WEBVTT 00:01.620 --> 00:03.040 Professor Donald Kagan: I have a title for 00:03.040 --> 00:04.800 today's talk. I call it, "Philip, 00:04.802 --> 00:09.142 Demosthenes and the Fall of the Polis," and I read that to you 00:09.143 --> 00:13.483 because it's always useful to remember that while we look back 00:13.484 --> 00:17.904 on these events and know their outcome and can assign to them a 00:17.897 --> 00:22.027 special significance, let's never forget they didn't 00:22.026 --> 00:26.366 know that they were on the brink of the end of the independent 00:26.370 --> 00:29.930 polis. In fact, I'm sure if you came 00:29.930 --> 00:35.020 along in 362 after that battle it would never have occurred to 00:35.023 --> 00:40.033 you that that whole fundamental arrangement of the world that 00:40.032 --> 00:43.682 had been sort of in place, to some degree, 00:43.675 --> 00:47.405 perhaps as far back as the eighth century was going to 00:47.405 --> 00:50.005 change its character very sharply, 00:50.010 --> 00:52.840 and that although there would still be poleis that 00:52.839 --> 00:56.249 would be going on, it might seem in the same old 00:56.249 --> 01:01.379 way, even after the Macedonian conquest, the fact was that none 01:01.378 --> 01:06.418 of them ever again really was autonomous in the sense of to be 01:06.424 --> 01:11.474 fully in control of its own fate both in terms of the internal 01:11.470 --> 01:15.810 constitution and also, more importantly or at least 01:15.808 --> 01:19.748 the one that was most in danger, the capacity to engage in 01:19.753 --> 01:24.053 international relations freely and to be free to make their own 01:24.045 --> 01:26.535 foreign policy. So, as I say, 01:26.538 --> 01:30.378 it's going to be a very major change but it's something that 01:30.384 --> 01:33.844 they don't know they're in the middle of watching. 01:33.840 --> 01:44.640 Well, in 359 a man called Philip became King of Macedon. 01:49.000 --> 01:52.850 We know the Macedonians were fundamentally Greeks. 01:52.849 --> 01:56.539 That is to say, they were Greek speakers and 01:56.537 --> 02:01.337 ethnically, if there is such a thing, they were Greek. 02:01.340 --> 02:05.910 But they were so far out of the mainstream of the development of 02:05.906 --> 02:09.886 the Greek poleis that we have been examining this 02:09.892 --> 02:12.602 semester that many, many Greeks, 02:12.602 --> 02:16.952 perhaps most of them, didn't think of them as being 02:16.947 --> 02:19.637 Greek. When Greeks thought about what 02:19.642 --> 02:23.282 it was to be a Greek they thought about more than the fact 02:23.277 --> 02:25.697 that they spoke the Greek language, 02:25.699 --> 02:30.119 they thought fundamentally--if you get to Aristotle you see how 02:30.124 --> 02:33.534 thoroughly true this is, it had to do with a culture, 02:33.532 --> 02:36.422 a way of life and that way of life was based upon the 02:36.417 --> 02:40.677 independent polis. Well, Macedon did not have 02:40.682 --> 02:44.142 such a structure. The Greeks called the 02:44.141 --> 02:49.031 Macedonians an ethnos, a tribal group is what that 02:49.027 --> 02:52.397 sort of means. We use the word "nation" 02:52.395 --> 02:56.475 somehow to translate ethnos and that's okay. 02:56.479 --> 02:59.149 The word "nation" itself, you remember, 02:59.148 --> 03:02.728 comes from the Latin word which means to be born; 03:02.729 --> 03:05.989 people who are born of the same stock. 03:05.990 --> 03:09.170 But for the Greeks it had a different meaning; 03:09.169 --> 03:13.249 it was people who participated in the culture that they 03:13.254 --> 03:17.724 designated as Hellenic and they thought the Macedonians fell 03:17.717 --> 03:21.027 outside of that. There were no poleis in 03:21.030 --> 03:24.710 the Macedonian kingdom. It was something that we might 03:24.709 --> 03:26.749 call feudal. That is to say, 03:26.748 --> 03:30.098 yes there was a monarch, but there were powerful 03:30.098 --> 03:34.368 noblemen who were practically independent and who owed only a 03:34.373 --> 03:38.793 limited allegiance to the king and who were really the dominant 03:38.791 --> 03:42.781 figures in the state for most of the history prior to the 03:42.782 --> 03:46.072 appearance of Philip. On the other hand, 03:46.073 --> 03:49.173 the king was an important and powerful character so that you 03:49.165 --> 03:52.465 have--this was true of European feudal states at certain periods 03:52.467 --> 03:54.807 in their development. On the one hand, 03:54.814 --> 03:57.894 the fundamental society was based upon great lords, 03:57.890 --> 04:00.540 great noblemen, barons, but there was a king 04:00.535 --> 04:04.075 and he was not inconsequential. That's the situation that 04:04.079 --> 04:05.249 pertained in Macedon. 04:08.439 --> 04:10.839 In a certain sense, if a Greek had looked at 04:10.837 --> 04:12.897 Macedonian society prior to Philip, 04:12.900 --> 04:17.290 he might have described it as Homeric, and you'll be familiar 04:17.291 --> 04:21.031 with that. Sure, there were guys called 04:21.029 --> 04:25.519 basileus, but they were not really the 04:25.522 --> 04:30.832 rulers over the barons, these great noblemen in their 04:30.832 --> 04:33.442 kingdom. They thought of it as 04:33.442 --> 04:35.642 uncivilized in the technical sense. 04:35.639 --> 04:38.809 If you don't live in a polis, 04:38.807 --> 04:43.677 a city, as they understood it, then you are not civilized; 04:43.680 --> 04:46.260 you are part of an ethnos and that's the 04:46.256 --> 04:49.446 term they used of the tribal societies all around them, 04:49.449 --> 04:53.319 Illyrians, Scythians, they were all from an 04:53.324 --> 04:56.264 ethnos. The Macedonians, 04:56.264 --> 05:00.114 on the other hand, claimed very proudly and 05:00.108 --> 05:04.958 powerfully, and insistently that they were Greeks; 05:04.959 --> 05:08.929 they were Hellenes, and they probably invented a 05:08.925 --> 05:13.175 myth of their descent. Indeed, not merely from Greeks 05:13.178 --> 05:17.188 but from the real Greeks, that is to say the Argives, 05:17.189 --> 05:21.639 who were the leading people in the time of Homer's poetry and 05:21.639 --> 05:26.239 they claimed direct descent from Agamemnon and the other Argive 05:26.238 --> 05:28.918 kings. We hear about various 05:28.921 --> 05:34.101 Macedonian monarchs of some importance prior to Philip, 05:34.100 --> 05:37.720 back at the time of the Persian War, Alexander the first played 05:37.719 --> 05:40.929 an interesting and shady role between the Greeks and the 05:40.930 --> 05:43.750 Persians. During the Peloponnesian War we 05:43.754 --> 05:47.484 hear of a King Perdiccas, who also played a role shifting 05:47.483 --> 05:50.283 between the Spartans and the Athenians. 05:50.279 --> 05:53.549 This business of shifting between sides is not just 05:53.551 --> 05:57.331 because they're shifty people. It's that their status is such 05:57.331 --> 06:00.771 that they're always vulnerable and not powerful enough to 06:00.768 --> 06:04.448 defend themselves and so they have to make the best deal they 06:04.451 --> 06:07.521 can with whoever has the power at any moment. 06:07.519 --> 06:11.899 One other Macedonian king has left a name that we know 06:11.895 --> 06:14.285 something about, Archelaus, 06:14.290 --> 06:18.640 who followed Perdiccas, one of the things about him was 06:18.644 --> 06:23.244 that he kept a kind of a cultural court at his capital, 06:23.240 --> 06:27.250 and for instance Euripides, for reasons that we do not 06:27.253 --> 06:31.723 know, left Athens at some point in the Peloponnesian War and 06:31.721 --> 06:36.111 came to Macedon where he joined a collection of artists and 06:36.114 --> 06:39.874 scholars, and whatever that Archelaus was 06:39.871 --> 06:44.641 gathering in his kingdom. Well, Philip becomes king in 06:44.635 --> 06:49.665 359 and the Macedonian kings were very much like Homeric 06:49.674 --> 06:53.344 kings as we have described them here. 06:53.339 --> 06:56.229 That is, yes you had to have a dynastic claim, 06:56.230 --> 06:59.630 you had to be a member of the royal family to be king, 06:59.634 --> 07:03.964 but that wasn't good enough. You had to also have--remember, 07:03.956 --> 07:06.946 to rule as I said about the Homeric kings, 07:06.953 --> 07:09.623 iphi, by force, by power, 07:09.615 --> 07:13.645 you had to have the actual capacity to command and 07:13.652 --> 07:18.682 sometimes you had to demonstrate that by fighting it out among 07:18.678 --> 07:23.368 various potential successors with having the winner coming 07:23.374 --> 07:26.904 out as the king. Something like that is what 07:26.903 --> 07:29.323 Philip did. He was not the most direct 07:29.317 --> 07:34.077 descendant of the previous king. He was left as a kind of a 07:34.075 --> 07:40.205 regent over the under-aged young king of just a boy and he was 07:40.212 --> 07:44.842 actually Philip's nephew and Philip's ward, 07:44.839 --> 07:49.699 and Philip took care of him in more senses than one, 07:49.697 --> 07:54.837 finally killing him and replacing him on the throne. 07:54.839 --> 07:58.849 That was not a unique event in Macedonian history. 07:58.850 --> 08:03.240 So, Philip is now on the throne and, of course, 08:03.236 --> 08:08.286 with this disputed descent, this disputed right to the 08:08.290 --> 08:11.330 throne, you can imagine that he is not 08:11.329 --> 08:15.109 in the most secure position when he takes over this job, 08:15.110 --> 08:19.410 and so I think some part of his actions, certainly at the early 08:19.412 --> 08:22.582 part of his career, and perhaps all the way 08:22.582 --> 08:26.532 through, was meant to demonstrate his own greatness, 08:26.529 --> 08:31.269 his own capacity to be king so as to put down all resistance 08:31.270 --> 08:35.770 internally and for that purpose what could be better than 08:35.769 --> 08:39.479 spreading the boundaries, increasing the power, 08:39.483 --> 08:43.373 and in making the greatness of Macedon more than it had been 08:43.370 --> 08:45.940 before and that's what he undertook. 