 25:52.354 --> 25:57.334 but it has a kind of legitimate basis that generates the sort of 25:57.327 --> 25:59.377 thinking that it does. 25:59.380 --> 26:03.220 But then--and here is where I want you to look at the passages 26:03.221 --> 26:04.671 that I've handed out. 26:04.670 --> 26:08.470 Here's where three great figures--there are others but 26:08.471 --> 26:11.631 these are considered the seminal figures-- 26:11.630 --> 26:15.520 begin to raise questions which complicate the whole issue of 26:15.516 --> 26:16.566 consciousness. 26:16.568 --> 26:21.438 Their argument is that it's not just that consciousness doesn't 26:21.444 --> 26:25.774 clearly understand what it's looking at and is therefore 26:25.769 --> 26:27.499 alienated from it. 26:27.500 --> 26:31.140 It's also that consciousness is alienated from its own 26:31.141 --> 26:34.391 underpinnings, that it doesn't have any clear 26:34.388 --> 26:38.678 sense of where it's coming from any more than what it's looking 26:38.684 --> 26:42.494 at: in other words, that consciousness is not only 26:42.488 --> 26:46.538 estranged from the world but that it is in and of itself 26:46.536 --> 26:47.636 inauthentic. 26:47.640 --> 26:50.580 So just quickly look at these passages. 26:50.578 --> 26:54.748 Marx, in the famous argument about commodity fetishism in 26:54.750 --> 26:58.770 Kapital, is comparing the way in which we 26:58.772 --> 27:03.392 take the product of human labor and turn it into a commodity by 27:03.391 --> 27:06.521 saying that it has objective value, 27:06.519 --> 27:10.019 by saying that we know what its value is in and of itself. 27:10.019 --> 27:12.669 He compares that with religion. 27:12.670 --> 27:16.330 The argument is: well, God is a product of human 27:16.326 --> 27:16.946 labor. 27:16.950 --> 27:18.800 In other words, it's not a completely 27:18.803 --> 27:21.833 supercilious argument, sort of "God is brought 27:21.833 --> 27:25.693 into being the same way objects that we make use of are brought 27:25.693 --> 27:26.943 into being." 27:26.940 --> 27:30.790 God is a product of human labor, but then we turn around 27:30.785 --> 27:34.135 and we say God exists independently and has value 27:34.141 --> 27:35.261 objectively. 27:35.259 --> 27:39.589 Marx's argument is that the two forms of belief, 27:39.588 --> 27:45.018 belief in the objective value of the commodity and belief in 27:45.022 --> 27:47.052 God, are the same. 27:47.048 --> 27:50.768 Now whether or not any of this is true, believe me, 27:50.773 --> 27:52.863 is neither here nor there. 27:52.858 --> 27:59.598 The point that Marx is making is that consciousness, 27:59.598 --> 28:02.538 that is to say the way in which we believe things, 28:02.538 --> 28:07.278 is determined by factors outside its control-- 28:07.278 --> 28:10.828 that is to say in the case of Marx's arguments, 28:10.828 --> 28:15.818 social, historical and economic factors that determine what we 28:15.817 --> 28:20.557 think and which in general we call "ideology"; 28:20.558 --> 28:25.288 that is to say, ideology is driven by factors 28:25.294 --> 28:31.324 beyond the ken of the person who thinks ideologically. 28:31.318 --> 28:34.548 So you see the problem for consciousness now is not just a 28:34.547 --> 28:35.507 single problem. 28:35.509 --> 28:38.689 It's twofold: its inauthentic relationship 28:38.690 --> 28:42.650 with the things it looks at and also its inauthentic 28:42.645 --> 28:46.055 relationship with its own underpinnings. 28:46.058 --> 28:48.698 The argument is exactly the same for Nietzsche, 28:48.703 --> 28:50.893 only he shifts the ground of attack. 28:50.890 --> 28:53.410 For Nietzsche, the underpinnings of 28:53.409 --> 28:57.479 consciousness which make the operations of consciousness 28:57.483 --> 29:01.193 inauthentic are the nature of language itself. 29:01.190 --> 29:05.280 That is to say that when we think we're telling the truth 29:05.284 --> 29:08.944 we're actually using worn-out figures of speech. 29:08.940 --> 29:11.150 "What then is truth? 