Session 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
Document Actions
We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game.
ECON 159: Game Theory
| Lecture 8 - Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization |
Overview:
We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game.
Reading assignment:
Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapters 8-9
Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapter 11
Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 7
Class lecture:
 |
 |
|
Resources:
Document Actions
|
Yale University 2011. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply. |
