WEBVTT

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Professor Donald
Kagan: I have a title for

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today's talk.
I call it, "Philip,

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Demosthenes and the Fall of the
Polis," and I read that to you

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because it's always useful to
remember that while we look back

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on these events and know their
outcome and can assign to them a

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special significance,
let's never forget they didn't

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know that they were on the brink
of the end of the independent

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polis.
In fact, I'm sure if you came

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along in 362 after that battle
it would never have occurred to

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you that that whole fundamental
arrangement of the world that

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had been sort of in place,
to some degree,

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perhaps as far back as the
eighth century was going to

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change its character very
sharply,

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and that although there would
still be poleis that

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would be going on,
it might seem in the same old

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way, even after the Macedonian
conquest, the fact was that none

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of them ever again really was
autonomous in the sense of to be

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fully in control of its own fate
both in terms of the internal

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constitution and also,
more importantly or at least

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the one that was most in danger,
the capacity to engage in

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international relations freely
and to be free to make their own

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foreign policy.
So, as I say,

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it's going to be a very major
change but it's something that

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they don't know they're in the
middle of watching.

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Well, in 359 a man called
Philip became King of Macedon.

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We know the Macedonians were
fundamentally Greeks.

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That is to say,
they were Greek speakers and

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ethnically, if there is such a
thing, they were Greek.

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But they were so far out of the
mainstream of the development of

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the Greek poleis that we
have been examining this

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semester that many,
many Greeks,

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perhaps most of them,
didn't think of them as being

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Greek.
When Greeks thought about what

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it was to be a Greek they
thought about more than the fact

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that they spoke the Greek
language,

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they thought fundamentally--if
you get to Aristotle you see how

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thoroughly true this is,
it had to do with a culture,

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a way of life and that way of
life was based upon the

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independent polis.
Well, Macedon did not have

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such a structure.
The Greeks called the

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Macedonians an ethnos,
a tribal group is what that

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sort of means.
We use the word "nation"

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somehow to translate
ethnos and that's okay.

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The word "nation" itself,
you remember,

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comes from the Latin word which
means to be born;

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people who are born of the same
stock.

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But for the Greeks it had a
different meaning;

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it was people who participated
in the culture that they

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designated as Hellenic and they
thought the Macedonians fell

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outside of that.
There were no poleis in

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the Macedonian kingdom.
It was something that we might

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call feudal.
That is to say,

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yes there was a monarch,
but there were powerful

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noblemen who were practically
independent and who owed only a

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limited allegiance to the king
and who were really the dominant

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figures in the state for most of
the history prior to the

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appearance of Philip.
On the other hand,

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the king was an important and
powerful character so that you

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have--this was true of European
feudal states at certain periods

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in their development.
On the one hand,

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the fundamental society was
based upon great lords,

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great noblemen,
barons, but there was a king

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and he was not inconsequential.
That's the situation that

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pertained in Macedon.

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In a certain sense,
if a Greek had looked at

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Macedonian society prior to
Philip,

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he might have described it as
Homeric, and you'll be familiar

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with that.
Sure, there were guys called

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basileus,
but they were not really the

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rulers over the barons,
these great noblemen in their

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kingdom.
They thought of it as

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uncivilized in the technical
sense.

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If you don't live in a
polis,

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a city, as they understood it,
then you are not civilized;

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you are part of an
ethnos and that's the

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term they used of the tribal
societies all around them,

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Illyrians, Scythians,
they were all from an

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ethnos.
The Macedonians,

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on the other hand,
claimed very proudly and

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powerfully, and insistently that
they were Greeks;

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they were Hellenes,
and they probably invented a

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myth of their descent.
Indeed, not merely from Greeks

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but from the real Greeks,
that is to say the Argives,

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who were the leading people in
the time of Homer's poetry and

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they claimed direct descent from
Agamemnon and the other Argive

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kings.
We hear about various

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Macedonian monarchs of some
importance prior to Philip,

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back at the time of the Persian
War, Alexander the first played

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an interesting and shady role
between the Greeks and the

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Persians.
During the Peloponnesian War we

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hear of a King Perdiccas,
who also played a role shifting

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between the Spartans and the
Athenians.

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This business of shifting
between sides is not just

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because they're shifty people.
It's that their status is such

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that they're always vulnerable
and not powerful enough to

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defend themselves and so they
have to make the best deal they

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can with whoever has the power
at any moment.

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One other Macedonian king has
left a name that we know

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something about,
Archelaus,

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who followed Perdiccas,
one of the things about him was

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that he kept a kind of a
cultural court at his capital,

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and for instance Euripides,
for reasons that we do not

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know, left Athens at some point
in the Peloponnesian War and

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came to Macedon where he joined
a collection of artists and

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scholars,
and whatever that Archelaus was

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gathering in his kingdom.
Well, Philip becomes king in

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359 and the Macedonian kings
were very much like Homeric

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kings as we have described them
here.

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That is, yes you had to have a
dynastic claim,

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you had to be a member of the
royal family to be king,

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but that wasn't good enough.
You had to also have--remember,

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to rule as I said about the
Homeric kings,

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iphi,
by force, by power,

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you had to have the actual
capacity to command and

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sometimes you had to demonstrate
that by fighting it out among

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various potential successors
with having the winner coming

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out as the king.
Something like that is what

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Philip did.
He was not the most direct

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descendant of the previous king.
He was left as a kind of a

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regent over the under-aged young
king of just a boy and he was

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actually Philip's nephew and
Philip's ward,

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and Philip took care of him in
more senses than one,

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finally killing him and
replacing him on the throne.

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That was not a unique event
in Macedonian history.

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So, Philip is now on the throne
and, of course,

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with this disputed descent,
this disputed right to the

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throne,
you can imagine that he is not

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in the most secure position when
he takes over this job,

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and so I think some part of his
actions, certainly at the early

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part of his career,
and perhaps all the way

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through, was meant to
demonstrate his own greatness,

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his own capacity to be king so
as to put down all resistance

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internally and for that purpose
what could be better than

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spreading the boundaries,
increasing the power,

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and in making the greatness of
Macedon more than it had been

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before and that's what he
undertook.

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It looks as though,
I think we have enough evidence

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to believe, that he certainly,
of course, meant to rule

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Macedon and to do whatever was
necessary, however harsh to make

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that secure.
But it is pretty clear that he

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had it in mind to conquer
Greece, to make himself the

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master of Greece.
That was certainly one of his

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objectives.
As a matter of fact,

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an interesting part of his
biography was that as a young

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man--probably I should say as a
boy,

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probably in his teens,
he was sent to Thebes as a

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hostage as a result of a war
between the Thebans and the

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Macedonians,
but he was treated as a member

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of the royal family.
He was treated very decently

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and with respect,
and he spent his time in the

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house of Epaminondas.
Can you imagine a better place

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for a young king with his
military ambitions to be brought

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up than in the house of the man
who is surely the foremost

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general in the Greece of his
time and perhaps of any time,

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and I think we should imagine
that he must have learned a

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great deal about military
affairs there.

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There remains the question,
did Philip already have in his

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mind the plan of conquering the
Persian Empire,

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which was, of course,
the job that was completed by

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his son, because whatever
Philip's intentions may have

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been he died before he could
carry them out.

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I don't think we can be certain
about that, but it was an idea

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that he didn't have to do a lot
to dream up.

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I've mentioned to you how many
an orator, Isocrates,

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most famously,
had been calling on various

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Greek states and individuals to
conquer the Persian Empire,

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to solve Greece's problems,
and he wrote such a letter to

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Philip once Philip became the
most powerful figure in that

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world.
So, he certainly could have had

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the idea;
I mean, he certainly did have

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the idea--whether he was
planning to do that or not we

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don't know.
Now, his first--sort of the

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instrument that permitted him
and Macedon to become as great

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as they did was the army that he
created.

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I mean, it is very he who is
the revolutionary,

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the military genius who creates
the weapon which will allow him

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to conquer Greece,
and it's the same military

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force that enables Alexander the
Great, who had brought to it

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brilliant military talents,
but he had an instrument shaped

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for him that was already far and
away the best army in the Greek

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world,
the best army of the Greek

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world had ever seen,
perhaps as good an army as

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there ever existed in the
ancient world.

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This is the great
achievement of Philip,

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or at least that was a basis of
it.

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He was not merely a hoplite
battle leader in the old style.

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One thing about Philip that was
very important was his

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temperament, his mind,
his approach to warfare.

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He simply didn't accept the
notion of defeat.

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He didn't accept the notion of
making some kind of a deal

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except on his terms when he
found it necessary to do so.

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He's famous for having said
after a temporary setback

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against one of his opponents,
Philip has said,

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"I have not fled,
but I have retired as rams do

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in order that I might make a
stronger attack the next time."

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He really lived that principle.
Nobody ever defeated him

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permanently.
If he had to accept a temporary

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setback he immediately went to
work to repair it through a

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variety of means,
military, diplomatic and

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whatever else he had available.
But as I'm saying at the

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moment, he crafted this great
grand new army,

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supplied,
led, and organized quite

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differently from what I have
described to you in the past as

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the standard Greek practice,
which was essentially the

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hoplite phalanx,
and as you know,

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in the course of the
Peloponnesian War in the fourth

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century new gimmicks were added
to that and different devices

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were contributed to it but still
that was true.

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Now, Philip absorbed all the
things that had been going on

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before his time,
but he also made fundamental

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changes in the way that things
worked.

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To his phalanx,
and I was going to say,

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of grim professional
soldiers--now,

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that I think is in itself an
enormously important thing.

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We have something new on the
Greek scene, an army which is a

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national army.
That is to say,

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it is made up of Macedonians
serving Macedon,

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under a Macedonian king,
but they are not the citizen

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soldiers that we have examined
in the case of the polis

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and its phalanx.
They are hoplites in that

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phalanx.
They were professional

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soldiers so that their full time
job was being an army;

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they did not spend their spare
time back on farms.

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That means Philip had to pay
them a salary for them to

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perform.
At the same time,

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they were not a mercenary army
in the traditional sense.

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They were not people gathered
anywhere who fought for whoever

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hired them;
they were very much Macedonian

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soldiers.
Something we can understand in

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the United States today--an
unusual thing in American

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history beginning only a couple
of decades ago.

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We have that sort of an army.
We have a professional national

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army, and I think this is an
objective statement,

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it has become the best army in
the world.