29:11.150 --> 29:15.000 A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 29:15.000 --> 29:19.210 anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations which 29:19.209 --> 29:22.979 became poetically and rhetorically intensified," 29:22.982 --> 29:26.392 etc., etc., etc., "and are now no longer of 29:26.394 --> 29:29.664 account as coins but are debased." 29:29.660 --> 29:31.080 Now that word "now" > 29:31.079 --> 29:32.379 is very important. 29:32.380 --> 29:35.980 It suggests that Nietzsche does somehow believe that there's a 29:35.978 --> 29:39.278 privileged moment in the history of language when perhaps 29:39.280 --> 29:42.940 language is a truth serum, when it is capable of telling 29:42.941 --> 29:45.611 the truth, but language has now 29:45.611 --> 29:48.941 simply become a question of worn-out figures, 29:48.940 --> 29:53.930 all of which dictates what we believe to be true. 29:53.930 --> 29:59.690 I speak in a figurative way about the relationship between 29:59.686 --> 30:04.736 the earth and the sky, and I believe that there's a 30:04.737 --> 30:05.947 sky god. 30:05.950 --> 30:09.370 I move from speech to belief because I simply don't believe 30:09.366 --> 30:11.426 that I'm using figures of speech. 30:11.430 --> 30:14.490 All of this is implied in Nietzsche's argument. 30:14.490 --> 30:16.470 In other words, language, the nature of 30:16.472 --> 30:19.102 language, and the way language is 30:19.095 --> 30:23.005 received by us, in turn determines what we can 30:23.010 --> 30:25.760 do with it, which is to say it determines 30:25.763 --> 30:29.613 what we think, so that for Nietzsche the 30:29.608 --> 30:33.968 distortion of truth-- that is to say the distortion 30:33.965 --> 30:36.625 of the power to observe in consciousness-- 30:36.630 --> 30:40.060 has as its underlying cause language, 30:40.058 --> 30:43.498 the state of language, the status of language. 30:43.500 --> 30:47.810 Freud finally argues for exactly the same relationship 30:47.814 --> 30:50.804 between consciousness-- that is to say, 30:50.801 --> 30:54.041 what I think I am thinking from minute to minute-- 30:54.038 --> 30:58.028 and the unconscious, which perpetually in one way or 30:58.028 --> 31:02.478 another unsettles what I'm thinking and saying from minute 31:02.484 --> 31:03.584 to minute. 31:03.578 --> 31:05.978 You know that in The Psychopathology of Everyday 31:05.982 --> 31:08.032 Life, Freud reminded us that the 31:08.028 --> 31:11.418 Freudian slip isn't something that happens just sometimes-- 31:11.420 --> 31:14.900 and nobody knows this better than an ad libbing lecturer-- 31:14.895 --> 31:17.575 ;it's something that happens all the time. 31:17.578 --> 31:22.708 The Freudian slip is something that one lives with simply as a 31:22.713 --> 31:27.093 phenomenon of the slippage of consciousness under the 31:27.092 --> 31:29.872 influence of the unconscious. 31:29.868 --> 31:33.038 Now in the passage I gave you, Freud says a very interesting 31:33.036 --> 31:35.136 thing, which is that after all, 31:35.137 --> 31:39.177 we have absolutely no objective evidence that the unconscious 31:39.184 --> 31:39.864 exists. 31:39.858 --> 31:44.228 If I could see the unconscious, it'd be conscious. 31:44.230 --> 31:44.900 Right. 31:44.900 --> 31:47.340 The unconscious, Freud is saying, 31:47.335 --> 31:51.895 is something that we have to infer from the way consciousness 31:51.900 --> 31:52.890 operates. 31:52.890 --> 31:54.460 We've got to infer something. 31:54.460 --> 31:58.780 We've got to figure out somehow how it is that consciousness is 31:58.778 --> 32:02.888 never completely uninhibited, never completely does and says 32:02.887 --> 32:04.627 what it wants to say. 32:04.630 --> 32:10.330 So the spin on consciousness for Freud is the unconscious. 32:10.328 --> 32:14.518 Now someone who didn't fully believe Marx, 32:14.519 --> 32:17.389 Nietzsche and Freud, a very important modern 32:17.387 --> 32:21.587 philosopher in the hermeneutic tradition named Paul Ricoeur, 32:21.588 --> 32:26.098 famously said in the fourth passage on your sheet that these 32:26.096 --> 32:28.996 great precursors of modern thought-- 32:29.000 --> 32:31.850 and particularly, I would immediately add, 32:31.848 --> 32:36.688 of modern literary theory--together dominate a 32:36.691 --> 32:40.351 "school of suspicion." 