WEBVTT

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Professor Donald
Kagan: In the year 401 the

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prince of Persia,
Cyrus, who was a younger son

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and had recently succeeded the
King of Persia,

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Artaxerxes, his older brother,
was in power.

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Cyrus had always been ambitious
for achieving the job of Shah in

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Persia and his mother had worked
on his behalf,

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but it hadn't paid off.
He was not prepared to accept

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the verdict and so he set out in
the year 401 to launch a scheme

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that would bring him to the
throne of Persia,

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and his scheme was to hire a
good sized army of Greek

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mercenaries and to trick them
into becoming the army that

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would defeat the army of his
brother Artaxerxes,

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and make him king.
As it turned out,

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one of the men who joined up on
that expedition was an Athenian

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cavalryman by the name of
Xenophon,

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and he left an account of that
experience in a work that is

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called in Greek,
the Anabasis,

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which means "the march back."
But it's the story of how

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this body of roughly 10,000
Greek hoplite mercenaries,

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marched into the heart of the
Persian Empire,

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defeated the army of the great
king--but in the process Prince

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Cyrus himself was killed and
since the whole point of the

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expedition was to make him king
there wasn't any point any

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longer.
The great question--I've told

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you about this earlier in the
semester, what should these

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10,000 Greeks do?
They end up,

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after their generals are put to
death by treachery,

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to elect new generals and to
fight their way out of the

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empire back to the Black Sea,
which was the easiest way for

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them to get home,
and then to do whatever it was

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they would do.

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It was a very important
event because--and I think

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Xenophon's account of it was
very,

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very important because it
planted in the minds of many

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Greeks a new notion that the
vast,

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powerful, wealthy empire of the
Persians was remarkably

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vulnerable, and that it was
possible,

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and many thought highly
desirable, for the Greeks to

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turn the tables on the Persians,
to invade Persia,

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and to take from it,
to subdue it,

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and to take from it the vast
wealth that the Persians had,

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and we shall see down through
the years of the fourth century

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different speakers will come out
and speak or write urging that

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the Greeks do exactly this.
Isocrates, the Athenian teacher

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of rhetoric, was the foremost
figure who kept seeking somebody

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who would undertake this chore.
One of the reasons that he

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gave for it more than once was
that Greece was suffering,

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and, of course,
had been for some time,

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from poverty produced by war
and most particularly by civil

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wars between democrats and
oligarchs that became more and

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more common in the fourth
century,

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and his solution was if you
need money, steal it.

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So, take it from the Persians
and that would put an end to the

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troubles.
Well, of course,

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none of the Greek city states
was capable of establishing

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leadership in Greece during the
period we're studying now,

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so that it could carry out
Isocrates' wishes.

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So, he turned to a man that the
rest of the Greeks regarded as,

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or many of the Greeks regarded
as a barbarian,

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the King of Macedon Philip,
and urged him to take on that

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course, and apparently whether
it was Isocrates or simply the

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idea itself,
Philip himself did intend to do

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exactly that,
to conquer the Persian Empire,

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but he was killed before he
could do it and the job was left

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to his quite young son,
Alexander, who in fact

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accomplished it;
but we're looking down the road.

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Let's go back to 401 and
there we see this expedition of

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10,000 Greeks accomplishing what
I mentioned to you.

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That there could be 10,000
Greek hoplites available for

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such a purpose I think is a
consequence of the Peloponnesian

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War.
It shows us how much that war

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had helped to uproot people and
to impoverish many of them,

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so that the idea of becoming a
mercenary soldier for a Persian

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prince was attractive enough to
take them away from home,

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something that would have been
less likely in the prosperous

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years before the Peloponnesian
War.

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Well, of course,
that aside, that is a kind of a

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side show, it doesn't very much
affect what is happening to the

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Greek cities on the coast of
Asia Minor who remain the issue

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as to what will happen.
You remember,

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these were under Athenian
control during the Peloponnesian

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War,
and when the war was over they

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were taken over in many cases by
Lysander.

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What was to happen to them
ultimately still had to be

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decided, because the King of
Persia claimed that territory

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still for his own.
The Spartans had really agreed

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to that in the treaties they
made with the great king during

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the Peloponnesian War,
but now Lysander didn't see any

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reason for carrying out those
promises and so there was at the

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very least conflict.
Of course, what the cities

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would have liked best of all was
to achieve autonomy for

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themselves and they claimed that
and regarded the rule either by

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Persian or by Spartan as
improper and something to be

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resisted.
Well, Tissaphernes the

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satrap of the region of
Lydia and to the west,

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the ones that included the
Greek cities,

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attacked those cities,
which he claimed for the great

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king but which cities were
holding out.

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Those cities in turn,
because the great menace to

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them for the moment was Persian,
turned to Sparta the great

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victorious power,
and asked the Spartans to help.

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In the year 400 and 399 the
Spartans sent an army under a

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general by the name of Thibron,
who recruited about 6,000 of

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those 10,000 men who had marched
into the Persian Empire and who

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still sought service as
mercenaries rather than go home

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to poverty,
plus about 5,000 or so

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Peloponnesians.
All of the overseas activities

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of the Spartans in these years
include practically no Spartans.

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They are just too short of
troops to be risking them in

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overseas ventures.
So, they use their

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Peloponnesian allies,
they sometimes use mercenaries,

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and they also use some of these
folks I told you about the last

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time who were neither this nor
that.

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The ones that they used on
these campaigns are the ones

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that we are calling
neodamodes,

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people who had been helots,
but who were liberated and

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permitted to fight for the
Spartans,

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and the notion of sending
neodamodes overseas to

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fight was very attractive to the
Spartans,

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because it got them out of
Laconia, for one thing,

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and provided them with soldiers
as well.

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So, that kind of army is the
one that Thibron is now using to

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fight against the Persians,
who just a few years ago had

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been the allies of the Spartans
for control of the Greek cities

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of Asia Minor.
Now, meanwhile we have to

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turn our attention to the sea,
and especially to the island of

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Cyprus.
It's a Persian possession,

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but on that island there are
some cities that have a degree

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of autonomy.
One of them has as its king a

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man called Evagoras,
and he is very ambitious for

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himself and for the Cypriotes,
and so he is eager to fight

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against the Spartans,
presumably on behalf of the

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great king,
although his motives are not

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made clear by our sources.
Reasonable guess is that he may

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have hoped by achieving
something great for the great

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king he might receive back
thanks from the great king in

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whatever form you can imagine.
It might be allowing him to

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rule over Cyprus,
it might mean to give him

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wealth,
who knows, but also on the

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island of Cyprus where he had
taken refuge was the Athenian

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Admiral Conon,
who had been one of the

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admirals at the final defeat at
Aegospotomi.

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He had escaped from that
battle and had not gone home to

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Athens;
he felt that the air there

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would not be healthy for
somebody who lost the entire

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fleet at Aegospotomi and so he
went to Evagoras,

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who it took good care of Conon
and he was a great sailor.

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One of the very most
distinguished admirals in Greek

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history, and he too now
continued his feeling that

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Sparta was the enemy.
So, he joined Evagoras in

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urging the great king to build a
navy, which would then defeat

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the Spartan navy,
which would by itself rid Asia

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of the menace of Sparta and be a
great thing for the Persians.

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Conon, I suspect,
had some other hopes out of

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this activity,
which in fact will come to

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fruition and I'll tell you about
them in due course.

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Well, the Spartans have their
fleet out there and the king

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agrees and he starts building a
fleet of his own,

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which will ultimately be a very
large one indeed--some 300

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ships, and the king puts Conon
in charge of that fleet,

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which is smart in a way because
Conon is a great admiral.

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Maybe not so smart if you look
at what Conon is really up to.

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In the face of these
activities, the Spartans decided

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to raise the ante and they sent
an expedition into Asia Minor.

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Thibron had not done very well
and after about a year the

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Spartans replaced him with
another general by the name of

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Dercyllidas,
who does better,

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but there's no decisive victory
out there.

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The war is dragging on and so
they choose to send the new King

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Agesilaus, who is the son of
Aegis,

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whose characteristics are among
other things,

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that he was born lame;
he probably would not have been

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allowed to live had he not come
from the royal family,

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but he did and he grew to be an
ambitious, aggressive Spartan

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King, who I suspect--I mean,
a cheap psychology when you

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have a handicap like that in a
society which values physical

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valor and strength,
and military success so highly

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as the Spartans did,
you're twice as aggressive,

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and twice as ambitious as an
ordinary Spartan.

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In any case,
that was the way Agesilaus

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turned out to be.
Another interesting thing about

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Agesilaus is that he had been
the tent mate of Lysander and

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it's hard to believe that
Lysander could ever have

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achieved the eminence that he
did,

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the command that was given to
him, had he not been a friend of

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the young man that people looked
to as the next king,

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or possibly the next king.
But as yet, Agesilaus,

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being a much younger man than
Lysander, he seemed to be

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deferential and everything was
okay and so he was very keen on

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doing what the Spartans did,
which was to send Agesilaus out

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with a new expedition to win the
war against the Persians out

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there.
Agesilaus, it is plain,

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had extremely lofty plans for
himself and for this expedition.

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The way the expedition worked,
Agesilaus chose to leave with

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his fleet from the town of
Aulis, which is located in

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Boeotia.
Does anybody recognize the name

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and think why Agesilaus should
have wanted to leave from Aulis?

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Tell us about
it.Student:

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[inaudible]Professor
Donald Kagan: That's right.

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Agamemnon took off for the
Trojan War at Aulis,

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and you remember how the legend
goes.

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The winds were against the
Greeks, they wouldn't let the

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ships get away,
and they asked a holy man to

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tell them what the gods were up
to and the gods said,

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well you can't go until you
sacrifice your daughter,

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your little daughter Iphigenia
to the god for that purpose.

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So Agamemnon did and the winds
relented, and Agamemnon would

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pay the price when he got back
from Troy.

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But it is precisely that the
Greek fleet against the

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barbarian, against the
non-Greeks,

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the most important ones in all
of their legends,

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namely the Trojans,
it was at all Aulis that they

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left and Agesilaus wanted to
bring that to the mind.

