WEBVTT 00:01.900 --> 00:05.880 Professor Donald Kagan: Let me remind you 00:05.876 --> 00:09.696 that the Spartans, ever since their victory in the 00:09.696 --> 00:13.746 Peloponnesian War had been attempting to extend their 00:13.750 --> 00:17.670 hegemony, at first all the way over into 00:17.671 --> 00:23.181 Asia, and then when that was thwarted, they tried to do so on 00:23.175 --> 00:28.445 the mainland of Greece, and one consequence of their 00:28.450 --> 00:34.020 effort and the failure to achieve it in an easy way was 00:34.024 --> 00:40.114 the restoration of Athens to a primary position in the Greek 00:40.114 --> 00:43.184 world. Again, not as powerful as 00:43.183 --> 00:47.133 Sparta, but once again an independent state that was 00:47.126 --> 00:51.376 capable of being a serious opponent of the Spartans. 00:51.380 --> 00:58.460 Today, I want to talk about the emergence of a third great power 00:58.457 --> 01:03.847 in this period which had never had a position, 01:03.850 --> 01:07.860 I think, of something resembling equality with the 01:07.862 --> 01:10.812 leading powers in the Greek world, 01:10.810 --> 01:14.550 although it had had periods when it was very strong anyway. 01:14.549 --> 01:17.189 Thebes is what I'm talking about. 01:17.189 --> 01:22.629 Now, if you look at the situation in 379, 01:22.626 --> 01:28.426 when the Spartans were in control of Thebes as a 01:28.433 --> 01:33.873 consequence of the actions of Phoebidas, 01:33.870 --> 01:36.990 there was a Spartan garrison there in the city, 01:36.991 --> 01:40.251 on its acropolis, there were Spartan garrisons in 01:40.249 --> 01:44.189 other towns in Boeotia and it was probably as a low a point 01:44.185 --> 01:48.115 for the Thebans as they had experienced since the 450s when 01:48.122 --> 01:51.382 the Athenians gained control of Boeotia. 01:51.379 --> 01:56.099 But starting with the successful Theban rebellion 01:56.101 --> 02:01.021 which overthrew the Spartan command of the city, 02:01.019 --> 02:05.679 the Thebans launched a period of growth in power, 02:05.684 --> 02:10.354 influence, wealth, and even to some degree extent 02:10.348 --> 02:15.398 which justifies modern historians in speaking about a 02:15.402 --> 02:22.012 period perhaps beginning in 371 and running at least a decade, 02:22.009 --> 02:25.549 to which they give the name the Theban Hegemony, 02:25.547 --> 02:29.907 and today I want to talk about how that happened and how it 02:29.911 --> 02:32.321 sort of developed and ended. 02:39.750 --> 02:44.960 The Spartans invaded, after the Theban overthrow of 02:44.963 --> 02:50.853 Spartan rule and in the first year the leader in that invasion 02:50.852 --> 02:55.102 was given to the young King Cleombrotus, 02:55.099 --> 02:58.829 not to Agesilaus, and his failure to undertake 02:58.832 --> 03:03.892 that command exercised the minds of ancient writers as well as 03:03.892 --> 03:07.382 modern ones. One answer whenever Agesilaus 03:07.379 --> 03:11.769 doesn't take command of an army, which is following a policy 03:11.773 --> 03:15.733 that he likes, people suggest that he might 03:15.731 --> 03:19.961 have been physically incapable of doing it. 03:19.960 --> 03:25.190 He was an old man and he had been injured and so that's a 03:25.186 --> 03:30.016 plausible reason at any time, and yet the ancient writers 03:30.016 --> 03:34.456 were persuaded that there were times when he was simply playing 03:34.463 --> 03:38.773 politics in some complicated way and choosing not to take the 03:38.767 --> 03:41.727 command. This is one of those occasions 03:41.734 --> 03:45.534 when they speculate that he was trying to get Cleombrotus 03:45.532 --> 03:48.112 engaged in this anti-Theban policy, 03:48.110 --> 03:52.360 which would provide for greater support for that general 03:52.364 --> 03:57.004 Agesilean policy and that that's why he had worked it so that 03:57.004 --> 04:01.714 Cleombrotus got the command. We simply can't be sure 04:01.707 --> 04:05.757 about what the truth of that is. Cleombrotus, 04:05.760 --> 04:11.970 however, did not wage a very aggressive campaign and that 04:11.972 --> 04:17.742 first invasion of 378 produced very, very little. 04:17.740 --> 04:22.350 However, subsequent Spartan invasions also, 04:22.346 --> 04:27.936 even those led by Agesilaus, were not successful. 04:27.939 --> 04:32.099 The Thebans were able gradually to gather their strength, 04:32.104 --> 04:36.794 to recover parts of Boeotia and bring them under their power, 04:36.790 --> 04:43.230 and to drive the Spartans away without yielding anything of 04:43.227 --> 04:48.957 importance. One of the consequences--I'm 04:48.957 --> 04:57.837 talking really about the years 378,377, 376 and into 375. 04:57.839 --> 05:00.429 One of the things that the Thebans engaged in, 05:00.431 --> 05:02.711 in this period, and it's extremely important 05:02.705 --> 05:05.715 because it provides the basis for the power that they will 05:05.719 --> 05:08.789 develop, was a reconstruction of the 05:08.785 --> 05:12.905 Boeotian League. The Thebans had commanded or 05:12.906 --> 05:17.266 led, or dominated the Boeotian League before. 05:17.269 --> 05:21.969 They changed its constitution, however, in these years in a 05:21.968 --> 05:27.588 way that was rather important. In a word, to simply the 05:27.590 --> 05:34.280 matter, the entire operation of the league became more 05:34.282 --> 05:38.772 democratic. They used to have the decisive 05:38.766 --> 05:43.656 bodies that determined the Theban policy in the form of 05:43.655 --> 05:48.365 four separate councils, which were sort of indirect 05:48.372 --> 05:51.612 regimes that really made the policy. 05:51.610 --> 05:56.650 The new constitution made the decisive place really an 05:56.646 --> 06:01.776 assembly in which all the representatives of the Theban 06:01.777 --> 06:07.187 cities came and made policy in an assembly not in separate 06:07.194 --> 06:10.694 councils, all of which could be more 06:10.694 --> 06:15.644 readily controlled by oligarchic figures, and the only thing is 06:15.642 --> 06:19.872 that the meetings of the Boeotian League took place in 06:19.872 --> 06:22.572 Thebes. Now, not only did Thebes 06:22.566 --> 06:25.606 have a majority of representatives in that league, 06:25.605 --> 06:29.255 or at least the largest number by virtue of its size and its 06:29.263 --> 06:32.483 leading role, but the fact that it all took 06:32.482 --> 06:37.052 place in Thebes meant that there would be more Thebans there and 06:37.048 --> 06:40.748 more Thebans playing an influential role in what was 06:40.745 --> 06:42.795 going on. Nonetheless, 06:42.795 --> 06:47.625 we shouldn't discount the truly democratic nature of this 06:47.627 --> 06:49.697 regime. It's a new thing. 06:49.699 --> 06:55.149 Boeotia and Thebes used to be bulwark of oligarchy, 06:55.147 --> 07:00.047 and it became a remarkably democratic city, 07:00.050 --> 07:05.720 and I think there's reason to take note of the fact that this 07:05.718 --> 07:11.668 seemed to have had an impact on Thebes and Boeotia much like the 07:11.670 --> 07:17.240 one that Herodotus praises so highly back when Athens became 07:17.243 --> 07:20.723 democratic, when they threw out their 07:20.717 --> 07:24.227 tyrants, and established the Cleisthenic regime, 07:24.229 --> 07:28.039 Herodotus says that they became better warriors. 07:28.040 --> 07:31.290 They produced a better army; they began defeating their 07:31.293 --> 07:33.423 enemies as they had not done before. 07:33.420 --> 07:37.810 I think that is very clearly also what happens in 07:37.810 --> 07:40.790 Thebes. We can't get away from the fact 07:40.788 --> 07:44.368 that Thebes became a more formidable military power 07:44.367 --> 07:47.067 thereafter. Whether or not it's linked to 07:47.068 --> 07:50.408 democracy is open to argument, but I think there is a real 07:50.406 --> 07:53.096 argument that would say it worked that way. 07:53.100 --> 07:56.680 At least, we don't know the details of this very well, 07:56.676 --> 08:00.046 but a very unusual thing seems to have happened. 08:00.050 --> 08:04.850 The Thebans ultimately were able to increase the size of 08:04.851 --> 08:09.761 their army by using farmers, who would not ordinarily have 08:09.761 --> 08:14.421 been able to afford hoplite equipment, but somehow the state 08:14.424 --> 08:19.644 managed to equip poorer farmers and to turn them into hoplites, 08:19.639 --> 08:24.389 so that ultimately the army that Thebes commanded--when you 08:24.385 --> 08:28.635 get down to the years after the Battle of Leuctra, 08:28.639 --> 08:33.479 in which the Thebans and their friends defeated the Spartans, 08:33.482 --> 08:36.632 you will see that really a huge army, 08:36.629 --> 08:40.209 by Greek standards, goes marching into the 08:40.212 --> 08:45.452 Peloponnesus of which a large portion was this Theban hoplite 08:45.454 --> 08:50.784 group that was much more potent, because of its size and it 08:50.779 --> 08:55.809 could be argued because of the spirit of these newly hoplited 08:55.810 --> 08:58.830 democrats, you might say. 08:58.830 --> 09:03.080 Well, as the Thebans were developing this league they were 09:03.076 --> 09:07.246 also fighting the Spartans and gradually driving the Spartans 09:07.253 --> 09:09.103 back. For instance, 09:09.096 --> 09:14.516 they destroyed the city of Plataea, which was always on the 09:14.522 --> 09:19.812 side of the enemies of Thebes. In this case they were on the 09:19.812 --> 09:23.312 side of the Spartans, and it would take a while 09:23.305 --> 09:28.115 before that was undone. They also placed a number of 09:28.119 --> 09:32.919 cities under Theban command. They didn't need to do that, 09:32.917 --> 09:36.427 for most of the cities in Boeotia, because mostly they 09:36.432 --> 09:40.152 seemed to be satisfied and pleased to cooperate with--and 09:40.147 --> 09:42.117 why not? I mean, I should make the point 09:42.124 --> 09:43.854 clear as to why they would be happy to do that. 09:43.850 --> 09:47.110 When the Spartans invaded Boeotia they didn't only beat up 09:47.105 --> 09:49.245 Thebes. In fact, Thebes was less hurt 09:49.250 --> 09:52.400 than were the other towns because Thebes was further away 09:52.400 --> 09:54.650 and better equipped to defend itself. 