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There are many reasons for
that, but I would argue one

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reason is that if you can have
the sociological background to

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permit that kind of an army,
you are in very good shape

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indeed.
That's what Philip was able to

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create.
The kind of loyalty,

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the kind of commitment,
the kind of association with

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the cause that only a citizen or
a subject of a king can have,

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along with the skill,
and the practice,

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and the conditioning that is
part of being a professional

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soldier.
So, he has this phalanx made up

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of these professionals that I'm
talking about,

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but he added to that a group of
people called the foot

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companions, pezetairoi is
the Greek word,

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who were the biggest and the
strongest of all the Macedonians

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and to that group he added the
companion cavalry,

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the hetairoi themselves,
the companions of the king,

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and of course these were the
noblemen and they became

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personally attached to Philip in
a special way and were the most

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effective,
the most reliable forces that

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he had, an elite core,
and here again is something

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different.
The cavalry will play a

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much more important role in
fighting than it ever has in the

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Greek fighting of the past.
One of the great geniuses of

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Philip would be to create a
combined force that could use

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cavalry and infantry and some
other subordinate forces I'll

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tell you about in a minute,
jointly together,

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to carry out a rather complex
military plan.

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These, of course,
are these hetairoi,

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our aristocratic horsemen,
heavily armored on strong

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horses.
That's very important as well,

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because if you're going to use
them as shock troops,

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which he did on many an
occasion, all of that has to be

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in place.
Then there was another

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contingent of infantry with
probably less body armor than

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his phalanx had,
who were called the shield

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bearers, hypaspists,
and they occupied the center of

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the Macedonian line next to the
phalanx.

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These fellows were usually
the first infantry forces to

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follow behind a cavalry charge
if that's the way Philip fought

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the battle,
charging a cavalry at the

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enemy, and as the enemy provided
opportunities,

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these shield bearers,
these lighter armed infantrymen

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would find their way and expand
the holes, opening the way for

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the major blow to be struck by
the phalanx.

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I'm describing one kind of
battle that could be fought.

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The thing about having this
kind of varied military force is

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that you could have different
tactics for different battles

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and Philip does things
differently on different

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occasions.
This group of

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hypaspists,
lighter infantry,

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provide a crucial link between
the first mounted attack and the

18:26.494 --> 18:31.984
follow up by the phalanx proper.
On top of all of this,

18:31.981 --> 18:37.321
you have a professional core;
again, they're all Macedonians

18:37.316 --> 18:40.886
remember, made up of really
light infantry.

18:40.890 --> 18:43.650
That is to say,
slingers, archers,

18:43.654 --> 18:48.684
javelin men in the traditional
mode that the old Greek armies

18:48.679 --> 18:51.329
had,
but didn't make too much use of

18:51.331 --> 18:55.421
typically and so that rounds out
the composite army group made up

18:55.421 --> 18:57.851
of these different kinds of
forces,

18:57.849 --> 19:02.389
and these missile men I guess
you could call them,

19:02.393 --> 19:07.683
supplied both preliminary
bombardment with the things they

19:07.678 --> 19:11.478
did to help harass the enemy
phalanx,

19:11.480 --> 19:15.690
but also they provide a kind of
crucial reserve support.

19:15.690 --> 19:19.200
If you need to throw some
forces into a suddenly important

19:19.198 --> 19:22.888
piece of the battle these guys
were very mobile and you could

19:22.891 --> 19:26.461
order them into that place to
support whatever was going on

19:26.461 --> 19:29.311
there.
You can see how infinitely more

19:29.305 --> 19:33.375
complex this was than the kind
of fighting we've talked about

19:33.380 --> 19:36.230
before.
Now, these Macedonian

19:36.227 --> 19:41.777
contingents I've been describing
do not represent a fragmentation

19:41.777 --> 19:45.417
of forces as might possibly be
thought,

19:45.420 --> 19:52.480
but rather a diversification
and a sophistication of arms,

19:52.477 --> 19:59.157
as one historian puts it,
a symphony not a cacophony of

19:59.164 --> 20:04.734
professionally equipped men.
Philip's contribution to the

20:04.725 --> 20:08.835
history of western warfare,
therefore, is not so much

20:08.841 --> 20:11.691
tactical as it is
organizational,

20:11.690 --> 20:18.160
creating this complex
organization that could have a

20:18.163 --> 20:22.543
variety of tactical uses.
Now at first,

20:22.540 --> 20:26.850
the equipment and the tactics
of this Macedonian phalanx for

20:26.853 --> 20:29.923
itself did not differ
considerably from the

20:29.924 --> 20:33.364
traditional hoplite columns of
the Greeks,

20:33.359 --> 20:37.509
but he then subsequently made a
very important change.

20:37.509 --> 20:43.609
Now, he does keep the
spear, the pike that was the

20:43.607 --> 20:48.207
fundamental weapon of the old
phalanx.

20:48.210 --> 20:54.800
But it was lengthened from
being let's say roughly eight

20:54.803 --> 20:59.003
feet long to fourteen feet or
so.

20:59.000 --> 21:02.580
Now, you cannot hold a
fourteen-foot pike with one

21:02.578 --> 21:06.188
hand.
This is a two-handed weapon;

21:06.190 --> 21:09.170
if you're going to control and
use it effectively that's what

21:09.166 --> 21:11.906
you have to do.
Well, if you're going to have

21:11.909 --> 21:15.639
two hands on this thing you
can't have that hoplite shield

21:15.641 --> 21:19.441
that was the characteristic of
the old hoplite phalanx.

21:19.440 --> 21:24.540
So, the shield shrank and
became unimportant.

21:24.539 --> 21:29.299
You realize that once you do
this to your hoplite phalanx,

21:29.299 --> 21:33.389
it can only function
successfully as an aggressive

21:33.391 --> 21:38.271
force, if you see what I mean.
You can't just take blows;

21:38.269 --> 21:42.259
you have to be delivering blows
all the time.

21:42.259 --> 21:44.759
The greaves and the
breastplates,

21:44.764 --> 21:48.664
and the heavy head gear were
replaced either with leather

21:48.659 --> 21:52.789
which was lighter,
or various composite materials,

21:52.786 --> 21:57.176
or else abandoned altogether.
So, you can see these hoplites

21:57.180 --> 22:00.880
don't look anything like the
hoplites we're accustomed to.

22:00.880 --> 22:05.770
The central idea,
however, of a fighting mass of

22:05.769 --> 22:09.409
infantrymen remained
predominant.

22:09.410 --> 22:13.820
In fact, integrated with and
protected by such diverse

22:13.815 --> 22:17.385
forces, Philip's phalanx of true
pikemen,

22:17.390 --> 22:22.930
their lances now allowed the
first five, not merely the first

22:22.926 --> 22:26.336
three ranks to strike at the
enemy,

22:26.339 --> 22:32.069
was both more lethal and more
versatile than the traditional

22:32.071 --> 22:35.961
hoplite columns.
The historian Polybius,

22:35.963 --> 22:41.843
who wrote in the second century
B.C., but you have to realize he

22:41.835 --> 22:46.025
was a contemporary of Macedonian
soldiers,

22:46.029 --> 22:49.619
who were still fighting
fundamentally in the same way

22:49.616 --> 22:53.386
that Philip had created,
so he knew what he was saying.

22:53.390 --> 22:56.340
He, for instance,
he describes the great battles

22:56.335 --> 22:59.565
between the Romans and the
Macedonians that occurred late

22:59.570 --> 23:02.170
in the third and into the second
century.

23:02.170 --> 23:08.230
So, he even saw or certainly
knew about the new phalanx,

23:08.233 --> 23:13.543
the Macedonian phalanx,
tackling the Roman Legion and

23:13.541 --> 23:17.151
fighting it practically to a
standstill.

23:17.150 --> 23:22.180
Polybius says that infantry,
who faced such a storm of

23:22.179 --> 23:27.109
spears, as he puts it,
might have as many as ten iron

23:27.113 --> 23:34.563
points concentrated on each man.
Nothing Polybius concluded can

23:34.560 --> 23:40.840
stand up to the phalanx.
The Roman, by himself with his

23:40.838 --> 23:46.768
sword, can neither slash down
nor break through the ten spears

23:46.773 --> 23:50.473
that all at once press against
him.

23:50.470 --> 23:54.690
Well, he has to face the fact
that the Roman Legion did defeat

23:54.694 --> 23:58.854
one of these phalanxes in the
course of the third century,

23:58.849 --> 24:02.719
but I think if you look at the
details you realize that there

24:02.717 --> 24:05.487
was nothing inevitable about
that defeat.

24:05.490 --> 24:10.020
Circumstances in battle
allowed the Romans to win,

24:10.021 --> 24:15.321
because it put a premium on the
great advantage that the legion

24:15.322 --> 24:19.322
had over the phalanx;
namely, that it was divided up

24:19.324 --> 24:23.244
into smaller fighting units that
could adjust and move about the

24:23.241 --> 24:27.031
field much more freely than the
fighters in the phalanx of the

24:27.033 --> 24:29.883
Macedonians.
That was certainly an edge that

24:29.884 --> 24:32.554
the legion had,
but there never was a time when

24:32.547 --> 24:35.787
a legion fighting a good
Macedonian phalanx could predict

24:35.788 --> 24:38.998
that it would win,
much less that it would be any

24:38.996 --> 24:42.246
kind of a walk over.
Of course, against the kind of

24:42.254 --> 24:45.764
forces that Philip faced,
it was all the more likely to

24:45.755 --> 24:50.355
produce a Macedonian victory,
because those were not Roman

24:50.359 --> 24:54.949
legions that they had to face.
Now, if you're going to

24:54.948 --> 24:58.718
have a national mercenary army,
a national army made up of

24:58.723 --> 25:02.713
professionals,
that means it costs money in a

25:02.705 --> 25:08.605
way that the old phalanx system
did not require the expenditure

25:08.606 --> 25:13.066
of funds very much.
So, Philip, early in his

25:13.072 --> 25:19.302
career, had to gain control of
sources of money and he did so.

25:19.299 --> 25:24.679
Early as king he immediately
had to put down his opponents

25:24.676 --> 25:29.046
from within Macedonia,
but he also did what I suppose

25:29.050 --> 25:32.850
Macedonian kings always had to
do on their accession,

25:32.849 --> 25:36.389
they were surrounded by what
the Greeks called barbarian

25:36.386 --> 25:39.916
peoples and these barbarian
peoples were always fighting

25:39.923 --> 25:43.273
against the Macedonians and
trying to push back their

25:43.267 --> 25:47.467
frontiers and so on.
So Philip turned against these,

25:47.468 --> 25:52.358
the Illyrians and various other
peoples, and did an excellent

25:52.361 --> 25:55.771
job of defeating them,
driving them back,

25:55.765 --> 25:59.555
establishing the boundaries
where he wanted them.