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He was the new Agamemnon and he
was not leading a Spartan fleet

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against the Persians,
he was the spokesman for the

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Greeks.
He was the leader of the Greeks

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revenging that original offense,
whatever that might be.

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He was trying to make the case
for a panhellenic motive for

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what was absolutely a strictly
Spartan one and raising himself

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to a legendary level
practically.

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Well, that turned out to be a
mistake, because the Thebans

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happened at that moment to be,
as far as we can tell,

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led by a faction that was very
hostile to the Spartans.

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So, as Agesilaus' people were
setting up the altars for

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sacrifices before they took off,
along the road came a Theban

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army, knocked over all of the
altars, and asked them who the

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hell invited him into Boeotia in
the first place,

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to get the hell out of there,
grossly insulting Agesilaus and

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forcing him to skulk out of
Aulis,

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not in the grand way that he
had imagined.

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This turned out to be very
significant.

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Agesilaus took it personally.
He didn't like that,

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and I suppose--well,
never mind I was about to make

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a bad joke, let it go.
It had an enormous impact

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on him because for the rest of
his life Agesilaus will be

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hostile to Thebes,
and when he could he would

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promote a policy of attacking
Thebes, of trying to defeat it,

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to subject it to Sparta,
and a whole piece of Spartan

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foreign policy,
which was to be very costly and

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damaging to Sparta was the
result of Agesilaus' attempt at

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vendetta against the Thebans.

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Well, he goes to Asia and
begins to encounter the

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Persians.
He does pretty well,

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as always, Greek hoplites if
they can get the Persians to

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fight them in a nice flat field
will beat them,

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and he did that on several
occasions, but he was never able

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to bring a large force of
Persians to battle,

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so that he could really destroy
a good chunk of Persian power in

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the region so that the victories
were not decisive.

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They could not win the war,
he could win the battles,

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but you couldn't win the war,
at least he didn't.

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Meanwhile,
things turned around against

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the Spartans from the side that
you might expect,

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that is to say,
from the sea.

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Conon, with the Persian fleet,
sailed against the very

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important Island of Rhodes and
captured it and brought it back

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to--took it away from the
Spartans in any case.

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Where the Spartans went,
you will remember,

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they establish oligarchic
governments,

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and in this case the victorious
Athenian admiral removed the

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oligarchic government and in its
place there rose up a democracy.

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I'm sure the great king didn't
care what kind of regime it was

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for the moment,
he just wanted to get rid of

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the Spartans,
which he did.

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But it was, of course,
on the Greek scene,

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it was a great defeat for the
Spartans and it was a challenge

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to the Spartans.
It was obvious that Conon,

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at least, and who knew what
might happen on the part of

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other Greeks,
were going to resist Spartan

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power and Spartan
aggressiveness,

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and that if he wanted to come
back,

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then he would have to have a
navy.

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The Spartans set out to
increase their navy to meet this

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challenge and just to look ahead
a few years,

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as I think we need to at this
moment, it was that Spartan

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fleet that Conon defeated
thoroughly and decisively a few

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years later in 394 at the Battle
of Cnidus,

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which really puts an end for
considerable time the whole idea

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of Sparta fighting at sea
entirely.

19:34.819 --> 19:38.799
It really means that that
approach--remember we were

19:38.797 --> 19:43.157
talking last time about the
three different possibilities

19:43.164 --> 19:46.444
that the Spartans had to choose
among,

19:46.440 --> 19:49.650
and they chose for a while this
thoroughly aggressive one

19:49.651 --> 19:52.551
overseas, that's out now.
If you had been defeated at

19:52.549 --> 19:55.549
sea, you don't have a navy that
can challenge your opponents,

19:55.549 --> 19:58.899
you can't do it.
As a matter of fact it will not

19:58.904 --> 20:03.174
be very much longer when events
in Greece compel them to

20:03.171 --> 20:07.281
withdraw their army under
Agesilaus and bring him back

20:07.283 --> 20:11.863
home and no Spartan army ever
goes back to Asia again.

20:11.859 --> 20:16.629
We're looking ahead but the
action that caused that was the

20:16.633 --> 20:18.283
victory at Cnidus.

20:21.380 --> 20:24.140
Now, of course,
with the Spartans being

20:24.143 --> 20:27.833
defeated in that part of the
world, the Greek cities that

20:27.827 --> 20:31.707
have been under Spartan rule now
typically rebel against the

20:31.709 --> 20:35.419
Spartan rule,
and we must imagine that for a

20:35.415 --> 20:40.485
few years there are really quite
confused conditions in Asiatic

20:40.491 --> 20:43.661
Greece.
Some places may have continued

20:43.659 --> 20:47.889
to be under Spartan rule,
some may have continued to be

20:47.887 --> 20:50.937
under Persian rule,
no doubt about it,

20:50.942 --> 20:54.842
some of them became autonomous.
We just don't know what the

20:54.839 --> 20:58.009
numbers were and there could
have been mixtures of things

20:58.013 --> 21:01.463
going on too.
I make that point because when,

21:01.462 --> 21:05.402
later on, a final settlement is
produced there,

21:05.400 --> 21:10.830
it is imposed upon a condition
of confusion rather than simply

21:10.829 --> 21:16.259
overthrowing a single thing that
was characteristic across the

21:16.259 --> 21:20.259
board.
Still, many of those towns as I

21:20.263 --> 21:24.283
say did return to Persian rule
as well.

21:24.279 --> 21:29.259
That's the situation which
leads us to the next great event

21:29.260 --> 21:32.610
in Hellenic history across the
board.

21:32.609 --> 21:36.429
The Corinthian War,
as it is called,

21:36.432 --> 21:41.432
which breaks out in 395 and
runs down to 387-386,

21:41.430 --> 21:46.380
so called because the bulk of
the fighting on land was around

21:46.383 --> 21:51.723
the city of Corinth.
But it was a war that engaged

21:51.720 --> 21:58.760
all of the major cities of
Greece right around its core and

21:58.760 --> 22:03.510
its center.
I think a fair way to see it is

22:03.511 --> 22:09.221
the cause of that war was,
in its most fundamental sense,

22:09.220 --> 22:14.450
Sparta's tyrannical behavior
towards the other Greek cities

22:14.451 --> 22:18.061
which produces a variety of
reactions.

22:18.059 --> 22:21.949
Let me remind you of some and
tell you about some others that

22:21.953 --> 22:25.463
we haven't talked about.
Remember there were these

22:25.459 --> 22:29.899
grievances that lingered from
the end of the Peloponnesian War

22:29.898 --> 22:33.968
when Spartan allies like Corinth
and Thebes had been very

22:33.973 --> 22:38.343
dissatisfied with the way the
booty had been shared that came

22:38.339 --> 22:41.249
from the defeat of the
Athenians,

22:41.250 --> 22:44.500
and you remember those two
cities were aggrieved also

22:44.500 --> 22:48.130
because the Spartans ignored
their wishes as to what should

22:48.125 --> 22:51.495
happen to Athens and went their
own way there too.

22:51.500 --> 22:54.850
I think I mentioned as well
that in all contacts with

22:54.846 --> 22:58.876
non-Spartans in this period,
the Spartans seemed to be very

22:58.877 --> 23:03.647
arrogant, very hard to get along
with, and they certainly inspire

23:03.652 --> 23:06.862
considerable unhappiness and
discontent.

23:06.860 --> 23:11.540
Those things you know about.
Now in 402, the Spartans

23:11.543 --> 23:16.853
launched a war against the
polis of Elis located up

23:16.847 --> 23:21.497
in the northwestern corner of
the Peloponnesus.

23:21.500 --> 23:27.150
Olympia is included in that
area, just to help you fix it in

23:27.150 --> 23:31.160
your mind.
Now, the Spartans called upon

23:31.156 --> 23:35.486
their allies to join them in
this expedition,

23:35.491 --> 23:39.041
as is their right,
according to the traditional

23:39.042 --> 23:41.532
rules of the game in the
Peloponnesian League.

23:41.529 --> 23:46.849
Thebes and Corinth refuse to
send their contingents.

23:46.849 --> 23:54.329
That is practically an act of
rebellion against the Spartans.

23:54.329 --> 23:58.709
It's a violation of their
treaty agreements and it shows

23:58.714 --> 24:02.944
you how much irritation there
existed between them.

24:02.940 --> 24:06.500
The whole campaign seemed to
these states very annoying

24:06.500 --> 24:09.600
because why were the Spartans
attacking Elis,

24:09.599 --> 24:12.669
partly because they had a
continuing debate,

24:12.674 --> 24:15.754
a conflict with them about a
border town,

24:15.750 --> 24:19.310
the old stuff.
But also I think as an act

24:19.307 --> 24:23.417
of revenge, because the Elians
had been disloyal during the

24:23.420 --> 24:26.970
Peloponnesian War,
during the Peace of Nicias

24:26.971 --> 24:31.891
after 421, Aulis was one of the
four democracies that joined up

24:31.887 --> 24:36.717
in this new separate league that
ended up fighting against the

24:36.724 --> 24:41.034
Spartans for a period of time.
At the great Battle of

24:41.034 --> 24:44.734
Mantinea, in which the very
existence of Sparta was at

24:44.732 --> 24:48.642
issue, Elis was on the side of
the enemies of Sparta.

24:48.640 --> 24:52.070
So, that was why the Spartans
suddenly decided to attack them

24:52.066 --> 24:55.486
and the allies didn't think that
was right, the ones who were

24:55.493 --> 24:58.913
discontented in any case.
So, that's in the

24:58.906 --> 25:03.416
background, and all these other
irritations that I have

25:03.422 --> 25:06.472
mentioned,
but it wasn't enough because

25:06.468 --> 25:10.518
even if you were as mad as you
could be at the Spartans and

25:10.524 --> 25:14.584
determined to try to undo their
effort at hegemony over the

25:14.580 --> 25:18.240
Greeks,
there was no easy way to think

25:18.238 --> 25:23.508
of fighting them successfully.
All of these states that were

25:23.511 --> 25:27.661
discontented Thebes,
Corinth, and as we will quickly

25:27.663 --> 25:32.063
see, Athens as well,
were isolated from each other.

