WEBVTT

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Professor Donald
Kagan: The Persians were

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busy with other things as well
as thinking about returning to

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Greece because the great king
was not willing,

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and understandably in a way,
to accept his defeat by these

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few puny Greeks,
because of the consequences

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that would have for the
reputation of Persia,

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and just as a matter of
personal honor these kings would

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not have been glad to accept
such an outcome.

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I won't drag you through the
details of the invasion by the

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Persians in 480.
After all, we're making you

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read Herodotus,
and the whole problem about it.

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But let me simply talk a bit
about the conclusion to the

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great invasion,
the great Persian Wars,

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as we call them,
and also to say something about

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what their meaning was.
The meaning of the defeat

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of the Persians in 479 was
broader than the meaning of

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their defeat at Marathon in 490.
For one thing,

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it involved the entire Greek
nation;

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of course, it wasn't a nation,
but you know I'm using the word

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loosely.
Of course it didn't involve the

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whole of that nation no matter
how loosely I use it,

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because if you imagine that
there are over 1,000

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poleis,
there were only 31 who signed

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up to resist the Persian
invasion of 480.

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However, they included the most
important, and strongest,

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and largest of the Greek
poleis.

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So, it's not too much of a
stretch to speak of it as a

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Greek victory.
Again, the same issue that

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had been present at Marathon,
the question of whether the

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Greeks would continue to live
their lives free in their

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poleis,
developing their own style,

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their unique style of life or
become another province of the

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Persian Empire just like so many
others.

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We can see that in one
wonderful contemporary reference

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to the meaning of the war--it's
in Aeschylus' oldest surviving

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play Persians,
in which the central event is

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the great sea battle at Salamis
in which the Greeks defeat the

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Persian fleet,
which guarantees that the

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Persians will not win a great
victory, even though two more

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decisive battles in the
following year 479 are necessary

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to drive the Persians away.
But here's what Aeschylus

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describes in his play
Persians.

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He's having the story told
by--I'm trying to remember,

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it may well have been a Persian
who's telling the story,

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but in any case--probably not.
It was one of the Greeks.

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Anyway, here's what he says,
"a mighty shout greeted our

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ears, on you sons of Hellas,
free your homeland,

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free your children,
your wives, the homes of your

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father's gods,
and the tombs of your

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ancestors."
In other words,

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this play was put on something
like--about I think it's about

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seven years after the Battle of
Salamis.

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So, it's almost a contemporary
event and you can see that from

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the first the Greeks viewed this
war as being about freedom as

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opposed to many other possible
considerations.

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In the spring,
in the following year in 479,

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there were two great battles
that decided the outcome of the

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war finally.
On the land,

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the battle of Plataea in
southern Boeotia,

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in which a great Greek army,
which included the major cities

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including especially Sparta and
Athens took on a powerful

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Persian land army and defeated
them on land.

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Herodotus says on the very same
day--it would be a wonderful

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coincidence if it were true.
It may be true.

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A sea battle was fought off the
coast of Asia Minor at Mycale,

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where again,
the Greek fleet once more

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destroyed the Persian fleet,
and at that point the Persians

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had no choice but simply to flee
and to try to escape the Greeks,

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who were pursuing them and
doing their best to kill as many

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of them as they could.
Now, after Mycale,

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a very important event took
place that cast a long shadow

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about the future of what was
going to happen in that part of

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the world.
There was a conference held on

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the island of Samos,
perhaps one of the most

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important of the Ionian islands
off the coast,

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which brought to the Greek
council that had been conducting

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the war, it brought the island
states of Chios,

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Lesbos, and Samos,
these are the three largest,

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most important islands that are
located off the coast of Asia

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Minor.
All of them had taken advantage

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of the presence of the Greek
forces in that region to rebel

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against the Persians and now
they wanted to be admitted to

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the league that the Greeks had
formed in 481 to resist the

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Persian invasion.
The Greeks referred to

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themselves to that league simply
as the Hellenes,

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the Greeks,
and it's convenient to think

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about it as the Greek League
meant to fight the Persians in

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that war.
Now, this might seem like a

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simple thing to do.
Why not accept these three

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Greek states,
all of them potentially

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powerful and important,
who want join the Greek League.

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One thing I think we need to
understand once or we won't

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comprehend the situation at all,
we know that the Persian wars

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are over.
We know that the Persians just

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ran away and weren't going to
come back and challenge this

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Greek victory for the longest
time,

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but the Greeks didn't know it.
The Persian Empire was still

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intact;
it was still an extraordinarily

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extensive, rich,
and powerful empire.

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There was no reason why the
Greeks should not believe that

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the Persians would be coming
again,

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and if we don't grasp that,
then all of what they do now

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makes no sense.
Well, Chios,

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Samos, and Lesbos wanted to be
sure that they would be

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protected by this Greek League,
if and when,

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the Persians came back and
tried to put them back into the

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Persian Empire.
So, there is a conference,

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but there is not a unity of
intention.

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When the Greeks have to
discuss, shall we take these

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people into our league,
basically the Spartans said no,

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and the reasons for that are no
so very strange.

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The Spartans certainly could
conclude with security that

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there wasn't very much danger
that in the foreseeable future,

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the Persians would come
marching into Greece again and

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present a threat to the
Peloponnesus and to the Spartan

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predominance in that area,
and we all know by now that the

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Spartans were most reluctant to
be far from home anyway.

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They didn't like to have to
cross the sea to get to a

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battlefield and didn't want
their army out there on any

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permanent basis.
Everything in their tradition

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said bring the army home,
put an end to this activity,

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and they didn't want to take on
the responsibility of bringing

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these islanders into their
league,

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so that they would have to go
and fight for their freedom.

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On the other hand,
the Athenians took the opposite

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view;
they were very much in favor of

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bringing these states into this
thing.

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Anyway, the Athenians thought
differently and that's not

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surprising either,
because their situation was

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quite different from that of the
Spartans.

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They were on the sea;
they were accustomed to be at

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sea.
Moreover, as we've seen and

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said several times,
they had very important supply

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line,
lines of communication and

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transportation,
in order to feed themselves

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they needed to go out there and
have freedom of the seas,

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and that meant that they had to
see to it that the Persians were

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indeed driven from the Aegean
Sea and the Hellespont and the

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straits in general,
and the access to the Black Sea.

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So, for those reasons alone,
the Athenians would have had to

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take seriously this request by
the islanders.

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But it's also true that at
least some of the islanders,

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Samos particularly,
were Ionians,

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as you remember,
kinsmen of the Athenians.

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The Athenians were recognized
as the leader of the Ionian

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people.
So, there was that sentimental

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attachment as well.
But most strikingly,

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I think we have to understand
that the Athenians understood

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the Persians have to be kept
away from the Aegean Sea and the

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Athenians also wanted very much,
because ever since the

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rebellion of 499,
the Athenians had wanted to

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liberate the Greeks of Asia
Minor from the Persian rule.

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So, the Athenians won the
argument;

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it was agreed to take these
three island states into the

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Greek League and that meant that
the Greeks would be committed to

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protect them should the Persians
attack them again.

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In accordance with these
decisions, the commander of the

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Spartan fleet out there,
King Leotychidas sailed home

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and took his Spartans,
and I would imagine his

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Peloponnesians with him.
On the other hand,

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the commander of the Athenian
fleet, Xanthippus stayed,

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and carried on the war against
the Persians in the area.

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Let me just give you a small
clue.

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Xanthippus will have a
son--sorry he has a son in the

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year 479 whose name is Pericles,
and we will be hearing of

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course a lot about him later on.

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The Persians have fled but
there are a few places in Europe

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that, along the route of their
escape,

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where the Persians still had
control of a town or a city here

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and there, and one of the most
important was the town of

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Sestos,
located on the European side of

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the Dardanelles,
and so Xanthippus besieged the

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city with the Athenian and the
navy,

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and the rest of the Greeks
ships that were still there,

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and after awhile,
took the city by siege and

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cleared the Persians out of
there.

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The result of the war was,
of course, first of all,

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the vindication,
the validation of Greek

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freedom.
Greeks would indeed continue to

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be able to live the lives that
they had been accustomed to.

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But another thing had happened,
which was going to make an

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enormous impact on Greek
life--you perhaps will remember

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that before the Persian
invasion,

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but not long before,
I believe it's in the year 482,

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the silver mines in the south
of Attica had yielded an unusual

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strike.
A vein of silver had been

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discovered that was much more
than normal, so much so that

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something had to be decided by
the Athenian assembly.

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What should we do with the
silver?

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It's a wonderful insight into
the way Greeks thought about

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their polis.
The first thought,

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the one that was most popular
to begin with,

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was well, let's take the silver
and divide it up equally among

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the Athenians.
That in some sense the

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polis was a kind of joint
stock company and when there was

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a nice dividend you just dole it
out to the investors.

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Themistocles thought
otherwise.

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Themistocles was--it'
evident--was constantly aware of

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the threat from Persia and of
the importance of getting ready

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to fight the Persians,
and he understood I think

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before most other Greeks that
the navy was going to be really

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critical in this operation.
So, he made the suggestion that

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the silver strike be used to
build a whole fleet of new ships

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for the Athenians,
and they end up with two

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hundred triremes,
which is, the trireme is the

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battleship of the ancient
Greeks.

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So, that is the core of the
fleet which is the one that

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defeats the Persians at Salamis
and defeats them again at

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Mycale.
The Spartans were given command

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of the war against Persia,
both on land and sea,

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but the Spartans didn't have
any great skill or experience in

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naval matters,
and the Athenians had more than

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they, and it was the Athenian
portion of the fleet,

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which was the largest and the
most effective in fighting those

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naval battles.
And, of course,

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the battle of Salamis was
fought in Athenian waters and

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Themistocles,
with his clever devices,

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had come up with the way of
winning victory.

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First of all,
compelling the Greeks to fight

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at Salamis and then winning the
victory at Salamis.

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Now, the point of all this
is one of the changes that has

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come upon the Greek world as a
result of this Persian invasion,

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is that there is something new
in the Greek world,

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a big Athenian navy,
and it has proven itself

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already to be an extraordinarily
capable navy.

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That is a new power factor,
and the whole idea of naval

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power, being very decisive in
Greek affairs is a relatively

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new idea.
That's not to say that there

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weren't states that had navies
before and naval battles,

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and in some cases that these
were very important.