08:45.940 --> 08:49.100 It looks as though, I think we have enough evidence 08:49.104 --> 08:52.834 to believe, that he certainly, of course, meant to rule 08:52.826 --> 08:57.206 Macedon and to do whatever was necessary, however harsh to make 08:57.209 --> 09:00.879 that secure. But it is pretty clear that he 09:00.878 --> 09:05.398 had it in mind to conquer Greece, to make himself the 09:05.400 --> 09:08.990 master of Greece. That was certainly one of his 09:08.986 --> 09:11.766 objectives. As a matter of fact, 09:11.767 --> 09:16.387 an interesting part of his biography was that as a young 09:16.391 --> 09:19.671 man--probably I should say as a boy, 09:19.669 --> 09:23.519 probably in his teens, he was sent to Thebes as a 09:23.518 --> 09:27.928 hostage as a result of a war between the Thebans and the 09:27.927 --> 09:31.007 Macedonians, but he was treated as a member 09:31.009 --> 09:34.309 of the royal family. He was treated very decently 09:34.305 --> 09:37.575 and with respect, and he spent his time in the 09:37.575 --> 09:42.065 house of Epaminondas. Can you imagine a better place 09:42.072 --> 09:47.302 for a young king with his military ambitions to be brought 09:47.301 --> 09:52.531 up than in the house of the man who is surely the foremost 09:52.530 --> 09:58.310 general in the Greece of his time and perhaps of any time, 09:58.309 --> 10:01.819 and I think we should imagine that he must have learned a 10:01.818 --> 10:04.448 great deal about military affairs there. 10:04.450 --> 10:09.710 There remains the question, did Philip already have in his 10:09.712 --> 10:13.942 mind the plan of conquering the Persian Empire, 10:13.940 --> 10:17.080 which was, of course, the job that was completed by 10:17.075 --> 10:20.395 his son, because whatever Philip's intentions may have 10:20.399 --> 10:23.409 been he died before he could carry them out. 10:23.409 --> 10:27.179 I don't think we can be certain about that, but it was an idea 10:27.184 --> 10:30.034 that he didn't have to do a lot to dream up. 10:30.029 --> 10:33.489 I've mentioned to you how many an orator, Isocrates, 10:33.488 --> 10:36.268 most famously, had been calling on various 10:36.268 --> 10:40.538 Greek states and individuals to conquer the Persian Empire, 10:40.539 --> 10:44.149 to solve Greece's problems, and he wrote such a letter to 10:44.154 --> 10:47.834 Philip once Philip became the most powerful figure in that 10:47.834 --> 10:51.074 world. So, he certainly could have had 10:51.073 --> 10:53.173 the idea; I mean, he certainly did have 10:53.172 --> 10:55.482 the idea--whether he was planning to do that or not we 10:55.480 --> 10:59.350 don't know. Now, his first--sort of the 10:59.351 --> 11:05.561 instrument that permitted him and Macedon to become as great 11:05.560 --> 11:10.190 as they did was the army that he created. 11:10.190 --> 11:14.440 I mean, it is very he who is the revolutionary, 11:14.436 --> 11:20.156 the military genius who creates the weapon which will allow him 11:20.159 --> 11:24.359 to conquer Greece, and it's the same military 11:24.361 --> 11:29.371 force that enables Alexander the Great, who had brought to it 11:29.373 --> 11:34.333 brilliant military talents, but he had an instrument shaped 11:34.326 --> 11:39.296 for him that was already far and away the best army in the Greek 11:39.299 --> 11:41.379 world, the best army of the Greek 11:41.382 --> 11:43.812 world had ever seen, perhaps as good an army as 11:43.810 --> 11:46.080 there ever existed in the ancient world. 11:46.080 --> 11:48.900 This is the great achievement of Philip, 11:48.901 --> 11:51.331 or at least that was a basis of it. 11:51.330 --> 11:58.170 He was not merely a hoplite battle leader in the old style. 12:01.500 --> 12:04.600 One thing about Philip that was very important was his 12:04.596 --> 12:07.456 temperament, his mind, his approach to warfare. 12:07.460 --> 12:11.920 He simply didn't accept the notion of defeat. 12:11.919 --> 12:16.049 He didn't accept the notion of making some kind of a deal 12:16.051 --> 12:20.331 except on his terms when he found it necessary to do so. 12:20.330 --> 12:24.710 He's famous for having said after a temporary setback 12:24.709 --> 12:28.769 against one of his opponents, Philip has said, 12:28.771 --> 12:32.941 "I have not fled, but I have retired as rams do 12:32.944 --> 12:38.664 in order that I might make a stronger attack the next time." 12:38.660 --> 12:43.590 He really lived that principle. Nobody ever defeated him 12:43.589 --> 12:46.829 permanently. If he had to accept a temporary 12:46.829 --> 12:50.749 setback he immediately went to work to repair it through a 12:50.745 --> 12:54.105 variety of means, military, diplomatic and 12:54.112 --> 12:59.312 whatever else he had available. But as I'm saying at the 12:59.311 --> 13:03.971 moment, he crafted this great grand new army, 13:03.969 --> 13:06.949 supplied, led, and organized quite 13:06.947 --> 13:11.137 differently from what I have described to you in the past as 13:11.144 --> 13:14.964 the standard Greek practice, which was essentially the 13:14.962 --> 13:17.032 hoplite phalanx, and as you know, 13:17.026 --> 13:20.316 in the course of the Peloponnesian War in the fourth 13:20.316 --> 13:24.186 century new gimmicks were added to that and different devices 13:24.186 --> 13:27.666 were contributed to it but still that was true. 13:27.669 --> 13:32.009 Now, Philip absorbed all the things that had been going on 13:32.006 --> 13:35.346 before his time, but he also made fundamental 13:35.354 --> 13:38.554 changes in the way that things worked. 13:38.549 --> 13:42.369 To his phalanx, and I was going to say, 13:42.367 --> 13:45.777 of grim professional soldiers--now, 13:45.782 --> 13:51.812 that I think is in itself an enormously important thing. 13:51.809 --> 13:56.819 We have something new on the Greek scene, an army which is a 13:56.821 --> 13:59.471 national army. That is to say, 13:59.470 --> 14:03.260 it is made up of Macedonians serving Macedon, 14:03.256 --> 14:08.306 under a Macedonian king, but they are not the citizen 14:08.309 --> 14:14.259 soldiers that we have examined in the case of the polis 14:14.257 --> 14:17.267 and its phalanx. They are hoplites in that 14:17.271 --> 14:19.721 phalanx. They were professional 14:19.719 --> 14:24.089 soldiers so that their full time job was being an army; 14:24.090 --> 14:26.840 they did not spend their spare time back on farms. 14:26.840 --> 14:30.780 That means Philip had to pay them a salary for them to 14:30.777 --> 14:32.557 perform. At the same time, 14:32.562 --> 14:36.062 they were not a mercenary army in the traditional sense. 14:36.059 --> 14:40.479 They were not people gathered anywhere who fought for whoever 14:40.481 --> 14:43.541 hired them; they were very much Macedonian 14:43.539 --> 14:45.969 soldiers. Something we can understand in 14:45.967 --> 14:48.957 the United States today--an unusual thing in American 14:48.961 --> 14:51.841 history beginning only a couple of decades ago. 14:51.840 --> 14:57.120 We have that sort of an army. We have a professional national 14:57.122 --> 15:01.432 army, and I think this is an objective statement, 15:01.430 --> 15:05.380 it has become the best army in the world. 15:05.379 --> 15:08.699 There are many reasons for that, but I would argue one 15:08.698 --> 15:12.458 reason is that if you can have the sociological background to 15:12.456 --> 15:16.516 permit that kind of an army, you are in very good shape 15:16.517 --> 15:18.987 indeed. That's what Philip was able to 15:18.989 --> 15:21.189 create. The kind of loyalty, 15:21.194 --> 15:24.844 the kind of commitment, the kind of association with 15:24.837 --> 15:29.477 the cause that only a citizen or a subject of a king can have, 15:29.480 --> 15:32.120 along with the skill, and the practice, 15:32.122 --> 15:36.022 and the conditioning that is part of being a professional 15:36.015 --> 15:39.605 soldier. So, he has this phalanx made up 15:39.608 --> 15:43.788 of these professionals that I'm talking about, 15:43.789 --> 15:49.499 but he added to that a group of people called the foot 15:49.496 --> 15:54.876 companions, pezetairoi is the Greek word, 15:54.879 --> 15:59.719 who were the biggest and the strongest of all the Macedonians 15:59.723 --> 16:03.843 and to that group he added the companion cavalry, 16:03.840 --> 16:08.040 the hetairoi themselves, the companions of the king, 16:08.044 --> 16:11.814 and of course these were the noblemen and they became 16:11.813 --> 16:16.383 personally attached to Philip in a special way and were the most 16:16.380 --> 16:19.920 effective, the most reliable forces that 16:19.917 --> 16:23.927 he had, an elite core, and here again is something 16:23.934 --> 16:27.134 different. The cavalry will play a 16:27.132 --> 16:31.792 much more important role in fighting than it ever has in the 16:31.791 --> 16:35.891 Greek fighting of the past. One of the great geniuses of 16:35.891 --> 16:39.351 Philip would be to create a combined force that could use 16:39.354 --> 16:42.944 cavalry and infantry and some other subordinate forces I'll 16:42.941 --> 16:46.501 tell you about in a minute, jointly together, 16:46.504 --> 16:50.704 to carry out a rather complex military plan. 16:50.700 --> 16:54.760 These, of course, are these hetairoi, 16:54.762 --> 16:59.582 our aristocratic horsemen, heavily armored on strong 16:59.580 --> 17:02.650 horses. That's very important as well, 17:02.653 --> 17:06.113 because if you're going to use them as shock troops, 17:06.110 --> 17:09.770 which he did on many an occasion, all of that has to be 17:09.771 --> 17:12.871 in place. Then there was another 17:12.867 --> 17:18.337 contingent of infantry with probably less body armor than 17:18.335 --> 17:22.495 his phalanx had, who were called the shield 17:22.501 --> 17:27.661 bearers, hypaspists, and they occupied the center of 17:27.657 --> 17:31.477 the Macedonian line next to the phalanx. 17:31.480 --> 17:35.800 These fellows were usually the first infantry forces to 17:35.795 --> 17:40.325 follow behind a cavalry charge if that's the way Philip fought 17:40.333 --> 17:43.393 the battle, charging a cavalry at the 17:43.394 --> 17:46.974 enemy, and as the enemy provided opportunities, 17:46.973 --> 17:51.443 these shield bearers, these lighter armed infantrymen 17:51.443 --> 17:56.573 would find their way and expand the holes, opening the way for 17:56.566 --> 18:00.426 the major blow to be struck by the phalanx. 18:00.430 --> 18:05.030 I'm describing one kind of battle that could be fought. 18:05.029 --> 18:09.189 The thing about having this kind of varied military force is 18:09.189 --> 18:13.279 that you could have different tactics for different battles 18:13.278 --> 18:16.518 and Philip does things differently on different 18:16.521 --> 18:18.701 occasions. This group of 18:18.695 --> 18:21.505 hypaspists, lighter infantry, 18:21.509 --> 18:26.489 provide a crucial link between the first mounted attack and the 18:26.494 --> 18:31.984 follow up by the phalanx proper. On top of all of this, 18:31.981 --> 18:37.321 you have a professional core; again, they're all Macedonians 18:37.316 --> 18:40.886 remember, made up of really light infantry. 