25:32.059 --> 25:36.569
They didn't belong to any
common activity and they all

25:36.567 --> 25:39.627
were not strong enough,
individually,

25:39.628 --> 25:44.058
to take on the Spartans.
Moreover, there was the problem

25:44.058 --> 25:47.958
if you wanted to fight these
people, it would require money,

25:47.958 --> 25:51.658
and all of them were short of
funds for that purpose.

25:51.660 --> 25:56.560
So the critical element
necessary to create a coalition

25:56.563 --> 26:01.563
that could undertake a war
against Sparta--that decision

26:01.556 --> 26:05.776
was made by the Persians.
The King of Persia

26:05.782 --> 26:09.482
presumably, although it very
much looks like the new

26:09.475 --> 26:12.585
satrap in that
region--there were two

26:12.589 --> 26:16.569
satraps in the western
part of the Persian Empire

26:16.571 --> 26:19.581
remember;
the one whose capital is at

26:19.580 --> 26:22.460
Sardis in Lydia,
and the one whose capital,

26:22.457 --> 26:26.567
or whose territory is along the
Hellespont and the straits in

26:26.569 --> 26:28.399
general,
Pharnabazus,

26:28.396 --> 26:32.526
our old friend Pharnabazus from
the Peloponnesian War,

26:32.531 --> 26:38.151
and a new sIatrap in Sardis,
both want this to happen and so

26:38.146 --> 26:44.126
they find a Rhodian Greek and
give him a batch of money and

26:44.126 --> 26:49.796
send him to the Greek cities
seeking out those factional

26:49.796 --> 26:55.776
leaders who were known to be
hostile to Sparta and offering

26:55.776 --> 27:01.856
to give them some of the money
that he was carrying,

27:01.859 --> 27:05.169
which was not in itself a vast
amount and certainly not enough

27:05.167 --> 27:08.387
to fight in any war,
but was obviously a sign of

27:08.392 --> 27:12.982
good faith saying the King of
Persia and his satraps in

27:12.984 --> 27:17.354
this region are against the
Spartans and would like for you

27:17.350 --> 27:22.090
to put an end to the things you
don't like that are happening in

27:22.092 --> 27:26.762
the Greek world and he will
support you with his money.

27:26.759 --> 27:29.679
That, I think,
turned out to be an absolutely

27:29.683 --> 27:32.783
critical act.
He went to a town I have

27:32.775 --> 27:37.255
not mentioned that belongs in
the company of the anti-Spartan

27:37.264 --> 27:40.134
people at this point,
of course is Argos,

27:40.134 --> 27:43.594
the traditional enemy of Sparta
running back at least into the

27:43.585 --> 27:46.295
eighth century and perhaps
further than that,

27:46.299 --> 27:51.359
who seem to find themselves in
a war with the Spartans at least

27:51.358 --> 27:56.418
once a century and it looks like
this is the time in the fourth

27:56.416 --> 27:59.546
century for them.
Argos is a democracy too,

27:59.546 --> 28:01.866
and as you know that is a
relevant fact.

28:01.869 --> 28:06.449
Corinth is not a democracy,
but they are so angry they want

28:06.451 --> 28:09.931
to play too and they join up.
Thebes, again,

28:09.932 --> 28:13.032
it's hard to tell what the
government is.

28:13.029 --> 28:16.599
It looks throughout this entire
period as oligarchy and

28:16.595 --> 28:20.355
democracy may well have been
very close to one another,

28:20.359 --> 28:24.019
so that at any time one faction
or the other may have the upper

28:24.017 --> 28:25.607
hand.
And, of course,

28:25.612 --> 28:28.452
Athens, which is a democracy
again.

28:28.450 --> 28:32.040
Now, the Athenians have been
very, very reluctant to do

28:32.041 --> 28:35.701
anything to annoy the Spartans
for very good reasons.

28:35.700 --> 28:38.530
They have no navy,
they have no walls,

28:38.530 --> 28:42.890
and they have no money so to
buck the Spartans would be an

28:42.891 --> 28:46.381
act almost of suicide,
because all the Spartans needed

28:46.384 --> 28:49.494
to do was coming marching into
Attica and they have no defense.

28:49.490 --> 28:52.760
Up to now therefore they've
been very, very careful not to

28:52.761 --> 28:55.721
annoy.
In fact in 402 when the Thebans

28:55.715 --> 29:00.355
and Corinthians refused to go to
Elis with the Spartans,

29:00.359 --> 29:04.569
the Athenians sent their force,
as they were required to do by

29:04.571 --> 29:09.061
their treaty with the Spartans.
But the new situation changed

29:09.060 --> 29:13.710
things in Athens just as it did,
perhaps even more than it did

29:13.711 --> 29:16.881
in other cities.
Now the great king--the

29:16.877 --> 29:20.907
Persians were not the enemy,
the Persians were going to

29:20.909 --> 29:24.419
support the war,
if they were ready to launch it

29:24.418 --> 29:27.788
against the Spartans.
There was no war yet I should

29:27.790 --> 29:30.110
point out when this money is
being handed out.

29:30.109 --> 29:34.039
This is an effort to stir up
that kind of activity.

29:34.039 --> 29:39.389
Of course, the enemies of the
policy refer to these transfers

29:39.394 --> 29:44.574
of money as bribes and there's
nothing in Greek practice or

29:44.569 --> 29:49.919
Greek tradition to reject the
idea that some of these Persian

29:49.924 --> 29:56.264
coins ended up in the pockets of
the men that they were given to,

29:56.259 --> 29:59.999
but I don't think we really
should think of them as bribes.

30:00.000 --> 30:04.670
Most of the money was used for
the purpose for which it was

30:04.674 --> 30:09.194
intended, to help these leaders
stir up support for a war

30:09.188 --> 30:12.828
against Sparta.
It was something they believed

30:12.831 --> 30:17.131
in anyway, it was a source of
their ability to carry out their

30:17.126 --> 30:18.586
wishes.
But as I say,

30:18.588 --> 30:22.088
the Greeks didn't think there
was anything wrong with picking

30:22.091 --> 30:27.761
up a few bucks along the way.
Now, a war breaks out on the

30:27.756 --> 30:35.206
frontier between Phocis and
Locris, two towns in central

30:35.214 --> 30:39.664
Greece,
both of which are quite close

30:39.661 --> 30:44.141
to Boeotia, the land ruled by
the Thebes.

30:44.140 --> 30:47.390
The Spartans,
and I think this was

30:47.385 --> 30:51.615
probably--well,
I'm pretty confident that it

30:51.615 --> 30:56.625
was what--motivated by the
Spartan unhappiness about

30:56.631 --> 31:00.671
Thebes,
the Spartans assist Phocis

31:00.672 --> 31:05.352
against Locris,
knowing that Thebes is allied

31:05.348 --> 31:08.538
to Locris,
and that this would be,

31:08.539 --> 31:11.999
they believed and hoped,
a pretext for war.

31:12.000 --> 31:15.460
This was their chance to get
even with the Thebans for all

31:15.459 --> 31:19.159
the things that the Thebans had
done that irritated them since

31:19.161 --> 31:23.261
the war.
So, Sparta invaded Boeotia;

31:23.259 --> 31:26.599
their strategy to win this war
was that they would invade

31:26.599 --> 31:29.969
Boeotia from two sides.
One army coming from central

31:29.966 --> 31:32.916
Greece, from the region of
Phocis and Locris,

31:32.915 --> 31:35.725
where they were assisting the
Phocians,

31:35.730 --> 31:41.140
and another army being sent up
from the Peloponnesus itself;

31:41.140 --> 31:46.980
they do finally meet in 395 at
a town in western Boeotia called

31:46.979 --> 31:50.369
Haliartus where there is a
battle,

31:50.369 --> 31:55.339
and where by the way,
Lysander is killed in the

31:55.342 --> 31:59.452
fighting and removed from the
scene.

31:59.450 --> 32:03.130
But even before that
happened, as it was clear that

32:03.128 --> 32:05.988
the Spartans meant to fight the
Thebans,

32:05.990 --> 32:10.490
the Thebans went to Athens and
asked the Athenians for help and

32:10.486 --> 32:14.326
of course they had a case that
was very attractive.

32:14.329 --> 32:17.399
First of all,
they certainly reminded the

32:17.396 --> 32:22.146
Athenians of the roll Thebes had
played in liberating Athens by

32:22.148 --> 32:26.748
giving a home to Thrasybulus and
his free Athenians when they

32:26.747 --> 32:30.957
were in the position of
defeating the Thirty Tyrants and

32:30.963 --> 32:34.513
driving them out.
I have a feeling they didn't

32:34.510 --> 32:38.060
remind the Athenians about that
little congress they had after

32:38.063 --> 32:41.333
the war in which they suggested
that they destroy all the

32:41.325 --> 32:44.695
Athenians and take away their
land and turn the whole place

32:44.703 --> 32:48.263
into a great big cattle farm.
I think they probably didn't

32:48.262 --> 32:51.102
remember to mention that.
But they had that reason,

32:51.098 --> 32:54.468
but more important than that,
was what they were saying,

32:54.470 --> 32:58.190
you have a chance now to escape
from your bondage to the

32:58.193 --> 33:01.583
Spartans, where the Athenians
certainly were and to

33:01.579 --> 33:05.369
re-establish yourself as an
autonomous polis along

33:05.371 --> 33:09.571
with us and all the others who
want to take away power from the

33:09.568 --> 33:12.578
Spartans,
which they are abusing so

33:12.584 --> 33:16.214
terribly.
Now, the remarkable thing

33:16.205 --> 33:21.055
to me is that Xenophon,
who very likely was there,

33:21.064 --> 33:26.424
reports that the Athenian
assembly voted unanimously in

33:26.419 --> 33:29.889
favor.
Well, it's worth pointing out,

33:29.888 --> 33:34.248
of course, that the number one
advocate of doing that,

33:34.250 --> 33:37.760
of joining the rebellion
against Sparta,

33:37.759 --> 33:43.249
was Thrasybulus the great hero
of the time that certainly made

33:43.250 --> 33:47.370
a big difference.
Thrasybulus had been one of the

33:47.373 --> 33:51.343
cautious leaders before who had
been against getting the

33:51.337 --> 33:54.547
Spartans mad,
because he knew Athens was

33:54.550 --> 33:59.150
incompetent to fight them now,
but with the Persian support

33:59.147 --> 34:04.137
and with the prospect of forming
a coalition against Sparta,

34:04.140 --> 34:07.270
the strategic situation had
changed and Thrasybulus now came

34:07.270 --> 34:09.180
out a hundred percent for the
war.