25:59.559 --> 26:01.869
In the process,
accomplishing two very

26:01.869 --> 26:04.919
important things.
One was to establish his

26:04.923 --> 26:10.053
credentials as a great general
and leader for internal purposes

26:10.046 --> 26:14.426
and for military purposes is in
a sense of winning the

26:14.425 --> 26:20.765
confidence of his soldiers,
but also it meant that his own

26:20.769 --> 26:27.679
stature in general and the
reputation that he gained both

26:27.676 --> 26:34.266
among enemies and friends grew,
and finally the last point,

26:34.266 --> 26:39.326
this kind of fighting allowed
him to train his army and to

26:39.325 --> 26:43.255
create this army,
and to make it as excellent as

26:43.264 --> 26:47.454
it became before he had to face
more formidable forces than

26:47.450 --> 26:50.750
these.
So, now he has won the loyalty

26:50.745 --> 26:55.855
of his nobility to a degree that
no predecessor ever had.

26:55.859 --> 26:59.269
He now has these barons who are
so independent,

26:59.269 --> 27:03.789
happily, gladly serving him and
being rather in awe of him,

27:03.789 --> 27:08.389
and the army in general was
devoted to him in a way that was

27:08.392 --> 27:11.202
unprecedented for the
Macedonians.

27:11.200 --> 27:16.590
Now, with this weapon
largely forged he was able to

27:16.594 --> 27:21.094
begin serious expansion in the
Greek world.

27:21.089 --> 27:26.369
A critical step rather early in
his monarchy was his attack on

27:26.371 --> 27:30.871
Amphipolis, and you will
remember Amphipolis was this

27:30.873 --> 27:36.243
Athenian colony that was such a
big deal for the Athenians that

27:36.241 --> 27:41.611
they were prepared to do almost
anything to get it back,

27:41.609 --> 27:45.069
but they never had thoroughly
been able to get it back until

27:45.065 --> 27:46.875
recently.
So, now he took

27:46.875 --> 27:51.225
Amphipolis--what was more
important than anything for him

27:51.225 --> 27:55.105
was that who held Amphipolis was
likely to hold Mt.

27:55.109 --> 27:59.769
Pangaean which is right near
Amphipolis, which contained gold

27:59.769 --> 28:03.959
and silver mines that were
producing wealth as they had

28:03.964 --> 28:08.844
been for centuries now,
and now that wealth was going

28:08.835 --> 28:14.095
into Philip's pocket and he used
it for the purpose that was most

28:14.100 --> 28:17.620
important,
chiefly for paying for that

28:17.616 --> 28:20.966
army that I have been talking
about.

28:20.970 --> 28:24.440
We are told that this
produced about 1,000 talents a

28:24.439 --> 28:27.399
year for Philip's use,
and that's about the same

28:27.403 --> 28:30.813
amount that the Athenians got
out of their empire.

28:30.809 --> 28:34.769
So, you are talking about lots
and lots of money and this

28:34.767 --> 28:39.007
explains the economic capacity
that gave Philip the chance to

28:39.008 --> 28:44.208
use the kind of army he had.
But he was extraordinarily

28:44.206 --> 28:48.156
skillful at the game of
diplomacy.

28:48.160 --> 28:52.190
I say game, because he treated
it in that way.

28:52.190 --> 28:56.140
Diplomacy, I think,
for him was an extension of

28:56.144 --> 28:59.244
military forces by peaceful
means.

28:59.240 --> 29:03.500
It's kind of a standing
Clausewitz's definition of war

29:03.503 --> 29:06.783
on its head.
Who was it?

29:06.779 --> 29:10.709
Sir John Fortescue,
I think, it was in the

29:10.708 --> 29:16.068
fifteenth century defined a
diplomat as a man sent to lie

29:16.073 --> 29:20.863
abroad for his country.
I think the spirit behind that

29:20.863 --> 29:25.053
pun was certainly right for
Philip, that for him diplomacy

29:25.051 --> 29:29.311
was a way for advancing his
country's interests by whatever

29:29.312 --> 29:33.302
means that he possibly could;
he was very good.

29:33.299 --> 29:38.019
One of his very great
skills was precisely to lie in a

29:38.019 --> 29:42.269
very convincing manner and,
of course, it's much easier to

29:42.266 --> 29:45.526
get people to believe what you
say if you have got the

29:45.529 --> 29:48.979
strongest army anywhere in sight
in case you should be so

29:48.977 --> 29:51.437
impolite as to say "you're a
liar."

29:51.440 --> 29:53.750
I think that must have assisted
him.

29:53.750 --> 29:57.710
But what I mean is Philip would
come into conflict with some

29:57.708 --> 30:00.588
polis or some
poleis over some

30:00.593 --> 30:03.683
territory that was in dispute or
whatever,

30:03.680 --> 30:06.750
and they would say Philip what
are you trying to do,

30:06.750 --> 30:09.760
you seem to be trying to
conquer this territory.

30:09.759 --> 30:12.949
Oh no, no Philip said,
I have absolutely no interest

30:12.946 --> 30:15.756
in this territory,
I've got other things to do

30:15.758 --> 30:19.048
that are much more important.
Those Paeonians in my

30:19.054 --> 30:22.584
background require my attention
and when the other guys would

30:22.581 --> 30:25.871
calm down he would calmly take
the place that he had left

30:25.873 --> 30:28.323
alone.
I'm reminded,

30:28.322 --> 30:34.582
and I guess after the Second
World War, in fact even before,

30:34.578 --> 30:40.828
there were some scholars who
made the analogy between Hitler

30:40.833 --> 30:45.073
and Philip,
and Demosthenes and Churchill,

30:45.068 --> 30:48.168
it's not the worst one.
It's very imperfect,

30:48.165 --> 30:51.405
but it's not the worst analogy
possible, but I remember Hitler

30:51.413 --> 30:54.453
kept saying before his strength
was great enough simply to

30:54.449 --> 30:58.649
launch a major war he would say,
if you give me this that's all

30:58.650 --> 31:01.920
I'm interested in,
that is absolutely my last

31:01.921 --> 31:06.171
territorial demand in Europe,
and then in a few months he

31:06.168 --> 31:09.558
would then seize Austria or
something like that.

31:09.559 --> 31:13.929
So, Philip reminds me of that,
because he did such things from

31:13.934 --> 31:15.014
time to time.

31:19.009 --> 31:22.759
It's just too much to tell in
terms of the detail of his

31:22.758 --> 31:26.848
career, but let me just hit a
few highlights and give you the

31:26.846 --> 31:31.626
direction in which it was going.
The first business that he

31:31.630 --> 31:36.060
had to do after he gained
Amphipolis and the wealth of the

31:36.058 --> 31:41.028
mines was to gain control of the
shoreline of the northern Aegean

31:41.030 --> 31:44.110
Sea,
and that meant of course his

31:44.109 --> 31:46.399
own Macedonia,
which he had,

31:46.404 --> 31:50.404
but also eastward into the
region of Thrace.

31:50.400 --> 31:54.650
He began precisely to gain
control of those places.

31:54.650 --> 32:00.470
It was in 357 that he took
Amphipolis and that meant that

32:00.471 --> 32:04.851
he had to clash with Athens,
because as I say,

32:04.846 --> 32:09.056
Athens had never given up its
claim to Amphipolis and kept

32:09.061 --> 32:13.131
trying to get it back,
because of its value to the

32:13.126 --> 32:17.716
Athenians.
What we will see is war between

32:17.715 --> 32:24.125
Philip and Athens on and off
until the final victory of

32:24.134 --> 32:27.274
Macedonia.
It's a period of quite a

32:27.272 --> 32:30.592
stretch of time in here in which
that's going on.

32:30.589 --> 32:34.049
On the other hand,
it's never a full scale war

32:34.047 --> 32:36.797
with Philip trying to conquer
Athens.

32:36.800 --> 32:39.750
How could he?
He's still outside from a

32:39.751 --> 32:43.511
territorial point of view,
outside the entire old Greek

32:43.513 --> 32:46.533
world.
But he can cause all the havoc

32:46.526 --> 32:51.216
he wants to in the northern
Aegean and the Athenians will be

32:51.219 --> 32:54.649
unhappy about it;
they will send forces up into

32:54.648 --> 32:58.128
that part of the world to
contest Philip's expansion and

32:58.134 --> 33:00.484
that's where the fighting goes
on.

33:00.480 --> 33:05.690
But the Athenians are not ready
to take him on and really try to

33:05.688 --> 33:09.738
stop him from going where he
seems to be going.

33:09.740 --> 33:12.610
What they do is they respond
when he does something that

33:12.612 --> 33:14.912
annoys them or that they're
worried about.

33:14.910 --> 33:19.610
Sometimes they go out and fight
him, but usually they don't,

33:19.605 --> 33:24.535
or sometimes they do and they
do so too little and too late.

33:24.539 --> 33:28.479
That's the story of the
relationship between these two

33:28.483 --> 33:31.983
powers throughout this whole
stretch of time.

33:31.980 --> 33:36.910
With the expansion of
Philip in a variety of

33:36.906 --> 33:43.296
directions, he increases his
revenues wherever he conquers.

33:43.299 --> 33:46.549
He gets down into Thessaly,
now we're talking about

33:46.545 --> 33:50.245
territory that the Greeks
consider to be Greece and Philip

33:50.245 --> 33:53.745
is now gaining more and more
control of that area.

33:53.750 --> 33:58.830
The revenues grow and he even
builds a navy and begins to

33:58.832 --> 34:02.192
challenge Athens and others at
sea.

34:02.190 --> 34:06.560
He attacks Athenian commerce
when he is quarreling with the

34:06.564 --> 34:09.944
Athenians.
The Athenian position in

34:09.939 --> 34:16.109
general is badly weakened in the
years between 357 and 355 in

34:16.111 --> 34:21.771
what the traditional historians
call the Social War.