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But we're really at another
level after the Athenians have

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built this fleet and had the
success that they had.

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Another consequence of the
war was of course the tremendous

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boom that came in Greek
self-confidence.

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I can't emphasize enough what
an incredible upset this was.

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No one would have imagined
that, if the great king got

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really serious and sent over an
army of a hundred or two hundred

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thousand,
nobody knows exactly how

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many--Herodotus' numbers are,
it is widely agreed,

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exaggerated,
but it's a very big army and a

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very big navy,
certainly it outnumbers the

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Greeks in both cases.

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Anybody would have thought it
was going to be an easy victory

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for the Persians.
To defeat that meant an

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enormous amount and the Greeks
came away feeling that their

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general prejudice over their own
superiority over everybody else

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had been justified by their
performance in the Persian Wars;

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the Athenians,
no less, of course,

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because of the very central
role that they had

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played.So,
all of these are new things

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that are in the hearts and minds
of the Greeks and by no means

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are trivial.
There was a sense that the

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Greeks had something remarkably
glorious, not to be forgotten,

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which made them proud and made
them, I think also,

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rather ambitious to continue in
that course.

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Finally, one other point that I
would want to make and that is,

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this is the first great
panhellenic activity,

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really.
There had been some sense in

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which the Greeks were
increasingly aware that there

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was something called Hellenes,
Greek peoples different from

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people who were not Hellenes,
and this probably took shape

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most fully when they competed in
the major athletic contests at

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major religious festivals in
which they were fundamentally

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Greek even though it--well,
they were entirely Greek,

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really.
So that would have fostered

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this sense of panhellenism,
but nothing could have given it

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the tremendous boost that it got
like this victory of these

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thirty-one states that had
banded together to defeat the

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Persians in that war.
So, panhellenism is now on

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the horizon.
I don't mean to say that the

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Greeks are shaped now into a
single people,

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have retreated from their
localism and their love for

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their polis;
nothing could be further from

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the truth, but alongside of
their love of autonomy and love

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of their polis,
there was the idea that

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panhellenism was a good thing.
It had a kind of a nice ring to

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it.
It's the sort of the thing that

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I feel some familiarity with.
Not that I was around right

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after the First World War,
but reading about it,

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you realize that there was some
sense after that war that the

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victorious peoples had something
in common,

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and that in any case they could
work together to achieve

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international peace in a way
that hadn't been thought of much

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before.
But even more strongly,

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I think the idea after the
Second World War,

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when this idea took even
stronger roots to the point

20:10.214 --> 20:15.174
where you know people have this
quasi-religious feeling,

20:15.170 --> 20:20.390
at least some of them do,
about the desire to avoid

20:20.391 --> 20:24.361
having parochial national
interests,

20:24.359 --> 20:28.409
determined what you're going to
do in international relations.

20:28.410 --> 20:32.620
Everything has to be done
somehow as though there were a

20:32.620 --> 20:36.470
world government that really
existed and really managed

20:36.474 --> 20:39.034
things,
and although everybody knows

20:39.031 --> 20:41.941
that's not true,
it's thought to be bad form to

20:41.941 --> 20:45.441
face that fact.
Well, something like that kind,

20:45.442 --> 20:49.252
not as bad as that,
but something like that kind of

20:49.252 --> 20:52.302
unreality was in the minds of
Greeks,

20:52.299 --> 20:55.889
because you will be hearing
over the next century various

20:55.891 --> 21:00.081
thinkers and speakers,
who want to make the case that

21:00.077 --> 21:04.047
a thing is good if it's somehow
panhellenic,

21:04.050 --> 21:08.030
that's a fine thing.
So it's an idea that's there,

21:08.034 --> 21:11.814
not that any state,
any more than our nations have

21:11.810 --> 21:15.200
given up any sovereignty or any
independence,

21:15.201 --> 21:20.611
or any autonomy.
It's an idea and that's all

21:20.613 --> 21:25.733
that it is.
Another consequence of the

21:25.729 --> 21:32.249
war was a division within the
Greek world that was in part

21:32.245 --> 21:38.755
based upon the fact that Athens
had come on in that war to

21:38.761 --> 21:45.281
become a great power and by
anybody's reckoning had played

21:45.277 --> 21:50.647
one of the leading roles in the
victory.

21:50.650 --> 21:55.350
Now, the Spartans had too;
the Spartans were the official

21:55.348 --> 21:59.898
leaders, and their regent had
been the commander at the great

21:59.904 --> 22:04.464
land battle at Plataea and their
general was in charge of the

22:04.460 --> 22:07.650
navy,
but Athens had become so

22:07.650 --> 22:12.310
important, so big,
so successful that there was

22:12.307 --> 22:16.887
now a question--I mean,
was Sparta really the leader of

22:16.893 --> 22:19.253
the Greeks?
What was the future?

22:19.250 --> 22:22.180
Was the future going to be one
in which the Spartans would

22:22.184 --> 22:25.074
maintain the unique leadership
of the Greeks or would the

22:25.067 --> 22:28.757
Athenians challenge them?
It soon became clear that

22:28.756 --> 22:31.856
the Athenians would indeed
challenge them,

22:31.862 --> 22:35.582
and so a major theme,
maybe the major theme in

22:35.576 --> 22:40.236
international relations for the
next fifty years will be the

22:40.237 --> 22:43.237
conflict between Athens and
Sparta.

22:43.240 --> 22:46.610
A lot of it,
I think, could be described

22:46.606 --> 22:50.836
really as a cold war,
because there is no fighting

22:50.835 --> 22:55.405
between the two states between
479 and about 460,

22:55.410 --> 22:58.630
or even a little bit later.
Actually, they don't come into

22:58.627 --> 23:02.687
conflict themselves until 457
again, and when that war stops

23:02.694 --> 23:05.524
there is a period once again of
peace,

23:05.519 --> 23:08.509
and then we come to the great
Peloponnesian War which

23:08.507 --> 23:10.917
dominates the last third of the
century.

23:10.920 --> 23:14.850
That's all in the future.
But what's clear now is that

23:14.849 --> 23:19.549
there's got to be some new
arrangement, some new alignment

23:19.552 --> 23:23.762
to face up to the change in the
power structure.

23:23.759 --> 23:26.519
There was only one great power
before the war;

23:26.519 --> 23:29.369
there clearly are two after the
war.

23:32.680 --> 23:36.470
Well, the Greeks also had
to decide certain questions that

23:36.467 --> 23:38.897
had been created by the war.
One of them,

23:38.902 --> 23:41.572
who is to be the leader if
there is to be a leader of the

23:41.573 --> 23:43.913
Greeks,
but beyond that there was some

23:43.907 --> 23:47.807
Greek states that had gone over
to the Persians in the course of

23:47.808 --> 23:50.858
the war.
The Greeks refer to these

23:50.862 --> 23:54.682
people as Medizers.
What should be done with the

23:54.675 --> 23:57.495
Medizers?
I'm sure there were proposals

23:57.497 --> 24:02.137
from one extreme that would have
said just wipe those cities out

24:02.140 --> 24:05.530
to the other extreme which would
have said,

24:05.530 --> 24:09.500
well, let bygones be bygones.
And there were opinions all

24:09.496 --> 24:14.296
along the middle of the way,
and so that remained an issue

24:14.303 --> 24:20.403
that had to be settled somehow.
Then behind it all was the

24:20.396 --> 24:25.556
question, what shall we look for
in the future?

24:25.559 --> 24:31.439
Was Persia going to be a threat
once again, which would imply

24:31.444 --> 24:36.484
one whole set of policies,
or can we consider the threat

24:36.475 --> 24:41.195
from Persia finished so that we
can go back to our normal way

24:41.203 --> 24:44.043
without adjusting to that
policy?

24:44.039 --> 24:48.199
For the reasons I've already
indicated the Spartans and the

24:48.199 --> 24:52.719
Peloponnesians were more likely
to take the view that the threat

24:52.717 --> 24:54.777
was over.
The Athenians,

24:54.777 --> 24:57.187
the islanders,
and the Ionians,

24:57.192 --> 25:00.092
I should said the Asiatic
Greeks,

25:00.089 --> 25:05.479
would take the view that no,
there is a very imminent danger

25:05.482 --> 25:09.212
from the Persians,
the war isn't over,

25:09.213 --> 25:12.523
we need to continue to fight
it.

25:12.519 --> 25:18.329
Now, let me then try to
describe the way in which a new

25:18.334 --> 25:24.454
way of dealing with the Persians
would come onto the scene.

25:24.450 --> 25:29.570
For that I need to take you
back to 481, the year when

25:29.569 --> 25:35.269
Xerxes started his march from
the Persian empire against the

25:35.267 --> 25:38.087
Greeks.
The Greeks knew this was

25:38.094 --> 25:41.114
happening and they met,
you will remember,

25:41.109 --> 25:45.449
at Corinth in 481 when those
thirty one cities came together

25:45.446 --> 25:50.516
and swore that they would fight
together to defeat the Persians.

25:50.519 --> 25:54.209
They appointed Sparta
officially as the

25:54.213 --> 25:58.493
hegemon,
the leader of that league,

25:58.490 --> 26:02.740
which meant that the Spartans
would be in command on land and

26:02.744 --> 26:06.294
sea and once the battles
commenced they would be in

26:06.289 --> 26:08.309
charge.
But, of course,

26:08.308 --> 26:12.598
the decisions as to what to do,
where to go to fight,

26:12.601 --> 26:16.591
when to fight and so on,
were made by the council of

26:16.585 --> 26:20.435
Greeks who were participating.
The Spartans did not

26:20.438 --> 26:23.808
attempt to impose their wishes
at that point,

26:23.809 --> 26:28.329
So, the league really functions
like a league of equals,

26:28.329 --> 26:30.709
but of course,
the states are not equal in

26:30.713 --> 26:34.553
their power so that there's much
more influence by the Spartans,

26:34.549 --> 26:37.379
but there's also a lot of
influence by the Athenians,

26:37.377 --> 26:39.387
because of the size of their
fleet.

26:39.390 --> 26:43.040
That's the way things were
working in the Greek League

26:43.039 --> 26:45.869
against Persia.
Even though the Spartans are

26:45.872 --> 26:48.842
the hegemon,
they do not confuse this league

26:48.840 --> 26:53.250
with the Peloponnesian League.
It is something quite different.