32:40.348 --> 32:44.518 There is in other words in Ricoeur's view a hermeneutics of 32:44.523 --> 32:47.453 suspicion, and "skepticism" 32:47.448 --> 32:51.268 or "suspicion" is a word that can also be 32:51.271 --> 32:55.331 appropriated perhaps more rigorously for philosophy as 32:55.326 --> 32:56.546 negativity. 32:56.548 --> 33:00.058 That is to say, whatever seems manifest or 33:00.055 --> 33:05.175 obvious or patent in what we are looking at is undermined for 33:05.184 --> 33:10.064 this kind of mind by a negation which is counterintuitive: 33:10.057 --> 33:14.257 that is to say, which would seem not just to 33:14.258 --> 33:18.888 qualify what we understand ourselves to be looking at but 33:18.894 --> 33:21.384 to undermine it altogether. 33:21.380 --> 33:23.720 And these tendencies in the way in which Marx, 33:23.721 --> 33:26.851 Nietzsche and Freud have been received have been tremendously 33:26.846 --> 33:27.676 influential. 33:27.680 --> 33:29.700 When we read Foucault's "What is an 33:29.701 --> 33:32.911 Author?" next time we'll return to this question of 33:32.913 --> 33:35.333 how Marx, Nietzsche and Freud have been 33:35.327 --> 33:38.877 received and what we should make of that in view of Foucault's 33:38.875 --> 33:41.935 idea that-- well, not that there's no such 33:41.935 --> 33:46.725 thing as an author but that it's rather dangerous to believe that 33:46.727 --> 33:48.297 there are authors. 33:48.298 --> 33:49.498 So if it's dangerous to believe that there are authors, 33:49.500 --> 33:50.370 what about Marx, Nietzsche and Freud? 33:50.368 --> 33:53.338 Foucault confronts this question in "What is an 33:53.342 --> 33:56.842 Author?" and gives us some interesting results of 33:56.838 --> 33:57.828 his thinking. 33:57.828 --> 34:04.868 For us, the aftermath even precisely of the passages I have 34:04.868 --> 34:09.078 just quoted, but certainly of the oeuvre 34:09.077 --> 34:12.737 of the three authors I have quoted from, 34:12.739 --> 34:18.729 can to a large degree be understood as accounting for our 34:18.726 --> 34:21.476 topic-- the phenomenon of literary 34:21.478 --> 34:23.058 theory as we study it. 34:23.059 --> 34:24.729 In other words, literary theory, 34:24.728 --> 34:27.148 because of the influence of these figures, 34:27.150 --> 34:33.290 is to a considerable degree a hermeneutics of suspicion 34:33.286 --> 34:39.876 recognized as such both by its proponents and famously-- 34:39.880 --> 34:43.450 I think this is perhaps what is historically remote for you-- 34:43.449 --> 34:45.179 by its enemies. 34:45.179 --> 34:48.039 During the same period when I was first teaching this course, 34:48.039 --> 34:53.199 a veritable six-foot shelf of diatribes against literary 34:53.202 --> 34:57.712 theory was being written in the public sphere. 34:57.710 --> 35:02.350 You can take or leave literary theory, 35:02.349 --> 35:06.139 fine, but the idea that there would be such an incredible 35:06.135 --> 35:10.595 outcry against it was one of the most fascinating results of it. 35:10.599 --> 35:14.049 That is to say for many, many, many people literary 35:14.054 --> 35:18.204 theory had something to do with the end of civilization as we 35:18.199 --> 35:19.029 know it. 35:19.030 --> 35:24.430 That's one of the things that seems rather strange to us today 35:24.434 --> 35:29.224 from an historical perspective: that the undermining of 35:29.219 --> 35:34.449 foundational knowledge which seemed to be part and parcel of 35:34.447 --> 35:39.937 so much that went on in literary theory was seen as the central 35:39.940 --> 35:45.170 crucial threat to rationality emanating from the academy and 35:45.168 --> 35:51.928 was attacked in those terms in, as I say, at least six feet of 35:51.927 --> 35:53.647 lively polemics. 