18:40.890 --> 18:43.650 That is to say, slingers, archers, 18:43.654 --> 18:48.684 javelin men in the traditional mode that the old Greek armies 18:48.679 --> 18:51.329 had, but didn't make too much use of 18:51.331 --> 18:55.421 typically and so that rounds out the composite army group made up 18:55.421 --> 18:57.851 of these different kinds of forces, 18:57.849 --> 19:02.389 and these missile men I guess you could call them, 19:02.393 --> 19:07.683 supplied both preliminary bombardment with the things they 19:07.678 --> 19:11.478 did to help harass the enemy phalanx, 19:11.480 --> 19:15.690 but also they provide a kind of crucial reserve support. 19:15.690 --> 19:19.200 If you need to throw some forces into a suddenly important 19:19.198 --> 19:22.888 piece of the battle these guys were very mobile and you could 19:22.891 --> 19:26.461 order them into that place to support whatever was going on 19:26.461 --> 19:29.311 there. You can see how infinitely more 19:29.305 --> 19:33.375 complex this was than the kind of fighting we've talked about 19:33.380 --> 19:36.230 before. Now, these Macedonian 19:36.227 --> 19:41.777 contingents I've been describing do not represent a fragmentation 19:41.777 --> 19:45.417 of forces as might possibly be thought, 19:45.420 --> 19:52.480 but rather a diversification and a sophistication of arms, 19:52.477 --> 19:59.157 as one historian puts it, a symphony not a cacophony of 19:59.164 --> 20:04.734 professionally equipped men. Philip's contribution to the 20:04.725 --> 20:08.835 history of western warfare, therefore, is not so much 20:08.841 --> 20:11.691 tactical as it is organizational, 20:11.690 --> 20:18.160 creating this complex organization that could have a 20:18.163 --> 20:22.543 variety of tactical uses. Now at first, 20:22.540 --> 20:26.850 the equipment and the tactics of this Macedonian phalanx for 20:26.853 --> 20:29.923 itself did not differ considerably from the 20:29.924 --> 20:33.364 traditional hoplite columns of the Greeks, 20:33.359 --> 20:37.509 but he then subsequently made a very important change. 20:37.509 --> 20:43.609 Now, he does keep the spear, the pike that was the 20:43.607 --> 20:48.207 fundamental weapon of the old phalanx. 20:48.210 --> 20:54.800 But it was lengthened from being let's say roughly eight 20:54.803 --> 20:59.003 feet long to fourteen feet or so. 20:59.000 --> 21:02.580 Now, you cannot hold a fourteen-foot pike with one 21:02.578 --> 21:06.188 hand. This is a two-handed weapon; 21:06.190 --> 21:09.170 if you're going to control and use it effectively that's what 21:09.166 --> 21:11.906 you have to do. Well, if you're going to have 21:11.909 --> 21:15.639 two hands on this thing you can't have that hoplite shield 21:15.641 --> 21:19.441 that was the characteristic of the old hoplite phalanx. 21:19.440 --> 21:24.540 So, the shield shrank and became unimportant. 21:24.539 --> 21:29.299 You realize that once you do this to your hoplite phalanx, 21:29.299 --> 21:33.389 it can only function successfully as an aggressive 21:33.391 --> 21:38.271 force, if you see what I mean. You can't just take blows; 21:38.269 --> 21:42.259 you have to be delivering blows all the time. 21:42.259 --> 21:44.759 The greaves and the breastplates, 21:44.764 --> 21:48.664 and the heavy head gear were replaced either with leather 21:48.659 --> 21:52.789 which was lighter, or various composite materials, 21:52.786 --> 21:57.176 or else abandoned altogether. So, you can see these hoplites 21:57.180 --> 22:00.880 don't look anything like the hoplites we're accustomed to. 22:00.880 --> 22:05.770 The central idea, however, of a fighting mass of 22:05.769 --> 22:09.409 infantrymen remained predominant. 22:09.410 --> 22:13.820 In fact, integrated with and protected by such diverse 22:13.815 --> 22:17.385 forces, Philip's phalanx of true pikemen, 22:17.390 --> 22:22.930 their lances now allowed the first five, not merely the first 22:22.926 --> 22:26.336 three ranks to strike at the enemy, 22:26.339 --> 22:32.069 was both more lethal and more versatile than the traditional 22:32.071 --> 22:35.961 hoplite columns. The historian Polybius, 22:35.963 --> 22:41.843 who wrote in the second century B.C., but you have to realize he 22:41.835 --> 22:46.025 was a contemporary of Macedonian soldiers, 22:46.029 --> 22:49.619 who were still fighting fundamentally in the same way 22:49.616 --> 22:53.386 that Philip had created, so he knew what he was saying. 22:53.390 --> 22:56.340 He, for instance, he describes the great battles 22:56.335 --> 22:59.565 between the Romans and the Macedonians that occurred late 22:59.570 --> 23:02.170 in the third and into the second century. 23:02.170 --> 23:08.230 So, he even saw or certainly knew about the new phalanx, 23:08.233 --> 23:13.543 the Macedonian phalanx, tackling the Roman Legion and 23:13.541 --> 23:17.151 fighting it practically to a standstill. 23:17.150 --> 23:22.180 Polybius says that infantry, who faced such a storm of 23:22.179 --> 23:27.109 spears, as he puts it, might have as many as ten iron 23:27.113 --> 23:34.563 points concentrated on each man. Nothing Polybius concluded can 23:34.560 --> 23:40.840 stand up to the phalanx. The Roman, by himself with his 23:40.838 --> 23:46.768 sword, can neither slash down nor break through the ten spears 23:46.773 --> 23:50.473 that all at once press against him. 23:50.470 --> 23:54.690 Well, he has to face the fact that the Roman Legion did defeat 23:54.694 --> 23:58.854 one of these phalanxes in the course of the third century, 23:58.849 --> 24:02.719 but I think if you look at the details you realize that there 24:02.717 --> 24:05.487 was nothing inevitable about that defeat. 24:05.490 --> 24:10.020 Circumstances in battle allowed the Romans to win, 24:10.021 --> 24:15.321 because it put a premium on the great advantage that the legion 24:15.322 --> 24:19.322 had over the phalanx; namely, that it was divided up 24:19.324 --> 24:23.244 into smaller fighting units that could adjust and move about the 24:23.241 --> 24:27.031 field much more freely than the fighters in the phalanx of the 24:27.033 --> 24:29.883 Macedonians. That was certainly an edge that 24:29.884 --> 24:32.554 the legion had, but there never was a time when 24:32.547 --> 24:35.787 a legion fighting a good Macedonian phalanx could predict 24:35.788 --> 24:38.998 that it would win, much less that it would be any 24:38.996 --> 24:42.246 kind of a walk over. Of course, against the kind of 24:42.254 --> 24:45.764 forces that Philip faced, it was all the more likely to 24:45.755 --> 24:50.355 produce a Macedonian victory, because those were not Roman 24:50.359 --> 24:54.949 legions that they had to face. Now, if you're going to 24:54.948 --> 24:58.718 have a national mercenary army, a national army made up of 24:58.723 --> 25:02.713 professionals, that means it costs money in a 25:02.705 --> 25:08.605 way that the old phalanx system did not require the expenditure 25:08.606 --> 25:13.066 of funds very much. So, Philip, early in his 25:13.072 --> 25:19.302 career, had to gain control of sources of money and he did so. 25:19.299 --> 25:24.679 Early as king he immediately had to put down his opponents 25:24.676 --> 25:29.046 from within Macedonia, but he also did what I suppose 25:29.050 --> 25:32.850 Macedonian kings always had to do on their accession, 25:32.849 --> 25:36.389 they were surrounded by what the Greeks called barbarian 25:36.386 --> 25:39.916 peoples and these barbarian peoples were always fighting 25:39.923 --> 25:43.273 against the Macedonians and trying to push back their 25:43.267 --> 25:47.467 frontiers and so on. So Philip turned against these, 25:47.468 --> 25:52.358 the Illyrians and various other peoples, and did an excellent 25:52.361 --> 25:55.771 job of defeating them, driving them back, 25:55.765 --> 25:59.555 establishing the boundaries where he wanted them. 25:59.559 --> 26:01.869 In the process, accomplishing two very 26:01.869 --> 26:04.919 important things. One was to establish his 26:04.923 --> 26:10.053 credentials as a great general and leader for internal purposes 26:10.046 --> 26:14.426 and for military purposes is in a sense of winning the 26:14.425 --> 26:20.765 confidence of his soldiers, but also it meant that his own 26:20.769 --> 26:27.679 stature in general and the reputation that he gained both 26:27.676 --> 26:34.266 among enemies and friends grew, and finally the last point, 26:34.266 --> 26:39.326 this kind of fighting allowed him to train his army and to 26:39.325 --> 26:43.255 create this army, and to make it as excellent as 26:43.264 --> 26:47.454 it became before he had to face more formidable forces than 26:47.450 --> 26:50.750 these. So, now he has won the loyalty 26:50.745 --> 26:55.855 of his nobility to a degree that no predecessor ever had. 26:55.859 --> 26:59.269 He now has these barons who are so independent, 26:59.269 --> 27:03.789 happily, gladly serving him and being rather in awe of him, 27:03.789 --> 27:08.389 and the army in general was devoted to him in a way that was 27:08.392 --> 27:11.202 unprecedented for the Macedonians. 27:11.200 --> 27:16.590 Now, with this weapon largely forged he was able to 27:16.594 --> 27:21.094 begin serious expansion in the Greek world. 27:21.089 --> 27:26.369 A critical step rather early in his monarchy was his attack on 27:26.371 --> 27:30.871 Amphipolis, and you will remember Amphipolis was this 27:30.873 --> 27:36.243 Athenian colony that was such a big deal for the Athenians that 27:36.241 --> 27:41.611 they were prepared to do almost anything to get it back, 27:41.609 --> 27:45.069 but they never had thoroughly been able to get it back until 27:45.065 --> 27:46.875 recently. So, now he took 27:46.875 --> 27:51.225 Amphipolis--what was more important than anything for him 27:51.225 --> 27:55.105 was that who held Amphipolis was likely to hold Mt. 27:55.109 --> 27:59.769 Pangaean which is right near Amphipolis, which contained gold 27:59.769 --> 28:03.959 and silver mines that were producing wealth as they had 28:03.964 --> 28:08.844 been for centuries now, and now that wealth was going 28:08.835 --> 28:14.095 into Philip's pocket and he used it for the purpose that was most 28:14.100 --> 28:17.620 important, chiefly for paying for that 28:17.616 --> 28:20.966 army that I have been talking about. 28:20.970 --> 28:24.440 We are told that this produced about 1,000 talents a 28:24.439 --> 28:27.399 year for Philip's use, and that's about the same 28:27.403 --> 28:30.813 amount that the Athenians got out of their empire. 28:30.809 --> 28:34.769 So, you are talking about lots and lots of money and this 28:34.767 --> 28:39.007 explains the economic capacity that gave Philip the chance to 28:39.008 --> 28:44.208 use the kind of army he had. But he was extraordinarily 28:44.206 --> 28:48.156 skillful at the game of diplomacy. 