PHIL 181 - Lecture 18 - Punishment II
Lecture 18 - Punishment II
The lecture begins with a consideration of the traditional consequentialist account of punishment–-that punishment is justified by its deterrent effect on future crimes. Traditional criticisms of the view are presented, and John Rawls’ two-level justification for punishment is offered as one possible way to avoid such criticisms by bringing together consequentialist and deontological justifications of punishment in a single theory. Next, Professor Gendler reviews some empirical research on punishment intuitions, including data on moral outrage and the “Knobe effect”. The lecture concludes with a brief discussion of how moral luck interacts with intuitions about punishment.
Darley, “The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice”
Lewis, “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”
Kazdin, Parenting the Defiant Child, Ch. 6 (pp. 126-146)