35:53.650 --> 35:57.650 All of that is the legacy of literary theory, 35:57.650 --> 36:01.250 and as I say, it arises in part from the 36:01.248 --> 36:06.418 element of skepticism that I thought it best to emphasize 36:06.416 --> 36:07.336 today. 36:07.340 --> 36:12.730 Now I think that one thing Ricoeur leaves out, 36:12.730 --> 36:16.680 and something that we can anticipate as becoming more and 36:16.675 --> 36:20.825 more important for literary theory and other kinds of theory 36:20.833 --> 36:24.783 in the twenty-first century, is Darwin. 36:24.780 --> 36:28.780 That is to say, it strikes me that Darwin could 36:28.784 --> 36:34.014 very easily be considered a fourth hermeneut of suspicion. 36:34.010 --> 36:37.970 Of course, Darwin was not interested in suspicion but he 36:37.974 --> 36:41.584 was certainly the founder of ways of thinking about 36:41.577 --> 36:44.387 consciousness that are determined, 36:44.389 --> 36:48.409 socio-biologically determined: determined in the realm of 36:48.411 --> 36:51.341 cognitive science, determined as artificial 36:51.335 --> 36:53.625 intelligence, and so on. 36:53.630 --> 36:56.360 All of this is Darwinian thinking and, 36:56.362 --> 37:00.572 I think, increasingly will be central in importance in the 37:00.572 --> 37:02.422 twenty-first century. 37:02.420 --> 37:08.280 What will alter the shape of literary theory as it was known 37:08.284 --> 37:12.564 and studied in the twentieth century is, 37:12.559 --> 37:16.469 I think, an increasing emphasis on cognitive science and 37:16.472 --> 37:20.172 socio-biological approaches both to literature and to 37:20.172 --> 37:24.582 interpretive processes that will derive from Darwin in the same 37:24.583 --> 37:28.783 way that strands of thinking of the twentieth century derive 37:28.780 --> 37:32.410 from the three figures that I've mentioned. 37:32.409 --> 37:37.019 But what all this gives rise to--and this brings me finally 37:37.023 --> 37:41.883 to the passages which you have on both sides of your sheet and 37:41.876 --> 37:46.726 which I don't want to take up today but just to preview-- 37:46.730 --> 37:50.160 the passages from Henry James' Ambassadors from 1903, 37:50.159 --> 37:53.199 and from Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard from 37:53.202 --> 37:53.862 1904. 37:53.860 --> 37:56.800 In other words, I am at pains to remind you 37:56.800 --> 38:00.580 that this is a specific historical moment in which, 38:00.579 --> 38:04.489 in a variety of ways, in each case the speaker argues 38:04.487 --> 38:07.217 that consciousness-- that is to say, 38:07.217 --> 38:11.307 the feeling of being alive and being someone acting in the 38:11.311 --> 38:14.841 world-- no longer involves agency: 38:14.840 --> 38:21.110 the feeling that somehow to be conscious has become to be a 38:21.110 --> 38:25.990 puppet, that there is a limitation on 38:25.994 --> 38:30.324 what we can do, imposed by the idea that 38:30.322 --> 38:35.822 consciousness is determined in ways that we cannot control and 38:35.817 --> 38:40.467 cannot get the better of, so that Strether in The 38:40.472 --> 38:45.422 Ambassadors and Yepihodov in The Cherry Orchard speak 38:45.422 --> 38:50.222 for a point of view which is a kind of partially well-informed 38:50.215 --> 38:54.765 gloom and doom that could be understood to anticipate texts 38:54.773 --> 39:00.273 that are much better informed, that we will be considering but 39:00.273 --> 39:04.983 nevertheless are especially important as an aspect of their 39:04.976 --> 39:06.676 historical moment. 39:06.679 --> 39:09.969 I want to begin the next lecture by taking up those 39:09.965 --> 39:10.685 passages. 39:10.690 --> 39:13.890 Please do bring them, and I will also be passing 39:13.885 --> 39:17.755 around Tony the Tow Truck and I'll give you a brief 39:17.762 --> 39:21.842 description of what the little children's book actually looks 39:21.842 --> 39:24.032 like, and then we will plunge in to 39:24.025 --> 39:26.095 the question "What is an author?" 39:26.099 --> 39:27.509 So I'll see you on Thursday. 39:27.510 --> 39:34.000