28:48.160 --> 28:52.190 I say game, because he treated it in that way. 28:52.190 --> 28:56.140 Diplomacy, I think, for him was an extension of 28:56.144 --> 28:59.244 military forces by peaceful means. 28:59.240 --> 29:03.500 It's kind of a standing Clausewitz's definition of war 29:03.503 --> 29:06.783 on its head. Who was it? 29:06.779 --> 29:10.709 Sir John Fortescue, I think, it was in the 29:10.708 --> 29:16.068 fifteenth century defined a diplomat as a man sent to lie 29:16.073 --> 29:20.863 abroad for his country. I think the spirit behind that 29:20.863 --> 29:25.053 pun was certainly right for Philip, that for him diplomacy 29:25.051 --> 29:29.311 was a way for advancing his country's interests by whatever 29:29.312 --> 29:33.302 means that he possibly could; he was very good. 29:33.299 --> 29:38.019 One of his very great skills was precisely to lie in a 29:38.019 --> 29:42.269 very convincing manner and, of course, it's much easier to 29:42.266 --> 29:45.526 get people to believe what you say if you have got the 29:45.529 --> 29:48.979 strongest army anywhere in sight in case you should be so 29:48.977 --> 29:51.437 impolite as to say "you're a liar." 29:51.440 --> 29:53.750 I think that must have assisted him. 29:53.750 --> 29:57.710 But what I mean is Philip would come into conflict with some 29:57.708 --> 30:00.588 polis or some poleis over some 30:00.593 --> 30:03.683 territory that was in dispute or whatever, 30:03.680 --> 30:06.750 and they would say Philip what are you trying to do, 30:06.750 --> 30:09.760 you seem to be trying to conquer this territory. 30:09.759 --> 30:12.949 Oh no, no Philip said, I have absolutely no interest 30:12.946 --> 30:15.756 in this territory, I've got other things to do 30:15.758 --> 30:19.048 that are much more important. Those Paeonians in my 30:19.054 --> 30:22.584 background require my attention and when the other guys would 30:22.581 --> 30:25.871 calm down he would calmly take the place that he had left 30:25.873 --> 30:28.323 alone. I'm reminded, 30:28.322 --> 30:34.582 and I guess after the Second World War, in fact even before, 30:34.578 --> 30:40.828 there were some scholars who made the analogy between Hitler 30:40.833 --> 30:45.073 and Philip, and Demosthenes and Churchill, 30:45.068 --> 30:48.168 it's not the worst one. It's very imperfect, 30:48.165 --> 30:51.405 but it's not the worst analogy possible, but I remember Hitler 30:51.413 --> 30:54.453 kept saying before his strength was great enough simply to 30:54.449 --> 30:58.649 launch a major war he would say, if you give me this that's all 30:58.650 --> 31:01.920 I'm interested in, that is absolutely my last 31:01.921 --> 31:06.171 territorial demand in Europe, and then in a few months he 31:06.168 --> 31:09.558 would then seize Austria or something like that. 31:09.559 --> 31:13.929 So, Philip reminds me of that, because he did such things from 31:13.934 --> 31:15.014 time to time. 31:19.009 --> 31:22.759 It's just too much to tell in terms of the detail of his 31:22.758 --> 31:26.848 career, but let me just hit a few highlights and give you the 31:26.846 --> 31:31.626 direction in which it was going. The first business that he 31:31.630 --> 31:36.060 had to do after he gained Amphipolis and the wealth of the 31:36.058 --> 31:41.028 mines was to gain control of the shoreline of the northern Aegean 31:41.030 --> 31:44.110 Sea, and that meant of course his 31:44.109 --> 31:46.399 own Macedonia, which he had, 31:46.404 --> 31:50.404 but also eastward into the region of Thrace. 31:50.400 --> 31:54.650 He began precisely to gain control of those places. 31:54.650 --> 32:00.470 It was in 357 that he took Amphipolis and that meant that 32:00.471 --> 32:04.851 he had to clash with Athens, because as I say, 32:04.846 --> 32:09.056 Athens had never given up its claim to Amphipolis and kept 32:09.061 --> 32:13.131 trying to get it back, because of its value to the 32:13.126 --> 32:17.716 Athenians. What we will see is war between 32:17.715 --> 32:24.125 Philip and Athens on and off until the final victory of 32:24.134 --> 32:27.274 Macedonia. It's a period of quite a 32:27.272 --> 32:30.592 stretch of time in here in which that's going on. 32:30.589 --> 32:34.049 On the other hand, it's never a full scale war 32:34.047 --> 32:36.797 with Philip trying to conquer Athens. 32:36.800 --> 32:39.750 How could he? He's still outside from a 32:39.751 --> 32:43.511 territorial point of view, outside the entire old Greek 32:43.513 --> 32:46.533 world. But he can cause all the havoc 32:46.526 --> 32:51.216 he wants to in the northern Aegean and the Athenians will be 32:51.219 --> 32:54.649 unhappy about it; they will send forces up into 32:54.648 --> 32:58.128 that part of the world to contest Philip's expansion and 32:58.134 --> 33:00.484 that's where the fighting goes on. 33:00.480 --> 33:05.690 But the Athenians are not ready to take him on and really try to 33:05.688 --> 33:09.738 stop him from going where he seems to be going. 33:09.740 --> 33:12.610 What they do is they respond when he does something that 33:12.612 --> 33:14.912 annoys them or that they're worried about. 33:14.910 --> 33:19.610 Sometimes they go out and fight him, but usually they don't, 33:19.605 --> 33:24.535 or sometimes they do and they do so too little and too late. 33:24.539 --> 33:28.479 That's the story of the relationship between these two 33:28.483 --> 33:31.983 powers throughout this whole stretch of time. 33:31.980 --> 33:36.910 With the expansion of Philip in a variety of 33:36.906 --> 33:43.296 directions, he increases his revenues wherever he conquers. 33:43.299 --> 33:46.549 He gets down into Thessaly, now we're talking about 33:46.545 --> 33:50.245 territory that the Greeks consider to be Greece and Philip 33:50.245 --> 33:53.745 is now gaining more and more control of that area. 33:53.750 --> 33:58.830 The revenues grow and he even builds a navy and begins to 33:58.832 --> 34:02.192 challenge Athens and others at sea. 34:02.190 --> 34:06.560 He attacks Athenian commerce when he is quarreling with the 34:06.564 --> 34:09.944 Athenians. The Athenian position in 34:09.939 --> 34:16.109 general is badly weakened in the years between 357 and 355 in 34:16.111 --> 34:21.771 what the traditional historians call the Social War. 34:21.769 --> 34:26.169 That doesn't mean that they fought over teacups or anything 34:26.171 --> 34:30.721 like that, "social" derives from the Latin word socii, 34:30.724 --> 34:35.284 which means allies. It was a rebellion against 34:35.279 --> 34:40.149 the allies of Athens in the Athenian Confederation, 34:40.150 --> 34:44.870 which really frightened the Athenians, and kept them busy 34:44.869 --> 34:48.239 putting it down for a couple of years. 34:48.239 --> 34:53.179 There is some debate among scholars today as to how 34:53.183 --> 34:58.723 oppressive or not was the Athenian rule of its empire. 34:58.719 --> 35:04.249 The more recent scholarship has suggested that the Athenians 35:04.245 --> 35:08.755 were not really very oppressive, which leaves for, 35:08.764 --> 35:12.144 I think, for them an uncomfortable question, 35:12.138 --> 35:16.768 if that's true why was there this rebellion in the years 357 35:16.768 --> 35:19.148 to 355? We just don't know enough to 35:19.153 --> 35:21.783 talk details about this, but I think there can be no 35:21.782 --> 35:23.932 mistake; the Athenians abused their 35:23.927 --> 35:26.837 position of power and leadership in the empire. 35:26.840 --> 35:30.420 They didn't do so as thoroughly and completely as they did in 35:30.420 --> 35:33.880 the great Athenian Empire of the fifth century but that was 35:33.881 --> 35:38.151 largely because they couldn't. They never had the power, 35:38.145 --> 35:43.235 they never had the financial strength to be able to impose 35:43.242 --> 35:46.822 their will as the earlier empire had, 35:46.820 --> 35:50.440 but they did what they could and they did enough to annoy 35:50.438 --> 35:52.828 their allies into such a rebellion. 35:52.829 --> 35:56.219 Athens recovers, they win, they put down the 35:56.223 --> 35:59.473 allied rebellion, but they are weakened in the 35:59.473 --> 36:03.373 process. In 356, there breaks out on the 36:03.366 --> 36:08.246 mainland of Greece, what they would call the Sacred 36:08.246 --> 36:11.596 War. It's the old business of who 36:11.602 --> 36:15.562 controls the Delphic Oracle. The neighbors, 36:15.559 --> 36:19.219 Phocis, Locris, frequently take advantage of 36:19.215 --> 36:24.395 opportunities to gain control of the oracle and to deprive the 36:24.400 --> 36:28.140 priests of their control of the region. 36:28.139 --> 36:32.719 The priests then call on other Greeks traditionally led by 36:32.715 --> 36:37.685 Sparta but not always to beat up the people who have taken over 36:37.691 --> 36:42.351 the oracle's place and drive them out and restore it to the 36:42.346 --> 36:45.426 priest. Well, this is another in that 36:45.433 --> 36:47.833 theory, in that series of events. 36:47.829 --> 36:54.369 Thebes and Phocis are involved in a war over Delphi. 36:54.369 --> 36:59.229 The Phocian general is the only time he crops us in this story, 36:59.234 --> 37:03.864 Onomarchus apparently was an outstanding military leader and 37:03.864 --> 37:08.184 defeated the Thebans and even pushed into Thessaly, 37:08.179 --> 37:13.349 and that brings Philip into the picture, because Philip has been 37:13.351 --> 37:18.361 expanding Macedonian power into Thessaly from the north coming 37:18.359 --> 37:21.499 south. So, Philip takes his forces 37:21.498 --> 37:25.308 and he pushes the Phocians back, defeats Onomarchus, 37:25.313 --> 37:28.323 sends them off. Now, here's the question. 37:28.320 --> 37:31.190 Is this good or bad for the Greeks? 37:31.190 --> 37:34.480 On the one hand the one thought would be well, 37:34.477 --> 37:38.857 sure he's just put down this fellow who has arrogantly seized 37:38.859 --> 37:42.269 the Delphic Oracle, but now who is there, 37:42.271 --> 37:46.641 who is sitting in Thessaly, this great big new army. 37:46.639 --> 37:51.879 Is he going to be a menace to the Greeks in general? 37:51.880 --> 37:55.720 Well, we who have had a chance to know how it came out and know 37:55.722 --> 37:58.382 that it did. But at the time people were 37:58.381 --> 38:02.491 divided, some say oh my heavens this is a thoroughly aggressive 38:02.494 --> 38:06.544 man at the head of an army that looks incredibly strong and he 38:06.542 --> 38:10.202 has terrific ambitions, what are we going to do, 38:10.195 --> 38:12.885 against those who said, no it's okay, 38:12.888 --> 38:15.698 he's okay now, he's happy, he doesn't want to 38:15.700 --> 38:18.900 do anymore than that. Let's take a look at 38:18.900 --> 38:23.900 Athens, which will necessarily be the leading figure in the 38:23.902 --> 38:27.182 opposition to Philip such as it is. 38:27.179 --> 38:31.079 Thebes, last time we looked at Thebes, Thebes had reached a 38:31.077 --> 38:34.837 position of power perhaps greater than that of Athens, 38:34.840 --> 38:39.680 but you remember the deaths of Pelopidas and Epaminondas simply 38:39.682 --> 38:44.602 did not allow Thebes to continue to have that vitality and power 38:44.603 --> 38:48.763 that it had before. It's still a very strong state. 