34:09.179 --> 34:13.389
But unanimous vote in favor of
the war, I can't imagine the

34:13.388 --> 34:17.018
Athenian assembly giving
unanimous vote in favor of

34:17.015 --> 34:21.605
getting a drink of water.
It's just so incredible to me.

34:21.610 --> 34:26.200
So, how do I explain it?
Well, I got to make it up.

34:26.199 --> 34:29.429
I think if there was an
overwhelming sentiment in favor

34:29.426 --> 34:33.066
obviously the attractions were
great but there were reasons to

34:33.072 --> 34:35.332
fear.
If you lose the price could be

34:35.327 --> 34:38.587
very, very high.
But I think what happened was

34:38.593 --> 34:43.343
that the emotion was so strong
at the moment that once it was

34:43.339 --> 34:48.559
evident that there was a large
majority in favor of the motion,

34:48.559 --> 34:53.089
nobody wanted to be seen as
being against it.

34:53.090 --> 34:56.430
It would had the look of
cowardice, of a lack of

34:56.429 --> 34:59.839
patriotism, and people in these
circumstances,

34:59.840 --> 35:04.050
it has been my experience,
hate to seem not to be going

35:04.046 --> 35:07.936
along when everybody is
enthusiastically going in a

35:07.942 --> 35:12.252
particular direction.
So that's how I interpret

35:12.253 --> 35:18.213
Xenophon's remarkable testimony,
but whatever the truth of it,

35:18.210 --> 35:21.840
what is clear is the great
enthusiasm, overwhelming

35:21.835 --> 35:26.325
majority, they are prepared to
fight for their true autonomy in

35:26.329 --> 35:27.779
the war to come.

35:30.860 --> 35:33.170
So, the coalition is
finally formed.

35:33.170 --> 35:34.790
Athens, Thebes,
Corinth, Argos,

35:34.789 --> 35:38.029
those are the main states on
the mainland and they'll do most

35:38.030 --> 35:41.020
of the fighting,
but it's worth pointing out

35:41.015 --> 35:44.045
that there are other places that
join too.

35:44.050 --> 35:49.450
Euboea, the island to the east
of Attica, not surprising;

35:49.449 --> 35:52.489
they're so thoroughly
influenced by the Athenians.

35:52.489 --> 35:55.659
That's not a great surprise but
it's interesting that many a

35:55.661 --> 35:57.651
town up in the north of the
Aegean,

35:57.650 --> 36:03.630
on the Chalcidice also joined
in this anti-Spartan coalition,

36:03.634 --> 36:07.524
and likewise,
the region in the west on the

36:07.523 --> 36:12.153
Ionian Sea of Acarnania also
join, which I think suggests

36:12.146 --> 36:16.926
that there was quite a lot of
anti-Spartan sentiment in the

36:16.933 --> 36:24.843
Greek world at this time,
which very often comes about if

36:24.836 --> 36:33.236
any state seems to be too
strong, too powerful,

36:33.239 --> 36:36.459
too much of a threat to what
everybody else wants,

36:36.462 --> 36:41.242
people tend to cut it down.
Political scientists tend

36:41.244 --> 36:46.804
to formulize this into the
notion of--if you join up with

36:46.796 --> 36:52.146
the most powerful state that's
called bandwagoning,

36:52.150 --> 36:56.290
what do they call it if you're
against the--balancing,

36:56.292 --> 36:59.172
that's the word.
Sorry, I am weak in my

36:59.172 --> 37:03.372
political science technology.
Balancing is what's supposed to

37:03.373 --> 37:05.313
happen;
the truth of the matter is that

37:05.307 --> 37:07.557
you never can tell which way
states will go in these

37:07.558 --> 37:10.288
situations and there you are.
But in this case I'm simply

37:10.291 --> 37:13.381
making the point that there was
a lot of hostility to Sparta out

37:13.375 --> 37:15.915
there and some people you
wouldn't think of joined in

37:15.920 --> 37:18.190
this,
but it's the big four that

37:18.187 --> 37:22.217
really matter and they do most
of the fighting in the war.

37:22.219 --> 37:26.859
Well, there's no point in going
through the war in great detail;

37:26.860 --> 37:30.400
just a few highlights,
I think, need to be mentioned.

37:30.400 --> 37:34.370
The largest highlight of all
being how in the world are you

37:34.373 --> 37:38.003
supposed to win this war,
what is the strategy on each

37:38.003 --> 37:41.043
side?
It's remarkable how similar

37:41.035 --> 37:44.475
they are.
The Spartans want to gain

37:44.479 --> 37:49.489
control of the isthmus of
Corinth, it's Corinth and Megara

37:49.489 --> 37:53.109
especially,
so that they can get out into

37:53.110 --> 37:57.730
central Greece and defeat their
opponents individually in

37:57.725 --> 38:02.255
Boeotia for the Thebans and
Attica for the Athenians and

38:02.258 --> 38:05.258
Corinth,
of course, right there in the

38:05.260 --> 38:07.300
isthmus.
The other folks,

38:07.298 --> 38:10.358
the big four,
want to push into the

38:10.355 --> 38:15.655
Peloponnesus where they can
raise up rebellion of the helots

38:15.660 --> 38:20.960
and the perioikoi and
defeat the Spartans right there

38:20.964 --> 38:25.914
and strip away their allies in
the Peloponnesus.

38:25.909 --> 38:31.009
So, each side basically has to
gain control of the isthmus and

38:31.006 --> 38:35.846
then move forward to carry out
the conclusion of the war in

38:35.853 --> 38:39.933
their favor,
and the bottom line is neither

38:39.929 --> 38:44.559
side is able to do it.
The bulk of the fighting

38:44.559 --> 38:51.199
throughout the years of that war
surround the city of Corinth,

38:51.199 --> 38:54.599
walls are put up by the
Corinthians meant to keep the

38:54.597 --> 38:57.467
Spartans out,
they do so for a great chunk of

38:57.472 --> 38:59.712
time,
Spartans can take part of the

38:59.711 --> 39:03.011
walls but they can't manage to
take everything and to punch

39:03.013 --> 39:05.003
through,
and so for all these years

39:05.000 --> 39:08.050
that's what happens.
There are some big battles

39:08.046 --> 39:10.756
that are fought.
There's one in 394,

39:10.755 --> 39:14.465
soon after the beginning of the
war at Nemea,

39:14.472 --> 39:18.192
which is located to the south
of Corinth.

39:18.190 --> 39:22.440
It's a very big tough standard
hoplite battle,

39:22.435 --> 39:27.715
both sides having strong
armies, both sides fighting well

39:27.718 --> 39:30.978
and determinedly.
The Spartans technically

39:30.979 --> 39:34.069
winning--it's one of those
victories where you know who won

39:34.071 --> 39:37.221
because they put up the trophy
and they were able to collect

39:37.217 --> 39:39.627
their dead,
and the other guys had to ask

39:39.630 --> 39:41.460
permission to collect their
debt.

39:41.460 --> 39:44.780
But it was another one of these
victories that did not have

39:44.779 --> 39:48.049
strategic consequences,
neither side had been able to

39:48.054 --> 39:51.114
destroy the other,
neither side could now advance

39:51.107 --> 39:54.727
into the region that they had to
get to in order to make a

39:54.732 --> 39:59.922
difference,
so that I think is the major

39:59.920 --> 40:05.310
story of that war.
There's another event in there

40:05.306 --> 40:09.476
that has interesting
consequences for future Greek

40:09.482 --> 40:12.552
warfare that deserves
mentioning.

40:12.550 --> 40:16.860
At a certain point in that
war the Athenians,

40:16.856 --> 40:22.146
under an extraordinary general
by the name of Iphicrates,

40:22.150 --> 40:27.470
had put together a force of
light-armed troops,

40:27.466 --> 40:32.196
not hoplites,
people without hoplite armor

40:32.204 --> 40:38.334
and shields who threw missiles
at the other side,

40:38.329 --> 40:42.539
probably mainly slingers,
but they also would have been

40:42.536 --> 40:45.726
spear throwers,
throwers not thrusters,

40:45.730 --> 40:50.270
and bowmen, and these guys
could never confront the phalanx

40:50.267 --> 40:55.197
in the normal way and they would
normally not even be able to do

40:55.196 --> 40:58.166
much harm in an extraordinary
way,

40:58.170 --> 41:04.260
but what was new was that
Iphicrates had trained them as a

41:04.257 --> 41:09.197
professional force,
so that they could move swiftly

41:09.195 --> 41:14.665
and together as a body in such a
way as to be as effective as it

41:14.672 --> 41:20.152
was possible for light-armed
troops to be against a phalanx.

41:20.150 --> 41:25.760
It happened that Iphicrates was
able to maneuver a whole

41:25.760 --> 41:31.980
division of Spartan soldiers in
such a way that they got stuck

41:31.983 --> 41:36.173
in a dead end,
in a cal du sac,

41:36.169 --> 41:42.499
and were absolutely victimized
by Iphicrates light-armed forces

41:42.503 --> 41:48.633
and about 600 men making up this
division of the Spartan army

41:48.633 --> 41:53.833
called a mora,
were wiped out and the Greek

41:53.833 --> 41:59.193
world was astonished by this,
because no such thing had ever

41:59.193 --> 42:04.123
happened before,
and it led to the increased use

42:04.119 --> 42:08.969
of well trained,
light-armed infantry who play a

42:08.971 --> 42:12.281
larger role.
They never replace the

42:12.283 --> 42:16.223
phalanx as the major form of
land warfare but things become

42:16.217 --> 42:20.147
more complicated in the fourth
century as they have already

42:20.151 --> 42:23.001
begun to be in the Peloponnesian
War,

42:23.000 --> 42:26.660
as you have different branches
that are able to perform more

42:26.656 --> 42:29.996
usefully than they were
typically expected to do in the

42:30.002 --> 42:30.562
past.