09:54.649 --> 09:57.509 Every time the Spartans came in they ravaged the 09:57.507 --> 10:00.867 Boeotian countryside and did harm to these Boeotian towns. 10:00.870 --> 10:04.400 So, it was Thebes that was the defender, the protector of the 10:04.398 --> 10:07.868 Boeotians against the Spartans, and this certainly gave them 10:07.867 --> 10:11.437 popularity; it helps explain why this new 10:11.436 --> 10:16.436 Boeotian confederation was so effective and so loyal. 10:16.440 --> 10:20.400 The Thebans were doing a key job for Boeotia and the 10:20.398 --> 10:21.328 Boeotians. 10:25.149 --> 10:28.479 Meanwhile, this new army that was being put together--it 10:28.475 --> 10:32.475 wasn't of course entirely new, its heart would have been the 10:32.484 --> 10:36.564 old Boeotian hoplite farmer group, but it was added to and 10:36.562 --> 10:41.472 it was given this new twist. I think really a combination 10:41.473 --> 10:46.483 twist of two kinds of elements that explain a kind of 10:46.476 --> 10:51.476 enthusiasm, a kind of morale boost that they had. 10:51.480 --> 10:55.400 One was a greater sense of what we would call nationalism. 10:55.399 --> 10:58.519 It's obviously an anachronistic for the city states but we don't 10:58.515 --> 11:01.105 have a better word for it. That is to say, 11:01.113 --> 11:05.243 this constant warfare, these constant attacks by the 11:05.239 --> 11:08.549 Spartans, culminating in this seizure of 11:08.545 --> 11:13.135 their city against all custom, against all law and in a very 11:13.138 --> 11:15.988 unpleasant way, and the support of these 11:15.985 --> 11:19.595 oligarchs as against the common people, the ordinary folks, 11:19.600 --> 11:24.300 so that when this new regime led--I should point out by these 11:24.301 --> 11:27.201 two extraordinary military leaders, 11:27.200 --> 11:31.550 Pelopidas and Epaminondas, when these fellows also were 11:31.547 --> 11:35.007 responsible for the liberation of Thebes, 11:35.009 --> 11:39.109 especially Pelopidas, and when they were leading the 11:39.113 --> 11:41.933 fight for the defense of Boeotia, 11:41.929 --> 11:45.979 all of that meant that there was a growing feeling of "we are 11:45.981 --> 11:50.011 Boeotians, we are together, and the enemy is the Spartans 11:50.005 --> 11:54.605 and we need to fight them." To that, if you throw in the 11:54.611 --> 11:59.841 feeling that democracy appears to have in its first burst 11:59.835 --> 12:05.515 especially--I should point out that the Athenian extraordinary 12:05.524 --> 12:11.034 success on land occurs right after the democratic revolution 12:11.027 --> 12:15.037 of Cleisthenes. I don't say they become bad 12:15.035 --> 12:18.755 thereafter but they're never again quite as extraordinary as 12:18.758 --> 12:22.838 a land force as they are then. An analogy that's often drawn 12:22.841 --> 12:26.981 is with the armies of the French Revolution in the eighteenth 12:26.980 --> 12:30.240 century, which really were fantastically 12:30.237 --> 12:34.827 successful right after the revolution began and they began 12:34.828 --> 12:39.338 enrolling and de-conscripting great numbers of people who 12:39.340 --> 12:44.010 would never have been in the army before in the name of the 12:44.012 --> 12:46.632 nation, in the name of freedom, 12:46.631 --> 12:49.421 in the name of all kinds of lovely things. 12:49.419 --> 12:53.129 Again, it's often neglected that the French already had a 12:53.128 --> 12:56.838 terrific army before that happened and they had wonderful 12:56.837 --> 13:00.207 officers and generals, and were skilled in the art of 13:00.205 --> 13:03.315 war. So, it was a kind of a best of 13:03.318 --> 13:08.048 all worlds where they had a solid base for military 13:08.050 --> 13:12.020 superiority, to which was added this great 13:12.022 --> 13:16.602 business of numbers and the zeal that went with it. 13:16.600 --> 13:20.700 Something like that I believe is going on here in the 13:20.700 --> 13:24.880 370s to help explain what's happening to what becomes this 13:24.875 --> 13:28.605 enormously powerful and successful Theban army. 13:33.790 --> 13:35.930 The fighting goes on. The Thebans, 13:35.934 --> 13:38.934 you remember, joined with the Athenians 13:38.926 --> 13:43.726 against the Spartans back at the time of the foundation of the 13:43.728 --> 13:48.368 Second Athenian Confederacy in 377 and they do work together 13:48.372 --> 13:52.132 for a time, but it doesn't take very long 13:52.126 --> 13:57.036 for there to grow up differences between the Athenians and the 13:57.042 --> 14:00.012 Boeotians. They are, if you look back at 14:00.013 --> 14:03.063 the whole history, more frequently enemies than 14:03.063 --> 14:05.993 they are friends. There are longstanding 14:05.992 --> 14:10.002 differences, suspicions, attitudes that are not entirely 14:09.997 --> 14:13.997 friendly and so on, and as Theban power grows, 14:13.999 --> 14:19.629 and as the threat from Sparta diminishes, the Athenians become 14:19.627 --> 14:24.607 less enthusiastic about their alliance with Thebes, 14:24.610 --> 14:28.520 because the Thebans are now emerging as a contender for the 14:28.524 --> 14:32.174 leading position for a hegemonal position in Greece. 14:32.169 --> 14:39.329 So, we will see the Athenians and the Thebans gradually moving 14:39.329 --> 14:46.519 apart in the decade of the 370s. There was in 375 a proposal 14:46.523 --> 14:52.313 for peace to be established in the warring Greek world. 14:52.309 --> 14:56.989 It was apparently--there's some difference of opinion among our 14:56.988 --> 15:01.358 sources, but one thing that seems clear, the King of Persia 15:01.364 --> 15:05.334 was in favor of it. The ancient writers explain his 15:05.327 --> 15:09.057 reason for doing that, for being interested in having 15:09.064 --> 15:12.734 that happen, because he had other wars to fight. 15:12.730 --> 15:16.020 As to often was the case, there was a rebellion in Egypt, 15:16.016 --> 15:18.126 which was always a serious menace, 15:18.129 --> 15:22.819 so he wanted peace so that he could hire Greek mercenaries to 15:22.817 --> 15:26.277 fight in his army. Perhaps that wasn't the only 15:26.283 --> 15:30.903 reason that the great king had. He must have been worried at 15:30.898 --> 15:35.168 the growth of Athenian power and influence at sea, 15:35.166 --> 15:39.256 which was continuing throughout this period. 15:39.259 --> 15:42.859 The Second Athenian Confederacy never had the power and extent 15:42.855 --> 15:45.975 that the great empire had had in the fifth century, 15:45.980 --> 15:50.200 but it was scary from the standpoint of the great king and 15:50.198 --> 15:54.048 so he might very well have wanted to restore peace to 15:54.046 --> 15:58.406 Greece as a way of stopping excuses for further expansion on 15:58.413 --> 16:02.413 the part of the Athenians.On the other hand, 16:02.409 --> 16:06.429 the Athenians were not unhappy to make peace as an opportunity 16:06.431 --> 16:10.251 to consolidate the gains that they had had and because that 16:10.254 --> 16:14.544 would put a stop to what I think was beginning to worry them, 16:14.540 --> 16:17.820 the expansion of Thebes. Now, mind you, 16:17.818 --> 16:21.628 they're still worried number one about Sparta in 375. 16:21.629 --> 16:24.429 Spartans haven't been defeated by anybody; 16:24.429 --> 16:28.379 they're still the most serious power, and they're still the 16:28.379 --> 16:32.259 power that stands for Persian power in the Greek world, 16:32.259 --> 16:36.159 but things have become more complicated as Thebes has 16:36.163 --> 16:40.363 emerged on the scene. Well, the ancient writer, 16:40.362 --> 16:44.812 Diodorus especially, speaks of an event--well, 16:44.812 --> 16:50.082 let me describe the event. He says that when it was time 16:50.079 --> 16:55.289 to sign this common peace--maybe I want to say a word about that 16:55.290 --> 16:57.990 too. The Greek words for common 16:57.986 --> 17:02.676 peace are koine eirene; it is a term that comes up 17:02.683 --> 17:07.623 again and again in the fourth century in attempting to bring 17:07.615 --> 17:11.205 peace agreements among the Greek states. 17:11.210 --> 17:13.510 It's a new thing. As you know, 17:13.511 --> 17:18.081 peace in the past usually took the form of the swearing of 17:18.078 --> 17:22.888 oaths to accept a peace treaty on very specific terms between 17:22.886 --> 17:27.526 combatants in that war. The koine eirene concept 17:27.530 --> 17:32.020 has a more modern ring to it, and it seems to have the idea 17:32.023 --> 17:36.673 that there should be a common peace among all the Greeks, 17:36.670 --> 17:42.110 and that the signatories should be responsible for upholding 17:42.114 --> 17:46.064 that common peace. It's a very interesting idea 17:46.055 --> 17:50.765 and it sparked enormous interest in scholars, I think especially 17:50.769 --> 17:54.959 after the First World War, when all of the hopeful talk 17:54.961 --> 17:59.151 about the League of Nations and Kant's picture of perpetual 17:59.149 --> 18:03.119 peace and all of that stuff was flying around in certain 18:03.121 --> 18:06.571 circles, so people hoped to see in the 18:06.573 --> 18:10.213 koine eirene, this might have been a 18:10.213 --> 18:14.203 preliminary sign of that same kind of idea. 18:14.200 --> 18:19.840 But it didn't work any better in the ancient world than 18:19.839 --> 18:23.339 it has worked in the modern world. 