38:48.760 --> 38:52.160 Its hoplite phalanx is still formidable; 38:52.159 --> 38:56.909 they still have great ambitions and so on, but it turns out they 38:56.908 --> 39:01.128 don't really have the capacity to take the lead in such a 39:01.130 --> 39:04.030 business. The Athenians do and they are 39:04.028 --> 39:06.938 very much concerned about what's happening. 39:06.940 --> 39:11.440 But it's not the same Athens that we saw in the height of its 39:11.443 --> 39:15.933 power in the fifth century. Relatively speaking, 39:15.927 --> 39:20.807 it is a very poor place indeed. It is, however, 39:20.809 --> 39:25.089 still the number one naval power in the Greek world and 39:25.090 --> 39:29.060 therefore very important. Let's take a look at the 39:29.057 --> 39:33.047 internal life of Athens a little bit and notice some changes they 39:33.053 --> 39:36.613 will have some significance in terms of what decisions the 39:36.611 --> 39:39.331 Athenians make. There is something that was 39:39.327 --> 39:42.747 introduced -- we don't know just when -- it might have been late 39:42.752 --> 39:45.962 in the Peloponnesian War it, might have been afterwards. 39:45.960 --> 39:51.500 It is called the theoric fund, and it gets its name 39:51.495 --> 39:57.515 apparently because there was a payment to the Athenian citizens 39:57.515 --> 40:03.335 of the price necessary to pay for the ticket to see the great 40:03.342 --> 40:09.462 theatrical festivals that went on twice a year in Athens, 40:09.460 --> 40:14.330 which had apparently degenerated pretty much into a 40:14.327 --> 40:19.777 dole, into a kind of a welfare fund for the very poor. 40:19.780 --> 40:23.160 It did not amount to a stunning amount of money, 40:23.161 --> 40:26.401 but given the poverty of Athens in general, 40:26.400 --> 40:32.160 any fund of money could be very significant at critical moments, 40:32.159 --> 40:36.089 especially on issues of national defense. 40:36.090 --> 40:39.850 But there was a lot of argument, a sort of a democratic 40:39.854 --> 40:43.364 party, the party of the underprivileged or whatever, 40:43.360 --> 40:46.200 always insistent that everybody's supposed to keep 40:46.200 --> 40:49.560 hands off the theoric fund which should only be used 40:49.562 --> 40:52.812 for its welfare state--I'm embarrassed to use such a term 40:52.808 --> 40:56.228 because of course there was nothing like that in the ancient 40:56.228 --> 40:59.108 world. Just for that portion of the 40:59.107 --> 41:03.827 national income that was used to alleviate the worst poverty they 41:03.833 --> 41:08.183 wanted that untouched, but when the state was under 41:08.179 --> 41:12.999 siege, it was under threat, it was--had to go to war, 41:13.000 --> 41:15.770 so it seemed to some politicians, they needed money 41:15.773 --> 41:18.993 to do it and say let's take the theoric fund for now 41:18.991 --> 41:22.321 while we have this necessity and there would be a fight about 41:22.319 --> 41:22.929 that. 41:26.300 --> 41:28.550 You remember the Athenian Empire in the fifth century? 41:28.550 --> 41:32.210 Never had a money--not never, but could generally handle its 41:32.208 --> 41:35.558 money problem because it had this great income from the 41:35.557 --> 41:37.967 empire, say roughly 1,000 talents a 41:37.966 --> 41:41.686 year coming in. That was not true. 41:41.690 --> 41:48.090 So, that if Athens wanted to send an expedition anywhere, 41:48.087 --> 41:52.197 they had to levy a direct war tax; 41:52.199 --> 41:54.279 it was called the eisphora. 41:54.280 --> 41:58.170 They had done so two or three times during the Peloponnesian 41:58.173 --> 41:59.923 War. As far as we know they had 41:59.919 --> 42:04.479 never done it before that time. We have stressed how unnatural 42:04.482 --> 42:10.682 direct taxation was in the Greek world, but here that's what they 42:10.675 --> 42:13.395 really had. They had to pay this 42:13.400 --> 42:17.510 eisphora, if they were going to conduct a military and 42:17.512 --> 42:20.872 naval campaigns that they felt were necessary. 42:20.869 --> 42:25.329 In fact, it used to be true that individual Greeks back in 42:25.332 --> 42:28.622 the fifth century could pay their share, 42:28.619 --> 42:31.809 what was assigned to them for the eisphora, 42:31.806 --> 42:34.666 individually, but now they were so few people 42:34.667 --> 42:38.627 who could do that they organized groups of taxpayers whom they 42:38.633 --> 42:42.343 called symmories who would share the burden. 42:42.340 --> 42:47.200 It makes me think that it probably sank further down 42:47.198 --> 42:51.198 the--sort of the wealth class of Athens. 42:51.199 --> 42:55.349 More people I guess were now paying taxes than before. 42:55.349 --> 42:58.769 In the fifth century the only people who paid taxes were 42:58.769 --> 43:02.309 the very wealthy and now that I think was attenuated as people 43:02.305 --> 43:05.605 who were not so wealthy had to pay something as well. 43:05.610 --> 43:10.070 Another thing is that we find the Athenians using, 43:10.069 --> 43:15.439 as a regular thing in these campaigns that they will have to 43:15.439 --> 43:20.249 fight, mercenary soldiers. I don't mean mercenaries of the 43:20.254 --> 43:23.554 Macedonian kind, the kind that Philip was using. 43:23.550 --> 43:28.260 I mean hiring a band of mercenaries who might come from 43:28.258 --> 43:33.218 anyplace in Greece. That was because the Athenians 43:33.218 --> 43:38.638 were reluctant themselves to go out on expeditions. 43:38.639 --> 43:42.019 Nothing could be more different I think from the way the 43:42.020 --> 43:45.770 Athenians behaved in the fifth century when they were all over 43:45.769 --> 43:47.879 the joint, as you remember, 43:47.881 --> 43:52.571 in 457 that inscription that talked about those died from one 43:52.572 --> 43:56.292 tribe all over the battle. They were proud of it and they 43:56.287 --> 43:58.847 never ran short of soldiers willing to do this kind of 43:58.845 --> 44:00.945 thing. The assembly voted it and the 44:00.949 --> 44:03.259 people win. Not now. 44:03.260 --> 44:07.180 The Athenians are reluctant to engage in these activities. 44:10.530 --> 44:14.060 Our main source for complaint about this is Demosthenes, 44:14.061 --> 44:17.461 who much of the time is pleading with the Athenians to 44:17.464 --> 44:21.324 recognize the danger presented by Philip and for them to take 44:21.316 --> 44:25.486 the necessary steps to check Philip before it was too late. 44:25.489 --> 44:29.979 What he asked them to do repeatedly was to first of all 44:29.978 --> 44:33.888 vote the money that was necessary to support the 44:33.885 --> 44:38.455 expedition and then not to hire mercenaries but to serve 44:38.456 --> 44:43.366 themselves in the fighting, and he did not win those 44:43.370 --> 44:48.120 arguments very often. There were in Athens throughout 44:48.117 --> 44:53.807 this period people that we would call in our own jargon hawks and 44:53.809 --> 44:57.349 doves; people who were ready to fight 44:57.348 --> 45:02.638 for these purposes and people who were very reluctant to do 45:02.642 --> 45:06.722 so. The people who seemed to be the 45:06.718 --> 45:12.408 most reluctant to do this were the upper classes, 45:12.409 --> 45:17.109 of course, because war meant taxation and they were going to 45:17.106 --> 45:20.366 do the bulk of the paying of the taxes. 45:20.369 --> 45:25.259 It may well be--I don't want to make too much of this, 45:25.261 --> 45:30.501 Philip, wherever he could would install oligarchic governments 45:30.496 --> 45:34.696 in places that he ruled. He was not interested in 45:34.703 --> 45:37.083 democracy; he was not a friend of 45:37.076 --> 45:40.306 democracy. There were some Athenians who 45:40.312 --> 45:44.982 had never given up their hope that an oligarchy could be 45:44.983 --> 45:48.893 placed into Athens, instead of a democracy. 45:48.889 --> 45:53.649 They would have been doves and more. 45:53.650 --> 45:58.020 I mean, there is a pretty clear indication that Philip did in 45:58.015 --> 46:01.285 Athens what he did in other states as well. 46:01.289 --> 46:06.399 He bribed important Athenians to be champions of his cause and 46:06.402 --> 46:11.602 the people it's easiest to get this to work with are people who 46:11.599 --> 46:15.369 agree with your approach, who on your side of the 46:15.368 --> 46:18.458 argument. So, there was some of that. 46:18.460 --> 46:22.670 I mean, there was a real difference of opinion as there 46:22.665 --> 46:25.505 always is. We should be very aware of 46:25.509 --> 46:29.199 it and in recent years this is the kind of thing you see. 46:29.199 --> 46:34.079 Some people in society seeing a great danger out there that must 46:34.075 --> 46:38.545 be prepared for and confronted, others thinking that that is 46:38.549 --> 46:42.389 overblown, that that is too pessimistic, that there is no 46:42.387 --> 46:46.017 such great danger or that it can best be dealt with by 46:46.019 --> 46:50.339 negotiation and conversation, and anything but fighting, 46:50.340 --> 46:53.250 and that was the situation in Athens. 46:57.679 --> 47:00.709 If you were hostile, if you were a member of the 47:00.713 --> 47:03.363 hawk faction, you would say your opponents 47:03.360 --> 47:07.100 were deluding themselves about the degree of the danger and 47:07.104 --> 47:10.594 that Philip was a very special kind of a menace. 47:10.590 --> 47:14.910 If you were a dove you would accuse your opponents of being 47:14.905 --> 47:18.025 alarmists, excessively afraid and worse. 47:18.030 --> 47:22.220 Of course, both sides accused each other of much worse things 47:22.220 --> 47:25.290 having to do with their characters and so on, 47:25.293 --> 47:29.913 as people always do. The first statement we have 47:29.912 --> 47:34.282 of Demosthenes, who will emerge as the dominant 47:34.279 --> 47:39.979 hawk for most of the time that he is doing business in Athens 47:39.975 --> 47:43.475 is in 351, when he delivers the speech 47:43.475 --> 47:46.085 that we call the First Philippic. 47:46.090 --> 47:50.520 He delivered a series of speeches attacking Philip and 47:50.516 --> 47:55.356 warning the Athenians of the danger presented by Philip. 