26:53.250 --> 26:56.170
I've already described the
league to you and so you know

26:56.168 --> 26:59.248
that the relationships are
different, and the membership is

26:59.247 --> 27:01.587
different.
The Greek League has states

27:01.587 --> 27:05.137
that are not in the Peloponnesus
and have not previously been

27:05.136 --> 27:08.356
allied to Sparta;
it also includes Sparta's

27:08.358 --> 27:11.128
traditional Peloponnesian
allies.

27:11.130 --> 27:16.760
They swear this common oath;
the Greeks are to fight for the

27:16.759 --> 27:20.659
common freedom,
to free the Greeks in the

27:20.655 --> 27:26.955
islands in Asia Minor.
And it is to be a perpetual

27:26.957 --> 27:32.967
league, as we know,
because as late as 461,

27:32.974 --> 27:36.334
I guess,
when there is a conflict

27:36.326 --> 27:39.286
between Athens and Sparta,
the Athenians,

27:39.286 --> 27:42.906
in fact,
withdraw from their alliance

27:42.913 --> 27:46.533
with the Greeks under Spartan
rule.

27:46.529 --> 27:50.559
So, that tells us that until
then they felt themselves still

27:50.564 --> 27:55.384
to be part of that Greek League.
They agreed in 481 to put aside

27:55.377 --> 27:59.307
the quarrels that they may have
had at the time,

27:59.309 --> 28:04.069
and to have the same friends
and enemies, the famous clause

28:04.072 --> 28:07.112
that means a common foreign
policy.

28:07.109 --> 28:09.119
But it doesn't mean,
again--just because the

28:09.124 --> 28:11.844
Spartans are hegemons
doesn't mean the Spartans will

28:11.841 --> 28:14.871
determine that policy.
The policy will be determined

28:14.867 --> 28:17.047
by the league in its own
meetings.

28:17.049 --> 28:21.939
It is to be a typical Greek
alliance.

28:21.940 --> 28:25.630
The Greek word for that is
symmachia;

28:25.630 --> 28:29.410
it means an offensive and
defensive alliance.

28:29.410 --> 28:33.240
I will fight along your side,
not only if you are attacked,

28:33.239 --> 28:36.739
but if you go to war against
somebody else at your own

28:36.739 --> 28:39.769
discretion,
I still am bound to be your

28:39.767 --> 28:41.547
ally;
that's what a symmachia

28:41.552 --> 28:42.882
is.
So far as we know,

28:42.881 --> 28:46.341
that's the only kind of
international alliance that the

28:46.336 --> 28:49.916
Greeks knew up to that time,
offensive and defensive.

28:49.920 --> 28:55.390
Nothing is said about money;
there is no provision for

28:55.387 --> 29:00.927
providing funds for the league.
I think that implies very

29:00.932 --> 29:06.602
clearly each state would pay for
its own forces when they were

29:06.599 --> 29:10.859
engaged in the common cause.
There was no provision for

29:10.862 --> 29:13.492
regular meetings;
meetings would be held when

29:13.487 --> 29:15.647
they were thought to be
necessary.

29:15.650 --> 29:21.110
Of course, everything would
have to be done by the common

29:21.114 --> 29:24.234
consent.
I don't mean that there was a

29:24.232 --> 29:27.852
need for unanimity,
but there certainly would have

29:27.853 --> 29:31.773
to be a general agreement of
things for the game to go

29:31.769 --> 29:34.669
forward.
This is a new thing.

29:34.670 --> 29:37.920
It's an innovation,
and of course it fits in nicely

29:37.918 --> 29:41.098
with what I said a moment ago
about the concept of

29:41.101 --> 29:47.041
panhellenism coming forward.
This is the first Pan Hellenic

29:47.035 --> 29:52.685
expedition, I suppose since the
Trojan War.

29:52.690 --> 29:55.220
Now Sparta,
as you've seen,

29:55.216 --> 30:00.016
when the decision had to be
made as to whether they should

30:00.015 --> 30:04.895
commit themselves to defending
the islands with a kind of a

30:04.899 --> 30:08.519
permanent force out there to do
that,

30:08.520 --> 30:12.490
the Spartans withdrew.
Nothing is formal;

30:12.490 --> 30:14.240
there's no change in the
arrangements,

30:14.242 --> 30:15.902
but they just decided to go
home.

30:15.900 --> 30:19.940
Now we see that the Athenians
will be pursuing a different

30:19.943 --> 30:23.853
policy -- the one that was
ultimately adopted by most of

30:23.845 --> 30:27.055
the Greeks,
but which allowed the Athenians

30:27.058 --> 30:30.728
to come forward and make the
kinds of claims for their

30:30.730 --> 30:34.660
influence that they would.
One of the first things the

30:34.663 --> 30:37.513
Athenians wanted to do,
and I remind you,

30:37.513 --> 30:40.723
that the Persians had marched
into Attica,

30:40.720 --> 30:47.540
and done fearful damage to the
polis of Athens and had

30:47.541 --> 30:52.091
done great harm to the city of
Athens.

30:52.089 --> 30:55.119
They had gone up to the
Acropolis, destroyed the temples

30:55.122 --> 30:58.192
that existed there,
a terrible sacrilege from the

30:58.193 --> 31:02.283
point of view of the Athenians,
and they wanted to do what they

31:02.284 --> 31:05.324
could to see this would never
happen again.

31:05.319 --> 31:13.759
So, they undertook to build
the walls around the Acropolis

31:13.763 --> 31:21.933
stronger than they had been,
and also to make the city walls

31:21.930 --> 31:28.790
stronger than they had been.
Now, it's an interesting sign

31:28.790 --> 31:33.730
of the way some of the other
Greek states felt that when the

31:33.734 --> 31:37.924
Athenians set about building
their walls there were

31:37.923 --> 31:42.533
complaints from some of the
Greek allies to the Spartans

31:42.532 --> 31:47.482
that the Athenians were doing
this and saying this was a bad

31:47.476 --> 31:50.536
idea.
My guess is that the

31:50.540 --> 31:55.640
complainants would have included
such cities as Thebes,

31:55.643 --> 32:00.583
Megara, probably Corinth;
Thebes and Megara being both

32:00.580 --> 32:05.820
neighbors abutting on Attica and
old enemies of the Athenians and

32:05.817 --> 32:09.087
the Corinthians being just next
door,

32:09.089 --> 32:12.299
so to speak,
not quite on their border but

32:12.296 --> 32:16.206
also a state that was
undoubtedly challenged by the

32:16.206 --> 32:20.346
emergence of Athens as a great
naval power and a great

32:20.351 --> 32:24.181
commercial power.
Corinth had had one of the

32:24.182 --> 32:26.012
biggest navies,
and Corinth,

32:26.012 --> 32:29.262
for the longest time,
had been a great commercial

32:29.264 --> 32:32.264
power.
The archaeological evidence is

32:32.257 --> 32:36.447
that it was being challenged in
the latter respect by the

32:36.453 --> 32:39.903
Athenians as early as in the
sixth century.

32:39.900 --> 32:43.030
So, these are the kind of
states that would have been

32:43.027 --> 32:46.817
complaining and thinking that if
the Athenians had a walled city

32:46.816 --> 32:50.476
that they could defend,
it would make them more

32:50.475 --> 32:55.605
confident and possibly more
aggressive and more trouble for

32:55.608 --> 33:00.768
their neighbors.
In the war, the Athenians had

33:00.769 --> 33:06.649
shown an astonishing,
daring, especially at sea,

33:06.650 --> 33:11.810
which obviously was making some
of their old enemies and

33:11.812 --> 33:17.142
neighbors nervous.
Well, the Spartans heard

33:17.143 --> 33:24.423
about it, and they heeded their
friends complaints enough,

33:24.420 --> 33:28.870
so that Themistocles who was--I
need to point out to you,

33:28.867 --> 33:33.757
though I'm sure you know it,
emerged from the war as the

33:33.763 --> 33:37.323
great hero.
He had done so many wonderful

33:37.317 --> 33:39.757
things.
He was responsible for the

33:39.762 --> 33:42.492
Athenian navy,
he was responsible for the

33:42.488 --> 33:45.678
decision to fight at Salamis,
he was responsible,

33:45.677 --> 33:48.007
people believe,
for the victory at Salamis.

33:48.009 --> 33:52.309
We hear as Plutarch tells
wonderful stories about in the

33:52.307 --> 33:55.117
Olympic games right after the
war,

33:55.119 --> 33:58.159
people were watching the games
when Themistocles arrived,

33:58.157 --> 34:01.627
they stopped watching the games
and they watched Themistocles,

34:01.630 --> 34:07.530
because so great was the
admiration and wonder that he

34:07.527 --> 34:10.087
created.
I always try to figure out some

34:10.090 --> 34:13.120
analogy now but I can't.
If you imagine if you could

34:13.115 --> 34:16.405
wrap up Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin and make

34:16.413 --> 34:19.923
him one person after Second
World War you might have

34:19.917 --> 34:24.617
something like Themistocles did.
So, Themistocles goes to

34:24.618 --> 34:28.168
Sparta, and he,
of course, is the main champion

34:28.165 --> 34:33.095
in Athens of Athens rebuilding
its walls as fast as possible,

34:33.099 --> 34:37.239
and Athens taking the most
forward position possible in the

34:37.236 --> 34:41.226
navy at sea and in international
relations in general.

34:41.230 --> 34:45.260
He does this little trick that
Thucydides describes.

34:45.260 --> 34:50.630
He says, he will go to Sparta,
but the Spartans are to send

34:50.628 --> 34:55.128
some people to Athens too,
and then he tells the Athenians

34:55.134 --> 34:58.164
to hold those Spartans there
until he gets home.

34:58.159 --> 35:03.129
The next thing he says is,
let me know when the walls have

35:03.128 --> 35:06.178
been built high enough to
defend.

35:06.179 --> 35:09.089
So, he goes to talk to the
Spartans, the Spartans says we

35:09.093 --> 35:11.593
hear you guys are building walls
around there.

35:11.590 --> 35:14.150
You know, I know it's your own
business but we don't think

35:14.147 --> 35:17.007
that's a good idea,
because if the Persians come

35:17.008 --> 35:21.118
again they could use your walled
city as a base against us.