18:23.339 --> 18:28.409 To get back to the first suggestion in 375 about having 18:28.406 --> 18:32.246 such a thing, the states were agreed to do 18:32.253 --> 18:35.453 it, and then trouble came when 18:35.447 --> 18:41.687 Thebes insisted that just as the Spartans could sign on behalf of 18:41.694 --> 18:46.774 all of their allies for the Peloponnesian League, 18:46.769 --> 18:51.599 the Thebans wanted the right to sign for all of their Boeotian 18:51.596 --> 18:54.916 allies on behalf of the Boeotian League. 18:54.920 --> 18:58.760 It would have been the de facto recognition of the 18:58.761 --> 19:01.781 Boeotian League with Thebes as its leader. 19:01.779 --> 19:05.279 This is really what happened, if you put your minds back to 19:05.275 --> 19:08.885 445 in the thirty-years peace that concluded what we call the 19:08.892 --> 19:12.642 first Peloponnesian War. When the Spartans allowed the 19:12.635 --> 19:17.095 Athenians to sign and speak for all of the members of its league 19:17.099 --> 19:21.419 they were giving de facto recognition and regarding the 19:21.423 --> 19:26.543 Athenians as their equals. This was something that the 19:26.538 --> 19:32.698 Spartans no doubt led chiefly in this view by Agesilaus; 19:32.700 --> 19:35.720 they were not going to let the Thebans do it. 19:35.720 --> 19:39.290 In fact, we're told in a very bold 19:39.292 --> 19:44.412 action Agesilaus struck the Thebans from the lists, 19:44.410 --> 19:49.070 the list of those who would take part in the peace because 19:49.073 --> 19:53.143 they insisted on this clause. Now, there's a problem about 19:53.141 --> 19:55.731 this. The same story almost 19:55.726 --> 20:01.736 identically is told in 371 when we come to the attempt at 20:01.742 --> 20:07.252 another koine eirenee, to bring peace to the general 20:07.253 --> 20:11.763 Greek world, the whole story is told in pretty much the same way 20:11.759 --> 20:16.049 and the up shot of the one in 371 will be the Great Battle of 20:16.050 --> 20:18.920 Leuctra. This had led some scholars to 20:18.919 --> 20:21.529 say Diodorus, who is the source of these 20:21.526 --> 20:24.866 tales, simply has screwed up, has got it wrong; 20:24.869 --> 20:27.229 this is what they call a doublet. 20:27.230 --> 20:32.340 Somehow he projected backwards an event that really happened in 20:32.338 --> 20:35.618 371 and has it happen twice. I'm very, 20:35.619 --> 20:39.289 very suspicious about modern historians who are prepared rip 20:39.291 --> 20:42.911 up pieces of ancient historians, because we know better and it 20:42.912 --> 20:45.152 just doesn't make any sense is the argument. 20:45.150 --> 20:47.000 The truth is, I can see no reason why this 20:46.997 --> 20:50.777 shouldn't have happened twice. Certainly, Epaminondas would 20:50.777 --> 20:54.947 have insisted on that, certainly the Spartans would 20:54.950 --> 20:59.000 have objected to it, the actions that go with it 20:58.995 --> 21:03.635 strike me as being perfectly okay in 375 and when four years 21:03.640 --> 21:06.790 later a similar circumstance emerges, 21:06.789 --> 21:08.969 why shouldn't the same thing happen again? 21:08.970 --> 21:11.880 I haven't really looked into this, but I can imagine if you 21:11.879 --> 21:14.839 look through the whole Cold War history I'm sure you'll find 21:14.839 --> 21:17.799 many of the things that are happening over and over again in 21:17.798 --> 21:21.258 exactly the same way because the circumstances haven't changed. 21:21.259 --> 21:25.579 So, with my characteristic gullibility I believe in the 21:25.579 --> 21:30.169 story as it is told in 375. Well, fighting resumes 21:30.172 --> 21:34.452 since the peace really didn't hold and the Thebans 21:34.454 --> 21:39.874 continue--and the Boeotians in general continue to successfully 21:39.872 --> 21:44.472 fight off the Spartans. I should have mentioned in the 21:44.470 --> 21:47.770 course of this fighting, soon after the treaty, 21:47.767 --> 21:51.707 there's an amazing occasion which has harbingers for the 21:51.709 --> 21:55.009 future. A Spartan army is marching in 21:55.011 --> 21:58.551 one direction, a Theban army is marching in 21:58.547 --> 22:02.247 another direction, the Spartans outnumber the 22:02.251 --> 22:07.301 Thebans very greatly. In fact, the whole Theban force 22:07.301 --> 22:12.931 is simply the 300 men who had been formed pretty recently into 22:12.931 --> 22:18.101 a special elite fighting core called the Sacred Band. 22:18.099 --> 22:23.009 Their special quality was that in addition to be excellent 22:23.007 --> 22:27.137 warriors and trained especially for their job, 22:27.140 --> 22:32.500 they were homosexual lovers who stood and fought right next to 22:32.498 --> 22:35.778 each other. This was just carrying forward 22:35.778 --> 22:40.268 the principle that the Spartans had used in one way and another, 22:40.270 --> 22:43.550 and it turned out to be equally successful. 22:43.549 --> 22:47.779 This Sacred Band was a tremendous fighting force and 22:47.782 --> 22:52.632 will play a critical role in the important Battle of Leuctra. 22:52.630 --> 22:57.230 Anyway, they managed to defeat in a hoplite battle, 22:57.232 --> 23:01.652 a Spartan force that is greater than they are. 23:01.650 --> 23:04.860 It's not a real hundred percent hoplite battle, 23:04.862 --> 23:08.982 the numbers--there are only 300 Thebans, even though there's 23:08.983 --> 23:13.273 about 1,000 Spartans. The way the battle is fought is 23:13.273 --> 23:17.133 not traditional, typical, it's a little peculiar 23:17.129 --> 23:21.559 so you really can't regard it as the decisive time, 23:21.559 --> 23:24.619 somebody beat a Spartan hoplite phalanx in battle. 23:24.619 --> 23:26.859 That will have to wait until Leuctra. 23:26.859 --> 23:29.899 On the other hand, the evidence of the ancients is 23:29.899 --> 23:33.249 that it really impressed the Greek world in general, 23:33.250 --> 23:36.860 and even this form of a victory over Spartan hoplites, 23:36.856 --> 23:40.726 was unprecedented and it really I think kind of shook some 23:40.734 --> 23:44.274 people in terms of their confidence that the Spartans 23:44.272 --> 23:47.132 would always win a battle like that. 23:47.130 --> 23:52.010 So, the fighting goes on, on all the fronts that I have 23:52.006 --> 23:55.786 mentioned to you, until finally we get down to 23:55.789 --> 23:59.319 371 and in 371 the same thing happens. 23:59.319 --> 24:03.999 There is a pressure from the Persians for a general peace, 24:04.000 --> 24:07.450 the Athenians are not against that idea, 24:07.450 --> 24:11.190 but the same tale I told you last time, there's no question 24:11.187 --> 24:15.957 that it happened at Leuctra, nobody doubts that and the 24:15.960 --> 24:22.410 result was a renewal of the war with the Spartans taking the 24:22.406 --> 24:25.886 lead, aggressively moving into 24:25.888 --> 24:30.668 Boeotia as they had done every time before. 24:30.670 --> 24:34.670 I think it's very worth mentioning that we don't have 24:34.669 --> 24:37.129 any case up to now, up to 371, 24:37.130 --> 24:40.960 in which the Boeotians and their friends and allies march 24:40.959 --> 24:44.899 into the Peloponnesus. All the attacking has been by 24:44.896 --> 24:49.086 the Spartans into Boeotia, which means these wars have 24:49.092 --> 24:53.132 always been costly to Boeotia but not to Sparta, 24:53.130 --> 24:58.530 and we'll see that one of the things that Epaminondas wants to 24:58.534 --> 25:02.614 do when he can is to reverse that situation. 25:02.609 --> 25:07.989 So, this brings us to the Battle of Leuctra; 25:07.990 --> 25:13.120 Leuctra is a town in southwestern Boeotia. 25:13.119 --> 25:18.209 The two armies march towards each other; 25:18.210 --> 25:21.300 there's a lot of maneuvering this way and that way, 25:21.297 --> 25:24.567 but finally they come onto this rather small field. 25:24.569 --> 25:28.069 You can go there today and look at it; 25:28.069 --> 25:34.399 it really is pretty easy to place the ancient story into the 25:34.401 --> 25:38.841 modern geography. There's a plain between two 25:38.836 --> 25:42.916 hills, one to the south and one to the north. 25:42.920 --> 25:46.680 Boeotian army took up its position on the northern hill, 25:46.684 --> 25:50.454 and the Spartans took up theirs on the southern hill, 25:50.450 --> 25:55.090 and then finally when the daylight came they move forward 25:55.087 --> 25:59.807 and fought each other in this field which is sort of--it's 25:59.808 --> 26:04.858 plenty big enough for any kind of hoplite battle that you want 26:04.860 --> 26:08.100 to have. Some scholars have wanted to 26:08.097 --> 26:12.477 make the battle in terms of a limited space but I think that 26:12.475 --> 26:16.775 really isn't an issue. This is a sort of a typical 26:16.782 --> 26:21.522 hoplite battlefield. So, Cleombrotus marches on 26:21.516 --> 26:24.626 Thebes, again, it's not Agesilaus, 26:24.626 --> 26:29.806 and I mean this looks like the culmination of Agesilaus' 26:29.808 --> 26:33.498 anti-Theban policy; he's not there. 