42:37.170 --> 42:41.570
Perhaps as big an event as any
that occurred in that war was

42:41.572 --> 42:50.422
the event I mentioned earlier.
Conon, using the Persian fleet,

42:50.422 --> 43:02.932
defeating the Spartan fleet at
the Battle of Cnidus in 394.

43:02.930 --> 43:06.780
But what does he do?
Conon takes his victorious

43:06.775 --> 43:11.015
fleet, sails back to Athens,
the Athenians have already

43:11.022 --> 43:14.722
begun the process of rebuilding
their walls,

43:14.719 --> 43:18.459
but now with the help of
Conon's men and the money that

43:18.455 --> 43:22.665
he carries and gives to them,
they are building those walls

43:22.671 --> 43:27.031
at a much faster clip and before
the war is over the Athenians

43:27.028 --> 43:29.598
will once again be a walled
city,

43:29.599 --> 43:32.819
with a walled port,
and with long walls connecting

43:32.820 --> 43:34.410
them.
In other words,

43:34.409 --> 43:38.549
the basis for having an
independent naval policy will be

43:38.549 --> 43:41.409
in place thanks to Conon's
victory.

43:41.409 --> 43:44.569
On top of which,
he takes the Persian fleet and

43:44.572 --> 43:48.432
goes to the Athenians and says,
this is now your fleet and

43:48.431 --> 43:52.451
suddenly the Athenians have
again probably the biggest fleet

43:52.451 --> 43:55.581
in the Greek world,
just like that.

43:55.579 --> 43:58.999
Similarly, or rather as a
consequence of all this,

43:59.003 --> 44:02.993
because for a while at least
they are able to dominate the

44:02.985 --> 44:07.245
Aegean Sea with these forces and
with Conon around they regain

44:07.247 --> 44:11.087
those famous islands that are so
crucial to them,

44:11.090 --> 44:15.490
the stepping stones to the
Hellespont: Lemnos,

44:15.491 --> 44:19.991
Imbros, Skyros--become Athenian
owned again.

44:19.989 --> 44:24.359
They also gain control of the
scared Island of Apollo at

44:24.355 --> 44:28.035
Delos.
They also make an alliance with

44:28.042 --> 44:33.852
the important Island of Chios
and suddenly you have what are

44:33.852 --> 44:38.872
the bare beginnings of the
reconstruction of the old

44:38.874 --> 44:43.704
Athenian naval alliance;
you might want to call it an

44:43.697 --> 44:46.417
empire.
Let me make it very clear that

44:46.415 --> 44:50.435
even when they become far more
powerful in years to come,

44:50.440 --> 44:54.680
they are never able to recreate
the old Athenian Empire.

44:54.679 --> 44:59.819
They never reach the point
which was so decisive for their

44:59.821 --> 45:04.961
power where it is truly an
empire where almost every state

45:04.962 --> 45:08.572
in the league is contributing
money,

45:08.570 --> 45:13.820
which allows the Athenians to
not only build but to sustain in

45:13.823 --> 45:18.733
peace time and war time the
biggest navy and the best navy

45:18.732 --> 45:20.902
around.
They never get there.

45:20.900 --> 45:23.330
They do become very
important as a naval power

45:23.332 --> 45:26.362
again, they are going to be a
very significant state again,

45:26.360 --> 45:29.480
but even though they are
turning in that other direction

45:29.476 --> 45:32.056
they never get there.
But I think we need to remember

45:32.058 --> 45:34.448
that probably there's a very
good chunk of the Athenians,

45:34.449 --> 45:38.989
who regard those days as the
good old days and as the natural

45:38.988 --> 45:42.218
state of things,
and is the place to which they

45:42.223 --> 45:44.663
ought to be going towards that
empire.

45:44.659 --> 45:47.809
Certainly a lot of their
behavior in the Corinthian war

45:47.810 --> 45:51.370
and afterwards suggests that
that was a widespread opinion.

45:51.369 --> 45:55.019
There was, undoubtedly,
also hostility to that opinion

45:55.018 --> 45:59.008
as people look back on the
experience of what happened last

45:59.010 --> 46:03.290
time, look at the consequences.
There were important

46:03.289 --> 46:08.339
socioeconomic political
significance of pursuing such a

46:08.335 --> 46:10.715
policy;
it meant democracy,

46:10.724 --> 46:14.704
it meant a naval democracy,
it meant the most extreme

46:14.704 --> 46:17.904
democracy,
and a lot of people's memories,

46:17.900 --> 46:22.160
especially those of the rich
were of the mistakes and defeats

46:22.159 --> 46:25.069
that that democracy had brought
about.

46:25.070 --> 46:28.800
When you read Plato,
particularly about the Athenian

46:28.798 --> 46:33.568
democracy, or even Aristotle,
I think you have to remember

46:33.567 --> 46:38.617
that these people were very,
very critical of what the

46:38.616 --> 46:43.566
Athenian democracy had done in
the fifth century,

46:43.570 --> 46:47.850
blamed the democracy for that
defeat, and then that was tied

46:47.850 --> 46:52.200
up with their political views in
general that democracy was a

46:52.203 --> 46:55.773
very bad wicked thing,
and that should help you

46:55.769 --> 47:00.249
understand this very strong bias
against democratic government on

47:00.250 --> 47:02.140
the part of such people.

47:05.670 --> 47:09.360
Another special event in the
course of the Corinthian War,

47:09.362 --> 47:12.802
which would have some
consequence for Greek life later

47:12.796 --> 47:15.856
on,
during that war there was a

47:15.862 --> 47:20.412
union between the cities of
Corinth and Argos.

47:20.409 --> 47:24.099
It was brought about by a
special emergency situation

47:24.101 --> 47:28.501
created by the war in which all
the fighting was around Corinth

47:28.503 --> 47:32.203
in which there was terrible
destruction of Corinthian

47:32.195 --> 47:35.295
property,
in which poverty came to be a

47:35.303 --> 47:39.113
problem with Corinth in a way
that it had never been.

47:39.110 --> 47:41.500
There was a topsy-turvy
situation.

47:41.500 --> 47:45.370
It had been throughout the
whole fifth century back into

47:45.371 --> 47:48.611
the sixth century--an oligarchic
government,

47:48.610 --> 47:52.250
a broad oligarchic government,
one that was widely thought to

47:52.246 --> 47:55.736
be a good government,
and that so far as we know was

47:55.736 --> 47:59.856
never touched until sometime
here in the Corinthian War when

47:59.859 --> 48:03.349
these extreme conditions
produced what looks like a

48:03.352 --> 48:06.642
democratic faction,
which seized power,

48:06.643 --> 48:11.913
which murdered the leaders of
the opposition in a brutal way.

48:11.909 --> 48:17.729
By the way, on a holy day,
it was a memorable and horrible

48:17.732 --> 48:22.532
event.
So, it was after that event had

48:22.527 --> 48:29.067
taken place that you see this
union between Argos,

48:29.070 --> 48:32.610
which is a democracy,
and this democratic government

48:32.607 --> 48:36.697
in Corinth, which is under siege
for the reasons that I have

48:36.699 --> 48:39.579
suggested,
and what they do is they

48:39.577 --> 48:44.267
arrange for a new situation
where citizens of one state will

48:44.268 --> 48:47.128
be citizens of the other as
well.

48:47.130 --> 48:49.960
So, theoretically,
if you lived in Corinth and you

48:49.959 --> 48:53.599
wanted to go to Argos to sit in
on the Argive Assembly you could

48:53.596 --> 48:58.156
do it and vice versa.
This is something absolutely

48:58.162 --> 49:00.892
new.
The idea of anything but a

49:00.889 --> 49:04.649
polis being by itself or
being on top of other

49:04.650 --> 49:08.000
poleis,
but the notion of their being a

49:08.000 --> 49:11.280
sharing of a regime
interpoleis sharing of

49:11.284 --> 49:14.504
governmental responsibilities is
really new,

49:14.500 --> 49:19.120
and it becomes more usual in
the course of the next century

49:19.119 --> 49:23.639
and the century after that.
This one hardly lasts at all;

49:23.639 --> 49:26.129
it's just a few years as a
consequence of the war,

49:26.128 --> 49:28.158
and it's undone at the end of
the war.

49:28.159 --> 49:32.129
But it's an indication of what
people might be thinking about

49:32.127 --> 49:35.827
and we shall see that in the
course of this century there

49:35.830 --> 49:39.600
will grow up federations--that's
something different,

49:39.599 --> 49:41.549
but still it's the same thing
in a way.

49:41.550 --> 49:45.940
A federation is a political
union that allows for the

49:45.939 --> 49:50.499
maintenance of local powers on
the part of the original

49:50.497 --> 49:54.467
members,
but also takes some powers for

49:54.465 --> 49:58.795
a central body,
which is made up of more than

49:58.800 --> 50:01.470
one.
We Americans of course have

50:01.472 --> 50:04.482
some idea about that,
but there was the Arcadian

50:04.477 --> 50:07.857
League that came into being,
and the Achaean League that

50:07.860 --> 50:10.190
came into being,
and the Aetolian League which

50:10.194 --> 50:13.274
came into being,
and as a matter of fact our

50:13.268 --> 50:16.898
founding fathers read very
carefully about these

50:16.903 --> 50:21.003
experiments in federal
government as they were writing

50:21.002 --> 50:25.022
the American Constitution,
we have hard evidence about

50:25.019 --> 50:27.879
that.
The best evidence for those

50:27.879 --> 50:33.619
confederations does not occur in
our period, it occurs later,

50:33.619 --> 50:37.139
typically in the third and the
second centuries B.C.,

50:37.144 --> 50:40.944
and the accounts of them are in
the works of Polybius,

50:40.940 --> 50:45.010
if you're ever interested.
So, Polybius was a very

50:45.012 --> 50:48.662
important figure for the
American founding fathers who

50:48.660 --> 50:52.940
wrote the Constitution.
But the first seed of this kind

50:52.942 --> 50:57.372
of interstate cooperation on a
basis that was not merely

50:57.365 --> 51:00.545
alliance,
but was co-citizenship is in

51:00.550 --> 51:05.070
the case of Corinth and Argos in
the course of this war.