35:21.119 --> 35:25.119
Now, if you can follow that
kind of reasoning you're sharper

35:25.121 --> 35:28.581
than I am, but anyway that's the
story they told.

35:28.579 --> 35:31.089
Themistocles says where did
you hear that nonsense;

35:31.090 --> 35:34.100
we're building walls?
What a lot of baloney;

35:34.100 --> 35:36.220
forget about it.
I'm sorry.

35:36.219 --> 35:37.409
I haven't told the story quite
right.

35:37.409 --> 35:40.249
He says, look don't take my
word for it, you send an embassy

35:40.251 --> 35:43.231
to Athens and take a look;
that's when he told his friends

35:43.232 --> 35:45.342
keep those guys there until I
get home.

35:45.340 --> 35:49.570
So one day, a messenger from
Athens comes to Themistocles and

35:49.567 --> 35:52.947
tells him, okay the walls can
now be defended,

35:52.949 --> 35:55.029
whereupon Themistocles says to
the Spartans,

35:55.030 --> 35:57.450
you know those walls you were
complaining about,

35:57.450 --> 36:00.820
you were right;
we do have them and they're now

36:00.815 --> 36:03.955
big enough that we can defend
ourselves against them,

36:03.960 --> 36:06.440
and what are you going to do
about it?

36:06.440 --> 36:10.620
Then he delivers a speech,
which is a kind of a

36:10.621 --> 36:15.391
declaration, not so much of
independence as of equivalence

36:15.387 --> 36:18.177
to the Spartans.
His message was,

36:18.179 --> 36:22.399
we don't take orders from you;
keep your advice to yourself,

36:22.399 --> 36:26.569
we'll take care of ourselves,
you take care of yourselves.

36:26.570 --> 36:31.200
You are not our superiors.
We are your equals was the

36:31.198 --> 36:34.958
essence of what he said.
Thereafter, Themistocles was

36:34.961 --> 36:37.421
not so popular in Sparta as he
used to be.

36:37.420 --> 36:41.470
Indeed, for the rest of his
life the Spartans will be trying

36:41.469 --> 36:44.489
to do him harm and remove him
from the scene,

36:44.489 --> 36:47.509
but he certainly achieves what
he wants.

36:47.510 --> 36:51.650
The Athenians are a walled
city, and they have declared

36:51.654 --> 36:55.804
that whatever their formal,
technical relationship with

36:55.800 --> 36:58.720
Sparta might be under the
Hellenic League,

36:58.716 --> 37:02.336
the fact is they are
independent players and they're

37:02.344 --> 37:05.194
going to do things as they see
fit.

37:05.190 --> 37:09.890
Thucydides says the
Spartans accepted this,

37:09.890 --> 37:13.570
but secretly they were
embittered.

37:13.570 --> 37:17.970
I think that's the first clue
we have to what will become a

37:17.971 --> 37:22.601
continuing situation in Sparta
for the rest of the time we pay

37:22.600 --> 37:26.730
attention to them.
That there will be a factional

37:26.734 --> 37:31.174
division among Spartans,
at least, this much is true.

37:31.170 --> 37:34.760
I'm sure it's much more
complicated than we know,

37:34.762 --> 37:38.952
but in the simplest way there
were some Spartans who were

37:38.953 --> 37:43.593
content to withdraw back to the
Peloponnesus to have nothing to

37:43.592 --> 37:47.262
do with the world outside the
Peloponnesus,

37:47.260 --> 37:51.130
much less with the world of the
Aegean Sea and beyond,

37:51.125 --> 37:54.475
and try to return to their
traditional ways,

37:54.480 --> 37:59.500
a peace faction if you will,
a conservative faction perhaps.

37:59.500 --> 38:04.470
But that there is also starting
now as a result of the victory

38:04.466 --> 38:08.616
in the war, a faction of
Spartans that would like to

38:08.618 --> 38:12.768
exert Spartan power and
influence more broadly,

38:12.769 --> 38:17.009
at least to include the rest of
the Greek states of the

38:17.009 --> 38:21.409
mainland, but also a number of
them surely felt that they

38:21.405 --> 38:24.305
wanted to exert power
everywhere,

38:24.310 --> 38:29.260
including overseas as well.
But that faction,

38:29.261 --> 38:32.891
that second faction doesn't win
the argument.

38:32.889 --> 38:36.769
They have to be secretly
embittered, because the official

38:36.771 --> 38:40.331
policy of Sparta is to accept
the Athenian situation,

38:40.329 --> 38:44.019
and we'll see in a moment that
events move them in the same

38:44.017 --> 38:46.897
direction.
The commander of the Spartan

38:46.898 --> 38:50.228
forces at Plataea,
who emerges as the leading

38:50.226 --> 38:52.946
figure immediately after the
war,

38:52.949 --> 38:56.889
is Pausanias,
who was the regent,

38:56.888 --> 39:02.918
but effectively one of the two
kings of Sparta.

39:02.920 --> 39:07.570
He goes out to the Aegean
Sea--remember the previous king

39:07.566 --> 39:12.036
and commander had retired,
but now Pausanias takes the

39:12.042 --> 39:16.432
fleet and he goes out there,
and he proceeds to make the

39:16.426 --> 39:19.226
Greeks--first of all,
he proceeds to be very

39:19.232 --> 39:22.422
effective against the Persians.
He does some fighting,

39:22.418 --> 39:27.568
particularly in the Hellespont,
and the straits in general.

39:27.570 --> 39:31.780
Byzantium is a very important
city there, what later becomes

39:31.781 --> 39:35.491
Constantinople and then
Istanbul, and the little town

39:35.493 --> 39:39.223
across the way.
So, they control the straits,

39:39.216 --> 39:44.186
he defeats the Persians and so
on, but in the process he makes

39:44.194 --> 39:48.744
enemies among the Greeks.
Part of the reason is

39:48.743 --> 39:53.903
because he treats the Greeks as
inferiors, as if they were

39:53.903 --> 39:59.113
underlings of the Spartans.
In general, it appears to have

39:59.108 --> 40:03.668
been a common Spartan problem
that when they went out of

40:03.671 --> 40:08.401
Sparta and had commanding
positions over other Greeks,

40:08.400 --> 40:12.750
they regularly treated them in
that way--different degrees,

40:12.750 --> 40:15.520
of course.
Pausanias must have been

40:15.515 --> 40:19.555
particularly annoying,
but there were main complaints

40:19.556 --> 40:23.516
about how they were treated by
his Greek allies.

40:23.519 --> 40:28.849
In addition,
he became very much caught up

40:28.846 --> 40:37.156
in the great wealth and luxury
that the Persians demonstrated.

40:37.159 --> 40:40.839
Most Greeks were,
at least theoretically,

40:40.842 --> 40:45.912
very appalled at the morals or
the lack of morals of the

40:45.905 --> 40:50.815
Persians from their perspective.
But the Persians were,

40:50.824 --> 40:53.894
first of all,
very rich and the Greeks were

40:53.887 --> 40:58.117
not, and they used their wealth
for various purposes all of

40:58.117 --> 41:01.907
which were seen to be ungreek
and unattractive.

41:01.909 --> 41:06.339
Pausanias fell for it and
he began behaving as though he

41:06.340 --> 41:10.020
were a Persian satrap at
the very least.

41:10.019 --> 41:12.499
All of these things,
as I say, irritated their

41:12.503 --> 41:15.543
fellow Greeks who began to bring
charges against him.

41:15.539 --> 41:19.289
He was charged in Sparta with,
first of all,

41:19.287 --> 41:22.857
tyranny and then second of all
treason.

41:22.860 --> 41:28.380
He was alleged to have cut some
kind of a deal with the Persian

41:28.382 --> 41:33.372
ruler and his satraps
against the common cause.

41:33.369 --> 41:37.249
This was effective enough to
have him recalled and put on

41:37.246 --> 41:40.366
trial.
He was acquitted.

41:40.369 --> 41:44.539
On the other hand,
he was not sent out again to be

41:44.538 --> 41:47.928
the commander;
he was put on the side.

41:47.929 --> 41:52.119
Later on further charges would
be brought against him and he

41:52.119 --> 41:56.099
would indeed be put to death.
Okay, but the main point is

41:56.099 --> 41:59.259
that the Spartans have withdrawn
their commander,

41:59.264 --> 42:02.894
pretty much in disgrace with
the rest of the Greeks.

42:02.890 --> 42:07.590
They send out a replacement.
A man called Dorcis.

42:07.590 --> 42:11.630
The allies don't accept him,
and they say no we're not

42:11.629 --> 42:15.969
taking any Spartan commanders
these days and send him back

42:15.974 --> 42:20.514
home.
That is an extremely important

42:20.510 --> 42:24.290
step.
The allies, and that means now,

42:24.294 --> 42:29.064
the people in the Aegean Sea
and on its borders,

42:29.059 --> 42:33.229
the people who are in what will
be first the Athenian sphere of

42:33.225 --> 42:35.975
influence and then the Athenian
Empire,

42:35.980 --> 42:39.910
these are the states that don't
want Spartan rule.

42:39.909 --> 42:42.329
I think the main reason
is--well, there's a couple of

42:42.325 --> 42:44.325
reasons.
One is the behavior of

42:44.325 --> 42:47.865
Pausanias has discredited the
Spartans, but the other I think

42:47.870 --> 42:50.700
is this.
Look, how much evidence do you

42:50.702 --> 42:55.142
need that the Spartans really
don't like this kind of thing?

42:55.139 --> 42:58.049
Remember, they had voted
against taking those three

42:58.054 --> 43:00.914
islands into the league even
back there in 479.

43:00.909 --> 43:04.569
And the other thing is that,
here are the Athenians,

43:04.574 --> 43:07.524
the guys who really won the war
at sea,

43:07.519 --> 43:10.849
which is the one you're
concerned about and who are

43:10.846 --> 43:14.436
apparently ready and waiting to
continue to do that.