26:33.500 --> 26:36.770 Again, the ancient writers and modern scholars wonder why he 26:36.768 --> 26:38.958 wasn't there. I'm prepared to take the 26:38.958 --> 26:41.148 simple-minded view; if he wasn't there, 26:41.146 --> 26:44.656 he couldn't have been there. He must have been out of action 26:44.655 --> 26:47.585 for physical reasons, because I can't imagine any 26:47.591 --> 26:51.751 good reason why he wouldn't want to be there for the payoff here. 26:51.750 --> 26:57.130 Anyway, there was something in the neighborhood of 10,000 26:57.134 --> 27:03.294 Spartan hoplites and maybe 1,000 cavalry and the Boeotian side is 27:03.288 --> 27:08.768 less clear maybe 6,000 maybe 7,000 Boeotian hoplites. 27:08.769 --> 27:14.069 So, they are outnumbered and I think that has a lot to do with 27:14.073 --> 27:19.553 the tactics that Epaminondas employs in fighting this battle. 27:19.550 --> 27:22.000 It's a famous battle; it's an important battle. 27:22.000 --> 27:27.350 So, I'll take a few moments to talk about the battle itself. 27:27.350 --> 27:33.860 Again, this is much debated; it's not easy to know what's 27:33.857 --> 27:38.947 going on or why it's going on. Let's start with the important 27:38.953 --> 27:41.613 point that the Thebans were outnumbered. 27:41.609 --> 27:47.509 So, it really was up to Epaminondas to think of some way 27:47.514 --> 27:53.204 to overcome this disadvantage. Normal course of events 6,000 27:53.195 --> 27:57.375 or 7,000 against 10,000 in a regular hoplite battle you 27:57.377 --> 28:01.557 can--the bookies would take the game off the board. 28:01.559 --> 28:05.379 I mean, especially if they're Spartans and Peloponnesians. 28:05.380 --> 28:09.740 The bigger battalions are going to win. 28:09.740 --> 28:13.850 So Epaminondas comes up with certainly--nobody can deny that 28:13.845 --> 28:16.345 he came up with some kind of plan. 28:16.350 --> 28:20.280 What am I fussing about here? Some scholars have wanted 28:20.275 --> 28:25.405 to emphasize not the tactics of Epaminondas, but rather the 28:25.406 --> 28:29.826 superior fighting qualities of this new Theban, 28:29.830 --> 28:34.850 democratic, national army. Well, I certainly think that 28:34.849 --> 28:37.749 made a difference. I give real credit to that 28:37.746 --> 28:41.836 element and yet I can't escape thinking that there really was a 28:41.839 --> 28:45.579 very tricky, unusual, strategy of tactics or 28:45.583 --> 28:50.383 operational plan used by Epaminondas that accounts in a 28:50.379 --> 28:55.259 considerable part for the success of the Thebans in this 28:55.264 --> 28:58.224 battle. The normal way you line up 28:58.217 --> 29:02.567 is--sort of the leading forces on each side take up the right 29:02.574 --> 29:06.224 wing of their phalanx. That's the position of honor 29:06.221 --> 29:09.361 and that's where you try to beat the other guy. 29:09.359 --> 29:12.459 That has the consequence incidentally of meaning that the 29:12.461 --> 29:15.121 best army doesn't fight against the best army. 29:15.119 --> 29:17.729 In each case, the best army is fighting 29:17.729 --> 29:20.819 against a weaker portion of the enemy army. 29:20.819 --> 29:23.419 That's not what Epaminondas wanted. 29:23.420 --> 29:30.250 He put his Theban forces with the 300 Sacred Band members at 29:30.254 --> 29:35.424 the front of it; his own group was at the left 29:35.417 --> 29:41.357 side of the Boeotian line facing the Spartans directly. 29:41.359 --> 29:47.139 Now, the Spartans had to realize when they saw what was 29:47.139 --> 29:52.379 going on--forgive me, I forgot to tell you another 29:52.384 --> 29:58.424 very important thing. Instead of the usual depth of 29:58.415 --> 30:03.735 the phalanx eight, twelve, maybe sixteen ranks, 30:03.738 --> 30:09.638 Epaminondas loaded his left wing fifty men deep. 30:09.640 --> 30:14.910 It may be precedented, but if so it's extremely rare 30:14.912 --> 30:20.022 in the past. Then when he started for battle 30:20.016 --> 30:26.856 he took his left wing and moved it obliquely further to the 30:26.856 --> 30:30.456 left. The plan being to flank the 30:30.459 --> 30:35.479 Spartans, if they could, and come at them from their 30:35.482 --> 30:40.902 vulnerable side and to do so in tremendous strength. 30:40.900 --> 30:46.550 I think the idea of the tremendous strength and depth 30:46.545 --> 30:51.785 was to win on that side quickly, because he was weak, 30:51.787 --> 30:56.677 obviously, on his right. I suppose that the force 30:56.677 --> 31:02.017 immediately after the Thebans would itself present a problem, 31:02.019 --> 31:05.549 because if the Thebans went sharply to the left on this 31:05.546 --> 31:08.416 occasion with their deep powerful phalanx, 31:08.420 --> 31:12.680 the guys next to them probably would move with them to some 31:12.677 --> 31:16.787 degree, but not with the same speed and not with the same 31:16.788 --> 31:19.748 determination, because the situation--so there 31:19.747 --> 31:22.597 was the danger of there being an opening right there; 31:22.600 --> 31:26.780 that would have been very scary. Apparently, Epaminondas told 31:26.782 --> 31:32.192 the people on the right--I would have thought everybody to the 31:32.190 --> 31:36.800 right of his outfit, to proceed only very slowly. 31:36.799 --> 31:41.789 If that's the case, the Peloponnesian army on their 31:41.785 --> 31:48.165 left would have had to take some time before they could encounter 31:48.166 --> 31:52.936 the Boeotian army. So, the first fighting would be 31:52.940 --> 31:58.020 on the left, where Epaminondas wanted it and his hope was in a 31:58.018 --> 32:02.178 way this is a variety of the Marathon strategy. 32:02.180 --> 32:05.920 You remember the big thing there was the Athenians under 32:05.922 --> 32:09.542 Miltiades hoped to win swiftly on the wings where they had 32:09.538 --> 32:11.928 greater depth. They knew they would lose in 32:11.932 --> 32:14.172 the middle, they just hoped they would lose slower, 32:14.169 --> 32:15.779 than they would win on the wings. 32:15.779 --> 32:19.139 I think this is a version of the same idea. 32:19.140 --> 32:25.290 So, Epaminondas and his block of Thebans goes to the left, 32:25.289 --> 32:31.439 and I would argue and the ancient sources say this too, 32:31.440 --> 32:37.380 swiftly as Herodotus said of the Athenians at Marathon, 32:37.380 --> 32:40.460 dromoi, on the run. 32:40.460 --> 32:44.770 Well, I guess that means on the trot, and so they wanted to get 32:44.773 --> 32:49.093 that fight going as fast as they could and to win it as fast as 32:49.086 --> 32:51.946 they could. Well, that's the essential 32:51.950 --> 32:55.870 idea, that they would win powerfully on the left and send 32:55.869 --> 32:59.649 the Spartans into route and thereby destroy their whole 32:59.650 --> 33:03.500 campaign. Now, we have to account for 33:03.504 --> 33:08.724 funny things that happen apart from the phalanx. 33:08.720 --> 33:13.850 Before the battle is over, both sides take their cavalry 33:13.849 --> 33:17.239 from the usual position on the wings, 33:17.240 --> 33:22.010 on the flanks of the phalanx, meant either to protect your 33:22.006 --> 33:26.936 wings or to assault the enemy on his wing and move it to the 33:26.941 --> 33:31.291 center of the battlefield where it plays a role, 33:31.289 --> 33:33.989 and so the question always is what are they doing, 33:33.988 --> 33:37.798 what's this all about? I think one can only speculate. 33:37.799 --> 33:42.709 Surely, it would have been a wise thing for Epaminondas to 33:42.710 --> 33:47.880 move his cavalry into the center of the field in front of the 33:47.878 --> 33:51.698 center of his line, not in front of him but in 33:51.703 --> 33:56.103 front of the guys to his right, because they too would have had 33:56.098 --> 34:00.418 an effect of slowing down any Spartan attack where there was a 34:00.423 --> 34:04.023 vulnerability. So, if you take it from that 34:04.020 --> 34:07.400 point of view you could think the Spartans, 34:07.395 --> 34:11.655 who definitely moved their cavalry out front did so in 34:11.655 --> 34:14.865 order to combat the Theban cavalry. 34:14.869 --> 34:17.159 That would be an explanation enough, 34:17.164 --> 34:20.174 but some scholars make an argument, and there's some 34:20.166 --> 34:22.516 reason to think they might be right, 34:22.519 --> 34:28.559 that the Spartans seeing what Epaminondas was doing knew that 34:28.556 --> 34:34.186 he was trying to flank them on the right side and so they 34:34.191 --> 34:40.531 wanted to take steps to prevent being flanked on that side, 34:40.530 --> 34:43.720 and so they did something which they tried to do at the Battle 34:43.718 --> 34:46.498 of Mantinea, but it didn't happen for them, 34:46.503 --> 34:50.203 they pulled troops out from the center of their line, 34:50.199 --> 34:54.829 sent them around behind the phalanx, and put them out on the 34:54.826 --> 34:59.056 right wing to prevent exactly that kind of an event. 34:59.059 --> 35:04.659 But to prevent the Boeotians from charging that empty spot 35:04.658 --> 35:08.858 until it was filled, they sent their cavalry up 35:08.863 --> 35:12.873 front to shield them, not only to shield them but in 35:12.872 --> 35:16.272 effect to hide them. Certainly, the cavalries being 35:16.270 --> 35:18.710 out there would have kicked up a lot of dust, 35:18.710 --> 35:22.800 and they could have hoped that the Thebans wouldn't know what 35:22.797 --> 35:25.757 was going on. So, that's the theory. 35:25.760 --> 35:31.960 What is a fact is that the Boeotian cavalry and the Spartan 35:31.960 --> 35:35.880 cavalry clashed, and as I think again the 35:35.882 --> 35:40.572 bookies if this had happened, would have predicted the 35:40.570 --> 35:44.020 Thebans defeated the Peloponnesians. 35:44.019 --> 35:47.079 The Thebans had a superior cavalry. 