47:55.360 --> 47:59.760 To this day, philippic is a word in English 47:59.757 --> 48:06.037 which means a strong attacking piece of rhetoric against some 48:06.039 --> 48:11.299 individual or some nation. He charged the Athenians with 48:11.295 --> 48:15.885 having created the great danger that they faced by making Philip 48:15.890 --> 48:20.270 into a great man through neglect by their refusal to stop him 48:20.266 --> 48:23.326 when it was relatively easy to do so. 48:23.329 --> 48:26.229 They should send, he thought, a fleet, 48:26.231 --> 48:30.941 a good-sized fleet to serve in the northern Aegean Sea and to 48:30.935 --> 48:35.165 stop Philip's expansion and to stop Philip period. 48:35.170 --> 48:37.700 He urged them, and he will do this over and 48:37.697 --> 48:40.367 over again. Don't hire mercenaries, 48:40.374 --> 48:44.084 enlist for service yourself, vote for war tax, 48:44.079 --> 48:48.279 and those of you who should pay it should do so. 48:48.280 --> 48:52.380 He lost the argument. The Athenians did not take 48:52.378 --> 48:58.038 that action that he recommended. Philip, pretty soon after that, 48:58.037 --> 49:03.297 attacked the Olynthians; you remember Olynthus is an 49:03.304 --> 49:07.244 important state on the Chalcidic Peninsula; 49:07.239 --> 49:11.009 it has been a very significant state back in this century you 49:11.013 --> 49:14.353 remember when the Spartans went up there to defeat the 49:14.346 --> 49:17.676 Olynthians who had constructed a league of their. 49:17.679 --> 49:19.859 Well, they weren't out of business yet. 49:19.860 --> 49:25.650 So, Philip went after them and, again, Demosthenes urges the 49:25.645 --> 49:31.325 Athenians to get involved and to prevent Philip from taking 49:31.332 --> 49:37.022 Olynthus an the Chalcidic states and gaining control of the 49:37.019 --> 49:42.899 northern Aegean Sea and all the danger that that presented to 49:42.902 --> 49:50.732 Athenian interests. Again, he loses the argument. 49:50.730 --> 49:55.040 He delivers three Olynthiac speeches which have the same 49:55.037 --> 49:59.417 character as the one I've described, but the Athenians do 49:59.423 --> 50:03.143 not do it. In the year 348 Olynthus 50:03.143 --> 50:08.283 falls. That city and the other cities 50:08.280 --> 50:14.900 of the region were destroyed. You remember this is not a 50:14.900 --> 50:19.840 typical way in which the Greeks dealt with defeated states, 50:19.840 --> 50:22.710 although heaven knows the Peloponnesian War had seen 50:22.706 --> 50:24.726 examples of it, but it was a very, 50:24.730 --> 50:28.860 very harsh kind of warfare that Philip carried forward. 50:28.860 --> 50:33.690 He destroyed the cities physically, he enslaved what was 50:33.690 --> 50:38.170 left of the population and so this was a message. 50:38.170 --> 50:41.020 I think it wasn't just that he had a cruel temperament, 50:41.024 --> 50:43.244 though I suppose he must have had that too, 50:43.244 --> 50:45.204 but it was meant to be exemplary. 50:45.199 --> 50:48.669 It was meant to say when Philip says do this, 50:48.674 --> 50:53.184 do it, because if you don't, he will crush you and this is 50:53.176 --> 50:56.726 what will happen to your city and to you. 50:56.730 --> 51:00.730 That's an old technique. We know that the Assyrians used 51:00.725 --> 51:04.345 to do that way back in biblical times in which they would 51:04.347 --> 51:07.967 deliberately be as brutal and cruel as they could be, 51:07.969 --> 51:11.399 and having done so would broadcast how brutal and cruel 51:11.401 --> 51:14.011 they had been, in order to encourage other 51:14.006 --> 51:17.116 states to behave appropriately in the future. 51:17.119 --> 51:21.589 Hitler had used those same tactics early in the Second 51:21.586 --> 51:26.676 World War when he destroyed the city of Rotterdam from the air, 51:26.679 --> 51:30.429 completely not military whatsoever. 51:30.429 --> 51:35.359 It was obviously intended to terrify everybody who might want 51:35.364 --> 51:39.284 to resist him. So, that's what Philip did up 51:39.281 --> 51:42.201 there. Finally after further fighting 51:42.203 --> 51:46.183 of one kind or another, the Athenians and a number of 51:46.179 --> 51:49.389 other Greeks make a treaty with Philip. 51:49.389 --> 51:52.939 It is called the Peace of Philocrates; 51:52.940 --> 51:57.110 he was one of the negotiators on the Athenian team. 51:57.110 --> 52:00.770 There really didn't seem to be much disagreement among the 52:00.766 --> 52:03.906 Athenians as to the desirability of this peace, 52:03.909 --> 52:07.159 even Demosthenes who is normally opposed to anything 52:07.160 --> 52:10.220 like it, felt that it probably had to be done, 52:10.219 --> 52:13.839 and I think that just reflected the realities of the 52:13.840 --> 52:17.750 distribution of power and also of the willingness of the 52:17.746 --> 52:20.866 Athenians to do anything more than that, 52:20.869 --> 52:24.799 and so there is this period of the Peace of Philocrates in 52:24.801 --> 52:28.941 which the Athenians make a defensive alliance with Philip. 52:28.940 --> 52:34.770 There things sit when another development raises the 52:34.769 --> 52:39.109 panic button, I think, for Demosthenes and 52:39.114 --> 52:42.434 some others. The Sacred War, 52:42.425 --> 52:46.405 there's another Sacred War going on. 52:46.409 --> 52:53.199 This time the people who want to restore power to the priests 52:53.201 --> 52:59.881 invite Philip to lead the Greek forces in the Sacred War. 52:59.880 --> 53:03.890 That is a very big deal. First of all, 53:03.891 --> 53:10.701 it recognizes the Macedonians as Greeks in the truest sense of 53:10.700 --> 53:13.660 the word. It should have been, 53:13.658 --> 53:17.138 probably was, a major source of satisfaction 53:17.136 --> 53:21.906 for Philip and extraordinary glory in the eyes of his fellow 53:21.910 --> 53:26.360 Macedonians that the Greeks should have done this. 53:26.360 --> 53:30.230 Not only accepted them as Hellenes, but asked them to save 53:30.226 --> 53:33.476 the Oracle of Apollo, the center of Greek worship 53:33.481 --> 53:36.291 there. So, he takes his army, 53:36.288 --> 53:41.408 he runs into the Phocians, blasts the Phocian army and 53:41.414 --> 53:45.964 does what he was asked to do. In the process, 53:45.957 --> 53:50.397 when it's all over, he decides that from now on 53:50.396 --> 53:55.896 Macedon and King Philip will take not just one vote on the 53:55.897 --> 54:00.237 council that governs the Delphic Oracle. 54:00.239 --> 54:05.459 I may have mentioned it to you earlier in the semester, 54:05.461 --> 54:10.781 the Amphictyonic Council, the council of those who dwell 54:10.779 --> 54:14.639 around Delphi. He took two votes on that 54:14.642 --> 54:19.742 council, and he made himself president of the Pythian Games-- 54:19.735 --> 54:23.465 you remember these panhellenic festivals. 54:23.469 --> 54:26.369 There were four great panhellenic festivals, 54:26.370 --> 54:28.900 Olympia, Nemea, the isthmus of Corinth, 54:28.900 --> 54:33.950 and the one at Delphi which was called the Pythian Games and 54:33.945 --> 54:38.725 here is this barbarian from Macedonia not only sitting on 54:38.734 --> 54:42.074 the council but being the chairman, 54:42.070 --> 54:48.020 holding the position of honor as all the Greeks gather for the 54:48.019 --> 54:52.069 Pythian Games. Well, this must have had an 54:52.069 --> 54:57.509 enormously intimidating effect on many in the Greek world, 54:57.510 --> 55:02.940 and it becomes more and more Athens that has to take the 55:02.944 --> 55:06.704 lead, if anybody is going to resist. 55:06.700 --> 55:10.520 The Athenians were concerned; at least those who were not 55:10.524 --> 55:13.354 determined to accept the course of events. 55:13.349 --> 55:18.469 Phillip was very careful with Athens, for this there was a 55:18.465 --> 55:22.155 very good reason. They had a special strategic 55:22.159 --> 55:26.209 set of advantages that nobody else in the Greek world had, 55:26.208 --> 55:29.758 and that Philip didn't have an easy answer for. 55:29.760 --> 55:36.020 Athens was a walled city which had proven itself capable 55:36.016 --> 55:42.046 of defending those walls. You should realize that up to 55:42.050 --> 55:48.060 this point in Greek history, nobody has demonstrated any 55:48.064 --> 55:53.754 kind of ability of taking a walled city by force, 55:53.750 --> 55:56.790 the only way you can take a walled city is by surrounding it 55:56.787 --> 55:59.997 and starving it out, but you remember now that the 55:59.999 --> 56:04.299 Athenians have a navy and walls, they can't be starved out in 56:04.302 --> 56:07.032 the same way. So, taking on Athens, 56:07.034 --> 56:11.264 if you really want to take the city, is a job that's very 56:11.260 --> 56:14.630 difficult indeed. Of course, the Athenians have 56:14.633 --> 56:17.973 their navy which makes that true, but also allows the 56:17.973 --> 56:22.153 Athenians to do you harm in a way that other states cannot do. 56:22.150 --> 56:26.190 So, all of that means that Philip is not about to make a 56:26.188 --> 56:30.298 headlong assault on Athens, but to try to have his way by 56:30.300 --> 56:35.080 going around Athens somehow. He tried to win Athenian 56:35.078 --> 56:39.328 support through his usual technique of soft words, 56:39.327 --> 56:44.007 explaining how he had no aggressive intentions in areas 56:44.010 --> 56:47.740 that the Athenians were interested in, 56:47.739 --> 56:50.569 even though he had already demonstrated that that wasn't 56:50.568 --> 56:52.958 right. Also by working Athenian 56:52.962 --> 56:57.752 politics, by bribing Athenian politicians to be on his side 56:57.754 --> 57:02.384 and using every device he could to make it harder for the 57:02.380 --> 57:05.520 hawkish people to have their way. 57:05.519 --> 57:10.559 Demosthenes from here on in is determined, and determinedly 57:10.556 --> 57:14.196 against Philip, spending all his energy and 57:14.204 --> 57:18.724 time trying to get up Athenian support and then, 57:18.719 --> 57:22.959 indeed, to put together a coalition of states besides 57:22.964 --> 57:26.804 Athens to resist and fight and defeat Philip. 57:26.800 --> 57:30.160 Indeed, he is more successful than he was before, 57:30.159 --> 57:33.729 because the danger from Philip is obviously greater, 57:33.730 --> 57:37.020 so that more Athenians can see it that way. 57:37.019 --> 57:41.639 The league he puts together includes Euboea, 57:41.636 --> 57:45.066 Megara, Achaea, Acarnania, Lucas, 57:45.071 --> 57:49.581 Phocis, and finally Thebes. Now, that's a pretty good 57:49.576 --> 57:51.186 trick. Phocis and Thebes are 57:51.192 --> 57:54.492 traditional opponents, but they're both in the league 57:54.493 --> 57:57.543 and what that tells you is that those states, 57:57.539 --> 58:01.669 and especially those states which are in central Greece, 58:01.674 --> 58:05.734 closest to where Philip is located with his forces into 58:05.734 --> 58:09.944 Thessaly and so they now see that there is a great danger 58:09.944 --> 58:14.234 from him and they join in an anti-Philip coalition. 