43:14.440 --> 43:18.200
And it was I think that choice
that was in the minds of the

43:18.201 --> 43:21.121
allies when they sent Dorcis
home and said,

43:21.119 --> 43:24.919
please no more,
and the Spartans did not send a

43:24.916 --> 43:28.916
replacement for Dorcis.
They, in other words,

43:28.923 --> 43:33.043
accepted that they would not
participate in the future

43:33.043 --> 43:37.023
campaigns against Persia,
which would be obviously

43:37.021 --> 43:41.231
aggressive campaigns in Asia,
since the Persians had been

43:41.226 --> 43:44.976
driven out of Europe and out of
the Aegean Sea.

43:44.980 --> 43:49.760
Thucydides says this about the
Spartan decision.

43:49.760 --> 43:54.450
They also wanted to be rid of
the Persian War,

43:54.454 --> 44:00.404
and believed that the Athenians
were competent to lead,

44:00.400 --> 44:05.470
and were at the present time,
well disposed to the Spartans.

44:05.470 --> 44:09.060
Why not, they said.
We don't want to fight this war;

44:09.059 --> 44:11.499
we don't really care about
those things,

44:11.502 --> 44:15.202
and everything will be okay,
because the Athenians can do it

44:15.196 --> 44:19.426
and they're our friends.
But surely that was not all

44:19.429 --> 44:23.989
what all the Spartans thought,
that was the opinion of the

44:23.989 --> 44:28.749
faction that won the argument,
which was the conservative

44:28.745 --> 44:33.465
faction, the one that was the
peace party and let's stay in

44:33.465 --> 44:38.505
the Peloponnesus party--it was
still the predominant force,

44:38.510 --> 44:42.730
and I suspect their position
had been strengthened by the

44:42.729 --> 44:47.249
disgrace brought upon Sparta by
the behavior of Pausanias,

44:47.250 --> 44:51.940
and no doubt by the rejection
of the Spartan replacement by

44:51.935 --> 44:54.925
the other Greeks.
Why should we force ourselves?

44:54.929 --> 44:58.599
We are making ourselves
unpopular.

44:58.599 --> 45:02.139
It used to be the Greeks came
to us and begged us to fight and

45:02.135 --> 45:04.685
protect them,
when they're in trouble and now

45:04.685 --> 45:06.825
they're rejecting our
leadership.

45:06.829 --> 45:08.989
That's because we shouldn't be
out there.

45:08.989 --> 45:12.259
This is not our kind of a
campaign.

45:12.260 --> 45:17.540
Well, one can go on and imagine
the arguments that were used.

45:17.539 --> 45:22.429
Now, did this mean that
there would be no continuing

45:22.428 --> 45:26.018
campaign against Persia?
Certainly not;

45:26.019 --> 45:28.669
that is not what the allies
meant.

45:28.670 --> 45:33.610
They turned to Athens and asked
the Athenians to take the lead

45:33.606 --> 45:36.516
in the war that was going to
come.

45:36.519 --> 45:42.999
Herodotus has a line in which
he says, the Athenians offered

45:42.998 --> 45:49.808
the hubris of Pausanias
as a pretext for taking over the

45:49.807 --> 45:54.087
leadership of the Greeks out
there.

45:54.090 --> 45:57.970
That suggests that the
Athenians were planning to do

45:57.969 --> 46:02.459
just that, that they very much
wanted too and that they were

46:02.458 --> 46:05.728
engaged in maneuvers to bring it
about;

46:05.730 --> 46:08.720
that it was their idea that
they took the initiative.

46:12.830 --> 46:16.800
But I think that's not right.
Let me back up a step;

46:16.800 --> 46:20.080
it's only partly right.
What is certainly clear is that

46:20.077 --> 46:23.217
the Athenians were ready and
willing to do what they were

46:23.215 --> 46:25.905
asked,
but the idea that they either

46:25.913 --> 46:30.303
used their power and influence,
or their wiles to bring the

46:30.299 --> 46:33.899
allies to take that decision,
when they would not have

46:33.898 --> 46:35.958
otherwise done so,
I think that is wrong.

46:35.960 --> 46:39.840
I'm going to start doing
something that you may get tired

46:39.844 --> 46:43.254
of after awhile;
I want to use an analogy that I

46:43.250 --> 46:48.480
find very illuminating anyway.
The analogy of the formation of

46:48.481 --> 46:54.461
NATO after the Second World War
and the formation of the Delian

46:54.464 --> 46:58.394
League,
which is ultimately turned into

46:58.385 --> 47:02.575
the Athenian Empire after the
Persian Wars.

47:02.579 --> 47:08.659
In the case of the Delian
League, I think a Norwegian or a

47:08.656 --> 47:14.726
Swedish scholar has described
the process whereby NATO was

47:14.733 --> 47:21.133
invented as the establishment of
hegemony by invitation.

47:21.130 --> 47:24.640
That is, if you look at the
situation in 1945,1946,

47:24.635 --> 47:28.485
1947,1948, and 1949 the
Europeans states that ultimately

47:28.491 --> 47:32.631
became part of NATO desperately
wanted the Americans to join

47:32.628 --> 47:35.708
with them,
not to repeat what they had

47:35.711 --> 47:40.141
done after the First World War,
which was to retreat back into

47:40.144 --> 47:43.244
North America,
to have no connections of a

47:43.240 --> 47:47.030
political military kind with
Europe, which terrified the

47:47.030 --> 47:51.160
European states that were sort
of knocked down so hard by the

47:51.164 --> 47:55.374
Second World War and who were
afraid that the Soviet Union was

47:55.368 --> 47:59.778
going to take them over and they
desperately wanted the Americans

47:59.778 --> 48:03.468
to take the lead.
Now, the Americans were

48:03.472 --> 48:06.502
glad to do it.
I don't mean all the Americans,

48:06.501 --> 48:10.381
as always, there were factions
and differences of opinions and

48:10.381 --> 48:14.261
the American President and his
government had to fight hard to

48:14.261 --> 48:18.281
convince Americans to do it,
but by and large they did and

48:18.283 --> 48:22.203
those who won the argument were
of the opinion that American

48:22.197 --> 48:24.177
interests,
first of all,

48:24.183 --> 48:28.073
in restoring Europe to its
previous condition,

48:28.074 --> 48:31.104
and secondly,
to resisting communist

48:31.099 --> 48:34.179
takeover,
Soviet takeover of Europe,

48:34.181 --> 48:38.281
meant that it was in America's
interest to see that such a

48:38.284 --> 48:41.964
situation developed.
Both sides, I would argue,

48:41.956 --> 48:46.526
were equally glad to see what
happened because it was in the

48:46.533 --> 48:51.963
interest of both sides.
So I think it was in 478-7

48:51.959 --> 48:57.869
when the formation of the Delian
League took place.

48:57.869 --> 49:03.029
Obviously, the states that were
bordering on the Persian Empire

49:03.032 --> 49:07.862
and in the seas next to Asia
Minor were absolutely at risk,

49:07.862 --> 49:12.012
if the Persians came back.
Supposing the Athenians had

49:12.008 --> 49:14.688
said, we're not interested and
had gone home,

49:14.694 --> 49:18.364
just as the Persians had--there
was no Greek force except for

49:18.358 --> 49:21.588
the poor Asiatic Greeks
themselves to resist a Persian

49:21.594 --> 49:24.834
return and they couldn't
possibly resist that.

49:24.829 --> 49:27.409
So for them,
it was a life and death matter,

49:27.409 --> 49:30.949
at least it was a matter of
freedom versus slavery that they

49:30.949 --> 49:34.009
should persuade the Athenians to
take the lead.

49:34.010 --> 49:37.000
But for the Athenians,
who won the argument,

49:37.003 --> 49:39.583
it was obvious they felt our
needs,

49:39.579 --> 49:43.739
for instance access to the
Black Sea, our feelings,

49:43.737 --> 49:47.227
friendship for the Greeks of
Asia Minor,

49:47.230 --> 49:50.290
and our fear,
fear of what the Persians might

49:50.288 --> 49:54.178
do if they got rolling--all
point to the same outcome,

49:54.179 --> 49:59.879
and so I think both sides were
equally glad to undertake this

49:59.884 --> 50:03.004
new path.
I think we would be deeply

50:02.998 --> 50:06.788
mistaken, if we imagine that
anybody imposed his will on

50:06.792 --> 50:08.932
anybody else in this matter.

50:12.179 --> 50:16.159
In fact, the Athenians,
according to Plutarch's story,

50:16.158 --> 50:19.338
needed persuasion.
Plutarch tells the tale of

50:19.343 --> 50:23.233
Aristides, who was in command of
the Athenian fleet there off

50:23.226 --> 50:26.066
Asia Minor at the time.
When the Samians,

50:26.067 --> 50:30.017
particularly took the lead and
came to the Athenians and to

50:30.015 --> 50:32.875
Aristides and said,
won't you please be our

50:32.875 --> 50:35.315
leaders?
Aristides said,

50:35.321 --> 50:40.421
before we do that,
you show us that you are really

50:40.421 --> 50:45.001
committed to us,
and that you will not simply

50:45.001 --> 50:48.711
use us.
I'm putting in stuff that's not

50:48.710 --> 50:51.900
in Plutarch now.
Don't use us as a kind of a way

50:51.901 --> 50:55.351
of convincing the Spartans to
stay and then leave us in the

50:55.345 --> 50:58.215
lurch.
So Uliades, the commander of

50:58.216 --> 51:01.386
the Samian navy,
turned, took his ship,

51:01.387 --> 51:05.307
sailed it against the flagship
of Pausanias,

51:05.309 --> 51:09.099
this is at the time when
Pausanias is still around,

51:09.103 --> 51:12.763
and rams that ship.Well,
that ought to take care of any

51:12.762 --> 51:15.022
possibility of playing footsy
with the Spartans,

51:15.019 --> 51:18.669
at which point,
the Athenians accept the

51:18.666 --> 51:24.646
leadership and then move forward
with the plan for doing that.

51:24.650 --> 51:28.890
So in the winter of 478-7,
there is a meeting of the

51:28.893 --> 51:33.223
Greeks who are interested,
at the Island of Delos.

51:33.219 --> 51:38.139
Delos is right smack in the
middle of the Aegean Sea,

51:38.135 --> 51:42.955
and as I've told you,
it is the birthplace of Apollo

51:42.957 --> 51:46.027
and Artemis,
and Apollo, of course,

51:46.028 --> 51:50.138
has got a special fondness for
the Ionians, and so it's the

51:50.138 --> 51:52.688
natural place for this to
happen,

51:52.690 --> 51:55.910
and they come up with what
amount--it is essentially a

51:55.909 --> 51:58.809
constitutional convention.
They come up with a

51:58.813 --> 52:02.553
constitution that will describe
how the league is to work.