35:47.079 --> 35:50.659 It had to do, of course, with the nature of 35:50.662 --> 35:55.352 their land which is better for horses than most of Greek 35:55.354 --> 36:00.304 country and so they drove the cavalry back into the Spartan 36:00.302 --> 36:05.172 phalanx helping to create confusion and to break ranks and 36:05.165 --> 36:09.175 all that kind of stuff. But the real payoff, 36:09.179 --> 36:13.359 the real victory in the battle was one where Epaminondas hoped 36:13.355 --> 36:17.595 it would be, on his left flank, on the Spartan right flank. 36:17.599 --> 36:23.229 I don't think it's an accident that the Theban phalanx came 36:23.231 --> 36:28.571 swiftly to the place where the Spartan king was located, 36:28.572 --> 36:31.682 Cleombrotus, and killed him. 36:31.679 --> 36:35.489 If you look at Greek battles throughout all of their 36:35.493 --> 36:39.933 history, killing the general in command is a really good idea, 36:39.929 --> 36:42.989 because when you do that you usually win. 36:42.989 --> 36:49.039 Have you got numbers Curtis on that or just got a general idea? 36:49.039 --> 36:54.419 Of how often that is a decisive or an important element? 36:54.420 --> 36:57.950 Very frequent, isn't it? When you kill the general you 36:57.951 --> 36:59.441 win; Curtis knows more about 36:59.444 --> 37:02.024 military history in the Greek world than anybody. 37:02.020 --> 37:08.370 So, I have to consult him. So that being the case, 37:08.368 --> 37:14.468 the Spartans fought bravely and strongly around the body of 37:14.467 --> 37:18.427 their king, but that only led more of them 37:18.428 --> 37:23.238 to be killed and before very long the Spartan phalanx broke 37:23.240 --> 37:28.660 and ran and the Thebans, the Boeotians had won a clear 37:28.657 --> 37:33.477 cut unmistakable, blatant victory in a normal 37:33.477 --> 37:37.047 hoplite battle, on a normal field, 37:37.052 --> 37:42.222 and this was the shock felt round the Greek world that this 37:42.215 --> 37:45.335 had happened, just changed everything. 37:45.340 --> 37:48.710 Here's an interesting fact that tells you something else 37:48.706 --> 37:52.126 that's important about what's going on in the Greek world. 37:52.130 --> 37:59.750 There were only perhaps 700 Spartiates in the whole battle 37:59.753 --> 38:06.613 and of these 400 were killed. Think about that; 38:06.610 --> 38:09.930 I mean, that's devastating in so many ways. 38:09.930 --> 38:16.680 It had all kinds of effects. We shall see it immediately 38:16.677 --> 38:20.007 shook the control of the Spartans, even over the 38:20.014 --> 38:22.794 Peloponnesus. It made people think the 38:22.788 --> 38:26.878 Spartans were vulnerable and that they might have come to the 38:26.883 --> 38:30.643 end of the line, but another interesting 38:30.635 --> 38:37.035 contrary consequence was that suddenly Sparta wasn't scary, 38:37.039 --> 38:42.169 but Thebes was very scary, and the Athenians who had 38:42.167 --> 38:48.297 already come to be nervous about the Thebans--notice I haven't 38:48.299 --> 38:52.399 mentioned them. They had been the allies of 38:52.400 --> 38:55.270 Thebes; they were not at the Battle of 38:55.273 --> 38:57.363 Leuctra. As a matter of fact, 38:57.363 --> 39:01.563 they were clearly working with the Spartans already to check 39:01.562 --> 39:05.332 Theban power and Theban expansion before the Battle of 39:05.334 --> 39:07.874 Leuctra. They stayed neutral; 39:07.869 --> 39:10.719 they didn't show up at the battle at all, 39:10.720 --> 39:14.570 but it tells you a very important change in the seam in 39:14.568 --> 39:20.298 the Greek world at this time. So, I think it's safe to 39:20.296 --> 39:27.406 say the Battle of Leuctra put an end to Spartan supremacy. 39:27.409 --> 39:33.729 The Spartan hegemony is over and now the question that awaits 39:33.730 --> 39:39.370 Greece is what happens next. I think in the normal course of 39:39.369 --> 39:43.289 events prior to the build up of this new Thebes, 39:43.289 --> 39:47.349 there would have been a division of power between the 39:47.349 --> 39:51.409 states, the Athenians would have used some muscle, 39:51.409 --> 39:55.219 the Thebans would have used some muscle, some lesser states 39:55.219 --> 39:59.229 would have emerged in the vacuum created by the destruction of 39:59.226 --> 40:02.376 Spartan power but that would have been that. 40:02.380 --> 40:08.140 However, given all that had had happened in Boeotia and the kind 40:08.143 --> 40:13.543 of leadership that existed in Thebes, something amazing then 40:13.540 --> 40:17.140 happened; the Thebans decided to put an 40:17.143 --> 40:22.143 end to Spartan power forever and took a number of measures to 40:22.135 --> 40:25.765 bring that about. Just the defeat of Leuctra 40:25.766 --> 40:29.846 meant the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League. 40:29.849 --> 40:33.479 A number of states obviously took advantage of 40:33.479 --> 40:37.629 Sparta's weakness to just pull out and get out from under 40:37.628 --> 40:41.978 Spartan control. Then in the year 370, 40:41.975 --> 40:49.615 the Thebans put together a tremendous army and ultimately 40:49.615 --> 40:58.615 marched into the Peloponnesus to do what they were going to do. 40:58.619 --> 41:05.169 One of the things that happened reflecting the collapse of the 41:05.169 --> 41:10.969 Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesus was that the towns 41:10.966 --> 41:17.216 in the region of Arcadia, the mountainous region to the 41:17.223 --> 41:22.213 north of Sparta, put themselves together in the 41:22.209 --> 41:27.659 form of the Arcadian League. I mentioned this to your 41:27.664 --> 41:31.444 earlier, I believe; it is one of the first federal 41:31.439 --> 41:35.699 leagues of a different kind from the one we've seen up to now. 41:35.700 --> 41:40.560 There is no hegemonal state. It is not some big state and 41:40.559 --> 41:45.169 its friends, which even the Boeotian League is still in that 41:45.171 --> 41:47.461 category. It is, in fact, 41:47.464 --> 41:51.674 a collection of states that are ostensibly equal and this is 41:51.671 --> 41:55.021 entirely voluntary. They are coming together, 41:55.022 --> 41:58.732 these Arcadian states, in order to protect themselves 41:58.729 --> 42:02.579 and to pursue their interests against the many troubles 42:02.578 --> 42:04.858 they've had over the years. 42:09.019 --> 42:12.409 The question always is then--this is both evidence of 42:12.406 --> 42:16.046 what I'm saying that it was a new kind of a league and it 42:16.054 --> 42:20.034 reveals the fact that there was no state that was sufficiently 42:20.027 --> 42:23.737 superior to the others that could make it obvious that the 42:23.740 --> 42:27.520 capital so to speak of this new confederation would be that 42:27.517 --> 42:32.597 state. They built a brand new city. 42:32.599 --> 42:36.469 It was called, I love it, Megalopolis. 42:36.469 --> 42:40.399 That means it ran from Washington to Boston. 42:40.400 --> 42:43.400 No I'm sorry. It meant, of course, 42:43.403 --> 42:46.593 big polis, big city, big state, 42:46.590 --> 42:50.790 whatever you want. But it was the place where the 42:50.793 --> 42:53.593 league council met, state sent their 42:53.585 --> 42:57.585 representatives to it, their business was done there, 42:57.592 --> 43:00.412 and it's really quite an interesting event, 43:00.409 --> 43:04.499 especially as you look ahead in the history of Greece and as I 43:04.500 --> 43:07.920 told you last time, that kind of thing had the 43:07.915 --> 43:11.865 remarkable influence on the thinking of the shapers of the 43:11.873 --> 43:16.113 American Constitution. The Athenians' attitude 43:16.108 --> 43:22.028 towards this--we think about all this long rivalry between Sparta 43:22.032 --> 43:26.662 and Athens that resulted in such terrible wars, 43:26.659 --> 43:31.359 it just goes to show you--what was it--Palmesrton in the 43:31.363 --> 43:35.293 nineteenth century, British statesman, 43:35.288 --> 43:40.608 I think he once said, Britain has no permanent 43:40.608 --> 43:45.198 friends or enemies, only permanent interests. 43:48.909 --> 43:52.539 I think whether that was true of Britain or not at the time, 43:52.542 --> 43:55.992 I think we should always realize that that is true of the 43:55.991 --> 43:59.071 way states operate in an international system. 43:59.070 --> 44:02.880 It is not that they don't have inclinations and longstanding 44:02.876 --> 44:07.446 friendships do have some impact, and longstanding enmities have 44:07.454 --> 44:11.114 a greater impact and yet anything can happen. 44:11.110 --> 44:18.030 I mean, just to get some sense of that who would have believed 44:18.025 --> 44:24.485 that in the 1930s that Great Britain and France would join 44:24.487 --> 44:31.627 with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union for any purpose whatever, 44:31.630 --> 44:35.210 since they, especially the British, had been interested in 44:35.212 --> 44:38.732 putting an end to that regime from the moment that it was 44:38.732 --> 44:41.492 invented, and that Winston Churchill 44:41.492 --> 44:46.052 would be the greatest advocate of this alliance with Stalin. 44:46.050 --> 44:48.130 Winston Churchill, who I tell you, 44:48.125 --> 44:51.835 had been a leading figure in having an invasion of Russia in 44:51.835 --> 44:55.415 1920-21, in order to bring down the Bolshevik Regime. 44:55.420 --> 44:58.950 Churchill's answer, I think, to the question of why 44:58.952 --> 45:01.832 you're doing this, tells you a lot about this 45:01.829 --> 45:04.249 general point I'm trying to make. 45:04.250 --> 45:06.080 I'm not going to get this exactly right; 45:06.079 --> 45:09.009 I don't have Churchill's gift and my memory is fading. 