Personal tools
You are here: Home → Economics → Game Theory → contents → sessions → Session 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
 

Session 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships

by jsl57 — last modified 10-14-2008 04:00 PM
Document Actions
  • Print this
  • Bookmarks

We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.

ECON 159: Game Theory

Lecture 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships << previous session | next session >>

Overview:

We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.

Reading assignment:

Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapter 5

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapters 6-9

Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 3, Sections 4-6

Class lecture:

Transcript
html
 Audio
mp3
 Video
medium bandwidth
low bandwidth
high bandwidth
Document Actions
  • Print this
  • Bookmarks
Creative Commons License Yale University 2011. Some rights reserved. Unless otherwise indicated in the applicable Credits section of certain lecture pages, all content on this web site is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Please refer to the Credits section to determine whether third-party restrictions on the use of content apply.