52:02.550 --> 52:08.000
The aims of the league are
that the members of the league

52:08.001 --> 52:12.171
will fight against the Persians,
first of all,

52:12.174 --> 52:15.934
to avenge what the Persians did
to the Greeks,

52:15.929 --> 52:19.099
and secondly,
to collect booty from the

52:19.100 --> 52:23.940
Persians to pay for the damage
that the Persians did.

52:23.940 --> 52:29.200
So, that is a part of the story.
I think, of course,

52:29.200 --> 52:34.480
implicit, it didn't have to be
said, that the primary motive

52:34.481 --> 52:38.791
must be to maintain,
establish I would guess,

52:38.787 --> 52:44.217
and maintain the freedom of the
Greeks from Persian rule.

52:44.219 --> 52:47.069
Thucydides doesn't mention that
and some scholars have been

52:47.068 --> 52:49.818
misled into thinking that
somehow that wasn't part of the

52:49.818 --> 52:51.618
story.
Well, how could they do the

52:51.621 --> 52:53.371
rest of it, if they didn't do
that?

52:53.369 --> 52:57.329
These states were obviously in
danger of being taken by the

52:57.333 --> 53:01.363
Persians, so the maintenance of
their freedom had to be step

53:01.364 --> 53:05.744
number one,
and surely that was clear in

53:05.736 --> 53:08.456
their minds.
They agreed,

53:08.464 --> 53:11.994
as it was typical,
in Greek alliances to have the

53:11.987 --> 53:15.727
same friends and enemies,
common foreign policy.

53:15.730 --> 53:20.340
To carry this forward,
they all swore oaths;

53:20.340 --> 53:23.250
that's their form of signing
treaties.

53:23.250 --> 53:26.970
They don't sign treaties they
swear oaths.

53:26.969 --> 53:32.419
Then they dropped chunks of
iron into the sea,

53:32.422 --> 53:38.482
as a symbol that the treaty was
to be perpetual.

53:38.480 --> 53:41.670
That is to say,
it would last until the iron

53:41.667 --> 53:44.407
came up and floated on the
surface.

53:44.409 --> 53:45.769
They knew that wasn't going to
happen.

53:45.769 --> 53:51.599
So, they are a standard kind of
an alliance with a perpetual--I

53:51.598 --> 53:57.518
need to make the point that most
Greek alliances that we hear of

53:57.521 --> 54:01.001
in this period are not
perpetual.

54:05.539 --> 54:09.449
The Athenians and the Spartans
in 445 make a thirty-years

54:09.451 --> 54:13.091
peace.
In 421, they make a fifty-years

54:13.093 --> 54:15.523
peace;
on another occasion they make a

54:15.523 --> 54:17.773
five-years peace;
that's the way they do things

54:17.771 --> 54:19.421
normally.
This is different.

54:19.420 --> 54:25.430
This is like the Greek League;
this is a perpetual alliance.

54:25.429 --> 54:29.289
The membership of the
league, as best we can figure it

54:29.291 --> 54:33.021
out--this is not a hundred
percent accurate but it's not

54:33.018 --> 54:35.928
bad.
It includes--First of all it,

54:35.930 --> 54:39.040
uniformally,
at this point--divides the

54:39.037 --> 54:43.007
league up into zones.
One is the islands of the

54:43.013 --> 54:47.283
Aegean Sea, and we have
knowledge of twenty towns that

54:47.282 --> 54:52.412
are members from the islands.
Ionia, that is on the coast of

54:52.407 --> 54:56.227
Asia Minor itself,
thirty six, towns along the

54:56.228 --> 54:59.538
Hellespont route into the Black
Sea,

54:59.539 --> 55:03.129
thirty five,
Caria which is the southern

55:03.125 --> 55:06.615
coast of Asia Minor has twenty
four.

55:06.619 --> 55:12.189
Thrace, which is the northern
shore of the Aegean Sea in Greek

55:12.185 --> 55:16.175
territory is thirty three;
comes to a total of a hundred

55:16.183 --> 55:19.023
forty eight.
If you imagine you're talking

55:19.015 --> 55:23.455
about a hundred and fifty towns,
you've got the general idea

55:23.461 --> 55:26.191
right.
So, that's quite an amazing

55:26.188 --> 55:27.878
thing.
Peloponnesian League

55:27.882 --> 55:30.892
certainly didn't have anything
like that in terms of numbers of

55:30.885 --> 55:33.095
states.
But don't be too carried away,

55:33.100 --> 55:36.270
because lots of these places
are just tiny little spots,

55:36.271 --> 55:39.041
especially when you're talking
about islands.

55:39.039 --> 55:43.999
Some of the island states in
the Aegean and they apparently

55:44.003 --> 55:48.543
were just about all members,
are very small indeed.

55:48.539 --> 55:51.759
Still, it includes some very
important states like those big

55:51.757 --> 55:53.717
islands I mentioned already
Samos,

55:53.719 --> 55:57.679
Chios, and Lesbos,
and others that were not quite

55:57.682 --> 56:02.472
as big, and some states on the
Asian side that were old,

56:02.469 --> 56:08.099
and big, and important cities,
Miletus being one example of

56:08.104 --> 56:10.534
it.
So, there it is,

56:10.529 --> 56:14.529
notice what I have not
included.

56:14.530 --> 56:19.200
No Peloponnesians.
This is not in any shape,

56:19.195 --> 56:24.175
manner, or form connected with
the Peloponnesian League.

56:24.179 --> 56:26.959
I'm going to play my
analogy game in a moment too,

56:26.962 --> 56:30.062
but what I want to say is you
need to--it would be easiest I

56:30.059 --> 56:32.579
think for you to grasp what's
going on here,

56:32.579 --> 56:35.629
if you think of three separate
organizations;

56:35.630 --> 56:39.410
first, there's the Greek League
against Persia that was formed

56:39.407 --> 56:42.187
in 481 which includes
Peloponnesian states and

56:42.194 --> 56:45.034
non-Peloponnesian states.
Then keep in mind,

56:45.025 --> 56:47.895
the oldest of these,
I should have mentioned first,

56:47.900 --> 56:51.260
the Peloponnesian League,
which is older than the Greek

56:51.258 --> 56:54.568
League, which includes for our
purposes essentially only

56:54.573 --> 56:57.333
Peloponnesian states.
There are a couple of

56:57.326 --> 57:00.556
exceptions, but none are across
the sea in any way.

57:00.559 --> 57:04.909
Then there's this new league
which we should call the Delian

57:04.905 --> 57:09.245
League, although the Greeks
referred to it as the Greeks,

57:09.250 --> 57:12.810
just as they had the earlier
league.

57:12.809 --> 57:16.209
But it's easier to think of it
as the Delian League to separate

57:16.205 --> 57:19.535
it from that league.
Okay, here's the analogy

57:19.541 --> 57:22.661
that I suggest.
The Greek League against

57:22.662 --> 57:27.182
Persia, we might think of as
being like the United Nations

57:27.181 --> 57:31.341
Organization,
because it includes states from

57:31.338 --> 57:36.828
both sides, from all of these
places and I think if we think

57:36.834 --> 57:42.894
of the Peloponnesian League as
one of the subordinate leagues,

57:42.889 --> 57:46.399
and the Delian League as the
other, in other words,

57:46.399 --> 57:50.679
like NATO on the one hand and
the Warsaw Pact on the other,

57:50.679 --> 57:54.519
that will be a helpful analogy,
because, first of all,

57:54.522 --> 57:58.222
both of them are members of the
Greek League too,

57:58.219 --> 58:03.399
and as the United Nations
Organization Charter permits

58:03.396 --> 58:07.596
regional associations,
so NATO and the Warsaw Pact

58:07.596 --> 58:11.516
were regional associations,
so too without their being any

58:11.516 --> 58:14.586
formality about it,
it clearly didn't mean to

58:14.593 --> 58:16.723
abolish the Peloponnesian
League.

58:16.719 --> 58:20.389
Therefore, there was no reason
why there shouldn't be a

58:20.386 --> 58:23.776
different regional alliance like
that of the Delian

58:23.781 --> 58:27.791
League.That,
I think, is the structure of

58:27.787 --> 58:32.797
the international system in
Greece as we move past the

58:32.797 --> 58:36.487
Persian wars.
Now, let's say a little more

58:36.492 --> 58:39.812
about that Delian League;
there are more things you need

58:39.807 --> 58:43.127
to know about it.
It is a hegemonial league,

58:43.133 --> 58:46.673
just like the Peloponnesian
League.

58:46.670 --> 58:50.250
That is, there is a designated
leader.

58:50.250 --> 58:56.160
Athens is the designated
hegemon of the league,

58:56.155 --> 59:02.055
and there is also something
quite different,

59:02.059 --> 59:06.169
something new,
since this is a naval league,

59:06.173 --> 59:11.443
it cost money in a way that a
military league made up of

59:11.435 --> 59:16.725
hoplite citizens doesn't.
So it was clear there had to be

59:16.734 --> 59:19.834
some league money,
a league treasury.

59:19.829 --> 59:22.409
For this purpose,
they declared the collection of

59:22.409 --> 59:24.559
something they called a
phoros.

59:27.690 --> 59:30.280
It just simply means,
in the most neutral sense,

59:30.282 --> 59:33.152
contribution.
As time passed,

59:33.149 --> 59:38.949
this contribution was seen to
be something imposed upon

59:38.945 --> 59:45.485
unwilling payers and in English
we use the word to describe it

59:45.492 --> 59:48.572
as tribute.
But let's think now,

59:48.565 --> 59:51.675
for the moment,
only about the beginning of the

59:51.681 --> 59:54.461
league and what was intended at
first.