45:09.010 --> 45:12.850 He said, you know, why are you joining up with 45:12.851 --> 45:15.241 Stalin? You've been denouncing him 45:15.239 --> 45:18.549 forever. He said, if the devil--no I'm 45:18.550 --> 45:24.430 sorry, if Hitler invaded hell at the very least I would want to 45:24.430 --> 45:30.500 say a few kind words about the devil in the House of Commons. 45:30.500 --> 45:34.460 That ought to tell you something about the permanence 45:34.462 --> 45:39.842 of these kinds of things. Interests are what matter and 45:39.837 --> 45:44.067 the Athenian interests have changed. 45:44.070 --> 45:49.760 Thebes was becoming a challenge to the Athenian growth and 45:49.762 --> 45:53.862 influence in power, and they did not want the 45:53.861 --> 45:58.821 Thebans now to destroy Sparta's control of the Peloponnesus and 45:58.824 --> 46:03.314 replaced it with a Theban control of the Peloponnesus and 46:03.306 --> 46:07.386 that accounts both for why Athens is not helping the 46:07.389 --> 46:10.039 Thebans, but also in fact, 46:10.043 --> 46:15.173 intriguing with states in the Peloponnesus to try to stand up 46:15.171 --> 46:18.951 to the Thebans, rather than to do what might 46:18.949 --> 46:21.809 seem obvious. Now, the Thebans were 46:21.808 --> 46:26.188 continuing--I'll come back to their invasion in just a moment. 46:26.190 --> 46:32.880 They were continuing to grow, they were gaining allies in 46:32.876 --> 46:36.576 central Greece, Phocis, Aetolia, 46:36.577 --> 46:40.157 Acarnania, Locris, Euboea. 46:40.159 --> 46:43.519 Here again, I'm going to be teaching you general truths 46:43.518 --> 46:47.118 about international relations that don't seem to be part of 46:47.124 --> 46:49.554 the ordinary education and that is, 46:49.550 --> 46:54.740 power has a fantastically attractive quality. 46:54.739 --> 46:58.499 When a state is suddenly enormously powerful--I think the 46:58.496 --> 47:02.446 political scientists' rules and I admit what I just said has 47:02.453 --> 47:06.213 been known and been said by many of them many times, 47:06.210 --> 47:08.740 but the favorite thing is if there's a great power what 47:08.737 --> 47:11.587 happens next? What happens is all the other 47:11.589 --> 47:16.109 states get together and join up to control that power to which 47:16.110 --> 47:19.500 the answer is "sometimes." A lot of times, 47:19.495 --> 47:23.935 and they have another term to consider the alternative, 47:23.943 --> 47:28.893 which they call bandwagoning and that is states are attracted 47:28.885 --> 47:32.585 by that power, want to get on the right side 47:32.591 --> 47:35.401 of that power, join up with that power, 47:35.398 --> 47:39.828 and that's what happened here where suddenly the Theban power 47:39.829 --> 47:44.109 in that area seemed so strong that you wanted to be on that 47:44.113 --> 47:46.673 side. I'm just in this terrible 47:46.673 --> 47:50.253 analogizing mood today so please forgive me, but lest you think 47:50.252 --> 47:53.202 the study of ancient history is not relevant to your 47:53.196 --> 47:55.386 understanding of the world today, 47:55.389 --> 47:59.019 and I know none of you would be so foolish as to think that, 47:59.015 --> 48:02.575 let me just look at what's happening in the Middle East. 48:02.579 --> 48:04.659 And I'll say it before it's common wisdom, 48:04.656 --> 48:06.476 so that you'll see how smart I am. 48:11.260 --> 48:15.320 Syria, which has been nothing but trouble for our side all 48:15.317 --> 48:19.657 this time, all of a sudden seems to be behaving in a different 48:19.660 --> 48:22.370 way, and even the United States 48:22.365 --> 48:27.455 government says that the Syrians seem not to be feeding more Al 48:27.456 --> 48:31.066 Qaeda people across the border into Iraq. 48:31.070 --> 48:34.000 Why is that? What have they found religion? 48:34.000 --> 48:38.130 I guess they had religion already, but the answer is 48:38.133 --> 48:42.913 because suddenly the American forces are kicking hell out of 48:42.914 --> 48:47.944 everybody in Iraq and suddenly there's a powerful American army 48:47.939 --> 48:52.299 sitting there, which is right next door to 48:52.299 --> 48:54.499 Syria. It's also right next door to 48:54.500 --> 48:56.320 Iran. That should have interesting 48:56.317 --> 48:59.347 consequences too; the result is that the Syrians 48:59.353 --> 49:02.053 are suddenly talking very differently. 49:02.050 --> 49:04.740 Now, that doesn't mean that there'll be a permanent change; 49:04.740 --> 49:10.170 that will depend upon realities. But you get fed so much gunk in 49:10.173 --> 49:14.163 a different direction. The most important single 49:14.161 --> 49:17.641 element in international relations, not the only one by 49:17.642 --> 49:21.002 any means, but the most important one is 49:21.003 --> 49:25.183 power and the perception of where the power is, 49:25.179 --> 49:29.199 and the perception of whether that power is growing or 49:29.199 --> 49:31.919 shrinking. Nothing is as important as 49:31.921 --> 49:35.411 that, everything else contributes, but doesn't have 49:35.406 --> 49:38.966 that central role. Well, that's the situation that 49:38.965 --> 49:42.885 the Thebans have created with their victory and so they are 49:42.886 --> 49:47.266 expanding all over the place. Thebans were great landlubbers, 49:47.274 --> 49:51.374 they're even building a navy, they are moving out into the 49:51.365 --> 49:54.635 Aegean Sea, and that's one of the things 49:54.638 --> 49:58.368 that has created this nervousness in Athens and 49:58.365 --> 50:04.855 explains the Athenian behavior. Now comes this great 50:04.857 --> 50:14.347 invasion over the year 370,369. The total force of hoplites in 50:14.352 --> 50:22.332 the army put together by Epaminondas is reported to be 50:22.325 --> 50:26.585 40,000. Now, there's just not a number 50:26.588 --> 50:31.638 like that in the whole fifth century, or any time before 50:31.644 --> 50:34.924 this. It's just an amazing army and 50:34.924 --> 50:39.844 we are told there were some 30,000 others on the campaign 50:39.836 --> 50:43.536 who were not hoplites, maybe many of them weren't even 50:43.538 --> 50:46.068 fighters but a lot of them would have been cavalry, 50:46.070 --> 50:50.030 light arm infantry and so on. But in any case, 50:50.028 --> 50:55.738 here are 70,000 people meaning no good to the Spartans pouring 50:55.741 --> 50:59.301 into the Peloponnesus in that year. 50:59.300 --> 51:03.850 It is the largest military force reported in Greek history. 51:03.849 --> 51:09.359 The men in charge are these two extraordinary men, 51:09.362 --> 51:14.252 Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who repeatedly proved 51:14.250 --> 51:17.900 themselves. By the way, it was Pelopidas 51:17.902 --> 51:22.392 who won that victory in 375 at Tegyra, you remember that with 51:22.387 --> 51:25.517 the 300. So, he has that great victory 51:25.522 --> 51:30.312 on his record and Epaminondas, of course, is the architect of 51:30.308 --> 51:35.248 the victory at Leuctra and they just are amazing and remarkable 51:35.252 --> 51:38.422 people. If you read some of those--we 51:38.416 --> 51:41.986 do not have a Plutarch biography of Epaminondas, 51:41.991 --> 51:46.101 although he does give us a Pelopidas, we're happy about 51:46.099 --> 51:49.169 that. But before I get through I will 51:49.166 --> 51:53.926 try to remedy that as I tried to do in the case of Thrasybulus by 51:53.929 --> 51:58.169 bringing to your attention how great was the reputation of 51:58.171 --> 52:03.131 Epaminondas in the Greek world; maybe I should just say a word 52:03.130 --> 52:07.630 about him now. He is reputed to have been 52:07.625 --> 52:13.095 a person of great intellect. Apparently, he was a 52:13.097 --> 52:19.337 philosopher and took that seriously and was regarded with 52:19.335 --> 52:24.565 respect by others of that ilk in that world. 52:24.570 --> 52:30.040 Of course, it looks very much as though he is a man of 52:30.037 --> 52:35.807 political convictions of such a kind as almost to suggest 52:35.813 --> 52:40.403 political theory. I mean, he seems to have been 52:40.401 --> 52:44.741 committed to the idea of democracy as a good thing in 52:44.744 --> 52:47.594 itself. On this latter point we just 52:47.588 --> 52:51.388 don't have very much evidence, nothing that he said, 52:51.389 --> 52:55.969 but we do have what he did which squares perfectly with 52:55.973 --> 53:00.183 what we are talking about. It would be--I mean it breaks 53:00.184 --> 53:03.414 my heart--these lives that Plutarch did not write. 53:03.409 --> 53:08.109 What I would give for a life of Cleisthenes by Plutarch, 53:08.109 --> 53:12.039 and similarly of Epaminondas and I'm amazed. 53:12.040 --> 53:14.650 I don't know. Who knows why Plutarch did what 53:14.645 --> 53:16.875 he did. But in any case it would be 53:16.876 --> 53:20.836 really fascinating in his case, because of the complicated 53:20.837 --> 53:25.297 nature of his mind and his life, but there he is along with 53:25.295 --> 53:28.795 Pelopidas leaving this armed force in there. 53:28.800 --> 53:34.990 They move down into Laconia, the home territory of 53:34.988 --> 53:39.528 the Spartans. Now, the Spartans are forced to 53:39.526 --> 53:45.186 huddle in their city and to try to resist anything that comes at 53:45.190 --> 53:48.290 them. They cannot go out to fight 53:48.294 --> 53:51.654 these people invading their homeland. 53:51.650 --> 53:55.300 Their homeland has never been invaded in anybody's memory. 