51:05.070 --> 51:10.430
Well, as the war dragged
on, it became clearer and

51:10.434 --> 51:15.904
clearer that neither side had
any way of prevailing.

51:15.900 --> 51:19.770
But another thing that happened
that was to play a very

51:19.768 --> 51:23.778
important part in how the war
came to an end was that the

51:23.779 --> 51:28.149
Athenian control of the sea was
rapidly making Athens stronger

51:28.148 --> 51:31.688
and stronger,
and more like that scary thing

51:31.694 --> 51:35.924
which Athens had been to its
neighbors and its opponents in

51:35.917 --> 51:39.587
the fifth century B.C.,
such that the Persians,

51:39.589 --> 51:42.919
who after all,
had started the war by virtue

51:42.916 --> 51:47.786
of encouraging the anti-Spartan
factions to get together and had

51:47.790 --> 51:51.660
been supporting it to some
degree during the war in

51:51.659 --> 51:55.279
general,
began to feel that maybe Athens

51:55.280 --> 51:59.960
was becoming more frightening
from the Persian point of view

51:59.962 --> 52:02.922
than Sparta was.
After all, Sparta was out of

52:02.917 --> 52:05.967
the navy business now and they
were not likely to be able to

52:05.966 --> 52:08.626
get back into it,
and if you don't have a navy

52:08.632 --> 52:11.952
you really can't threaten Persia
very much, at least until

52:11.954 --> 52:15.164
Alexander came along and figured
out a way to do it.

52:15.159 --> 52:19.989
So, all of that gives the
Spartans, who really want to get

52:19.994 --> 52:23.224
out of this war,
because it isn't going

52:23.217 --> 52:26.977
anywhere,
the hope that they can bring

52:26.980 --> 52:32.200
about a peace and so the
Spartans try to make peace with

52:32.204 --> 52:36.554
the aid of Persia.
There's a Spartan political

52:36.547 --> 52:41.087
figure by the name of Antalcidas
who emerges on this scene,

52:41.090 --> 52:45.820
and we shall see in his life,
the few times we hear about him

52:45.823 --> 52:49.933
he's always engaged in
attempting to contain Sparta's

52:49.925 --> 52:52.915
ambitions,
to certainly exclude the

52:52.922 --> 52:57.262
possibility of overseas
commitments and I would argue,

52:57.260 --> 53:01.290
I think most scholars would
agree, even not to be engaged

53:01.291 --> 53:04.101
outside of the Peloponnesus very
far.

53:04.099 --> 53:08.119
He seems to represent a
traditionalist point of view,

53:08.124 --> 53:11.844
which obviously comes to the
fore as this war,

53:11.840 --> 53:15.900
which the Spartans have started
really as part of Agesilaus'

53:15.902 --> 53:19.092
aggressive policy,
isn't working.

53:19.090 --> 53:22.120
The Spartans are having to
constantly fight,

53:22.117 --> 53:26.337
they are suffering casualties,
their allies are becoming more

53:26.341 --> 53:29.321
and more restive,
and look what's happened,

53:29.322 --> 53:32.212
suddenly Sparta which was
absolutely in charge of

53:32.206 --> 53:34.966
everything is practically on the
defensive.

53:34.969 --> 53:38.409
So, for all these reasons
there's opposition to the bold

53:38.414 --> 53:40.924
policy and Antalcidas represents
that.

53:40.920 --> 53:45.270
He gets the Spartan assembly or
the Spartan gerousia in

53:45.265 --> 53:49.605
efforts to support a mission to
the King of Persia in which he

53:49.611 --> 53:54.981
tries to negotiate a peace.
It doesn't work in large

53:54.976 --> 54:00.726
part, because the enemies,
that is Athens and Thebes

54:00.726 --> 54:04.366
particularly,
and perhaps the others--sorry

54:04.368 --> 54:07.478
Corinth and Argos also,
and I'll tell you why in a

54:07.475 --> 54:09.725
moment,
are not ready to do what is

54:09.730 --> 54:12.250
necessary from the Spartan point
of view.

54:12.250 --> 54:16.850
What the Spartans really want
is to break up this coalition

54:16.852 --> 54:21.532
and all anti-Spartan coalitions.
That's really the bottom line

54:21.530 --> 54:23.840
for Sparta.
There's no sense making peace,

54:23.836 --> 54:25.566
if you leave these people in
tact.

54:25.570 --> 54:28.440
What's to stop the whole thing
from happening again in the

54:28.437 --> 54:31.157
future?
That's the bottom line and they

54:31.159 --> 54:35.259
are unable to persuade the
Greeks to make the concessions

54:35.259 --> 54:39.589
that are necessary.
So, the war continues and

54:39.592 --> 54:44.822
nothing really changes except
things get worse.

54:44.820 --> 54:50.990
This time Antalcidas again
negotiates a peace and he really

54:50.988 --> 54:55.878
negotiates it with the great
King of Persia.

54:55.880 --> 55:00.350
The King of Persia has
changed his mind about where the

55:00.347 --> 55:04.237
great threat comes from.
Thrasybulus in the 390s,

55:04.238 --> 55:08.878
in the latter part of the 390s,
engages in a series of naval

55:08.881 --> 55:13.521
campaigns all around the Aegean
Sea in which he recovers one

55:13.524 --> 55:18.404
city after another that used to
be under Athenian rule and once

55:18.403 --> 55:21.633
again puts it under Athenian
rule.

55:21.630 --> 55:24.720
He even once again starts
collecting money from them.

55:24.719 --> 55:28.049
He did something also that the
Athenians had done late in the

55:28.050 --> 55:31.180
Peloponnesian War;
he establishes a customs house

55:31.183 --> 55:34.693
in the Hellespont in the
Bosporus and every ship that

55:34.691 --> 55:37.661
goes through pays a tax to the
Athenians.

55:37.659 --> 55:41.449
So, there's a real feeling in
Persia obviously that the

55:41.450 --> 55:45.100
Athenians are coming back to
rebuild their empire,

55:45.099 --> 55:48.809
and we better stop them and the
Spartans are safer from our

55:48.814 --> 55:51.764
point of view having been
chasing by events,

55:51.760 --> 55:56.610
and so I think that's probably
the single most important reason

55:56.605 --> 55:59.805
why the great king comes out and
backs,

55:59.809 --> 56:04.249
and as we shall see,
insists on a peace in Greece

56:04.254 --> 56:09.634
which meets Sparta's needs and
the needs are that all these

56:09.625 --> 56:14.435
international organizations
should be broken up.

56:14.440 --> 56:18.430
Obviously,
the league of four states that

56:18.425 --> 56:23.135
have conducted the war must
stop, but on top of that,

56:23.136 --> 56:28.386
the union between Argos and
Corinth must be broken up;

56:28.389 --> 56:31.079
that's especially critical to
the Spartans.

56:31.080 --> 56:34.880
That's right next door.
Argos would be strengthened by

56:34.883 --> 56:38.383
its association with Corinth and
if it were allowed to continue,

56:38.377 --> 56:40.537
it would be a problem in the
future.

56:40.540 --> 56:43.360
So, it had to be broken up.
Thebes, of course,

56:43.361 --> 56:48.391
was a great problem for the
Spartans and they insisted that

56:48.391 --> 56:53.431
before peace was to come,
the Thebans had to give up

56:53.434 --> 56:57.864
their control of Boeotia.
They had used the war as an

56:57.861 --> 57:01.351
opportunity to reconstruct the
old Boeotian League,

57:01.349 --> 57:05.559
which left Thebes at the head
and in control of the bulk of

57:05.563 --> 57:10.433
Boeotia that was to be broken up
in order to reduce Theban power.

57:10.429 --> 57:12.919
Originally,
the Spartans had wanted the

57:12.924 --> 57:16.494
Athenians to give up the things
that they had acquired in the

57:16.488 --> 57:19.338
course of the war but they
couldn't do that.

57:19.340 --> 57:23.630
Athens was still too strong in
the one field that they couldn't

57:23.627 --> 57:27.707
be challenged in easily -- their
control of the sea and so a

57:27.707 --> 57:31.577
compromise had to be made if a
peace was to be made.

57:31.579 --> 57:36.389
Athens would not join unless it
was allowed to keep Lemnos,

57:36.390 --> 57:40.070
Skyros, Imbros.
So, that was permitted.

57:40.070 --> 57:45.480
So the peace came and the
critical part--Xenophon reports

57:45.481 --> 57:51.571
the exact language of a message
that King Artaxerxes sent to the

57:51.569 --> 57:57.849
Greeks that was in effect the
instrument that made the peace.

57:57.849 --> 58:02.449
Here's what it said,
"King Artaxerxes thinks it just

58:02.451 --> 58:07.231
that the cities in Asia,
and the islands of Klazomenai

58:07.232 --> 58:12.632
and Cyprus shall belong to him.
Further, that all the other

58:12.630 --> 58:15.040
Greek cities,
small and great,

58:15.038 --> 58:17.948
shall be autonomous."
Listen to that word,

58:17.954 --> 58:21.134
that's critical.
This peace is associated with

58:21.134 --> 58:25.514
the principle of autonomy,
there shall be no breach of

58:25.511 --> 58:28.431
autonomy except,
says the king,

58:28.427 --> 58:33.917
"Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros
which shall belong to Athens as

58:33.915 --> 58:38.035
in the past.
If any refuse to accept this

58:38.039 --> 58:44.069
peace, I shall make war on them,
along with those who are of the

58:44.068 --> 58:48.678
same purpose,
both by land and sea and with

58:48.684 --> 58:53.084
both ships and money."
Ancient writers and modern

58:53.084 --> 58:57.674
writers have disagreed as to
what is the name of this peace,

58:57.670 --> 59:00.970
some of them speak of the Peace
of Antalcidas,

59:00.972 --> 59:05.012
more of them I think speak,
and I think they're right in

59:05.008 --> 59:09.838
this decision,
as the King's Peace.

59:09.840 --> 59:13.120
This is not the product of
a negotiation and the king is

59:13.117 --> 59:15.337
very careful even though it
really is,

59:15.340 --> 59:17.810
but he's very careful to make
it clear that that's not the way

59:17.812 --> 59:20.952
he sees it.
This is a command leveled by

59:20.950 --> 59:26.730
the king at the Greek states
saying, this is how you will be,

59:26.730 --> 59:31.400
I say so, and if you don't like
it I will beat the hell out of

59:31.400 --> 59:34.360
you.
That's the message that comes.