34:21.769 --> 34:26.169
That doesn't mean that they
fought over teacups or anything

34:26.171 --> 34:30.721
like that, "social" derives from
the Latin word socii,

34:30.724 --> 34:35.284
which means allies.
It was a rebellion against

34:35.279 --> 34:40.149
the allies of Athens in the
Athenian Confederation,

34:40.150 --> 34:44.870
which really frightened the
Athenians, and kept them busy

34:44.869 --> 34:48.239
putting it down for a couple of
years.

34:48.239 --> 34:53.179
There is some debate among
scholars today as to how

34:53.183 --> 34:58.723
oppressive or not was the
Athenian rule of its empire.

34:58.719 --> 35:04.249
The more recent scholarship has
suggested that the Athenians

35:04.245 --> 35:08.755
were not really very oppressive,
which leaves for,

35:08.764 --> 35:12.144
I think, for them an
uncomfortable question,

35:12.138 --> 35:16.768
if that's true why was there
this rebellion in the years 357

35:16.768 --> 35:19.148
to 355?
We just don't know enough to

35:19.153 --> 35:21.783
talk details about this,
but I think there can be no

35:21.782 --> 35:23.932
mistake;
the Athenians abused their

35:23.927 --> 35:26.837
position of power and leadership
in the empire.

35:26.840 --> 35:30.420
They didn't do so as thoroughly
and completely as they did in

35:30.420 --> 35:33.880
the great Athenian Empire of the
fifth century but that was

35:33.881 --> 35:38.151
largely because they couldn't.
They never had the power,

35:38.145 --> 35:43.235
they never had the financial
strength to be able to impose

35:43.242 --> 35:46.822
their will as the earlier empire
had,

35:46.820 --> 35:50.440
but they did what they could
and they did enough to annoy

35:50.438 --> 35:52.828
their allies into such a
rebellion.

35:52.829 --> 35:56.219
Athens recovers,
they win, they put down the

35:56.223 --> 35:59.473
allied rebellion,
but they are weakened in the

35:59.473 --> 36:03.373
process.
In 356, there breaks out on the

36:03.366 --> 36:08.246
mainland of Greece,
what they would call the Sacred

36:08.246 --> 36:11.596
War.
It's the old business of who

36:11.602 --> 36:15.562
controls the Delphic Oracle.
The neighbors,

36:15.559 --> 36:19.219
Phocis, Locris,
frequently take advantage of

36:19.215 --> 36:24.395
opportunities to gain control of
the oracle and to deprive the

36:24.400 --> 36:28.140
priests of their control of the
region.

36:28.139 --> 36:32.719
The priests then call on other
Greeks traditionally led by

36:32.715 --> 36:37.685
Sparta but not always to beat up
the people who have taken over

36:37.691 --> 36:42.351
the oracle's place and drive
them out and restore it to the

36:42.346 --> 36:45.426
priest.
Well, this is another in that

36:45.433 --> 36:47.833
theory, in that series of
events.

36:47.829 --> 36:54.369
Thebes and Phocis are involved
in a war over Delphi.

36:54.369 --> 36:59.229
The Phocian general is the only
time he crops us in this story,

36:59.234 --> 37:03.864
Onomarchus apparently was an
outstanding military leader and

37:03.864 --> 37:08.184
defeated the Thebans and even
pushed into Thessaly,

37:08.179 --> 37:13.349
and that brings Philip into the
picture, because Philip has been

37:13.351 --> 37:18.361
expanding Macedonian power into
Thessaly from the north coming

37:18.359 --> 37:21.499
south.
So, Philip takes his forces

37:21.498 --> 37:25.308
and he pushes the Phocians back,
defeats Onomarchus,

37:25.313 --> 37:28.323
sends them off.
Now, here's the question.

37:28.320 --> 37:31.190
Is this good or bad for the
Greeks?

37:31.190 --> 37:34.480
On the one hand the one thought
would be well,

37:34.477 --> 37:38.857
sure he's just put down this
fellow who has arrogantly seized

37:38.859 --> 37:42.269
the Delphic Oracle,
but now who is there,

37:42.271 --> 37:46.641
who is sitting in Thessaly,
this great big new army.

37:46.639 --> 37:51.879
Is he going to be a menace to
the Greeks in general?

37:51.880 --> 37:55.720
Well, we who have had a chance
to know how it came out and know

37:55.722 --> 37:58.382
that it did.
But at the time people were

37:58.381 --> 38:02.491
divided, some say oh my heavens
this is a thoroughly aggressive

38:02.494 --> 38:06.544
man at the head of an army that
looks incredibly strong and he

38:06.542 --> 38:10.202
has terrific ambitions,
what are we going to do,

38:10.195 --> 38:12.885
against those who said,
no it's okay,

38:12.888 --> 38:15.698
he's okay now,
he's happy, he doesn't want to

38:15.700 --> 38:18.900
do anymore than that.
Let's take a look at

38:18.900 --> 38:23.900
Athens, which will necessarily
be the leading figure in the

38:23.902 --> 38:27.182
opposition to Philip such as it
is.

38:27.179 --> 38:31.079
Thebes, last time we looked at
Thebes, Thebes had reached a

38:31.077 --> 38:34.837
position of power perhaps
greater than that of Athens,

38:34.840 --> 38:39.680
but you remember the deaths of
Pelopidas and Epaminondas simply

38:39.682 --> 38:44.602
did not allow Thebes to continue
to have that vitality and power

38:44.603 --> 38:48.763
that it had before.
It's still a very strong state.

38:48.760 --> 38:52.160
Its hoplite phalanx is still
formidable;

38:52.159 --> 38:56.909
they still have great ambitions
and so on, but it turns out they

38:56.908 --> 39:01.128
don't really have the capacity
to take the lead in such a

39:01.130 --> 39:04.030
business.
The Athenians do and they are

39:04.028 --> 39:06.938
very much concerned about what's
happening.

39:06.940 --> 39:11.440
But it's not the same Athens
that we saw in the height of its

39:11.443 --> 39:15.933
power in the fifth century.
Relatively speaking,

39:15.927 --> 39:20.807
it is a very poor place indeed.
It is, however,

39:20.809 --> 39:25.089
still the number one naval
power in the Greek world and

39:25.090 --> 39:29.060
therefore very important.
Let's take a look at the

39:29.057 --> 39:33.047
internal life of Athens a little
bit and notice some changes they

39:33.053 --> 39:36.613
will have some significance in
terms of what decisions the

39:36.611 --> 39:39.331
Athenians make.
There is something that was

39:39.327 --> 39:42.747
introduced -- we don't know just
when -- it might have been late

39:42.752 --> 39:45.962
in the Peloponnesian War it,
might have been afterwards.

39:45.960 --> 39:51.500
It is called the theoric
fund, and it gets its name

39:51.495 --> 39:57.515
apparently because there was a
payment to the Athenian citizens

39:57.515 --> 40:03.335
of the price necessary to pay
for the ticket to see the great

40:03.342 --> 40:09.462
theatrical festivals that went
on twice a year in Athens,

40:09.460 --> 40:14.330
which had apparently
degenerated pretty much into a

40:14.327 --> 40:19.777
dole, into a kind of a welfare
fund for the very poor.

40:19.780 --> 40:23.160
It did not amount to a stunning
amount of money,

40:23.161 --> 40:26.401
but given the poverty of Athens
in general,

40:26.400 --> 40:32.160
any fund of money could be very
significant at critical moments,

40:32.159 --> 40:36.089
especially on issues of
national defense.

40:36.090 --> 40:39.850
But there was a lot of
argument, a sort of a democratic

40:39.854 --> 40:43.364
party, the party of the
underprivileged or whatever,

40:43.360 --> 40:46.200
always insistent that
everybody's supposed to keep

40:46.200 --> 40:49.560
hands off the theoric
fund which should only be used

40:49.562 --> 40:52.812
for its welfare state--I'm
embarrassed to use such a term

40:52.808 --> 40:56.228
because of course there was
nothing like that in the ancient

40:56.228 --> 40:59.108
world.
Just for that portion of the

40:59.107 --> 41:03.827
national income that was used to
alleviate the worst poverty they

41:03.833 --> 41:08.183
wanted that untouched,
but when the state was under

41:08.179 --> 41:12.999
siege, it was under threat,
it was--had to go to war,

41:13.000 --> 41:15.770
so it seemed to some
politicians, they needed money

41:15.773 --> 41:18.993
to do it and say let's take the
theoric fund for now

41:18.991 --> 41:22.321
while we have this necessity and
there would be a fight about

41:22.319 --> 41:22.929
that.

41:26.300 --> 41:28.550
You remember the Athenian
Empire in the fifth century?

41:28.550 --> 41:32.210
Never had a money--not never,
but could generally handle its

41:32.208 --> 41:35.558
money problem because it had
this great income from the

41:35.557 --> 41:37.967
empire,
say roughly 1,000 talents a

41:37.966 --> 41:41.686
year coming in.
That was not true.

41:41.690 --> 41:48.090
So, that if Athens wanted to
send an expedition anywhere,

41:48.087 --> 41:52.197
they had to levy a direct war
tax;

41:52.199 --> 41:54.279
it was called the
eisphora.

41:54.280 --> 41:58.170
They had done so two or three
times during the Peloponnesian

41:58.173 --> 41:59.923
War.
As far as we know they had

41:59.919 --> 42:04.479
never done it before that time.
We have stressed how unnatural

42:04.482 --> 42:10.682
direct taxation was in the Greek
world, but here that's what they

42:10.675 --> 42:13.395
really had.
They had to pay this

42:13.400 --> 42:17.510
eisphora, if they were
going to conduct a military and

42:17.512 --> 42:20.872
naval campaigns that they felt
were necessary.

42:20.869 --> 42:25.329
In fact, it used to be true
that individual Greeks back in

42:25.332 --> 42:28.622
the fifth century could pay
their share,

42:28.619 --> 42:31.809
what was assigned to them for
the eisphora,

42:31.806 --> 42:34.666
individually,
but now they were so few people

42:34.667 --> 42:38.627
who could do that they organized
groups of taxpayers whom they

42:38.633 --> 42:42.343
called symmories who
would share the burden.

42:42.340 --> 42:47.200
It makes me think that it
probably sank further down

42:47.198 --> 42:51.198
the--sort of the wealth class of
Athens.

42:51.199 --> 42:55.349
More people I guess were now
paying taxes than before.

42:55.349 --> 42:58.769
In the fifth century the
only people who paid taxes were

42:58.769 --> 43:02.309
the very wealthy and now that I
think was attenuated as people

43:02.305 --> 43:05.605
who were not so wealthy had to
pay something as well.