53:55.300 --> 53:59.000 This is out of the question, nothing like this would have 53:58.995 --> 54:01.825 been possible, and here they are just hiding 54:01.832 --> 54:04.272 in their city. Not even a walled city, 54:04.267 --> 54:07.357 because it was part of their pride, they don't need walls, 54:07.360 --> 54:10.100 they have an army. Nobody can come in there and 54:10.103 --> 54:12.283 attack their city and there they are. 54:12.280 --> 54:16.800 What does Epaminondas do? He does not go after them in 54:16.796 --> 54:22.636 that city, because probably--one reason would have been--fighting 54:22.640 --> 54:26.170 in the city, urban warfare is always 54:26.170 --> 54:30.400 difficult and costly, and nobody until lately, 54:30.396 --> 54:34.436 is really good at it. I mean, I don't know much 54:34.440 --> 54:38.020 you paid attention to what's going on in Iraq these days in 54:38.020 --> 54:41.330 the so called surge, but if you study it as a 54:41.328 --> 54:44.788 military problem, then you see how they dealt 54:44.789 --> 54:49.399 with that military problem. It is one of the really most 54:49.395 --> 54:54.045 brilliant things I have ever seen, because to be successful 54:54.047 --> 54:59.097 in the war I'm talking about now requires not only shrewd use of 54:59.101 --> 55:02.551 military forces for military purposes, 55:02.550 --> 55:06.110 but it has to be integrated with constant political 55:06.111 --> 55:09.531 negotiation and conversation with the natives, 55:09.530 --> 55:13.840 which has to be associated also with certain economic conditions 55:13.836 --> 55:18.136 being brought about so that the people who might be on the other 55:18.143 --> 55:22.183 side can be on your side and then you can have them work for 55:22.176 --> 55:24.846 you. I've only touched on the 55:24.846 --> 55:28.236 beginning of all the complexity of that. 55:28.239 --> 55:31.879 But in any case, until that happened there are 55:31.876 --> 55:36.396 very few cases of really successful urban warfare without 55:36.402 --> 55:39.122 a tremendous cost. Well, of course, 55:39.115 --> 55:41.685 before they figured out what to do in Iraq they had some 55:41.688 --> 55:43.698 tremendous costs of not figuring it out. 55:43.699 --> 55:46.449 What I'm getting at is, yes I'm sure that if 55:46.454 --> 55:49.794 Epaminondas had wanted to, he would have been able to 55:49.785 --> 55:52.215 defeat the Spartans in their city, 55:52.219 --> 55:54.759 but he would have paid a great price. 55:54.760 --> 55:58.860 Now, there's perhaps another consideration. 56:03.500 --> 56:05.950 Before I come to that, let me just tell you that what 56:05.951 --> 56:09.001 Epaminondas did. He bypassed the city, 56:08.997 --> 56:13.597 ravaged the countryside wherever he found it, 56:13.600 --> 56:18.100 doing as much harm as he possibly could, 56:18.099 --> 56:21.969 and even as this was happening and was obviously reported back 56:21.968 --> 56:26.208 to the Spartans, the Spartans did not come out 56:26.210 --> 56:29.620 to fight. Now, here's where I think once 56:29.624 --> 56:34.004 again Victor Hansen's splendid imagination comes into the 56:34.000 --> 56:38.690 picture in what I find to be a very persuasive explanation of 56:38.688 --> 56:42.728 what's going on. He makes this explanation 56:42.734 --> 56:47.714 based on an analogy he draws with the army of general Sherman 56:47.710 --> 56:52.770 during the American Civil War in Sherman's famous march to the 56:52.768 --> 56:55.918 sea or his march through Georgia. 56:55.920 --> 57:02.060 When there is as confederate army to the north of where he 57:02.055 --> 57:05.925 goes but he doesn't seek them out. 57:05.929 --> 57:11.269 He goes marching towards where he wants to get to, 57:11.266 --> 57:15.836 doing as much damage as he possibly can, 57:15.840 --> 57:20.260 destroying the food, the crops, animals, 57:20.260 --> 57:25.930 everything, burning down houses, being as nasty and 57:25.926 --> 57:33.196 unpleasant as he can be. Why is the question? 57:33.199 --> 57:35.099 Well, he is a nasty, unpleasant fellow; 57:35.100 --> 57:38.030 not really. We do know a lot about what 57:38.033 --> 57:41.633 Sherman thought he was doing because he wrote about it. 57:41.630 --> 57:47.570 Sherman apparently hated the southern slaveocrisy. 57:47.570 --> 57:51.610 He wasn't satisfied with defeating the South as many a 57:51.608 --> 57:54.798 northerner was, and then sort of letting it be 57:54.797 --> 57:58.477 what it had been before or perhaps destroying slavery 57:58.481 --> 58:03.301 itself and leaving everything else pretty much as it had been. 58:03.300 --> 58:07.630 He seems to have thought this was a terrible wicked society, 58:07.630 --> 58:11.080 and if it wasn't to go back to its old bad ways, 58:11.080 --> 58:16.570 it not only had to be defeated; it had to be humiliated. 58:16.570 --> 58:19.510 In his view, part of the success of the 58:19.506 --> 58:24.366 south was in building up what he would have thought of as a myth 58:24.373 --> 58:27.313 of their aristocratic superiority, 58:27.309 --> 58:30.509 which made slave holding appropriate, because the people 58:30.511 --> 58:34.121 who were superior were ruling over people who were inferior, 58:34.119 --> 58:37.199 and they deserved it, because they were better 58:37.203 --> 58:40.653 fighters than anybody else. Everybody thought at the 58:40.646 --> 58:43.736 beginning of the war, certainly that the south had a 58:43.740 --> 58:47.160 better military tradition, and that they were better 58:47.161 --> 58:51.351 soldiers, and I think they were and that they were courageous. 58:51.349 --> 58:54.379 Being a great military man means being courageous. 58:54.380 --> 58:58.340 All of that justified the system and provided the pride 58:58.335 --> 59:02.545 that made it possible to work. Well, Sherman wanted to 59:02.547 --> 59:05.937 show it wasn't so, and here they were burning down 59:05.936 --> 59:09.396 houses and barns, and food, and women folk having 59:09.402 --> 59:13.232 to stand there and watch it, and where was the confederate 59:13.232 --> 59:15.752 army? They didn't come down to 59:15.750 --> 59:20.620 challenge them and he felt in the process, he was destroying 59:20.617 --> 59:25.507 the myth that was more potent. Well, I think Hansen certainly 59:25.510 --> 59:28.550 has that right when he talks about Sherman, 59:28.549 --> 59:32.819 and it's very attractive to think that maybe Epaminondas was 59:32.818 --> 59:37.418 after the same thing. Here were the Spartans cowering 59:37.419 --> 59:40.139 in their city, it would be said, 59:40.138 --> 59:45.838 while Epaminondas was doing as he liked with the Peloponnesus. 59:45.840 --> 59:49.570 There would never again be a time where people would accept 59:49.574 --> 59:52.864 the story that the Spartans were the great fighters, 59:52.857 --> 59:55.237 the great heroes etc., etc., etc. 59:55.239 --> 59:59.319 In any case, that's what he did and then--I 59:59.316 --> 1:00:04.716 think all of this is assisted by some of the things he did and 1:00:04.722 --> 1:00:08.712 some of the things that he actually said. 1:00:08.710 --> 1:00:14.610 He went to Mycenae and indeed he went to the place where the 1:00:14.605 --> 1:00:20.495 Mycenaeans had withdrawn for security in their rebellions up 1:00:20.501 --> 1:00:27.081 there and he established, or re-established a city called 1:00:27.081 --> 1:00:30.491 Mycenae. It was powerfully fortified, 1:00:30.488 --> 1:00:34.998 it was up on a mountain, it was a place where you could 1:00:34.999 --> 1:00:38.869 really defend it, and it became the capital of 1:00:38.873 --> 1:00:43.673 Mycenae, which would now be a free Mycenae in which the former 1:00:43.673 --> 1:00:46.483 helots, the former slaves of the 1:00:46.482 --> 1:00:49.682 Spartan state, would now rule their own 1:00:49.684 --> 1:00:53.564 country as they had not done for centuries. 1:00:53.559 --> 1:00:58.939 It was a liberation and that was language that 1:00:58.936 --> 1:01:03.236 Epaminondas used of it. It had the marvelous 1:01:03.243 --> 1:01:07.703 psychological effect that I am speaking of and also a very 1:01:07.700 --> 1:01:10.750 practical one. Here was a fortress on the 1:01:10.745 --> 1:01:14.175 flank of the Spartans, which was controlled by people 1:01:14.175 --> 1:01:18.125 who hated the Spartans bitterly and that would guarantee that 1:01:18.134 --> 1:01:21.894 the Spartans would not lightly gain control of the western 1:01:21.894 --> 1:01:25.514 Peloponnesus again. If you add to that that the 1:01:25.510 --> 1:01:29.380 Arcadians had suffered plenty from the Spartans and were 1:01:29.381 --> 1:01:32.831 unwilling to allow the Spartans to rise again, 1:01:32.829 --> 1:01:35.899 and there was Megalopolis, a walled powerful city that 1:01:35.901 --> 1:01:39.031 would see to it that the Spartans would never likely be 1:01:39.030 --> 1:01:42.390 able to make their way into control of central and northern 1:01:42.391 --> 1:01:46.671 Peloponnesus again. So, all of this combination of 1:01:46.674 --> 1:01:51.594 power and the strategic use of power, along with this 1:01:51.586 --> 1:01:56.876 psychological warfare that was involved brought about the 1:01:56.877 --> 1:02:01.127 permanent check on Sparta.Sparta amazingly 1:02:01.129 --> 1:02:06.799 enough would emerge from this still an independent city still 1:02:06.797 --> 1:02:10.857 somehow taken seriously by others, 1:02:10.860 --> 1:02:15.850 but never again in the position of threatening the security of 1:02:15.852 --> 1:02:20.602 other states. Now, some of what was happening 1:02:20.595 --> 1:02:26.375 began to create a counter force as it always does. 1:02:26.380 --> 1:02:29.940 Here was this blatantly democratic force that had been 1:02:29.939 --> 1:02:33.899 unleashed in the Peloponnesus, most of which had always been 1:02:33.902 --> 1:02:37.422 oligarchic. So, in Arcadia there began to 1:02:37.419 --> 1:02:42.269 be a revival of oligarchic activity, people who wanted to 1:02:42.266 --> 1:02:46.676 overthrow the regime that was being established, 1:02:46.679 --> 1:02:50.919 and to restore oligarchic governments, which would, 1:02:50.919 --> 1:02:55.409 of course, naturally be friendly to Sparta and some of 1:02:55.412 --> 1:03:00.502 these oligarchs in Arcadia began to assist the Spartans. 