59:54.460 --> 59:58.410
So there is this contribution
which becomes the league

59:58.410 --> 1:00:02.820
treasury.
The assessor was an Athenian

1:00:02.823 --> 1:00:06.843
general, Aristides.
Aristides the just,

1:00:06.839 --> 1:00:10.119
as he was known,
told each state how much it

1:00:10.119 --> 1:00:14.599
would be required to contribute.
This took the form in the

1:00:14.595 --> 1:00:18.635
beginning, in some cases,
of ships and crews to row them,

1:00:18.639 --> 1:00:21.749
and in other states from the
very beginning,

1:00:21.745 --> 1:00:24.615
money.
Now, I think we should imagine

1:00:24.616 --> 1:00:28.556
that the earlier you are in the
league, the more there are

1:00:28.560 --> 1:00:32.440
allied ships and crews,
and as you get later and later,

1:00:32.444 --> 1:00:35.744
until finally you're into the
Peloponnesian War,

1:00:35.739 --> 1:00:39.769
just about every state doesn't
have a fleet of its own,

1:00:39.772 --> 1:00:43.772
doesn't supply crews,
but just pays money.

1:00:43.769 --> 1:00:45.949
Again though,
I urge you to think about the

1:00:45.953 --> 1:00:48.283
beginning and not worry about
the end just now.

1:00:48.280 --> 1:00:53.360
So the Athenian assesses that,
there is also an Athenian

1:00:53.358 --> 1:00:59.078
citizen who will be chosen for
the job of treasurer of this new

1:00:59.084 --> 1:01:02.064
league,
hellenotamias is the

1:01:02.057 --> 1:01:06.407
Greek word and he will see to
the collection and the security

1:01:06.407 --> 1:01:09.557
of that money;
an Athenian does that too.

1:01:09.559 --> 1:01:14.959
Also, any military or naval
campaigns conducted on behalf of

1:01:14.959 --> 1:01:20.449
the Delian League will have an
Athenian general in charge.

1:01:20.449 --> 1:01:22.469
Now you know,
looking at it backwards,

1:01:22.470 --> 1:01:24.330
you can say,
well, this is Athenian

1:01:24.327 --> 1:01:27.547
imperialism and the Athenians
are imposing their power;

1:01:27.550 --> 1:01:31.930
no, the allies would have been
the first to want to do this

1:01:31.934 --> 1:01:34.584
because what they were afraid
of,

1:01:34.579 --> 1:01:37.649
just as I think as the
Europeans were afraid in the

1:01:37.653 --> 1:01:41.163
forties, was not that the
Athenians would have lorded over

1:01:41.156 --> 1:01:43.256
them,
they were afraid that the

1:01:43.256 --> 1:01:46.656
Athenians would run away and
leave them to their fate.

1:01:46.659 --> 1:01:50.639
They wanted to tie the
Athenians into this new

1:01:50.642 --> 1:01:54.122
organization.
Now, this Delian League is

1:01:54.117 --> 1:01:57.837
unsurpassed among the few
international organizations

1:01:57.839 --> 1:02:02.199
there are in the Greek world.
It was enormously efficient

1:02:02.199 --> 1:02:06.649
because you had a leader who was
designated and interested,

1:02:06.646 --> 1:02:12.036
and deeply involved.
You had an organ for making

1:02:12.040 --> 1:02:14.820
decisions;
I haven't mentioned it,

1:02:14.815 --> 1:02:18.415
but there was what they called
this synod of the league.

1:02:18.420 --> 1:02:22.080
It's the council of league in
which there are representatives

1:02:22.075 --> 1:02:25.845
from every state and it can make
all the decisions that have to

1:02:25.852 --> 1:02:30.222
be made in that one place.
Unlike these other places it

1:02:30.222 --> 1:02:33.582
has its own money,
and its own forces,

1:02:33.581 --> 1:02:37.941
which are assigned to it by the
constitution.

1:02:37.940 --> 1:02:42.980
All of these things make that a
much more effective league,

1:02:42.984 --> 1:02:48.124
able to do what it has to do
without any great difficulty in

1:02:48.116 --> 1:02:51.956
the decision making process,
and to make that a little

1:02:51.963 --> 1:02:53.753
clearer I need to tell you
another thing.

1:02:53.750 --> 1:02:59.140
In the synod,
the arrangement was one state,

1:02:59.141 --> 1:03:03.121
one vote.
So, Athens was one member of

1:03:03.117 --> 1:03:07.267
that synod.
Athens, which had the lion's

1:03:07.272 --> 1:03:10.342
share of the power,
had only one vote.

1:03:10.340 --> 1:03:13.630
So, how could the Athenians
have their way,

1:03:13.632 --> 1:03:16.652
you may ask.
But the way it really worked

1:03:16.646 --> 1:03:20.676
was, because Athens had all of
this prestige and all of this

1:03:20.684 --> 1:03:24.154
power,
it meant all of the very small

1:03:24.148 --> 1:03:29.748
powerless states huddled under
the wings of the Athenians,

1:03:29.750 --> 1:03:33.810
and could be counted on to
deliver the right sort of vote,

1:03:33.806 --> 1:03:36.436
to do what the Athenians told
them,

1:03:36.440 --> 1:03:40.660
whereas, supposing they had
used something like proportional

1:03:40.663 --> 1:03:44.813
representation,
given the Athenians "x" number

1:03:44.806 --> 1:03:50.266
of votes, a lot of votes,
but they would have had to give

1:03:50.269 --> 1:03:53.599
Thasos and Samos,
Chios, Lesbos,

1:03:53.596 --> 1:03:59.196
all these big towns and
islands, numerous votes as well.

1:03:59.199 --> 1:04:03.459
They would certainly have been
more votes than the Athenians

1:04:03.457 --> 1:04:05.627
had.
They could have outvoted them,

1:04:05.631 --> 1:04:07.781
the Athenians,
if they got together.

1:04:07.780 --> 1:04:10.950
Under this one state,
one vote rule,

1:04:10.949 --> 1:04:15.629
that's impossible.
We never, never hear of any

1:04:15.634 --> 1:04:22.134
trouble passing whatever the
Athenians want in the assembly.

1:04:22.130 --> 1:04:26.120
There's just no check on their
doing what they want in a

1:04:26.124 --> 1:04:27.654
constitutional way.

1:04:30.739 --> 1:04:34.659
Now, so long as everybody's
playing by the original rules

1:04:34.658 --> 1:04:37.988
this doesn't really present any
serious problems,

1:04:37.989 --> 1:04:41.279
but as time passes and there
are differences of opinion,

1:04:41.276 --> 1:04:44.526
and as for various reasons,
as I will explain,

1:04:44.525 --> 1:04:49.575
the Athenians begin to assert
their power and begin to change

1:04:49.578 --> 1:04:52.978
the situation,
it's at that point that the

1:04:52.984 --> 1:04:57.524
question of autonomy will arise,
and the Athenians will in fact

1:04:57.519 --> 1:05:01.249
interfere with the autonomy of
the other states,

1:05:01.250 --> 1:05:05.860
and turn the league ultimately
into what the Greeks called an

1:05:05.858 --> 1:05:09.218
arche,
which we rightly translate as

1:05:09.221 --> 1:05:13.571
an empire, but once again,
I don't want you to think about

1:05:13.569 --> 1:05:17.839
that when you're thinking about
the situation in 477.

1:05:17.840 --> 1:05:22.510
It's in the future,
and that's not what people are

1:05:22.508 --> 1:05:26.818
expecting or wanting.
There is a common interest,

1:05:26.822 --> 1:05:30.792
and it's very strong in 477,
to deal with the threat of the

1:05:30.793 --> 1:05:34.773
Persia and to get revenge and
payment from the Persians for

1:05:34.765 --> 1:05:39.475
what has happened.
The problem only emerges or

1:05:39.482 --> 1:05:46.002
problems emerge when the
challenge from Persia recedes,

1:05:46.000 --> 1:05:49.550
and as we shall see,
that's of course was the same

1:05:49.545 --> 1:05:53.665
problem that NATO suffered from
and suffers from today,

1:05:53.670 --> 1:05:56.420
which is to the degree that
they don't feel threatened by

1:05:56.416 --> 1:05:59.356
anything, the states that are
allied to the United States,

1:05:59.360 --> 1:06:02.820
don't feel they have to do what
the Americans want,

1:06:02.821 --> 1:06:06.701
and that's the way it was when
the situation developed in

1:06:06.698 --> 1:06:09.828
Greece.
Okay, that's the original

1:06:09.826 --> 1:06:15.506
situation of the Delian League
and I want to turn next to the

1:06:15.507 --> 1:06:20.427
story of how that turns into the
Athenian Empire.

1:06:20.429 --> 1:06:24.359
The first thing I want to
indicate to you is that the

1:06:24.359 --> 1:06:27.659
success of the Delian League
from the outset was

1:06:27.657 --> 1:06:31.567
extraordinary.
One little town that was still

1:06:31.569 --> 1:06:36.689
in Persian hands in 477 was the
town of Eion located at the

1:06:36.692 --> 1:06:40.492
mouth of the Strymon River up in
Thrace.

1:06:40.489 --> 1:06:46.679
The Athenian commander took a
league fleet to Eion and drove

1:06:46.684 --> 1:06:50.604
the Persians out.
Soon thereafter--by the way,

1:06:50.601 --> 1:06:54.101
the dates that we have for this
are very insecure.

1:06:54.099 --> 1:06:59.009
They are mostly derived from
the story that Thucydides tells

1:06:59.006 --> 1:07:03.996
us, the details are very few and
he doesn't give us very many

1:07:03.997 --> 1:07:07.877
good dates, if any.
So, there's a certain amount of

1:07:07.878 --> 1:07:10.438
estimation.
It doesn't really matter from

1:07:10.444 --> 1:07:13.494
your point of view,
but I will give you dates that

1:07:13.494 --> 1:07:17.204
are commonly accepted,
but you mustn't imagine that

1:07:17.200 --> 1:07:20.110
they're firmly fixed.
Anyway, some years,

1:07:20.112 --> 1:07:23.332
not too many after the
establishment of the league,

1:07:23.328 --> 1:07:26.478
the league under the great
Athenian commander,

1:07:26.480 --> 1:07:30.100
who will play a larger and
larger role in league affairs

1:07:30.100 --> 1:07:32.800
and also in Athenian political
affairs,

1:07:32.800 --> 1:07:38.200
Cimon takes this force against
the Island of Skyros in the

1:07:38.197 --> 1:07:40.927
Aegean.
Skiros was attacked,

1:07:40.928 --> 1:07:44.058
because it was not inhabited by
Greeks.