59:34.360 --> 59:37.200
But, of course,
the reason he can say that,

59:37.200 --> 59:41.330
with as much confidence as he
does, is that his partner in the

59:41.327 --> 59:44.627
peace is Sparta.
This is a peace that will

59:44.631 --> 59:48.531
benefit Persia and benefit
Sparta at the expense of

59:48.534 --> 59:52.214
everybody else.
The Spartans take it as a

59:52.206 --> 59:56.916
license to run Greece in the way
that they see fit.

59:56.920 --> 1:00:00.430
Notice nobody says that the
Spartans have to break up the

1:00:00.428 --> 1:00:04.528
Peloponnesian League,
that doesn't count as any kind

1:00:04.529 --> 1:00:09.579
of a violation of autonomy and
so that's the nature of the

1:00:09.582 --> 1:00:13.132
peace,
whether among the results are

1:00:13.130 --> 1:00:18.440
that the Asiatic Greeks are
abandoned by the Greek states

1:00:18.442 --> 1:00:22.522
once and for all,
and of course that means Sparta

1:00:22.520 --> 1:00:26.670
mainly, until finally Alexander
will impose his rule when he

1:00:26.669 --> 1:00:30.699
conquers the Persian Empire.
The Boeotian League is

1:00:30.696 --> 1:00:35.236
dissolved, Argos and Corinth are
split, and Athens loses all that

1:00:35.240 --> 1:00:39.070
has been gained except for those
three islands that are

1:00:39.074 --> 1:00:41.674
mentioned.
Sparta regains,

1:00:41.670 --> 1:00:46.770
and in a certain sense,
gets greater control of the

1:00:46.772 --> 1:00:51.962
mainland Greek situation.
It is the hegemon of

1:00:51.962 --> 1:00:56.542
Greece now as a kind of a
partner of the great king,

1:00:56.539 --> 1:00:59.169
and the great king leaves
Greece essentially to the

1:00:59.173 --> 1:01:01.073
Spartans without any
interference.

1:01:01.070 --> 1:01:03.820
How did he do that?
In the same way that they did

1:01:03.818 --> 1:01:07.668
it to win the Peloponnesian War.
An enemy of the Spartans would

1:01:07.672 --> 1:01:12.542
say because they were Medizers,
they had done the work of the

1:01:12.537 --> 1:01:15.147
Persians;
they had collaborated with the

1:01:15.152 --> 1:01:18.282
Persians against the Greeks.
That's now how the Spartans saw

1:01:18.276 --> 1:01:20.386
it of course;
they would have something

1:01:20.393 --> 1:01:23.303
like--I guess there's a crack in
Plutarch somewhere,

1:01:23.297 --> 1:01:27.627
it says, we have not Medized;
it's the Persians who have

1:01:27.627 --> 1:01:33.217
Spartanized, but that's a very
kind way of looking at it.

1:01:33.219 --> 1:01:36.679
It is without question,
if you look back on it,

1:01:36.677 --> 1:01:41.107
we're talking just about 100
years after the Persian war and

1:01:41.113 --> 1:01:44.123
it's a reversal of the Persian
Wars.

1:01:44.119 --> 1:01:47.339
The Greeks won the Persian
Wars and the proof of it was

1:01:47.341 --> 1:01:49.731
they chased the great king out
of Europe,

1:01:49.730 --> 1:01:53.970
eager to stay alive and
completely unable to do anything

1:01:53.969 --> 1:01:58.829
about what the Greeks were to do
with the coastal regions of the

1:01:58.825 --> 1:02:02.885
Persian Empire.
Now the King of Persia is

1:02:02.889 --> 1:02:06.839
telling the Greeks what they
must do.

1:02:06.840 --> 1:02:12.740
It was widely seen as a cause
for great shame and by those

1:02:12.736 --> 1:02:18.936
people who were not friendly to
Sparta a great cause of anger

1:02:18.943 --> 1:02:23.833
against the Spartans,
who were responsible for this

1:02:23.826 --> 1:02:27.376
condition of things.
But the Spartans didn't care

1:02:27.375 --> 1:02:31.545
much, because they were now in a
position to exercise the power

1:02:31.549 --> 1:02:34.039
that the dominant force in
Sparta,

1:02:34.039 --> 1:02:37.929
who is Agesilaus and his
supporters, wanted to do.

1:02:37.929 --> 1:02:48.899
So, in 385 we see the Spartans
attacking the city of Mantinea.

1:02:48.900 --> 1:02:52.930
Once again, the story is very
much like the story of Aulis in

1:02:52.927 --> 1:02:55.167
402.
This time Mantinea had been

1:02:55.166 --> 1:02:59.316
again, one of those states in
the Peloponnesus that had joined

1:02:59.316 --> 1:03:02.646
in a quadruple alliance against
Sparta in 421,

1:03:02.650 --> 1:03:07.300
the great battle that so much
threatened Spartan existence in

1:03:07.304 --> 1:03:11.264
418 had been fought on the
territory of Mantinea.

1:03:11.260 --> 1:03:15.720
It had a democratic history and
democratic tendencies.

1:03:15.719 --> 1:03:20.589
So, with no pretext really
at all, the Spartans invaded

1:03:20.585 --> 1:03:23.685
their territory,
besieged the city,

1:03:23.690 --> 1:03:28.640
managed finally to defeat
Mantinea by diverting the waters

1:03:28.643 --> 1:03:33.603
of a river that ran through
Mantinea to the point where it

1:03:33.597 --> 1:03:38.027
undermined the walls and they
had to surrender.

1:03:38.030 --> 1:03:42.140
Xenophon learns an important
lesson about warfare from this

1:03:42.141 --> 1:03:46.041
event and he concludes his
account of this by saying,

1:03:46.039 --> 1:03:49.459
well, that shows you that you
should not build your city

1:03:49.458 --> 1:03:52.748
around the river.
So, if any of you are planning,

1:03:52.754 --> 1:03:54.054
keep that in mind.

1:03:57.860 --> 1:04:02.460
Then soon afterwards,
the Spartans turn on another

1:04:02.456 --> 1:04:06.326
city in the Peloponnesus,
the city of Phlyus,

1:04:06.326 --> 1:04:10.546
which is to the southwest of
Corinth, not a very big city but

1:04:10.548 --> 1:04:15.018
not a small tiny one either,
and what it turns out here is

1:04:15.024 --> 1:04:19.144
that the thing that the
Phylasians have done that the

1:04:19.139 --> 1:04:24.039
Spartans don't like is that they
have been a democracy for part

1:04:24.044 --> 1:04:26.974
of the time.
King Agesilaus basically

1:04:26.970 --> 1:04:30.920
removes the government after
fighting a war and besieging the

1:04:30.923 --> 1:04:33.543
city.
It was not an easy task,

1:04:33.538 --> 1:04:38.238
it was expensive and time
consuming, but they do gain a

1:04:38.237 --> 1:04:43.627
victory and Agesilaus puts in a
new government made up not just

1:04:43.633 --> 1:04:47.193
of oligarchs,
which of course they were,

1:04:47.193 --> 1:04:50.953
but they were the personal
friends of Agesilaus.

1:04:50.949 --> 1:04:54.649
If you look at it,
historically it resembles the

1:04:54.648 --> 1:04:59.288
stuff that Lysander was doing at
the end of the Peloponnesian War

1:04:59.290 --> 1:05:03.860
and afterwards in placing these
decarchies of his friends

1:05:03.859 --> 1:05:07.319
in the cities,
so that they would not be only

1:05:07.317 --> 1:05:11.327
pro-Spartan but pro-Lysander,
and here Agesilaus did the same

1:05:11.332 --> 1:05:15.282
thing in Phylus and it's not the
only place that he did.

1:05:15.280 --> 1:05:21.170
Then enormity followed enormity
as the Spartan power was

1:05:21.171 --> 1:05:24.921
unchecked in this period of
time.

1:05:24.920 --> 1:05:29.560
Up in the north the city of
Olynthus, in the Chalcidic

1:05:29.561 --> 1:05:33.941
peninsula was gaining control of
that peninsula,

1:05:33.940 --> 1:05:38.080
basically establishing itself
as the hegemonal power over

1:05:38.077 --> 1:05:42.557
cities in that region.
In 383, a couple of cities up

1:05:42.560 --> 1:05:47.420
in that region came to Sparta
complaining of what the

1:05:47.421 --> 1:05:53.311
Olynthians were doing and urging
the Spartans to defend them and

1:05:53.309 --> 1:05:58.759
to undo these things,
using as the basis for their

1:05:58.761 --> 1:06:03.841
appeal the King's Peace.
This was a violation of their

1:06:03.839 --> 1:06:06.549
autonomy;
the Spartans were to be the

1:06:06.552 --> 1:06:10.552
upholders of Greek autonomy
according to the King's Peace,

1:06:10.546 --> 1:06:13.346
and so they ought to send a
force up.

1:06:13.349 --> 1:06:19.739
The Spartans did so and in
the course of that war which

1:06:19.743 --> 1:06:24.813
lasted from 382 to 379,
they defeated Olynthos,

1:06:24.807 --> 1:06:30.427
dissolved the confederacy,
and destroyed again any notion

1:06:30.425 --> 1:06:34.935
of a league other than the
Spartan League.

1:06:34.940 --> 1:06:39.830
There was an event that was
connected with that movement up

1:06:39.827 --> 1:06:43.147
towards the northeast,
up to the Chalcidice,

1:06:43.148 --> 1:06:46.238
which was the most famous,
I think--there's a small

1:06:46.240 --> 1:06:48.590
competition for a couple of
events,

1:06:48.590 --> 1:06:51.730
but one of the most famous
anyway in this period

1:06:51.734 --> 1:06:55.954
illustrating the arrogance and
power of the Spartan hegemony,

1:06:55.949 --> 1:07:01.579
a Spartan force was sent off
ostensibly to reinforce their

1:07:01.575 --> 1:07:05.715
Spartan army up there in the
Chalcidice.