1:03:00.500 --> 1:03:04.220 We know the Spartans were finished but they didn't know 1:03:04.219 --> 1:03:07.039 it. The Greeks at the time didn't 1:03:07.039 --> 1:03:11.519 know it so that--I'm just touching on the high points 1:03:11.520 --> 1:03:16.240 here. In 362, by now I should report 1:03:16.235 --> 1:03:21.615 that Pelopidas was dead. He had died fighting in 1:03:21.622 --> 1:03:26.842 Thessaly against an autocrat there by the name of Jason from 1:03:26.836 --> 1:03:31.516 the city of Pherae about whom we don't know a lot, 1:03:31.519 --> 1:03:34.649 except to say he got to be very powerful indeed, 1:03:34.653 --> 1:03:38.853 and was pretty soon challenging both Thebes on the land and also 1:03:38.853 --> 1:03:42.653 challenging Athens to some degree at sea and who knows how 1:03:42.653 --> 1:03:46.793 much trouble he would have made had he not died before he could 1:03:46.786 --> 1:03:50.906 do so. But Pelopidas died fighting in 1:03:50.914 --> 1:03:55.324 a battle against Jason. I think it was 364. 1:03:55.320 --> 1:03:59.670 So in 362 when the Thebans again put together a force to 1:03:59.665 --> 1:04:04.625 invade the Peloponnesus, to put down those forces that 1:04:04.633 --> 1:04:09.353 were working against his settlement, it was only 1:04:09.354 --> 1:04:13.554 Epaminondas who was in charge. Apparently, 1:04:13.553 --> 1:04:16.733 in the Battle of Mantinea--this is the second Battle of 1:04:16.733 --> 1:04:20.173 Mantinea, the first took place in the 1:04:20.173 --> 1:04:25.743 Peloponnesian War in 418, but this one in 362 apparently 1:04:25.742 --> 1:04:31.722 Epaminondas used some of the very same tactics that had been 1:04:31.715 --> 1:04:37.585 successful in the battle at Leuctra and the Thebans won the 1:04:37.587 --> 1:04:42.937 Battle of Mantinea. However, Epaminondas was killed 1:04:42.944 --> 1:04:48.314 in the fighting and it turned out that that was more important 1:04:48.306 --> 1:04:52.396 than anything else. With both Pelopidas and 1:04:52.398 --> 1:04:58.118 Epaminondas gone Thebes never again shows that kind of special 1:04:58.122 --> 1:05:03.942 quality that brought it swiftly to power and will swiftly bring 1:05:03.940 --> 1:05:07.290 it down. Although, as we look at the 1:05:07.291 --> 1:05:10.611 world in 362, we should realize that Thebes 1:05:10.608 --> 1:05:15.028 remains a very formidable power and the Greeks again, 1:05:15.030 --> 1:05:17.760 I want to warn you, don't know that Thebes isn't 1:05:17.758 --> 1:05:21.298 going to come back with two new leaders or ten new leaders, 1:05:21.300 --> 1:05:24.640 or one or whatever and become the same kind of a menace that 1:05:24.640 --> 1:05:28.200 it had been before, but looking back we can see 1:05:28.195 --> 1:05:32.865 that that was the outcome. So, the Thebans won the 1:05:32.866 --> 1:05:36.876 victory, but in effect they really lost the war, 1:05:36.882 --> 1:05:41.412 because that was the end of their special quality. 1:05:41.409 --> 1:05:47.379 Since we're all writing about this, centuries later called 1:05:47.383 --> 1:05:51.683 Epaminondas the foremost man of Greece. 1:05:51.679 --> 1:05:56.229 There is an inscription, or there was an inscription, 1:05:56.226 --> 1:06:01.906 on Epaminondas' statue that was erected on his death at Thebes, 1:06:01.909 --> 1:06:04.599 and it is as though he was speaking. 1:06:04.599 --> 1:06:09.819 It must have been taken somehow from something he said or wrote. 1:06:09.820 --> 1:06:15.150 Here's what he said, "By my plans was Sparta shorn 1:06:15.146 --> 1:06:22.426 of her glory and holy Mycenae at last received back her children. 1:06:22.429 --> 1:06:28.839 By the weapons of Thebes was Mycenae fortified, 1:06:28.844 --> 1:06:35.264 and all Greece became independent and free." 1:06:35.260 --> 1:06:38.680 Now, of course, the claim that everybody was 1:06:38.679 --> 1:06:42.889 seeking independence for the Greeks, autonomia, 1:06:42.893 --> 1:06:46.793 is an old stale one that never really worked. 1:06:46.789 --> 1:06:50.549 This is the first time that I am aware--no actually that's 1:06:50.551 --> 1:06:52.651 not true. The Spartans entered the 1:06:52.652 --> 1:06:56.272 Peloponnesian War claiming that they were fighting to free the 1:06:56.267 --> 1:06:57.587 Greeks; but of course, 1:06:57.585 --> 1:07:00.175 they immediately began enslaving as many of them as 1:07:00.175 --> 1:07:02.035 they could when they won the war. 1:07:02.039 --> 1:07:06.239 But Epaminondas says, well, we did this, 1:07:06.244 --> 1:07:13.044 we accomplished this and at the end of the day all of Greece was 1:07:13.036 --> 1:07:17.296 free, he claimed. I'm sure it wasn't perfectly 1:07:17.296 --> 1:07:21.926 true, but there was a lot in it and that's what he was proud of. 1:07:21.929 --> 1:07:23.909 That's what he thought he was doing. 1:07:23.909 --> 1:07:26.079 I think that's the important point about that quotation. 1:07:26.079 --> 1:07:29.929 It tells us what he would have wanted as indeed it has worked 1:07:29.930 --> 1:07:32.690 out that way, to come down as his legacy. 1:07:32.690 --> 1:07:36.350 What did Epaminondas do? Did he say he increased the 1:07:36.349 --> 1:07:40.009 power of Thebes ten told, he made Thebes name ring in the 1:07:40.014 --> 1:07:42.074 Valhalla; he never heard of Valhalla. 1:07:42.070 --> 1:07:45.690 The Valhalla of heroes throughout history, 1:07:45.690 --> 1:07:49.310 that's not what he wanted to have said. 1:07:49.309 --> 1:07:53.929 What he wanted to have said was, I restored the Mycenaeans 1:07:53.927 --> 1:07:57.407 to their land, I restored them to safety, 1:07:57.409 --> 1:08:02.499 I gave them freedom, I left Greece free and 1:08:02.502 --> 1:08:07.082 independent. Xenophon, writing after his 1:08:07.077 --> 1:08:13.257 description of the Battle of Mantinea says the following, 1:08:13.260 --> 1:08:16.880 and these are the last words in his Hellenica, 1:08:16.878 --> 1:08:20.078 in his history of Greek affairs in his time. 1:08:20.079 --> 1:08:23.929 "Since nearly all the people of Greece have come together or had 1:08:23.928 --> 1:08:27.348 come together and formed themselves in opposing lines, 1:08:27.350 --> 1:08:31.270 there was no one who did not suppose that if a battle were 1:08:31.271 --> 1:08:34.991 fought, those who proved victorious would be the rulers 1:08:34.987 --> 1:08:38.837 and those who were defeated would be their subjects. 1:08:38.840 --> 1:08:43.570 While each side claimed to be victorious, neither was found to 1:08:43.571 --> 1:08:47.761 be any better off than before the battle took place. 1:08:47.760 --> 1:08:52.540 But there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece 1:08:52.539 --> 1:08:57.739 after the battle than before." So, here's a case for the 1:08:57.744 --> 1:09:00.924 unimportance of warfare, you might say, 1:09:00.920 --> 1:09:04.850 for those people who want to make that case. 1:09:04.850 --> 1:09:07.700 Here was all this fighting, here were all the dead, 1:09:07.699 --> 1:09:10.719 and at the end of the day nothing had been settled. 1:09:10.720 --> 1:09:15.970 That is often the case in war. Although, it might be said, 1:09:15.967 --> 1:09:20.157 that something pretty serious had been settled by the 1:09:20.160 --> 1:09:24.760 campaigns that the Thebans had fought before the Battle of 1:09:24.757 --> 1:09:29.677 Mantinea and that Greece would never be the same again because 1:09:29.677 --> 1:09:33.787 of the fighting that had taken place before. 1:09:33.789 --> 1:09:39.229 But as we look forward not backward, it's worth noticing 1:09:39.234 --> 1:09:43.694 that the years of competition for hegemony, 1:09:43.689 --> 1:09:49.629 which go back you know at least to the days after the Persian 1:09:49.632 --> 1:09:54.092 Wars, had left Greece weakened and divided, 1:09:54.090 --> 1:09:59.030 and therefore, open for exploitation and even 1:09:59.026 --> 1:10:04.856 conquests by a new threat from outside the system, 1:10:04.859 --> 1:10:11.279 which was not even dreamed of by the Greeks as a menace in 362 1:10:11.282 --> 1:10:16.462 at the Battle of Mantinea. There's something to be 1:10:16.456 --> 1:10:20.356 learned in there too. I mean, if you had taken a poll 1:10:20.362 --> 1:10:23.742 of the Greeks and said, where are the dangers to us 1:10:23.737 --> 1:10:25.877 now, what problems do we have, 1:10:25.883 --> 1:10:29.833 they would have been talking about the traditional conflicts 1:10:29.831 --> 1:10:33.611 between the Greek city states. No one, I think, 1:10:33.608 --> 1:10:38.798 would have used the word Macedonia as part of anything 1:10:38.801 --> 1:10:41.801 that looked scary, and, of course, 1:10:41.798 --> 1:10:45.298 nobody would have uttered the name Philip, because Philip 1:10:45.304 --> 1:10:47.624 wasn't even king of Macedonia yet. 1:10:47.619 --> 1:10:51.229 And yet, within a few years, Philip would be the king of 1:10:51.234 --> 1:10:55.054 Macedonia, and within a couple or three decades there would 1:10:55.047 --> 1:10:58.857 suddenly be a real menace from the north that would be very 1:10:58.859 --> 1:11:02.999 threatening and we'll take a look at that next time. 1:11:03.000 --> 1:11:08.000