58:14.230 --> 58:18.910 He doesn't go at them immediately directly; 58:18.909 --> 58:25.209 he goes to war but he does so up in the north on the shores of 58:25.205 --> 58:29.005 the Aegean Sea. He moves eastward--this is an 58:29.009 --> 58:33.109 enormously clever thing to do, towards what the Greeks call 58:33.108 --> 58:36.508 the Chersonese, the peninsula which we call the 58:36.513 --> 58:39.063 Gallipoli Peninsula, the Hellespont. 58:39.059 --> 58:43.759 Philip wants to gain control of that, because if he can control 58:43.761 --> 58:46.331 the Hellespont, it's the old story, 58:46.332 --> 58:49.842 he can cut off trade, he can starve Athens out and it 58:49.842 --> 58:53.962 would hurt others too but Athens would be the main attack. 58:53.960 --> 58:57.020 So, he moves forces to the Thracian coast, 58:57.019 --> 59:00.619 taking various cities there, and gaining more and more 59:00.622 --> 59:05.272 territory towards that end, and then he goes all the way 59:05.267 --> 59:10.157 across to the Bosporus to Byzantium, modern Istanbul, 59:10.159 --> 59:13.179 and he takes that city as well, and, of course, 59:13.183 --> 59:16.083 you can cut off trade, if you can control the 59:16.075 --> 59:18.275 Bosporus. So this is very, 59:18.278 --> 59:22.748 very serious for Athens and it's on this occasion that 59:22.745 --> 59:27.795 Demosthenes delivers his third Philippic making the same case 59:27.801 --> 59:33.211 as he has been making all along, and only doing so but I think 59:33.210 --> 59:37.160 with even greater intensity and this time with more 59:37.158 --> 59:41.418 persuasiveness, because more and more Athenians 59:41.417 --> 59:45.717 understand how serious this menace has become. 59:45.719 --> 59:50.339 Small point but not so trivial that the Athenians were 59:50.336 --> 59:55.596 able even to enlist the support in language at least by Persia. 59:55.599 --> 59:58.299 If the Greeks are going to fight this guy, 59:58.295 --> 1:00:01.775 it would be awfully handy if you could get the Persian 1:00:01.780 --> 1:00:03.560 support. As it turns out, 1:00:03.561 --> 1:00:07.031 the Persians don't do anything of importance in resisting 1:00:07.030 --> 1:00:09.090 Philip, but it shows you how 1:00:09.093 --> 1:00:13.643 Demosthenes and those Greeks who agreed with him were attempting 1:00:13.639 --> 1:00:17.749 to put together as strong a coalition as they could to try 1:00:17.753 --> 1:00:20.633 to stop him. Forgive me. 1:00:20.630 --> 1:00:24.450 Don't pay too much attention to what I'm saying but I'm 1:00:24.454 --> 1:00:28.924 constantly being reminded of the behavior of the European states 1:00:28.917 --> 1:00:31.677 just prior to the Second World War, 1:00:31.679 --> 1:00:36.129 and in place of Persia I think we would have to put the United 1:00:36.130 --> 1:00:39.700 States of America, which was out of the game and 1:00:39.696 --> 1:00:43.396 sort of constantly trying to stay out of the game, 1:00:43.400 --> 1:00:46.650 powerful isolation of sentiment in this country, 1:00:46.654 --> 1:00:49.704 and people in Europe, some people urging that 1:00:49.701 --> 1:00:53.861 everything be done to get the United States into the game and 1:00:53.855 --> 1:00:57.755 others reluctant to do that. It wouldn't have made any 1:00:57.758 --> 1:01:01.008 difference, nothing would have gotten the Americans to take an 1:01:01.014 --> 1:01:03.314 active part against Hitler at that time, 1:01:03.309 --> 1:01:07.459 and I suspect there was no chance that anybody could have 1:01:07.464 --> 1:01:11.994 convinced the Persians to do anything at this point either. 1:01:15.019 --> 1:01:19.059 But the Athenians do send a force and it's a good size force 1:01:19.057 --> 1:01:23.017 and it does a very good job, and they drive Philip back out 1:01:23.018 --> 1:01:25.878 of some of the places that he has conquered, 1:01:25.880 --> 1:01:29.620 which I think is interesting to think about. 1:01:29.619 --> 1:01:33.449 It's not obvious that if the Athenians had gotten their 1:01:33.452 --> 1:01:37.532 collation together earlier, and if they had done the best 1:01:37.531 --> 1:01:41.711 they could, it's not obvious that they couldn't have defeated 1:01:41.713 --> 1:01:43.973 Philip. There's this terrible danger 1:01:43.967 --> 1:01:47.247 that we will all become victims of a fait accompli, 1:01:47.250 --> 1:01:50.490 what happened obviously had to happen, it couldn't happen any 1:01:50.491 --> 1:01:53.491 other way. No, I don't think that's right. 1:01:53.489 --> 1:01:56.759 We certainly don't live our lives as though that's true, 1:01:56.759 --> 1:01:59.849 and we shouldn't allow ourselves to imagine it's true 1:01:59.850 --> 1:02:03.130 in retrospect. The fact that the Athenians 1:02:03.130 --> 1:02:07.200 could have such success against Philip as they did at this 1:02:07.195 --> 1:02:11.825 moment is evidence that that was by no means a hopeless cause. 1:02:11.829 --> 1:02:17.699 Once again, a Sacred War breaks out over Delphi. 1:02:17.699 --> 1:02:23.819 Again, the Amphictyonic League, this time of course having as 1:02:23.820 --> 1:02:29.840 its president Philip invite Philip to lead the forces of the 1:02:29.839 --> 1:02:32.789 Sacred War. The Sacred War has been 1:02:32.791 --> 1:02:36.621 declared against the town near Delphi called Amphisa and that's 1:02:36.624 --> 1:02:39.534 the force that he's going to use against it. 1:02:39.530 --> 1:02:44.250 Philip moves down from Thessaly, arrives at a place not 1:02:44.253 --> 1:02:48.283 very far from Delphi called Elatea on one side, 1:02:48.276 --> 1:02:51.596 and the other side at Thermopylae. 1:02:51.599 --> 1:02:56.709 These are the roots to get down into central Greece. 1:02:56.710 --> 1:03:00.570 Once you go through those places you are right next to 1:03:00.572 --> 1:03:04.072 Boeotia, you are a couple of days from Athens, 1:03:04.070 --> 1:03:07.600 you're right in the middle of a position where you could do 1:03:07.604 --> 1:03:11.154 terrific harm. When the Athenians received 1:03:11.147 --> 1:03:17.967 the news, there really is panic. Demosthenes tells the story. 1:03:17.969 --> 1:03:23.789 Now, Demosthenes is a witness who is excellent because he's a 1:03:23.792 --> 1:03:27.332 participant, contemporary, that's great, 1:03:27.325 --> 1:03:30.645 but you've got to look at him with a certain amount of 1:03:30.648 --> 1:03:33.218 skepticism because he's a participant. 1:03:33.219 --> 1:03:36.149 He's a guy who held a certain point of view, 1:03:36.145 --> 1:03:40.025 he was very active in politics, he has strong views on 1:03:40.029 --> 1:03:44.199 everything, his reputation depends upon how you look upon 1:03:44.202 --> 1:03:46.922 what he did. So, you must understand that 1:03:46.924 --> 1:03:49.964 when he tells us these things he's telling it form his 1:03:49.960 --> 1:03:53.170 perspective. It's very much like Winston 1:03:53.168 --> 1:03:58.648 Churchill's histories of the two world wars in which he played a 1:03:58.647 --> 1:04:02.427 very large part, even in the first but certainly 1:04:02.426 --> 1:04:05.166 in the second, and it's not that he lies, 1:04:05.170 --> 1:04:09.180 it's not that he deceives, but when you read those stories 1:04:09.183 --> 1:04:12.843 you read them as Winston Churchill sees them and you have 1:04:12.838 --> 1:04:15.938 to be alert to them. There's a wonderful--about 1:04:15.936 --> 1:04:18.816 Churchill is a wonderful story, apparently true, 1:04:18.823 --> 1:04:22.513 that when Churchill's book on the First World War came out--I 1:04:22.508 --> 1:04:25.538 forget the title; let's say it was called "The 1:04:25.539 --> 1:04:29.419 Great War," which it wasn't. The former prime minister, 1:04:29.419 --> 1:04:32.959 Arthur Balfour, who didn't like Churchill at 1:04:32.957 --> 1:04:37.267 all is supposed to have said, "I see that Winston has 1:04:37.268 --> 1:04:41.578 published another book about himself and called it The Great 1:04:41.576 --> 1:04:43.976 War." The enemies of Demosthenes 1:04:43.981 --> 1:04:47.501 might say the same things about what he says in some of his 1:04:47.501 --> 1:04:50.321 speeches. But later on in his career when 1:04:50.317 --> 1:04:54.287 there was a big battle between him and his chief opponent, 1:04:54.289 --> 1:05:00.479 Demosthenes' friends were asking the assembly to vote him 1:05:00.483 --> 1:05:03.203 a crown. It meant a crown of leaves, 1:05:03.199 --> 1:05:05.759 not of gold, but the honor for things he had 1:05:05.761 --> 1:05:08.741 done for Athens and his opponents thought that what 1:05:08.741 --> 1:05:12.321 should be done for Demosthenes for what he had done to Athens 1:05:12.316 --> 1:05:14.756 is to throw him off the Acropolis. 1:05:14.760 --> 1:05:19.210 So, there's a great debate that we have both halves of. 1:05:19.210 --> 1:05:22.580 It's in that debate that he recounts the things he has done 1:05:22.581 --> 1:05:25.261 for Athens, why they should be grateful to him, 1:05:25.255 --> 1:05:27.575 and this moment is one he points to. 1:05:27.579 --> 1:05:33.239 He tells about the news came to Athens that Philip was in 1:05:33.237 --> 1:05:37.637 Elatea, and he says, we all gathered there first 1:05:37.638 --> 1:05:41.268 thing in the morning and the place was full. 1:05:41.269 --> 1:05:44.189 If you remember that passage I read to you from 1:05:44.186 --> 1:05:47.506 Aristophanes about how things usually were in the Athenian 1:05:47.511 --> 1:05:50.231 assembly, where everybody came ambling in 1:05:50.225 --> 1:05:52.685 late, no problem, nobody was in a hurry, 1:05:52.686 --> 1:05:55.716 no he says, everybody was there. 1:05:55.719 --> 1:06:02.009 When the prytany for the day, the president of the 1:06:02.008 --> 1:06:05.708 meeting said, who wishes to speak, 1:06:05.714 --> 1:06:09.874 no one, no one raised their hand. 1:06:09.869 --> 1:06:14.019 Then I got up and gave you guys the good advice that followed 1:06:14.018 --> 1:06:18.098 and all that stuff. But I think we can't doubt the 1:06:18.100 --> 1:06:22.840 essential truth of the situation, that there was just a 1:06:22.835 --> 1:06:26.425 terrible fear and no idea how to cope. 1:06:26.429 --> 1:06:32.239 Demosthenes then suggested what steps should be taken to resist. 1:06:32.239 --> 1:06:35.109 One of them, and he was able to do it now, 1:06:35.110 --> 1:06:39.240 was to use the theoric fund to supply the forces that 1:06:39.239 --> 1:06:42.249 were necessary. Secondly, to do something that 1:06:42.253 --> 1:06:45.403 was quite an achievement from a diplomatic point of view, 1:06:45.395 --> 1:06:47.355 to make an alliance with Thebes. 