43:05.610 --> 43:10.070
Another thing is that we find
the Athenians using,

43:10.069 --> 43:15.439
as a regular thing in these
campaigns that they will have to

43:15.439 --> 43:20.249
fight, mercenary soldiers.
I don't mean mercenaries of the

43:20.254 --> 43:23.554
Macedonian kind,
the kind that Philip was using.

43:23.550 --> 43:28.260
I mean hiring a band of
mercenaries who might come from

43:28.258 --> 43:33.218
anyplace in Greece.
That was because the Athenians

43:33.218 --> 43:38.638
were reluctant themselves to go
out on expeditions.

43:38.639 --> 43:42.019
Nothing could be more different
I think from the way the

43:42.020 --> 43:45.770
Athenians behaved in the fifth
century when they were all over

43:45.769 --> 43:47.879
the joint,
as you remember,

43:47.881 --> 43:52.571
in 457 that inscription that
talked about those died from one

43:52.572 --> 43:56.292
tribe all over the battle.
They were proud of it and they

43:56.287 --> 43:58.847
never ran short of soldiers
willing to do this kind of

43:58.845 --> 44:00.945
thing.
The assembly voted it and the

44:00.949 --> 44:03.259
people win.
Not now.

44:03.260 --> 44:07.180
The Athenians are reluctant
to engage in these activities.

44:10.530 --> 44:14.060
Our main source for complaint
about this is Demosthenes,

44:14.061 --> 44:17.461
who much of the time is
pleading with the Athenians to

44:17.464 --> 44:21.324
recognize the danger presented
by Philip and for them to take

44:21.316 --> 44:25.486
the necessary steps to check
Philip before it was too late.

44:25.489 --> 44:29.979
What he asked them to do
repeatedly was to first of all

44:29.978 --> 44:33.888
vote the money that was
necessary to support the

44:33.885 --> 44:38.455
expedition and then not to hire
mercenaries but to serve

44:38.456 --> 44:43.366
themselves in the fighting,
and he did not win those

44:43.370 --> 44:48.120
arguments very often.
There were in Athens throughout

44:48.117 --> 44:53.807
this period people that we would
call in our own jargon hawks and

44:53.809 --> 44:57.349
doves;
people who were ready to fight

44:57.348 --> 45:02.638
for these purposes and people
who were very reluctant to do

45:02.642 --> 45:06.722
so.
The people who seemed to be the

45:06.718 --> 45:12.408
most reluctant to do this were
the upper classes,

45:12.409 --> 45:17.109
of course, because war meant
taxation and they were going to

45:17.106 --> 45:20.366
do the bulk of the paying of the
taxes.

45:20.369 --> 45:25.259
It may well be--I don't
want to make too much of this,

45:25.261 --> 45:30.501
Philip, wherever he could would
install oligarchic governments

45:30.496 --> 45:34.696
in places that he ruled.
He was not interested in

45:34.703 --> 45:37.083
democracy;
he was not a friend of

45:37.076 --> 45:40.306
democracy.
There were some Athenians who

45:40.312 --> 45:44.982
had never given up their hope
that an oligarchy could be

45:44.983 --> 45:48.893
placed into Athens,
instead of a democracy.

45:48.889 --> 45:53.649
They would have been doves and
more.

45:53.650 --> 45:58.020
I mean, there is a pretty clear
indication that Philip did in

45:58.015 --> 46:01.285
Athens what he did in other
states as well.

46:01.289 --> 46:06.399
He bribed important Athenians
to be champions of his cause and

46:06.402 --> 46:11.602
the people it's easiest to get
this to work with are people who

46:11.599 --> 46:15.369
agree with your approach,
who on your side of the

46:15.368 --> 46:18.458
argument.
So, there was some of that.

46:18.460 --> 46:22.670
I mean, there was a real
difference of opinion as there

46:22.665 --> 46:25.505
always is.
We should be very aware of

46:25.509 --> 46:29.199
it and in recent years this is
the kind of thing you see.

46:29.199 --> 46:34.079
Some people in society seeing a
great danger out there that must

46:34.075 --> 46:38.545
be prepared for and confronted,
others thinking that that is

46:38.549 --> 46:42.389
overblown, that that is too
pessimistic, that there is no

46:42.387 --> 46:46.017
such great danger or that it can
best be dealt with by

46:46.019 --> 46:50.339
negotiation and conversation,
and anything but fighting,

46:50.340 --> 46:53.250
and that was the situation in
Athens.

46:57.679 --> 47:00.709
If you were hostile,
if you were a member of the

47:00.713 --> 47:03.363
hawk faction,
you would say your opponents

47:03.360 --> 47:07.100
were deluding themselves about
the degree of the danger and

47:07.104 --> 47:10.594
that Philip was a very special
kind of a menace.

47:10.590 --> 47:14.910
If you were a dove you would
accuse your opponents of being

47:14.905 --> 47:18.025
alarmists, excessively afraid
and worse.

47:18.030 --> 47:22.220
Of course, both sides accused
each other of much worse things

47:22.220 --> 47:25.290
having to do with their
characters and so on,

47:25.293 --> 47:29.913
as people always do.
The first statement we have

47:29.912 --> 47:34.282
of Demosthenes,
who will emerge as the dominant

47:34.279 --> 47:39.979
hawk for most of the time that
he is doing business in Athens

47:39.975 --> 47:43.475
is in 351,
when he delivers the speech

47:43.475 --> 47:46.085
that we call the First
Philippic.

47:46.090 --> 47:50.520
He delivered a series of
speeches attacking Philip and

47:50.516 --> 47:55.356
warning the Athenians of the
danger presented by Philip.

47:55.360 --> 47:59.760
To this day,
philippic is a word in English

47:59.757 --> 48:06.037
which means a strong attacking
piece of rhetoric against some

48:06.039 --> 48:11.299
individual or some nation.
He charged the Athenians with

48:11.295 --> 48:15.885
having created the great danger
that they faced by making Philip

48:15.890 --> 48:20.270
into a great man through neglect
by their refusal to stop him

48:20.266 --> 48:23.326
when it was relatively easy to
do so.

48:23.329 --> 48:26.229
They should send,
he thought, a fleet,

48:26.231 --> 48:30.941
a good-sized fleet to serve in
the northern Aegean Sea and to

48:30.935 --> 48:35.165
stop Philip's expansion and to
stop Philip period.

48:35.170 --> 48:37.700
He urged them,
and he will do this over and

48:37.697 --> 48:40.367
over again.
Don't hire mercenaries,

48:40.374 --> 48:44.084
enlist for service yourself,
vote for war tax,

48:44.079 --> 48:48.279
and those of you who should pay
it should do so.

48:48.280 --> 48:52.380
He lost the argument.
The Athenians did not take

48:52.378 --> 48:58.038
that action that he recommended.
Philip, pretty soon after that,

48:58.037 --> 49:03.297
attacked the Olynthians;
you remember Olynthus is an

49:03.304 --> 49:07.244
important state on the Chalcidic
Peninsula;

49:07.239 --> 49:11.009
it has been a very significant
state back in this century you

49:11.013 --> 49:14.353
remember when the Spartans went
up there to defeat the

49:14.346 --> 49:17.676
Olynthians who had constructed a
league of their.

49:17.679 --> 49:19.859
Well, they weren't out of
business yet.

49:19.860 --> 49:25.650
So, Philip went after them and,
again, Demosthenes urges the

49:25.645 --> 49:31.325
Athenians to get involved and to
prevent Philip from taking

49:31.332 --> 49:37.022
Olynthus an the Chalcidic states
and gaining control of the

49:37.019 --> 49:42.899
northern Aegean Sea and all the
danger that that presented to

49:42.902 --> 49:50.732
Athenian interests.
Again, he loses the argument.

49:50.730 --> 49:55.040
He delivers three Olynthiac
speeches which have the same

49:55.037 --> 49:59.417
character as the one I've
described, but the Athenians do

49:59.423 --> 50:03.143
not do it.
In the year 348 Olynthus

50:03.143 --> 50:08.283
falls.
That city and the other cities

50:08.280 --> 50:14.900
of the region were destroyed.
You remember this is not a

50:14.900 --> 50:19.840
typical way in which the Greeks
dealt with defeated states,

50:19.840 --> 50:22.710
although heaven knows the
Peloponnesian War had seen

50:22.706 --> 50:24.726
examples of it,
but it was a very,

50:24.730 --> 50:28.860
very harsh kind of warfare that
Philip carried forward.

50:28.860 --> 50:33.690
He destroyed the cities
physically, he enslaved what was

50:33.690 --> 50:38.170
left of the population and so
this was a message.

50:38.170 --> 50:41.020
I think it wasn't just that he
had a cruel temperament,

50:41.024 --> 50:43.244
though I suppose he must have
had that too,

50:43.244 --> 50:45.204
but it was meant to be
exemplary.

50:45.199 --> 50:48.669
It was meant to say when Philip
says do this,

50:48.674 --> 50:53.184
do it, because if you don't,
he will crush you and this is

50:53.176 --> 50:56.726
what will happen to your city
and to you.

50:56.730 --> 51:00.730
That's an old technique.
We know that the Assyrians used

51:00.725 --> 51:04.345
to do that way back in biblical
times in which they would

51:04.347 --> 51:07.967
deliberately be as brutal and
cruel as they could be,

51:07.969 --> 51:11.399
and having done so would
broadcast how brutal and cruel

51:11.401 --> 51:14.011
they had been,
in order to encourage other

51:14.006 --> 51:17.116
states to behave appropriately
in the future.

51:17.119 --> 51:21.589
Hitler had used those same
tactics early in the Second

51:21.586 --> 51:26.676
World War when he destroyed the
city of Rotterdam from the air,

51:26.679 --> 51:30.429
completely not military
whatsoever.

51:30.429 --> 51:35.359
It was obviously intended to
terrify everybody who might want

51:35.364 --> 51:39.284
to resist him.
So, that's what Philip did up

51:39.281 --> 51:42.201
there.
Finally after further fighting

51:42.203 --> 51:46.183
of one kind or another,
the Athenians and a number of

51:46.179 --> 51:49.389
other Greeks make a treaty with
Philip.

51:49.389 --> 51:52.939
It is called the Peace of
Philocrates;

51:52.940 --> 51:57.110
he was one of the negotiators
on the Athenian team.