1:07:44.059 --> 1:07:48.219
It was inhabited by non-Greek
peoples who made their living

1:07:48.221 --> 1:07:50.401
out of piracy.
Well clearly,

1:07:50.400 --> 1:07:55.080
all the states of the league
had a lot to lose from allowing

1:07:55.079 --> 1:07:58.409
pirates to roam freely in their
waters,

1:07:58.409 --> 1:08:04.369
and so Cimon crushed the
Skirian pirates and he drove

1:08:04.365 --> 1:08:08.895
them from the island,
and he made sure that the

1:08:08.898 --> 1:08:12.468
island would be secure by
putting in an Athenian

1:08:12.467 --> 1:08:15.677
cleruchy.
Remember that cleruchy

1:08:15.677 --> 1:08:17.807
the Athenians put in near
Chalkis.

1:08:17.810 --> 1:08:19.750
This is the same kind of
arrangement;

1:08:19.750 --> 1:08:25.630
Athenians of military age who
permanently settle in Skiros,

1:08:25.632 --> 1:08:29.692
but retain their Athenian
citizenship;

1:08:29.689 --> 1:08:34.709
they are a garrison in effect
to protect the island of Skyros

1:08:34.709 --> 1:08:38.389
from falling into bad hands in
the future.

1:08:38.390 --> 1:08:42.200
It was widely believed,
and justifiably,

1:08:42.204 --> 1:08:47.264
that Cimon and that force had
liberated the Aegean Sea.

1:08:47.260 --> 1:08:50.230
We never hear about piracy
anymore;

1:08:50.229 --> 1:08:54.459
piracy was a problem that the
states in the Mediterranean in

1:08:54.462 --> 1:08:58.412
general suffered from a lot and
at different times very,

1:08:58.407 --> 1:09:01.507
very seriously.
One thing that this new league,

1:09:01.513 --> 1:09:04.383
even when it's the Delian
League and one becomes the

1:09:04.381 --> 1:09:07.961
Athenian Empire,
there is no piracy in the

1:09:07.962 --> 1:09:12.842
region where that league exists.
Then they turn to the city of

1:09:12.836 --> 1:09:15.726
Carystos, which is at the
southern end of the Island of

1:09:15.733 --> 1:09:18.443
Euboea.
The Carystians you remember

1:09:18.439 --> 1:09:23.419
had, under the greatest military
pressure, actually surrendered

1:09:23.422 --> 1:09:26.922
to the Persians,
given earth and water,

1:09:26.921 --> 1:09:32.211
and so technically they were
Medizers and there was no mercy

1:09:32.206 --> 1:09:34.986
shown to them.
They were compelled,

1:09:34.989 --> 1:09:38.709
they didn't wish to do this,
but they were compelled to join

1:09:38.707 --> 1:09:43.127
the Delian League,
and to pay a cash contribution,

1:09:43.125 --> 1:09:47.715
not to be allowed to provide
their own ships.

1:09:47.720 --> 1:09:52.340
Thus, almost from the very
beginning, there is one instance

1:09:52.339 --> 1:09:56.659
of a state, which doesn't fit
the general picture I've been

1:09:56.661 --> 1:10:00.011
painting.
A state that is a subject state

1:10:00.011 --> 1:10:04.771
and is compelled to be a member,
but it's just this one case of

1:10:04.773 --> 1:10:10.223
a Medizing state.
Then possibly in the year 470,

1:10:10.221 --> 1:10:14.361
another development.
We hear that the island of

1:10:14.357 --> 1:10:17.097
Naxos--this seems to be an
island full of trouble.

1:10:17.100 --> 1:10:19.430
Every time we hear of Naxos,
it's getting into difficulty of

1:10:19.431 --> 1:10:21.941
some kind or another,
but they decided that there

1:10:21.937 --> 1:10:25.067
wasn't any great threat from
Persia, that the Persians

1:10:25.074 --> 1:10:28.984
weren't coming back and so they
said we're quitting the league.

1:10:28.979 --> 1:10:31.939
Well, I'm sure somebody said,
don't you remember,

1:10:31.942 --> 1:10:34.652
you swore this oath.
You threw some iron lumps into

1:10:34.653 --> 1:10:36.613
the sea.
Do you see any iron floating

1:10:36.611 --> 1:10:40.181
around here in the Aegean Sea?
You're not quitting.

1:10:40.180 --> 1:10:45.660
They rebelled.
The league sent a fleet,

1:10:45.660 --> 1:10:49.930
and they put down the Naxian
rebellion, and Naxos was now

1:10:49.933 --> 1:10:53.293
reduced from the category of a
free ally,

1:10:53.289 --> 1:10:56.999
making the kinds of
contributions the other allies

1:10:57.001 --> 1:11:02.151
did to another subject state,
which paid money.

1:11:02.149 --> 1:11:05.699
Their walls were taken down,
their fleet was taken away,

1:11:05.702 --> 1:11:08.482
and that's the pattern that we
shall see.

1:11:08.479 --> 1:11:12.489
States who don't carry out
their responsibilities,

1:11:12.494 --> 1:11:17.824
states that particularly try to
rebel will be treated this way,

1:11:17.819 --> 1:11:21.339
and their number will increase
as time passes.

1:11:21.340 --> 1:11:25.370
By the way, we do not hear of
anybody in the league objecting

1:11:25.369 --> 1:11:29.399
to these decisions and these
actions, nor should we expect to

1:11:29.398 --> 1:11:33.288
that there would be.
The allies still believed they

1:11:33.293 --> 1:11:37.713
needed this league and they
weren't about to let people get

1:11:37.707 --> 1:11:40.597
a free ride such as Carystos
would,

1:11:40.600 --> 1:11:43.110
whether they paid or not,
the Persians weren't going to

1:11:43.105 --> 1:11:44.725
attack them so they ought to
pay,

1:11:44.729 --> 1:11:47.389
or states like Naxos who
decided, well,

1:11:47.390 --> 1:11:50.820
we feel safe enough so we quit.
That wasn't going to be

1:11:50.816 --> 1:11:52.526
permitted.
So in a sense,

1:11:52.531 --> 1:11:56.141
what you can really see from
this is that the league was

1:11:56.141 --> 1:12:00.081
working, as it was supposed to,
to be able to do the job that

1:12:00.079 --> 1:12:03.129
it had too.
Then if the dates are right,

1:12:03.125 --> 1:12:06.755
in the next year 469,
comes a very important turning

1:12:06.761 --> 1:12:09.471
point in the history of the
league.

1:12:09.470 --> 1:12:15.640
The Persians have a fleet in
the--well, you can't really call

1:12:15.635 --> 1:12:19.485
it the Aegean,
it's around the corner on the

1:12:19.489 --> 1:12:23.909
southern coast of Asia Minor,
the Eurymedon river flows out

1:12:23.907 --> 1:12:27.637
there and they had a fleet and
an army inland.

1:12:27.640 --> 1:12:33.550
The league forces went there to
the Eurymedon under the command

1:12:33.545 --> 1:12:39.065
of Cimon, defeated and crushed
the Persian fleet at sea,

1:12:39.069 --> 1:12:43.319
landed and defeated the Persian
army on the land,

1:12:43.320 --> 1:12:48.460
and that was a terrible blow to
the Persian position in the

1:12:48.457 --> 1:12:53.717
eastern Mediterranean.
The evidence is apparently that

1:12:53.718 --> 1:12:59.158
the Persians had to pull back
from that entire area and it

1:12:59.159 --> 1:13:04.699
would not have been at all
unreasonable for people to think

1:13:04.695 --> 1:13:07.725
well,
the Persian threat really is

1:13:07.733 --> 1:13:11.123
over.
This is beyond what happened in

1:13:11.116 --> 1:13:13.516
479;
it's not just that we've driven

1:13:13.522 --> 1:13:16.642
them out of Europe,
we've driven them away from the

1:13:16.640 --> 1:13:20.740
Mediterranean Sea.
You could imagine that that's

1:13:20.738 --> 1:13:24.198
just the end of the Persian
threat.

1:13:24.199 --> 1:13:29.029
That was not the view taken
by the Athenians,

1:13:29.028 --> 1:13:32.648
or I guess, by most of the
allies,

1:13:32.649 --> 1:13:36.149
but we can imagine that there
were some of the allies,

1:13:36.151 --> 1:13:39.451
who were restless in their need
to continue to make

1:13:39.454 --> 1:13:43.624
contributions to the league when
they didn't feel that there was

1:13:43.617 --> 1:13:46.257
any purpose to the league
anymore.

1:13:49.310 --> 1:13:52.790
I gave a hint to this earlier.
I don't remember whether

1:13:52.793 --> 1:13:56.543
General Grunther was the second
commander of NATO,

1:13:56.535 --> 1:13:59.815
but he was an earlier commander
of NATO,

1:13:59.819 --> 1:14:03.729
obviously a West Point man,
educated, he knew all about

1:14:03.729 --> 1:14:07.639
Thucydides and the Peloponnesian
War and so he made the

1:14:07.638 --> 1:14:11.618
analogy--the first time I'm
aware that anybody did,

1:14:11.619 --> 1:14:15.599
between NATO and the Delian
League, and he was doing so as

1:14:15.601 --> 1:14:19.721
commander of NATO at a period
when he felt that the American

1:14:19.722 --> 1:14:24.052
allies in Europe were more and
more reluctant to make the kinds

1:14:24.053 --> 1:14:27.963
of contributions that he thought
they should make and was

1:14:27.964 --> 1:14:31.344
bewailing his situation,
which was every time the

1:14:31.341 --> 1:14:33.531
Russians looked like they were
going to behave,

1:14:33.529 --> 1:14:35.959
then the allies decided they
didn't want to make any

1:14:35.956 --> 1:14:38.216
contributions,
and then when the Russians

1:14:38.215 --> 1:14:40.245
looked scary,
everybody came running and

1:14:40.248 --> 1:14:43.428
said, sure we'll contribute and
he suggested that's the way it

1:14:43.427 --> 1:14:45.197
was in the Delian League too.

1:14:48.489 --> 1:14:52.519
So keep in the back of your
mind that there are real

1:14:52.518 --> 1:14:56.938
questions out there in the
league as to whether it should

1:14:56.942 --> 1:14:58.992
persist,
and we'll carry this story

1:14:58.987 --> 1:14:59.997
forward next time.