1:06:47.360 --> 1:06:52.430 Ever since the late 370s Athens had not been allied to 1:06:52.434 --> 1:06:57.514 Thebes, it had become alarmed that Theban power had joined 1:06:57.509 --> 1:07:01.159 even with Sparta against the Thebans, 1:07:01.159 --> 1:07:05.799 but here as we're into the very late 340s, early 330s, 1:07:05.803 --> 1:07:10.533 he makes an alliance with Thebes so that what is surely 1:07:10.534 --> 1:07:15.704 the strongest ground force on the side of the Greeks against 1:07:15.704 --> 1:07:19.594 Philip will be there, namely the Thebans, 1:07:19.590 --> 1:07:26.490 and the Boeotians in general. Finally, in 338 the Battle of 1:07:26.492 --> 1:07:35.652 Chaeronea takes place in western Boeotia and the result is a 1:07:35.654 --> 1:07:39.074 victory for Philip. 1:07:42.230 --> 1:07:45.760 The battle itself was by no means a walkover; 1:07:45.760 --> 1:07:50.300 it was very close. Our accounts of it make it 1:07:50.298 --> 1:07:54.178 clear that there was every possibility, even then, 1:07:54.179 --> 1:07:56.629 even though the Spartans weren't there, 1:07:56.630 --> 1:07:59.790 even though Philip's forces were at their peak. 1:07:59.789 --> 1:08:03.669 The Greeks might have won that battle, that's a very important 1:08:03.667 --> 1:08:06.017 thing to remember, but they didn't. 1:08:06.019 --> 1:08:09.989 Philip won and that was the end of Greek freedom. 1:08:09.989 --> 1:08:14.929 Thereafter, the states all had to bow down to Philip in terms 1:08:14.925 --> 1:08:17.845 of foreign policy. In many cases, 1:08:17.845 --> 1:08:21.455 he actually interfered in their internal autonomy. 1:08:21.460 --> 1:08:26.170 He established garrisons at key places in the Greek world, 1:08:26.168 --> 1:08:31.038 including Chalcis and Euboea, Corinth and Mount Ambracia in 1:08:31.042 --> 1:08:35.272 the west and they were called the fetters of Greece. 1:08:35.270 --> 1:08:38.710 It was like he put a great chain across Greece to show and 1:08:38.707 --> 1:08:41.177 demonstrate, and make real his control. 1:08:41.180 --> 1:08:44.990 Athens was forced to abandon the confederacy, 1:08:44.986 --> 1:08:48.356 its own confederacy; they were forced to make an 1:08:48.361 --> 1:08:52.151 alliance with Philip. He constituted in 336 the 1:08:52.145 --> 1:08:56.795 League of Corinth with himself as president. 1:08:56.800 --> 1:09:01.310 It was an offensive and defensive alliance. 1:09:01.310 --> 1:09:06.180 Philip was commander in chief and he could tell everybody what 1:09:06.183 --> 1:09:09.223 to do, and they would have to do it. 1:09:09.220 --> 1:09:12.710 This truly was the end of Greek freedom. 1:09:12.710 --> 1:09:16.650 As it turned out, Philip was assassinated in the 1:09:16.645 --> 1:09:21.835 same year so that he never was able to demonstrate how he would 1:09:21.835 --> 1:09:26.555 carry on once he had that power. The business of the 1:09:26.564 --> 1:09:29.924 conquest of Persia, if that was in the mind of 1:09:29.917 --> 1:09:34.237 Philip, had to be left to his very young son Alexander, 1:09:34.239 --> 1:09:36.999 who I think was eighteen at this point. 1:09:37.000 --> 1:09:41.280 So, that gets us to the interesting question of 1:09:41.284 --> 1:09:44.734 history's judgment on these events, 1:09:44.729 --> 1:09:48.689 and especially I think the interesting person is 1:09:48.685 --> 1:09:53.645 Demosthenes, and as you read in your problems collection, 1:09:53.649 --> 1:09:59.319 the nineteenth-century German historian Droysen and the German 1:09:59.323 --> 1:10:04.533 historians of that time in general had no doubt about the 1:10:04.530 --> 1:10:07.930 judgment. It was very negative about 1:10:07.926 --> 1:10:11.656 Demosthenes. After all, what was Athens 1:10:11.658 --> 1:10:14.698 anyway? According to Droysen it was 1:10:14.701 --> 1:10:19.491 ein advokaten republic, it's the lowest blow anybody 1:10:19.494 --> 1:10:22.804 could deliver, a republic of lawyers. 1:10:22.800 --> 1:10:29.320 What Demosthenes was trying to preserve was kliene 1:10:35.090 --> 1:10:38.660 states, a contemptible term in the eyes 1:10:38.657 --> 1:10:41.477 of Droysen and his fellow nationalists. 1:10:41.479 --> 1:10:45.429 German, you remember had just--I forget the date of his 1:10:45.425 --> 1:10:49.585 writing, either it had already been unified by Bismarck or 1:10:49.590 --> 1:10:53.830 nationalists were demanding that these little states all be 1:10:53.827 --> 1:10:58.137 brought together into a great German empire and that's where 1:10:58.138 --> 1:11:01.048 Droysen was. The future, 1:11:01.054 --> 1:11:04.064 Droysen said, was with Philip. 1:11:04.060 --> 1:11:07.830 Demosthenes was a reactionary trying to retain things that 1:11:07.825 --> 1:11:10.265 were--whose time had come and gone. 1:11:10.270 --> 1:11:13.320 What was needed was the unification of the ancient 1:11:13.319 --> 1:11:16.679 Mediterranean and this was a step in that direction. 1:11:16.680 --> 1:11:19.740 Why was it necessary to have a unification of the ancient 1:11:19.736 --> 1:11:21.846 Mediterranean? As would finally be 1:11:21.851 --> 1:11:24.401 accomplished, not by Philip and Macedon, 1:11:24.398 --> 1:11:27.998 but by the Romans, because it was all part of the 1:11:27.996 --> 1:11:31.626 great plan without which there could not have been 1:11:31.632 --> 1:11:35.272 Christianity. Christianity could come to the 1:11:35.274 --> 1:11:39.944 world and dominate Europe, because it had been made into a 1:11:39.937 --> 1:11:45.007 single word by virtue of the Macedonian and Roman conquest, 1:11:45.010 --> 1:11:49.420 and Demosthenes in his small minded petty way was standing in 1:11:49.417 --> 1:11:53.527 the way of that. Yes, there were admirable 1:11:53.527 --> 1:11:58.907 things about Demosthenes, but his behavior and his policy 1:11:58.909 --> 1:12:02.849 was quixotic, because it was hopeless. 1:12:02.850 --> 1:12:08.180 I think this is my reading of what Droysen really is saying; 1:12:08.180 --> 1:12:11.100 he lost so he must have been wrong. 1:12:11.100 --> 1:12:14.720 Winners are always right or else they wouldn't win. 1:12:14.720 --> 1:12:19.560 Now, I think we can evaluate that in a different way. 1:12:19.560 --> 1:12:22.270 If we think about a different situation, I've been thinking 1:12:22.270 --> 1:12:24.420 about it all along and telling you about it, 1:12:24.420 --> 1:12:28.530 which is let's take a look at Winston Churchill who had been 1:12:28.528 --> 1:12:32.148 called by historians the Demosthenes of that time. 1:12:32.149 --> 1:12:36.519 The man who had been calling attention to the danger from 1:12:36.521 --> 1:12:40.971 Hitler and trying to rally support and really treated like 1:12:40.971 --> 1:12:43.861 an idiot until finally the knife, 1:12:43.859 --> 1:12:47.959 the dagger was at the throat of the British and only then, 1:12:47.959 --> 1:12:52.489 and with great reluctance did the British put him in control. 1:12:52.489 --> 1:12:55.629 Now, if we look at his experience and what he did I 1:12:55.628 --> 1:12:59.758 think it's illuminating. The difference between heroic 1:12:59.762 --> 1:13:03.652 victory and disaster can be terribly thin. 1:13:03.649 --> 1:13:09.109 Taking office at a low point in the fortunes of his country and 1:13:09.108 --> 1:13:13.068 its allies, Churchill made a famous speech, 1:13:13.069 --> 1:13:17.199 which just breathed defiance when there was no physical 1:13:17.198 --> 1:13:19.948 justification for such a position. 1:13:19.949 --> 1:13:24.029 He said this, "I have myself full confidence 1:13:24.026 --> 1:13:29.046 that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, 1:13:29.050 --> 1:13:33.970 and if the best arrangements are made as they are being made, 1:13:33.970 --> 1:13:38.890 we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island 1:13:38.891 --> 1:13:42.461 home. To ride out the storm of war 1:13:42.457 --> 1:13:48.717 and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, 1:13:48.720 --> 1:13:52.660 if necessary alone, we shall go onto the end, 1:13:52.664 --> 1:13:57.604 we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and 1:13:57.595 --> 1:14:00.925 the oceans, we shall fight with growing 1:14:00.932 --> 1:14:05.512 confidence and growing strength in the air, and we shall defend 1:14:05.506 --> 1:14:09.006 our island, whatever the cost may be. 1:14:09.010 --> 1:14:12.490 We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing 1:14:12.490 --> 1:14:14.850 grounds, we shall fight in the fields, 1:14:14.850 --> 1:14:18.970 and in the streets, and we shall fight in the 1:14:18.971 --> 1:14:22.251 hills, we shall never surrender." 1:14:22.250 --> 1:14:28.500 Yet England came within a hair's breath of losing that war 1:14:28.497 --> 1:14:34.537 and suffering the horrors of invasion and occupation by Nazi 1:14:34.540 --> 1:14:37.980 Germany. In fact, had Hitler and Guering 1:14:37.980 --> 1:14:41.690 continued bombing the RAF's landing fields and ground 1:14:41.689 --> 1:14:46.039 facilities as they began to do with the Battle of Britain, 1:14:46.039 --> 1:14:50.009 instead of turning away from that and using their planes to 1:14:50.013 --> 1:14:52.483 bomb cities and scaring civilians, 1:14:52.479 --> 1:14:56.169 it's very clear to me that Germany would have won the 1:14:56.174 --> 1:14:59.234 Battle of Britain and control of the air, 1:14:59.229 --> 1:15:02.869 which would have made their success inevitable. 1:15:02.869 --> 1:15:05.509 Now imagine that it had gone that way; 1:15:05.510 --> 1:15:08.120 in that case, Churchill's bulldog 1:15:08.122 --> 1:15:11.722 determination, his refusal to accept what was 1:15:11.715 --> 1:15:16.855 a relatively generous peace offer after the fall of France, 1:15:16.859 --> 1:15:21.949 would seem in retrospect the wrong-headed defiance of a man, 1:15:21.945 --> 1:15:26.595 who brought his people low by his own intransigence. 1:15:26.600 --> 1:15:30.380 He would have been treated, I think by history, 1:15:30.384 --> 1:15:35.654 as some kind of a gallant fool, some kind of a brave imbecile. 1:15:35.649 --> 1:15:41.459 But men like Churchill and Demosthenes know that those who 1:15:41.457 --> 1:15:46.517 love liberty must fight for it, even against odds, 1:15:46.523 --> 1:15:52.613 even when there is little support, even when victory seems 1:15:52.614 --> 1:15:56.334 impossible. In spite of the outcome, 1:15:56.334 --> 1:16:01.804 it seems to me that the stand of Athens and its Greek allies 1:16:01.801 --> 1:16:07.081 at Chaeronea may have been in words that Churchill used in 1:16:07.083 --> 1:16:10.203 another context, "their finest hour." 1:16:10.200 --> 1:16:16.000 Thank you very much.