51:57.110 --> 52:00.770
There really didn't seem to be
much disagreement among the

52:00.766 --> 52:03.906
Athenians as to the desirability
of this peace,

52:03.909 --> 52:07.159
even Demosthenes who is
normally opposed to anything

52:07.160 --> 52:10.220
like it, felt that it probably
had to be done,

52:10.219 --> 52:13.839
and I think that just reflected
the realities of the

52:13.840 --> 52:17.750
distribution of power and also
of the willingness of the

52:17.746 --> 52:20.866
Athenians to do anything more
than that,

52:20.869 --> 52:24.799
and so there is this period of
the Peace of Philocrates in

52:24.801 --> 52:28.941
which the Athenians make a
defensive alliance with Philip.

52:28.940 --> 52:34.770
There things sit when
another development raises the

52:34.769 --> 52:39.109
panic button,
I think, for Demosthenes and

52:39.114 --> 52:42.434
some others.
The Sacred War,

52:42.425 --> 52:46.405
there's another Sacred War
going on.

52:46.409 --> 52:53.199
This time the people who want
to restore power to the priests

52:53.201 --> 52:59.881
invite Philip to lead the Greek
forces in the Sacred War.

52:59.880 --> 53:03.890
That is a very big deal.
First of all,

53:03.891 --> 53:10.701
it recognizes the Macedonians
as Greeks in the truest sense of

53:10.700 --> 53:13.660
the word.
It should have been,

53:13.658 --> 53:17.138
probably was,
a major source of satisfaction

53:17.136 --> 53:21.906
for Philip and extraordinary
glory in the eyes of his fellow

53:21.910 --> 53:26.360
Macedonians that the Greeks
should have done this.

53:26.360 --> 53:30.230
Not only accepted them as
Hellenes, but asked them to save

53:30.226 --> 53:33.476
the Oracle of Apollo,
the center of Greek worship

53:33.481 --> 53:36.291
there.
So, he takes his army,

53:36.288 --> 53:41.408
he runs into the Phocians,
blasts the Phocian army and

53:41.414 --> 53:45.964
does what he was asked to do.
In the process,

53:45.957 --> 53:50.397
when it's all over,
he decides that from now on

53:50.396 --> 53:55.896
Macedon and King Philip will
take not just one vote on the

53:55.897 --> 54:00.237
council that governs the Delphic
Oracle.

54:00.239 --> 54:05.459
I may have mentioned it to you
earlier in the semester,

54:05.461 --> 54:10.781
the Amphictyonic Council,
the council of those who dwell

54:10.779 --> 54:14.639
around Delphi.
He took two votes on that

54:14.642 --> 54:19.742
council, and he made himself
president of the Pythian Games--

54:19.735 --> 54:23.465
you remember these panhellenic
festivals.

54:23.469 --> 54:26.369
There were four great
panhellenic festivals,

54:26.370 --> 54:28.900
Olympia, Nemea,
the isthmus of Corinth,

54:28.900 --> 54:33.950
and the one at Delphi which was
called the Pythian Games and

54:33.945 --> 54:38.725
here is this barbarian from
Macedonia not only sitting on

54:38.734 --> 54:42.074
the council but being the
chairman,

54:42.070 --> 54:48.020
holding the position of honor
as all the Greeks gather for the

54:48.019 --> 54:52.069
Pythian Games.
Well, this must have had an

54:52.069 --> 54:57.509
enormously intimidating effect
on many in the Greek world,

54:57.510 --> 55:02.940
and it becomes more and more
Athens that has to take the

55:02.944 --> 55:06.704
lead, if anybody is going to
resist.

55:06.700 --> 55:10.520
The Athenians were concerned;
at least those who were not

55:10.524 --> 55:13.354
determined to accept the course
of events.

55:13.349 --> 55:18.469
Phillip was very careful with
Athens, for this there was a

55:18.465 --> 55:22.155
very good reason.
They had a special strategic

55:22.159 --> 55:26.209
set of advantages that nobody
else in the Greek world had,

55:26.208 --> 55:29.758
and that Philip didn't have an
easy answer for.

55:29.760 --> 55:36.020
Athens was a walled city
which had proven itself capable

55:36.016 --> 55:42.046
of defending those walls.
You should realize that up to

55:42.050 --> 55:48.060
this point in Greek history,
nobody has demonstrated any

55:48.064 --> 55:53.754
kind of ability of taking a
walled city by force,

55:53.750 --> 55:56.790
the only way you can take a
walled city is by surrounding it

55:56.787 --> 55:59.997
and starving it out,
but you remember now that the

55:59.999 --> 56:04.299
Athenians have a navy and walls,
they can't be starved out in

56:04.302 --> 56:07.032
the same way.
So, taking on Athens,

56:07.034 --> 56:11.264
if you really want to take the
city, is a job that's very

56:11.260 --> 56:14.630
difficult indeed.
Of course, the Athenians have

56:14.633 --> 56:17.973
their navy which makes that
true, but also allows the

56:17.973 --> 56:22.153
Athenians to do you harm in a
way that other states cannot do.

56:22.150 --> 56:26.190
So, all of that means that
Philip is not about to make a

56:26.188 --> 56:30.298
headlong assault on Athens,
but to try to have his way by

56:30.300 --> 56:35.080
going around Athens somehow.
He tried to win Athenian

56:35.078 --> 56:39.328
support through his usual
technique of soft words,

56:39.327 --> 56:44.007
explaining how he had no
aggressive intentions in areas

56:44.010 --> 56:47.740
that the Athenians were
interested in,

56:47.739 --> 56:50.569
even though he had already
demonstrated that that wasn't

56:50.568 --> 56:52.958
right.
Also by working Athenian

56:52.962 --> 56:57.752
politics, by bribing Athenian
politicians to be on his side

56:57.754 --> 57:02.384
and using every device he could
to make it harder for the

57:02.380 --> 57:05.520
hawkish people to have their
way.

57:05.519 --> 57:10.559
Demosthenes from here on in is
determined, and determinedly

57:10.556 --> 57:14.196
against Philip,
spending all his energy and

57:14.204 --> 57:18.724
time trying to get up Athenian
support and then,

57:18.719 --> 57:22.959
indeed, to put together a
coalition of states besides

57:22.964 --> 57:26.804
Athens to resist and fight and
defeat Philip.

57:26.800 --> 57:30.160
Indeed, he is more successful
than he was before,

57:30.159 --> 57:33.729
because the danger from Philip
is obviously greater,

57:33.730 --> 57:37.020
so that more Athenians can see
it that way.

57:37.019 --> 57:41.639
The league he puts together
includes Euboea,

57:41.636 --> 57:45.066
Megara, Achaea,
Acarnania, Lucas,

57:45.071 --> 57:49.581
Phocis, and finally Thebes.
Now, that's a pretty good

57:49.576 --> 57:51.186
trick.
Phocis and Thebes are

57:51.192 --> 57:54.492
traditional opponents,
but they're both in the league

57:54.493 --> 57:57.543
and what that tells you is that
those states,

57:57.539 --> 58:01.669
and especially those states
which are in central Greece,

58:01.674 --> 58:05.734
closest to where Philip is
located with his forces into

58:05.734 --> 58:09.944
Thessaly and so they now see
that there is a great danger

58:09.944 --> 58:14.234
from him and they join in an
anti-Philip coalition.

58:14.230 --> 58:18.910
He doesn't go at them
immediately directly;

58:18.909 --> 58:25.209
he goes to war but he does so
up in the north on the shores of

58:25.205 --> 58:29.005
the Aegean Sea.
He moves eastward--this is an

58:29.009 --> 58:33.109
enormously clever thing to do,
towards what the Greeks call

58:33.108 --> 58:36.508
the Chersonese,
the peninsula which we call the

58:36.513 --> 58:39.063
Gallipoli Peninsula,
the Hellespont.

58:39.059 --> 58:43.759
Philip wants to gain control of
that, because if he can control

58:43.761 --> 58:46.331
the Hellespont,
it's the old story,

58:46.332 --> 58:49.842
he can cut off trade,
he can starve Athens out and it

58:49.842 --> 58:53.962
would hurt others too but Athens
would be the main attack.

58:53.960 --> 58:57.020
So, he moves forces to the
Thracian coast,

58:57.019 --> 59:00.619
taking various cities there,
and gaining more and more

59:00.622 --> 59:05.272
territory towards that end,
and then he goes all the way

59:05.267 --> 59:10.157
across to the Bosporus to
Byzantium, modern Istanbul,

59:10.159 --> 59:13.179
and he takes that city as well,
and, of course,

59:13.183 --> 59:16.083
you can cut off trade,
if you can control the

59:16.075 --> 59:18.275
Bosporus.
So this is very,

59:18.278 --> 59:22.748
very serious for Athens and
it's on this occasion that

59:22.745 --> 59:27.795
Demosthenes delivers his third
Philippic making the same case

59:27.801 --> 59:33.211
as he has been making all along,
and only doing so but I think

59:33.210 --> 59:37.160
with even greater intensity and
this time with more

59:37.158 --> 59:41.418
persuasiveness,
because more and more Athenians

59:41.417 --> 59:45.717
understand how serious this
menace has become.

59:45.719 --> 59:50.339
Small point but not so
trivial that the Athenians were

59:50.336 --> 59:55.596
able even to enlist the support
in language at least by Persia.

59:55.599 --> 59:58.299
If the Greeks are going to
fight this guy,

59:58.295 --> 1:00:01.775
it would be awfully handy if
you could get the Persian

1:00:01.780 --> 1:00:03.560
support.
As it turns out,

1:00:03.561 --> 1:00:07.031
the Persians don't do anything
of importance in resisting

1:00:07.030 --> 1:00:09.090
Philip,
but it shows you how

1:00:09.093 --> 1:00:13.643
Demosthenes and those Greeks who
agreed with him were attempting

1:00:13.639 --> 1:00:17.749
to put together as strong a
coalition as they could to try

1:00:17.753 --> 1:00:20.633
to stop him.
Forgive me.