1:07:05.719 --> 1:07:08.699
It was led by a general named
Phoebidas.

1:07:08.699 --> 1:07:13.059
As he was moving north on a
route that would not have been

1:07:13.063 --> 1:07:17.633
the normal route to take,
a route that took him right

1:07:17.631 --> 1:07:22.541
past the city of Thebes,
he camped out at night and on

1:07:22.540 --> 1:07:28.190
his way there he was contacted
by an important official in the

1:07:28.191 --> 1:07:32.621
government of Thebes,
an oligarch, a friend of Sparta.

1:07:32.619 --> 1:07:38.279
The next day the Spartan army
seized the Acropolis of Thebes,

1:07:38.276 --> 1:07:41.666
which is called the
Cadmea.

1:07:41.670 --> 1:07:46.540
They did so on a sacred day,
a holiday was being celebrated,

1:07:46.536 --> 1:07:51.316
everybody was in the same shape
people are on a holiday.

1:07:51.320 --> 1:07:56.670
Nobody was ready,
they took the city;

1:07:56.670 --> 1:08:01.150
the enemies of the dominant
party that had invited the

1:08:01.153 --> 1:08:05.553
Spartans in were put to death,
if they could not flee

1:08:05.551 --> 1:08:09.401
successfully.
The Spartans left a

1:08:09.396 --> 1:08:15.776
garrison on the Cadmea
and took control of the city and

1:08:15.780 --> 1:08:20.490
had their stooges run the city
thereafter.

1:08:20.489 --> 1:08:24.039
Now, this had not been
determined by the Spartan

1:08:24.043 --> 1:08:28.433
assembly, this was not the
consequence of a policy decision

1:08:28.429 --> 1:08:32.209
that the Spartan officials or
people had made.

1:08:32.210 --> 1:08:36.220
When Phoebidas came back to
Sparta he was put on trial and

1:08:36.216 --> 1:08:40.286
there was great anger against
him and there was great anger

1:08:40.293 --> 1:08:44.233
against Sparta of course
throughout the Greek world.

1:08:44.229 --> 1:08:48.769
There was no real case for him,
but surprisingly enough,

1:08:48.773 --> 1:08:53.403
even though he was not a member
of Agesilaus' faction.

1:08:53.399 --> 1:08:56.619
Agesilaus got up at the trial
and simply said,

1:08:56.617 --> 1:09:00.117
you guys are all talking about
the wrong thing.

1:09:00.119 --> 1:09:03.909
There's only one question that
should be asked about the

1:09:03.907 --> 1:09:10.647
behavior of Phoebidas.
Was what he did good or bad for

1:09:10.647 --> 1:09:14.857
Sparta?
Well, it was obviously good.

1:09:14.859 --> 1:09:17.289
Why in the world do you want to
punish him?

1:09:17.289 --> 1:09:21.529
He was not punished with any
severity;

1:09:21.529 --> 1:09:24.739
a mild fine or at least a fine
was imposed.

1:09:24.739 --> 1:09:26.719
We don't know if he ever paid
it.

1:09:26.720 --> 1:09:29.610
In any case,
the critical thing was what

1:09:29.608 --> 1:09:32.718
would Sparta do about the action
itself?

1:09:32.720 --> 1:09:36.570
The fact that it had a garrison
up there on the Cadmea.

1:09:36.569 --> 1:09:39.269
If they thought it had been the
wrong thing to do,

1:09:39.274 --> 1:09:42.204
if it had been the idea that
Phoebidas and what didn't

1:09:42.199 --> 1:09:44.899
represent Spartan policy,
then they should have withdrawn

1:09:44.902 --> 1:09:46.922
the garrison.
The garrison stayed,

1:09:46.921 --> 1:09:51.331
so that Sparta now--this was
something that rang all around

1:09:51.334 --> 1:09:54.664
the Greek world.
This was the worst thing

1:09:54.659 --> 1:09:59.129
anybody could remember in peace
time with no allegation of

1:09:59.125 --> 1:10:02.035
cause,
they had simply seized another

1:10:02.038 --> 1:10:04.608
city, an ancient city,
a great city,

1:10:04.614 --> 1:10:06.974
and they refused to back off.

1:10:10.159 --> 1:10:17.309
Finally there's one other
example of this same kind of

1:10:17.310 --> 1:10:20.570
behavior.
The government in Thebes was

1:10:20.566 --> 1:10:23.646
tyrannical, imposed upon an
unwilling people;

1:10:23.649 --> 1:10:28.599
some of the people who had fled
did a reverse of what happened

1:10:28.604 --> 1:10:32.344
in the time of the Thirty
Tyrants in Athens.

1:10:32.340 --> 1:10:35.190
They fled to Athens,
and, of course,

1:10:35.191 --> 1:10:39.591
the Athenians gave them
support, and protected them and

1:10:39.591 --> 1:10:44.401
then in 379 a small number of
these exiles launched a clever

1:10:44.398 --> 1:10:49.288
plot that allowed them to sneak
into Thebes and to make their

1:10:49.286 --> 1:10:54.256
way to the Cadmea and to
kill the oligarchic leaders of

1:10:54.256 --> 1:10:59.306
the city in the dark when nobody
could really do anything about

1:10:59.307 --> 1:11:03.077
it,
and to drive away a number of

1:11:03.076 --> 1:11:06.146
the Spartans and to free the
city.

1:11:06.149 --> 1:11:09.609
Thebes became free,
it became democratic too,

1:11:09.612 --> 1:11:13.652
because these people now
belonged to a democratic faction

1:11:13.652 --> 1:11:16.372
and more and more,
if you're a democrat,

1:11:16.374 --> 1:11:18.644
you're anti-Spartan,
if you're an oligarch,

1:11:18.643 --> 1:11:21.753
you're a pro-Spartan,
and so all of this is the

1:11:21.749 --> 1:11:25.729
beginning of what we will get to
next time, which is the

1:11:25.730 --> 1:11:29.830
flowering of Theban power.
It's going to happen as they

1:11:29.826 --> 1:11:33.456
get stronger and stronger,
but the event I wanted to

1:11:33.461 --> 1:11:37.811
mention as the twin of the
Phoebidas thing is that in 379,

1:11:37.810 --> 1:11:43.910
a Spartan harmost of the
one of the garrisons in Boeotia

1:11:43.909 --> 1:11:48.729
by the name of Sphodrias took a
force by night,

1:11:48.729 --> 1:11:52.869
marched into Attica,
ostensibly his plan was to

1:11:52.866 --> 1:11:58.526
reach the Piraeus and then that
would allow them to take control

1:11:58.531 --> 1:12:01.411
of Athens,
because they could cut them off

1:12:01.408 --> 1:12:04.728
from their port at the sea.
He didn't get it quite right.

1:12:04.729 --> 1:12:08.759
By the time morning broke and
they were visible he was still

1:12:08.760 --> 1:12:11.960
miles and miles,
and miles away from the Piraeus

1:12:11.962 --> 1:12:15.592
and so all he could do was to do
some harm to the Athenian

1:12:15.590 --> 1:12:19.290
territory and then to go home.
Well, when he got home again he

1:12:19.293 --> 1:12:22.353
hadn't gotten any vote from the
Spartan assembly or from the

1:12:22.345 --> 1:12:25.445
gerousia or from the
ephors to do anything,

1:12:25.449 --> 1:12:28.549
another thing that he had
apparently done on his own.

1:12:28.550 --> 1:12:34.310
So, there was another trial and
this time the only thing he had

1:12:34.306 --> 1:12:39.986
going for him apparently--well,
he still had Agesilaus' general

1:12:39.992 --> 1:12:44.732
approach, but he was the lover
of the son of Agesilaus,

1:12:44.729 --> 1:12:49.469
and so Agesilaus who ostensibly
was hostile to what had happened

1:12:49.468 --> 1:12:54.128
was made to speak in his defense
and this time his argument was

1:12:54.132 --> 1:12:57.212
simply,
Sparta has too few men of

1:12:57.211 --> 1:13:01.901
quality to be able to execute
any for whatever reason

1:13:01.895 --> 1:13:07.205
whatsoever and so we shouldn't
do anything to Sphodrias.

1:13:07.210 --> 1:13:11.560
So, they didn't.
That was yet another signal and

1:13:11.560 --> 1:13:16.780
it had fantastic consequences.
In Athens they had been

1:13:16.781 --> 1:13:21.471
holding some Spartan ambassadors
when the Sphodrias' raid had

1:13:21.474 --> 1:13:25.394
taken place and they were
holding them in effect as

1:13:25.385 --> 1:13:27.845
hostages,
but the Spartans said,

1:13:27.848 --> 1:13:31.578
look we had nothing to do with
it, this was--Sphodrias did it

1:13:31.580 --> 1:13:33.730
all on his own,
and he'll certainly be

1:13:33.731 --> 1:13:35.561
condemned when he gets back to
Sparta.

1:13:35.560 --> 1:13:38.400
So, the Athenians said okay,
you can go home,

1:13:38.399 --> 1:13:42.139
and then he wasn't and so the
Athenians now were determined

1:13:42.143 --> 1:13:44.793
that they would have to fight
Sparta.

1:13:44.789 --> 1:13:48.869
In the process,
they set about organizing an

1:13:48.866 --> 1:13:53.886
alliance, a general alliance,
meant against Sparta,

1:13:53.890 --> 1:13:56.890
which they were able to do in
considerable part,

1:13:56.885 --> 1:14:00.065
because of all of the
irritation that had been felt

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all around Greece by these
terrible actions of the

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Spartans,
and as I think I'll tell you

1:14:06.483 --> 1:14:11.483
next time, they put together
what we call the Second Athenian

1:14:11.483 --> 1:14:15.673
Confederation,
and they made an alliance with

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the newly liberated Thebes.
Thebes, which is going to get

1:14:20.375 --> 1:14:24.235
stronger and stronger,
and stronger and so we have now

1:14:24.241 --> 1:14:28.331
a threat once again to the
Spartan hegemony which will be

1:14:28.326 --> 1:14:31.326
very serious,
but of a different kind from

1:14:31.330 --> 1:14:33.630
the one we had before.
I'll tell you about it next

1:14:33.629 --> 1:14:33.999
time.