1:00:20.630 --> 1:00:24.450
Don't pay too much attention to
what I'm saying but I'm

1:00:24.454 --> 1:00:28.924
constantly being reminded of the
behavior of the European states

1:00:28.917 --> 1:00:31.677
just prior to the Second World
War,

1:00:31.679 --> 1:00:36.129
and in place of Persia I think
we would have to put the United

1:00:36.130 --> 1:00:39.700
States of America,
which was out of the game and

1:00:39.696 --> 1:00:43.396
sort of constantly trying to
stay out of the game,

1:00:43.400 --> 1:00:46.650
powerful isolation of sentiment
in this country,

1:00:46.654 --> 1:00:49.704
and people in Europe,
some people urging that

1:00:49.701 --> 1:00:53.861
everything be done to get the
United States into the game and

1:00:53.855 --> 1:00:57.755
others reluctant to do that.
It wouldn't have made any

1:00:57.758 --> 1:01:01.008
difference, nothing would have
gotten the Americans to take an

1:01:01.014 --> 1:01:03.314
active part against Hitler at
that time,

1:01:03.309 --> 1:01:07.459
and I suspect there was no
chance that anybody could have

1:01:07.464 --> 1:01:11.994
convinced the Persians to do
anything at this point either.

1:01:15.019 --> 1:01:19.059
But the Athenians do send a
force and it's a good size force

1:01:19.057 --> 1:01:23.017
and it does a very good job,
and they drive Philip back out

1:01:23.018 --> 1:01:25.878
of some of the places that he
has conquered,

1:01:25.880 --> 1:01:29.620
which I think is interesting to
think about.

1:01:29.619 --> 1:01:33.449
It's not obvious that if the
Athenians had gotten their

1:01:33.452 --> 1:01:37.532
collation together earlier,
and if they had done the best

1:01:37.531 --> 1:01:41.711
they could, it's not obvious
that they couldn't have defeated

1:01:41.713 --> 1:01:43.973
Philip.
There's this terrible danger

1:01:43.967 --> 1:01:47.247
that we will all become victims
of a fait accompli,

1:01:47.250 --> 1:01:50.490
what happened obviously had to
happen, it couldn't happen any

1:01:50.491 --> 1:01:53.491
other way.
No, I don't think that's right.

1:01:53.489 --> 1:01:56.759
We certainly don't live our
lives as though that's true,

1:01:56.759 --> 1:01:59.849
and we shouldn't allow
ourselves to imagine it's true

1:01:59.850 --> 1:02:03.130
in retrospect.
The fact that the Athenians

1:02:03.130 --> 1:02:07.200
could have such success against
Philip as they did at this

1:02:07.195 --> 1:02:11.825
moment is evidence that that was
by no means a hopeless cause.

1:02:11.829 --> 1:02:17.699
Once again, a Sacred War breaks
out over Delphi.

1:02:17.699 --> 1:02:23.819
Again, the Amphictyonic League,
this time of course having as

1:02:23.820 --> 1:02:29.840
its president Philip invite
Philip to lead the forces of the

1:02:29.839 --> 1:02:32.789
Sacred War.
The Sacred War has been

1:02:32.791 --> 1:02:36.621
declared against the town near
Delphi called Amphisa and that's

1:02:36.624 --> 1:02:39.534
the force that he's going to use
against it.

1:02:39.530 --> 1:02:44.250
Philip moves down from
Thessaly, arrives at a place not

1:02:44.253 --> 1:02:48.283
very far from Delphi called
Elatea on one side,

1:02:48.276 --> 1:02:51.596
and the other side at
Thermopylae.

1:02:51.599 --> 1:02:56.709
These are the roots to get down
into central Greece.

1:02:56.710 --> 1:03:00.570
Once you go through those
places you are right next to

1:03:00.572 --> 1:03:04.072
Boeotia, you are a couple of
days from Athens,

1:03:04.070 --> 1:03:07.600
you're right in the middle of a
position where you could do

1:03:07.604 --> 1:03:11.154
terrific harm.
When the Athenians received

1:03:11.147 --> 1:03:17.967
the news, there really is panic.
Demosthenes tells the story.

1:03:17.969 --> 1:03:23.789
Now, Demosthenes is a witness
who is excellent because he's a

1:03:23.792 --> 1:03:27.332
participant, contemporary,
that's great,

1:03:27.325 --> 1:03:30.645
but you've got to look at him
with a certain amount of

1:03:30.648 --> 1:03:33.218
skepticism because he's a
participant.

1:03:33.219 --> 1:03:36.149
He's a guy who held a certain
point of view,

1:03:36.145 --> 1:03:40.025
he was very active in politics,
he has strong views on

1:03:40.029 --> 1:03:44.199
everything, his reputation
depends upon how you look upon

1:03:44.202 --> 1:03:46.922
what he did.
So, you must understand that

1:03:46.924 --> 1:03:49.964
when he tells us these things
he's telling it form his

1:03:49.960 --> 1:03:53.170
perspective.
It's very much like Winston

1:03:53.168 --> 1:03:58.648
Churchill's histories of the two
world wars in which he played a

1:03:58.647 --> 1:04:02.427
very large part,
even in the first but certainly

1:04:02.426 --> 1:04:05.166
in the second,
and it's not that he lies,

1:04:05.170 --> 1:04:09.180
it's not that he deceives,
but when you read those stories

1:04:09.183 --> 1:04:12.843
you read them as Winston
Churchill sees them and you have

1:04:12.838 --> 1:04:15.938
to be alert to them.
There's a wonderful--about

1:04:15.936 --> 1:04:18.816
Churchill is a wonderful story,
apparently true,

1:04:18.823 --> 1:04:22.513
that when Churchill's book on
the First World War came out--I

1:04:22.508 --> 1:04:25.538
forget the title;
let's say it was called "The

1:04:25.539 --> 1:04:29.419
Great War," which it wasn't.
The former prime minister,

1:04:29.419 --> 1:04:32.959
Arthur Balfour,
who didn't like Churchill at

1:04:32.957 --> 1:04:37.267
all is supposed to have said,
"I see that Winston has

1:04:37.268 --> 1:04:41.578
published another book about
himself and called it The Great

1:04:41.576 --> 1:04:43.976
War."
The enemies of Demosthenes

1:04:43.981 --> 1:04:47.501
might say the same things about
what he says in some of his

1:04:47.501 --> 1:04:50.321
speeches.
But later on in his career when

1:04:50.317 --> 1:04:54.287
there was a big battle between
him and his chief opponent,

1:04:54.289 --> 1:05:00.479
Demosthenes' friends were
asking the assembly to vote him

1:05:00.483 --> 1:05:03.203
a crown.
It meant a crown of leaves,

1:05:03.199 --> 1:05:05.759
not of gold,
but the honor for things he had

1:05:05.761 --> 1:05:08.741
done for Athens and his
opponents thought that what

1:05:08.741 --> 1:05:12.321
should be done for Demosthenes
for what he had done to Athens

1:05:12.316 --> 1:05:14.756
is to throw him off the
Acropolis.

1:05:14.760 --> 1:05:19.210
So, there's a great debate that
we have both halves of.

1:05:19.210 --> 1:05:22.580
It's in that debate that he
recounts the things he has done

1:05:22.581 --> 1:05:25.261
for Athens, why they should be
grateful to him,

1:05:25.255 --> 1:05:27.575
and this moment is one he
points to.

1:05:27.579 --> 1:05:33.239
He tells about the news came to
Athens that Philip was in

1:05:33.237 --> 1:05:37.637
Elatea, and he says,
we all gathered there first

1:05:37.638 --> 1:05:41.268
thing in the morning and the
place was full.

1:05:41.269 --> 1:05:44.189
If you remember that
passage I read to you from

1:05:44.186 --> 1:05:47.506
Aristophanes about how things
usually were in the Athenian

1:05:47.511 --> 1:05:50.231
assembly,
where everybody came ambling in

1:05:50.225 --> 1:05:52.685
late, no problem,
nobody was in a hurry,

1:05:52.686 --> 1:05:55.716
no he says,
everybody was there.

1:05:55.719 --> 1:06:02.009
When the prytany for the
day, the president of the

1:06:02.008 --> 1:06:05.708
meeting said,
who wishes to speak,

1:06:05.714 --> 1:06:09.874
no one, no one raised their
hand.

1:06:09.869 --> 1:06:14.019
Then I got up and gave you guys
the good advice that followed

1:06:14.018 --> 1:06:18.098
and all that stuff.
But I think we can't doubt the

1:06:18.100 --> 1:06:22.840
essential truth of the
situation, that there was just a

1:06:22.835 --> 1:06:26.425
terrible fear and no idea how to
cope.

1:06:26.429 --> 1:06:32.239
Demosthenes then suggested what
steps should be taken to resist.

1:06:32.239 --> 1:06:35.109
One of them,
and he was able to do it now,

1:06:35.110 --> 1:06:39.240
was to use the theoric
fund to supply the forces that

1:06:39.239 --> 1:06:42.249
were necessary.
Secondly, to do something that

1:06:42.253 --> 1:06:45.403
was quite an achievement from a
diplomatic point of view,

1:06:45.395 --> 1:06:47.355
to make an alliance with
Thebes.

1:06:47.360 --> 1:06:52.430
Ever since the late 370s
Athens had not been allied to

1:06:52.434 --> 1:06:57.514
Thebes, it had become alarmed
that Theban power had joined

1:06:57.509 --> 1:07:01.159
even with Sparta against the
Thebans,

1:07:01.159 --> 1:07:05.799
but here as we're into the very
late 340s, early 330s,

1:07:05.803 --> 1:07:10.533
he makes an alliance with
Thebes so that what is surely

1:07:10.534 --> 1:07:15.704
the strongest ground force on
the side of the Greeks against

1:07:15.704 --> 1:07:19.594
Philip will be there,
namely the Thebans,

1:07:19.590 --> 1:07:26.490
and the Boeotians in general.
Finally, in 338 the Battle of

1:07:26.492 --> 1:07:35.652
Chaeronea takes place in western
Boeotia and the result is a

1:07:35.654 --> 1:07:39.074
victory for Philip.

1:07:42.230 --> 1:07:45.760
The battle itself was by no
means a walkover;

1:07:45.760 --> 1:07:50.300
it was very close.
Our accounts of it make it

1:07:50.298 --> 1:07:54.178
clear that there was every
possibility, even then,

1:07:54.179 --> 1:07:56.629
even though the Spartans
weren't there,

1:07:56.630 --> 1:07:59.790
even though Philip's forces
were at their peak.

1:07:59.789 --> 1:08:03.669
The Greeks might have won that
battle, that's a very important

1:08:03.667 --> 1:08:06.017
thing to remember,
but they didn't.

1:08:06.019 --> 1:08:09.989
Philip won and that was the end
of Greek freedom.

1:08:09.989 --> 1:08:14.929
Thereafter, the states all had
to bow down to Philip in terms

1:08:14.925 --> 1:08:17.845
of foreign policy.
In many cases,

1:08:17.845 --> 1:08:21.455
he actually interfered in their
internal autonomy.

1:08:21.460 --> 1:08:26.170
He established garrisons at key
places in the Greek world,

1:08:26.168 --> 1:08:31.038
including Chalcis and Euboea,
Corinth and Mount Ambracia in

1:08:31.042 --> 1:08:35.272
the west and they were called
the fetters of Greece.

1:08:35.270 --> 1:08:38.710
It was like he put a great
chain across Greece to show and

1:08:38.707 --> 1:08:41.177
demonstrate, and make real his
control.

1:08:41.180 --> 1:08:44.990
Athens was forced to abandon
the confederacy,

1:08:44.986 --> 1:08:48.356
its own confederacy;
they were forced to make an

1:08:48.361 --> 1:08:52.151
alliance with Philip.
He constituted in 336 the

1:08:52.145 --> 1:08:56.795
League of Corinth with himself
as president.

1:08:56.800 --> 1:09:01.310
It was an offensive and
defensive alliance.

1:09:01.310 --> 1:09:06.180
Philip was commander in chief
and he could tell everybody what

1:09:06.183 --> 1:09:09.223
to do, and they would have to do
it.

1:09:09.220 --> 1:09:12.710
This truly was the end of Greek
freedom.

1:09:12.710 --> 1:09:16.650
As it turned out,
Philip was assassinated in the

1:09:16.645 --> 1:09:21.835
same year so that he never was
able to demonstrate how he would

1:09:21.835 --> 1:09:26.555
carry on once he had that power.
The business of the

1:09:26.564 --> 1:09:29.924
conquest of Persia,
if that was in the mind of

1:09:29.917 --> 1:09:34.237
Philip, had to be left to his
very young son Alexander,

1:09:34.239 --> 1:09:36.999
who I think was eighteen at
this point.

1:09:37.000 --> 1:09:41.280
So, that gets us to the
interesting question of

1:09:41.284 --> 1:09:44.734
history's judgment on these
events,

1:09:44.729 --> 1:09:48.689
and especially I think the
interesting person is

1:09:48.685 --> 1:09:53.645
Demosthenes, and as you read in
your problems collection,

1:09:53.649 --> 1:09:59.319
the nineteenth-century German
historian Droysen and the German

1:09:59.323 --> 1:10:04.533
historians of that time in
general had no doubt about the

1:10:04.530 --> 1:10:07.930
judgment.
It was very negative about

1:10:07.926 --> 1:10:11.656
Demosthenes.
After all, what was Athens

1:10:11.658 --> 1:10:14.698
anyway?
According to Droysen it was

1:10:14.701 --> 1:10:19.491
ein advokaten republic,
it's the lowest blow anybody

1:10:19.494 --> 1:10:22.804
could deliver,
a republic of lawyers.

1:10:22.800 --> 1:10:29.320
What Demosthenes was trying to
preserve was kliene

1:10:35.090 --> 1:10:38.660
states,
a contemptible term in the eyes

1:10:38.657 --> 1:10:41.477
of Droysen and his fellow
nationalists.

1:10:41.479 --> 1:10:45.429
German, you remember had
just--I forget the date of his

1:10:45.425 --> 1:10:49.585
writing, either it had already
been unified by Bismarck or

1:10:49.590 --> 1:10:53.830
nationalists were demanding that
these little states all be

1:10:53.827 --> 1:10:58.137
brought together into a great
German empire and that's where

1:10:58.138 --> 1:11:01.048
Droysen was.
The future,

1:11:01.054 --> 1:11:04.064
Droysen said,
was with Philip.

1:11:04.060 --> 1:11:07.830
Demosthenes was a reactionary
trying to retain things that

1:11:07.825 --> 1:11:10.265
were--whose time had come and
gone.

1:11:10.270 --> 1:11:13.320
What was needed was the
unification of the ancient

1:11:13.319 --> 1:11:16.679
Mediterranean and this was a
step in that direction.

1:11:16.680 --> 1:11:19.740
Why was it necessary to have a
unification of the ancient

1:11:19.736 --> 1:11:21.846
Mediterranean?
As would finally be

1:11:21.851 --> 1:11:24.401
accomplished,
not by Philip and Macedon,

1:11:24.398 --> 1:11:27.998
but by the Romans,
because it was all part of the

1:11:27.996 --> 1:11:31.626
great plan without which there
could not have been

1:11:31.632 --> 1:11:35.272
Christianity.
Christianity could come to the

1:11:35.274 --> 1:11:39.944
world and dominate Europe,
because it had been made into a

1:11:39.937 --> 1:11:45.007
single word by virtue of the
Macedonian and Roman conquest,

1:11:45.010 --> 1:11:49.420
and Demosthenes in his small
minded petty way was standing in

1:11:49.417 --> 1:11:53.527
the way of that.
Yes, there were admirable

1:11:53.527 --> 1:11:58.907
things about Demosthenes,
but his behavior and his policy

1:11:58.909 --> 1:12:02.849
was quixotic,
because it was hopeless.

1:12:02.850 --> 1:12:08.180
I think this is my reading of
what Droysen really is saying;

1:12:08.180 --> 1:12:11.100
he lost so he must have been
wrong.

1:12:11.100 --> 1:12:14.720
Winners are always right or
else they wouldn't win.

1:12:14.720 --> 1:12:19.560
Now, I think we can evaluate
that in a different way.

1:12:19.560 --> 1:12:22.270
If we think about a different
situation, I've been thinking

1:12:22.270 --> 1:12:24.420
about it all along and telling
you about it,

1:12:24.420 --> 1:12:28.530
which is let's take a look at
Winston Churchill who had been

1:12:28.528 --> 1:12:32.148
called by historians the
Demosthenes of that time.

1:12:32.149 --> 1:12:36.519
The man who had been calling
attention to the danger from

1:12:36.521 --> 1:12:40.971
Hitler and trying to rally
support and really treated like

1:12:40.971 --> 1:12:43.861
an idiot until finally the
knife,

1:12:43.859 --> 1:12:47.959
the dagger was at the throat of
the British and only then,

1:12:47.959 --> 1:12:52.489
and with great reluctance did
the British put him in control.

1:12:52.489 --> 1:12:55.629
Now, if we look at his
experience and what he did I

1:12:55.628 --> 1:12:59.758
think it's illuminating.
The difference between heroic

1:12:59.762 --> 1:13:03.652
victory and disaster can be
terribly thin.

1:13:03.649 --> 1:13:09.109
Taking office at a low point in
the fortunes of his country and

1:13:09.108 --> 1:13:13.068
its allies, Churchill made a
famous speech,

1:13:13.069 --> 1:13:17.199
which just breathed defiance
when there was no physical

1:13:17.198 --> 1:13:19.948
justification for such a
position.

1:13:19.949 --> 1:13:24.029
He said this,
"I have myself full confidence

1:13:24.026 --> 1:13:29.046
that if all do their duty,
if nothing is neglected,

1:13:29.050 --> 1:13:33.970
and if the best arrangements
are made as they are being made,

1:13:33.970 --> 1:13:38.890
we shall prove ourselves once
again able to defend our island

1:13:38.891 --> 1:13:42.461
home.
To ride out the storm of war

1:13:42.457 --> 1:13:48.717
and to outlive the menace of
tyranny, if necessary for years,

1:13:48.720 --> 1:13:52.660
if necessary alone,
we shall go onto the end,

1:13:52.664 --> 1:13:57.604
we shall fight in France,
we shall fight on the seas and

1:13:57.595 --> 1:14:00.925
the oceans,
we shall fight with growing

1:14:00.932 --> 1:14:05.512
confidence and growing strength
in the air, and we shall defend

1:14:05.506 --> 1:14:09.006
our island,
whatever the cost may be.

1:14:09.010 --> 1:14:12.490
We shall fight on the beaches,
we shall fight on the landing

1:14:12.490 --> 1:14:14.850
grounds, we shall fight in the
fields,

1:14:14.850 --> 1:14:18.970
and in the streets,
and we shall fight in the

1:14:18.971 --> 1:14:22.251
hills, we shall never
surrender."

1:14:22.250 --> 1:14:28.500
Yet England came within a
hair's breath of losing that war

1:14:28.497 --> 1:14:34.537
and suffering the horrors of
invasion and occupation by Nazi

1:14:34.540 --> 1:14:37.980
Germany.
In fact, had Hitler and Guering

1:14:37.980 --> 1:14:41.690
continued bombing the RAF's
landing fields and ground

1:14:41.689 --> 1:14:46.039
facilities as they began to do
with the Battle of Britain,

1:14:46.039 --> 1:14:50.009
instead of turning away from
that and using their planes to

1:14:50.013 --> 1:14:52.483
bomb cities and scaring
civilians,

1:14:52.479 --> 1:14:56.169
it's very clear to me that
Germany would have won the

1:14:56.174 --> 1:14:59.234
Battle of Britain and control of
the air,

1:14:59.229 --> 1:15:02.869
which would have made their
success inevitable.

1:15:02.869 --> 1:15:05.509
Now imagine that it had gone
that way;

1:15:05.510 --> 1:15:08.120
in that case,
Churchill's bulldog

1:15:08.122 --> 1:15:11.722
determination,
his refusal to accept what was

1:15:11.715 --> 1:15:16.855
a relatively generous peace
offer after the fall of France,

1:15:16.859 --> 1:15:21.949
would seem in retrospect the
wrong-headed defiance of a man,

1:15:21.945 --> 1:15:26.595
who brought his people low by
his own intransigence.

1:15:26.600 --> 1:15:30.380
He would have been treated,
I think by history,

1:15:30.384 --> 1:15:35.654
as some kind of a gallant fool,
some kind of a brave imbecile.

1:15:35.649 --> 1:15:41.459
But men like Churchill and
Demosthenes know that those who

1:15:41.457 --> 1:15:46.517
love liberty must fight for it,
even against odds,

1:15:46.523 --> 1:15:52.613
even when there is little
support, even when victory seems

1:15:52.614 --> 1:15:56.334
impossible.
In spite of the outcome,

1:15:56.334 --> 1:16:01.804
it seems to me that the stand
of Athens and its Greek allies

1:16:01.801 --> 1:16:07.081
at Chaeronea may have been in
words that Churchill used in

1:16:07.083 --> 1:16:10.203
another context,
"their finest hour."

1:16:10.200 --> 1:16:16.000
Thank you very much.